the decline of european sea power

The Decline of European Sea Power

Europe's Navies in a Time of Austerity and Brinkmanship

Diplomarbeit

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades

eines Magisters der Philosophie

an der Karl-Franzens Universität Graz

vorgelegt von

Jeremy STÖHS

am Institut für Geschichte

Begutachter: Ao.Univ.-Prof. i.R. Mag. Dr. phil. Siegfried Beer

Graz, 2015

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Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I want to express my profound gratitude to my parents.

This thesis is the result of their unconditional support throughout my life. I owe

all of my achievements to them.

I also want to thank Professor Siegfried Beer for encouraging me to pursue

excellence in my studies and for providing me with so many opportunities to

study, discuss, and write about what interests me most.

Finally, I want to thank Diana for all her love.

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Table of Content

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ......................................................................................... 3

List of Figures: ........................................................................................................................... 5

PART ONE ............................................................................................................................... 7

1) Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 7

2) Principles of Sea Power ................................................................................................... 14

3) The ‘Pivot’ Towards Asia – and the Consequences for Europe ...................................... 23

PART TWO ............................................................................................................................ 30

4) Case Studies: Analyzing Europe’s Navies ....................................................................... 30

5) The UNITED KINGDOM: Keep Calm and Get Those Carriers Operational ................. 33

6) FRANCE: Stretched but Willing – Europe’s Most Capable Naval Force ....................... 50

7) ITALY: The Marina Militare – Between Global Interest and Regional Necessities. ..... 65

8) SPAIN: Creating a Well-Balanced Fleet – and Maintaining It ........................................ 81

8) TURKEY and GREECE: Allies and Yet Not Friends – Diverging Naval Powers ......... 96

8.1) Turkey ......................................................................................................................... 100

8.2) Greece ......................................................................................................................... 105

9) GERMANY: Reluctance and Reductions – Not Stepping Up to the Plate .................... 111

10) DENMARK and the NETHERLANDS: Commercial Might and Military Inaptitude 127

10.1) Denmark .................................................................................................................... 131

10.2) The Netherlands ........................................................................................................ 140

11) FINLAND, SWEDEN, NORWAY: Scandinavian Navies Sticking to their Guns ..... 147

11.1) Finland ...................................................................................................................... 150

11.2) Sweden ...................................................................................................................... 153

11.3) Norway ...................................................................................................................... 159

PART THREE ...................................................................................................................... 166

12) Analysis and Observations – Quo Vadis Europe? ....................................................... 166

13) Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 174

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Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 183

Selected Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 189

List of Illustrations ................................................................................................................. 207

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

A2/AD: anti-access/area-denial

AAW: anti-air warfare

ABM: anti-ballistic missile

APAR: active phased-array radar, also AESA: active electronically scanned array

APR: Asian-Pacific Region

ASN: anti-ship missile

AsuW: anti-surface warfare

ASW: anti-submarine warfare

CATOBAR: catapult-arrested take-off barrier-assisted recovery

CIWS: close-in weapon system

CODOG: combined diesel or gas

COIN: counterinsurgency

CT: counterterrorism

CTF: combined task force

DoD: United States Department of Defense

EEZ: exclusive economic zone

EMI/EMC: Electromagnetic interference / electromagnetic compatibility

EMPAR: European Multifunction Phased Array Radar

ERAM: Extended Range Active Missile (RIM-174 Standard SM-6)

ESSM: Evolved Sea-Sparrow Missile

EU: European Union

FREMM: Frégate européenne multi-mission

GDP: gross domestic product

GIN: Greenland-Iceland-Norway (gap)

HADR: human assistance and disaster relief

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ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (also IS: Islamic State)

LCF: Luchtverdedigings en Commando Fregat, Dutch air defense frigate

LCS: littoral combat ship

LHA: landing helicopter assault (amphibious assault ship)

LHD: landing helicopter dock

LPD: landing platform dock

LSD: landing ship dock

MCM: mine countermeasure

MM: Marina Militare

MN: Marine Nationale

MoD: Ministry of Defense (general)

MW: mine warfare

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NLG: Netherlands Guilder

OPV: offshore patrol vessel

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe

PAAMS: principle anti-air missile system

RAM: radar absorbing material,

RDN: Royal Danish Navy

RIMPAC: Rim of the Pacific (exercise)

RN: Royal Navy

RNLN: Royal Netherlands Navy

RNoN: Royal Norwegian Navy

SAM: surface to air missile

SAR: search and rescue

SDR: Strategic Defense Review (U.K.)

SDSR: Strategic Defense and Security Review (U.K.)

SIGINT: signal intelligence

SLBM: submarine launched ballistic missile

SLOC: sea-lines of communication

SMART-L: Signaal Multibeam Acquisition Radar for Tracking, L-Band

SNMG: Standing Naval Maritime Group

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SSBN: ship submersible ballistic missile nuclear (nuclear powered ballistic missile

submarines)

SSK: ship submersible conventional (diesel-electric powered submarine)

SSM: surface to surface missile

SSN: ship submersible nuclear (nuclear powered attack submarine)

STANAVFORLANT: Standing Naval Force Atlantic

STANAVFORMED: Standing Naval Force Mediterranean

STOVL: short take-off or vertical landing

TEU: Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (standard container)

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNISON: United Nations Operation in Somalia

US: United States

USN: United States Navy

VLS: vertical launch system

VSTOL: vertical and/or short take-off and landing

List of Figures:

Figure 1: United Kingdom – Defense Spending ...................................................................... 33

Figure 2: United Kingdom – Number of Major Vessels .......................................................... 34

Figure 3: France – Defense Spending ...................................................................................... 50

Figure 4: France – Number of Major Vessels .......................................................................... 51

Figure 5: Italy – Defense Spending .......................................................................................... 65

Figure 6: Italy – Number of Major Vessels. ............................................................................. 65

Figure 7: Spain – Defense Spending ........................................................................................ 81

Figure 8: Spain – Number of Major Vessels. ........................................................................... 81

Figure 9: Turkey – Defense Spending ...................................................................................... 96

Figure 10: Turkey – Number of Major Vessels. ...................................................................... 97

Figure 11: Greece – Defense Spending .................................................................................... 97

Figure 12: Greece – Number of Major Vessels. ....................................................................... 98

Figure 13: Germany – Defense Spending .............................................................................. 111

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Figure 14: Germany – Number of Major Vessels. ................................................................. 112

Figure 15: The Netherlands – Defense Spending ................................................................... 127

Figure 16: The Netherlands – Number of Major Vessels. ..................................................... 127

Figure 17: Denmark – Defense Spending .............................................................................. 128

Figure 18: Denmark – Number of Major Vessels. ................................................................. 128

Figure 19: Finland – Defense Spending ................................................................................. 147

Figure 20: Sweden – Defense Spending ................................................................................ 147

Figure 21: Sweden – Number of Major Vessels. ................................................................... 148

Figure 22: Norway – Defense Spending ................................................................................ 148

Figure 23: Norway – Number of Major Vessels. ................................................................... 149

Figure 24: United United States – Defense Spending ............................................................ 183

Figure 25: United States – Number of Major Vessels. .......................................................... 183

Figure 26: Japan – Defense Spending .................................................................................... 184

Figure 27: Japan – Number of Major Vessels. ....................................................................... 184

Figure 28: South Korea – Defense Spending ......................................................................... 185

Figure 29: South Korea – Number of Major Vessels. ............................................................ 185

Figure 30: China – Defense Spending .................................................................................... 186

Figure 31: China – Number of Major Vessels. ...................................................................... 186

Figure 32: India – Defense Spending ..................................................................................... 187

Figure 33: India – Number of Major Vessels. ........................................................................ 187

Figure 34: Russia – Defense Spending .................................................................................. 188

Figure 35: Russia – Number of Major Vessels. ..................................................................... 188

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PART ONE

1) Introduction

There are no trends extant – technological, economic, political, or military – which suggest

an imminent diminution in the strategic leverage of sea power.1 (Colin S. Gray)

For over the past five hundred years, every single century can be considered a

maritime century. Decade after decade, seafaring nations such as the Portuguese, Spanish,

French, Dutch and English ventured farther out into the vast realms of the blue waters in

search of uncharted lands, new trade routes, and vast riches. In essence, these efforts can be

considered one of the driving forces behind globalization. However, this process was by no

means always peaceful and many wars were fought to decide who was to command the sea. In

those days it was necessary for economic power to be backed by military force and few rulers

were foolish enough to underestimate the utility of naval forces when it came to protecting

their interests – the maritime realm was no exception to that rule. It was this competitive

nature of trade among the leading European powers and the useful marriage of commercial

and military sea power that put the West far ahead of the rest, thus permitting the creation of

great colonial empires.2 Consequently, other powers unwilling or unable to follow suit, such

as the Chinese Ming Dynasty or the Ottoman Empire were degraded to second or even third-

rank powers.3

Today, naval scholars rejoice at the achievements of those exciting times. Historians

marvel at the superb seamanship of Magellan, Vasco da Gama, and Sir Francis Drake and

study the military feats of Lord Nelson, Tōgō Heihachirō, and Admiral Nimitz. The sea is no

longer the great unknown it once was – full of opportunities as well as danger. As a matter of

fact, naval conflict has become a rare sight and only a few people are still alive to tell the tales

of the last Great War at sea. Yet the underpinning rules of geopolitics remain constant and the

oceans of this world, as we shall see, will continue to constitute the most important medium

of power distribution on this planet. As Colin S. Gray states: “If the coming of the railroad,

internal combustion engine, air, missile, nuclear, and space eras could not demote the strategic

1 Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power, The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York: The Free

Press, 1992): 289. 2 See Chris Parry, Super Highway, Sea Power in the 21

st Century (London: Elliot and Thompson Limited, 2014):

65. The economist and historian, Niall Ferguson discussed Western ascendency more broadly. See Niall

Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest (New York: Penguin Books, 2011). 3 See Parry, Highway, 10-23.

8

value of sea power significantly, it is difficult to see what could emerge to do so over the next

several decades.”4

It may seem somewhat peculiar for a scholar from Austria to write about a topic

concerning naval matters. The end of World War I and the subsequent provisions of the

Treaty of Saint-Germain not only stripped Austria of its entire naval fleet but, more

importantly, also of its access to the sea. Therefore, (except for the period under Nazi rule)

since 1918, Austria has been a landlocked country and thus part of only 11 percent of the

world’s states that do not to have a coastline.5 However, its prosperity and wealth for a large

part depend on the sea – even if the average Austrian citizen wastes little time pondering on

this circumstance.

Life on our planet finds its origin in the salty matter we call the ocean. Over two-thirds

of the earth’s surface is covered by this enormous body of water which, together with the

seabed below, provides mankind with a precious source of food, energy, and raw materials.

However, of equally great importance is the ability to carry these goods in the currently safest

and most cost-efficient way – by sea. In fact, 90 percent of global commerce is currently

transported by ships, along lines that span across the oceans from continent to continent,

which one can imagine as great highways at sea.6 What many people in Austria, and

elsewhere for that matter, forget is that in the globalized world of today every single state is

either directly or indirectly dependent on the unimpeded flow of maritime commerce.

Although Austria does not import and export goods by ship its two largest trading partners,

Germany and Italy, do. As a matter of fact, together with their European partners both

countries have significant stakes in seaborne trade. Were a crisis to arise somewhere in the

world to make trade via these sea lanes impossible, and be it for just a short period of time,

the global supply chain would falter, possibly having severe repercussions on the industries,

economies and people across the globe.7 The decision of Iran’s leadership to close the Strait

of Hormuz – through which over 17 billion barrels of oil pass every day –would, for example,

quickly be felt across Europe, even in a state as ‘benign’ as Austria. Therefore, the freedom of

navigation, or the ‘good order at sea’ as it is often referred to, is of utmost importance.

4 Gray, Leverage, 290.

5 Parry, Highway, 37.

6 The term “great highway” was coined by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, one of the most prominent naval

strategists. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mahan On Naval Warfare. Selections from the Writing of Rear Admiral

Alfred T. Mahan, ed. Allan Westcott (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999 [1941]): 17. 7 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, 18 March (2011): II. 4.

http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm.

9

For the past seventy years the United States and its navy have protected the

international system of maritime trade. As the retired Admiral Chris Parry observes, “America

[has been] able to protect – and guarantee itself and its friends – access to the world’s

resources and deny access to an opponent or other disturber of the international peace.”8

However, the tides are turning. As we speak we are witnessing fundamental changes in

geopolitics, the likes of which we have not seen in the last five hundred years. For the first

time in modern history, the center of power is shifting from the West (the Atlantic and

Europe) to the East (the Indian Ocean and Asian-Pacific Region). In light of this evolution

there is the possibility that the United States, like Britain before, will no longer be willing or

able to perform the role as the global guardian of the seas.9

Yet security at sea will remain of pivotal importance, not least for Europe. Hence, it is

also in Europe’s interest to make provisions to maintain sufficient military power in case of an

emergency, something, as we will see, the European states have neglected over the last

twenty-five years. Sea power, both of economic and military nature, “will be critical to the

world’s future, one way or another”, Till concludes.” The only real question”, he adds, “is

whose seapower it will be?”10

Over the course of the following chapters I intend to provide

some answers to this pressing question.

The main aim of this thesis is to gain insight into the development of Europe’s naval

forces since the end of the Cold War. In order to better comprehend the drastic changes the

European navies have undergone over the past twenty-five years, I will conduct a thorough

analysis of the countries’ defense policies as well as the evolution, deployment, and

capabilities of their naval forces.

In particular, the focus of my thesis will lie on the effects the Soviet dissolution had on

European naval strategy. In an increasingly diverse security environment, states and their

armed services have had to deal with an emergence of new technology, growing threats and

conflict running the entire gamut of the intensity spectrum. Many European states have

grappled with this seismic shift by drastically transforming their military forces in an attempt

to deal with a widening range of security challenges. As a consequence, today many European

naval forces bear little resemblance to the respective fleets at the end of the Cold War.

With the Soviet Union and its Communist Party relegated to the pages of history in

December 1991, to many it seemed as if the threat to Europe’s security had disappeared once

8 Parry, Highway, 85.

9 Ibid.

10 Geoffrey Till, Seapower. A Guide for the Twenty-First Century: Revised and Updated Third Edition (New

York: Routledge, 2013): xv.

10

and for all. After almost sixty years of militarization and the looming threat of nuclear war

within the heart of Europe, peace had finally come. As an immediate reaction, military

funding was cut across the board as the large armies, fashioned for the cataclysmic showdown

with the forces of the Warsaw Pact, were no longer needed. As I will show, nearly all the

European countries reduced their defense spending in the initial aftermath of the Cold War.

For the most part, these reductions have continued to the present day. Unsurprisingly, this has

led to Europe’s armies being considerably smaller in size. Germany’s military, for example,

had roughly 330,000 active duty personnel and 700,000 reservists in 1990. In comparison, the

current land forces have been reduced to around 60,000 service members. At the same time

the number of tank units has dropped from 16 panzer brigades to 12 panzer companies.11

Or

put differently, out of the 2,125 Leopard 2 main battle tanks delivered to the Bundeswehr only

176 remain in operational units.12

Similar examples can be found across Europe. Not only had

the threat of the Red Army and its large mechanized forces disappeared but, more

importantly, the military operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan heralded a

paradigmatic shift in how land warfare was fought.13

Although heavy armored units

represented the only credible protection against improvised explosive devices, rocket-

propelled grenades and road-side bombs in these contingencies, the evolution of

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism warfare made large numbers of mechanized units

seem anachronistic and therefore unnecessary.

Naval warfare, on the other hand, has also witnessed a significant – yet somewhat less

profound – change. The primary functions of naval forces, as we shall see later, have largely

remained constant over the centuries and navies today conduct very similar missions as they

did a quarter century ago, albeit over a far broader range of possible contingency. For

example, today a greater emphasis is being placed on projecting power from the sea onto land

or using naval assets for human assistance operations. Notwithstanding this the evolution of

naval theory and the different interpretations of what navies ought to be able to do,14

the

maritime sphere, by nature, precludes similar developments as have been witnessed on land.

Asymmetrical warfare, despite being a buzzword in naval quarters, will arguably have far less

impact on naval planning and the shape of naval forces than the unconventional fighting

11

F. Stephen Larrabee et al, NATO and the Challenges of Austerity (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012):

28. 12

Ezio Bonsignore et al, “Germany,” Military Technology The World Defense Almanac 2014, Issue 1 (2014):

130. 13

For an excellent account of the development of war, see Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. The Art of War in

the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2005). 14

For a detailed description of naval functions see Till, Seapower, 32-35.

11

which has taken place in Baghdad, Mosul or Helmand Province has had on the general

perception of land warfare. The “wars among the people”15

we see on land today cannot be

fought at sea. As Sir Julian S. Corbett wrote in his seminal work, Principles of Maritime

Strategy, “[y]ou cannot conquer sea because it is not susceptible of ownership [and] you

cannot subsist your armed forces upon it as you can upon enemy’s territory”.16

Therefore,

because the oceans are uninhabited by man no person can be subjugated to the maritime

forces at sea.

While there is a general reluctance among Western states to engage in ground

operations after the experiences in the so-called ‘War on Terrorism’, the number of naval

operations conducted by European states, however, has continuously expanded over the past

decade. Yet the drastic decline of available naval assets, a concomitant of general downsizing

of Europe’s armed forces and the consequent reduction of capabilities have left operational

gaps and precarious shortfalls in training and readiness. These developments pose grave risks

to the future of Europe’s ability to protect its interests at sea.

This thesis is divided into three parts. Part One introduces the general topic, as well as

the research question, whereupon Chapter Two will examine the fundamental elements of the

maritime domain, as well as the basic principles of sea power. Based on the writings of the

two most renowned naval strategists, Alfred T. Mahan and Julian S. Corbett, as well as more

recent publications by, inter alia, Colin S. Gray, Geoffrey Till, and Chris Parry, the utility of

naval forces will be discussed. Chapter Three focuses on the current shift in geopolitics –

from Europe and the Atlantic Ocean towards the Asian-Pacific Region (APR). This trend, as I

will show, will be one of the defining factors of power distribution in the 21st century. As a

matter of fact, the United States, as Europe’s closest ally and most important NATO member,

is in the process of “pivoting”17

towards the Asia-Pacific in order to secure its national

interests there. At the same time, numerous countries in the region (in particular China, India,

Japan and South Korea) have become regional powers in varying degrees and all wield

substantial political, economic and military might. While most of the actors in the APR have

apparently understood the importance of robust naval forces, Europe, in comparison,

continuous to suffer under an austere financial environment, budget deficits and the lack of

political will, as well as public support, to strengthen its naval capabilities.

15

Smith, Utility, 3. 16

Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications 2004 [1911]): 89. 17

The rebalancing of the United States towards the Asian-Pacific Region is described in further detail in Chapter

Three.

12

Part Two represents the mainstay of my thesis. In it, Chapter Four will provide an

outline of the parameters according to which the analysis of the subsequent case studies will

be conducted, while Chapters Five to Eleven cover the majority of Europe’s naval forces. On

the one hand, my research will be based on each country’s defense policies and naval

doctrine, promulgated in official documents, white papers, and public statements. On the

other hand, the composition, size, and capabilities of the individual fleets will need to undergo

close examination.

To begin with, the development of the four major European naval powers, the United

Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain, will be construed. All four fleets continue to maintain

capabilities over the entire spectrum of naval warfare but have also been considerably reduced

in size, allowing some of them to just barely operate a so-called balanced fleet.

Thereafter, the navies of Turkey and Greece will be compared. Despite both countries

being NATO members, their strained relationship has had substantial ramifications on naval

doctrine and the composition of their naval forces. While Turkey is apparently aspiring to

become a regional power in its own right, thereby going to great lengths to modernize its

fleet, Greece is unable to maintain such an arms race with its larger neighbor and has relapsed

to a defensive naval strategy.

Germany is also a country which is likely to play an increasingly important role in

Europe’s development in the 21st century. However, the German Navy has been considerably

truncated over the last two decades and despite commissioning highly sophisticated warships,

its surface and submarine fleet is far smaller than at the end of the Cold War.

The Netherlands and Denmark have a rich history as seafaring nations. Although their

naval heydays, during which they had a major influence on the events in Europe and the

world, have passed, they continue to be major players in maritime trade. Thus, it could be

expected that both states operate reasonably capable naval forces. In fact, the Dutch and

Danish navies have made some substantial improvements in terms of the capabilities of the

warships they have put into service over the last two decades. On the other hand, as will be

discussed, both countries’ naval forces have been drastically reduced in the same period of

time, both in number and in the range of operations they can perform, ceding some critical

capabilities along the way.

The northern European nations of Norway, Sweden and Finland provide interesting

examples of relatively small states effectively dealing with sinking defense budgets and the

rising costs of equipment and personnel. Despite Sweden and Finland being neutral and

13

therefore self-responsible for their national defense – while Norway’s national security is

assured through NATO’s Article 5 – these countries’ navies will be examined in conjunction.

Some countries, such as Poland, the Baltic States, and Belgium will only be mentioned

in passing and other states will not be addressed at all. However, I am confident that my

analysis includes all major European naval forces and provides a comprehensive overview of

naval strategies, defense procurement policies, naval capabilities and recent operations. The

findings of my case studies will support my assessments, predictions, and conclusion of this

thesis. It is worth noting that an analysis of the Coast Guards is beyond the scope of this

study, despite their great importance regarding littoral security.

Part Three will finally recapitulate on the main tenets of the preceding chapters. In the

penultimate Chapter Twelve, I will provide substantial evidence that the previous and

continuing budget cuts to the naval branch of the armed forces should be considered serious

brinkmanship. Ultimately, I will conclude that based on the understanding of sea power as a

prerequisite for political influence and economic health, the geopolitical shift towards the

Asian-Pacific Region, and most importantly the general decline of European naval

capabilities, Europe’s role and influence in the world will be seriously jeopardized in the

future. To avoid the possible detriment such a development could have on the prosperity and

security of the continent and the people living on it, the European states, (in particular its

NATO members), need to revoke their propensity for saving as much money as possible on

their naval forces.

History has provided numerous examples in which the rise and fall of great powers

was decided by a state’s or an alliance’s ability to successfully engage in trade by sea, and if

challenged, protect its vital interests by hard power in the form of its naval forces. Four

hundred years ago, Sir Walter Raleigh famously stated that “whoever commands the sea,

commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the

world, and consequently the world itself.”18

So far his words have held true. Despite dramatic

changes in the global security environment over the last two decades, there is no indication

that the fundamental axioms of sea power will be called into question any time soon.

Therefore, it lies in the responsibility of current and future governments to decide whether

Europe will be relegated to the outermost fringes of a world centered on the Pacific Ocean, or

if in fact, Europe can reverse its growing geopolitical and strategic irrelevance by reviving

and committing to its naval capabilities.

18

Sir Walter Raleigh quoted in Parry, Highway, 3.

14

2) Principles of Sea Power

Earth is called the Blue Planet for a reason. From space the shimmering blue orb

allows the observer to comprehend the sheer vastness of the world’s oceans. 70 percent of its

surface is covered with water and 80 percent of the world’s population lives within 150

kilometers of the coast.19

Although we neither find shelter nor sanctuary among its waves, we

have been able to access the valuable resources it contains and found means to move upon its

surface in a most cost-efficient manner. Thus, the world’s trade is dependent on the waters

connecting the continents. In fact, 90 percent of global commerce flows by sea. What is more,

the unique characteristics of the continental landmass and demographic factors have led to 75

percent of this trade having to pass a small number of narrow canals and straits.20

The moment man ventured out to sea, the maritime realm became a sphere of

conflicting interests. Different parties sought to expand their influence by peaceful means of

commercial enterprise as well as by the use of force. Hence, the concept of sea power was

born. Despite the dramatic evolution of mankind over the ages, many principles which govern

this concept have remained constant. “[M]uch about sea power is enduring” former British

Admiral Chris Parry notes. “[It] can be best expressed as the combined investment in the sea

of the various components and resources of a state or enterprise in the pursuit of favourable

outcomes”.21

These investments, are neither constant nor can they be strictly categorized, but

instead depend on a multitude of factors. In general, a distinction can be made between hard

power and soft power. The former is based on the use or threat of force (economic or

military), while the second is understood to be ruled by the principles of cooperation and

consensus, by means of diplomacy, respectable policies, and other ‘benign’ measures.22

Over

the last centuries, those countries capable of merging hard and soft power, such as Portugal,

Spain, Denmark and England, have created vast colonial empires and could make their

economic and military presence felt around the world.23

19

NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, 18 March (2011): II. 4.

http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm. 20

Ibid. 21

Parry, Highway, 258. 22

The term was coined by Joseph Nye in his book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power

and expanded in 2004 in Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. In the preface of his latter

publication the author briefly defines what he considers to be ‘soft power’: “What is soft power? It is the ability

to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a

country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means To Success in World

Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): Preface. 23

Parry, Highway, 65.

15

Illustration 1: Arguably most renowned naval strategist: Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Abbildung 1

From this bipartite, sea power can be subdivided into four elements: 1) the business of

international commercial trade by sea; 2) the utilization of the ocean’s resources, be it the

exploitation of oil and gas under the seabed or creating energy from the ocean’s continuous

tidal flow; 3) using naval forces or economic instruments in support of national interests in

time of peace; and lastly 4) naval operations in war.24

As we can see, sea power cannot be

fully understood without considering all these aspects of maritime operations. “In this regard,

appearance can be deceptive”, Parry notes: “[T]he most powerful navy in the world is that of

the USA; the largest merchant fleet is held by the Greeks; the largest fishing fleet, by volume

and activity, is the Chinese; and the biggest commercial shipping company is Danish. In this

sense, sea power is diffused.”25

Trying to address all forms of sea power is well

beyond the scope of this thesis. My main aim

therefore, as was stated in the introduction, is to

focus on Europe’s naval forces; in other words

the individual states’ naval hard power.

Although mainly European naval issues – in

peace as well as in crisis and war – will be

analyzed, the economic factors of sea power,

(commerce and the exploitation of natural

resources) merit close attention and will

therefore also be addressed over the course of

the following chapters.

History has shown that the marriage of

naval sea power and commercial sea power

constitutes a principal factor in a state’s ability

to gain power, wealth and prosperity. As A.T.

Mahan famously stated “Control of the sea by

maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in the world … (and)

is the chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity of the nations.”26

Much has changed since Mahan published his profound writings in 1890. However, his ideas

and those of his British contemporary, the naval strategist Julian S. Corbett, remain

quintessential for the understanding of sea power. Their insight into maritime strategy remains

24



Mahan quoted in Till, Seapower, 57.

16

as timely as ever, in regard to military as well as economic issues. Of course, from a modern-

day perspective, the two strategists based their presumptions on the somewhat “old fashioned

[concept of the] nation-state as the basic unit of concern”; while today we are already

witnessing a period in which these formally established systems of statehood, society and

civilization are being perforated by the profound changes in the way peoples engage with

each other. Notwithstanding these developments, any scholar concerned with maritime issues

needs to indulge in these “seminal and enduring works of maritime strategy”, Till

underscores.27

This is because the elements of sea power are governed by “the unchangeable,

or unchanging, order of things remaining the same in cause and effect, from age to age.”28

They belong, as it were, to the Order of Nature, of whose stability so much [was heard

of in Mahan’s days]; whereas tactics, using as its instruments the weapons made by

man, shares in the change and progress of the race from generation to generation.

From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down,

but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock.29

Therefore, we can assume that the principles of sea power, described in this chapter will

continue to remain applicable in the decades to come. In regard to maritime strategy, war on

and from the sea, and the utility of sea power in general, a close reading of history is of

paramount importance in forming viable conclusions and making meaningful predictions of

the future. As Mahan wrote in the opening pages of his chapter on Naval Principles, “a study

of the military history of the past, […] is enjoined by great military leaders as essential to

correct ideas and to the skillful conduct of war in the future.”30

He continues by arguing that

throughout time military tactics have often undergone change due to the evolution in weapon

technology, while other aspects of war at sea have remained unaltered and universally

applicable, thereby forming general principles.31

One of these general principles is the purpose of naval forces. The British scholar Ken

Booth argued that the three basic functions of a navy are its military, diplomatic, and policing

roles. Of the three elements the military function represents the foundation of this trinity.32

Essentially, military force can be utilized to attack an enemy, to defend oneself against attack,

27

Till, Seapower, 349. 28

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1890):

88.

A digital version is freely accessible under: https://archive.org/details/seanpowerinf00maha. 29

Ibid. 30

Mahan, Naval Warfare, 4. 31

Ibid. 32

Ken Booth in Karl Rommetveit and Bjørn Terjesen, “Introduction,” in: The Rise of naval power in Asia and

Europe’s decline, (eds.) Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø (Oslo Files: Dec. 2012): 10.

17

or to deter an enemy from attacking. 33

Naval forces are in many cases the best tool to perform

these tasks. They are able to react to crisis quickly and can project power over great distances.

At the same time, navies have distinct advantages over other military forces because they are

able to operate freely in the vast realms of international waters. As Admiral Carlisle A.H.

Trost put it “[o]perating in international waters, [navies enjoy] the unique advantage of being

able to signal menace without violating sovereignty, and once the need is past, of being able

to sail over the horizon without signaling retreat.”34

However, ultimately navies have one sole

purpose “to influence decisions and events on land, because that is where people live.”35

In order to have an influence upon history, as the title of Mahan’s book indicates, a

country’s navy has to command the sea. However, it would seem obvious that given the

vastness of the oceans any effort to patrol its entire surface at all times would be a hopeless

undertaking. “You cannot conquer the sea because it is not susceptible of ownership”, Corbett

rightfully pointed out. “You cannot, as lawyers say, ‘reduce it into possession,’ because you

cannot exclude neutral from it as you can from territory you conquer [and] you cannot subsist

your armed force upon it as you can upon enemy’s territory.”36

Therefore, so his conclusion,

the natural state for it is to be uncommanded.37

So how can a naval force exercise sea power if

it cannot command the sea such as an army can command enemy territory?

According to Mahan the key lay in ‘communications’. “[The term designates] the lines

of movement by which a military body, army or fleet, is kept in living condition with the

national power.”38

However, such lines of communication are not limited to military strategy

but rather can be applied more generally to any form of communication between two

geographical points of distribution.39

For example, the great highways at sea on which 90

percent of global commerce travels represent such strategic lines of communication. A navy

capable of controlling this maritime traffic is, in turn, able to greatly influence decisions made

on land. Both Mahan and Corbett therefore ascribe to the principle that controlling these

strategic lines of communications (SLOCs) is the key to preeminent sea power.

By winning command of the sea we remove [a possible] barrier from our own path,

thereby placing ourselves in position to exert direct military pressure upon the national

life of our enemy ashore, while at the same time we solidify it against him and prevent

33

James Eberle, “Maritime Strategy,” Naval Forces, Vol. 8, 2 (1987): 38. 34

Carlisle A.H. Trost, “Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy,” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected

Documents, (eds.) John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008): 263. 35


Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications 2004 [1911]): 89. 37

Ibid., 87. 38

Mahan, Naval Warfare, 52. 39

Corbett, Principles, 90.

18

his exerting direct military pressure upon ourselves. Command of the sea, therefore,

means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial

or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications,

and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory.40

Concordantly, since the end of World War II the U.S. Navy has been able to fashion a fleet

powerful enough to control the global SLOCs. In fact, throughout this period only the Soviet

Union seriously challenged U.S. naval preponderance. However, throughout its history Russia

had been a continental land power, and despite its impressive naval buildup during the Cold

War, it failed to overcome Western naval dominance. Ultimately, the NATO alliance and its

principles of sea power withstood the test.41

Gray further expands on the superiority of sea

powers over land power:

One argument is that modern history has shown the inability of preponderant

continental power to fashion potent enough maritime (or air) instruments for the defeat

of offshore sea powers. Another, more convincing is that no land power has been

sufficiently preponderant on land as to have the surplus resources necessary for the

conduct of successful war against great-power enemies offshore.42

Today, the pillars on which U.S. naval strategy rests are a reiteration of this “maritime

narrative.”43

Despite criticism for not having a comprehensive maritime strategy, provisions

are being made for the U.S. Navy to remain the world’s only globally steaming navy, capable

of substantial forward presence in the most important regions of the world, maintaining

credible nuclear and conventional deterrence, exacting sea-control and power projection

globally, providing maritime security, and lastly supporting human assistance and disaster

relief (HADR).44

The conclusion we can draw from over five hundred years of predominance through

sea powers would likely have us believe that the Western European states also understand the

importance of powerful naval fleets as a guarantor for economic wealth and prosperity.

However, it seems that in the wake of the Soviet demise, the security of Europe as well as the

safety of international system of trade was considered to be inviolable by the leadership in

London, Paris, Berlin and Rome. How else can the dramatic decline in the size and capability

of Europe’s naval forces since the end of the Cold War be explained?

40

Ibid., 90. 41

Till, Seapower, 1-5. 42

Gray, Leverage, 281. 43

Ibid., 5. 44

See Department of Defense, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, (Washington DC, 2007).

19

This is my prediction for the future – whatever hasn’t happened will happen and no-one will

be safe from it.’ […] in the dynamic security environment, any assessment of the future is

truly only as valuable as its facility for being up-graded.45

Today, the process of designing and building capital warships can take up to three

decades. Therefore, by the time a ship enters service the strategic environment in which it

operates might differ greatly from that which it was designed for. Similarly, if a government

decides to cancel the procurement of new weapon platforms or finds itself under financial

pressure to reduce the size of its fleet, this will entail profound strategic ramifications for the

country’s naval forces down the line. Therefore, eliminating naval capabilities, such as the

ability to operate submarines due to short-term fiscal restraints, can be considered

brinkmanship of the first order. In practice, it strips the country of an important political tool

of hard power and in most cases the enormous costs to regain such capabilities make

amendments unfeasible.

What is more, modern warships have to be capable of conducting a vast variety of

different missions. During the greater part of the Cold War NATO destroyers and frigates

were generally designed to protect the convoys from the United States to Europe against

Soviet submarines, while guided-missile cruisers provided the necessary air defense for

carrier battle groups. Nowadays, new surface combatants are no longer classified as cruisers,

while modern-day destroyers and frigates conduct everything from anti-piracy operations to

fleet air defense tasks. Therefore, they need to incorporate built-in redundancies and sufficient

room for incremental upgrades over the course of their service life – which in many cases can

reach fifty years. As a result, a trend is currently noticeable among most naval forces in the

world towards operating large, multi-purpose surface combatants.

As the size and sophistication of these platforms grow, so does the price tag of each

individual ship. It is important to note that this development constitutes one of the reasons for

the shrinkage of many navies over the last decades. For most states it is no longer feasible to

operate fleets of dozens – and sometimes hundreds – of warships. At the same time Gray

observes “[t]here is a centuries-long pattern of democratic, or relatively democratic,

commercial-minded sea powers choosing to neglect their defenses in peacetime”.46

With a

decrease in defense expenditure among all but a few European states after the Cold War and

exploding costs of building and operating naval vessels, the logical consequence has been a

45

J.B. Haldane quoted in Geoffrey Till, “A global survey of naval trends: the British approach,” in: Oslo Files

on Defence and Security, The Rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, ed. Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein

Tunsjø, Dec. (2012): 17. 46

Gray, Leverage, 284.

20

drastic reduction in the number of ships, submarines, aircraft and their crews. As will be

discussed in further detail later, advanced weapon systems and sensors can compensate for the

decline of a fleet’s size to a certain extent, providing long distance radar coverage or a greater

operational radius for search and rescue missions (SAR), for example.47

However, there is no

substitute for a relatively large, well-balanced fleet, in order to command the sea, control the

critical straits through which commerce passes, and to maintain a credible deterrent force. In

fact, in this day and age, deterrence has replaced the destruction of the enemy as the principle

function of naval forces. Therefore Lord Nelson’s famous lines “What a country needs is the

annihilation of the enemy. Only numbers can annihilate”48

can be translated into: What a

country needs is a sufficiently large forced with the potential capability to inflict unacceptably

high losses to the enemy in the case of belligerence. This is more likely to be achieved with

superior forces, both in quality and quantity.

Deterrence is a complex concept. Clearly, a good case can be made that nuclear

deterrence has worked over the past six decades. However, one cannot be as confident in

claiming that the same has been the case for conventional deterrence. Recent history has

demonstrably shown otherwise. Neither Saddam Hussein nor the Argentinean Junta shied

away from invading foreign territory, despite their respective opponents possessing far

superior firepower.49

Sam J. Tangredi, a senior American defense planner, makes an excellent

point by arguing that even though predictions about another country’s intentions and possible

actions are difficult, a less credible military capability increases the probability of the other

side pursuing a more aggressive course. Moreover, “deterrence is not a physical property – it

is a state of mind.”50

Therefore, to achieve credible deterrence, a nation’s military forces have

to exhibit distinct capabilities and be deployed in a specific manner so that hostile actors

believe they are unlikely to overcome them. The problem inherent to this equation is that it is

often based on assumptions. Hundreds of billions of dollars are spent on military equipment

every year in order to provide the countries with supposed, necessary deterrent capabilities.

“Yet the forces themselves may never be used”, Tangredi continues. “This is not a standard

business model.”51

47

An excellent article on the development of naval sensors and weapons and their effect on naval warfare can be

found in Norman Friedman, “Technological Reviews – Naval Sensors and Weapons,” in: Seaforth World Naval

Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth, 2009): 167-176. 48

Lord Nelson quoted in Mahan, Naval Warfare, 80. 49

Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare, Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013):

238. 50

Tangredi, Access, 78. 51

Ibid., 77.

21

Few battles at sea have occurred in the last seventy years and it is likely that for the

foreseeable future naval forces will largely be deployed to fulfill diplomatic and policing

tasks. Unfortunately, if history teaches us anything, it is that major inter-state conflict cannot

be entirely ruled out. For that reason, the growing defense procurement in the Asian-Pacific

Region, for example, must be monitored closely. “Indeed [contrary to European

developments] one of the principal [observations] is that the naval build-up in the Asia-Pacific

is significantly focused on war fighting capabilities and that Asian navies are better funded

and provided with extra resources to perform non-traditional security tasks.”52

In particular,

China’s military buildup is deeply vexing to U.S. defense planners, many of whom are

already predicting the inevitable end of U.S. naval supremacy unless large-scale investments

are made.

It is important to bear in mind that Lord Salsibury, the British Secretary of State for

India and later Prime Minister under the reign of Queen Victoria, once warned us from

placing too much weight on the opinion of so-called ‘experts’. “No lesson seems to be so

deeply inculcated by the experience of life as that you should never trust experts. If you

believe doctors, nothing is wholesome: if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent: if

you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require their strong wine diluted by a very

large admixture of insipid common sense.”53

Hence defense planners fall into the same

category. Their predictions also have to be considered cum grano salis because from their

perspective the greatest possible range of military capability should always be retained in

order to deal with every possible contingency in the future.54

Although a healthy degree of

skepticism towards overly pessimistic statements from the quarters of the military and defense

establishment is warranted, common sense should nevertheless allow even the most casual

observer to realize the utility of a well-balanced naval force.

Budget cuts over the last two decades have caused many European navies to reduce

the overall size of their fleets and increasingly focus on specific areas of naval warfare (i.e. air

defense, expeditionary warfare, or the defense of the littorals). Based on the principle,

“[b]etter to be master in some trades rather than mediocre at many”55

this niche specialization

offers smaller states a number of advantages, not least because it is much cheaper to entertain

such a force than a multi-purpose fleet. However, there are also serious drawbacks to this

approach. Specialized fleets find it much more difficult to adapt to the emergence of new

52

Rommetveit, “Introduction,” 10. 53

From a letter to Robert Bulwer-Lytton, 1st Earl of Lytton, 15 June (1877).

http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Robert_Gascoyne-Cecil,_3rd_Marquess_of_Salisbury. 54

Till, “British Approach,” 18. 55

Till, Seapower, 121.

22

threats, while “[a] navy that maintains a wide range of skills, is best placed to cope with a

variety of expected and perhaps unexpected operational contingencies.”56

Today, many

European states rely heavily on the naval forces of friends and allies (in particular the United

States) to fill the capability gaps their austerity policies have created.

As we shall see in the further course of the discussion, this trend entails considerable

strategic risks in light of a profound shift in geopolitics. As a matter of fact, the Western

European states often barely manage to conduct basic peacetime duties at the desired rate, and

have very limited surge capacity in the event of war. Parry laments that “[i]n conflicts not

involving the USA, these ‘come as you are’ navies will have to fight with what they have, or

play for time.”57

What makes this situation even more precarious is that there is little certainty

whether the “arsenal democracy” would be willing and able to quickly rush to Europe’s

assistance.58

Over a hundred years ago “Mahan painted an encouraging picture of the manner in

which naval strength underpins and encourages economic prosperity and then feeds from it in

a kind of virtuous circle”, Till notes.59

This process is clearly visible in the Asian-Pacific

Region, in which naval power is growing in lockstep with commercial maritime trade. This

practice constitutes a core principle of sea power, as was described before. The more money

that is allocated to naval shipbuilding programs, the faster naval sea power grows, thus

providing the beneficial conditions for the sea-born trade industry to expand and vice-versa.

However, “the arrows go both ways” and when countries are less willing to invest in their

naval forces, for example in times of peace or during economic difficulties, the circle can run

vicious.60

The British Royal Navy, for example, has not only been reduced by roughly 60

percent since the end of the Cold War, but at the same time the country’s merchant marine

and shipping industry have also experienced recent years of hardship. Once commanding the

largest trading fleet in the world, the island nation is currently ranked only twentieth among

the biggest merchant fleets in the world in regard to registration and gross tonnage.61

In the

end, sea power both in economic as well as in military terms will continue to underpin

economic prosperity and political influence in the world. Although it is often overlooked in

56



Ibid. 59

Till, “British approach,” 21. 60

Ibid., 21. 61

Department for Transport, Statistical Release – Shipping Fleet Statistics 2014, 18 Feb. (2015).

https://www.gov.uk/.../shipping-fleet-statistics-2014.pdf. For more information see: Parry, Highway, 48-51.

23

the public debate, the “mutually reinforcing relationship” between commercial and military

elements of sea power is well worth the investments.62

In the coming decades of the 21st century the principles of sea power outlined in this

chapter are likely to remain constant. The current economic and military maritime efforts by

the United States, Russia and many Asian states allow us to infer that sea power will, by all

reasonable estimates, remain an essential element of foreign policy in an increasingly

competitive world.63

The sea lines of communication will continue to be essential for a

prosperous global trade regime while well-balanced, general-purpose fleets will continue to

constitute the most useful tools to project power, protect national interests abroad, deter

aggressions and if need be underpin these interests by the use of force. As was the case in the

many centuries before, those actors who are willing and able to utilize the maritime domain to

a greater degree than their competitors will likely be able to secure more favorable outcomes

for themselves.

3) The ‘Pivot’ Towards Asia – and the Consequences for Europe

Our problem is not that [the Europeans] doubt our commitment. […] The allies do about as

much as they think they have to do. And they don’t think they have to do too much because the

U.S. is there to bankroll them.64

(Barry S. Posen)

In this chapter I will take a closer look at the United States’ recent rebalancing towards

the Asian-Pacific Region and outline the ramifications the ‘pivot’, as it is often referred to,

will have on Europe’s maritime security. By and large, we are currently seeing a shift from a

period of U.S. preponderance to a time of multipolar power-distribution. As a consequence,

the United States has “come down from the peak of hegemony that it occupied during the

unipolar era [after the Cold War]”,65

ceding some regulatory capabilities along the way. At

62


“It is always difficult to sketch out the future that defence planners need to prepare for, but never more so than

now, since in addition to the usual sets of challenges to do with the rise and fall of nations and the deadly

quarrels so often associated with this (which may well be hugely exacerbated by the perfect storm of shortages in

energy, food and water foreseen by some by the 2030s), we also have to grapple with a range of asymmetrical

threats from a variety of non-state actors including terrorists and pirates. And then there are the faceless threats

and challenges brought about by climate change – such as the increased propensity for catastrophic weather

events or the rising importance of the increasingly ice-free water of the High North both of which could have

both a direct and an indirect impact on Alliance security.” Till, “British approach,” 17. 64

Barry Posen, “Panel Discussion: A Moment of Transition,”

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIg_ZDHeoJg, min 33:00. 65

John G. Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics. The Enduring Power of Liberal Order,” in: Foreign Affairs,

May/June (2014): 81.

24

the same time, globally networked, radical Islamic terrorism presents a threat to the spread of

democracy, while the revisionist powers of China, Russia, and Iran are resisting the liberal

order the United States has been promoting since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.66

Nevertheless, the United States remains Europe’s closest ally – politically, economically, as

well as militarily. Unfortunately however, Europe remains utterly dependent on a number of

key U.S. military capabilities in order to conduct medium and high-intensity warfare over

longer periods of time and looks to the United States to protect the freedom of navigation at

sea.

Roughly 90 percent of global commerce travels by sea. Within this intricate system of

trade we are currently witnessing a fundamental shift. Over the past decades, the focus of

commercial and maritime activity has moved from West to East: from the Atlantic to the

Indian and Pacific Oceans. Already in 1984, U.S. trade across the Pacific had eclipsed that of

with Western Europe.67

Today, a greater value of goods is being imported and exported

among developing countries (South-South trade) than between developing countries and

developed countries (South-North trade).68

This dramatic geopolitical transformation had

coincided with the “downwards drift of most Western navies and the growth of others most

obviously in the Asian- Pacific, [which] promises a profound shift in the future world’s naval

balance in the decades to come.”69

One of the major rising naval powers in the Asian-Pacific Theater over the past decade

has been the People’s Republic of China. The country has emerged as a regional power in

South–East Asia and, in many ways, can be considered a peer competitor to the United States.

Therefore, the U.S. Armed Forces are shifting their attention from previous areas of operation,

such as the Atlantic and Mediterranean, to the Asian-Pacific Region in order to underscore

their continued interest in the region. Despite Europe remaining one of three areas in the

world that is critical to the United States,70

conceivably, the Europeans could conceivably be

able to defend their territory as well as their interests abroad on their own; especially if one

considers that Europe as a whole has a larger economy and greater population than the United

States. Many critics in Washington, therefore, argue that Europe has been on a long

66

See Walter Russel Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of Revisionist Power,” in: Foreign Affairs,

May/June (2014): 69-79. 67

John F. Lehmann, “The 600–Ship Navy,” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected Documents, ed. John

B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz. (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2008): 248. 68



“Europe and North-East Asia matter because that’s where the great powers are, and they are potential threats

to the United States; and the Middle East […] matters because that’s where the oil is, and oil is a critical resource

like no other.” See John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKFHe0Y6c_0.

25

procurement holiday while free riding on the backs of American taxpayers. John

Mearsheimer, for example, leaves no doubt about his repugnance towards Europe’s reluctance

to invest in their own defense: “When the Cold War ended […] I’d pull everything out of

Europe, […] let the Europeans defend themselves.”71

Yet, there is no indication that the

United States will reconsider its obligations towards its NATO allies anytime soon. In fact, in

the light of Russia’s actions in the Ukraine, additional U.S. forces have been redeployed to

Germany, Poland and the Baltic States as well as to the waters surrounding Europe.72

Despite these standing commitments, the geopolitical shift from West to East seems

irreversible and will compel the United States to focus less on Europe and more on Asia.

“Already much of the US Navy, […] sees the Atlantic merely as an area that must be passed

through on the way to somewhere more important. And this perception is more likely to grow

than to diminish in the future”,73

Till notes. “The result”, he predicts, “[will be] a fast

developing and historic shift in the naval balance between East and West [Europe and Asia]

which is likely to result in substantial but currently unknowable change in the world’s security

architecture.”74

At present, China is the main motor behind the naval arms race currently underway in

South-East Asia. Proof to this claim is the 175% increase in China’s defense budget since

2003.75

As a result, its ongoing military buildup is viewed critically by many of its neighbors,

while in the United States it is largely understood to be specifically designed to prevent U.S.

military forces from operating near, into, or within the South and East China Sea (also

referred to as anti-access/area-denial or A2/AD).76

Therefore, the United States considers

these developments as “primary strategic challenges to [its] international security

objectives”77

and, in 2010, announced that it would “out of necessity rebalance towards the

71

Mearsheimer, “Imperial,” min. 17:00. 72

Only ten months after the last batch of M1 Abrams main battle tanks had left Europe in April 2013, 29 Army

tanks arrived in Germany Ezio Bonsignore et al, “United States of America,” Military Technology: The World

Defence Almanac 2014, Issue I (2014): 32. 73



Although the percentage of defense spending has remained relatively constant, the dramatic increase in total

GDP has enabled China to allocate significantly more money to its defense sector. Sam Perlo Freeman et al,

“Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2013,” in: SIPRI Fact Sheet, April (2015), 2. 76

Anti-access and area denial are strategic approaches to warfare. Their aim is to deny enemy forces the ability

to operate in a contested area. Essential to this strategy, however, is the understanding that the enemy is

strategically superior and a force-on-force engagement should be avoided by all means. Asymmetric

technologies and tactics, as well as niche-capabilities, are sought by states relying on anti-access strategies to

offset the opponents’ military advantage. For obvious reasons, superior intelligence, misinformation and

deception play a vital role in A2/AD efforts. See Tangredi, Access, 1-5. 77

Ibid., 1.

26

Illustration 2: The two imagined lines of defense China might want to establish to expand its sphere of influence.

Abbildung 2

Asian-Pacific region.”78

As a consequence, and in concordance with a decrease of its land

forces, naval and aerial assets have been redeployed to the region. More than half of U.S.

naval vessels, most notably its carrier strike groups, and 60% of the Air Force’s oversea-based

assets have already been allocated to the Asian-Pacific. 79

As Øystein Tunsjø points out,

“[already in] 2007, for the first time in 60 years, more [U.S.] ships were based in the Pacific

than in the Atlantic. Two-thirds of the US Navy used to be located on the East coast and

deployed in the Atlantic, but about two-thirds are now located on the West coast and operate

in the Pacific. Newly commissioned ships are largely deployed to Asian waters.”80

Meanwhile, the Chinese are ramping up their military capacities. Apart from their

enormous land forces, they have recently developed a number of weapon systems that have

been widely discussed in public. In spite of being criticized in the past for obtaining many of

these capabilities through reverse engineering, espionage, cyber-attacks and other such

dubious measures, China has nonetheless been able to produce sophisticated fighter jets, long

range ballistic missiles, as well add some credible warships and weapon systems to its fleet.81

According to the latest U.S.

documents, China’s plan to expand its

“comprehensive national power” and

“[secure] China’s status as a great

power” continues to be viewed

skeptically.82

They point out that despite

“Chinese leaders [expressing] a desire to

maintain peace and stability along their

country’s periphery; […] and [to] avoid

direct confrontation with the United

States and other countries”83

, the United

78

Department of Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities for 21st

Century Defense (Washington DC, GPO 2012): 2. 79

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel quoted in Robert S. Dudney, “Verbatim,” Air Force Magazine, July (2013):

45. 80

Øystein Tunsjø, “Maritime developments in Asia: implications for Norway,” in: Olso Files on Defense and

Security: The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, ed. Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø Tunsjø,

Dec. (2012): 94. 81

According to many defense analysts, it will take three to five years for the LIAONING to become operational.

See Dawei Xia, “China: The People’s Liberation Army Navy,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed.

Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 56-65. 82

Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the

People’s Republic of China 2014 (Washington DC, 2014): i,15.

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf. 83

See Ibid., i.

27

Illustration 3: This map depicts the major trading routes to China and the critical choke points that lie between.

Abbildung 3

States has repeatedly urged the Chinese government to be more transparent regarding its

military and security policies. Otherwise, Chinese actions could “[pose] risks to stability by

creating uncertainty and increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation.”84

In particular, the latest efforts by the Chinese to forcefully expand their sphere of influence

have caused much alarm.

Currently, China is trying to reach and maintain military dominance in and over its

adjacent waters. Therefore, in November 2013, the People’s Liberation Army established an

air defense identification zone that overlaps with those of Japan and South Korea, adding to

the already substantial tensions in the region. Moreover, China has claimed sovereignty over a

number of islands, reefs and rocks ranging from the Korean Peninsula, Japan, southwards to

Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. These measures would not only significantly increase

China’s exclusive economic zone, but in strategic terms constitutes part of an imagined first

line of defense against possible foreign intervention. Moreover, the historic rivalry with Japan

as well as the unresolved issues concerning Taiwan is being closely followed by the U.S., as

China’s anti-access/area-denial networks within the first island chain are becoming

increasingly formidable.

In addition to the defense of the waters within the imagined ‘first-island-chain’, the

Chinese Navy apparently also

wants to establish what is called

“Far Sea Defense”.85

This second

line of defense stretches further

out into the Pacific, well beyond

the first line of defense, as is

indicated in the map above. The

need for these two lines of

defense also finds its strategic

reason in China’s dependency on

oil. The U.S. Defense

Department estimates that

84

Department of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington DC, 2009): i.

www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf. 85

“The term ―yuanhai fangwei‖ (远海防卫) which translates to ‘distant/far sea defense’, began appearing with

increasing frequency in Chinese publications. Authors associated with the Naval Research Institute (NRI) called

the ‘shift from offshore to open ocean naval operations’ an ‘inevitable historic choice’ for China noting that

naval power must ‘match the expansion of China’s maritime interests.’” Department of Defense, Military and

Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China – 2010 (Washington DC, 2010).

28

although China still relies on coal as its primary source of energy, it will soon surpass Japan

as the second largest oil importer, most of it from the Middle East and Africa. Therefore,

China is keen on securing these SLOCs, particularly the numerous critical straits between the

Middle East and South-East Asia, which in the case of war could be closed by the U.S.

Navy.86

The United States, on its part, will for a number of reasons continue to rely on its

naval forces to deter aggression and maintain its influence in the region. Firstly, since the

Second World War the U.S. has been able to maintain a naval fleet that has been and will

continue to remain unchallenged in a force-on-force engagement for the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, the current global geographical and political parameters allow Alfred Thayer

Mahan’s principles of controlling the SLOCs to insure economic, political and military

dominance to become applicable.87

In addition, while U.S. capabilities during ground

operations have been put to the test in asymmetrical conflicts such as in Afghanistan or Iraq,

often causing painful casualties, this paradigmatic change of warfare does not affect the realm

of blue-water operations to the same extent. Therefore, the United States Navy can continue

to rely on its ability to ‘deter by presence’.

However, this presence is growing somewhat thin. Given the numerous commitments

the United States has across the globe, even a military giant like the United States finds itself

in a dilemma. The U.S. Navy is by far the largest fleet, operating 283 ships, including ten

aircraft carriers, 100 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, over 50 attack submarines, and more

than 30 amphibious warships. However, under the recently announced ‘Optimized Fleet

Response Plan’ the U.S. will not increase its global deployed naval presence of around 95

ships, and as a retired naval officer claims, “the lethality inherent in this presence, based on

the ship types deployed, [will] be less than today’s 95-ship presence.”88

In fact, only two

carriers will be forward deployed at any given moment in time – down from three to four

carriers. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that any European nation would come to the

assistance of the United States in case naval conflict would erupt between China and the U.S.,

and if so, any such assistance would be rather insignificant, given the small number of assets

available to Europe’s navies.

86

The United States’ ability to close the Strait of Malacca is one of the biggest concerns to the PRC. See DoD,

China 2009, 3. 87

See Nikolaus Scholik, “Mahan oder Corbett: Das maritim-strategische Dilemma „Chinamerika“ im indo-

pazifischen Raum,“ Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Vol. 2 (2013): 140-151. 88

Robert C. Rubel, “Straight Talk on Forward Presence,” Naval Institute Proceedings, March (2015): 25.

29

Illustration 4: In the future the United States will continue to rely on its carrier battle groups to safeguard its interests around the globe.

Abbildung 4

So where does this fundamental shift leave Europe? As we will see over the course of

the following chapters, most naval forces in Europe have suffered a significant decrease in

size and funding since the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, many navies have either

ceded key capabilities, or have tried to operate balanced fleets with very few reserves and

therefore are barely able to fulfill the military, diplomatic and policing roles they are designed

for. Although utterly

dependent on trade by sea, it

is questionable to what

extent Europe can

contribute to the protection

of the SLOCs and, thereby,

to the freedom of the sea.

“On paper, NATO, with its

Standing Maritime Groups,

seems to be capable of

deploying relevant naval

forces across the globe”,

Felix Seidler points out. “In practice, however,” he relativizes, “any mission with a NATO

logo needs approval of 28 member states [and] many members would object any new NATO

involvement outside the Euro-Atlantic Area.”89

He continues by arguing that the European

Union likewise has little leverage regarding security issues outside its rather limited sphere of

influence “showing Brussels’ enduring strategic irrelevance in the Indo-Pacific.”90

In the

future, the United States will “expect their partner to ‘man up’, in policy, capability and

resource terms [because] the USA will not always be available as the force of first – or even

last – resort”.91

However, as the following case studies will show, little such effort can be

made out among the European partners.

89

Felix Seidler, “Europe’s Role in an East Asian War,” CIMSEC, 11 Jun. (2014), http://cimsec.org/europes-role-

east-asian-war/11576. 90

Ibid. 91

Parry, Highway, 273.

30

PART TWO

4) Case Studies: Analyzing Europe’s Navies

The following case studies constitute the mainstay of this thesis. Over the course of

the next chapters the development of European sea power since the end of the Cold War will

be examined. The principle aim of each case study is to gain insight into the evolution of the

respective naval forces. For that reason, the focus of this analysis will be twofold:

Firstly, the differences in the general composition of each fleet over the course of time

will be illustrated. To make the steep decline in both military expenditure and overall size of

Europe’s naval forces more palpable, two separate graphs will provide an outline of each

country’s annual defense spending and the number of warships. It is safe to say that

throughout history the principle criterion of any naval force (and any military force for that

matter) has been its size. Although, size – or in other words, the number of ships and naval

aircraft – does not necessarily reflect a fleet’s capabilities per se, it nonetheless often

represents a valid unit of measuring naval power. However, given the limited space of this

study, not every type of naval vessel qualifies to be taken into consideration. Despite their

importance, it would not make sense to count every training craft, transport ship, or

helicopter, for example. Therefore, my analysis will mainly focus on four types of warships:

aircraft carriers, large surface combatants (such as destroyers or frigates), submarines, and

finally ships designed for amphibious warfare.

Observant readers will have noticed that smaller surface combatants (torpedo boats,

guided-missile attack craft, mine warfare ships) are not included in these categories. Although

these kinds of vessels will also be discussed in some detail, they play a less important role in

(European) naval planning than during larger parts of the 20th

century. In particular, over the

course of the last twenty-five years, many naval forces around the world have undergone

drastic changes. In the light of the steadily evolving security environment, countires which

had formerly focused on defending the littoral waters closer to their homeland are now

building so-called ‘blue-water navies’. While fast attack craft, small diesel-electric

submarines and mine warfare vessels had been the preferred tools for territorial defense in the

‘brown-waters’ close to shore, nowadays much larger, more sophisticated warships are

needed in order to conduct operations for long periods of time and over great distances.

What is important to note is that the classification of naval ships can be at least as

misleading as simply comparing the number of warships between two navies. While, for

31

Illustration 5: A telling picture of Europe’s naval decline. Two older vessels are being replaced by a single new warship. Many navies have been literally cut in half over the last 25 years.

example, throughout the last century cruisers (nominally the second largest surface

combatants92

after battleships) had a displacement of anywhere between 5,000 and 10,000

tons, nowadays ships of similar size, such as the British Type 45 Daring-class (nearly 9,000

tons), are designated as destroyers (generally ranked one tier lower). However, to make things

more complicated, the new German Baden-Württemberg-class will displace more than 7,000

tons once she enters service, but is referred to as a ‘stabilization frigate’. Only two decades

ago, many frigates in service in Europe’s navies were actually small warships (1,000-3,000

tons), primarily designed for escort duties and anti-submarine warfare. As Till notes, in this

day and age, “the possession of given number of large surface combatants if often regarded as

rough indication of relative strength and purpose.”93

Therefore, the inclusion of all larger

surface combatants in one category not only provides us with better means of comparison

between the different navies, but also illustrates the rapid decline in the number of Europe’s

fleets over the last twenty-five years. 94

Apart from quantity, quality obviously plays a significant role in assessing naval

power. However, evaluating a ship’s capability is a somewhat more difficult undertaking.

First of all, we have not witnessed any major military confrontations at sea from which we

92

Note that aircraft carriers are generally not referred to as surface combatants. 93


See Ibid., 122-124.

32

could draw meaningful conclusions in more than thirty years. In fact, the last war to provide

insight into major naval warfare dates back to the Falkland War in 1982. Even in that case, it

was mainly a contest between the British surface forces, their carrier air wing, and the

Argentinean air force. In absence of large force-on-force engagements, much of the debate

regarding the ostensible capabilities of naval forces is theoretical (in particular, in regard to

high-intensity warfare at sea). However, recent military interventions (Iraq, Bosnia,

Afghanistan, Libya, and Georgia), naval exercises, live weapons tests, and technical analyses

do give us some idea of the past, current, and future capabilities of Europe’s navies, their

ships and their crews. For that reason a good part of each chapter will be dedicated to the

examination of the technical aspects of modern warships, such as weapon and sensor systems.

The second focus of attention in each case study will be the strategic framework in

which the navies operate. Although all European states under scrutiny are either part of the

European Union or NATO and hence share similar values and have a certain degree of

common security interests, historical, political, and lastly geographical circumstances have

resulted in each country identifying different key security needs. Accordingly, although many

European naval forces are assigned to multinational operations, such as fighting piracy around

the Horn of Africa, conversely they also have a very distinct strategic and tactical focus.

While Norway, for example, will remain vigilant towards Russia’s growing naval power in

the High North and therefore has strengthened its blue-water capabilities, Italy wastes little

thought on the possible reemergence of Russian sea bastions around the Kola peninsula, as it

is confronted with a human catastrophe unfolding right before its eyes. Smaller offshore

patrol vessels are needed to rescue refugees from drowning as they seek to escape the horrors

of wars that have engulfed larger parts of North Africa and the Middle East, while at the same

time larger warships are critical in order to protect Italy’s interests in the greater

Mediterranean region. Its neighbor Greece, on the other hand, is deeply vexed about Turkey’s

growing military power at sea despite both countries formally being NATO allies and

therefore remains focused on territorial defense. And lastly, the British Royal Navy is trying

to reassert itself as a first-rate naval power with global power projection capabilities by

rebuilding its fleet around two new aircraft carriers.

As we can see, there are numerous and often conflicting strategic interests among and

within Europe’s military services. What is more, continuous reduction in defense expenditure

over the last two decades has only exacerbated the already difficult question of how to best

allocate military funding. By taking a closer look at the provisions stipulated in each country’s

defense white papers and other public statements over the last two decades, valuable insight

33

will be gained in regard to the core missions of the navies, as well as the degree of trust they

enjoy within their respective country’s defense and security strategy. A comparison between

each navy’s responsibilities – assigned to them by their political and military leadership – and

its actual capabilities will provide evidence that many naval forces are barely able to fulfill

these duties in times of relative peace. Moreover, in light of the United States’ rebalance

towards the Asian Pacific Region, the studies will show that strategic foresight among

Europe’s policymakers and defense planners alike is evidently sorely lacking. As a

consequence, the following analysis will give little solace to those who are concerned that

Europe might become increasingly marginalized in a maritime century in which the center of

gravity will have finally shifted away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific.

5) The UNITED KINGDOM: Keep Calm and Get Those Carriers Operational

Figure 1

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

4

4,5

% o

f G

DP

1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 1 U.K.: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

34

Figure 2

Volumes could be written about the dramatic decline of British sea power over the

course of the last one hundred years. Once the world’s preeminent sea power which ruled the

waves of the seven seas, the British Royal Navy (RN) today can barely be considered

Europe’s most capable naval force. As the adjacent Figure 2 indicates, the size of the British95

fleet has been reduced by roughly sixty percent since the end of the Cold War. Although the

Royal Navy continues to operate a balanced fleet, the austerity measures over the last two

decades have elicited this alarming decline. The Royal Navy is much smaller and less capable

than it was in 1990; in particular, when compared to other naval powers of each era. These

developments are likely to undermine Britain’s role in world affairs and risk the nation’s

ability to defend its interests abroad.

Within less than twenty-five years, the Royal Navy has been forced to cede some vital

capabilities. The most visible among these cuts, without a doubt, has been the decision to

decommission all of its aircraft carriers. After almost seventy years of successful carrier

operations, the Royal Navy has lost its entire fleet of Harrier combat jets and its last

remaining aircraft carrier was withdrawn from service in 2014. Meanwhile, the escort fleet

has been reduced from 48 vessels in 1990 to merely 19 destroyers and frigates, while the

95

Despite not including the same geographical areas, the terms Great Britain and United Kingdom will be used

synonymously.

1990 2000 2014

Aircraft Carriers 3 3 0

Large Surface Combatants 48 41 19

Submarines 22 16 10

Assault/Amphibious 7 8 6

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 2 U.K.: Number of Major Vessels

Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

35

Illustration 6: British destroyers are conducting operations on both ends of the intensity spectrum: Fleet-air defense in the Atlantic and anti-piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden.

number of attack submarines has been halved. Since the emergence of the Soviet submarine

threat in the early 1960s, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) had been the forte of the British

fleet. Faced with ongoing retrenchment, such as the cancelation of the Nimrod MRA.4

maritime reconnaissance aircraft and fewer ships available for these tasks, the Navy’s ASW

capability has been severely atrophied. The only area not to be truncated to such an extent has

been the Royal Navy’s amphibious forces.

Over the course of the next chapters the reader will recognize a similar pattern among

all but very few European countries. With the end of the Cold War, the enormous provisions

for a cataclysmic showdown between East and West were no longer considered warranted. In

the case of the Royal Navy, this meant that “[i]ts own Cold War mission of hunting Soviet

submarines had vanished, and along with it the chief justification for large chunks of the

Fleet.”96

Faced with new forms of conflict and the emergence of threats that ranged across the

gamut of the intensity spectrum, many European countries had to make substantial

adjustments to their national defense strategy. However, the most important question that

needed answering was to what extent Europe’s governments would reduce their armed forces

as part of the “peace dividend”.97

The United Kingdom presents us with a somewhat ambiguous case study. On the one

hand, the country remains one of the few European NATO members committed to spending a

significant percentage of its

gross domestic product

(GDP) on defense (well over

the 2 percent margin), as

well as actively participating

in numerous U.N., NATO

and U.S.-led military

operations around the globe

over the last two decades.

On the other hand, since the

end of the Cold War, it has

been unable – or shall we

rather say unwilling – to

96

Nick Childs, Britain’s Future Navy. Rev. ed. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2014, [2012]): 7. 97

The term ‘peace dividend’ refers to the practice of allocating money that would have been invested in defense

to other areas, such as health care or social services, as the result of dramatic changes in the global security

environment.

36

maintain its military capabilities in relation to other countries in the world. Numerous critics,

therefore, have made a point to stress that as a consequence, the British Royal Navy has lost

much of its former might and no longer qualifies as the great sea power it used to be. As a

matter of fact, at the height of the Cold War only the two superpowers (the United States and

Soviet Union) had more capable naval forces than Britain.

Twenty-five years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, a brief comparison with other

naval powers should suffice to comprehend the perilous situation the Royal Navy currently

finds itself in. Clearly, the U.S. Navy remains the undisputed behemoth of sea power and

despite recent discussions about its ostensible decline, will continue to operate the most

powerful naval force for the foreseeable future.98

In addition, depending on one’s locus of

analysis, a number of other navies can be considered superior to the Royal Navy.

Russia, for example, is currently making a concerted effort to regain its former glory

by modernizing its fleet of Soviet-era warships and also building new submarines and surface

combatants. As a result, Russia maintains both substantial nuclear as well as conventional

naval capabilities. China’s process of “national rejuvenation”99

has led to the construction of a

sizable fleet of modern vessels within a very short period of time. The Chinese fleet is steadily

becoming a more effective force in blue-water operations, causing the Americans to shift their

strategic focus from the Atlantic to the Asian-Pacific Region. Similarly, the Indian Navy is

also undergoing a significant modernization process and currently deploys two aircraft

carriers, 13 submarines, as well as 31 destroyers and frigates. Nonetheless, its capabilities are

still not considered on par with western naval forces. Indian Commodore Manohar K. Banger

therefore rightfully asked why “[…] the Indian Navy is now a 100-ship navy yet [is] still

considered by the major powers to be a brown-water force”, when Great Britain only has 25

surface combatants but remains adamant that it operates a credible blue-water navy.100

Unlike

the Indian Navy, Japan’s naval forces (officially the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force),

despite their lack of power projection capabilities, are understood to operate a larger and more

98

See Scholik, “Chinamerikas,“ 140-151. 99

See DoD, China 2014, i. 100

Manohar K. Bangar, “Nobody asked me but… The Royal Navy: Whither Goes Thou?” Naval Institute

Proceedings, March (2008).

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008-03/nobody-asked-me.

Brown-water navies generally are not able to sustain operations over great distances and longer period of time on

the open ocean. A brown-water fleet also tends to operate warships that are smaller than those of blue-water

navies and which are designed for tasks closer to shore.

37

capable Navy than Great Britain. In fact, many consider the Japanese Navy to be the world’s

second-most effective conventional naval power apart from the U.S. Navy.101

Even among the European navies, a case can be made that the French Navy actually

would deserve to be put in the spotlight in any study of European sea power (a fact that is

surely loathed by many Britons). Both the British and the French navies operate a similar

number of frigates and destroyers. They each operate four strategic ballistic missile

submarines (SSBN) as well as six nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) and are both able

to conduct sizable amphibious operations. What puts the French ahead of the British (at least

until 2020) is the ability to deploy its naval air-arm from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft

carrier. Apart from the United States, no other nation can project power to the same degree or

conduct air-strikes with similar effectiveness as the French Navy’s naval air-arm – the

Aéronavale. However, there is a silver lining on the horizon for the British Royal Navy.

Notwithstanding its recent decline, there is reason to believe that it will again become

Europe’s most effective naval fighting force.

Had the dissolution of the Soviet Union seemed implausible to many analysts during

the mid-1980s,102

the dramatic events at the end of the decade heralded the beginning of a

new era – even if subliminal tensions persisted. Great Britain was quick to interpret the fall of

the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union as the harbingers of a drastic change in

the global security environment. In light of these changes, the U.K.’s Armed Forces were

considered to be too large and too expensive. Based on these conclusions “the MoD

commenced a far-reaching study into future defense requirements and policy entitled ‘Option

for Change’”, as John Roberts points out. “The fundamental aim of the study,” he explains,

“was to find large-scale savings to fund the expected ‘Post-Cold War Peace Dividend’ whilst

preserving as much of the front line as possible.”103

Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the consequent military operation, under

the auspices of the United States, put a brief halt to the planned defense cuts. The military

success of the Coalition vindicated the widely-shared concept of large-scale conventional

101

Yoji Koda, “Naval developments in Japan,” in: The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s, eds. Bjørn

Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø (Oslo Files. Dec 2012): 57. 102

Few members of the intelligence community predicted the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Australian defense

analyst Paul Dibb was one of them. In 1986 he published The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower which

pointed to the many weaknesses of the Soviet system. 103

John Roberts, Safeguarding the Nation: The Story of the Modern Royal Navy (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing,

2009): 202.

38

Illustration 7: The HMS Sheffield burns after being hit by Argentinean anti-ship missiles during the last major conflict at sea: The Falkland War.

Abbildung 5

warfare, despite asymmetric forms of conflict becoming far more common.104

However,

regardless of their success in the liberation of Kuwait, the British Army and Air Force had to

suffer the largest parts of the cuts postulated in the defense review.

The most significant cuts fell on the Army, which was reduced in strength by one

third, from 160,000 to 120,000. The largest cuts were in the ground forces based in

Germany which were reduced by over half. Tactical air power based in Germany was

significantly reduced with the closure of two out of four RAF bases and the

withdrawal of six RAF squadrons.105

These decisions were met with heavy criticism, mostly for the study having been written

without carefully assessing the “exact nature of the [evolving] strategic security

environment”.106

The Navy fared somewhat

better than its sister services. Only a

small number of older warships were

initially to be taken from service

while the number of personnel was to

be reduced from almost 69,000

(including the Royal Marines) to

55,000 by the mid-1990s. Despite

these cuts, the Royal Navy’s future

looked promising. All three 20,000

ton Invincible-class aircraft carriers

and their respective rotary and fixed-

wing detachments remained in service, providing significant operational flexibility to Western

interventions in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan over the coming years. The United

Kingdom’s new nuclear deterrent, in the form of the 16,000 ton Vanguard-class SSBN, was

also entering service, replacing the older Resolution-class. Close cooperation with the United

States during the design and construction phase provided the British boats with the American

Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Each missile could be fitted with up

104

The paradigmatic shift in armed conflict and the consequences it had on the U.S. Armed Forces is discussed

in Jeremy Stöhs, “US Defense Policy Since the End of the Cold War: The Difficulty of Establishing a Balanced

Force Structure,” JIPSS, Vol. 8, 1 (2014): 139-153. Also discussed in Smith, Utility. 105

Claire Taylor, A brief guide to previous defense white paper (House of Commons Library, 2010): 9.

www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05714.pdf. 106

Ibid.

39

to 12 nuclear warheads. Four of these boats were built allowing the Royal Navy to

continuously have at least one submarine with a maximum of 192 nuclear warheads at sea.107

In regard to the Navy’s attack submarine force, a final decision was made, namely to

withdraw all of its conventionally powered submarines. Being subject to severe financial

restrictions, the Navy concluded that operating a mixed fleet of nuclear and conventional

diesel-electric submarines had become unfeasible as the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Benjamin

Bathurst, noted at the time:

The judgment we made to withdraw the Upholder class [conventional submarines]

was the toughest decision the Navy Board has had to make for many years. I would

like to emphasize that […] we had a hard choice to make, and we decided to

consolidate around SSNs because by retaining support for two types there came a

point where we wouldn’t be able to afford to run both classes given the other resource

needs within the Navy.108

On the other hand, experience from Operation Desert Storm had convinced the British of the

utility of sea-launched cruise missiles and an initial order for 65 American Tomahawk land

attack missiles, which would be fired from the attack submarines, was made in 1995.109

Meanwhile, the large escort fleet was undergoing constant modernization. Both the

destroyers and frigates had shown significant vulnerabilities during the Falkland War when

the ships’ air defense systems proved unable to effectively engage low-flying targets. In total,

six ships were lost to enemy air attacks. As a result of this costly experience, the Royal Navy

reacted quickly and introduced significant upgrades to its SAM (surface-air missile) systems

and, like many other navies in the world, fitted their warships with close-in weapon systems

(CIWS) like the American Phalanx. It is possible that these upgrades saved the battleship

U.S.S. Missouri when it was fired upon by Iraqi forces during the Gulf War. Fortunately for

the Americans, the Type 42 air defense destroyer Gloucester successfully tracked and

destroyed the Silkworm missile racing towards the battleship.110

The slow and creeping reduction of surface forces during the later years of the decade

was largely compensated for by the introduction of more capable units. In particular, the Type

23 Duke-class frigates represented one of the finest multi-purpose frigates in the world,

107

The number of warheads was later reduced to 48. Ezio Bonsignore et al. “United Kingdom,” Military

Technology. The World Defence Almanac 1995-96, Issue 1 (1996): 168. 108

Benjamin Bathurst, “The Royal Navy in the 1990s,”Naval Forces Vol. 14, 4 (1993): 21. 109

See Bathurst, “Navy 1990s”, 21. Also in Bonsignore, “United Kingdom,” 168. 110

The Missouri, however, was also fitted with two Phalanx CIWS on each side of the ship. See Roberts

Safeguarding, 214.

40

Illustration 8: An artist’s impression of the cancelled Nimrod MRA.4 maritime patrol aircraft. Such aircraft constitute an invaluable asset for any navy.

despite having been specifically designed for ASW missions in the North Atlantic.111

In total,

16 of these ships were built between 1990 and 2003 and all but three remain in service as the

Royal Navy’s arguably most versatile asset.

Despite the somewhat more capable Sea Wolf SAM system aboard the Type 23

frigates, the Navy exerted itself in finding a suitable replacement for the obsolescent Type 42

Sheffield-class destroyers, two of which were sunk by the Argentineans in 1982. “Particular

weaknesses identified were the Type 42 destroyer’s inability to illuminate – and therefore

engage – more than two targets simultaneously”.112

As we shall later hear in more detail,

during the 1980s, the project for a common frigate design for most NATO allies was to

alleviate the pressing need for a capable surface combatant. However, insurmountable

differences over the respective capabilities and features of the ship ultimately led to the

cancelation of the NFR-90 program. However, the idea of a joint venture between European

NATO members persisted, not least because of immense costs of designing and building a

class of such warships packed with sophisticated weapon systems and electronics.

In 1992, the project ‘Horizon’ was brought into being. A trilateral cooperation

between the United Kingdom, France and Italy set out to build a new class of destroyers

which could provide a credible multi-tier fleet air defense against even the most advanced

aerial threats. (A more detailed description of this program is provided in the chapter on the

Italian Navy). Despite

the U.K. abandoning

the program in 1999,

substantial progress

had been made

regarding the ship’s

general layout as well

as the radar and SAM

systems and the British

shipbuilders went on to

incorporate many

design features found

111

A.D. Baker III, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 2000-2001. Their Ships, Aircraft,

and Systems (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press 2000): 860-862 112

A comprehensive article on the ship can be found in Conrad Waters’, “Significant Ships: HMS Daring: The

Royal Navy’s Type 45 Air-Defence Destroyer,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters

(South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 133.

41

in the Italo/French Horizon-class. In the end, Italy and France each commissioned a pair of

nearly identical ships, while the British Royal Navy has received six Type 45 destroyers,

known as the Daring-class. Apart from some smaller differences in the ships’ appearances,

the main point of distinction between the Daring and her ‘cousins’ concerns the radar system.

All ships are fitted with the SMART-L long range volume search and track radar as part of its

principle anti-air missile system (PAAMS). However, while Italy and France have chosen to

install the somewhat less capable EMPAR (European multi-function Electronically Scanned

Adaptive Radar) for target search, acquisition, and tracking, the Daring-class is fitted with the

BAE Systems Sampson multi-function radar, located on top of the ship’s main mast, thus

providing an increased search radius.

The intransigence on the part of the Royal Navy in incorporating the highly capable

Sampson radar in spite of its costs was, for the most part, founded in the Navy’s contingency

planning, which envisions “a much more demanding operational scenario than either the

[Marina Nationale or the Marina Militare]”.113

Although the “[f]ocus of the Type 45’s air

defense role has resulted in the remaining weapon fit being somewhat sparse for a ship of the

Daring’s size”,114

(single 114mm 55 cal Vickers Mod. 8 gun, Lynx or Merlin helicopter, two

single 30mm guns115

) it is by no means a bargain. Increasing costs and the austere financial

environment have led to the production being suspended after the completion of six vessels.

Instead of the initially planned replacement of the 12 Sheffield-class destroyers at a rate of

one-to-one, at the end of the day the Royal Navy will have to get by with only half as many

ships.

In contrast to the decline of the escort fleet, the Royal Navy’s amphibious capabilities

were strengthened as part of the U.K.’s strategic reorientation towards joint-expeditionary

operations. As we will see in the further course of this study, the majority of European states

changed their naval doctrine over the last two decades, shifting from the previous prevalent

concept of territorial defense to crisis-prevention and conflict-resolution further away from

home. Projecting power from the sea onto land, therefore, became a desirable capability for

most of today’s larger navies. The Strategic Defense Review in 1998 substantiates these

aspirations by stating that “[i]n the post Cold War world, we must be prepared to go to the

crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us.”116

113

Alcibiades Thalassocrates, “A Fateful Name - Horizon,” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 2 (1997): 14. 114

Waters, “HMS Daring,” 143. 115

Considerable provisions for additional weapons have been made. Possible cruise-missiles of European or

American make, Torpedo tubes, CIWS, Harpoon anti-ship missiles. 116

Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review (London: 1998): np.

42

Against this background, the Review suggested a continuing shift in focus away from

large-scale open-ocean warfare towards a wide range of operations in littoral areas.

This reflects changes in the potential maritime threat, especially relative to NATO, the

missions of our forces and the likely geographic location of future operations. These

changes are a continuation of trends since the end of the Cold War. They include a

decline in the likelihood of an open-ocean anti-submarine or anti-surface threat on the

scale previously envisaged.117

The helicopter assault ship HMS Ocean was the first ship to epitomize the aforementioned

strategic reorientation. By 2007 two Albion-class assault landing ships (LPD)118

and three

Bay-class dock landing ships (LSD) had been added to the fleet, replacing the much less

capable Fearless-class and elderly tank landing ships. Although the new warships represented

a considerable financial burden to the defense budget, they gave the Royal Navy hitherto

unprecedented capabilities to project power over great distances, and more importantly, into

the littoral waters and onto distant shores.

The most important procurement decision made by the British government since the

end of the Cold War has to be the construction of two new aircraft carriers. Although this

process has caused considerable debate among politicians, military brass and the broader

public, the recent decision to commission both carriers can be considered a hallmark moment

for the Royal Navy. Having experienced difficulties operating its Harrier jets from the short

decks of the three Invincible-class carriers in hot weather conditions, most noticeably during

deployments in the Persian Gulf,119

the Strategic Defence Review in 1998 announced that the

three ships would be replaced by two new aircraft carriers capable of “[delivering] increased

offensive air power, and an ability to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the

widest possible range of roles.”120

Initially planned to displace between 30,000-40,000 tons

and embark up to 50 aircraft, the former figure has significantly increased while the latter

figure no longer seems financially feasible.

Apart from the aircraft carriers, further promising provisions were made in the

Strategic Defence Review. For example, many observers at the time believed that the

117

MoD, SDR, np. 118

LPD stands for landing platform dock, LSD for landing ship dock. “An amphibious transport dock, also

called a landing platform/dock (LPD), is an amphibious warfare ship, a warship that embarks, transports, and

lands elements of a landing force for expeditionary warfare missions. Several navies currently operate this kind

of ship. The ships are generally designed to transport troops into a war zone by sea, primarily using landing craft,

although invariably they also have the capability to operate transport helicopters. Amphibious transport docks

perform the mission of amphibious transports, amphibious cargo ships, and the older LPDs by incorporating both

a flight deck and a well deck that can be ballasted and deballasted to support landing craft or amphibious

vehicles.” “Amphibious transport dock,” Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amphibious_transport_dock. 119

MoD, SDR, np. 120

Ibid.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amphibious_warfare_ship

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landing_force

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expeditionary_warfare

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amphibious_vehicle

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amphibious_cargo_ship

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Well_deck

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ballast_tank



43

Illustration 9: The difference in size between the former Invincible-class carrier and the new Queen Elizabeth becomes apparent in this picture.

procurement decision regarding the carriers necessarily meant that all twelve air defense

destroyers would be built.121

As we now know, this was merely wishful thinking. On the other

hand, the planned successor to the venerable Trafalger and Swiftsure-class submarines was to

be increased to a total of five units and, in fact, by 2015 three boats of the new Astute-class

have entered service while an additional three hulls are under construction. The seventh, and

final, unit has been ordered and tentative plans see the SSN entering service in 2024.122

According to the white paper, only minor adjustments had to be made in other areas.

The mine countermeasure (MCM) force was to be strengthened by five instead of ten ships,

the existing Nimrod MR.2 maritime patrol craft were to undergo modernization while work

on a successor, the Nimrod MRA.4, was already underway and, finally, the Air Force’s land-

based Harrier GR7s were to merge with the Navy’s Sea Harriers and be put under joint

command, “enabling them to operate equally effectively from both land and sea.”123

In toto, “[t]he

Strategic Defense Review

is an impressive

document”, E.R. Hooton

wrote at the time, “which

seems to indicate that the

Ministry of Defense has

taken a cold, hard look at

British defense policy for

the next century in the

light of diplomacy and

industrial capability.”124

Hooton’s upbeat remarks regarding the Strategic Defence Review are quite justifiable,

considering that its provisions apparently were made in a “time of relative plenty”125

and after

a close study of the United Kingdom’s aims and needs in the post-Cold War security

environment. The Royal Navy can be thankful for the prudence and strategic vision the

political and military leadership displayed at the time. “It may not have seemed like it at the

121

E. R. Hooton, “Britain’s Strategic Defence Review: Smiles All Around,” Military Technology, Vol. 22, 9

(1998): 34. 122

“UK: BAE Systems Secures $1.92 Bln Submarine Deal,” Navaltoday.com, 11 Dec. 2012.

http://navaltoday.com/2012/12/11/uk-bae-systems-secures-1-92-bln-submarine-deal/. 123

Taylor, Guide, 11-12. 124

Hooton, “Smiles,” 36. 125

Childs, Future Navy, 7.

44

time but, with the benefit of hindsight, the SDR probably marked [the] modern high-point for

the Royal Navy […]”.126

Had the foundation for a well-balanced and capable fleet not been

set during these critical years it is likely that the once proud British Royal Navy would by

now have been reduced to a small regional force with limited power projection capabilities

after the years of stringent defense cuts that followed.

It goes without saying that the British Armed Forces have conducted a vast number of

operations over the last two decades, ranging from large-scale mechanized warfare during

Operation Desert Storm to current anti-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa.127

Moreover, the Royal Navy regularly participates in naval maneuvers and also hosts the annual

Cougar exercises128

in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Indian Ocean. “[T]he UK still has

expeditionary capabilities to join US-led operations [to the] East of Malacca” an analyst notes

and the “[d]isaster relief after Typhoon Haiyan by the destroyer HMS Daring and the

helicopter carrier HMS Illustrious prove that British capability.”129

The most costly deployments, both in terms of money and lives lost, however, have

been the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a key ally to the United States, the U.K. has

suffered considerable casualties in what is known as the ‘Global War on Terrorism’. In

addition to the painful sacrifices the country has made in the last decade, the strategic focus

on counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) operations has also created what

critics, including Dr. Dave Sloggett calls, sea blindness: “[Many] countries in NATO are

transfixed at the moment by the problems in Afghanistan [Syria, Iraq and North Africa] and

the threat from transnational actors. In doing this they have developed a sea blindness that

appears to forget and marginalize their maritime heritage.”130

The British military is no

exception to this rule. Over the course of the last decade the British armed services were

forced to come up with new strategies and tactics of how to fight land wars, which were

anything but the conventional conflicts the military’s top echelon had known and trained for

during the Cold War.

With the British combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan having come to an end,

Britain must now look beyond Basra and Helmand Province. Nevertheless, much controversy

remains in regard what future conflicts will look like. Some argue that if Western powers

126

Childs, Future Navy, 7. 127

For a excellent overview of the Navy’s operations during this period of time see Roberts, Safeguarding, 202-

234. Note that the book was published in 2009. For more recent information on deployments visit:

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/. 128

See “Cougar 14,” Royal Navy,

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/operations/mediterranean-and-black-sea/cougar. 129

Seidler, “Europe’s Role,” np. 130

Dave Sloggett, “Norway Leads Where Others Should Follow,” Warships, 5 (2009): 23.

45

again decide to intervene militarily, it will be in Afghanistan-like stabilization operations,

fighting insurgencies with so-called ‘Joint Rapid Reaction Forces’ and large expeditionary

contingents, meaning ‘boots-on-the-ground’. Others, however, state quite the contrary,

namely that ground troops apart from Special Forces will not be needed and that air power

alone, be it land or sea based – manned or unmanned, will be a sufficient coercive measure

when the ground war is fought by rebels, self-proclaimed freedom fighters or other

indigenous forces.131

This argument is often backed by the NATO-led air campaign in Libya,

in which interdiction bombing gave the disjointed and rag-tag rebels a chance to overthrow

the Gaddafi Regime. Still others argue that a potential interstate conflict is likely to occur in

the next decades. In such a case, the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy – which has affected

all military branches by replacing high performance and heavy military assets with lighter but

cheaper systems designed for COIN operations – has left armies vulnerable in high intensity

conflicts.132

While considerable adjustments have been made to the force structure, enabling the

British Army and Royal Marines to become far more effective in fighting asymmetric wars on

land, the current Royal Navy cannot be considered more capable in dealing with emerging

threats than it used to be. With the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continuously

growing over the course of the last decade, the Navy’s large-scale procurement plans were

causing an additional burden on the defense budget, which fortunately remained at a

comparatively high level of around 2.5 percent of GDP. Therefore, it came as little surprise

that after the attacks of 9/11 large and expensive programs such as the Daring-class

destroyers were cut in order to allocate sufficient funds towards combating the “increased

threat from international terrorism.”133

However, it should have at least occurred to some of

the commentators, if not the political and military leadership at the time, that these decisions

would have severe ramifications for the Royal Navy in the long term. It therefore seems

inexplicable how a senior defense journalist such as E.R. Hooton, could dismiss the cuts to

the destroyers’ force as “no surprise and in indeed not a ‘real’ loss.”134

Even the most casual

131

Stephan Maninger, “Der Schattenkrieg – Ergänzungen zur „Counterinsurgency“ – Debatte,” Österreichische

Militärische Zeitschrift, Vol. 3 (2013): 305.

An interesting article comparing the two forms of warfare is Michael J. Boyle, “Do counterterrorism and

counterinsurgency go together?” International Affairs, Vol. 86, 2 (2010): 333-353. 132

Carlo Kopp, “COIN reorientation- too far or not far enough,” Defence Today, Vol. 9, 2 (2011): 24-27. 133

Ministry of Defense, Delivering Security in a Changing World, Defense White Paper, (London: 2003): 2-3.

While in early 2001 the requirement stood at 12 vessels it was subsequently reduced, first to eight then to six

ships. Compare E. R. Hooton, “Britain’s Type 45 Destroyers Advantage,” Military Technology, Vol. 25, 6

(2001): 57-60 and E.R. Hooton, “’Delivering Security in a Changing World’: UK Defence White Paper 2003,”

Military Technology, Vol. 28, 2 (2004): 76-78. 134

Hooton, “Security”, 77.

46

observer should have realized that this would mean that, at the end of the day, the surface fleet

would be reduced to a little over 20 vessels – and that this number represented a rather

optimistic estimate.

In 2010, the British Government published the already infamous Strategic Defense and

Security Review (SDSR), titled: Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty.135

In the light of

the global economic downturn, the European debt crisis and the ongoing war in Afghanistan,

the entire Armed Forces were to become subject to a “draconian downsizing.”136

The Royal Navy’s combat air fleet was disbanded and in the process the aircraft

carrier force was eliminated. Of the three Invincible-class carriers, the lead vessel had already

been decommissioned in 2005, but was maintained in reserve. In 2011 the ship was towed to

Turkey and scrapped. The second ship, the Illustrious, as we have heard, remained in service

until 2014, albeit its capability being limited by the absence of fixed-wing aircraft. The Ark

Royal had joined the fleet in 1985 and was previously scheduled to be withdrawn once the

new class of aircraft carriers became available. In accordance with the SDSR, the British

Government, however, decided to “decommission HMS Ark Royal immediately”,137

after only

twenty-five years of service, thus creating a capability gap until the 65,000 ton Queen

Elizabeth enters service around 2020. (By comparison, the recently decommissioned U.S.S.

Enterprise was in service for over fifty years.) The lack of naval air power was clearly visible

during the NATO-led air campaign against Libya in the summer of 2011. After axing the Ark

Royal, Britain had to rely on the Royal Air Force’s Tornados and Typhoons to conduct strike

missions from the homeland, while French Rafale combat aircraft flew sorties from the

Charles de Gaulle carrier off the coast of Libya, as did the Italian and U.S. Harriers from the

Giuseppe Garibaldi and U.S.S Kearsage. It goes without saying that operating a carrier would

have made a crucial difference for the British forces, both in means of cost reduction and

mission effectiveness. Moreover, the hiatus in carrier operations will also result in a

considerable challenge to restore such capabilities. Fortunately, close ties with the United

States have provided opportunities for British personnel to train on the U.S. Navy’s big deck

aircraft carriers, in order to maintain their flying and flight-deck operation skills.138

As previously mentioned, the surface fleet has been consolidated around the six Type

45 destroyers and 13 Type 23 Duke-class frigates, with its successor, the Type 26, scheduled

135

Minstry of Defense, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, The Strategic Defence and Security Review.

(London: The Stationary Office, 2010). 136

Larrabee, Austerity, xii. 137

MoD, SDSR, 22. 138

Dr Dave Sloggett, Iain Ballantyne, “Charting a new course for the ‘Special Relationship’ at sea,” Warships,

March (2015): 18-19.

47

to replace the Dukes in the course of the next decade. Cost overruns and delays in the Nimrod

MRA.4 program ultimately led to the cancelation of the maritime patrol aircraft and with it

the loss of an integral element of the U.K.’s ASW capabilities. These capabilities have been

sorely missed, in particular more recently when a Russian submarine allegedly was sighted in

the waters off Scotland. In a somewhat embarrassing move, the Royal Navy asked its

American ally for assistance in the search for the submarine.139

What is more, a further round

of cuts in manpower levels has left the Navy with a force of roughly 30,000 military

personnel, less than half than at the end of the Cold War.

To sum up these developments, a recent RAND study comes to the conclusion that

“reduced manpower levels, curtailed equipment procurement, and [subsequent] capability

gaps [have] direct consequences for the UK’s ability to carry out current and future

missions.”140

Although the Royal Navy is making investments to maintain a balanced naval

force – deciding to commission both new Queen Elizabeth-class carriers and planning a new

class of ballistic missile submarines – some analysts ask themselves if the British Navy is not

backing the wrong horse. “A key question, however, is whether a balanced force is ultimately

in the strategic interests of the United Kingdom, or whether such a force should be abandoned

in favor of a ‘cruising’ navy requiring a greater number of frigates and destroyers and

providing more naval presence in a greater number of places than the current fleet plan can

accomplish.”141

In fact, as McGrath continuous, “[c]onsidering the United Kingdom’s global economic

interests and its desire to remain closely aligned with the US Navy, a force of less than 20

combatants might not suffice.”142

Over the past decade the Royal Navy, by and large, has

tried to trade quantity for quality. By pursuing a strategy of ‘leapfrogging’, “cutting defense

expenditure heavily today while investing in new types of capabilities”,143

the British Navy

hopes to profit down the line, or in other words accepting “that there will be some significant

long-term gain, but also some significant short-term pain.”144

However, this practice cannot

be seriously considered an appropriate solution to the problem, especially if national security

139

Jamie Merrill, “MoD asks for American help in searching for Russian submarine near Scotland,” The

Independent, 1 April, 2014.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mod-asks-for-american-help-in-searching-for-russian-

submarine-near-scotland-9966080.html. 140

Larrabee, Austerity, 6 141

Bryan McGrath, “NATO at sea: Trends in allied naval firepower,” American Enterprise Insitute, September

18, 2013: np

http://www.aei.org/publication/nato-at-sea-trends-in-allied-naval-power/. 142

McGrath, “NATO Trends,” np. 143

Larrabee, Austerity, xvii. 144

Dr. Lee Willett, “The Strategic Defence and Security Review, A Preliminary RUSI Assessment,” min. 04:52-

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yt0NOuFL_Ss.

48

is at stake. Furthermore, the shortage of surface combatants is unlikely to become any less

critical in the future. At any given moment in time, British destroyers and frigates are

conducting a number of tasks in different parts of the world as the former First Sea Lord, Sir

Mark Stanhope pointed out:

Standing commitments [at the time included]: Protecting Iraqi oil infrastructure, anti-

piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-drugs, safeguarding overseas territories and Crown

Dependencies including the Falklands. Those missions require at least five or six ships

at any one time and the wisdom is that you need three or four ships for each

commitment, in order to guarantee having one on station. That means one out there,

one, possibly two, in refit or maintenance and another training to deploy. In frigate and

destroyer terms there is not a lot, if anything left over for emergencies such as war or

for training with allies to underpin alliances that prevent wars.145

Clearly, such a high frequency of deployments also increases the wear and tear on the

warships and their crews. Fatigue not only takes its toll on the ships’ hulls but also becomes

visible among the men and women who do their utmost to protect the interests of the United

Kingdom at sea.

In order to alleviate this dire situation – as we shall see in the following chapters –

many European states now operate flotillas of small ocean-going patrol vessels (OPV),

specifically designed for the increasing number of low intensity anti-piracy, drug interdiction,

fishery protection or search and rescue (SAR) operations. However, currently the Royal Navy

merely has four such vessels in service, of which only one is assigned to operations outside of

the British Isles’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).146

As a consequence, the more capable

frigates and air defense destroyers also have to conduct these operations, in which their

multimillion dollar electronics and weapons suit are rarely needed. General Sir David

Richards points to this paradox by stating, “‘You get to this ridiculous situation where in

Operation ‘Atalanta’, off the Somali coast, we have £1bn (Type 45) destroyers trying to sort

out pirates in a little dhow with RPGs […] costing $50 […]. That can’t be good.’”147

The Strategic Defense and Security Review in 2010 caused considerable capability

gaps among all branches of the Armed Forces. However, there is cautious optimism in naval

quarters, concerning the future of the Royal Navy. After years of defense cuts, military

expenditure is to increase slightly from 2015 onwards.148

In the light of a somewhat better

145

Iain Ballentyne, “The Big Interview, First Sea Lord of the RN,” Warships, Sep. (2009): 7. 146

Richard Beedall, “The Royal Navy: Mind the Gaps,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad

Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013), 80. For information on EEZ, see Footnote 157. 147

Sir David Richards quoted in ibid. 148

Till, “British approach,” 25.

49

economic situation Prime Minister Cameron announced that, instead of selling or mothballing

the second carrier, the Prince of Wales will join the fleet early next decade. “The second

carrier will be brought into service. [This] means the Royal Navy will be able deploy a carrier

100 percent of the time,” Cameron stated.149

Moreover, the teething problems the new Astute-

class SSNs have encountered will have been sorted out by the time the carriers arrive, making

them some of the most capable hunter-killer submarines in the world. The design phase of the

new Type 26 frigate and replacement for the four Vanguard ballistic missile subs is well

underway and it is hoped that the current size of the fleet can be maintained. Anything short

of the construction of 13 new frigates and four SSBNs would only exacerbate the already

critical state regarding the size of the fleet, and therefore can rightfully be considered as

possible brinkmanship on part of the government.150

Unless some unforeseen events occur which would necessitate substantial adjustments

to be made to the current procurement plan, the British Royal Navy will operate a multi-

purpose navy with increased power-projection capabilities by the beginning of the next

decade. By and large, the Royal Navy will have emulated the United States’ naval forces. In

fact, as a number of observers note, the Royal Navy already “looks strikingly like the US

Navy, except [at] a fraction of its size.” However, “the resources necessary to achieve these

goals are to some degree harvested from savings gained from a significantly smaller escort

and combatant fleet” McGrath criticizes.

151 Notwithstanding this predicament, operating a

balanced naval force gives the political and military leadership the most effective tool to cope

with the changing security environment and a myriad of emerging threats. “The general

tendency [in the 21st century]”, Geoffrey Till observes, “is to guard against the difficulty of

prediction by building general purpose fleet capabilities that can be adapted to respond to

unexpected events and trends.”152

After having now reached its ostensible nadir since the end of the Cold War, the

British Royal Navy is slowly recovering from the severe retrenchment that has befallen all of

the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces. With numerous high-profile procurement projects

underway, the Royal Navy can look forward to a somewhat brighter future. Britain is likely to

149

Andrew Chuter “Cameron: UK Will Operate 2 Aircraft Carriers,” Defense News, 5 Sep. (2014).

http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140905/DEFREG01/309050019/Cameron-UK-Will-Operate-2-

Aircraft-Carrier. 150

In particular, if only three SSBNs would be built this would severely change the strategic principle of an at-

sea nuclear deterrent force, as the U.K. would no longer be able to have one ship at sea all the time. Compare:

“Debating Continuous-at-Sea Deterrence: Britain's Nuclear Security”.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jC3-TPRnXhM&list=PLFAgO2TZWpwBH9t3LB4CJscyDOo5M3dt9. 151

Mc Grath “NATO Trends,” np. 152

Till, “British Approach,” 18

50

once again deploy fast jets in the form of the Lockheed Martin F-35B from the decks of its

aircraft carriers and thus regain substantial power projection and deterrent capabilities.

Ultimately, however, the drastic reduction in the size of the fleet over the last twenty

years has been a very costly one in strategic terms. As Till concludes, “a decline in the RN’s

global footprint seems inevitable given the decline in the number of its ships and people.”153

Such a development is likely to accelerate the already ongoing shift in the global naval

balance from West to East.154

This year, in 2015, the next Strategic Defense Review will be

published. As a consequence some of the findings in this chapter regarding Britain’s Naval

Forces might need to be qualified in view of the new provision made by the British

Government. However, there is little reason to believe that significantly more money will be

allocated to defense which would allow the Royal Navy to regain the status it enjoyed at the

end of the Cold War.

6) FRANCE: Stretched but Willing – Europe’s Most Capable Naval Force

Figure 3

153

Till, “British Approach,” 26. 154

Ibid., 28.

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

4

% o

f G

DP


Figure 3 France Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

51

Figure 4

Over the centuries the French and British fought epic naval battles to decide who was

to command the sea. In the end, French aspirations for global dominance ended with the

crippling defeat at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 against Lord Nelson and the accreted might

of the Royal Navy. From that point onwards the British would rule supreme for over a

hundred years, until their power was finally eclipsed by the United States and its Navy.

Consequently, during the Cold War the Royal Navy was subordinated to NATO’s naval

strategy against the Soviet threat. As has been noted, the British slowly shifted their focus

from a more general power projection capability to anti-submarine warfare in the North

Atlantic, relying on the United States’ carrier battle groups to bring the fight to the enemy in

the case of war. France, on the other hand, for both political and geographical reasons, had to

build and maintain a balanced multi-purpose fleet, able to shoulder the entirety of conceivable

maritime tasks.

Firstly, in 1966, after apparently insurmountable differences between France and the

United States regarding the Grand Nations status within NATO, President Charles de Gaulle

announced the country’s withdrawal from the Alliance.155

Therefore, the French Navy, or

155

Although the French Armed Forces were no longer incorporated into NATO’s command structure, France

had significant forces stationed in Germany. Throughout the Cold War NATO contingency planning was largely

based on the assumption that France would join the other NATO forces in the event of war with the Soviet

1990 2000 2015



Submarines 18 12 10


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 4 France: Number of Major Vessels


52

Marine Nationale, not only had to be designed to provide credible nuclear deterrence in the

form of its ballistic missile submarines (referred to as the force de frappe), but also had to be

capable of conducting naval operations ranging across the gamut of the intensity spectrum:

from fleet air defense to fishery protection.

The second defining factor was the unique nature of France’s geography. While other

European states such as Italy or Norway had (and still have) relatively confined spheres of

interest – the greater Mediterranean region and High North respectively – France had access

to the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the English Channel, hence to the North Sea.

Numerous sea lines of communication run through these waters and protecting them is of vital

interest to France, which like so many other nations is dependent on seaborne trade. What is

more, France still retains numerous oversea territories, including, inter alia, French Guiana in

South America (home to Europe’s spaceport), Guadalupe and Martinique in the Caribbean,

Réunion in the Indian Ocean, Adélie Land in Antarctica and French Polynesia in the middle

of the Pacific Ocean. Apart from the U.S., France is the only country to have its naval forces

continuously on station in all three oceans of the world156

and also possesses the second

largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ)157

which stretches over more than 11,000,000 km².

Accordingly, the French Navy has over the past decades operated a mix of ‘first-rate’

warships, as well as patrol vessels designed for low-risk sea surveillance, fishery protection

and constabulary duties.

Sustained military expenditure of over 3.5 percent of the nation’s GDP throughout the

Cold War allowed the French Navy to become one of the most prominent sea powers in the

world by the time the global confrontation between East and West had come to an end.

Although its surface fleet was not as numerous as that of the British Navy (38 large surface

combatants compared to Britain’s 48), the Marine Nationale had one distinct advantage over

the British and other large naval forces. Instead of relying on small cruiser-sized aircraft

carriers that could only deploy the Harrier jump-jets (such as the British Invincible-class, the

Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi, or the Spanish Principe de Asturias), France operated two flat-

deck carriers using a CATOBAR system (catapult assisted take-off barrier arrested recovery).

Union. See Norman Friedman, The Fifty Year War. Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (London: Chatham

Publishing, 2000): 295-298. 156


“An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a sea zone prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law

of the Sea over which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including

energy production from water and wind. It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles (nmi) from its

coast. In colloquial usage, the term may include the continental shelf. The term does not include either the

territorial sea or the continental shelf beyond the 200 nmi limit.” Quote from “Exclusive Economic Zone,”

Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone.

53

This system allowed heavier aircraft like the Dassault Etendard IVPs, Grumman F-8E

Crusaders, and the Alizé maritime patrol planes to safely operate from the carrier, thus

increasing the naval air-wing’s combat radius and payload. In essence, the French carrier

battle groups around the Clemenceau and Foch represented Europe’s most powerful naval

assets.

In addition, the Jeanne d’Arc helicopter carrier, somewhat similar in design to the

Soviet Moskva-class, provided the fleet with ASW and amphibious capabilities. The escort

fleet consisted of 18 cruisers and destroyers, as well as 24 smaller frigates. Although a

considerable force, many of these ships had already been in service for nearly thirty years and

were becoming increasingly expensive and difficult to operate. On the other hand, units such

as the Cassard-class belonged to the most capable air defense destroyers of their time,158

while the new class of George Leygues ASW destroyers represents the core of the Navy’s

multi-purpose surface capabilities to date.

Like Britain, the French Navy operated a mix of nuclear propelled and conventional

diesel-electric submarines, the latter of which, it was decided during the 1990s, were to be

decommissioned in favor of the SSNs. A new class of boomers (SSNBs) had already been

laid down at the national shipyards at Cherbourg159

and would slowly replace the six existing

boats. Four nuclear power attack submarines of the Améthyste-class were also ordered to

augment the existing Rubis-class, but in the end only two units were built, bringing the

number of nuclear attack submarines to a total of six. Interestingly, these boats were very

small compared to other SSNs and, in fact, displaced less than, for example, the Japanese

Soryu and Oyashio-class conventional submarines.160

As mentioned, the French DCN

shipbuilders had also constructed the highly capable Agosta and Daphné SSKs, which were

158

“The two frigates are the most modern and doubtless the best equipped in all the navies of Western Europe, in

particular with respect to electronic warfare equipment.” Bernard Prézelin, Naval Institute Guide to Combat

Fleets of the World 1992-93. Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 1992):

xiii. 159

“The system under which the French Navy procures its warships and naval equipment is unique. The main

responsibility falls on the Direction des Constructions Navales [DCN], an official design bureau answerable to

the General Armament Authority. This resembles the structure of other leading navies’ procurement processes,

but the bureau is also responsible for running the dockyards, markets its products for export, undertakes a

surprisingly wide range of manufacturing, and collaborates with industry.” Antony Preston, “Warship Design for

the French Navy,” Naval Forces Vol. 13, 1 (1992): 16. 160

Tons submerged: Améthyste-class SSN, 2,680 tons; Oyashio-class SSK, 3,600 tons; Soryo-class SSK, 4,200

tons; Trafalger-class SSN, 5,200 tons; Los Angeles-class ca. 7,000 tons; Akula-class SSN, >9000 tons. See 160

Eric Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World. 16th Edition. Their Ships, Aircraft,

and Systems, (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 2013): 34. 160

Ibid., 37, 200, 359, 581, 797, 847.

54

particularly useful in waters closer to shore. The vessels’ quality is underscored by their

considerable commercial success.161

The need for offshore patrol vessels, sometimes referred to as surveillance frigates at

the time, has already been briefly addressed. Although warships, such as the 17 D’Estienne

D’Orves-class in service with the French Navy in 1990, would nowadays not be considered

credible surface combatants bearing in mind their shortcomings in size, speed and armament

(1,140 tons, 23kts, one 100mm gun, four Exocet missiles, ASW rocket launcher); at the end

of the Cold War they provided an indispensible element of the Marine Nationale’s fleet, in

particular because they could be built in great numbers. In comparison to the British Navy,

France has always sought to maintain a sizable fleet of such OPVs. However, their design

features and nature of deployment often blurs the line between the different classes of

warship. (Offshore patrol vessels now have reached the size, and sometimes capabilities, of

ships classified as destroyers twenty-five years ago).

In terms of amphibious capabilities and auxiliaries, France had already made

respectable investments by the time other European countries only started to realize the utility

of such forces in time of crisis. One 9,300 ton large dock landing ship (LSD), a smaller 3,310

ton LSD, two older Ouragan-class ships and five medium sized landing ships provided

comparatively robust power projection capabilities, despite some critics arguing at the time

that the “amphibious assault capabilities [were] dangerously reduced”.162

With five large fleet

replenishment ships and a sizable fleet of mine hunters, the French Navy could generally

consider itself on par with the British Navy, only outclassed by the U.S. Navy and the Soviet

naval juggernaut.163

The drastic changes at the end of the 20th

century obviously also had serious

repercussions on the French Armed Forces. Military spending was quickly reduced and the

entire defense structure underwent radical reorganization. At its heart, the so-called ‘Optimar

95’ plan, formulated only a year after the Cold War had come to an end, provided for some

far-reaching conditions, namely to disband all previous naval command structures. In short,

the naval squadron and flotillas were to be dissolved and the “bulk of the surface fleet [was]

subdivided into three large specialized structures, which could be looked at as coherent ‘force

pools’.”164

Somewhat similar to the development of the Alpha and Delta groups in Spain165

161

A number of Agosta boats were sold to Pakistan, Spain and Malaysia, while the Daphné saw service with the

Portuguese and Pakistani naval forces. See Chris Chant, Ships of the World’s Navies (London: Brain Trodd

Publishing House, 1990): 30-31. 162

“‘Optimar 95’ For The French Navy,” Military Technology Vol. 16, 9 (1992): 52. 163

See Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xii-xiv, 136-181. 164

“’Optimar 95’,” 51.

55

Illustration 10: The Singapore version of the French La Fayette frigate exhibits significant signal reduction features.

“the Joint Chief of Staff [would] be able to ‘pick up’ at will the naval assets he [needed] to

face a given crisis situation.”166

Space does not

allow the listing of all the

changes made as a

consequence of the

Optimar 95 plan, but in

general it can be said that

the foundation for the

current force structure was

laid during this period of

time. The aircraft carriers

and the majority of the

surface fleet (including air

defense and ASW frigates, the amphibious forces and fleet replenishment tankers), as well as

the nuclear attack submarines, would henceforth be stationed at Toulon in southern France.

The rest of the French fleet has its home at Brest on the Atlantic coast. The primary mission

of the frigates and OPVs stationed there is to protect the SSBNs on their way to and from

their nearby port at Ile Longue. The larger part of the mine countermeasure force also

operates from Brest and is supported by replenishment vessels.167

Despite a serious effort being made to modernize the fleet during the 1990s, it was not

long before the general state of the French Navy began to cause considerable alarm among

defense analysts. Defense expenditure had remained remarkably high during the early 1990s

(around 3.3 percent of GPD) but began to decrease drastically from 1995 onwards. By the

year 2000, the budget had been reduced by nearly 25 percent (to 2.5 percent of GDP). Apart

from the aforementioned streamlining measures, fiscal restrictions forced the Navy to make a

number of concessions. While some of the procurement projects were cut, such as the second

pair of Cassard air defense frigates,168

others were postponed or underwent “programme

165

Discussed in the chapter on Spain. 166

Ibid. 167

See for initial plan in “’Optimar 95’,” 51-54. Current forces in Jean Moulin, “France: The Marine Nationale:

The Bare Minimum for the Job,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire:

Seaforth Publishing, 2014): 85. 168

“It was originally planned to build four air defense destroyers to escort the Charles de Gaulle, but the

Cassard-class was cut back to two ships. More air defense ships will be needed”. Preston, Antony. “France’s

Naval Industry in the 1990s.” Naval Forces Vol. 13, 5 (1992): 16.

56

stretching measures”169

in order to avoid rash decisions, which might come back to haunt the

Navy. As Jean-Louis Promé stated at the time, “[g]iven the very long delay between the launching

of a modern weapon system and its eventual entry into service, a wrong decision today could

compromise the credibility and effectiveness of the French defense posture as a whole in the 2000-

2010 timeframe.”170

However, regardless of these saving measures, the Marine Nationale found itself in

gradual decline. By 1996 the last of the Daphné-class submarines had been decommissioned

and ultimately the Navy “opted to abandon the conventional submarine component.”171

This

is a shame given France’s continued proficiencies in building highly capable SSKs. The

Clemenceau was taken from service in 1997, while her sister the Foch waited for the arrival

of France’s new carrier before being decommissioned and sold to Brazil in 2000. Since then

the French Navy has operated a single carrier: the Charles de Gaulle.

Meanwhile, five new La Fayette frigates entered service, exhibiting groundbreaking

design features, not seen before in any warship.172

The public interest in the ships was

heightened when it was featured in the 1995 Bond movie GoldenEye. Stealth had become a

buzzword of the post-Cold War era, as American stealth fighters and bombers could penetrate

enemy air defense networks with seeming impunity. In the maritime realm, “[t]he best way to

protect a ship is still to avoid detection”, a commentator stated.173

Designed to drastically

reduce the ship’s radar cross section, the hull and superstructure of the La Fayette are slanted

to “control radar reflectivity”174

and are covered with radar absorbing material (RAM). The

usual openings one finds in the ship’s hull and superstructure are all covered with retractable

screens to enhance stealth as the illustration above shows. Apart from their groundbreaking

features, the ships provide a reasonable amount of firepower, despite having been designed

for long-range missions, overseas possessions control, as well as defensive operations closer

to home.175

A single 100mm 55 cal gun can be used against air, surface and land targets,

while the eight Exocet SSMs and Crotale CN2 SAM systems provide additional effectiveness

169

Jean-Louis Promé, “The French 1992-94 Military Programme Law: A Case of ‘Let’s Wait and See’ While

Adapting,” Military Technology Vol. 16, 9 (1992): 42. 170

Promé, “Military Programme,” 42. 171

Jean-Charles Lefebvre, interview by Naval Forces, “The French Navy in a Phase of Transition,” Naval Forces

Vol. 13, 5 (1992): 41. 172

“La Fayette Frigate Programme: A Major Success.” Naval Forces. Special Issue: French Naval Technology

(1994): 21-22.

Alan Hinden, interview by Naval Forces, “La Fayette Ship Profile (I),” Naval Forces Vol. 19, 2 (1999): 45-47. 173

“La Fayette,” 22. 174

Wertheim, “Combat Fleets 16th

,” 207. 175

Ibid.

57

in medium-intensity combat. A helicopter can be embarked, and owing to the ship’s

sophisticated stabilization system it can land even in very rough seas.176

On the international market the La Fayette design has been highly successful.

Modified versions of the ship have been sold to Singapore, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia.

However, for the French Navy, the frigate has become a double-edged sword. On the one

hand, it pioneered naval ship design and had significant influence on both France’s Horizon-

class destroyer and FREMM-class frigate (FREMM stands for Frégate européenne multi-

mission). At the time it gave the Navy exactly what it needed, namely a state-of-the-art

warship and technology test bed, which could fill the gap between the fleet’s OPVs and

aforementioned “first rank ships”.177

It is safe to say that very few people in the naval service

at the time would have imagined the five vessels, referred to as second rank ships,178

to

become front-line frigates, constituting a third of the Navy’s current escort fleet.179

Inherently

slow, arguably too lightly armed for high-intensity conflict (although a more capable air

defense system could be installed), the La Fayette exemplifies how important it is to build

multi-purpose surface combatants, capable of conducting a wide variety of missions and

which are able to quickly adapt to an ever changing security environment.

In hindsight, one can question the decision to invest so heavily in signature reduction,

instead of building more powerful and heavily armed warships. Even at the time, it was not

reasonable to believe that the stealth frigate would ever have to avoid a modern anti-ship

missile fired by an angry local fisherman while on station off the shores of Martinique or

Tahiti.

The French can rely on a powerful military industrial complex. Over the last decades,

French companies have provided cutting-edge designs in many areas of military technology.

In terms of shipbuilding, the French DCNS industrial group can rightfully be considered one

of the most experienced and successful manufacturers of naval weapon systems. In fact, it is

one of the few companies able to build nearly every kind of warship: from conventional and

nuclear powered submarines, to patrol vessels, frigates, assault ships and aircraft carriers.

More importantly, over the last two decades, the French naval industry has successfully

teamed up with other European shipbuilders to design and manufacture some of the best naval

vessels in service today (the trilateral Horizon-project has already been mentioned and will be

described in further detail in the next chapter). Based on these experiences, the continued

176

A helicopter can land at up to sea state six. See “La Fayette,” 22. 177

Hinden, “La Fayette Profile,” 48. 178

Ibid. 179

Ministère de la Défense, French White Paper, Defense and National Security 2013 (Paris 2013): 131.

58

Illustration 11: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, conversing with his counterpart, Pierre de Villiers aboard the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier.

cooperation with Italy’s Fincantieri has led to the construction of the highly versatile FREMM

frigates, eight of which have been ordered by the French Navy, called Aquitaine-class.180

Many design features of both the Horizon and the La Fayette are visible the Navy’s

new warship. Most notably it incorporates signature reduction measures to make it arguably

the most advanced warship in this area today.181

Despite its radar system being somewhat less

sophisticated than on the Italian FREMMs (Herakles radar instead of the more capable Selex

EMPAR radar), it nonetheless provides robust air defense capabilities. Besides its AAW

weapons, Exocet anti-ship missiles, and the French equivalent to the U.S. Tomahawk land

attack cruise missile (the MBDA SCALP), the ship’s anti-submarine warfare suit is most

impressive. Apart from the obligatory torpedo launchers, the ship has a Thales low frequency,

active and passive sonar mounted on the ship’s bow. “Providing long-range detection

irrespective of environmental conditions, it is particularly effective at detecting targets above

the thermal layer and has been influenced by Mediterranean anti-submarine conditions”,

Waters comments.182

A second variable-depth sonar is deployed from underneath the flight

deck and is designed to find submarines even at very great distances beneath the thermal

layer. Once a submarine has been located the Aquitaine’s helicopter is mainly responsible for

its pursuit. The current

Westland Lynx model is

currently being replaced

by the more capable

French Caïman version

of the NH-90. 183

This brief

description clearly

shows that the French

warship relies almost

exclusively on European

technical know-how. It is worth noting that as the defense spending, and thus the demand for

new warships, among European states began to sink in the wake of the Soviet breakup, France

180

Conrad Waters, “France’s Aquitaine: First French FREMM Heralds a Renaissance for Its Surface Fleet,” in

Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): 90-107. 181

Waters, “French FREMM,” 99. 182

Ibid., 95. 183

The thermal layer or thermocline is a general feature of large bodies of water, such as lakes or oceans. This

layer separates the upper more turbulent and mixed layer from the calm dark water below. The depth of the

thermocline is not constant but, generally, is found at around 100 meters below the surface.

59

was at the forefront of the attempt to maintain its industrial proficiencies, thereby also

ensuring that Europe’s defense industry remained competitive on the international market.184

Successive French defense white papers underscored the vital necessity to strengthen the

common European defense sector. “Industry must be European” they urged and made a point

by stating that “[i]ndividual European countries can no longer master every technology and

capability at national level. […] As regards the other technologies and capacities that it may

wish to acquire, France believes that the European framework must be privileged: combat

aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, satellites, electronic components etc.”185

While many European surface combatants had relied on American sensors and armament,

such as the Tartar and Standard SM-1ER missiles for upper tier fleet air defense during the

later years of the Cold War, the French were adamant that their future warships should be

fitted with European weapon systems to the greatest possible extent. In regard to air defense

capability – one of the primary elements of modern warships – a French and Italian defense

consortium developed and introduced the Aster missile series in the late 1990s. Two versions

of this highly capable SAM are currently in service: the short range Aster 15, for point and

local air defense and the larger Aster 30, for long-range air defense. Both types have been

successfully tested against a variety of targets and, owing to their active seeker and thrust

vector control, are by some analysts considered superior to all but the newest American

Standard missiles.186

Among the vessels fitted with the DCNS SYLVER vertical launch

system firing the Aster missiles are the four French and Italian Horizon-class destroyers, the

British Type 45 (which evolved out of the Horizon-project), the export versions of the La

Fayette frigate, the Italian aircraft carrier Cavour, as well as all new FREMM-class frigates.

The first ship to incorporate the Aster air defense missile, however, was the nuclear-

powered Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier – the backbone of Marine Nationale. After the keel

of the ship had been laid down in 1989 it took five years for the ship to be launched and, after

numerous delays, another seven! years for her to enter service. At a displacement of over

37,000 tons and a length of 261 meters, the French carrier will remain Europe’s largest

warship until the Queen Elizabeth joins the British fleet in around 2020.187

As was noted at

the beginning of the chapter, the ship is more powerful than any other aircraft carrier currently

184

Ministére de la Dèfense, Livre Blanc sur la Défense 1994 (Paris, 1994): 117-119. 185

Ministére de la Dèfense, The French White Paper on defence and national security (Paris, 2008): Chapter 2,

9. 186

The new SM-3 is generally considered the currently best air-defense missile against high-altitude targets and

has successfully been tested in the ballistic missile defense role. Moreover, Raython is now also building the

Standard SM-6 ERAM with an active seeker in order to engage targets beyond the horizon of the ships sensors. 187

For general data on carriers see Wertheim, Combat Fleets 16th

, 195-196.

60

Illustration 12: French troops are heavily engaged along the country’s geographical axis of interest, such as in Mali.

in service, save the American supercarriers. Furthermore, the French Navy has a long and

successful history of operating fast jets from the decks of its aircraft carriers.

Apart from the ships’ nuclear propulsion, the most notable difference to similar ships

in service today is the installation of catapults and arresting wires. France was not only able to

benefit from the American’s experience in CATOBAR carrier operations, “[buying] important

parts of these systems in the US”,188

but can also operate its Aéronavale detachment from the

U.S. Navy’s carriers, as members of the respective naval air-arm explain: “The goal of the

deployment [of French aircraft onboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt] was to

demonstrate, on a large scale, our ability to integrate with US forces”, the commander of the

French air group said,189

while a senior US pilot added that “[i]ntegrating with the French did

not pose any major problem. […] Basically, we have the same mentality and all French pilots

have been trained by the US Navy […]”.190

Close cooperation between the two countries has

been quite common over the last decades, and it is safe to say that after rejoining NATO in

2009, “France today is much more integrated in NATO planning and operations than at any

time since the mid-1960s.”191

Such interoperability and cooperation not only provides

valuable trust-building measures but also enhances Europe’s ability to effectively deploy

together with their most important ally, the United States.

The Charles de Gaulle has

been one of the most important

assets in naval operations since its

introduction in 2001. The

Aéronavale conducted air strikes

with its Super-Étendard and Rafale

fighter-bombers against al-Qaeda

and the Taliban in Afghanistan as

part of Operation Enduring

Freedom, (the French naval

operation was called Operation

Herakles), while E2-C Hawkeye surveillance aircraft provided radar coverage and airborne

188

Philippe Remon-Beauvais quoted in Jean-Paul Philippe, “The CHARLES DE GAULLE Takes Shape,”

Military Technology, Vol. 16, 10 (1992): 45.

This is a considerably well-written article regarding the envisioned design features and requirements towards the

carrier in 1992. 189

Patrick Zimmermann quoted in Henri-Pierre Grolleau, “RAFALE Demonstrates Interoperability,” Military

Technology Vol. 32, 10 (2008): 92. 190

Ibid., 94. 191

Larrabee, Austerity, 26.

61

early warning. In 2011, the Charles de Gaulle participated in the air campaign against Libya’s

longtime ruler Muammar Gaddafi, while most recently the carrier made a high-speed

transition from its previous station in the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf to join the U.S.-led

airstrikes against the IS network in Syria and Iraq.192

Despite serious discussion of building a second carrier has been going on for over two

decades (a possible cooperation with the British seemed to be the most cost-efficient solution)

the topic has now been dropped indefinitely. As a consequence, not a single large-deck

aircraft carrier will be operational in Europe between 2016 and 2018 when the French ship

undergoes her mid-life refueling and overhaul, and only the Spanish and Italians will be able

to deploy a very limited number of Harriers from their carriers. Meanwhile, India is already

making progress in deploying MiG-29K jets from the deck of the refurbished Soviet-era

Admiral Gorshkov, while the second carrier, the Viraat will await the introduction of India’s

first domestically built aircraft carrier before being decommissioned. Similarly, China has

also begun deployments of its first ‘flat-deck’, the Liaoning. While experts note that these

efforts do no amount to a credible aircraft carrier capability, both China and India have made

tentative provisions to build their fleet around numerous carrier battle groups. Moreover,

considering the current naval arms race which is under way in the Asia Pacific Region, these

developments clearly highlight the opposite trajectories that the European and Asian sea

powers are on.

In strategic terms France, however, remained steadfast. Despite increased political and

economical headwinds, the French Armed Forces would maintain a “full spectrum”193

force

and sufficient military means to conduct large-scale high-intensity interventions globally.

Priority would be given to the “geographical axis from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the

Arab-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.”194

However, as the defense white paper in 2008

noted, for ‘significant’ and ‘major’ operations, assets from other countries would be

needed.195

In other words, the United States’ heavy sealift, airlift and replenishment

capabilities, its aerial refueling fleet, large stock of precision ammunition, command and

control facilities, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets (ISR)196

would in any case remain a sine qua non in Europe’s defense planning.

192 “

France deploys aircraft carrier in Arabian Gulf for ISIL fight,” The National World 23 Feb. 2015.

http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/france-deploys-aircraft-carrier-in-arabian-gulf-for-isil-fight. 193

MdlD, Paper 2013, 12. 194

Ibid., chapter 2, 9. 195

Ibid., chapter 11. 196

An overview of American naval information warfare capabilities is provided in Jeremy Stöhs, “Intelligence

and Deterrence at Sea. The Role of US Naval Information Technology During the 1980s and Today,” JIPPS,

Vol. 8, 2 (2014): 73-91

62

Between 2008 and 2015, the size of the French Navy continued to decrease. The initial

plan to scale down the escort fleet to 18 vessels was found to be too costly in the light of an

11 percent cut to the Navy’s budget.197

Consequently, instead of 11 FREMM-class frigates,

(17 were originally planned in 2002) only eight would be procured, bringing the number of

“front-line” frigates down to the aforementioned 15 ships. Six of these warships are designed

for ASW tasks (in order to protect the force de frappe) while the last two units will be

upgraded to provide fleet air defense. The number of ballistic missile and attack submarines

remained untouched. On the other hand, in the past decade and in accordance with France’s

defense strategy, its amphibious forces were considerably strengthened. Three Mistral-class

(LHD) were built between 2003 and 2012198

and together with the Siroco LHD provide more

than “[just] limited crisis response and humanitarian intervention”, as McGrath believes to be

the case.199

In fact, apart from the British, France has the largest amphibious force in

Europe.200

The Mistral has been in the media spotlight as of late. In 2010, after more than two

years of secret negotiations, France and Russia signed a contract for four of these amphibious

assault ships to be built in French and Russian naval yards. The decision elicited fear among

some NATO members, not least because these ships would give the Russian fleet the

amphibious capabilities it so sorely lacked during the war against Georgia in 2009. Therefore,

it seems to be a somewhat peculiar historic coincidence that the second vessel under

construction is named after the port city annexed by Russian troops in the summer of 2014;

the Sevastopol. Given the renewed confrontation between East and West, the French

government ultimately had to bow to pressure from its allies and at first postponed and then

cancelled the delivery of the Vladivostok which already had a Russian crew onboard for

training at sea.201

197

Larrabee, Austerity,19. 198

Keel of the lead vessel Mistral laid down in 2003. Third and final unit Dixmude commissioned in 2012.

LHD stands for Landing Helicopter Dock. These vessels can embark helicopters as well as landing craft, small

vessels, and in some cases hovercraft from its well deck. Examples would be the American Tarawa and

America-class, the French Mistral-class, or the British HMS Ocean. 199

Compare McGrath “Decline,” np. 200

A summary regarding the vulnerability of the fleet’s large ships due to the lack of available escorts is

provided on Wikipedia: ““Incidents such as the near-loss of the Israeli corvette INS Hanit to a Hezbollah-fired

anti-ship missile during the 2006 Lebanon War have shown the vulnerability of modern warships to asymmetric

threats, with the Mistral-class ships considered under-equipped for self-defence in such a situation.[26]

Consequently, Mistral and Tonnerre cannot be deployed into hostile waters without sufficient escorting ships.

This problem is compounded by the small number of escort ships in the French Navy; there is a five-year gap

between the decommissioning of the Suffren-class frigates and the commissioning of their replacements, the

Horizon-class and FREMM frigates.” “Mistral-class amphibious assault ship,” Wikipedia, The Free

Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mistral-class_amphibious_assault_ship 201

Dave Sloggett and Ian Ballantiyne, “Franco Russian Carrier Saga,” Warships 1 (2015): 13-14.

63

Illustration 13: Recent actions in Eastern Ukraine have persuaded the French government to cancel the delivery of the Mistral-class LHD to Russia.

The dispute over the Mistral ships for the Russian Navy also offers two important

insights into current naval issues. Firstly, regardless of claims that Russia’s naval industrial

capacity will soon be back in full swing, the country remains unable to build large surface

warships, or as Mikhail Tsypkin puts it “[t]he Russian defense industry is not dead by any

means, but Russia is no longer an autarkic defense industrial power.”202

Secondly, France will

have to pay a high price for not committing to its agreements. Not only will it have to pay

back the money it has already received, but the French defense sector runs the risk of

becoming stigmatized, incapable of securing any bids for new weapon systems in the future.

Fortunately, the latter ostensibly has not become evident, as Egypt in late February 2015

placed an order of 24 Rafale jets, as well as two FREMM frigates.203

Among the European

states, France remains the

currently most capable naval

force. It has for the most part

maintained a well-balanced

fleet, including carrier strike

power and a nuclear deterrent.

These assets, such as the assault

ship Mistral which deployed

French forces to Mali in 2013,

will become increasingly

important as the United States

slowly shifts its priorities away from Europe. Therefore, the French effort to cooperate more

closely with its friends and allies, not only in operational terms but, moreover, in defense

procurement projects has to be considered particularly laudable. The most recent defense

agreement between the United Kingdom and France (The Lancaster House Treaties) “could

provide a roadmap to more effective European defense cooperation, based on deeper

capability planning and mutual dependency.” Although, as a senior defense advisor criticizes,

“[the Franco-British cooperation] side-steps the strategic question of the role of NATO and

the United States in European defense and security [and does not] address concerns among

202

Mikhail Tsypkin, “The challenge of understanding the Russian Navy,” in: Oslo Files on Defence and

Security, The Rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø Dec.

(2012): 90. 203

Frédéric Lert, “Egypt to acquire FREMM frigate,” HIS Jane’s 360, 23 Feb. 2015.

http://www.janes.com/article/49163/egypt-to-acquire-fremm-frigate.

64

some European states over the long-term disengagement of the US from Europe”, it will

nevertheless “set the ‘gold standard’ for defense cooperation [in Europe].”204

France is likely to remain actively engaged along its ‘geographical axis of interest’,

which currently includes the Sahel, the European periphery, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Persian

Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean.205

Moreover, the French Navy will continue to

commit naval forces to policing duties in its overseas territories and across France’s

11,000,000km² exclusive economic zones. However, as a result of the most recent austerity

measures, the size of the naval fleet has been significantly reduced and former ‘second-rate’

vessels, assigned to the aforementioned tasks, are now part of the Marine Nationale’s ‘first-

line’ of surface combatants. Jean Moulin somberly concludes that, “[t]he Marine Nationale

finds itself in a difficult position, with no reduction in its commitment but fewer resources.”206

Finally, the last round of defense cuts in 2014 elicited stark reaction on part of the top military

echelon, who warned that the Armed Forces were close to exacerbation. Only after the entire

military leaderships threatened to resign did the French government promise to leave the

budget untouched for the coming years.207

Fortunately for the French Navy many of its naval platforms remain highly effective

and can rightfully be considered among the most sophisticated in the world. This includes its

Rafel combat aircraft, the Aquitaine-class frigate, which likely incorporates the most

advanced signature reduction features of any current warship, the Horizon air defense

destroyers and the three Mistral-class LHDs. In the end, the French Navy will remain

Europe’s most capable naval force for another five years, after which it will rank a close

second to Britain’s strengthened Royal Navy. It will continue to be looked to when crises

occur and in support of both French and European interests abroad. The Navy will continue to

do what it must. It will be willing – but it will be stretched.

204

Ben Jones, “Franco-British military cooperation a new engine for European defence?” Occasional Paper 88,

Feb. (2011): 5. 205

See MdlD, Paper 2013, 54. 206

Moulin, “Marine Nationale,” 87. 207

Francis Beaufort, “French Chiefs ‘In Revolt’,” Warships, July (2014): 3.

65

7) ITALY: The Marina Militare – Between Global Interest and Regional

Necessities

Figure 5

Figure 6

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

% o

f G

DP


Figure 5 Italy: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 12 8 6


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 6 Italy: Number of Major Vessels


66

The strategic space where Italy feels herself involved has its centre of gravity in the

Mediterranean Sea. It starts form Gibraltar and moves along two main lines one reaching the

Black Sea and the Middle East through the Balkans and the Aegean Sea; the latter moving

southward through the Red Sea down to the Indian Ocean, the Gulf, and including the Horn

of Africa.208

(Admiral Angel Mariani, Chief of the Italian Navy)

For millennia the denizens of the Italian peninsula have looked towards the sea in hope

of prosperity and wealth. In many cases they were not disappointed. Throughout history its

geographical position has proved expedient to those prudent enough to take advantage of the

waters surrounding Italy. The adjacent shores and the hinterland of the regions mentioned in

the lines above represented some of the most fertile and prosperous lands in the world. Trade

flourished as merchants transported and traded goods from near and far. Some made great

fortunes on precious materials and useful goods, exchanged on the brisk market that

connected the Levant with the Spanish Peninsula, the North African shores with the ports of

the Turkish coast.

Whereas the Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians and the Roman Empire commanded

the seas over hundreds of years, a millennium later, Italian military and commercial sea power

again dominated events in the Mediterranean. Throughout the 13th

, 14th

, and 15th

centuries,

Italy’s princely states were able to fashion navies and merchant fleets large enough to

dominate seaborne trade, thus elevating their cities to hitherto unseen cultural heights.

However, given their geographic position – which confined them to Mediterranean waters –

city states such as Genoa and Venice were not able to maintain their power once the New

World was discovered. Ultimately, Italy’s states were “maritime state[s] with too narrow and

geotropically too exposed a base of resources at home to compete with the emerging much

larger sea and land powers”,209

such as Spain, France and Great Britain. Nonetheless, the

Mediterranean would remain an important theater in world affairs and as of late has again

become the strategic focus of attention.

Looking back on Italy’s more recent past, because of its role in the Second World War

the Italian navy was reduced to less than a third-rate sea power by the provisos of the Paris

Peace Treaty. However, over the course of following decades Italy’s Marina Militare, as the

Navy is called, became increasingly relevant. The primary reason for this trend lay in the

208

Angelo Mariani, “A Strategic View of the Italian Navy,” Naval Forces Special Issue 1 (1997): 6. 209

Gray, Leverage, 135

67

Soviet Union’s vigorous attempt to wring naval supremacy from the NATO Allies in the

1970s and 80s. The hitherto unprecedented Soviet naval buildup made the need for Italy’s

naval capabilities on the southern flank more pressing. Conrad Waters explains that “[a]fter a

period of low-key performance,” the Soviets’ large-scale naval deployments to the

Mediterranean elicited “a renewed Marina Militare [to abandon] its previous ‘silent service’

policy [and] become, almost overnight, a more overt player on the world stage.”210

Italy’s new vision was postulated in two major defense white papers, one in 1985 the

other in 1991. Both represent a watershed for the Navy. Based on Italy’s aspirations to take on

a more assertive role in international politics, the new doctrine underscored the importance of

its armed forces in support of its national interests. Multinational missions further away from

home (such as the Lebanon mission between 1982-84) were considered an essential element

of Italy’s foreign policy. The defense papers, therefore, represented a major stepping stone for

the country’s strategic reorientation and consequent modernization of its military, as Admiral

Campo di Paolo states: “The White Paper of 1985 contained some important guidelines,

aiming at restructuring defense towards a better integration of the forces at both operational

planning and, management of resources levels; from the definition of missions, the unification

of the line of command, to the organization of the industry and procurement policy.”211

Italy’s transition from a strategy of static-defense to engaging in an active role, either

alone or as part of a multinational operation, continued throughout the decade. These changes

were also heavily influenced by extrinsic political events, such as the dissolution of the Soviet

Union and the Gulf-War. As a result, the Modello di Difesa 1991 highlighted the increasing

challenges in the post-cold war era and utility of military force in support of the government’s

agenda. Multilateral cooperation within NATO, the European Union and United Nations was

to be expanded in order to legitimize the use of force.212

Fabrizio Coticchia summarizes these

tenets: “The key point of the whole document seems to be the identification between security

and the safeguarding of political and economic interests abroad, by means of new power

210

Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent P. O’Hara, “Fleet Review – Italy: The Marina Militare: A Well-balanced Force

in Time of Crisis,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth

Publishing, 2012): 82. 211

Original quote: “Il Libro Bianco del 1985, […], conteneva alcune indicazioni importanti, mirando alla

ristrutturazione della Difesa nella direzione di una migliore integrazione delle forze sia a livello operativo che di

pianificazione e gestione delle risorse, a partire dalla definizione delle missioni, dall’unificazione della linea di

comando, fino all’organizzazione del settore industriale e della politica degli approvvigionamenti.”

Giampaolo Di Paola, “L’evoluzione della Difesa italiana negli ultimi trent'anni,” Ministero Della Difesa,

September 28, 2012.

http://www.difesa.it/Il_Ministro/Articoli/Pagine/LEVOLUZIONEDELLADIFESAITALIANA.aspx 212

Fabrizio Coticchia. “Il Lungo Sentiero sul Lago di Ghiaccio: L’Evoluzione della Politica di Difesa Italiana

dalla Fine della Guerra Fredda all’Operazione Leonte,” (PhD diss., IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca,

2009): 185.

68

projection capabilities of the military instrument, as the heart of the country’s foreign

policy.”213

Although the Modello di Difesa also included a general reduction of Italy’s force

structure, Admiral Umberto Guarnieri, showed much certainty that the Navy at the time was

well equipped to achieve these tasks. The force of the 1990s, he pointed out, “will be

composed of elements of better quality, able to preserve the security and national interest of

Italy, wherever necessary be it alone or in cooperation with its allies.”214

The basic “strategic

functions” listed by Guarnieri have also not been altered to any considerable degree over the

course of the last 25 years. In fact, the Marina Militare’s primary tasks nowadays are very

similar to those mentioned back then:

- during peacetime, presence and surveillance in the areas of strategic national interest;

- during times of tensions and crisis, protection of national interest and cooperation with

international security organisations; and

- during war, contribution to the combined defence of national and allied homelands.215

Based on Italy’s doctrinal continuity, the Navy’s fleet structure has also undergone little

change since the end of the Cold War. Many vessels were commissioned during the

modernization process in the 1980s, laying the foundation for the Italian naval forces we see

today. Despite its declining numbers and ageing vessels, the Marina Militare, in general,

continues to field a balanced fleet which can conduct operations over a wide range of

contingencies. Moreover, in concordance with its defense policy it has been able to deploy

naval air power, retain power-projection capabilities, deploy naval forces – both alone and

with its NATO Allies – and promote maritime security for many years. However, similar to

other European countries, (e.g. Germany, Netherlands), Italy’s continued cuts in defense

expenditure have reduced the fleet to such an extent that the Navy might have to consider

ceding some of its aforementioned capabilities altogether in the mid-term, as Figure 6 shows.

One the other hand, the Italian Navy, arguably more than any other, is confronted with

the problem of maintaining both high-intensity war-fighting capabilities as well as extensive

naval provisions for low-intensity and humanitarian aid operations. The most challenging of

213

Original quote: “Il punto-chiave dell’intero documento appare l’identificazione tra la sicurezza e la

salvaguardia degli interessi politici ed economici all’estero, attraverso una nuova capacità di power projection

dello strumento militare, elemento cardine della politica estera del paese [italics in the original].”

Ibid. 214

Umberto Guarnieri interviewed by Naval Forces, “Roles, Missions and the Force Structure of the Italian

Fleet,“ Naval Forces Special Issue 1 (1997): 10. 215

Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 10.

69

the latter is caused by the influx of refugees trying to make their way from North Africa and

the Levant to Europe by sea.216

Migration, as Parry stresses, “is particularly acute in the

Mediterranean where there is a marked disparity in wealth, opportunity and social provision

between the northern and southern shores.”217

In these operations, which occur on a daily

basis, the Marina Militare and Italian Coast Guard conduct search and rescue operations to

save hundreds of refugees from drowning as they try to escape the war-torn regions of Africa

and the Middle East via the Mediterranean. These missions require both resources and

outstanding seamanship in humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR); qualities

that often come at the cost of more traditional capabilities of naval forces. However,

irrespective of this strategic dilemma, the “Marina Militare’s activities in this regard make it

stand out in terms of its compliance with the duties imposed by treaty – and by humanity – in

respect of the safeguarding of lives at sea.”218

Concerning its conventional naval forces, Italy has been able to rely on its substantial

defense industry to develop state-of-the-art warships and weapon systems. This industrial

base includes the Fincantieri shipyards, which are among the largest and most important

shipbuilders in Europe, Agusta and OtoBreda as part of the Finmeccanica group, and the

naval propulsion specialists of FIAT Avio.219

Italy’s ship designs are considered among the

best in the world – “Italian naval architects are artists”220

– and have been considerably

successful on the export market. Despite the “heyday [of] the Italian naval shipbuilding

industry”, dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, the country remains at the forefront in the field

of naval technology. 221

This can be explained, in part, by Italy’s ability to make smart choices

when it comes to balancing “indigenous development, offshore procurement and license

production.”222

Moreover, as Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent P. O’Hara point out, the Marina

Militare does not simply rely on its naval vessels to exact its strategic interests, but in fact

pays much attention to incorporating the latest weapon systems and electronics to its ships, as

well as manning them with highly trained crews.223

This progressive way of thinking has been

reflected in the fleet structure at least since the end of the Cold War.

216

Of the 42,000 refugees that registered in Italy in 2013, 34,141 had come by sea. Rivista Italiana Difesa, “Mare

Nostrum: Commando e Controllo e Operazioni Aeronavali,” Foto X-tra’gli speciali di RID, 10 (2014): np. 217


Cernuschi, “Marina Militare”, 84. 219

“The Italian Naval Industry,” Naval Forces Naval Forces Special Issue 1 (1997): 36-46. 220

Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xv. 221

In particular, during 1970s and 1980s Italian shipbuilders spearheaded the design of minehunters. More

recently the situation has become somewhat more difficult for Italy’s naval industry.

Antony Preston, “The Italian Navy Today,” Naval Forces, Vol. 14, 6 (1993): 32. 222

Ibid. 223

Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 89.

70

Illustration 14: The Albatros octuple SAM launcher is visible just behind the 100mm gun.

By the time the military confrontation between East and West drew to a close, Italy’s

Marina Militare had fashioned a sizeable fleet capable of conducting the entirety of naval

operations, except nuclear war. After a hard-fought battle against its sister service, the more

prestigious Aeronautica Militare, and some adverse political elements, the Italian Navy

finally acquired its first STOVL, AV-8B+ Harrier II aircraft from the United States in 1989 to

operate from the Giuseppe Garibaldi escort carrier. With this move the Navy was not only

able to replace its increasingly obsolete helicopter carriers (Andrea Doria-class, in service

since 1964) but, more

importantly, Italy joined the

small club of nations able to

operate fixed wing aircraft

from the sea.224

Unlike

Australia, Canada and the

Netherlands, who all lost their

carrier forces throughout the

Cold War, the Italian Navy

was able to strengthen its

doctrine of operating two

naval groups, each with an

aerial detachment.225

Akin to the envisioned “naval force with a nucleus of 18 combatant ships of the first

echelon, of which two are flat deck aircraft carriers”226

, Italy’s surface fleet was extensively

modernized. In 1991, the average age of its ships was only eight years,227

with a pair of new

air defense destroyers (Animoso-class) already under construction. Together with the two

Audace-class vessels and the larger helicopter-carrying cruiser Vittorio Veneto, the ships

would provide the fleet with the necessary defense against enemy aircraft and missiles

throughout the 1990s. Smaller frigates and corvettes, such as the eight Maestrale, four Lupo

and the eight Minerva-class ships were all designed to have substantial AAW, ASW, and

ASuW capabilities. All cruisers, destroyers and frigates also had an aviation detachment and

helicopters embarked, providing the Navy additional ability to find and track Soviet

submarines. The anti-air systems deployed on these vessels merit some additional attention as

224

Among the states capable of operating aircraft carrier including fixed-wing manned aircraft are Argentina,

India, Spain, US, UK, France, Russia. 225

Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 80-81. 226

Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 16. 227

Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xv.

71

they are representative for Italy’s aforementioned ingenuity in combining domestic and

foreign design in order to come to the best results.

Mainly due to its complexity and proven effectiveness, at the time, the Italian Navy

decided to procure the long-range Standard SM-1ER missiles directly from the United States,

or ‘off-the shelf’ if you will.228

Its Albatros SAM launcher, visible in on the frigate in

Illustration 14, however, basically consisted of a licensed-built American Mk29 octuple

launcher that can fire both the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow as well as an improved version designed

and produced by Alenia: the Aspide missile. Such development processes proved highly

successful as the Albatros system found numerous international buyers and remains in service

to date.229

What stands out when one compares Europe’s navies at the time of the Soviet

dissolution with modern day naval forces, is that their fleets also included a number of small

and very often obsolete vessels. The Greek Navy, for example, still retained the Cannon-class

gun frigate (commissioned in 1944) as part of its fleet in 1990. Norway had the Sleipner-class

(1965) and the Spanish Navy was phasing out its Atravida-class (1953). Italy, for its part, had

both the Albatros (not to be confused with the SAM-system) and the De Cristoforo.230

With

governments across Europe seeking to reduce their respective military budgets, there has been

little place for such unnecessary addendum.

While some of the older vessels had been used for training, patrol and constabulary

operations in the fragile security environment of the Cold War, budget restrictions over the

past two decades have made these maintenance-intensive platforms unfeasible. As a result,

more funds and personnel could be allocated to modern platforms. The flipside inherent to

any reduction of surface forces lies within the geographic realties of the sea. Technology can

make up for some of the lost physical presence. However, the ability to operate numerous

vessels at sea is an advantage not even a radically new concept in sensor-fusion and maritime

awareness can provide. This is particularly the case in constabulary operations, such as

“fishery protection, pollution control, drug interdiction, and control of illegal immigration”231

,

tasks the Marina Militare is only too familiar with.

For more than three decades Italy’s naval ambitions have remained largely unaltered –

deploying a well-balanced blue-water navy designed around two aircraft carrier groups and

228

See Preston, “Navy Today,” 28-32. 229

A basic overview of the SAM system can be found on Wikipedia.

“Spada (Flugabwehrsystem),” Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia,

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spada_%28Flugabwehrsystem%29. 230

Chant, Ships, 144, 158, 160, 166. 231

Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 10.

72

their escort fleet. Amphibious forces are to provide the Italian government with the ability to

project power over long periods of time and into regions further away from home. These

efforts have been hinged, for one, on Italy’s role as a founding NATO member and its

subsequent emphasis on achieving sea-control in the Mediterranean Sea and, on the other

hand, on Italy’s own strategic interests in the region. As Admiral Mariani explains, “[during

the Cold War] a great deal of the NATO navies’ efforts were devoted to preparing for the

battle for control of the sea.”232

With the decline of the Warsaw Pact, new challenges

emerged. The shift within “the global strategic environment”, so Mariani elucidates, “have

contributed to the birth of a new idea which draws attention to the coastal water, stirring up

the interest in operations conducted in the littoral environment.”233

Unlike Germany, who had

comparably few multi-purpose platforms capable of adapting to the new situation, Italy’s

naval forces demonstrably proved they were both capable and willing to take a leading role on

Europe’s southern flank. Cernuschi and O’Hara provide a excellent summary of Italy’s global

presence since its re-emergence as a medium-sized naval power:

[This has] included naval and air confrontations with Libya off Malta in 1980 and

1986; constant naval patrol activities in the Red Sea since 1982; missions off Lebanon

between 1982 and 1984 and, again, since 2006; international minesweeping operations

in the Red Sea in 1983; Persian Gulf operations in 1987-88; the war against Iraq in

1991; Yugoslavia from 1991-97; Mozambique in 1993; Somalia from 1991-95;

Albania in 1997; Eritrea in 1998; the conflict against Serbia in Kossovo [sic] from

1999 (where the AV-8Bs from Garibaldi conducted their first bombing missions);

Timor in 1999; Afghanistan since 2001 (here again the Garibaldi’s air wing

participated in combat); Iraq peacekeeping since 2003; and continuous anti-piracy

patrols in the Indian Ocean. On 22 November 2011, for example, the new ‘Horizon’

class destroyer Andrea Doria exchanged gunfire with a motorboat suspected of pirate

activities eight miles off the Somali coast.234

In addition, Italy also participated, even if somewhat hesitantly, in the NATO-led air-

campaign against Libya in 2011, again demonstrating the utility of naval air power as well as

the need for a balanced fleet in high-intensity combat operations. However, before we analyze

the latest developments concerning the Marina Militare, Italy’s effort to maintain its naval

capabilities during the 1990s and 2000s has to be outlined in more detail.

Despite being a heavyweight among European shipbuilders, Italy’s maritime defense

industry has also shown considerable interest in collaborating with other countries in order to

reduce the costs of designing and constructing warships. Among the most successful bilateral

232

Mariani, “Strategic View,” 7. 233

Ibid., 7. 234

Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 82.

73

efforts has been the joint development of the Horizon, and FREMM-class frigates by France

and Italy. These projects have shown that despite different operational requirements and

numerous hurdles such large-scale projects entail, the European defense industry can

successfully cooperate in putting highly-sophisticated ships to sea. The Horizon project,

however, also lends itself to explain the problems Europe’s navies have had to face in the

austere financial environment after the Cold War.

After the idea of a common frigate design had finally been buried underneath the

waves of conflicting views among the NATO partners regarding its specific capabilities, Italy,

France and the U.K. joined forces in 1992 to design and construct a future air defense frigate.

Largely based on the countries’ myopia towards the future trajectory of defense spending, the

initial plan envisioned a class of 22 ships; 12 for the Royal Navy, six for France, and four for

the Italian Navy. This highly optimistic calculation was soon understood to be entirely

unrealistic. Already early on, it became apparent that the military budgets of each partner

would allow far fewer units: “In all likelihood, the RN will eventually have to be contented

with six-eight ships, and both the [Marine Nationale] and [Marina Militare] will each procure

two to four”235

, as a project insider, going by the pen name ‘Alcibiades Thalassocrates’,

observed in 1995. Furthermore, due to their strategic incongruence of the states involved,

there was considerable risk of the entire project failing before a single ship was built. This had

not least to do with

the Royal Navy looking for a large (6,000+ tons) ship, featuring extended range for

North Atlantic operations and offering quite considerable surface-to-air missile

capabilities; the French, on the other hand, had more ‘modest’ aims, and were thinking

in terms of a substantially smaller ship with reduced range and half the missile battery

as called for by the UK.236

In the same vein, Italy’s requirements were more limited due to its fleet being able to operate

in the Mediterranean (its primary theater of operation) under the aegis of Italian air power.

Continued differences between the U.K. and its two partners finally caused the British to

withdraw from the Horizon effort in 1999.237

Notwithstanding this setback, the two remaining

countries would complete the project. The Marina National and Marina Militare each

received two identical ships which continue to form the mainstay of their fleet air defense.

Displaying considerable stealth features, highly sophisticated electronics – including the

235

Alcibiades Thalassocrates, “Glimmer on the HORIZON,” Military Technology, Vol. 19, 7 (1995): 17. 236

Thalassocrates, “Glimmer,” 10. 237

The numerous reasons are explained in Ibid., 27-34.

74

PAAMS (Principal Anti Air Missile System) with its Alenia EMPAR radar, DCNS SYLVER

vertical launch system and Aster-15/30 short and long-range missiles – the Horizons are

among the most capable air defense warship in the world.

The allure of buying proven and capable systems from the United States also caused

the U.K. to consider installing the Mk41 VLS on its domestic destroyer design (the Daring-

class); although ultimately they also decided to rely on the SYLVER VLS. Similarly, the

Horizon project was criticized for sticking to the tri-national PAAMS system instead of

choosing the AEGIS combat system and SPY-1D radar as the Dutch and Spanish had done.238

Regardless of the obvious advantages the U.S. design could bring to the table, the Italians and

French have to be credited with upholding a large part of the European defense sector and

therefore remaining competitive on the naval market, even if this proved considerably

difficult against their overbearing American competitors.

Of course […] adopting a US shipborne air-defense system, or even only the surface-

to-air missile, would have meant the end of credible European alternative in many

high-technology fields. To this [it] could be replied that maintaining these alternatives

makes little sense, given that the chances of ever achieving export sales for PAAMS

against the more mature US solutions are exceedingly faint.239

Notwithstanding the enormous effort poured into the Horizon project, the Italian and French

cooperation has proved that such multi-national programs can have substantial cost saving

benefits if conducted in a prudential fashion and, more importantly, are the “only way for

European countries to remain present on the international market as designers and producers

[of] major weapons systems.”240

In addition to the two air defense Horizon destroyers, the Andrea Doria and Caio

Dulio, launched in 2005 and 2007, the Italian Navy was also able to commission its first batch

of air-independent propulsion Type-212A submarines in 2006-07. Again, teaming up with

other European partners (in this case Germany) in order to effectively modernize its fleet

proved to be a wise choice by the Italian government.241

The currently largest European naval

238

Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 15. 239

Alcibiades Thalassocrates, “A Fateful Name - Horizon,” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 2 (1997): 15. 240

Thalassocrates, “Fateful Name,” 15. 241

A very detailed chapter on the Italian version of the FREMM can be found in Conrad Waters’, “Significant

Ships – Italian Fremms: Carlo Bergamini (General Purpose) and Virginio Fasan (Anti-Submarine) Frigates,” in

Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014): 89.

The Type 212 is discussed in more detail in the chapter on the German Navy. For more information on the Type

212 see Conrad Waters, “Significant Ships – Germany’s Type 212A Submarines: Cutting-Edge Technology

Drives German Maritime Transformation,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad Waters (South

Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 137-152.

75

project, with an estimated investment of over ten billion Euros, is the Italo-French FREMM-

class frigate program.242

Planned as the successors to the two countries’ numerous surface combatants, the

FREMM project was able to capitalize on the experiences gained during the development of

the previously described Horizon-class. Furthermore, the new frigates’ design was based on

features of both the air defense destroyers and French La Fayette stealth vessels

(commissioned between 1991 and 1996).243

Unlike during their previous cooperation, the two

countries decided to facilitate the process by allowing each navy to design major elements of

the ship according to their specific requirements. The French, on the one hand needed a rather

large number of ASW and AAW frigates to, firstly, replace the majority of its escort forces

built in the 1970s, and secondly, to provide sufficient defensive capabilities for its most vital

assets: its aircraft carrier and ballistic missile submarines. “Protection of the strategic missile

submarines of France’s […] nuclear deterrent is a key mission for the new class, as evidenced

by the principle ASW designation [of almost all units of the class].”244

France, moreover, has

territorial interests in all three major oceanic regions of the world, hence has far more space to

cover with its only somewhat larger navy than Italy, whose sphere of national interest was

outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The French planners therefore chose to “select

equipment sufficient to meet role requirements over more capable but costly alternatives” in

order to “maintain its first-line surface fleet at roughly current strength”245

while most other

European naval forces have to make concessions by reducing the size of their fleet even

further.

Italy’s FREMM frigates or Rinascimento as they are sometimes referred to, on the

other hand, look distinctively different than the French version.246

At the end of the day, the

difficulties of finding common ground led to the ships being “closely-related cousins”247

rather than sister-ships, with common hulls, similar propulsion and some shared equipment,

electronics and weapon systems. As a consequence, however, “[a] key attraction of the

FREMM concept”, as Waters argues, is “the ability to configure a common design to different

242

Waters, “Italian FREMMs.” 89-107.

An article describing the early stages of the program can be found in “France and Italy Launch Joint Frigate

Programme,” Military Technology, Vol. 27, 2 (2003): 64-68. 243

The FREMM frigates incorporate impressive stealth features and the French Aquitaine supposedly has an

even smaller radar cross-section (RCS) than the La Fayette-class. For more see Waters, “Aquitaine,” 90-107. 244

Ibid., 94. 245

Waters, “Aquitaine,” 107. 246

Italy also looked into cooperating with Britain’s Future Surface Combatant (Type 24 frigate) and Germany’s

F-125 project. However, because of the ageing fleet it was decided that a joint venture with France would be

more favorable and make the frigates available at an earlier point. See “Joint Frigate,” 2003, 64-68. 247

Waters “Italian FREMMS,” 90.

76

roles through limited changes to new equipment outfit.”248

So far, the Marina Militare has

received three vessesls; the lead-ship being the general-purpose design Carlo Bergamini,

whereas the two following units are designed for ASW. The construction of six of these

highly capable frigates has been approved by the Italian government with the fate of the

pending order of the final two vessels being decided in the course of this year.

There are two main reasons for the budgetary constraints that have caused the

reduction of the FREMM-class (initially 10 were planned). The first goes by the name of

Cavour, Italy’s second aircraft carrier, which, at a displacement of over 22,000 tons,

constitutes the largest warship to be built in Italy since the end of World War II. The second

reason is known around the world as fiscal crisis, debt crisis, or economic crisis. The former,

it can be argued, has cost the Navy a pretty penny to build and due to its large crew of nearly

750 sailors also contributes to the Navy’s considerable “personnel costs, [which] are one of

the highest overhead in any of the developed nations’ fleets.”249

The debt crisis which hit

Italy’s defense sector hard in the immediate aftermath of the Libyan air-campaign in 2011, on

the other hand, represented a real litmus test for the Marina Militare. However, before we

come to the most recent fiscal realities, let us first take a brief look at the Navy’s most

impressive addition to the fleet: the Cavour.

Based on Italy’s two-carrier doctrine, discussed previously, the new and much larger

successor to the Giuseppe Garibaldi provided Italy the flexibility and power-projection the

nation’s strategic doctrine called for.250

Incorporating significant amphibious capabilities (it

can carry a force of over 300 marines as well as deploy heavy equipment such as tanks into

theaters of operation), medical facilities for HADR, substantial electronic warfare measures, a

sophisticated air defense system relying on the same EMPAR Radar and Aster 15 missiles as

on the FREMM frigates, and, last but not least, its air wing of helicopters and fast-jets, the

Cavour offers the Marina Militare an essential tool to execute the country’s national

248

Waters “Italian FREMMS,” 89. 249

Ibid., 107.

“The Italian defense budget is divided into three major areas: (1) investment (what the U.S. calls research and

development, plus procurement), (2) personnel, and (3) training, maintenance, and operations. Since going to a

volunteer military in 2006, the Italian goal was to spend roughly 50 percent of their budget on personnel, 25

percent on investment, and 25 percent on training, maintenance, and operations. In reality, personnel costs have

consumed roughly 70 percent of Italian military spending.”

Larrabee, Austerity, 36. 250

The defense white paper 2005 remains on point that: “[t]he multilayered and unpredictable nature of future

threats […] demand development of a capability to prevent and, when necessary, to intervene quickly and

efficiently even at a great distance from the homeland. In other words, unlike in the past, the military

contribution to national security can no longer depend exclusively on the capability to guard and provide static

defense of the metropolitan areas (“Homeland defense”); it must develop the capability to dynamically face

threats whenever they occurs[sic].” Giampaolo di Paolo “Il Concetto Stregico del Capoi die Stato Maggiore dell

Difesa. 2005,” 10-11.

77

strategy.251

Once the Lockheed Martin F-35B is embarked (early 2020s), this fifth generation

combat aircraft, despite its bumpy development and numerous cost-overruns, will provide the

Italian Navy with “unprecedented hitting power and protection.”252

The carrier Cavour did not take part in the NATO-led air-campaign against Libya’s

long-time ruler, Muammar al-Gaddafi. However, Italy’s AV-8B Harriers flew 560 sorties

against targets in Libya from the light carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi. The war in Libya has

provided much insight into how future NATO operations will be conducted. In general, the

decision of some NATO members to interpret the U.N. mandate as a green light to expand

their mission from establishing a no-fly zone, to pursuing regime-change – ultimately creating

the circumstances in which radical Islamic factions such as IS can thrive – has caused

considerable criticism. I do not intend to reiterate the conflicting views on the issue or to lay

blame. The following short summary of Italy’s participation should merely provide insight

into Italy’s ability to deploy its forces in such multinational operations.

As part of operation Unified Protector, ships assigned to NATO’s Standing Maritime

Groups participated in strike missions and enforced the embargo against the Gaddafi regime.

Italy’s contribution to the mission by the most honest examination has to be viewed as

somewhat ambivalent. Conrad Waters, for example, points to both Italy’s initial reluctance to

take action – due, in part, to its economic interests in Libya – and later restraint when it came

to striking risky targets. He mostly emphasizes the Navy’s contribution to the naval blockade,

the ability of Italy’s fleet to deploy its aircraft carrier into the vicinity of Libya’s coast,

(greatly reducing the cost of strike-missions) and therefore concludes that “the Marina

Militare [was able] to take satisfaction in its performance.”253

Bryan McGrath, setting his

analysis in a somewhat larger strategic frame, on the other hand, comes to a different

assessment regarding Italy’s resolve and commitment: “Britain and France proved both highly

capable and highly committed,” he argues. Italy, however, only provided “partial […]

support.”254

As a matter of fact, when the financial crisis finally caught up with Italy in the

summer of 2011, the newly appointed government showed little interest in continuing the

expensive deployment and withdrew its carrier, the Giuseppe Garibaldi, leaving the Coalition

without its much needed naval aviation assets.255

251

Andy Nativi, “Mission Ready: Italy’s New Carrier Has Multiple Roles,” Defense Technology International,

Vol. 2, 8 (2008): 19-20. 252

Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent P. O’Hara, “Significant Ships – The Aircraft Carrier Cavour: Doctrine and Sea

Power in the Italian Navy,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire:

Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 127. 253

Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 85. 254

McGrath, “Decline,” np. 255

Agence France-Presse, “Italy Removes Aircraft Carrier from Libya Campaign,” Defense News, 7 July 2011.

78

Gary J. Schmitt, the co-director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies,

points to a very important fact: “Like other European states that are reducing number of

people and platforms, the pledge is that Italy’s military will be ‘of smaller dimension but with

higher quality.’ Whether that will happen remains to be seen.”256

Given Italy’s unabated effort

to take part in large-scale multinational combat missions, peacekeeping operations and

continuous HADR in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, ongoing defense cuts will

unquestionably cause precarious shortcomings among Italy’s armed forces and the Marina

Militare in particular.

In general, it can be said that Italy’s more recent defense white papers have only

reiterated its grand strategy first postulated in the 1980s.257

In fact, in a special article of the

Naval Institute Proceedings in 2012, Admiral Bruno Branciforte made a point to emphasize

that “the navy will be guided by the operational experience gained in the past decade[s]”,

remaining dedicated to the Navy’s expeditionary and amphibious capabilities, its fleet air arm,

its multirole platforms designed to cope with the entire spectrum of possible conflict, and

hence being able to underpin Italy’s national defense and maritime security.258

“The Italian

Navy, in coming years”, so he claims “will boast the capabilities needed to fulfill its national

and international commitments.”259

Regardless of what the future will bring, the strain on the

naval force will undoubtedly remain continuously high, while at the same time older ships

cannot be replaced at a rate of one to one. As the graph at the beginning of the chapter shows,

in 1990, the Navy had a fleet of 47 large vessels, not counting the smaller and crucial offshore

patrol vessels (OPV)260

and auxiliaries. By 2000 this number had dropped to 39, and yet

another 15 years later has been reduced to 33. Unfortunately, Italy’s maritime surveillance is

also diminishing in lockstep with Europe’s general difficulty in keeping pace with the rapidly

developing sector of intelligence and surveillance. “The Breguet Atlantic maritime aircraft

http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20110707/DEFSECT05/107070311/Italy-Removes-Aircraft-Carrier-

from-Libya-Campaign. 256

Gary J. Smith, “Italian Hard Power: Ambitions and Fiscal Realities,” American Enterprise Institute, 1

November (2012): np.

http://www.aei.org/publication/italian-hard-power-ambitions-and-fiscal-realities/. 257

See Ibid., np. 258

Bruno Branciforte, “The Commanders Respond: Italian Navy,” Naval Institute Proceedings, March (2012).

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/commanders-respond-italian-navy. 259

Ibid. 260

Italy has decided to build five new offshore multipurpose patrol vessels, with an option of four additional

ships. “The Pattugliatore Polivalente D’Altura (PPA) vessel will replace Minerva-class corvettes, Cassiopea-

class patrol vessels and two Duran de la Penne-class destroyers.” Needless to say the new class will in any case

number fewer than the ships being decommissioned. Tom Kingston, “Italy Closing in on Patrol Vessel Deal,”

Defense News, 26 October, 2014.

http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20141026/DEFREG01/310260018/Italy-Closing-Major-Patrol-Vessel-

Deal.

http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20110707/DEFSECT05/107070311/Italy-Removes-Aircraft-Carrier-from-Libya-Campaign


79

Illustration 15: The most recent tragedy in the Mediterranean, has finally elicited a somewhat more immediate reaction by the European Union. However, it remains unclear as of how exactly the EU intends to deal with the incredible influx of illegal refugees.

will be retired in 2012 and [like in the U.K.] there are currently no plans to fill its maritime

surveillance capabilities.”261

Of course, the fleet has also been able to expand its capabilities in certain areas. New

vessels, such as the Horizon destroyer, FREMM frigates, the Cavour, Type 212As, and

Commandanti OPVs, are far

more versatile than their

predecessors, to some

extent being able to

compensate for their limited

numbers with longer

endurance, reduced

maintenance and crew

requirements, as well as

more sophisticated combat

systems. Over the last two-

plus decades the naval

forces have been

restructured and modernized, in concordance with Italy’s transition to an all volunteer force.

From a platform-centric point of view, and considering Italian shipbuilding prowess, its

leading position in naval gun technology and electronics, there is little reason to believe that

the Marina Militare cannot operate a well-balanced fleet of state-of-the-art combat ships in

the future. Undoubtedly, a somewhat larger defense budget will be needed in order to protect

Italy’s interests in the future – at home and abroad.

With a pending humanitarian catastrophe of hitherto unprecedented magnitude

developing opposite Europe’s southern shores, Italy (as well as France and Spain) will need to

make substantial investment in SAR assets and HADR capabilities in the coming years. Alone

the Mare Nostrum mission, which was conducted by Italy’s Navy under the auspices of the

E.U. between October 2013 and 2014, cost over nine million Euros a month262

and was

conducted by numerous air and sea elements of the Italian Armed Forces. Its successor, the

European FRONTEX mission Triton, paradoxically, has so far been more limited in its scope.

However, with public pressure mounting and hundreds of refugees already having drowned in

261


Lizzy Davies and Arthur Neslen, “Italy: end of ongoing sea rescue mission ‘puts thousands at risk’,” The

Guardian, 31 October, 2014.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/italy-sea-mission-thousands-risk.

80

2015, there is reason to believe Italy and its European partners will be forced to expand their

efforts.263

If these circumstances alone are not enough to persuade Italy’s ministers to raise

Italy’s defense budget to the 2 percent of GDP commonly agreed upon by all NATO

members, the United States’ rebalancing towards the Asian-Pacific Region should by all

means be a sufficiently compelling reason to do so. As the mighty United States Navy is

currently coerced in shifting its forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific as a consequence of

China’s emergence as a near-peer competitor, “[it] seems to be a reasonable assumption [that] the

Cavour and the Italian fleet are effectively going to be a substitute [for the] American carrier battle

group in the larger Mediterranean as the reduced US Navy carrier line-up is increasingly concentrated

on the Pacific and Indian Ocean.”264

In 1990, the well-known Italian naval analyst Giorgio Giorgerini came to the

following assessment regarding the future operational scenario of the Italian Navy.

It would indeed be difficult to foresee, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, what

future situations may demand the intervention of the Italian Armed Forces, and

particularly the Marina Militare. One point can, however, be taken for granted. Due to

its geographical and political characteristics, the Mediterranean will remain what it has

always been throughout the centuries – namely, an extremely sensitive basin from

both the strategic and the political point of view, an area where tension and crisis can

stream in from all cardinal points and criss-cross with each other.265

This profound insight applies just the same today as it did twenty-five years ago. No matter if

for humanitarian reasons or out of strategic interest, Italy’s Marina Militare will consequently

continue to be a most useful tool in Italy’s foreign policy toolkit. However, remedial actions

have to be taken to ameliorate the increasingly difficult situation the Navy finds itself in and

to guarantee that these tools do not suffer abrasion to an extent at which they can no longer be

used. Similarly to France, Italy’s fleet has reached a point at which continued reductions of its

force level cannot be compensated for by superior ship design and better training. Unless the

current size of the Navy is maintained by increasing the nation’s defense budget, Italy’s

government will likely have to accept limitations in the operational capability of the Marina

Militare. As a result, Italy’s grand strategy – which for decades has relied on the Navy as a

263

Britain only has one officer as part of Frontex speaking of the “pull factor” if illegal immigrants knew that

they would be saved.

Joch Lowe, “EU Migration: why has the Home Office opposed rescuing migrants?” Prospect, 28 October, 2014.

http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/blogs/prospector-blog/eu-migration-why-has-the-home-office-opposed-

rescuing-migrants. 264


Giorgio Giorgerini, “The Italian Navy in the 1990s,” Military Technology, Vol. 14, 5 (1990): 48.

81

principle pillar of the nation’s vision of an indispensible power in the greater Mediterranean

region and the world – could become unfeasible

8) SPAIN: Creating a Well-Balanced Fleet – and Maintaining It

Figure 7

Figure 8

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1

1,2

1,4

1,6

1,8

2

% o

f G

DP


Figure 7 Spain Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

1990 2000 2015



Submarines 8 8 3


0 2 4 6 8

10 12 14 16 18 20

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 8 Spain: Number of Major Vessels

Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Mil itary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

82

For over five hundred years the Spanish navy has made its mark in the annals of

history: From the discovery of the New World by Cristobal Colon, to Hernán Cortés’

campaign against the Aztecs and the subsequent Spanish colonization of large parts of the

Americas over the course of the next three centuries. During this period of time, the Spanish

navy provided the Spanish Crown with an indispensible instrument to pursue the ‘conquista’

of new territories and to transport its vast riches back to Europe. Spanish power grew

corollary with its expansion abroad, while its military campaigns, both abroad as well as

against its European opponents, were largely funded by precious metals from its colonies.

The Spanish navy, however, is also known for suffering some of the most crippling

defeats in naval history. To date, the arguably greatest calamity in Spanish history was the

battle between the English fleet and Spain’s ‘Invincible Armada’. In 1588, the moribund

Spanish Armada set sail in support of the Spanish Invasion of England, but found its doom in

the form of the English galleons and the merciless nature of the sea. After having suffered

severe damage in the battle at Calais, the Spanish commander Medina Sidonia chose to take a

route around the north of Scotland and then down the Irish west coast to reach Spanish

waters.266

“Freak storms turned their voyage home into a naval catastrophe. Scattered ships

disappeared without trace in the Atlantic Ocean or were wrecked upon the wild north and

west coast of Ireland. […] Just 67 ships out of the original fleet of 130 succeeded in making it

back to Spanish shores.”267

Although the Spanish were able to reassert themselves as a naval power after the

events of 1588, their maritime dominance was increasingly challenged by other powers such

as the English, Dutch and, particularly on the continent, by France under King Louis XIV.268

Nonetheless, throughout the 17th

century Spain was able to command a fleet of the first order

and, for the most part, to protect its interests at sea. However, this would change after the

Spanish War of Succession and the Utrecht settlements in 1713.269

Spain was essentially

“stripped of all of its non-contiguous European territories, its succession was determined by

266

R.G. Grant, Battle at Sea: 3,000 Years of Naval Warfare (London: Dorling Kindersley Limited, 2008): 120. 267

Ibid. 268

In particular, as the Spanish also owned territories surrounded by major naval powers. 269

“Spain was the big loser of the war and the settlement. Although it signed a series of treaties with its military

opponents, it never accepted their terms until forced to do so in 1719-20. As soon as the Succession War was

over and the Utrecht Treaties signed, Spain set out to undo the entire settlement. It had been stripped of the

Netherlands, all of its Italian holdings, and Gibraltar and Minorca. It was compelled to grant British participation

in the Asiento trade, shipping African slaves to Latin America and to the Spanish West Indies. Philip V had been

forced to renounce his claim to the French throne. The settlements were thus a major national and dynastic

humiliation. […] The assault on the settlement came quickly.” Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts

and International Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 77-78.

83

outside powers, and it remained diplomatically isolated.”270

The country’s effort to undo these

decisions was effectively cut short by British sea power and the French invading Spain in

1719.271

Thereafter, for almost a century, the Spanish and French naval forces would fight the

growing British naval dominance (Spain’s fleet ranked third largest behind the two other great

powers) but the alliance was ultimately defeated in the famous Battle of Cape St. Vincent, the

Battle of the Nile, and the climactic Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. When the largest warship at

the time, the Spanish flagship Santisima Trinidad – having lost all three of its masts as well as

many of its men – surrendered to the British Forces, the ground was set for the Royal Navy’s

unchallenged dominance that lasted for more than a century.

Spain’s naval power declined even further as it lost many of its colonies in South

America throughout the course of the 19th

century. Yet it still retained some important

territories in the Caribbean, South America and the Asia-Pacific Region. It is somewhat

remarkable that Spain’s ultimate demise would be decided by its closest military ally today,

namely the United States. In 1898 war broke out between the two countries effectively putting

an end to Spain’s status as a great power. At the end of the 19th

century the two nations were

on entirely opposite trajectories. On the one side, the rising naval power of the United States

under President McKinley was willing to use force in support of its national interests in the

Caribbean and Pacific, which by itself represented a Copernican revolution in U.S. foreign

policy. On the other hand the Spanish fleet, which was annihilated by the superior American

warships and as a consequence Spain lost all but a small number of its colonial possessions. In

effect, the Battle of Santiago de Cuba and Commodore George Dewey’s victory at Manila

Bay relegated the Spanish naval power to the footnotes of history for decades to come.

Today the Royal Spanish Navy, or Royal Armada Española, again has found its place

among the world’s medium-sized sea powers, albeit not attaining the glory of former days. As

mentioned, Spain owes its naval resurrection in large part to the United States’ support during

the Cold War. Despite the Franco Regime being largely isolated from the European

reunification effort after the horrors of the Second World War, strategic imperatives of the

evolving confrontation between East and West persuaded the U.S. to provide Spain with

substantial military support. Similar to Italy, the Spanish Navy received two light aircraft

carriers from the surplus U.S. fleet. While the Italian Marina Militare was not able to operate

fixed-wing aircraft from their carriers due to a law dating back to the days of Mussolini that

270

Holsti, Peace, 78. 271

Ibid., 78.

84

granted the air force the sole right to maintain combat aircraft, the Spanish pioneered the use

of VSTOL aircraft from its carriers.272

Despite closer cooperation with other European

defense industries over the last years, Spain’s naval forces still exhibit their close ties to the

United States.

In general, Spain’s navy has not suffered the same reduction in size since the end of

the Cold War as, say, the British Royal Navy or the German Bundesmarine. For the most part

Spain has been able to make prudent choices in its procurement policy as well as its national

defense strategy and has exhibited an adroit apportionment of its funds to build a small but

modern multi-purpose fleet. As a consequence, the Armada Española is often compared to

Italy’s navy and, in fact, has many similarities, despite being only two-thirds the size.

Like the Italian Navy, the Spanish naval forces constitute a well-balanced fleet capable

of conducting operations across the gamut of the intensity spectrum, both alone and in

conjunction with friends and allies. Furthermore, the Spanish Navy has undergone a similar

strategic reorientation from a sea-control navy to an expeditionary force that can “[exert]

influence from the sea over coastal areas” in out-of-area operations. 273

Although the graph

above indicates a reduction in amphibious platforms, the Navy’s actual expeditionary

capabilities have increased dramatically as will be discussed later. Continuing our

comparison, Italy operates its fast jets from its new Cavour aircraft carrier, while Spain,

likewise, retains the ability to deploy naval air power in the form of a dozen AV-8Bs

Harrier/Matador aircraft from its new amphibious assault ship/LHD, the Juan Carlos I. It is

worth noting that Spain’s strategic framework differs from Italy’s, hence requiring the

Armada Española to provide somewhat fewer capabilities. This is mainly due to the different

roles the respective countries seek to play in world affairs.

As I have pointed out, Italy as a member of the G-7 (formally G-8) and founding

member of NATO has tried to assert itself as a regional power in the greater Mediterranean

region and active player in world politics. In order to meet these ends, its navy also needs to

represent a sizeable force – an undertaking that has become increasingly difficult over time.

Spain, on the other hand, has somewhat more limited ambitions abroad and fittingly refers to

itself as a “medium-power” with its main region of interests lying within the Western

Mediterranean and the Atlantic waters between the Iberian Peninsula and the Canary

272

The Spanish Matador aircraft were based on the British Hawker Siddeley Harrier short/vertical take-off and

landing (S/VTOL) aircraft. The Spanish version is almost identical to the U.S. Marine Corps’ AV-8A Harrier. 273

Minsterio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, Defense White Paper 2000 (Madrid: Centro de

Publicaciones, 2000): 193.

85

Islands.274

Consequently, its armed forces and the navy in particular are the smallest of

Europe’s four major naval powers.

From this brief description, one might conclude that the last twenty years have been

plain sailing for Spain’s naval forces. Nothing could be further from the truth. As one of the

NATO members with the smallest percentage of defense expenditure (in fact one of the

lowest in all of Europe), the most recent financial crisis has hit Spain much harder than other

European countries. As a consequence, the Armada Española once again is threatening to

wither away as it had over 100 years ago. This time, however, its fate will not be decided by

American guns but by political myopia and the fiscal restrictions of the post-Cold War era.

It is safe to say that the Spanish Navy undoubtedly began the post-Cold War era on a

high note:

The day of 31 May 1989 was auspicious for the Royal Spanish Navy. It was on that

date that King Juan Carlos handed over to the Armada its new aircraft carrier Principe

de Asturias in an imposing ceremony attended by a number of foreign warships,

including the French aircraft carrier Foch and the antiaircraft frigate Cassard,

assembled in the roads of Barcelona. With the commissioning of the new carrier, the

glorious Royal Spanish Navy has reached today a level of power of which one must go

far back into its history to find equivalent.275

Not only had the aforementioned aircraft carrier been put into service, but quite frankly the

entire naval force was in the process of undergoing substantial modernization and

restructuring. The year 1990, as a matter of fact, not only provided the Navy with a hitherto

unprecedented strike capability in form of the Principe de Asturias, it also constituted a

watershed moment in Spain’s force structure and long-term naval planning. The Alta Mar

Plan, presented to the public in March of 1990, outlined the procurement plan over the course

of the next 15 years and also had significant influence on the fleet’s reorganization into the

Grupo Alfa and Grupo Delta over the course of the following years.276

The Grupo Alfa was

formed around Spain’s capital ship (the carrier plus its aircraft) and included both fleet escort

and fleet support vessels. The Grupo Delta, on the other hand, was later created in light of the

increasing need for amphibious forces in the progressively diverse security environment.

274

MdD, White Paper 2000, 57. “Within the geostrategic unity of the Mediterranean, where problems and

tension spread easily, Spain considers that its western basin requires much attention as a nearby area with

specific characteristics.” Ibid., 65. 275

Prezelin, Combat Fleets, xv. 276

Íñigo Puente, “Plan Alta Mar: ¿sueño de lo que pudo ser o anticipo de lo que será?” Revista Naval, December

1997. http://www.revistanaval.com/www-alojados/armada/especial/planalta.htm.

86

Illustration 16: European aircraft carriers at the end of the Cold War. The French flat top is equipped with steam catapults, while the Italian and Spanish carriers rely on ski jumps to launch their Harrier jump-jets.

Perhaps most

importantly, the Alta Mar

Plan was based on the premise

that the Navy should have 15

frigates at any given time and

therefore needed a concerted

shipbuilding plan to mitigate

the capability gaps the

decommissioning of its older

fleet escort would create.277

Given the upbeat economic

situation at the turn of the

decade this was by no means

an unrealistic proposal. As it

happened, the escort fleet at the time consisted of 15 major surface combatants, if one

excludes the obsolete World War II ex-U.S. Gearing FRAM-I class destroyers. The Gearing-

class, however, was not the only U.S. design in service with the Spanish Navy.

As part of the greater Cold War picture, Spain played an important role in the United

States’ strategic planning. Already under the Franco regime, the U.S. provided the Armada

Española with second-rate warships. After Franco’s death the re-established Spanish

Monarchy quickly – and officially – aligned itself with the Western Allies, becoming a NATO

member in 1982 and a member of the European Union in 1986. As a quit pro quo for U.S.

support, if you will, the Spanish Navy had provided the West with credible ASW and ASuW

capabilities in the Atlantic and Western Mediterranean vis-à-vis from the Soviet Union.278

The principle task of the Navy was, therefore, to exercise sea-control and to protect the

SLOCs around the Iberian Peninsula.279

In 1990, the Spanish Navy’s five Baleares-class and

four Santa Maria-class frigates and half-dozen of the somewhat smaller Descubierta-class

ships reflected this strategic requirement.

277

Camil Busquets i Vilanova, “The Spanish F-100 Frigates,” Naval Forces, Vol. 17, 5 (1996): 26. 278

It can be expected that Spanish naval forces would have provided support to NATO operations in the case of

a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Spanish are described as specifically looking to the

Americans for help. See F.J. West Jr., et al, “Sea Plan 2000,” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s – Selected

Documents, ed. John Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007): 113.

By the 1980s Spain’s maritime role within NATO was clearly laid out. See Watkins, “Strategy 1984,” 76. 279

“Grupo Alfa’ – the Spanish Navy’s Main Fighting Force,” Naval Forces Vol. 12, 5 (1991): 20.

87

The Baleares-class was an improved version of the American Knox-class. Constructed

in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these capable ships had substantial weapons and sensor

suits.280

The ships were continuously upgraded over the years to increase their capabilities.

Nevertheless, the Royal Spanish Navy for some time had been hard pressed for a class of new

frigates. Although a decision to build new warships was made as early as 1977, the

construction of the carrier Principe de Asturias had taken priority over the frigate construction

and it was not until 1986 that the first of six modified U.S.–design Oliver Hazard Perry

frigates was delivered to the Royal Armada Española. Originally designed as part of the U.S.

Navy’s maritime strategy of SLOC protection, together with the planned Sea Control Ship,

the Perry-class was to safeguard American transport vessels from Soviet air and underwater

threats, much the same as the Allies had done during the Second World War. Despite the

aggressive strategic reorientation under President Reagan, the Perry-class was built in larger

numbers than any other western major surface warship (total of 72) and was also successful

on the international market.281

The Spanish variant of the frigate, the Santa Maria-class, has

similar capabilities, including the Mk 13 Mod 4 launcher for both Standard SM-1 MR and

Harpoon missiles, a 76mm OTO Melara gun, six torpedo tubes and a CIWS.282

As noted, the

frigate’s design allowed substantial updates and the six ships remain a vital asset in the

country’s current fleet structure.

Interestingly, the Principe de Asturias was the second type of warship based on the

U.S. vision of a sea-control Navy and a strategy of SLOC defense to be built by Spain. As

Bernard Prezélin explains, the “[d]esign is essentially that of the final version of the U.S.

Navy’s Sea Control Ship concept, with a 12-degree ski-jump bow added.”283

Inspired by the “Sea Control Ship,” that modern version of the last war’s escort carrier

of which the U.S. Navy wanted to build several units when Admiral [Elmo] Zumwalt

was at its head and which it renounced after his departure, the Principe de Asturias is

now benefiting from all the progress that has since been achieved in naval architecture.

[…] Her very well conceived aviation installations enable her to house on her hangar

deck seventeen aircraft […]. Counting aircraft parked on the flight deck, she can

embark and put into action up to thirty aircraft, or roughly twice as many as the British

Invincible, despite her inferior tonnage […].284

280

For more information see Christopher Chant, Ships, 474-475. 281

A more detailed description of these ships can be found in both Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 803-806. Also in

Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 15th

Edition, (Annapolis

M.A: Naval institute Press, 1993): 143-146. 282

Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 473. 283

Ibid., 472. 284

Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xv.

88

Having outlined Spain’s comparatively well-balanced naval air and surface

capabilities at the end of the Cold War, it is worth noting that her submarine flotilla at the

time was equally effective. With eight submarines, four of which were older, continuously

modernized French S60 Daphné diesel-electric submarines and four were of the highly

capable S 70 Agosta series, built in Spain with French technical assistance, “the situation of

the Submarine Flotilla of the Navy […] was superb, the best, certainly since the advent of the

Second Republic in 1931 (or maybe even the best ever)”,285

Íñigo Puente points out.

In line with most other European countries, the Spanish Armed Forces did their best to

adapt and restructure their standing forces, as well as to align their procurement plan with the

paradigmatic shift within the global security environment. In many ways their current naval

force is a testament to this vigorous effort to maintain a balanced fleet while at the same time

addressing the need for larger amphibious forces. This feat becomes even more impressive

when one compares the Spanish approach towards the increased need for expeditionary

capabilities with that of Germany. As we shall see in Chapter Nine, Germany has decided to

solely rely on multi-purpose frigates to satisfy the needs for out-of-area capable platforms.

The F-125 Baden-Württemberg represents the latest example of this approach. Regardless of

their size and sophistication, none of the German frigates built since the end of the Cold War

can be considered en par with even the smallest modern amphibious assault ships when it

comes to projecting sea power onto land. It is not by chance that the German Defense white

paper remains vague on how exactly the Bundesmarine intends to support ground operations

on the shores of far-off regions.286

The Spanish naval strategy, on the other hand clearly describes why amphibious forces

are of paramount importance for the nation’s security. Even before the terrorist attacks on

September 11, 2001 and the subsequent shift towards counterterrorism, stability operations,

and littoral combat, the Ministerio de Defensa published a white paper clearly stating that

amphibious operations represented a cornerstone of Spain’s defense policy. More importantly,

it also provides evidence for the general shift of most European states from the idea of sea-

control to expeditionary capabilities:

285

In the original: “La situación de la Flotilla de Submarinos de la Armada a principio de los 90 era magnífica, la

mejor, sin duda, desde el advenimiento de la II República en 1931 (o quizá, incluso, la mejor de su historia). Se

hallaban en servicio 8 submarinos pertenecientes a dos series, cuatro del tipo Delfín (S-60), construidos en torno

a 1970, y cuatro Galerna (S-70), construidos diez años después.”

Puente, “Plan Alta Mar“ np. 286

“Neben ihrer [der maritimen Kräfte] Befähigung zum bewaffneten Einsatz auf See können sie wirkungsvoll

zu Operationen an Land beitragen.”Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 2006, Zur Sicherheitspolitik

Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin, 2006): 122.

89

The chief mission of the Navy is to ensure the free use of the maritime routes, which

are a particularly significant interest in the case of Spain, as it is a country with vast

coastline, archipelagoes and enclaves, heavily depended on trade and on the

exploitation of marine resources. However the strategic environment does not pose

great risks for navigation. Therefore, the navies of the allied countries – particularly

that of Spain – currently gear their capabilities to exerting influence from the sea over

coastal areas of operations far from national territory in what is also a characteristic

mission of the Navy.287

The Spanish Strategic Defense Review in 2003 added that

[t]he very presence of an amphibious force has a deterring effect, obliging the enemy

to carry out defensive deployment and distracting a disproportionate number of forces.

Therefore it is important to acquire a greater capability for naval power projection over

land, a fundamental capability that the Navy can contribute to joint and combined

strategy.288

The Grupo Alfa and Delta have already been briefly mentioned. They, however,

merely represent a stepping-stone (if but an important one) towards the Armada Española

attaining a broader set of capabilities in a time marked by declining defense budgets and

increasing needs. Only shortly after the aforementioned white paper had been published, a

new directive unified the two groups under a single command.289

Regardless of its organizational structure, the Spanish Navy was able to secure the

funds for building two Galicia-class dock landing ships. Profiting from the shipbuilding

experience of the Dutch Royal Shelde and Spain’s Empresa Nacional Bazán (now Navantia),

both countries received two units each, thus providing each navy with far greater amphibious,

power projection and HADR capabilities than ever before.290

Along with two former U.S.

tank landing ships transferred in 1994 and 1995, and the construction of a replenishment

oiler, the Spanish Navy was able to incrementally expand its expeditionary capabilities.

Despite growing financial difficulties, the Spanish Government could not bring itself

to cancel the procurement of a new fleet escort. A class of four F-100, Álvaro de Bazán

frigates was granted in 1997 and the first of these highly capable, domestically designed and

constructed ships joined the Armada Española in 2002. Featuring American-designed Aegis

287

MdD, White Paper 2000, 193. 288

Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, Strategic Defence Review, (Madrid: Imprenta Ministerio

de Defensa, 2003): 107. 289

Ministerio di Defensa, Directive 001/2000 Admiral Chief of Staff of the Navy, GRUFLOT is created

http://www.armada.mde.es/ArmadaPortal/page/Portal/ArmadaEspannola/conocenos_organizacion/prefLang_en/

03_Flota--02_Flota-Fuerza-Accion-Naval--023_COMGRUP2--02_historia_grup2_es. 290

Baker III, expands on the ships’ impressive features: “[These amphibious warfare ships] can carry up to 6

helicopters in the hangars. [They] have 1,010m² internal vehicle parking space and can use 885m² docking […]

for additional vehicles; further vehicles can be carried on the helicopter deck and in the helicopter hangar.”

Baker III, Combat Fleets, 723.

90

Illustration 17: A cut-away of the Canberra for the Australian Navy. The ship is built by the Spanish Navantia shipbuilder.

combat system (SPY-1D and Standard SM-2 Block IIIB), the class will provide the backbone

of the Navy’s air defense for the next three decades.

After the NFR-90 project had failed in the late 1980s, Spain joined Germany and the

Netherlands in the cooperative development of a new class of air defense warships.291

Up

until this point in time, all large surface combatants in service with the Armada Española had

been of U.S. design. However, the only ships the United States could offer were the Arleigh

Burke-class destroyers, which, despite being considered the most capable air defense

destroyers in the world, were far too expensive for Spain. Therefore, the state-owned

Navantia shipbuilder made an effort to capitalize on general design features provided by its

Dutch and German partners while relying on the American air defense system. “The selection

of the Aegis/SPY-1D/VLS Mk 41 is a good decision given that it is sufficiently proven”,

Busquets i Vilanova underscored. “Its large series production allows one to count on effective

291

“The three partners were able to agree on practically identical operational requirements, establishing the basis

for a cooperation programme [in 1994].” Michael Herwig, “Trilateral Cooperation for a Frigate Programme –

Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany,” Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 5 (1994): 35.

91

technical support incorporating without difficulty the successive improvements.”292

Undoubtedly, Spain had proven that in spite of its comparatively smaller industrial base it was

able to build warships which could bear comparison with the best in the world.

This claim can be supported by Australia’s decision to build three F-100 design

frigates, the first unit (Hobart) entering service in 2016. The blocks for these ships are

produced both in Spanish and Australian shipyards, while the final assembly of the parts takes

place in Australia. In addition, the Australian government has also decided to award the

Spanish shipyard with the construction of two 27,000 ton amphibious assault ships. “Built to

Spain’s Juan Carlos I design, the ships’ hulls were fabricated by Navantia at Ferrol Spain

prior to being transported by heavy lift vessels to Williamstown near Melbourne for

installation of their island structure and final fitting out by BAE Systems.”293

Laid down during a period in which Spain’s defense budget was briefly increased, the

Juan Carlos I LHDs are truly remarkable ships, expanding the Navy’s capabilities in

numerous operational areas. Initially called the BPE, the Buque de Proyecciòn Estratégica,

(Strategic Projection Ship) this is the largest warship ever to be built in Spain. Sometimes

mistaken for an aircraft carrier like the Italian Cavour, the “BPE […] comes to very close

dimension of the [Italian ship], and indeed she appears having been designed through a rather

similar process based on the same operational considerations”.294

However, in addition to

operating STOVL aircraft and helicopters from its deck, the Juan Carlos also has a large stern

well dock for the deployment of landing craft and other small vessels. Furthermore, she can

carry up to 46 main battle tanks and 925 troops. Like most other small carriers, LHAs and

LHDs, the ship is much slower than the American supercarriers, largely because of her less

powerful propulsion and different hull form.295

Nevertheless, the Juan Carlos is “the very first

and only aviation-capable amphibious assault platform to be fitted with a ski-jump […] for a

dramatic increase in the payload/range of fixed-wing STOVL aircraft” such as Spain’s AV-

8B Harriers.296

292

Busquets i Vilanova, “F-100,” 25. For more detailed information on the capabilities see Wertheim, Combat

Fleets 16th

, 672. 293

Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Asia and the Pacific,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad

Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 28. 294

Massimo Annati, “European Aircraft Carrier Programmes,” Military Technology, Vol. 29, 10 (2005), 44. For

more information also see article of Europe’s amphibious vessels in: Christina MacKenzie, and Andy Nativi,

“Mission Ready: Amphibious Ship Designs Meet Diverse Operational Needs,” Defense Technology

International Vol. 3, 3 (2009): 34-35. 295

The CODLAG (combined diesel-electric and gas turbine) in the Juan Carlos creates a thrust of 30,500 hp

allowing speeds up to 21 knots, while the nuclear reactor on U.S. carriers can produce over 280,000 hp giving

the ships’ sustained speed of over 30 knots. 296

Annati, “European Programme,” 44,

92

Unfortunately, the Navy’s submarine force has not done as well over the last two

decades. As the graph at the beginning of the chapter indicates the total number of operational

submarines has fallen to only three. This precarious shortfall in subsurface capabilities has

been caused by major problems encountered during the production of Spain’s first AIP

submarine, the S-80.297

To make matters worse, these circumstances will hardly help the S-80

compete against Germany’s Type 212A and Type 214 on the export market.

Having outlined the modernization of the Spanish fleet over the course of the last

twenty-five years, it is now time to briefly discuss its deployment during this period. “Spain’s

contributions to NATO’s maritime roles, while not in the class of the United Kingdom or

France, [has] remained relatively strong in what is admittedly an increasingly weak field”,298

McGrath summarizes. Between 1994 and 1996 the Asturias (F 74) and Reina Sofia (F 84)

frigates took part in NATO operation Sharp Guard, enforcing the embargo against former

Yugoslavia.299

Spanish naval forces have also provided its capabilities to NATO’s standing

naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic – known since 2006 as the Standing NATO

Maritime Group 1 & 2 – and at the time of writing, the Patiño replenishment oiler is deployed

with the SNMG 2 in the Adriatic Sea.300

At the same time the Perry-class Canarias frigate is

currently conducting anti-piracy operations as part of the NATO Operation Active Endeavour.

This mission has been underway since Article 5 was invoked in the aftermath of 9/11.

Although there is considerable question as to how effective these naval anti-terrorism

operations have been over the past thirteen years, for now most NATO members judge the

gains in “deterrence and collective defence, crisis management; cooperative security; and

maritime security”301

worth the costs.

The same can be said in regard to Spain’s military contribution to the War in

Afghanistan. Despite the precipitous learning curve all NATO allies were confronted with,

297

“A major ongoing concern is the troubled S-80 submarine programme, which envisages completion of four

boats to replace Spain’s existing underwater flotilla. Construction work has effectively been suspended until

major weight and buoyancy problems identified in the first submarine, Isaac Peral in May 2013 are resolved.

General Dynamics Electric Boat of the USA has been brought in to assist a major re-design, which will involve

lengthening the submarines into a S-80 Plus configuration.” Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Europe and

Russia,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing,

2014): 65.

The following quote is from Bryan McGrath, “NATO Trends,” footnote 38. See Jose Alberto Gonzalez, “La

Armada da de Baja el ‘Siroco’ y Centra Sus Esfuerzos en Los Submarines S-80” [The Navy Withdraws the

‘Sirocco’ and Focuses Its Efforts on the Submarine S-80], La Verdad, 5 August, 2012,

www.laverdad.es/murcia/v/20120508/cartagena/armada-baja-siroco-centra-20120508.html. 298

McGrath, “NATO Trends,” np. 299

“NATO/WEU: Operation Sharp Guard,” NATO, 2 October, 1996. http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-

grd.htm. 300

The ship was in Trieste on the 2 March, 2015. See

http://www.armada.mde.es/ArmadaPortal/page/Portal/ArmadaEspannola/_inicio_home/prefLang_es/. 301

NATO, “Operation Active Endeavour,” 3 March, 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

93

Spain remained committed to the task, albeit on a relatively small scale. From a military point

of view, however, “NATO troop contingents became divided into those who fought (the

Americans, the British, the Canadians, and the Italians) and those who did not fight”.

Together with France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the Spanish largely belonged to the

latter group. This, as John Ballard et al, explain, was “mainly due to restrictions or ‘national

caveats’ imposed by their political leadership.”302

The U.S.-led invasion in Iraq (2003) would underscore the deep rifts within NATO,

rifts which have only grown bigger since the heavily criticized liberation of Iraq. Initially, the

Spanish government under the conservative Prime Minister José María Aznar decided to take

sides with the Americans and British and provided slightly over 1,300 military personnel to

the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’. However, after the devastating terrorist attacks in

Madrid in March of 2004, the deeply dissatisfied Spanish population voted the Aznar

Government out of office. The decision of the newly elected government to withdraw all

Spanish forces from Iraq reaffirmed the notion that Europe had become increasingly

inconsistent and discordant concerning global security issues.

As noted, the Spanish maritime contribution to multi-national operations has been

somewhat more robust, owing to her geographic position and economic dependency on

seaborne trade.303 Sadly, the brief period of economic growth during the first years of the 21

st

century granted the Navy only temporary respite. “[W]hen the global economic crisis began

rippling across Europe in 2008, Spain took a bigger hit than other Western European states,

and its defense budget was cut three separate times.”304

Over the following years, Spain’s

Ministerio de Defensa tried to compensate for the lack of funding by stretching out their

procurement plans from 15 to 20 years. Moreover, after having decided to acquire a fifth ship

of the Bazán-class during the aforementioned favorable budgetary environment, plans for a

sixth vessel were finally dropped. In addition, cuts in personnel had to be made across all

services, opening up gaps in readiness and the ability to quickly deploy a large number of

units.305

The overall number of troops has dropped from 32,000 (including 6,200 Marines), to

302

John R. Ballard et al, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back. The U.S: at War in Afghanistan and Iraq (Annapolis

MA: Naval Institute Press, 2012): 137.

As of 2013 Spain had 856 troops deployed to the relatively stable Badghsi province in the northwest. This is a

small number when compared to other countries’ troop levels: Romania 1077, Italy 2825, Germany 4400. See

“U.S. War in Afghanistan, 1999-Present,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-

afghanistan/p20018. 303

Departamento De Securidad National, Presidencia Del Gobierno, The National Maritime Security Strategy

2013: Sharing a Common Project (Madrid, 2013): 35.

http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/documents/estrategiaseguridad_baja_julio.pdf. 304

Larrabee, Austerity, 45-46. 305

Ìbid., 49-50.

94

22,000 (including 5,836 Marines) over the course of only six years. To make matters worse,

Spain has decided that preserving its general purpose fleet has precedence over all other

matters. “[O]ne of the ways the Spanish have ensured continuity of capabilities in the face of

spending constraints has been to reduce overall training levels”, a RAND study points out.

“All units are no longer required to undergo training to reach an established standard.”306

The costs of manning ships as well as training navy personnel have affected Europe’s

naval forces across the board. However, although Italy, for example, is hard pressed to reduce

the number of sailors in order to decrease their overall costs, its naval leadership remains

adamant that highly trained crews are of paramount importance.307

The Spanish Navy, on the

other hand, is willing to risk its overall degree of professionalism in order to preserve its fleet.

Simply put, Spain’s brinkmanship stems from its negligently low defense expenditure.

“The very low percentage of GDP spent on defense [0.9 percent in 2014] makes Spain one of

the worst performers in terms of defense spending in Europe”308

, and puts it in a league with

Lithuania, Latvia, and Luxemburg.309

As of late, slight signs of improvement in the overall

financial situation have come about. For the first time in seven years the government has

approved an increase in its defense budget as the Armed Forces will receive an additional €57

million.310

Although honorable, these figures are far from the 2 percent benchmark agreed

upon by all NATO members at numerous consecutive summits. What is more, the slight

budget increase will not amend the shortfalls suffered by the naval forces over the last several

years. Quite frankly, much of the damage to the Armada Española has already been done.

As Conrad Waters states, “[p]revious rumors that the aircraft carrier Principe de

Asturias, would be decommissioned were proven correct and the former fleet flagship was

withdrawn from service in February 2013.”311

The Juan Carlos I now remains the sole

platform for the reduced naval air-arm. Moreover, the lack of funding for the S-80 submarines

and inability to quickly resolve their technical shortcomings has left the submarine force at its

lowest level since the end of the Cold War. In fact, to permit the fleet to operate a minimum

306



Larrabee, Austerity,51 309

For more information on defense spending, see SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. 310

David Ing and Fenella McGerty, “Update: Spain to Increase Defence Spending,” Janes.com, 1 October, 2014,

http://www.janes.com/article/43968/update-spain-to-increase-defence-spending. 311

Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Europe and Russia,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad

Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 65.

95

of two submarines, while the third is undergoing an overhaul, the fourth unit of the Galerna-

class (S-70) has been cannibalized for spare parts.312

What is equally vexing for Spanish naval commanders is the growing gap between the

number of small surface combatants or offshore patrolling vessels (OPV) and the number of

incidents regarding unlawful or criminal activities. As the National Maritime Security

Strategy in 2013 points out “Ii]llicit trafficking is [particularly] common at sea [and] in a

broad sense is one of the most serious risks and threats to National Security”.313

In line with

many other European states, Spain is therefore participating in the U.S.-led “Africa

Partnership Station” operations, providing maritime security to the African shores and thereby

extending the cooperation between the numerous states and agencies in the region.314

However, these additional tasks will continue to put increased strain on the few ships in the

Spanish fleet. In particular only four new OPVs have been built with an additional two under

construction. (Originally a class of 14 was planned.)

Given the increasing scope of maritime operations that have evolved since the

conclusion of the Cold War, Spain’s initial effort to maintain a modern and well-balanced

fleet is laudable, more so, if one considers the increasingly austere environment the naval

forces found themselves in the 1990s and early 2000s. Unfortunately, it comes at a high price.

As the rather positive financial situation turned sour in the face of Europe’s debt crisis and the

severe cuts to military spending that followed, training and readiness have suffered greatly.

In conclusion, the Royal Armada Española, notwithstanding these shortcomings, for

now remains the fourth largest naval force in Europe, which actively participates in numerous

international maritime missions despite continuing economic difficulties. On a more positive

note, Spain’s naval industrial base has grown substantially over the last twenty-five years and

was recently able to secure a number of high-profile export deals. Given the country’s unique

geopolitical position on Europe’s southern flank and its close political ties to its European,

African and American partners, Spain will likely want to continue to play an active role in

world affairs. However, with the importance of the maritime realm steadily increasing over

the coming decades, the Spanish Navy will be forced to make some substantial investments

312

As of early 2013 the Navy only had two submarines operating, with an average age of 27 years, the 'Galerna'

and the 'Tramuntana', since the 'Mistral' was under repair until the spring of 2013. If delays occur in the delivery

of the S-80, the complexity of the construction that will take it beyond 2016, the armed forces would be

operating only one submarine. It would be the 'Mistral', which as of early 2013 was passing its last major review.

Later in 2013 'Tramuntana', the most modern in the series, entered overhaul. The 'Tramuntana' ends its

operational life in 2018. See: “Series 70 Galerna-type submarines,” np.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/s-70.htm. 313

DSN, Strategy 2013, 21. 314

Department of Defense: Africa Command, “African Partnership Station,” http://www.africom.mil/what-we-

do/security-cooperation-programs/africa-partnership-station.

96

mid-term, in order to maintain a fleet capable of conducting the entirety of naval operations.

These investments would include the F-110 successor for its Perry-class frigates, a larger

number of OPVs, as well as purchasing the Lockheed/Martin F-35 Lighting II in order to

retain a capable naval air-arm. All these projects, however, come with a significant price tag.

Given the large number of maritime missions that are underway, as well as the need to recruit

and train the necessary crews, it is hardly possible that this feat can be achieved under the

current budgetary levels.

It is therefore possible that over the next decades the Spanish fleet might have to

slowly abandon its multi-purpose capabilities, ultimately arriving at a smaller, less powerful

force, similar to that of Germany or Denmark. Such a development would, however, severely

affect Europe’s naval power, adding to its overall decline.

8) TURKEY and GREECE: Allies and Yet Not Friends – Diverging Naval

Powers

Figure 9

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

4

4,5

% o

f G

DP


Figure 9 Turkey: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

97

Figure 10

Figure 11

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 16 14 14


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 10 Turkey: Number of Major Vessels


0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

4

% o

f G

DP


Figure 12 Greece: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

98

Figure 12

The last two European naval powers to have strategic interests in the Mediterranean

theater are Turkey and Greece. Unfortunately, the two countries have a long history of mutual

animosity and distrust tracing all the way back to the Greco-Persian Wars during the 5th

century B.C. Over much of their history the two states have remained regional competitors,

often resolving their differences by military means. Even today, Turkey and Greece “are

widely considered to be major antagonistic powers in the region” as Christos Kollias and

Gülay Günlük-Şenesen state.315

Paradoxically, they remain in an unstable limbo between

being NATO allies, yet entertaining the possibility of going to war against each other in order

to protect their individual national interests. Despite this strained relationship, the two

countries’ geostrategic position as well as their interest and influence in the Mediterranean,

the Aegean Sea, and the Black Sea lend themselves to be analyzed in conjunction.

In general, Turkey and Greece make significant investments towards their national

defense. In part, due to unresolved issues regarding Cyprus, the status of a number of small

islands and rocks, (hence the issues regarding the EEZ), as well as the “nonexistence of an

agreement determining the sea boundaries between Turkey and Greece on the Aegean Sea”,316

315

Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen, Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation.

A political Economy Perspective, eds. Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen (New York: Nova Science,

2003): 1. 316

Turkish Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2000, Section Five, np.

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 9 8 8


0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 11 Greece: Number of Major Vessels


99

both countries maintain large armed forces. Their naval forces are also similar in size and

capability; the Turkish Navy though being somewhat larger. Furthermore, both countries’

defense spending has for many years exceeded that of its European neighbors and, in fact, as

the graphs show, has remained well over 2 percent of GDP since the end of the Cold War.

Although the economic crisis has also affected Turkey and Greece, (especially the latter of the

two), and both states have had to reduce their military budgets somewhat over the past

decade, they still share the highest percentage of defense spending of all European NATO

members.317

The hostility between the two has had profound influence on Turkish and Hellenic

maritime strategy. During the 1990s, many European countries sought to attain a wider range

of maritime capabilities; slowly shifting from the parochial tasks of ASW and ASuW against

the Soviet Navy towards out-of-area operations, power projection, and littoral warfare far

from home. However, given Turkey’s and Greece’s foreign policies their respective naval

strategies have largely been dictated by the principles of sea-control and protection of the sea-

lines of communication.318

As I will show, the largest part of both navies consists of platforms

capable of conducting sea-control and sea-denial, while amphibious capabilities, for example,

up until recently have only played a negligible role.

The ongoing dispute in the Aegean Sea also provides a good example of what the

future holds. While much attention is currently given to China’s claim over numerous islands

in the South and East China Seas, thus creating tensions with its neighbors and the United

States, it is often overlooked that the continued hostilities between Greece and Turkey are also

caused by territorial feuds about the many islands and islets of the Aegean Sea – Cyprus in

particular.319

It also goes to show how difficult these conflicts are to resolve, in particular in

times of growing nationalism in many regions of this world. Quite frankly, the conflict

between the Turks and Greeks remains a volatile situation, and crisis, such as imminent war

over the Imia/Kardak islet in 1996, remains a possibility. However, what also bears

mentioning is that despite all the criticism NATO and the United States have had to face since

1990, mutual NATO membership as well as pressure by the U.S. and European Union have

very likely prevented outright war between the two countries.

The fleets of Turkey and Greece show some resemblance and have also undergone a

similar development since the end of the Cold War. As noted, both states have designed their

317

Greece Turkey and the UK account for the highest defense expenditure with 2.2 percent of GDP. 318

TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Five, Section Three, n.p. 319

Littoral disputes have also included Israel to which Turkey has frozen diplomatic ties with its former ally. See

Burak Ege Bekdil and Umit Enginsoy, “Mediterranean Littoral Dispute Challenges Turkish Navy,” Defense

News, 9 Jan. (2012): 10.

100

naval forces around the concept of sea-control and the protection of SLOCs.320

Thus, these

territorial defense operations have taken precedence over other forms of naval capabilities,

such as expeditionary warfare. Compared to the four major European navies already discussed

in this thesis, the Turkish and Greek fleets lack large warships necessary to conduct large-

scale out-of-area operations. Particularly, they have little capability to project naval power

over great distances. The most obvious proof for this argument is the absence of warships

capable of embarking aircraft and amphibious forces, such as small aircraft carriers, LHAs or

LPDs. Therefore, the number of amphibious forces shown in the graph at the beginning of the

chapter is somewhat misleading. While Greece retains seven ships capable of amphibious

operations (including two Soviet-design air cushion craft),321

the aggregated power of these

units is not comparable to, say, Spain’s two Galicia-class LPDs or its single Juan Carlos I

LHD. Numbers do matter. However, any meaningful analysis has to take numerous other

factors into account, as I have repeatedly pointed out. What the Hellenic and Turkish navies

do have is substantial numbers of smaller warships, ranging from frigates and corvettes, to

guided-missile craft and patrol vessels. Moreover, both maintain the ability to conduct sea-

denial operations by fielding large submarine fleets of German-design as well as mine warfare

vessels. This comes as no surprise. The geopolitical realities of the region have driven both

states to invest heavily in such operational capabilities, not least due to the significance of the

Bosporus and adjacent waters.

8.1) Turkey

Of the two navies, the Turkish Naval Forces are the somewhat larger and more

capable. This goes hand in hand with Turkey being larger, more populous and enjoying the

benefits of a more powerful economy. The Turkish industrial base has evolved drastically

over the past twenty-five years; its naval branch in particular having profited immensely from

this development.322

For this reason, Turkey has been able to expand its indigenous

shipbuilding, whereas Greece remains largely dependent on foreign sales. For over two

decades the Turkish leadership has made a concerted effort to modernize and strengthen its

320

TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Two, np. Also see Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, White Paper for the

Armed Forces 1996-1997, Chapter 1, np. 321

These are the largest air cushion vehicle landing craft in the world, (Russian Zubr-class). See Wertheim,

Combat Fleets, 253-254. 322

The article provides examples for the up-and-coming naval ship industry in the 1990s.

“Turkish Navy – Reasons to Celebrate.“ Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 4 (1994): 23-24. 23-24.

101

armed forces and has in turn created one of the most capable armies in the world. American

defense expert George Friedman points out that, by his estimate, Turkey’s conventional

capabilities have surpassed those of France and Germany, also providing evidence for the

general decline in military power among European states. “[Turkey] has one of the most

substantial armies, not only in the region, but in Europe. Except for the British army – and it

would be an interesting fight, I wish I could stage it – […] there is no European army that

could face Turkey. […] And this is important, because Turkey was historically the dominant

power in the region.”323

In line with the seismic shift that occurred at the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey’s

security environment also changed drastically. For the larger part of the Cold War, Turkey

had been subject to the constant threat of a Soviet military thrust southwards to take the

Turkish Straits.324

Similar to the Germans in the Baltic Sea, the Turkish fleet, in the case of

belligerence, was appointed with fighting the Soviet Black Sea Fleet as it moved to secure the

exit to the Aegean.325

It is not by chance that the Turkish purchased and license-produced

many warships of German design. The similar geographical constraints of the Baltic and the

Black Seas,326

as well as the similar size of the Soviet Forces deployed to the respective

theaters, demanded similar naval strategies and forces. As a result, in 1990, the Turkish fleet

consisted of 16 submarines (including six German Type 209), 22 surface destroyers and

frigates (mostly older American designs and four newer German MEKO 200-class), 22

German guided-missile and torpedo boats, as well as numerous other vessels designed for

territorial defense.327

Unlike many European countries which reduced their naval forces as part of the post-

Cold War peace dividend, Turkey gradually increased its naval power over the following

years. Thanks to its significant defense budget, reaching over 4 percent of GDP in the mid and

late 1990s, the country was able “[t]o maintain [its] ambitious growth programme and

strengthen NATO’s southern flank”, by adding numerous new warships to its fleet.328

More

than half of these ships were of American origin. (The U.S. Navy had a large surplus of

frigates that were too expensive to keep in service). As part of U.S. military assistance to

323

“A forecast for the 21st century: George Friedman. ANU,” min. 46:40.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiMRAhupqE0. 324

“The primary Soviet thrust would be in Central Europe. Smaller attack would also occur to attempt to seize

Northern Norway and the Turkish Straits. A limited offensive is also possible in Eastern Turkey, to try to draw

off forces defending the straits [italics in the original].” Watkins, “Strategy 1984,” 78. 325

Ibid., 76. 326

The Black Sea has a size of 436,000km and its average depth is 1200 m, The Baltic Sea is of similar size

377,000km but is much shallower at an average depth of 55 meters. 327

Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 533-552. 328

“Celebrate,” 24.

102

many NATO allies, a total of six Oliver Hazard Perry-class and eight Knox-class frigates

were transferred to the Turkish Navy under ‘grant-in-aid’ programs during the later years of

the Cold War. Also, the Gölcük shipyards, located on the southern coast of the Sea of

Marmara, were awarded with the shared production of four improved MEKO 200TN-class

frigates.329

These frigates provide impressive capabilities for such relatively small vessels

(3,100 tons). All Turkish MEKOs have a hangar for a single helicopter, hull-mounted sonar,

air and surface search and track radars, Harpoon-missile launchers, the widely used and

powerful 127mm 54-cal Mk45 guns, Sea Sparrow air defense systems, and Sea Guard CIWS.

Torpedoes, jammers and decoys complete the ships’ offensive and defensive capabilities. In

addition, the navy can capitalize on the ships’ modular design which greatly facilitates the

installation of new weapon and combat systems. The octuple Sea Sparrow launcher module

atop of the hangar area has been exchanged for the Mk 41 vertical launch system firing the

more advanced folding wing Evolved Sea Sparrow SAM in the last two units of the class (F

246 and F 247).330

By 2000, the submarine force was also making great strides to expand its capabilities.

Most of the ex-U.S. submarines, dating all the way back to World War II, were being retired

while license-built Type 209/1400331

were entering service at a rate of a ship per year.332

Therefore, although the total number of submarines had decreased, Turkey’s underwater fleet

was in a much better state than it had ever been. Interestingly, the defense white paper

published the same year mostly reiterated the same maritime tasks that had been expected of

the Turkish Navy in the early 1990s, namely territorial defense (in particular of the Turkish

Straits), protecting the SLOCs, participating in multinational operations, as well as

humanitarian aid and search and rescue.333

Therefore,

[t]he operational requirements of the Turkish Naval Forces [dictated] owning modern

platforms having the capacity and capability of undertaking Above Water Warfare,

Anti Submarine Warfare and Air Defense Warfare. Reconnaissance, surveillance and

submarine warfare for preserving and protecting maritime transport in the surrounding

seas has an important place among the duties of the Navy.334

329

Two units were built by Blohm + Voss in Hamburg, two by the Gölcük shipyards. 330

Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 749. 331

These were somewhat larger and more capable than the Type 209/1200 already in service. 332


Admiral Vural Bayazit interview by Naval Forces “A Secure Turkey – A Secure Alliance.” Naval Forces

Special Supplement: Turkish Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1992): 2-8. 334

TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Three, np.

103

Illustration 18: Turkey is one of the few nations able to strengthen its maritime forces with domestically designed and built warships.

Again, amphibious

operations and power

projection over great

distances was not

considered a primary

concern. In fact, there is

not a word of either

concept in the 107-page

document.335

It is also

somewhat surprising that

it would take another 15

years before the Turkish

leadership decided to

make large investments in

these areas. Considering Turkey’s ambition to become a regional power, this fact remains

quite astounding. In part, of course, the country’s military doctrine has to be ascribed to its

unaltered geographical position and historical experiences. Surrounded by regions of

instability and conflict – the Balkans to its northwest, the current civil war in the Ukraine to

its north, the recent armed conflict in Georgia and war in Nagorno-Karabakh to its east, and

ongoing turmoil and bloodshed along its border with Iraq and Syria, and, lastly its strained

relationship with Greece to its west – Turkey is not in an enviable position. Moreover,

domestic unrest, either in the form of the Kurdish resistance movement, known as PKK, or

from regular citizens, frustrated by the country’s increasingly authoritarian leadership, have

persuaded the government to deal with issues closer to home before spending time and money

on regional crises on distant shores.

Nonetheless, the Turkish Navy has contributed to a number of multinational

operations. These have included operation Sharp Guard in the Mediterranean and Adriatic

Seas, numerous deployments with NATO’s naval standing forces, as well as by taking a

leading role in the creation of the Black Sea Naval Force in 2001. This effort was aimed at

promoting closer cooperation among the states surrounding the Black Sea. In this particular

case it is worth mentioning that joint exercises, such as those regularly conducted by the

335

Amphibious forces are only mentioned in the list of Turkish forces assigned to NATO: “The number of forces

presently assigned to NATO by the Turkish Armed Forces is as follows: […]15 Frigates, 2 LSTs, 17 Patrol

Boats, 9 Helicopters, 11 Minesweepers/hunters 1 Logistic Support Ship, 7 Submarines and 1 Amphibious

Infantry Battalion.” Ibid., Part Two, np.

104

NATO allies, have many positive effects. Common goals and shared interests during these

missions are largely responsible for fostering mutual trust and respect among the different

services and can break down the wall of preconception and misunderstanding. As such, Greek

and Turkish naval forces have operated together on numerous occasions in the past, which

arguably could be a deciding factor in a naval stand-off between the two countries: It is much

harder to shoot at someone you know and who you have learned to respect.

Based on the Navy’s decision to continuously modernize its existing force and replace

its ageing frigates with new warships on a one-to-one basis336

, the Turkish naval forces set

itself the goal of “transforming from a force structure required for coastal operations, to a

structure that could have a say in the open seas”, over the next 15-20 years.337

Conrad Waters

comes to the conclusion that as a result of this process over the last two decades, Turkey is the

“[o]perator of what is numerically the strongest of Europe’s mid-sized naval forces”.

Furthermore, he adds, “Turkey has managed to combine the creation of a modern and well-

balanced fleet with a progressive increase in the involvement of domestic industry in warships

construction.”338

With the development of the MILGEM corvette, Turkey has not only

demonstrably shown its industrial capacity, but also “join[ed] the small group of countries

able to both design and construct their own warships.”339

Yet, a number of hurdles remain.

The announced development of the TF-2000 air defense frigate in 1996 can be seen as

an important step in the fleet’s evolution into a blue-water navy, despite claims that “Turkey’s

naval defense concept is almost exclusively littoral-based.”340

However, not a single ship has

been laid down as of 2015. This unfortunate circumstance has caused a strategic “window of

vulnerability” as Israeli defense analyst Micha’el Tanchum notes.341

So far Turkey has been

able to balance its naval forces against both the Hellenic as well as Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

However, with Russia’s naval buildup under way, Turkey can no longer rely on its naval

parity. “Prior to the Crimean conflict, Russia’s Black Sea fleet consisted of twenty-four major

surface combatants and one diesel submarine while Turkey’s major naval assets consist of

336

Wertheim, “Combat Fleets,” 751. 337

TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Three, np, 338

Waters, “Europe 2010,” 99. 339

Ibid. 340

An early outline of shipbuilding for the first decade of the 21st century is provided in: “Ship Construction and

New Projects.“ Naval Forces Vol. 18, 4 (1997): 27. Recent development found in: Umit Enginsoy and Burak

Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Seeks Full Littoral Defense Architecture,” Defense News, 10 Jan. (2011): 13. 341

Micha’el Tanchum, “Turkey Vulnerable to Rising Russian Power in the Black Sea,” The Turkey ANALYST. A

Biweekly Briefing on Current Affairs, 9 April (2014): np.

http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/101-turkey-vulnerable-to-rising-russian-

power-in-the-black-sea.html.

105

approximately twenty-four surface combatants and fourteen submarines”,342

Tanchum

elaborates. The deployment of Russia’s new Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates and Kilo-

class submarines to the Black Sea (the first units will enter service this year), however, “will

quickly tilt the balance of naval forces in Russia’s favor, giving Russia a significant strategic

advantage for a window of four to eight years […].”

The problem of insufficient fleet air defense capabilities will only be exacerbated by

the introduction of the new assault ship in the near future. Although this ship and the addition

of two new tank landing ships will, for the first time in recent history, give the Turkish Navy

robust amphibious capabilities, the smaller version of the Spanish Juan Carlos is not intended

to carry a SAM system, thus making it dependent on its escort for air defense. This

circumstance goes to show how difficult it is to build a balanced fleet capable of conducting

sea-control as well as expeditionary and amphibious operations. Even if there are significant

funds available, building numerous different types of ships, as well as training its crews, is a

significant challenge. Without previously gained experience in constructing and operating

these new platforms, the learning curve is very steep for both the shipbuilders as well as for

the Turkish Navy itself. It will be interesting to see how the government deals with the

financial burden such grand visions of Turkey’s naval forces entails. One point many

advocates of a large Turkish navy however stress, is that “Turkey, unlike many European

countries, always has money for defense”.343

8.2) Greece

Similar to Turkey, the Hellenic Navy has profited from a sustained defense budget of

over 2 percent of the country’s GDP. As a matter of fact, according to the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute, Greece allocates the highest percentage of all

European countries to national defense. Even the economic crisis and ongoing difficulties in

reducing the national debt have not led to the cuts in military spending one would have

imagined, given the severity of the Euro debt crisis. Despite this fact, it is not quite clear how

the financial problems will pan out in the future and there is some evidence suggesting that

the Hellenic Navy will be forced to forfeit some of its capabilities down the road. In short, it

is unlikely that the Greece will be able to modernize its fleet at the same pace it has been able

342

Tanchum, “Turkey Vulnerable,” np. 343

Adnan Caglayan quote in Umit Enginsoy and Burak Ege Bekdil, “Does Turkey Need an Aircraft Carrier?”

Defense News, 7 May, (2012): 13.

106

to over the last twenty-five years, and maybe more importantly (from a Greek point of view)

the strategic balance will shift even more in favor of its neighbor, Turkey.

As I have explained, the two countries share a common interest in a geopolitically

highly volatile region. “Greece is located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia

and Africa). It is an integral part of the Balkans […] and is also in close proximity to the

Black Sea and oil-rich regions of the Middle East and Caucasus,”344

Kollias and Şenesen

point out. Throughout history Greece was considered a seafaring nation. It is no surprise that

even now its navy cherishes the country’s naval heritage that predates that of most modern-

day sea powers. However, as Dokos and Tsakonas explain, “[Greece’s] strategic importance

was eclipsed twice in history, once by naval technology, shifting the traffic of sea commerce

to the Atlantic and the other, during the Cold War, when the central front of the continent

attracted most allied attention.”345

In many ways, “[i]n the past NATO and the West had generally regarded the

Mediterranean as the peripheral strategic theatre.”346

For Greece, however, the surrounding

waters represented a national necessity. Therefore, capable naval forces were considered

imperative for the country’s prosperity. Unfortunately, Greece and Turkey have not been able

to put aside their differences over the islands and waters of the Aegean Sea and as a

consequence Turkey’s military power continues to dictate Greece’s defense policies. Nowhere

can this be observed better than in its national defense strategy.

Although Turkey and Greece were essential NATO members (both joined in 1952)

assigned with challenging Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean and Middle East,

conflicting interests between the two NATO allies in the Aegean Sea led to a number of

precarious situations throughout the second half of the 20th

century. Even the conclusion of

the Cold War had little positive effect on both countries’ oppugnancy. It is astounding that

many Greeks – policymakers and citizens alike – perceive Turkey as an even greater threat

than the Soviet Union.347

“In trying to understand how Turkey is seen from the other shore of

the Aegean Sea, we can compare it with about the Turks’ perception of the USSR”,348

Sönmezoğlu and Ayman elaborate.

344

Thanos P. Dokos and Panayotis J. Tsakonas, “Greek-Trukish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” in: Greece

and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. A political Economy Perspective, eds. Christos Kollias

and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen (New York: Nova Science, 2003): 10.

Kollias, Greece and Turkey, 10. 345

Ibid. 346

Ibid. 347

See Kollias, Greece and Turkey, 37-48. 348

Kollias, Greece and Turkey, 38.

107

Illustration 19: The Hellenic Navy remains focused on territorial defense, thus relying on guided-missile attack craft.

As a neighbor and a historically conflicting partner of Tsarist Russia Turkey has

perceived (and continues to perceive) [its] northern neighbor as a source of threat

regardless of its regime. With sizeable territory, large population, enormous natural

resources and the perennial aim of reaching the ‘Warm Waters’ via controlling the

Turkish STRAITS […], this ‘big neighbor of the North’ has put potential threat and

sometime actual pressure on Anatolia [italics in the original]349

“Despite some differences, we can apply a similar scenario to the Turkish-Greek

relationship”, the two authors continue. “With a big territory, a large population, and a

dynamic economy […], Turkey seems to be perceived as a considerable source of pressure

[and threat] by Greece.”350

Proof to this claim can be

found in the Greek defense

white paper from 1996. In this

document the Ministry of

National Defense postulated “the

national military strategy which

provides the directives for the

use of the country’s military

power, […] defense planning,

[…] structure of the forces, [and]

decision-making in defense

matters.”351

The Hellenic Armed Forces were to be designed around a defensive strategy

capable of protecting the so-called ‘Greece-Cyprus Joint Defense Area’ against the most

vexing enemy: the Turks. Therefore, the “central axis of Greece’s military strategy [was] the

deterrence of the Turkish threat”.352

The Navy was to perform four principal tasks: 1)

deterrence, 2) naval presence, 3) sea-control and 4) power projection ashore.353

(The last

point, however, would have been difficult to achieve given Greece’s limited amphibious

capabilities).

In the early 1990s, the Hellenic naval forces reflected this defense strategy. Mostly

designed for territorial defense among the many islets of the Aegean Sea against a possible

Turkish incursion, the Navy exhibited effective ASW and ASuW capabilities. Its submarine

force consisted of eight Type 209 vessels and two old U.S. subs for training. 11 destroyers and

349

Ibid., 39. 350

Ibid., 30. 351

HMoND, Paper 1996-1997, np. 352

HMoND, Paper 1996-1997, np. 353

Ibid.

108

frigates, mostly veterans from World War II, were in service and newer ships of Dutch and

German design were either being bought abroad or built in Greek shipyards. The Dutch

Kortenaer-class, for example, represented “an excellent general-purpose frigate type optimized

for the anti-ship and anti-submarine roles”.354

Ultimately, ten of these warships would sail

under the Hellenic flag. The second type of warship that came into service during the 1990s

was the MEKO 200-class, similar to those built for the Turkish Navy, except for the

propulsion system and CIWS. Four of these ships were built and remain in service today.

Small surface combatants, especially patrol vessels and fast guided-missile attack craft, had

always played an important part in Greece’s naval doctrine. As Conrad Waters observes

“[t]here has been continued investment in this warship category in spite of the fact that it has

increasingly fallen out of favour elsewhere.”355

With tensions between the two neighbors somewhat decreased at the beginning of the

new millennium, so did Greek defense spending. While older vessels were decommissioned,

the Hellenic Armed Forces made an effort to restructure and modernize its naval fleet. It had

become apparent that an arms race with Turkey was neither useful nor could it be sustained.

The Navy’s main role therefore remained hinged on the strategy of territorial defense and

protection of the SLOCs. Investments were made to maintain the current fleet and replace

older ships with more sophisticated ones. As a result, it can be argued that this decision was

the only reasonable approach to the fiscal realities that confronted the Greek government. In

his thesis from 2001 Major Stergio Tsilikas comes to the following assessment of Greece’s

strategy:

Greek-Turkish relations have entered a period [in which] the prospects for resolution

are better now than they have been in years. A new rapprochement effort has unfolded

between the two countries since the 1999 destructive earthquakes in Turkey, and the

two sides have made gestures of reconciliation. Unfortunately, experience has shown

us that similar efforts in the past [were of only temporary nature and] in certain cases

were followed by major crisis. Greece's deterrence doctrine includes those elements

needed to restore the balance in the Greek-Turkish interaction and tries to ensure that a

low or medium level crisis will not get out of hand.356

The modernization of the Hellenic Navy proved to be a significant challenge as

payment difficulties postponed a number of naval projects. The procurement problem that

354

Chant, Ships, 126. 355


Stergios Tsilikas, “Greek Military Strategy: The Doctrine of Deterrence and Its Implications on Greek-

Turkish Relations,” (Master thesis, U.S. Navy: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2001).

www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a397555.pdf.

109

caught the most public attention was that of a successor to the ageing Type 209 submarines.

With Germany leading the field in AIP submarine technology, the Greek government awarded

the Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems, who also owned Hellenic shipyards, to build four new

Type 214-class boats. It was reported that despite these ships being launched as long ago as

2004, financial constraints enticed the Greek government to reject the vessels on the ground

of alleged technical shortcomings.357

The legal feud which lasted for years “has become

something of a cause célèbre in Greek political circles”, Waters notes. “A former Greek

defense minister has been jailed over the alleged handing of bribes from another company

[…] and other Greek officials are under investigation.”358

It seems this might also have an

effect on the decision from whom to procure a new air defense frigate. While the German

shipbuilder was one of the primary contenders for the bid, more recently, Greece has showed

interest in buying the French version of the FREMM frigate, which has already been sold to

Morocco and Egypt. However, any such procurement is far from certain as declining funds

make large-scale investments in the future seem increasingly unlikely. Greece’s obscure and

sometimes dubious acquisition processes largely contribute to the difficulty of predicting the

future of the Hellenic Navy:

There have been no comprehensive analyses or systematic studies of arms

procurement decision making in Greece, despite the high level of resources allocated

to defence. The lack of previous research is a major obstacle to examining this

process. The Greek defence planning process and in particular the arms procurement

decision-making process are also fairly closed in terms of public accountability,

transparency, parliamentary scrutiny, monitoring and oversight.359

What seems to be clear is that the Greek Navy will want to retain a large number of warships

in order to protect its interests in the region. The latest defense white paper, published in

2014, acknowledges the fact that the United States is in the process of pivoting to the Asian

Pacific Region, which, as a consequence, will “create new conditions for the security and

defence demands in the European area.”360

Greece intends to address these demands by

participating in international peacekeeping operations, supporting the transformation of

NATO, facilitating the creation of a joint European defense and security policy and

357



Stelios Alifantis and Christos Kollias, “Greece,” in: Arms Procurement Decision Making Volume II: Chile,

Greece, Malaysia, Poland, South Africa and Taiwan, ed. Ravinder Pal Singh (Oxford: University Press, 2000):

39-66. 360

Hellenic Ministry of Defense, White Paper, (2014): 18.

110

supporting the HADR effort in the Mediterranean Sea.361

Like Spain, France, and Italy,

Greece will have to shoulder the growing burden of mass migration from the African and

Asian continents towards Europe’s shores.

Though specific requirements in terms of military capabilities is not provided in the

white paper, it reiterates the basic tenets of Greece’s defense strategy, which has largely

remained unaltered since the end of the Cold War (and in fact since the creation of the

deterrent strategy after the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus in 1973).362

Greece will pursue the

“[e]nhancement of Hellenic Navy capabilities, area air defense capabilities, maritime

cooperation aircraft and modern submarines.”363

To what extent the Greek government will be

able to provide the necessary funds to fulfill these needs remains to be seen. It is quite

possible that the size of the fleet will decrease after 2020 if no replacement of the Kortenaer-

class frigates and Type 209 submarines can be found. Moreover, unlike its neighbor, its

“existing domestic construction appears to be paralyzed whilst longstanding plans of new

orders have been stalled.”364

Furthermore, it is also questionable if a replacement for the

Navy’s six P-3B Orion patrol planes (retired in 2011) can be found anytime soon.

Both Greece and Turkey currently entertain robust naval capabilities. However,

although both countries allocate significant funds towards their national defense, Turkey has

incrementally expanded its naval capabilities since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It has

also been able to revive a defense industry capable of building warships up to the size of

frigates and fit them out with domestically developed electronics and weapon systems – a

great achievement by any standard. But even Turkey has to make sure it does not get ahead of

itself. With national pride soaring high, not least among the country’s elite and advocates of

sea power demanding the production of an aircraft carrier to buttress Turkey’s status as a

regional power, the country might outrun itself, both financially as well as politically.

Maintaining a large naval force is both costly and manpower intense. Already there are too

little funds to properly balance all the navy’s capabilities. This would only grow more

difficult if a carrier would be put to sea, not to mention a naval air-wing of F-35s. Moreover,

in the long term, Turkey will also need to revoke its increasingly authoritarian rule, or else it

is likely to further alienate allies like the United States, and possibly reawaken hostilities with

its neighbors such as Greece.

361

HMnD, Paper 2014, 42. 362

For more information on the development of Hellenic naval strategy see thesis by Tsilikas, “Military

Strategy.” 363

HMnD, Paper 2014, 42. 364

Waters, “Europe 2014,” 69.

111

The future of the Hellenic Navy looks much bleaker. With the ongoing struggle

between the European Union and the current Greek government regarding its financial debt,

large-scale investments seem unlikely. It will, therefore, need to make smart choices in its

future procurement policies, not least making them a less likely victim of corruption and

dubious political schemes. Moreover, in the near and midterm Greece will likely have to

streamline its forces and make a number of painful concessions.

However, what is most important is that the two countries continue their political

dialogue, put their differences aside and move closer together. Turkey and Greece will

undoubtedly play an important role in Europe’s future. They will also determine to what

degree Europe has a say in world affairs and their respective maritime forces will be a

significant factor in this.

9) GERMANY: Reluctance and Reductions – Not Stepping Up to the Plate

Figure 13

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

% o

f G

DP


Figure 13 Germany: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

112

Figure 14

Since the end of the Cold War, the German armed forces have undergone one of the

most drastic changes of all European states. As was pointed out in the introduction, since its

founding in 1949 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany

invested heavily in its military forces. At the same time numerous other NATO members

deployed large forces on German soil in order to deter a possible attack by the Warsaw Pact.

Similarly, East Germany, officially the German Democratic Republic, had a huge number of

men and military matériel deployed on its territory. As a matter of fact, at the height of the

Cold War, the Soviets alone had more than 300,000 soldiers, organized in twenty tank and

motorized rifle divisions, in East Germany. These troops were considered “Category I”: the

best trained and equipped among the Soviet Army.365

During this period of time, the common assumption was that if deterrence were to fail

and war was to break out, the decisive battle would be fought on the Central European Front:

in Germany, France, Italy, and possibly also in Austria.366

American and NATO contingency

planning called on the West German armed forces to share the burden of confronting the bulk

of Soviet heavy mechanized forces. For that reason the German Army and Air Force received

the lion’s share of military funding.

The role of the German Navy, the Deutsche Bundesmarine, on the other hand, was for

the most part limited to operations in the littoral waters of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.

365

See William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy (London: McGraw-Hill, 1982): 180. 366

See Dieter Krüger, Felix Schneider (eds.), Die Alpen im Krieg: Historischer Raum, Strategie und

Sicherheitspolitik (Munich 2012), 123, 243, 256, 269.

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 24 14 6


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 14 Germany: Number of Major Vessels


113

The Navy was designed to play a key role within NATO’s maritime strategy in case of

conflict, conducting anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and mine

warfare (MW) against Soviet naval forces.367

In particular, the mining operations of the

Danish Straits, one of many critical-choke points in NATO planning, required the Germans to

sustain a large fleet of mine warfare vessels and substantial mine inventory.368

When the Iron Curtain had finally fallen, the Berlin Wall had crumbled, and East and

West Germany had finally celebrated their reunification, the German navy consisted of over a

hundred vessels, including nearly a dozen destroyers and frigates, 42 guided-missile patrol

boats and nearly 50 mine warfare ships. In addition, the Howaldtswerke in Kiel had designed

and produced what were considered among the best diesel-electric submarines in the world.

While the Bundesmarine had 18 Type 206, and six older Type 205 submarines in 1991,

numerous modified versions were sold to other states, including Venezuela, Chile, Norway,

Greece, and Indonesia.369

East Germany, on the other hand, had a much smaller force and

many of the ships were quickly put out of service. Unlike some advanced Soviet technology,

most notably the Mikojan-Gurewitsch MiG-29 combat aircraft, which was of interest to

Western defense analysts, the handful of Soviet-built frigates, corvettes and missile patrol

boats were of no relevance in the post-Cold War era and were quickly taken from service or

sold.370

Compared to other European powers, such as Great Britain, Italy and France, Germany

has for most of its history been considered a continental power. Its naval ambitions were

squandered in both World Wars and therefore Germany lacks the naval history and culture of

a blue-water fleet that is capable of conducting the full range of naval warfare.371

Despite the

German Empire’s vigorous attempt to gain the strategic upper hand prior to the outbreak of

World War I, by challenging Great Britain in a naval arms’ race, “the superiority of the

British Grand Fleet to the German High Sea Fleet […] was such that even the most aggressive

German commanders were loath to accept battle except in the most favourable

367

The naval strategy documents states that Americas allies would deploy their forces according to plan. “The

West German Navy would move to conduct forward operations in the Baltic, and the Turkish Navy, especially

its submarines would do the same in the Black Sea.” James D. Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy, 1984,” in: U.S.

Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected Documents, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz (Newport, RI:

Naval War College Press, 2008): 76. 368

German mine inventory countered roughly 10,000 mines. See Arthur Moreau, “Maritime Strategy

Presentation (for the Secretary of the Navy, 4 November 1982),” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected

Documents, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008): 38. 369

Grant, Ships, 41-46. 370

“In a significant increase to the Indonesia Navy a total of 39 ships have been procured from Germany

covering ships of the former East German Navy.” See Ezio Bonsignore et al. “Indonesia.,” The World Defense

Almanac 1992-1993, Vol 17, Issue 1 (1993): 190. 371

McGrath, “NATO trends,” np.

114

circumstance.”372

As Geoffrey Till points out, Admiral Tirpitz, who oversaw Germany’s

ascendance as a naval power, however, created a navy strong enough so that the Royal Navy

was neither able to “impose a close blockade” nor to attack the submarine bases on the

German coast.373

Moreover, the size and power of Tirpitz’s fleet limited Great Britain’s

ability to use its superior forces elsewhere. Designed as a constant threat, the German

battleships and battle cruisers were to tie down the Grand Fleet until favorable circumstances

would come about that would make an engagement possible. These are also the basic

elements of Mahan’s concept of a ‘fleet-in-being’.374

The only two battles involving larger

formations of each side, the Battle of Dogger Bank and battle of Jutland (known to the

Germans as the Skagerrakschlacht) were inconclusive. Ultimately, the German High Sea Fleet

would fail to be a deciding factor in World War I. As Gray observes, “the Royal Navy had

defeated German’s High Seas Fleet strategically in the war without benefit of victory in a

major fleet-to-fleet battle.”375

The Second World War would provide a similar experience for the German navy as

the Kriegsmarine attempted to draw strategic advantages from its war at sea. While Nazi

Germany’s submarine war against the convoys reinforcing Great Britain and Russia from the

United States was highly successful, Hitler’s surface fleet again posed little threat to major

Allied naval operations. In total, the Kriegsmarine had only two battleships,376

(the Bismarck

and Tirpitz), two battle cruisers (the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst) and a handful of heavy

cruisers. Its only aircraft carrier, the famous Graf Zeppelin, was never put into service.

German sea power in both World Wars, Gray argues, “was never imbued with that

determination to close with, and destroy, the enemy which was the tradition in Britain’s Royal

Navy.” As a large land power, “the Germans either lacked superiority in force or they had

ulterior objectives in mind, in support of which the hazards of battle would be an arguably

needless complication.”377

Considering the relative strategic inaptitude of naval forces throughout Germany’s

history, the evolution of the Bundesmarine since the end of the Cold War seems quite

372

Till, Seapower 175. 373

Ibid. 374

“This approach is of particular value for a fleet that knows it is inferior to its adversary (in number and

quality) and cannot realistically hope to gain or contest command of the sea by the normal method.“ Till,

Seapower, 173.

For information on the concept see Mahan, Naval Warfare, 255-275. The origin of the term is discussed in

further detail in Corbett, Principles, 215-228. 375

Gray, Leverage, 18. 376

The Bismark was sunk in 1941, while her sister, the Tirpitz, saw little actual combat in the waters off the

Norwegian coast and was sunk by a bomb raid in 1944. 377

Gray, Leverage, 225.

115

remarkable. Conceived as a littoral maritime force, limited both by its role and required

capabilities within NATO, the navy has developed into a multi-mission fleet that can be

deployed over great distances. The ability of this ‘Expeditionary Navy’ to conduct so-called

‘out-of-area operations’378

reflects the change in how the role of the Bundesmarine of the 21st

century is perceived by the German government. The defense white paper, published by the

German Defense Ministry in 2006 describes the capability of the navy as following:

[Die Marine wird] in die Lage versetzt sein, dauerhaft auch in großer Entfernung, im

multinationalen Rahmen und unter Bedrohung vor fremden Küsten operieren zu

können. […] Deutsche maritime Kräfte können ungehindert und frühzeitig in weit

entfernte Regionen vorausstationiert werden und diplomatische Aktivitäten flankieren.

Neben ihrer Befähigung zum bewaffneten Einsatz auf See können sie wirkungsvoll zu

Operationen an Land beitragen.379

Based on these criteria and the numerous reform efforts, including the abolishment of

conscription as a major goal of the Bundeswehrreform (initiated in 2000), the force structure

has undergone drastic changes. As Figure 14 illustrates, the number of warships has

plummeted over the last twenty years as older ships have been replaced by fewer, yet more

capable, vessels. Moreover, the entire naval structure has undergone major reorganization and

the current fleet is now divided into two flotillas, one in Kiel (Einsatzflotille 1: submarines,

guided-missile craft, mine warfare vessels, K-130 corvettes and tenders) and in

Wilhelmshaven (Einsatzflotille 2: frigates and larger support vessels); naval command

(Marinekommando) has been consolidated at Rostock while the only remaining naval aviation

base is located at Nordholz.380

Before I continue my analysis, it is important to briefly address some principal points

of discussion. Currently, there is considerable debate among defense analysts whether the

German armed forces in general, and the Navy in particular, can provide sufficient military

readiness and will be able to deploy and sustain forces abroad in the near term. The reduced

force level is likely to cause considerable strain on the available platforms and cause defense

planners quite a headache. Moreover, there are numerous indicators suggesting that Germany

378

The term ‘out of area’ is explained by the Oxford dictionary as follows: “(Of a military operation) conducted

away from the place of origin or expected place of action of the force concerned.” In the case of Germany it can

be explained as, “NATO Alliance operations and non-NATO coalition operations in which the United States and

other NATO allies participate and that occur outside or on the periphery of Alliance territory.” Myron Hury et al,

Interoperability, A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,

2000): Chapter 1, 1.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1235.html. 379

BmdV, Weißbuch 2006, 112-115. 380

Ulf Kaak, Die Schiffe der Deutschen Marine: 1990 bis heute (München: GeraMond Verlag, 2013): 6-7.

116

will remain unwilling to conduct any form of high-intensity warfighting in the foreseeable

future. Considering Germany’s experiences in Afghanistan and its reluctance to take part in

other large-scale military operations in recent years (Iraq 2003, Libya 2011, Syria 2014),

“[t]he key question is whether Germany will be willing [and able] to deploy forces in

contingencies beyond its borders.”381

Lacking the ability to project significant military power

at the upper end of the intensity spectrum, and with apparently no intention to make any large-

scale investments to increase these capabilities in the near future, it is likely that we will see

Germany only taking part in low-threat, peacekeeping operations, delegating responsibilities

in high-risk operations to others.

In the mid 1990s the German Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces published a

number of strategic white papers in an attempt to define the role of its military in the new

security environment. The Weißbuch 1994 put forward a defense policy framework in which

the German naval forces where to be transformed from the aforementioned littoral to a

modern blue-water navy (‘expeditionary navy’).382

As its principal task it was designed to

support the freedom of the sea and undertake crisis-management operations further away from

home: “[Die Neuausrichtung zu einer Marine, die] im Bündnisrahmen einen eigenständigen und

sichtbaren Beitrag zur Aufrechterhaltung des Prinzips der ‚Freiheit der Meere’, insbesondere jedoch

für maritime Maßnahmen in der internationalen Krisenbewältigung [leistet].”383

This reorientation also forced the Navy to reevaluate its fleet structure. Adjustments

had to be made to guarantee its effectiveness and future procurement decisions had to be

reconsidered, all under a far more restrictive financial atmosphere. By the mid-1990s many of

the Navy’s vessels were nearing the end of their service life, or were no longer capable of

conducting the new missions envisioned by the defense planners. For these reasons further

goals of the Bundesmarine were outlined in what was known as the ‘Fleet 2005’ and ‘Marine

2005’ plans. Their basic tenet was to restructure the Navy, gradually reducing its size, but

ultimately arriving at a force that constituted a well-balanced fleet, capable of conducting out-

of-area operations, albeit not of the same order as the four major European naval powers.384

The initially and, as so often, overoptimistic procurement plan envisioned the fleet to

be comprised of 16-20 frigates, 20-30 patrols boats, 20-30 MW vessels, 10-14 submarines,

15-17 support ships, 60-65 naval fighter-bombers, 35-40 search and rescue (SAR) helicopters

381


Despite being outlined in earlier white papers the term was only used in the 2006 defense white paper. See

BmdV, Weißbuch 2006, 112. 383

German Weißbuch 1994 quoted in Berthold Meyer, “Von der Entgrenzung nationaler deutscher Interessen.

Die politische Legitimation weltweiter Militäreinsätze,” in HSFK-Report 10/2007, (Frankfurt a.M. 2007): 16. 384 See Jürgen Rhades, “The German Navy Faces the Future,” Naval Forces 6 (1992): 18-22.

117

and 12-14 ASW and marine patrol craft.385

In his article from 1992, Jürgen Rhades rightfully

states that these numbers were merely provisional as “it [was] impossible to predict precisely

what [would] be required after 2005.”386

In fact, the actual number of ships envisioned for the

‘Fleet 2005’ was quickly revoked as the magnitude of defense cuts became apparent as Figure

13 indicates. By the time 2005 came along, the austerity measures had reduced the

Bundesmarine not by one-third, as Rhades had predicted, but effectively cut it in half. 387

Retired Admiral Sigurd Hess comments on this development by pointing to the fact

that the German Navy had to realize that it could neither replace its aging vessels to a

satisfactory degree, nor could it build and deploy the platforms necessary to conduct the

envisioned operations.

Die Marine bemühte sich zunächst mit gewissem Erfolg, für ihren Beitrag zum

Fähigkeitenkatalog der Bundeswehr den Vorteil zu nutzen, den ihr die

parlamentarische Unterstützung des Neubauprogrammes „Flotte 2005“ bot. Sie musste

jedoch sehr bald zur Kenntnis nehmen, daß der in diesem desaströsen Ausmaß noch

1991 für unmöglich gehaltene Einbruch der investiven Mittel mehr und mehr das in

Frage stellte, was das Ziel der „Flotte 2005“ ausmachte. Bald wurde der Marine,

sowohl aufgrund der Erfahrungen aus multinationalen Kriseneinsätzen, als auch durch

die Mitverfolgung des konzeptionellen Geschehens bei ihren Bündnispartnern, immer

klarer, daß sie sich einem doppelten Dilemma gegenübersah: Es fehlte ihr nicht nur

das Geld, um ihren gegenwärtigen Komponenten rechtzeitig die für eine sinnvolle

Durchhaltefähigkeit notwendige Anzahl von Neubauten zuzuführen, sondern ihr

fehlten damit auch die Mittel, die Bundeswehr mit den nun zusätzlich erforderlichen

Fähigkeiten ausstatten zu können, wie [die] Fähigkeit zum strategischen Seetransport.

Für die militärische Führung war in den Jahren 1994 bis 2003 weder in

verteidigungspolitischer noch in konzeptioneller Hinsicht eine wirkliche Perspektive

erkennbar.388

Despite these drastic changes, Germany has been able to produce and deploy highly

capable warships and weapon systems. Compared to the fleet of the 1980s, Germany

gradually put newer (yet fewer) ships to sea. These surface and subsurface combatants were

designed to conduct a larger variety of missions more effectively and over greater distances.

Based on Germany’s industrial prowess, its shipbuilding facilities have substantial experience

in producing state-of-the-art vessels. In particular, shipbuilders such as Blohm & Voss,

385 Rhades, “German Navy,” 20. 386 Ibid. 387 Ibid. 388

Sigurd Hess, “Die konzeptionelle Planung der Marine 1989-2002“, in: Die Wende. Die Deutsche Marine auf

dem Weg in die Einheit, eds. Stephan Huck, Hartmut Klüver (Bochum: Dieter Winkler Verlag, 2007): 21-30.

Quote taken from the author’s homepage: http://www.sigurd-hess.de/hauptseite-deutsche-version.

118

Illustration 20: Germany has established itself as the leading nation in the construction of diesel-electric submarines. This drawing illustrates the Type 214 AIP submarine sold to Greece.

Thyssen Nordseewerke and the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft have developed innovative

designs and delivered cutting-edge technology.

Besides the previously mentioned Type 206 submarine, the MEKO (Mehrzweck

Korvette), built since the 1980s, is representative for German technical ingenuity. Although

the MEKO design was never

procured by the German

Navy, it enjoyed

considerable commercial

success and units continue to

be operated by, inter alia,

Australia, Argentina and

Turkey.389

As we shall later

see, the modular design of

the MEKO already

incorporated many ideas of

later ship-building trends.

Parry points out that

“[reconfiguring] or [adapting] ships in the face of changing operational requirement […] has

often proved prohibitively expensive.”390

Therefore, concepts like the German MEKO, the

Royal Danish Navy’s Standard Flexible (Standflex) system on its Absalon-class command

ships and Ivor Huitfeldt frigates, or the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ship mission packages can

save costs and provide the needed flexibility.

As part of a more globally deployable naval force, Germany also sought to develop the

first air-independent (AIP) diesel-electric submarine. In general, diesel-electric powered

submarines need to surface regularly to reload their batteries and cannot stay submerged over

longer periods of times.391

For many years, only nuclear powered submarines had such a

capability. However, first tests of a fuel cell-based air-independent propulsion system were

already conducted as early as 1988. Due to technical challenges and fiscal restrictions, it

389

While the German government decided not to procure any of these ships for its own navy the MEKO design

was successfully sold to other states such as Turkey, Greece, Argentina and Nigeria. 390

Parry, Highway, 185-187. 391

“Submarines with diesel-electric propulsion generally have to surface every couple of days to run the

charging generator and recharge the batteries. However, with a special fuel cell system, subs can remain under

water for longer. The present record – set by an HDW Type 212A submarine – is 14 days. If a submarine is

unable to surface, the regulations require that the crew is able to survive for at least six days.” Stefan Nitschke

and Stephen Elliott, “Under Water,” Naval Forces, http://www.nafomag.com/2015/01/under-water-faq-on-

submarines.html.

119

would take another 15 years until the first AIP Type 212A submarine was delivered to the

German Bundesmarine. The new submarine, a joint venture between Germany and Italy, gave

its commanders the unique ability to remain submerged for much longer periods of time than

previously possible owing to the vessel’s fuel cells. What is so extraordinary about this

technology is that the boats are very quiet, thus very difficult to locate by enemy forces. In

general, diesel-electric submarines are known, and feared, for their ability to operate at a very

low noise level, loitering in shallow waters where their comparatively louder and larger

nuclear counterparts are less willing to venture. With the inherent limitations of the diesel-

electric propulsion having been overcome, the new German submarines are even more

difficult to locate. Operating the Type 212A the German Navy now “has a submerged

endurance bettered only by those few navies able to afford nuclear-propelled boats, as well as

an overall level of stealth that is perhaps second-to-none.”392

On the downside, Germany’s intention to build and deploy 10-14 such submarines as

envisioned during the 1990s “is little more than a distant memory”,393

Waters remarks. All

Type 206 subs have been decommissioned, leaving the Navy with no more than six

submarines.394

What is more, despite the Type 212’s increased endurance – necessary in out-

of-area operations – the Bundesmarine is “still some distance away from furnishing the true

offensive oceanic proficiency of high-speed attack submarines powered by high-capacity

nuclear reactors,”395

such as the United Kingdom or France operate.

In regard to surface combatants, the shift towards a more globally-oriented navy is the

most visible. Not only have many of the former MW and ASuW vessels, such as the

Frankenthal minehunters and Tiger-class guided-missile craft, been taken from service, but

much more capable platforms such as the F-123, F-124, F-125, and K-130 have been, or are

in the process of being commissioned.

Beginning with the F-123 Brandenburg-class, a ship with a total length of 139 meters

and a displacement of over 4700 tons, the German navy commissioned the first of a number

of very large and capable frigates. Despite being designed during the 1980s as an ASW frigate

to replace the increasingly obsolescent Lütjens-class destroyers (commissioned in 1969), the

F-123 carried a wide variety of ASW, ASuW, and AAW weapons and, at the time of

construction, also incorporated novel elements of stealth in its design. In addition, the number

392

Waters, “Type 212A,” 152. 393

Ibid., 151. 394

The final two Type 212As for the German Navy will enter service in 2015. 395

Waters, “Type 212A,” 152.

120

Illustration 21: While other European navies have expanded their amphibious forces, Germany has invested in highly sophisticated frigates, such as the F-124 Sachsen-class seen here firing a Standard SM-2 missile.

of crew could be somewhat reduced due to increased automation and its maintenance cycles

were prolonged.396

Its successor, the F-124 Sachsen-class, is in general a refined version of the F-123 and

was based on a trilateral cooperation for a future frigate between Germany, the Netherlands

and Spain. After the initial plan (the NRF-90 project) to build a common frigate for the eight

most important NATO members failed in the late 1980s, a memorandum of understanding

among the aforementioned three nations was signed in 1990.397

Its provisions required the

future frigate to be deployable in operations across the intensity spectrum. In essence, the ship

had to be a multipurpose platform. At the time, Michael Herwig pointed out that the focus had

shifted away from anti-submarine warfare, towards anti-surface and anti-air warfare.

Therefore, “[t]his new emphasis [demanded] improved equipment in the areas of surveillance,

communications, air defence and C2 [command and control].”398

This, he concluded, could

have “hardly been [achieved] by German, Dutch, or Spanish industry alone.”399

Although the

final versions of each country’s ships (the Álvaro de Bazán, De Zeven Provinciën, and

Sachsen-class) are different in design and combat systems, all of them exhibit substantial

capabilities, hitherto unprecedented in vessels of this class.

While the Spanish

Bazán frigate (also known

as F-100) relies on the

American Aegis combat

system to deal with aerial

threats, the Dutch and

German ships feature the

long-range 3-D volume

search radar (SMART-L)

and APAR multi-function

radar (an Active

Electronically–Scanned

Array, or AESA in short).

400 As Massimo Annati

396

Chris Chant Kriegsschiffe Heute (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 2006): 75. 397

Herwig, “Trilateral,” 35. 398

Ibid. 399

Ibid. 400

An interesting article regarding the German and Dutch AAW frigates can be found in Massimo Annati,

“German and Dutch AAW Frigates at Sea,” Military Technology, Vol. 26, 3-4 (2002): 102-108.

121

notes, “the APAR represented a very significant design, development and industrial

challenge,” while “the sophisticated technology used for [the SMART-L radar] allows its use

even in littoral scenarios, [as] it was especially designed to deal with small low-flying

targets”.401

Therefore, both radars on board the Sachsen-class are excellent examples of

Europe’s defense industry holding its own in this specific sector.402

Another common feature

is that all three classes deploy the American Standard SM-2 air defense missile fired from the

ships’ Mk 41 vertical launch system.

Finally, the three units of the Sachsen-class are among the most capable and well-

balanced AAW-frigates in the world and are, in fact, the only frigates to deploy anti-air

missile systems for all tiers of air defense.403

Moreover, Germany could integrate the SM-3

missiles in its frigates as part of the United States’ and NATO’s plan to establish a sea-based

theater ballistic missile system. However, so far, there are few indications that the German

government will go forward with such procurements.404

Within NATO, these vessels offer air and missile-defense to other, less capable units

and have also been deployed together with U.S. carrier strike groups over the past years. In

2013, and for the first time in history, a German frigate (F220, Hamburg) was assigned to

coordinate the air space around the strike group, thus being solely responsible for its air

defense.405

The growing interaction with other fleets, however, is only part of Germany’s

effort to increase its international presence. By and large, Germany’s involvement in

international operations has grown considerably over the past two decades. In the context of

its strategic reorientation and growing engagement abroad, the German Navy has been

deployed in numerous missions: from clearing mines in the Persian Gulf to fighting piracy off

the coast of Somalia.

The post-Cold War Bundesmarine conducted its first larger operation “Southern

Cross” in 1994, in an effort to evacuate German UNISOM II troops from Mogadishu,

Somalia. Between July 1994 and July 1996 the navy also took part in enforcing the embargo

against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. As a continuous part of NATO’s Standing Naval

401

“The programme was aimed at the realisation of a very advanced multi-function radar, in some way

comparable to the US SPY-1 and able to offer adequate performance to control both SM-2 and ESSM missiles,

but at the same time remain well below the size, weight and power characteristics of its US counterpart.” Ibid.,

103. 402

The SMART-L and APAR were developed by the Dutch Signaal company, now Thales. 403

RIM-166 for low-tier AAW, ESSM for medium-tier, and SM-2 Block IIIb for high-tier air defense. 404

See Footnote 5, in Norman Friedman, “Technology Review. Ballistic Missile Defense And The USN,” in:

Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): 191. 405 “Vom Flugzeugträgerverband verabschiedet - Fregatte "Hamburg" macht Heimatumdrehungen!” Presseportal 18.06.2013, http://www.presseportal.de/pm/67428/2495613/vom-flugzeugtr-gerverband-verabschiedet-fregatte-hamburg-macht-heimatumdrehungen.

122

Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), German destroyers and frigates participated in

nearly 6000 boarding operations and inspections at sea.406

The Navy’s longest-standing naval

deployment thus far has been its anti-terrorism mission as part of Operation Active

Endeavour. In an act of unprecedented solidarity, following the attacks of 9/11, the German

Bundestag decided to deploy its naval forces to the waters around the Horn of Africa and

consequently took command of joint task force CTF-150 on a number of occasions.407

Though publicly criticized, the German government remained adamant that the mission was

necessary to counter the threat that terrorist activities posed to the good order at sea: “Bei der

Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus kommt Seewegen eine besondere Bedeutung zu.

Im Vordergrund stehen dabei die Überwachung des Schiffsverkehrs und die Unterbrechung

von Versorgungslinien terroristischer Organisationen.”408

Germany’s commitment to

peacekeeping operations was buttressed by its leading naval role in the United Nation’s

UNIFIL mission off the coast of Lebanon. Based on Resolution 1701, the Bundesmarine

has been assisting and training the Lebanese Navy since 2006.409

The latest additions to Germany’s naval forces, the K-130 Braunschweig-class

Corvette, the F-125 Baden-Württemberg-class frigate, and the Berlin-class combat support

ship, reflect Germany’s effort to adapt to the new maritime security environment. As

mentioned, the Navy’s guided-missile Tiger, Gepard, and Albatros class patrol boats had

limited ability to perform out-of-area operations. As the maritime journalist Guy Toremans

points out, “[t]he one-watch boats had a very limited endurance by nature of their limited

seaworthiness and the fatigue factor impacting their crews.”410

Keeping these shortcomings in

mind, in 2001 a consortium of three German shipbuilders was awarded a €880 million

contract to build a first batch of five new corvettes. Incorporating signature-reduction

features, modern combat systems and potent AAW and ASuW capabilities, the

Braunschweig-class undoubtedly can meet a number of the Navy’s requirements over the next

decades. However, despite being “dispatched worldwide to undertake surveillance missions,

embargo and counter-drug operations, as well as, potentially, to participate in combat

406 “NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard,” IFOR Final Factsheet, 2 October 1996. http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm. 407 Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Europe and Russia,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 96. 408 “Die Operation Enduring Freedom,” Bundeswehr, 4 Dec. 2013. http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw. 409 Pierre Schubjé, “UNIFIL: Deutsch-libanesische Kooperation – Ein Zwischenbericht,” Marine Forum 1-2 (2014): 14-16. 410

Guy Toremans, “Significant Ships – Braunschweig Class Corvettes. Eagerly awaited by the German Navy,”

in Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): 129.

123

missions,”411

the vessels remain quite small. “One of the lessons already learned from the K-

130 programme”, Toremans adds, “was that, although significantly larger than the fast patrol

boats, the new corvettes have still proved to be a bit too small to operate comfortably and

effectively in support of some of the German Navy’s growing mission requirements around

the globe.”412

This will put more strain on the continuously shrinking number of large surface

combatants, such as the F-124s and new F-125 ‘Stabilization Frigate’.

If one thing the F-125 Baden-Württemberg-class does not lack, it is size. Its builders

proudly state that with a length of 149 meters and a displacement of over 7,300 tons it will be

the largest frigate ever built. The four ships of the class will replace the eight units of the Type

122 (Bremen-class), starting in 2016. Unlike its predecessors, (designed primarily for ASW),

according to a German naval expert, “[t]he design of the new frigate class reflects everything

that is important for littoral warfare.”413

These modern-day littoral operations, however,

should not be confused with those against the Soviet Baltic Fleet. While during the Cold War

German combatants could operate close to their homeports for shorter periods, the littoral

operations nowadays take place hundreds and thousands of miles away from home. In

concordance with Germany’s defense white paper the design of these ships reflects these

missions-capabilities, namely to project power into foreign littoral waters for long periods of

time, in order to conduct crisis management and conflict resolution operations:

[D]auerhaft auch in großer Entfernung im multinationalen Rahmen und unter

Bedrohung vor fremden Küsten operieren zu können. Damit trägt die Marine dazu bei,

Krisen und Konflikte bereits am Ort ihres Entstehens einzudämmen und – wenn

politisch gefordert – zu bewältigen.414

For those reasons, the F-125 arguably will not provide the same high-end combat

capabilities the Sachsen-class can bring to the table. In particular, its air defense and anti-

submarine capabilities will be limited when compared to other ships of its size,

notwithstanding that the ships have considerable room for upgrades. On the other hand, owing

to increased automation, the crew will be considerably smaller than on previous ships (120

sailors, compared to 200 on the Sachsen) – an important factor in times of reductions in

military personnel. Moreover, the Bundesmarine intends to employ a dual crewing concept

411

Toremanns, “Braunschweig,” 146. 412

Ibid., 147. 413

Sebastian Bruns, quoted in Albrecht Müller, “New Frigate Underscores Germany’s Shift From Cold War

Naval Combat,” Defense News, 13 Jan. 2014.

http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140113/DEFREG01/301130031/New-Frigate-Underscores-Germany-

s-Shift-From-Cold-War-Naval-Combat. 414

BmdV, Weißbuch 2006, 122.

124

much like that aboard U.S. submarines (rotating the crews while on deployment instead of

long tours of a single crew), thereby allowing the frigate to conduct operations for up to two

years and 5,000 hours at sea per year.415

Again, this analysis is not intended to be a simple “bean-counting exercise”.416

As was

already pointed out in the introductory chapter to these case studies, apart from the number of

hulls, other important factors, such as “technical quality, professional skill, and maintenance

efficiency”, have to be considered in order to successfully come to a meaningful

understanding of a navy’s capabilities. 417

As a matter of fact, the German Navy would by all

means score high in the second and third category and her current ability to deploy naval

forces, to many observers, also seems to be sufficient. The already quoted RAND study, for

example, points out that Germany’s defense budget has remained constant during the financial

crisis and in some cases has slightly grown over the past years.418

Furthermore, so the study

went on, the “changes to the navy structure are expected to be less drastic than those to the

army.”419

However, Germany’s commitment towards the maritime realm does not pass the

test under closer examination. While the Navy arguably was not hit as hard by the recent cuts

as its sister services, there is not much cause for celebration.

The German Navy is being stretched increasingly thin in support of its many missions.

Currently, its vessels are engaged in the UNIFIL mission and the E.U. anti-piracy operation

Atalanta. They contribute warships to the Standing NATO Maritime Groups as well as the

Standing NATO MCM Groups (mine-countermeasure) on a constant basis and, finally, air

defense frigates regularly deploy with U.S.-carrier strike groups. At the same time, the force

level has dropped to 11 frigates, five K-130 corvettes, and a small number of mine warfare

vessels. While the third and final Berlin-class combat group supply replenishment ship

represents an important addition to Germany’s ‘expeditionary fleet’ the decommissioning of

the last Gepard-class guided-missile craft by 2016 will leave the Bundesmarine with

alarmingly few combatants until the late 2020s (27 submarines and surface combatants in

total).420

The aforementioned maintenance efficiency and ability to deploy forces will become

increasingly challenging in the future, due to the wear and tear on the existing fleet.

Moreover, given Germany’s economic health – and the political, as well as military

influence it could thus conceivably wield – the government has to accept criticism for its

415



Ibid., 117. 418


Ibid., 30. 420

Bonsignore, “Germany,” 131.

125

general reluctance to use ‘hard power’, even in cases where it would be generally considered

justifiable. The NATO-led military intervention in Libya, for example, not only created deeps

rifts between the NATO members and emphasized the absence of a common European

defense strategy, but it also heralded the most likely form of the future Western response to

conflict and humanitarian crisis. As part of the ad-hoc ‘Coalition of the Willing and Able’,

neutral Sweden took part in enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya, while Germany, which for

over 40 years owed its safety and security to her NATO allies, watched from the sidelines. At

the time, “the German decision not to participate in the Libyan operation caught many

officials by surprise and raises questions about whether the Alliance can rely on Germany’s

support for future power-projection missions – even ones, like Libya, that are carried out

under a UN mandate.”421

More recent events, such as the threat of force against Bashar Al-

Assad’s regime in Syria in the summer of 2013, or the current effort against ISIS, underscore

Germany’s antipathy to commit its military forces to operations that entail a certain degree of

risk.

To sum up, since the end of the Cold War, the German Navy has undergone a drastic

reform. Today it bears little resemblance to the Cold War fleet patrolling the waters of the

North and Baltic Sea. Apart from a small number of increasingly obsolete ships, the Navy has

commissioned a number of state-of-the-art submarines, corvettes and frigates. Germany

continues to be a leader in key naval technologies and has had substantial commercial success

on the naval market over the last two decades – gaining contracts from navies around the

world. In addition, the Germans have successfully deployed naval forces in a number of

contingencies, albeit most of them being on the lower end of the intensity spectrum.

However, the drastic budget cuts that ensued as a consequence of the Soviet collapse

have taken a detrimental toll on the naval services. Vice Admiral Hans-Rudolf Boehmer’s

predictions from 1996 of the Navy’s future would almost seem laughable, would they not

have such substantial ramifications for Europe’s security in an increasingly competitive

maritime environment:

In the year 2010, [the Admiral predicted] the Navy will not be much different in size

than it is today, however, it will be significantly more capable. There will be 15

frigates, 10-12 submarines and it will include a strong mine countermeasure capability

421

Larrabee, Austerity, 98.

126

– Further, there will be a mixture of modern corvettes and not-so-modern patrol boats

[and the] naval air arm will still be flying the Tornados.422

Quite frankly, the Bundesmarine can call none of these capabilities its own. The surface and

subsurface fleet remain considerably smaller than envisioned, while the naval air arm has long

handed over its Tornados to the Air Force, and to date the Navy does not possess any

noteworthy amphibious forces.

Compared to other states of its size and wealth, (the other European G7 members for

example) Germany’s naval commitment can be considered lacking. In his critical assessment

of Europe’s navies, McGrath summarizes Germany’s naval abilities as “[falling] mainly

within the lower end of the operational spectrum.”423

Although he recognizes Germany’s

contribution to peacekeeping and stabilization efforts (which follow from its strategic

reorientation throughout the post-Cold War era), he makes clear that its “cruising navy

provides little in the way of power projection.”424

Given the considerable financial burden

countries such as France and the U.K. and, to a lesser degree, Italy and Spain have to carry to

maintain their well-balanced fleets, (which in the case of the former include costly nuclear

deterrent forces) Germany’s naval investments seem disproportionally small. With tensions

rising on Europe’s northern and southern flanks and Russia’s reemergence as a naval power, it

remains to be seen if Germany’s policymakers will take these changes within the geopolitical

security environment into consideration. Ultimately, however, “[t]he interesting question is

not whether the navy supports Germany’s worldview and view of itself; [but]” so McGrath

concludes ”it is whether a nation as powerful, rich, and networked as Germany, is

underinvesting in naval power while free riding on the backs of US, UK, and French naval

capabilities to a greater extent than other European nations.”425

422

Hans-Rudolf Boehmer, “… Today, the Navy is Better and More Capable Than Ever Before.” Naval Forces,

Special Issue 5 (1996): 10. 423

McGrath, “NATO trends,” np. 424

Ibid. 425

Ibid.

127

10) DENMARK and the NETHERLANDS: Commercial Might and Military

Inaptitude

Figure 15

Figure 16

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

% o

f G

DP


Figure 16 Denmark: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 5 3 0


0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 18 Denmark: Number of Major Vessels


128

Figure 17

Figure 18

Both the Netherlands and Denmark are interesting examples of how the principles of

sea power have evolved over the course of history. Centuries ago, both countries belonged to

the major sea powers of their time, fashioning large merchant fleets as well as powerful

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

% o

f G

DP


Figure 17 The Netherlands: Defense Spending in % of

GDP

Military Spending

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 5 4 4


0 2 4 6 8

10 12 14 16

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 18 The Netherlands: Number of Major Vessels


129

armadas of warships.426

As a consequence of this union between military and commerce –

conducted by many, but refined by the Dutch and ultimately mastered by the British –Mahan

concluded that the “[c]ontrol of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy [meant]

predominant influence in the world”.427

As mentioned, many renowned naval strategists

thereafter have generally accepted these principles.428

However, in this day and age, in the opinion of many European governments, large

and highly-capable naval forces are no longer considered essential to the prosperity of their

nations. Their country’s economy, despite being largely dependent on the transportation of

goods by sea (even those of landlocked countries such as Austria), do just fine without

maintaining large and expensive fleets. What is remarkable, however, is that even seafaring

nations of old, such as those under discussion in this chapter, worry little about their inability

to buttress their economic power with credible hard power in the form of a capable navy.

There are a number of reasons for such a development given the extent of geopolitical

changes over the last centuries. As we have heard, one reason that cannot be disregarded is

that the Western world has evolved into a community of (mostly) shared values and

comparatively little rivalry. More importantly, however, is that in a world of global commerce

in which 90 percent of materials and goods are shipped, one country has taken it upon itself to

protect the quintessential freedom of the sea, namely the United States by means of its navy

and its citizens’ tax dollars. For other countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, this of

course represents a welcome convenience. Both states rarely have to fear that their

commercial ships will fall prey to commerce raiders or are sunk by enemy sea powers, which

in the past were often of European origin. They can expand their commercial activities and in

turn gain large revenue by transporting goods to and fro between Europe, the United States,

the oil-rich Middle East and Asia. As a matter of fact, both countries have expanded their

commercial shipping capabilities, while their military capabilities have often been neglected.

To briefly outline this disparity, it is important to mention that the Netherlands are

dependent on the unimpeded flow of commerce at sea. Moreover, they have invested huge

sums to develop their seaport complex at Rotterdam into the fourth largest port in the world

and the largest in Europe (based on the amount of containers ‘TEU’ handled per day). At a

size of over 12,500 ha it can accommodate even the largest ship and has a throughput of a

426

The Danish-Norwegian personal union included territorial possessions in the High North, the African West

coast, India and the Caribbean. Its power was surpassed by the Dutch, whose East India Trading Company

propelled it to the forefront of political power during the 17th

and 18th

centuries. 427

Mahan, quoted in Till, Strategy, 57. 428

See Ibid., 1-5.

Till concludes that “So far, […] the maritime narrative seems to be holding true.” Ibid., 5.

130

Illustration 22: A Dutch frigate makes a sharp turn starboard as a gigantic Triple E containership of the Danish Maersk shipping company passes by in the background. Both countries are heavily invested in commercial trade at sea, yet have relatively small naval forces.

mindboggling 450 million tons a year.429

Of even greater magnitude is the Danish commercial

shipping industry. As Parry highlights, “the Danes are the understated, high achieving

denizens of the maritime industry”.430

The Danish Møller-Maersk shipping company is the

largest and arguably most famous shipping company in the world. Their huge Triple E

container ships have been specifically designed for the route between Asia and Europe and

can carry over 18,000 TEU.431

With over 249,000 tons, a single ship of this class has a

displacement five times that of the entire Danish Navy combined (around 54,000 tons

including its auxiliaries). Although many of these ventures are made by international

consortium enterprises as well as private investors and are, strictly speaking, not state matters,

it is nonetheless striking how successfully commercial shipping can be pursued in these

countries without the military power one would expect necessary to underpin and protect it in

times of crisis.

With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent defense retrenchment among all

European states, the naval forces of both the Netherlands and Denmark were slowly reduced.

While initially, new and highly innovative designed warships were able to absorb the gradual

decommissioning of older vessels, the latest defense cuts have either forced both navies to

drastically reduce the size of their fleet (as in the case of the Netherlands), or to give up

significant capabilities altogether (as in the case of Denmark). No matter how much better the

429

See Parry, Highway, 57. For more information see homepage of the Port of Rotterdam:

ttp://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/Port/port-in-general/Pages/default.aspx. 430

See Parry, Highway, 52-53. 431

Ibid., 54.

131

new warships, OPVs, and replenishment ships are, current defense spending will not allow

them to be used to their full potential, nor will it permit the navies to keep pace with naval

developments elsewhere. This circumstance might in fact one day lead to a similar detriment

both countries already had to painfully experience when their prosperous seaborne trade fell

victim to extrinsic events and hostile actors, who chose to pursue their interest by military

means, ultimately ending in years of hardship for many Danish and Dutch citizens.432

10.1) Denmark

Unlike some of its neighbors, the Danish military might was already eclipsed in the

early 19th

century. Throughout the last century, the Danish military were only able to maintain

comparatively small naval forces considering its strategically important position.433

Hence,

during the Cold War it was understood that the main brunt of a Soviet naval attack from the

Baltic Sea had to be absorbed by West German, Dutch and Norwegian forces, whereas

Denmark’s small flotilla could only provide modest support to ASW, and ASuW operations

against the Soviets around the Danish peninsula and the critical outlet of the Baltic Sea in

particular. Heavy mining of the critical chokepoint was in essence the Royal Danish Navy’s

(RDN) primary task within NATO planning.434

By 1990 the Danish Navy maintained a fleet

of five relatively old diesel-electric submarines of Norwegian and German design, three small

Nils Jule-class frigates, a number of patrol vessels with limited war fighting capabilities

(mainly used for protecting national fishing rights), as well as a number of guided-missile and

torpedo boats from the 1960s and 1970s. All nine warships were of similar age.435

Noteworthy are Denmark’s icebreakers which are needed for operations around Greenland,

part of the Danish Crown Lands. In the case of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,

however, Greenland could not have been reached by the small Danish fleet, thus making them

irrelevant to the Navy’s contingency planning.436

432

Mahan discusses Holland’s dependence on the sea: “[I]f England was drawn to the sea, Holland was driven to

it; without the sea England languished, but Holland died. In the height of her greatness, when she was one of the

chief factors in European politics, a competent native authority estimated that the soil of Holland could not

support more than one eighth of her inhabitants.” When the disastrous war with England in 1653-54 drew to a

close it had turned the Dutch harbors into “a forest of masts; the country was full of beggars; grass grew in the

streets, and in Amsterdam fifteen hundred houses were untenanted”. Mahan, Naval Warfare, 32-34. 433

Although it only had a relatively small Navy the Danes had some heavy mechanized forces stationed in

Germany. 434

The Danish Navy had an inventory of roughly 6,600 mines. See Moreau, “Maritime Strategy,” 38. 435

Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 104-114. 436

In fact, the icebreakers were “civilian-manned and subordinate to the Ministry of Trade and Shipping. See

Ibid., 113.

132

All in all, the Danish Navy could hardly be considered even a second-rate naval power

at the time and further defense cuts proved to be hardly encouraging. Faced with increasingly

strong headwinds, Danish shipbuilders, however, developed one of the most innovative ship

designs to date – the ‘Standard Flex’. “It seems somehow appropriate that the country that

produced Lego should have been a pioneer of naval warship modularisation”, Parry

observes.437

Already in the 1980s, the naval service had come up with a similar idea as was

pursued in the German MEKO design, namely that a ship should be able to quickly adapt and

transform to the needs of the Navy. To make such a flexible design possible the Standard Flex

300 multi-role vessels (Flyvefisken-class) were built with four StanFlex container positions

onboard. (See Illustration 23). In each position, “among others, medium caliber guns, anti-

ship missile launching systems, air defense missile launching systems, MCM control systems,

Variable Depth (VD) sonars, equipment for pollution control and hydrographic equipment”438

could be fitted and, if needed, swapped within a few hours.439

These containers, Parry

explains, “are precisely engineered to allow connections with power, cooling,

communications, water and data supplies [and the] weapon system or sensor is mounted on,

or in the module, with the electronics, power machinery, magazine and supporting equipment

inside.”440

As part of the necessary restructuring of the Danish Navy after the Cold War, the

Committee Concerning the Danish Armed Forces’ Equipment laid down a long-term

procurement policy which stipulated, or better said, recommended that a large part of the fleet

(17 ships) should be replaced by a total of six large vessels, all of which were to incorporate

the StandFlex modules.441

Two units would evolve into the Absalon-class command and

support vessel, on which, in turn, the three highly innovative multi-purpose Iver Huitfeldt

frigates are based. These five ships compose the largest part of the Dutch Navy and will be

described in more detail shortly.

The development of both the Dutch and Danish naval forces over the past twenty-five

years mirrors that of most other European NATO members. As has been discussed, many

navies – such as the British, the French, Italian, Spanish and German – have shifted their

focus from operations against the Soviet Navy in the Atlantic, North Sea and Mediterranean

437


Hans Harboe-Hansen, “The Royal Danish Navy’s Modernisation Programme,” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 6

(1997): 93. 439

For a description of Flyvefisken see Grant, Kriegsschiffe, 104. Initially, swapping StanFlex containers took 48

hours, but this time has been significantly reduced. See Guy Toremans’, “Significant Ships. Iver Huitfeldt Class

Frigates: Spearhead of the Royal Danish Navy” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad Waters

(South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 108. 440

Parry, Highway, 186 441

Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 92-93.

133

Illustration 23: A telling description of the possibilities the StanFlex system offers.

to expeditionary or out-of-area operations in littoral waters, most notably around the African

continent. In essence, power projection over great distances, and more importantly, from the

sea onto land has taken precedence over the concept of sea-control. Therefore, European

fleets operate larger vessels with notably better sea keeping characteristics which are also

capable of conducting amphibious operations and can remain at sea over longer periods of

time. The general strategic reorientation during this period can be summarized as follows:

[T]raditional blue water navies are taking an increasing interest in littoral warfare and

navies, which so far have focus upon operations in their national brown waters, may

be seeking to improve their blue water capability in order to offer their littoral warfare

experience in other parts of the world.442

It just so happens that this concept has been put into question as of late. This is most

noticeable within the U.S. naval community, which has largely revoked its previous naval

strategy focused on

littoral warfare in light of

China’s naval buildup.

The U.S. Navy has

ramped up its sea-control

and anti-A2/AD

capabilities by adding

additional destroyers and

attack submarines to its

fleet instead of the

formerly planned large

number of littoral combat

ships.443

Furthermore, resurgent Russian naval activities have painfully exposed Europe’s

shortcomings in conducting ASW and ASuW warfare, a métier the European allies used to

take great pride in. These aspects will be discussed in more detail in the penultimate chapter.

Returning to Denmark’s growing blue-water capability, it is safe to say that the

construction of the five large surface combatants has strained the small Danish defense budget

to such an extent that as a consequence some vital capabilities were relinquished outright.

442

Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 92 443

Eight Block III Virginia-class attack submarines are on order with a class of 30 being planned. Four

additional Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are being constructed and nine more have been ordered. See Ezio

Bonsignore et al., “United States of America,” Military Technology: The World Defense Almanac 2014, Issue 1

(2014): 36.

134

Although Danish defense planners had made tentative provisions for a replacement of the

nation’s ageing submarine fleet (a class of three or four AIP submarines were to be bought as

part of the trilateral Viking program between Norway, Denmark and Sweden444

), the

underwater flotilla was disbanded in 2004 and it is highly unlikely that we will see her return

anytime soon.445

Considering Denmark’s dependence on commercial shipping and its exposed

position at the entrance to the Baltic Sea, more cautious observers may be tempted to question

the decision to abandon the submarine program.

In 2003, the keel of the first 4,500 ton Absalon-class flexible support ship was laid

down in the Maersk Odense Staalskibsvaerft. At a length of 137 meters and a width of 19.5

meters this class of warship was much larger than the Niels Juels-class corvettes in service,

which throughout their service life had suffered under their “inherent size handicap which

basically is reflected in a limited endurance”.446

Not only was the Absalon much larger, it was

an entirely different kind of ship, and in many ways one of a kind. The relatively large

superstructure was designed to reduce the ship’s radar cross section and houses a

multipurpose ‘flex deck’ which can carry various modules. Main battle tanks can be

transported as well as containerized hospital modules for HADR operations. Two landing

craft can be embarked and up to 46 vehicles can be taken aboard via the stern ramp. Even

more flexibility is provided by the weapon modules installed amidships. Four quad Harpoon

SSM launchers and three 12-cell Mk56 VLS find space between the main mast and funnels

and are able deploy a total of 36 ESSM missiles in addition to the 16 Harpoon SSMs. A single

127mm/62 cal Mk 45 gun is mounted in the ‘A’ position on the bow which is overlooked by

an Oerlikon 35mm CIWS. A second CIWS is mounted above the hangar. Finally the Absalon-

class can engage enemy surface and subsurface threats with its ship and helicopter-launched

torpedoes.447

Due to their impressive capabilities, these ships can rightfully be compared to

other modern frigates, despite being appointed mainly to support duties.448

The reorganization of Denmark’s defense sector continued throughout the first decade

of the new millennium. The Danish Defense Agreement 2005-2009, highlighted that

“[c]hanges in the international security environment require[d] the Danish Defence to

strengthen its capacities in two central areas: 1) Internationally deployable military capacities

444

See Baker III, Combat Fleets, 738. 445

See Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 95. 446

Ibid., 94. 447


Ibid., 158.

135

and 2) the ability to counter terror acts and their consequences.”449

As mentioned, the short-

range submarine force disbanded and a number of StanFlex 300 and minelayers were phased

out in order to gain sufficient funding for the rest of the fleet to actively take part in NATO’s

Standing Naval Forces and Response Force.450

At the same time, the country committed itself

to the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. In January 2002 the Danish Parliament decided to

deploy its troops to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Its main battle

tanks, infantry units and Special Forces were heavily engaged over the course of the mission

to Helmand Province and among all contributors, the country suffered the highest percentage

of casualties.451

With its sister services suffering painful casualties fighting the insurgencies in

Afghanistan, the Royal Danish Navy has been spared such losses. It has, however, regardless

of its size been no less active in conducting joint maneuvers, providing its warships to

NATO’s joint forces, or participating in naval operations. The list of Danish deployments is

long: From Operation Desert Shield, the aforementioned Operations Sharp Guard in the

Adriatic, Operation Iraqi Freedom to the current deployments as part of the multinational

Combined Task Force 150 and 151, where the Absalon has served as the task force’s flagship.

She and her sister ship have also been part of the NATO anti-piracy operation around the

Horn of Africa, called Ocean Shield. (The Combined Task Force 151 is a multinational

operation that cooperates closely with the European Union’s Operation Atalanta and NATO’s

Operation Ocean Shield.)452

It is worth noting that Denmark has shown estimable willingness to participate in

military as well as peace-keeping operations beyond its shores. Apart from its previously

mentioned naval activities and ongoing assistance to the Afghan Government,453

the Danish

Air Force also took aggressive action in Libya in 2011. Surprisingly, the small number of

Danish F-16 combat aircraft accounted for roughly 11 percent of all sorties flown against the

Gaddafi regime. Considering that this is more than Italy, who had the Giuseppe Garibaldi

449

Danish Parliament, The Danish Defense Agreement 2005-2009, Preliminary translation, June (Copenhagen,

2004): 2. 450

Parliament, Preliminary, 7. 451

18,000 troops deployed over the course of 11 years, around 750 deployed at any given time. 43 were killed.

See “Operation Enduring Freedom,” iCasualties.org.

http://icasualties.org/oef/Nationality.aspx?hndQry=Denmark. 452

See “CTF-151: Counter-piracy,” Combined Maritime Forces, http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-

counter-piracy/. 453

Denmark will provide 700 million kroner in aid annually, see “Norway Cuts Afghan Aid over Lack of

Progress on Women’s Rights,” TOLOnews, 5 October (2013).

http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/12168-norway-cuts-afghan-aid-over-lack-of-progress-on-womens-

rights.

136

carrier stationed off the Libyan coast, this is quite a remarkable figure.454

The latest defense

documents published by the Danish government indicate that the nation is willing to continue

this effort, notwithstanding the significant shortage in personnel:455

“[T]he demand for Danish

military contributions will not be diminished”,456

the document makes clear. The Danish

Armed Forces, therefore, need to be able to conduct operations ranging from “armed conflict

[to] stabilization tasks and international policing.”457

The production of the newest class of

frigates, the much-discussed Iver Huitfeldt, constituted a vital step to “[enhance] the ability of

the Navy to participate in international operations, to support ground operations and to

perform tasks in the North Atlantic and the Arctic”.458

The Iver Huitfeldt multi-purpose frigate is one of the most discussed warships at the

moment. It owes this flattering instance to the heated debate that is currently revolving around

the U.S. Navy’s new frigate, also known as the littoral combat ship. Lightly armed and facing

numerous teething problems, the current production variants of the LCS (the monohull LCS-1

Freedom-class and the trimaran LCS-2 Independence-class) have fallen out of favor in U.S.

naval quarters. Despite their innovative design, which includes missions modules that are

planned to be prepositioned in order for the ships to quickly be able to adapt to new tasks in

combat theaters, the rebalancing to the Asian-Pacific region has led former Secretary of

Defense, Chuck Hagel, to curtail their production. In a recent DoD press briefing, Hagel

underscored these doubts by stating that “[r]egarding the Navy's littoral combat ship [LCS],

[he was] concerned that the Navy is relying too heavily on the LCS to achieve its long-term

goals for ship numbers. Therefore, no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go

forward”.459

Quickly, many defense analysts and armchair strategists were making the case

for the United States’ dropping the LCS altogether and preferably buying the Danish Iver

Huitfeldt instead. I do not intend to join the debate and would rather refer the reader to the

numerous articles provided in the footnote.460

454


Danish Parliament, Danish Defense Agreement 2010-2014 (Copenhagen, 2009): 2 & 7. 456

Ibid., 2. 457

Ibid., 3. 458

Ibid., 9. 459

Department of Defense, Remarks by Secretary Hagel and Gen. Dempsey on the fiscal year 2015 budget

preview in the Pentagon Briefing Room, Transcript, 24 Feb. (2014).

http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5377. 460

See T.X. Hammes, “Getting Our Money’s Worth: LCS VS Iver Huitfeldt-class,” War on the Rocks, 6 Aug.

(2013). http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/getting-our-moneys-worth-lcs-vs-iver-huitfeldt-class/.

Steven Wills, LCS Versus the Danish Strawman,“ CIMSEC, 19 Feb. (2015).

http://cimsec.org/lcs-versus-danish-strawman/14974.

Sam LaGrone, “Navy Asks Industry for Input for Follow-on to Littoral Combat Ship,” USNI News, 30 Apr.

(2014).

http://news.usni.org/2014/04/30/navy-asks-industry-input-follow-littoral-combat-ship.

137

The latest addition to the Navy’s fleet, however, deserves a closer look. Guy Toremans

provides an excellent chapter on the Iver Huitfeldt-class in the 2014 issue of the Seaforth

World Naval Review.461

In his opening remarks he underscores what has been stated thus far

in regard to the Danish Navy’s reorganization over the past two decades:

With the introduction of the Iver Huitfeldt class frigates , as well as the two Absalon-

class flexible support ships, the RDN has been transformed from a ‘small-ship’ navy –

focused on its adjacent waters – to a small ‘big ship’ force geared towards

expeditionary operations at range from its home bases.462

The second version of the Flexible Støtteskibe or Flexible Support Ship project

capitalized on the experiences made with the successful Absalon-class. Given the tight

defense budget the total number of ships was reduced to three instead of four and the

advantages of the StandFlex system were utilized to the extreme. The hull is somewhat

shorter than comparable ships of other European navies, such as the German Sachsen or

Dutch Zeven Provinciën-class, but therefore visibly broader. Even though as many off-the-

shelf components as possible are used to keep costs low, the frigates exhibit all aspects of a

state-of-the art warship. This includes “a comprehensive approach to signature reduction”

with the missile launchers and other weapons installed behind a flushed superstructure in

order to reduce the ship’s radar cross section.463

One of the main missions of the frigate is air

defense. The modularity of the StanFlex weapons containers has proved expedient, and thus

the Iver Huitfeldt could conceivably deploy two Mk56 VLS for ESSMs in the ‘E’ and ‘F’

positions flanking the central Mk41 VLS centrally located between the main mast and the

ships’ funnels. The latter is able to fire a total of 32 Raython Standard SM-2 Block IIIA

missiles and could also be updated to fire the SM-3 (capable of ABM defense) and

Tomahawk cruise missiles. In combination with its APAR active phased-array radar (also

AESA) search and track radar and SMART-L long-range volume search radar the ships’ air

defense capabilities can rightfully be considered among the best in the world. What is more,

the radar system can be upgraded to track ballistic missile targets as the Dutch efforts have

shown. In August 2014 the Danish Government decided to go forward with its plans to join

the NATO ABM missile shield and will invest around $70 million into modifying their

SMART-L radar. However, there are no plans to procure the SM-3 missile “the intention

461

Toremans, “Huitfeldt,” 105-119. 462

Ibid., 105. 463

Ibid., 107.

138

being that missile targets will be passed to other sea or land-based interceptors for

engagement”.464

Money remains an issue within the Danish Navy, which is not surprising given the

country’s sustained defense spending of only around 1.4 percent of GDP over the last ten

years. The three Iver Huitfeldt frigates have also proved to be quite costly, despite their

relatively modest production costs. As the Danish Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Frank

Trojahn elaborates in a recent issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings, “[t]he high-end

frigates/littoral combat ships are focused on international missions [They] have been heavily

engaged [and the] operational tempo is likely to remain high”.465

This puts great strain on

both men and material. Given the declared “manpower problems”466

the ships have all been

designed to operate with a much smaller crew than their foreign counterparts. While the

German, Dutch, and Italian frigates all require between 150 and 200 able-bodied men and

women onboard, the Iver Huitfeldt was envisioned to get by with a crew of 100. Yet

Commander Fjord-Larsen has pointed to the infeasibility of such lean ‘manning’. “The high

level of specialization has potential problems because there is less slack available in the

complement if someone goes sick or on leave. Personally, I think that we are at the lower end

of the manning limit.”467

Lt. Commander Kenneth Jensen, deployed on the third unit of the

class, the Niels Jung, acknowledges that the number was somewhat overoptimistic. (The case

with the American LCS is similar). According to him, 17 more crew members are being hired

in order to effectively operate the vessels.468

Given the Armed Forces’ manpower shortages,

“the RDN may […] face [increasing] manpower issue […] because the current Danish

defense agreement does not currently provide the resources needed for three full crews.”

Toremans concludes.469

More signs of the austere financial environment can be made out when one takes a

closer look at the current fitting of the ships. The two 76mm guns in the ‘A’ and ‘B’ positions

are an interim solution until funds for the intended 127mm/62 cal Mk 45 gun and Oerlikon

CIWS are found. The Mk41 VLS is not yet armed, as the Navy is waiting for the procurement

464

See Footnotes Friedman, “Missile Defense,” 191.

The discussion concerning the possible expansion of the Navy’s air defense capability can be found as early as

2007. Both SM-3 and SM-6 missiles were proposed in Joris Janssen Lok’s article; neither have been procured

though. See Joris Jansen Lok, “Danish Decision,” Defense Technology International, April (2007), 17. 465

Frank Trojahn, “The Commanders Response: Royal Danish Navy,” Naval Institute Proceedings, March

(2015). http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/commanders-respond-royal-danish-navy. 466

Parliament, Danish Defense, 14. 467

Quoted in Toremans, “Huitfeldt,” 115. 468

Christopher Cavas, “Aboard Danish Frigate, Clean Lines and Room to Grow,” Defense News, 17 Nov.

(2014), 11. 469

Toremans, “Huitfeldt,” 115.

139

of the Standard SM-2 missiles from the United States, while the two Mk52 VLS have neither

been bought nor installed; and finally, the CIWS on top of the helicopter hangar is in fact a

dummy.470

The ship’s potential is unquestioned. However, both the incremental fitting of new

combat systems and continuous deployment will heavily burden the crews as well as the

defense budget.

The Royal Danish Navy has made great strides since the days of President Reagan and

General Secretary Gorbachev. Over the last twenty-five years, the Odense Steel Shipyard has

spearheaded the art of constructing multi-purpose warships that can quickly and easily be

reconfigured to conduct different tasks. From the Navy’s small Thetis patrol boats to its large

frigates, the StanFlex module fittings can accommodate anything from hydraulic cranes and

towed sonar systems to rapid-fire guns and ESSM SAM launchers. What is more, the Danish

Navy, despite its small size, has taken part in numerous multinational operations for over two

decades, not least as an active participant in anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations in the

Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. The fleet’s capable surface combatants also contribute to

NATO’s standing naval and mine-countermeasure forces.

Unfortunately, the fiscal realities over the last decades have ruled out the possibility of

entertaining a balanced fleet. With the defense budget steadily decreasing throughout the

1990s and subsequently hovering at around the 1.4 percent mark, the Danish Armed Forces

did what they could to modernize their fleet. A deliberate decision was made, namely to phase

out the fleet’s numerous smaller combatants as well as its submarines and instead to build

large multipurpose warships. As a result the Danish fleet has been able to drastically increase

its power-projection, amphibious warfare, as well as air defense capabilities. Questions,

however, remain as to its ability to deploy these platforms in an increasingly contentious

maritime environment. The melting of the polar caps will create profound geostrategic ripples

which are likely to be felt in Copenhagen as well as in Amsterdam and Washington D.C. The

possibility of a North East Passage opening up for commercial shipping is both exciting and

vexing news for Europe’s northern states. With Denmark’s industry heavily invested in

commercial shipping – just barely maintaining their lead in this very competitive market –

and the expansive EEZ around Greenland and the Faroer Islands demanding vigilance, it will

have to be seen if Denmark’s small navy can protect the country’s national interests, when

push comes to shove.

470

Cavas, “Frigate,” 11.

140

10.2) The Netherlands

When the struggle between the Warsaw Pact and NATO drew to a close in the early

1990s, the Royal Dutch Navy had rightfully earned its place among the world’s most

powerful navies. Its large fleet had been a force to reckon with in both sides contingency

planning and had provided the Western allies with important sea-control capabilities. It is no

wonder that in his authoritative almanac, The Naval Guide to the Combat Fleets of the World,

Bernard Prézelin mentions the Dutch Navy in the same breath as the U.S., Soviet, Japanese,

Italian, and Chinese navy.471

Designed to defend the critical strategic lines of communication in the North Sea and

through the English Channel, the Dutch Navy fashioned a large fleet of capable warship. In

1990, five domestically designed diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) were in service with the

production of a follow-on class of four state-of-the-art boats underway. Two large guided-

missile destroyers (the Tromp and De Ruyter), easily recognizable by their large dome-

construction housing the SPS-01 3D radar, armed with both Sea Sparrow and Standard SM-1

MR missiles had served in the air defense role and as the fleet’s flagship since the mid 1970s.

Two of the ten Kortenaer-class frigates had been sold to Greece in the early 1980s and were

replaced by a modified version of the design which brought additional air defense capabilities

to the table.472

A large class of minehunters was put into service throughout the 1980s and

added significant capabilities to the already respectable MCM flotilla. Two large

replenishment ships provided necessary fuel and supplies to the fleet conducting operations

on the high seas. However, amphibious and littoral warfare capabilities were limited due to

the geographical and strategic realities of the Cold War security environment. On the other

hand, the Royal Dutch Navy operated a total of 13 P-3C Orion anti-submarine and maritime

surveillance aircraft, and 22 WG-13 LYNX helicopters,473

thereby providing the Navy with a

highly capable aviation element.

Like most NATO allies, the Dutch Navy relied heavily on American weapon systems,

in particular for AAW and ASW. However, the domestic defense industry had established

itself as one of Europe’s leaders in the field of electronics and sensor technology in the later

years of the Cold War. Over the course of time the Hollandse Signaal Apparaaten, or simply

Signaal, established itself as a powerhouse in the design and manufacturing of combat

systems and radars. Among others, the APAR and SMART-L radars already discussed, as

471

Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xvi. 472

Ibid., 377-391. 473

Ibid., 375.

141

well as other highly successful systems, were developed by what is now known as Thales

Naval Nederland.474

The Netherlands were also able to maintain the capability of constructing

very large vessels in its shipyards at Vlissingen, Rotterdam and Amsterdam and have

cooperated closely with other European states to build very fine warships. The trilateral

frigate project between Holland, Germany and Spain is but one example. It is therefore safe to

say that the ships built for the Royal Dutch Navy have no need to shun comparison with the

best warships on the market.

Without wanting to sound boringly repetitive, a big BUT has to follow the

aforementioned remarks. The Netherlands have a substantial industrial base, able to build and

fit out modern warships, but the general reluctance of its political leadership to invest in its

armed forces has, over time, substantially eroded the Navy’s capabilities. To exemplify this

supposition, a brief analysis of the procurement policy over the last two decades is necessary.

Though one runs the risk of confusing the procurement process of the Danish and

Dutch naval forces since the end of the Cold War given the similar numbers, there are some

considerable differences between the two states. Interestingly, the Danish long-term

procurement plan in 1999/2000 recommended the decommissioning of 17 ships and

replacement by six (ultimately 5) new multi-purpose ‘frigates’ by 2011.475

In the same period

of time, the Dutch Navy took 17 frigates from service adding only four! new escort vessels to

the fleet.476

The main difference in the outcome of this process is that while the Danish Navy

nevertheless has been able to expand its naval capabilities in some important areas (owing to

the obsolescence of its older warships), no such testament can be made for the Dutch fleet. As

Conrad Waters laments, “Once one of the more significant European maritime forces, the Royal

Netherlands Navy has been progressively reduced in size and stature since the end of the Cold War

until it barely ranks amongst Europe’s second-tier fleet.”477

This remarkable decline can, for the most part, be ascribed to the austere financial

environment during the decade following the Soviet dissolution in which the defense budget

plummeted from 2.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP as Figure 17 shows. At the same time, the

Royal Danish Navy was heavily invested in replacing its submarine and surface fleet. Four

new Walrus-class submarines and eight Karel Doorman, or ‘M’-class frigates entered service

between 1990 and 1998.478

In addition, the Rotterdam amphibious transport ship (a joint

474

An interesting article from the President of Thales Nederland can be found in: Arno Peels, “New Thinking in

Netherlands Defense,” Military Technology, Vol. 25, 12 (2001): 93-96. 475

Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 93. 476


Ibid. 478

The Karel Doorman-class is described in more detail in Chant, Kriegsschiffe, 79.

142

project between Spain’s E.N. Bazán and Netherlands’ Royal Schelde) was commissioned in

1998 and provided the Navy with the ability to deploy a battalion of marines from a single

ship.479

(It goes without saying that the financial investments during that time were

substantial.) Such capabilities, as has been pointed out, also allow naval forces to participate

in multinational peacekeeping operations, as well as to project military power over great

distances. Accordingly, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Navy, Vice

Admiral Luuk Kroon identified such tasks as the primary function of the Armed forces:

In order to fulfill these primary tasks [of crisis management as well as national and

allied territorial defense] the Dutch armed force will be capable of: Maintaining a

capacity for simultaneous participation in a maximum of four peacekeeping operations

under the aegis of the United Nations or the OSCE. In either case the contribution will

have the size of a battalion, or equivalent; [as well as maintaining] rapidly deployable

assets in peacetime for the protection of the NATO treaty area and for adequate

contribution to peace-enforcing operations.480

Admiral Kroon also stressed that although the new security environment the Navy found itself

in “has its impact on the RNLN, the structure of the Navy [would] be unaffected.”481

Almost

twenty years on, his predictions have long been forgotten in Dutch naval quarters.

Initially however, only small reductions in the fleet’s size were made while the

organizational structure was rearranged, shedding some unnecessary ballast in the process.

Furthermore, a somewhat more upbeat financial development at the end of the 1990s provided

the Armed Forces with an additional NLG 50 million (around €20 million) in funding.482

The

two Tromp-class destroyers and four Kortenaer frigates were scheduled for withdrawal and, at

the same time, the four new De Zeven Provinciën air defense frigates were laid down while

further modernization to the fleet’s ageing ships and aircraft seemed to be secured. The

acquisition of a second LPD as well as the procurement of the new NH-90 helicopter by 2007

was also put forward in the Dutch Defense White Paper in 2000.483

However, in hindsight, the

principle goals of the white paper, namely to increase the Armed Forces’ combat readiness

and ability to sustain power projection operations over longer periods of time, were probably

479

Two units of these ships were ordered by the Spanish Government as the Galicia-class. Up to 611 marines

and their equipment can be embarked. See: Ibid., 88. 480

Luuk Kroon, “Roles, Missions and Force Structure of the Royal Netherlands Navy,” Naval Forces, Special

Issue (1996): 4. 481

Ibid., 6. 482

Ministry of Defence, Summary of the Defence White Paper 2000 (The Hague, 2000). 1. 483

Ibid., 18.

143

Illustration 24: The backbone of the future Royal Netherlands Navy: The large Holland-class offshore patrol vessel, the Karel Doorman multi-purpose support ship and, the Zeven Provinciën frigate from left to right. Despite these additions the Dutch Navy will be relatively less capable than two decades ago.

overly optimistic and could only be met to a limited degree under the given fiscal restriction

and political myopia.484

Marcial Hernandez of the American Enterprise Institute provides some insight into the

momentous decline of the Netherlands’ Armed Forces throughout the last decade.

[W]ith the exception of the bump in the Dutch base defense budget in 2001, the

increase in defense expenditures has largely gone to Dutch operations needs connected

with the Netherlands’ deployment to Afghanistan. With the base defense budget […]

remaining essentially flat until [2014] and with the government’s [recent decision] to

cut planned defense spending substantially, the result is a Dutch military that falls well

short of the 2000 white paper’s goals.485

A brief glance at the military force structure is telling. In 1990 the Dutch Army had

468 Leopard 1 and 445 Leopard 2 main battle tanks. Now the army has nil – having sold its

remaining units to Finland in 2014.486

The air force has lost more than half of its F-16 fighters

484

NMoD, Paper 2000, 1-24. 485

Marcial Hernandez, “Dutch Hard Power: Choosing Decline,” American Enterprise Institute, 3 April, (2013):

np. http://www.aei.org/publication/dutch-hard-power-choosing-decline/. 486

Bonsignore, “Finland,” Military Technology. The World Defense Almanac 1990, Issue 1 (1990): 116-117.

“Finland is Buying Dutch Leopards for €200 Million,” DefenseUpdate, 19 January, 2014.

http://defense-update.com/20140119_finland_buys_dutch_leopards.html#.VQSkpuFY5ew.

144

and the Navy was stripped of all its P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. Last but not least, the

Navy’s escort fleet has been reduced from 15 frigates and destroyers to a total of merely six

ships.487

This process has been accompanied by a reduction of the active-duty force from

103,000 to 53,300 by 2014. Alone since 2011 over 12,000 jobs have been cut. That such

measures will have long-term effects on the Netherlands’ military capabilities should be

evident even to the most casual observer.

Before we dismiss the Netherlands’ naval capabilities outright, let us take a look at the

latest additions to the Navy over the last decade. Firstly, the decommissioning of all but two

Karel Doorman-class frigates (two were sold to Belgium with which the Netherlands have a

joint defense agreement488

) left a large gap in the Navy’s escort fleet. This gap has partly been

filled by introducing De Zeven Provinciën-class air defense frigates, formally known as the

LCF (Luchtverdedigings en Commando Fregat). The trilateral cooperation between Spain (F-

100), Germany (F-124) and the Netherlands (LCF) has been discussed at length. The ships’

capabilities are largely on par with the two foreign designs and can be considered among the

best frigates in service today. In contrast to the Spanish Álvaro-de Bazán-class, which uses the

Aegis combat system, the Dutch ships rely on the SEWACO IX combat system as well as the

APAR and SMART-L radars, all built by Thales. The above-mentioned upgrades to the long-

range radar in order to track (and engage) ballistic missiles are underway and scheduled to be

completed by 2017.489

Akin to the decisions of Germany, Spain and Denmark, the Dutch

government has not shown any intention to buy the Standard SM-3 missile, rather relying on

U.S. ABM-capable ships in the region. These four ships, however, represent the only possible

high-tier alternative to the Navy’s air defense destroyers.

Secondly, based on “NATO’s perspective of naval operations and […] on the views of

[the Netherlands’] main Allies [the U.S., U.K., and Belgium]”490

the Royal Dutch Navy

continued to enhance its amphibious capabilities in order to deploy brigade-sized elements in

high-intensity operations.491

The 28,000 ton Karel Doorman is arguably the most obvious

result of this effort. Fighting an uphill battle against unabated defense cuts during the height

487

Hernandez, “Dutch Power,” n.p. 488

The defense agreement was established in July 1994 between the two states. The Belgian naval staff is

integrated with the Dutch staff at Den Helder (NL). Although a commemorable effort among two European

neighbors, the crux, despite a closer cooperation, remains that ultimately “command of each nation’s ships,

however, remains with their respective national government. Each government reserves the right to deploy their

ships independently, for instance for operations in former colonies. Dutch warships remain homeported in

Zeebrugge and den Helder, respectively and the Belgian Navy will keep a command centre in Zeebrugge for its

own national tasks.” See Guy A. H. Toremans, “Belgian-Dutch Naval Cooperation,” Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 6

(1994): 18-24. 489

Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 475-476 490

Ministry of Defence, Netherlands Defence Doctrine (The Hague: Defense Staff, 2005): 6. 491

Ibid., 39, Footnote 25.

145

of the European economic crisis, the completion of the Karel Doorman was under question as

Waters points out: “[A]dditional reductions in defense spending revealed in September 2013

[threatened] to see the new JSS joint support ship […] sold before she had even entered into

service.”492

Fortunately this pending decision was revoked and she formally entered service in

2014, adding power projection and HADR capabilities to the Dutch fleet.

The third, high profile acquisition was the four Holland-class patrol vessels

commissioned between 2011 and 2013. At a total displacement of 3,750 tons, these ships

exhibit characteristic features of the current trend towards larger and more sophisticated

offshore patrol vessels. Though being lightly armed, these new OPVs are well-suited for their

respective mission environment. In fact, designed for low-intensity operations, they constitute

the “workhorse of the maritime security mission.”493

With no need for expensive long-range

weapon systems and powerful propulsion for sustained high speeds, they are far cheaper to

build. Moreover, the systems onboard the latest OPV’s, such as the Holland-class, are

specifically designed to conduct anti-terrorism, anti-piracy and other constabulary tasks on the

high seas.494

Deploying an exorbitantly expensive air defense destroyer to stop and search a

rogue motorboat in the Gulf of Aden, despite being common practice, does not represent the

most efficient way of doing things. Therefore, the new patrol boats offer the Royal Dutch

Navy much needed capabilities in low-threat environments. Conversely however, they do not

qualify as ‘first-rate’ warships. Therefore, they also cannot provide the necessary deterrent

and operational advantages a ship of similar size but heavier armament, such as former

frigates (Karel Doorman) could.495

Considering the Netherlands’ self-imposed liabilities and

the country’s continued effort to play an active role in multinational operations across the

intensity spectrum, the decision to reduce the escort fleet to only six frigates can rightfully be

viewed with reservation.

Since 1990, the size and capability of the Royal Dutch Navy has decreased

substantially. While a similar development can be observed in nearly all other Western navies,

over the last two decades successive Dutch governments have failed to successfully adapt to

the post-Cold War security environment. As of now, the Dutch military and its naval branch

are both smaller and less well-balanced than their equivalent twenty-five years ago.496

Despite

492


Joris Janssen Lok, “On the Beat: Robust Ocean Patrol Vessels Maintain Law and Order on the Seas,” Defense

Technology International, Nov. (2007): 33-39. 494

Operational environment include the North Sea, Atlantic, Caribbean and waters near their former colonies. 495

See Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 476. 496

This was predicted by a RAND study conducted in 2012. See Larrabee, Austerity, 52.

146

efforts to cooperate more closely with other NATO allies and to restructure its naval forces

and military administration, these measures were not sufficient to outweigh the negative

effects the fiscal restraints have had on the Armed Forces. This is not to say that the

Netherlands should return to their former war footing, given the general security the country

enjoys. “Obviously, no one expects the Netherlands to sustain a military the size and character

of the one it had during the height of the Cold War”,497

Marcial Hernandez makes clear.

However, a country with the fourth highest GDP per capita in Europe,498

which spends more

than 50 percent of its budget on health care and social services,499

it can be argued, should be

expected to allocate a little more than 1.4 percent to its national defense. However, according

to a poll from 2012 a mere 8 percent of the Dutch population considers an increase in defense

spending necessary.500

That the Netherlands are inevitably dependent on the security of the global SLOCs in

order to maintain their wealth was pointed out at the beginning of the chapter but does not

seem to strike a chord with the Dutch people and their leaders. More than in other states, the

prosperity of Dutch citizens depends on the unimpeded flow of commerce to and from its

ports. A slight hiatus in the global supply chain could possibly have detrimental effects on a

country that is so dependent on the sea. However, making a case for increasing the navy’s

capabilities in order to better protect the nation’s interests at sea would be an honorable yet

futile effort in any election campaign.

497

Hernandez, “Dutch Power,” np. 498

Only Luxemburg, Norway and Switzerland, have a higher per capita GDP. 499

Hernandez, “Dutch Power,” np 500

Ibid.

147

11) FINLAND, SWEDEN, NORWAY: Scandinavian Navies Sticking to their

Guns

Figure 19

Figure 20

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1

1,2

1,4

1,6

1,8

2

% o

f G

DP


Figure 19 Finland: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

% o

f G

DP


Figure 20 Sweden: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

148

Figure 21

Figure 22

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 12 9 5


0 2 4 6 8

10 12 14

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 21 Sweden: Number of Major Vessels


0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

% o

f G

DP


Figure 22 Norway: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

149

Figure 23

The three Scandinavian countries described in this chapter provide a good example of

how smaller European navies have successfully adapted to the changes in the global security

environment since the end of the Cold War. Although the graphs above indicate a steady

decrease in the countries’ defense budgets, the navies of Norway, Sweden and, to a somewhat

lesser extent, Finland are far more capable than twenty-five years ago. Unlike some of their

European partners, the governments in Oslo, Stockholm, and Helsinki have not succumbed to

the general fallacy that the end of the Cold War has heralded an age of reduced threats and

hence reduced needs. On the contrary, the political and military leaders of the three countries

have made wise choices in the recent past in how to best modernize their fleets under the

current fiscal conditions. Defense cooperation has been stressed at least to the same extent as

the development of leap-ahead technologies. As a result, Finland maintains a relatively small

flotilla of fast-attack craft and minehunters, sufficient in size to provide a respectable degree

of defensive capabilities, while the navies of Norway and Sweden unquestionably rank among

the most powerful and innovative small navies in the world.

A major reason not to include Denmark in this chapter, but rather to draw comparisons

between the Dutch and Danish navies, is founded in each state’s underlying strategic doctrine.

As has been repeatedly pointed out, many European navies underwent a fundamental strategic

reorientation after the close of the Cold War. The principle of sea-control, so it seemed, was

slowly being replaced by the idea of expeditionary operations in the littorals of distant regions

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 11 10 6


0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 23 Norway: Number of Major Vessels


150

of crisis. Both Denmark and the Netherlands made what they believed were necessary

adjustments to their defense policies and built large (and expensive) warships capable of

conducting amphibious operations, but consequently had to cede other capabilities in return.

None of the other Scandinavian states pursued such a course in the aftermath of the Soviet

breakup. Geographic realities, arguably, trumped the idea of expeditionary peace-keeping in

distant regions of the world; a concept which, in fact, has already been called into question as

of late.

11.1) Finland

Finland has one of the smallest naval forces of all the European states who have access

to the ocean. One reason for this is that Finland is it demographics. Much of its territory is

covered by lakes and its geographic location between the 60th

and 70th

latitudes has

encouraged most of the 5.5 million inhabitants to live in the southern municipalities. Finland’s

economy is heavily dependent on its wood industry and its electronics and machinery sector.

However, the country is only ranked 41 in the world in total GDP and creates 250 billion less

per year than Norway and roughly 300 billion less than Sweden.501

What is more, up until 1990, the size of the Finnish navy was subject to the provisions

of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. Its fleet was limited to a total displacement of 10,000 tons

and was banned from operating submarines and torpedo boats.502

Given its strategy of

territorial defense503

no drastic changes were made to the fleet structure after the end of the

Cold War. As a non-aligned state it maintained a military force of both western and eastern

equipment. Manfred Sadlowski makes a point in stating “[w]hat is different in Finland from

other countries [is] the fact that Finland […] is a bridge between Eastern, Northern and

Western Europe.”504

In accordance with its political stance and its defense-oriented strategy, the Finnish

Navy largely operated small corvettes, guided missile patrol boats and mine warfare vessels in

the shallow waters of the Baltic Sea. Four of these small attack craft were the 250 ton

501

“List of countries by GDP nominal,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29. 502

Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 129-130.

Also see Corporal Frisk, “Where are the Finnish Submarines?” Corporal Frisk Wordpress, 3 January, 2015.

https://corporalfrisk.wordpress.com/2015/01/03/where-are-the-finnish-submarines/. 503

As stated by the Finnish Minster of Defense. See Anneli Taina “National Defence Vitally Important to

Finland,” Military Technology: Special Supplement: Defence In Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 3 504

Manfred Sadlowski “What is different from Finland,” Military Technology: Special Supplement: Defence In

Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 2.

151

Helsinki-class boats built during the 1980s which were armed with highly potent, RBS-15

long-range anti-ship missiles from Saab Bofors Sweden. Interestingly, the four Soviet-design

Osa II-class, attack craft were armed with the famous Styx anti-ship missile providing a nice

comparison between the capabilities of the early era Soviet anti-ship missile and the state-of-

the-art Swedish design.

Throughout the 1990s, the Finnish government strengthened its cooperation with

many of its neighbors. “For obvious geographic and historical reasons, one of our special

goals is to promote the development and expansion of Nordic cooperation […] in defence

material”, Eero Lavonon stated.505

Finnish maritime forces also participated in joint exercises

with NATO forces and the Russian Navy, while its army contributed to U.N. peacekeeping

missions, for example in the Golan Heights.

By the turn of the millennium the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced that

“[e]quipment procurement in the Navy [would] focus on replacing essential vessels and

improving the mobility of coastal defence.”506

Four stealth Rauma 2000 patrol craft were

added to the fleet while the recent additions to the Navy, such as the Hämeenmaa-class

minelayers and Helsinki II-class attack craft were steadily upgraded. With Europe enjoying a

period of peace increased cooperation with the Russian Federation, the MoD saw little need in

making adjustments to its defense posture. As a non-aligned state, Finland did not participate

in many recent U.S.-led combat operations,507

nor was the country affected by the growing

instability surrounding the Mediterranean, although a growing number of fugitives have been

seeking refuge in Scandinavian countries. Strategic territorial defense remained a valid

concept as the 2004 Defense White Paper underscores: “The Navy must be able to compile

and maintain a recognized maritime picture, conduct surveillance of territorial integrity, repel

any violations of territorial integrity, protect sea lines of communication and repel attacks

from the sea in cooperation with the other services.”508

More recent events, however, have caused alarm among the Finnish government and

military brass. Russia’s incursion into Georgia in 2009 can be considered a turning point in

the hitherto quite amicable relationship between the European states and Russia. Finland’s

505

Eero Lavonen, “Finland’s International Cooperation For Defence Material,” Military Technology: Special

Supplement: Defence In Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 6. 506

“Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001: Report by the Government to Parliament.” 13 June (2001): 50. 507

Finland did send around 100 peacekeepers to Afghanistan. See “Finland’s participation in NATO-led crisis

management operations,” Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=115832&contentlan=2&culture=en-US. 508

Prime Minister’s Office. Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004: Government Report 6/2004, (Prime

Minister’s Office Publications, 2004): 112.

152

strained history and its long border with the Russian juggernaut provided sufficient reason for

Finland to reevaluate its national defense policy.

When it comes to Finland’s security environment, the most important questions relate

to Russia’s political and economic stability and to the evolution of its international

relations. Russia has political, economic and military interests in our neighbouring

areas. Russia’s most stable neighbouring areas border on Finland and other countries

in Northern Europe. Still, the possibility of change in the security situation of our

neighbouring areas cannot be excluded, nor can the possibility of armed aggression or

the threat thereof. During the Georgia crisis Russia demonstrated that it is willing and

able to use military force in defending its interests. The crisis may have created long-

term tensions in Europe, further complicating security cooperation. The crisis in

Georgia also demonstrated that events even far from us can impinge on the EU-Russia

relationship and thereby also affect Finland [emphasis in the original].509

With Russia showing aggressive irredentism – annexing Crimea and supporting the

secessionist movement in Ukraine – it is likely that Finland will be encouraged to strengthen

its ties with the West. Already now its close defense cooperation with Norway, Sweden,

Denmark and the Baltic states (all apart from Sweden are NATO members and, save Norway,

all are part of the E.U.) has secured numerous defense arrangements with the respective

countries and institutions. “For example, Finland gains access to strategic airlift capabilities

through a collaborative arrangement that encompasses ten NATO nations, Sweden and

Finland.”510

Moreover, Finland has also pledged to support the European Rapid Reaction

Force as part of the “mutual assistance obligation and the solidarity clause.”511

In comparison

to other European armed forces, so far Finland, however, has for the most part only been able

to deploy its Army for “crisis management operations.”512

In the future, the capability of her

sister services, the Navy and the Air Force, will have to be expanded, in order to satisfy the

need of power projection by air and sea.513

In general, the future for the Finnish Armed Forces looks quite promising. Close

cooperation with its larger European partners will compensate for some of the shortcomings

the country’s military, in particular its navy suffer from. Moreover, there are tentative plans to

expand naval capabilities by building a class of larger surface combatants. This seems to be a

509

PMO. Defense 2009, 66-67. 510

Ibid., 113.

A more general description of the collaboration can be found in NATO, “NATO’s relations with Finland,”

March 4, 2015.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm. 511

PMO, Defense 2009, 109. 512

Ibid., 113. 513

Ibid.

153

Illustration 25: Almost surreal looking, the Visby-class provides the Swedish Navy with increased brown and blue-water capabilities.

wise decision, considering Finland’s exposed geographic position and the need to entertain

capable armed forces in order to provide credible deterrence. Unfortunately, the continuation

of a relatively low level of defense spending would likely cut short any effort to create a more

robust Finnish Navy in the near future.

11.2) Sweden

In October of 2014, a number

of eye-witnesses reported

suspicious underwater activity

near the Stockholm

archipelago. In the days that

followed the Swedish military

conducted one of the largest

submarine hunts since the end

of the Cold War. To date, the

identity of what was believed

to be a small submarine

remains a mystery. This incident, however, came at a time of increased tensions between

Europe and Russia due to the forceful annexation of Crimea and Russian support to the

separatists in eastern Ukraine. Western media was quick to point to Russia’s aggressive naval

buildup as the logical source of the incursion. Be it as it may, the incident provided the

Swedish Armed Forces with an opportunity to display its credible naval capabilities.

For over three decades, the Royal Swedish Navy has gone to great lengths to build and

maintain a small but highly capable fleet. Similar to Finland, Sweden cannot look to any allies

for help in case of war514

but has to be able to defend its territory and people on its own. As a

result, the country’s national defense strategy has relied on the same strategic principle as its

514

Armed neutrality has a long history in Sweden. In particular during the Cold War, the Swedish government

made a case to portray itself as a beacon of peace between the two blocks. However, secretly political

reassurances were made with NATO for the case of war. “[I]n Sweden’s case, the official interpretation of the

Cold War is not the whole story. Official armed neutrality was complemented by secret bilateral cooperation

with the United States and select NATO countries that guaranteed Western support in case of a war with the

Soviet Union. That duality worked for a long time, and Sweden’s political elites has been comfortable seeking

security through informal bilateral ties to the United States and other European countries, rather than through

official membership in NATO.”

Jan Joel Andersson, “Nordic NATO. Why It’s Time for Finland and Sweden to Join the Alliance,” Foreign

Affairs, April 30, 2012.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141377/jan-joel-andersson/nordic-nato.

154

neighbors to the east and west; namely territorial defense. The Navy’s job over the larger part

of the Cold War had been to defend the country from aggression from the sea. For that

purpose the fleet was conceived as a sea denial force. Even after the end of this monumental

conflict, the Navy remained focused on protecting Sweden from invasion. While other

European nations were quickly lulled to sleep by the ostensible economic benefits of the

peace-dividend, the Swedes remained vigilant. This attitude is reflected in the remarks of Vice

Admiral Peter Nordbeck in an interview from 1996. Although the Chief of the Swedish Navy

pointed out that, at the time, there was no direct threat to Swedish sovereignty, caution was

well advised:

The fact remains […] that Europe is still resolving many areas of conflict and that all

nations do indeed value military strength to support their international security

politics. Therefore we cannot, within the foreseeable future, neglect the risks of war

and that Sweden could be subject to an armed aggression. [The] main task for the

Swedish Armed Forces is to demonstrate such a wartime operations capability that it

deters an aggressor from planning or executing any armed attack against our

country.515

With these directives in mind, the Swedish Navy was designed to “[1] deny the aggressor

secure sea lines of communication to Sweden; [2] establish full control over [Swedish]

territorial waters; and [3] defend [Swedish] ports and naval bases.”516

To understand the evolution of the Swedish naval forces we have to go further back in

time, to another fateful naval incident that occurred in October 1981. Hans Harboe-Hansen

observes, “Seldom has a single peacetime event had such profound an impact on the

development of a navy”.517

Supposedly having lost its ability to navigate, the Soviet S-363

Whiskey-class submarine ran aground only ten kilometers from a Swedish naval base. To

many, the ‘Whiskey on the Rocks’ incident provided evidence that the Soviet Union was

regularly conducting illegal intrusions into Swedish territorial waters. As a result, a vigorous

effort was made to modernize the Swedish fleet. In particular, the Navy’s anti-submarine

warfare capabilities were to be enhanced and also a more balanced approach towards ASuW

and MCM capabilities was conceived. New submarines and larger corvettes were to

515

Admiral Peter Nordbeck interviewed by Naval Forces, “Preparing the Navy For the Next Century,” Naval

Forces Special Issue: The Royal Swedish Navy – Today and Tomorrow 2 (1996): 5. 516

Ibid. 517

Hans Harboe-Hansen, “Swedish Naval Trends and Programmes,” Military Technology, Vol. 17, 12 (1993):

20.

155

Illustration 26: Territorial defense has been a principal part of Norway, Sweden, and Finland’s strategic planning during larger parts of the Cold War. Coastal guns, such as this one near Stockholm, are a reminder of this doctrine.

complement sophisticated sea denial network composed of underwater acoustic sensors,

minefield, and coastal artillery.518

By 1990 the Swedish Navy

had evolved into an effective

fighting force, operating within

the confined waters of the Baltic

Sea and adjacent North Sea. Its

domestically produced submarine

fleet consisted of four new

Västergötland-class, three

Näcken-class, and five older, but

still capable, Sjöormen-class

submarines. Pioneering the

concept of air independent

propulsion, the Kockums

shipbuilder in Malmö installed an additional Stirling closed-cycle diesel engine into a six-

meter hull extension onboard the Näcken. This not only enabled the boat to carry out

operations at much lower acoustic levels, but increased the time it could stay submerged to

almost two weeks.519

The surface fleet consisted of nearly three dozen fast-attack craft, armed with

torpedoes, Saab RBS-15 SSMs, the Norwegian Penguin Mk2 SSM, as well as 57mm Bofors

guns. The RBS-15 was a fire and forget weapon and therefore no large ship-borne target

illuminators had to be installed. Moreover, the Navy was designed to operate under the

umbrella of the Swedish Air Force; hence anti-aircraft weapon systems (apart from the Bofors

gun which could also be used against aerial threats)520

were also considered superfluous. As a

result warships could be rather small in size and because the Navy was designed to operate

close to Sweden’s coast, none of the ships needed a powerful propulsion system for high

speed transitions over long distances.

Worth noting is Sweden’s maritime intelligence gathering effort. Few navies,

especially not small ones, are willing to invest their money in ships specifically designed to

518

For more information see Harboe-Hansen, “Trends,” 20-24.

Also see Torbjörn Hultman, “Reforming the Swedish Navy,” Military Technology: Special Supplement: Defence

Procurement in Sweden – FMV: The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, (1993): 62-71. 519

Chris Bishop (ed.), The Encyclopedia of World Sea Power. A comprehensive Encyclopedia of the World’s

Navies and their Warships (London: Guild Publishing, 1988): 52. 520

Explained in more detail in Bishop, Encyclopedia, 239.

156

conduct intelligence operations, i.e. collecting signal intelligence. In most cases regular naval

vessels are assigned with such duties. Submarines, for example, lend themselves particularly

well for conducting intelligence operations, as they can operate almost unimpeded and gain

vital information regarding the enemy’s strength, movement and intent. In some cases

submarines were also used to tap or cut underwater communication cables.521

However, it

goes without saying that despite their cost, specialized vessels will be more effective in

conducting these tasks. Thereby, the Orion intelligence gathering ship is one of very few such

vessels in service among European navies.

Based on the experiences gained with the Sterling propulsion in the Näcken, three AIP

Gotland-class submarines were delivered to the Royal Swedish Navy in the later 1990s,

underpinning the already renowned underwater capabilities. In his interview Admiral

Nordbeck expands on the new class’ capabilities:

[T]he greatest threat against conventional submarines occur when they are forced to

snort when charging their batteries. With the Gotland class we are receiving the first

non-experimental AIP conventional submarine in the world. In combination with the

diesel-electric machinery we are doubling the operational time at sea. [However this]

is no reason to reduce the total […] number of submarines […].522

The second major procurement project underway in the early years of the new

millennium was the YS2000 corvette. This radically different type of surface combatant can

rightfully be described as a leap-ahead naval ship design. Already preliminary drawings of the

ship hinted at the uncompromising application of state-of-the-art technology. Unlike the ships

she would replace, the YS2000 would break new ground in nearly all areas of naval

shipbuilding. Signature reduction across the entire spectrum lies at the heart of the corvette’s

clean but sharp lines. Water jets, powered by a combined diesel or gas (CODOG) propulsion

system, enables the ship to reach sprint speeds of up to 35 knots while long-duration missions

are also possible at lower speeds. Substantial automation has also reduced the size of the

crew. This is an important factor on a ship that displaced no more than 650 tons fully loaded.

Despite the relative scarcity of space, “[t]he living conditions and accommodation provided

for the complement of six officers, twenty petty officers and seventeen ratings is excellent”523

,

Toremans points out. “This is partly a reflection of the specialist nature of the crew,” he goes

on, “who have to maintain high standards of efficiency and flexibility to operate and

521


Nordbeck, “Next Century,” 5-6. 523

Guy Toremans, “Significant Ships: Sweden’s Visby Class Corvettes: Stealth at All Levels,” in Seaforth

World Naval Review 2012, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2011): 161.

157

understand multi-task software and to handle extremely complicated instruments and

sensors.”524

The sensor and weapon suit of each vessel is impressive to say the least. Most systems

on board are of Swedish design. The ship’s Sea Giraffe radar, for example, is built by Saab

Systems, as well as the CEROS 200 fire-control director (also by Saab) which is necessary to

direct the Bofors 57mm/70 Mk3 cannon. The gun is mounted in a stealth turret in order to

minimize the ship’s radar cross section. Additional AAW capabilities have been tentatively

planned for the future. However, for the moment, the reported price tag of $150 million for

five South African Umkhonto SAM systems seems too high for the MoD to proceed with the

purchase.525

Significant air defense capabilities will be necessary once the Visby-class ships

increase their deployments further away from home. With the proliferation of advanced sea

skimming anti-ship missiles in many regions of the world, “[s]uch a capability is an essential

requirement for the Royal Swedish Navy if it is to participate in international naval

activities.”526

The main reason to include the Visby-class in the graph above (although it cannot be

classified as a ‘large surface combatant’ per se) is founded on the ship’s ability to effectively

operate in littoral waters, as well as on the open seas, as Commander Erik Uhren remarks:

“[The latest improvement, which include a sonar system and landing system for Lynx

helicopter] are intended to allow the corvettes to participate in EU and NATO task groups on

‘out-of-area’ operations and exercises.”527

Its modular design enables it to quickly adapt to

any new threat that might arise and will give these multi-purpose surface combatants

sufficient room to grow in the future.

As we have heard, cooperation between Sweden and its neighbor has grown

significantly over the last two decades. As mentioned, the Nordic defense cooperation

between the Scandinavian countries (which includes Iceland) has been greatly expanded and

although the NORDEFCO is based on “a cooperation structure, not a command structure”528

a

very high degree of political and military collaboration has been achieved. Moreover, the

Swedish defense policy has highlighted the need to increase the Armed Forces’ participation

in international operations and to provide significant capabilities to the European Rapid

524

Toremans, “Visby,” 161. 525

Leon Engelbrecht, “Fact file: Denel Dynamics Umkhonto naval short-range surface-to-air missile,”

defenseWeb, 3 November 2008.

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=610. 526

Guy Toremans, „Sweden’s High Speed Stealthy V-Force,” Warships, Jan (2014): 31. 527

Commander Erik Uhren quoted in Ibid., 30. 528

Quote from the official website: “The basics about NORDEFCO,” Nordic Defense Cooperation.

http://www.nordefco.org/The-basics-about-NORDEFCO.

158

Reaction Force.529

Of particular interest in this context is Sweden’s defense cooperation with

Finland. Already outlined in the defense white paper ten years ago,530

Sweden’s Defense

Minister, Karin Enström, reiterated this fruitful effort in a recent interview with Defence

News:“As regards defense cooperation between Sweden and Finland, both countries signed an

action plan for deepened cooperation in May [2014]. This plan aims at increasing capabilities

and efficiency through combined use of resources, increased interoperability and a closer

dialogue on common challenges.”531

Moreover, Sweden is strengthening its partnership with the Baltic States and,

consequently, also with NATO in general. Although public support for joining the Alliance

remains well below the 50 percent margin, this step remains a matter of discussion, not least

because of Russia’s recent military action.532

Currently, Swedish forces are already

contributing to NATO operations as part of the Partnership for Peace initiative and can be

rightfully considered “NATO’s most active and most capable partner”.533

Moreover, Jan Joel

Anderson also points to the fact, that “[m]any in the political and military establishments in

Sweden and Finland have grown increasingly positive about the idea.”534

Ultimately,

however, any such decision will have to stem from popular support among each country’s

citizens, the majority of which remains skeptical towards the issue.

Despite some analysts’ remarks that Sweden’s admission into NATO is a “no-

brainer”,535

it is still not likely that the country will join NATO in the near future.

Consequently, the Swedish Armed Forces will continue to invest in their robust navy to

protect the country’s territorial integrity and increase its participation in multinational peace-

keeping operations. In contrast to many other countries, Sweden has shown no interest in

building an amphibious capability worth noting. Should the Swedes, however, become more

engaged internationally, the need is likely to arise to create an even more balanced fleet.

Costly provisions would have to be made to effectively project power over great distances as

well to entertain a fleet capable of conducting sea-denial and sea-control.

529

Government Offices of Sweden, Swedish Government Bill 2004/05:5, Our Future Defence – The focus of

Swedish defence policy 2005-2007 (2004): 13. 530

Ibid., 14. 531

Karin Enström interviewed by Defense News, “Interview Karin Enström. Sweden’s Defense Minister,”

Defence News, 18 August (2014), 22. 532

Viribus Unitis, “Nordic NATO Nominees,” CIMSEC, 9 May, 2014.

http://cimsec.org/nordic-nato-nominees/11192. 533

In fact, Sweden was the only country not part of the Arab League or NATO to participate in enforcing the no-

fly zone over Libya in 2011.

“Sweden sends eight fighter jets to Libya,” The Swedish Wire, 29 March, 2011.

http://www.swedishwire.com/politics/9146-sweden-sends-eight-fighter-jets-to-libya. 534

Andersson, “Nordic NATO,” np. 535

Ibid., np.

159

Illustration 27: The destructive firepower of anti-ship missiles has been demonstrated in a number of live-firing exercises by the Norwegian Navy.

For the time being, small but important steps are being made to steadily modernize the

existing force. The introduction of two new A-26-class submarines is scheduled for the end of

the decade, while the latest fitting of mine-clearance equipment onboard the Visby-class will

contribute to the Navy’s mine warfare capabilities. In addition, $40 million are being

allocated towards the procurement of a new SIGINT ship to replace the ageing Orion.536

With

defense spending reaching an all-time low in 2014, the Swedish government has recently

announced that is willing to invest over 700 million dollars over the next five years in order to

strengthen its armed forces.537

It is fair to say that in the near term Sweden’s defense industry

will be able to maintain its technical prowess and innovative naval craftsmanship and thus

will allow the Royal Swedish Navy to live up to the high standards it has set itself.

11.3) Norway

The last navy that will be discussed in detail in this thesis is the Royal Norwegian

Navy. From a naval perspective, the defense of Norway would have provided a litmus test for

the United States’ effort to

repel a Soviet attack on the

West during the Cold War.

Even if the initial thrust of the

Red Army through central

Europe could have been

stopped, or at least slowed

down, the European allies were

dependent on reinforcements

from America via the strategic

lines of communication across the Atlantic to win a possible war of attrition against a

numerically superior enemy. The Soviet’s Navy, so it was feared, would utilize their large

submarine fleet to rush out from their sea bastion at the Kola Peninsula and raise havoc

among the convoys crossing the Atlantic.

While the U.S. Maritime Strategy during the 1970s had focused on the protection of

these convoys and envisioned small carriers (such as the Principe de Asturias later built by

536

Gerard O’Dwyer, “Norway, Sweden Spending Billions To Secure Surrounding Seas,” Defence News, October

17 (2011): 19. 537

Charlie Duxbury, “Sweden Plan to Increase Military Spending,” Wall Street Journal, 12 March, 2015.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-plans-to-increase-military-spending-1426198507.

160

Spain) to provide the necessary protection, John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy during the

Reagan Administration, decidedly objected to any such defensive plans. Under his auspices, a

new American Maritime Strategy was drafted, which was designed to put full-forward

pressure on the Soviet Union’s flanks: the Mediterranean and North Sea, (as well as in other

theaters of war – such as the Pacific.) Moreover, areas of Soviet sea-control, i.e. the sea-

bastions in the High North, would be challenged by the deployment of large elements of U.S.

naval forces, directly threatening the Soviet ballistic missile submarines, and thereby relieving

pressure from the central front.538

Norway was crucial in this effort, also because Soviet naval

forces had to be confined to the waters north of the GIN-gap (Greenland-Iceland-Norway) in

order for NATO forces to reinforce the northern and central front.539

In fact, provisions were

made for American, Canadian, British, and Danish ground forces to support the Norwegian

army against the likely attempt by the Soviet Union to occupy as much of the Norway as

possible. To this end, territorial defense lay at the heart of Norwegian defense planning.

The concept of territorial defense was also reflected in the composition of the Royal

Norwegian Navy (RNoN) at the end of the Cold War. Ten modernized German Type 207

submarines were operational with a class of six Ula (Type 210) boats entering service

between 1990 and 1992. The five Oslo-class missile frigates were based on an older U.S.

design, and exhibited robust ASW, AAW, and ASuW capabilities. The two Sleipner-class

corvettes had been in service were over 35 years old. Although they were “attractively

modelled corvettes, [they were] obsolescent even in the coastal protection role,”540

Chant

notes. The opposite can be said about many of the Navy’s guided missile patrol craft. Their

primary task was to defend the shores from an enemy invasion fleet. In this role alone their

highly potent Penguin SSM qualified them as a significant deterrent force. The Norwegian

naval shipbuilding industry also invested heavily in mine warfare vessels. A class of air-

cushion minesweepers was under construction in the early 1990s representing a first step in

Norway’s revolutionary utilization of this technology.541

Even after the seismic shift in world politics that occurred at the end of the Cold War,

the aforementioned defensive strategic mindset remained prevalent among Norway’s political

and military leaders. From the perspective of Norway’s defense planners, the country would

538

See Watkins, “Strategy 1984,” 69-85. 539

Moreau, “Presentation,” 29. 540

Chant, Ships, 166. 541

Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 401-410. For a more detailed description of the program see the article in Naval

Forces: “MICOS – The New Mine Countermeasure Systems for the Royal Norwegian Navy,” Naval Forces

Special Issue: Norwegian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 38-42.

161

have to become more self-reliant when it came to national defense, as Admiral Torolf Rein,

Chief of Defense of Norway, elaborated in the mid 1990s.

From being situated at a pivotal point of opposed superpower interests, in the eyes of

our allies, Norway is in the process of being reduced to an ally of marginal interest,

located at the outskirts of the current events. […] With this background I, therefore, do

not see any development that entails a fundamental change in the assessment of the

challenges our defense forces could be faced with.542

The threat of invasion and the necessary provisions to “prevent an enemy from quickly

gaining a foothold on Norwegian soil”543

continued to dictate the shape of the Royal

Norwegian Navy.

Although the defense budget had been reduced considerably by the mid-1990s, the

size of the fleet remained largely intact. More importantly, however, as Admiral Rein stressed

at the time, was the quality of the fighting force. “For the Navy [this meant that] the

maintenance of a high quality submarine [and surface] force [was] essential for [Norway’s]

ability to counter an amphibious assault and to prevent enemy naval domination of [her]

territorial waters.”544

Consequently, weapon systems were continuously upgraded and naval

personnel kept at a high level of readiness.545

In regard to its territory, a brief look at a map of Norway will allow us to easily

identify the country’s inherent strategic vulnerabilities. While the southern tip is 1750 km

from the northern shores, most of its territory only expands a few hundred kilometers inland

from the coast. The Norwegian hinterland is largely dominated by rough mountainous terrain,

thus forcing the population to live close to the sea. Moreover, the few land lines of

communication, running from north to south would be under jeopardy in the case of war. This

means that the “coastal Sea Lines of Communication are of the utmost importance […] and

protecting [them] is therefore one of the major missions of the RNoN.”546

In order to protect the SLOCs a new class of frigates was to be delivered to the Navy

between 2004 and 2010. After the Oslo (F-300) had run aground and sunk in 1994, only four

ships of the Oslo-class were in service in 2000 and all were reaching the end of their service

542

Torolf Rein, “The Quality of Our Forces Remains a Primary Condition,” Naval Forces Special Issue:

Norwegian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 4. 543

Ibid. 544

Ibid. 545

During the Cold War Norwegian forces were at a constant alert readiness of less than 30 min. See Kjell

Amund Prytz interviewed by Naval Forces, “The Way Ahead,” Naval Forces Special Issue: Norwegian Naval

Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 18. 546

Rein, “Quality,” 4.

162

life. Their successors were planned to be far larger (4,900 tons compared to 1,670 tons) and

also far more capable in all areas of warfare. Initially, proposals from three different

manufacturers were considered, but in the end, Spain’s Empresa Nacional Bazán (now

Navantia) was awarded with the $1.6 billion contract to build five ships.547

Right from the

start it was clear that this project would be immensely expensive for a country such as

Norway, whose entire yearly defense budget amounted to approximately $5.5 billion.548

In

comparison, the most expensive procurement project in the history of the U.S. Navy has been

the latest order of ten Virginia-class submarines worth $17.5 billion, while the proposed

defense budget for FY2014 was set at over $600 billion.549

While many foreign frigates were either too expensive or did not provide the desired

capabilities, the Navy Material Command Norway decided “not to procure an off-the-shelf

design from abroad”,550

but instead to buy a ship that satisfied the Navy’s needs. The result of

this effort is the five Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates which entered service with only a year’s

delay. In comparison to other European frigates, e.g. the Dutch Zeven Provinciën, the German

F-124, or the FREMM-class, the Norwegian vessels are somewhat smaller and less heavily

armed. However, their sophisticated sensors and combat systems nonetheless make them very

capable warships.

The Nansen’s design is similar to that of the Spanish Àlvaro de Bazán, which is not

surprising considering the fact that both types were designed and built by Navantia. While the

Spanish frigate, as we have heard, is the smallest vessel to carry the American SPY-1D radar,

the Norwegian frigate, being even smaller, also uses the Lockheed Martin Aegis system.

However, it has to rely on a scaled-down version of the radar – the SPY-1F. It could

conceivably be used to fire the Standard SM-2 missile, yet only the Evolved Sea Sparrow

missile is currently deployed in a single, eight-cells Mk 41 VLS. Furthermore, the ship relies

on the Italian Oto Melara 76mm 62 cal gun to engage air, surface and land targets. (Note that

many foreign frigates already have larger 127mm guns.) Its hull-mounted sonar is provided

by Thales and the new NH-90 helicopter can be deployed for ASW operations in addition to

the ship’s Stingray torpedoes. Further space has been reserved for two quad SSM launchers,

547

Baker III, Combat Fleets, 503. 548

See SIPRI Fact Sheet.

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/milex_dat

abase. 549

See “General Dynamics Awarded $18 Billion by U.S. Navy for 10 Virginia-Class Submarines,” General

Dynamics, April 28, 2014.

http://www.generaldynamics.com/news/press-releases/detail.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1811=19222. 550

Eivind Hauger-Johanessen, “The Navy Materiel Command Norway: Facing A Historic Challenge,” Military

Technology, Vol. 21, 12 (1997): 37.

163

Illustration 28: Specifically, designed for operations among the vast littorals of the Norwegian fjords, the new air-cushion attack craft, however, can also be deployed in blue-water operations.

firing the Kongsberg’s stealthy Naval Strike Missile. Despite having undergone successful

testing at last year’s RIMPAC exercise,551

the missile is not yet installed on any of the ships.

What is more, no CIWS system has been fitted either. Notwithstanding these shortcomings,

the Fridtjof Nansen-class has enabled the Royal Norwegian Navy to become a significantly

more effective naval force.

Such improvements, however, come with a substantial price tag. At the end of the day,

the entire project will have cost more than $2 billion, putting the Navy under substantial

financial pressure. Already in 2013, rumors surfaced that the third ship of the class, the Otto

Sverdrup, was no longer operational because it was being stripped for spare parts in order to

keep the rest of the class in front-line service.552

Arguably, the stagnant defense spending over

the last years has not been helpful in the Navy’s effort to maintain a capable naval fighting

force.

On a more positive note,

after a long-pending decision, all

six Skjold air-cushion attack

missile craft were ordered.

Initially planned as a class of 24

to replace the ageing fleet of small

surface combatants, the highly

complex stealth craft underwent

“comprehensive testing with focus

on speed, sea-keeping,

[electromagnetic compatibility],

signature and functionality, as well as the operational reliability tests – mainly in northern

Norway [where the sea-conditions are particularly demanding].”553

These tests were necessary

as the design of the Skjold probed unknown ground in ship-design and it took ten years for the

second unit of the class to be commissioned.

Already at first sight, it becomes obvious that these warships differ in most aspects

from what we have seen in naval shipbuilding thus far. The largest parts of this catamaran are

made of carbon fiber to increase its stealth features. The propulsion system is based on the

experience gained with the Navy’s air cushion minesweepers and is designed around four gas

551

RIMPAC is hosted by the United States annualy and represents the largest naval exercises in the world. 552

“Frigate Berthed for its spare parts,” NEWS in ENGLISH.no, 30 Sept. 2013.

http://www.newsinenglish.no/2013/09/30/frigate-berthed-for-spare-parts/. 553

Guy Toremans, “Significant Ships: Skjold Class FACs: Norway’s Fighting Cats: Stealth Reigns Supreme,” in

Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014): 126-127.

164

turbines driving two water-jets (similar to those in the Swedish Visby-class). In order to

maintain speeds of over 40 knots (75 km/h) two lift fans in the bow blow air into the pocket

between and under the catamaran’s hull. The front and back of the ship are sealed by rubber

flaps, thus enabling the ship to ride on a cushion of air (also known as surface effect). Speeds

of up to 60 knots (>110 km/h) have been reached, making it the fastest naval vessel in the

world.554

At the same time these ships pack a powerful punch. A single 76mm/62 cal gun is

installed on the ship’s deck, while two retractable quad launchers for the Naval Strike Missile

are located aft of the bridge. Portable Mistral SAM launchers can also be installed for point

air defense. Although these ships are quite small, they are among the most innovative

warships designed to date. They can rightfully be considered an essential element of

Norway’s fleet of surface combatants555

and are “capable of contributing substantially to a

wide range of operations in both the littoral and in blue water”, as Toremans points out.

“Although designed to patrol Norway’s littoral waters,” he continues, “the units have already

proved to be amongst the most flexible [naval] assets.” A lengthy deployment as part of the

U.S. Navy in 2002 and 2003 proved that long-distance out-of-area operations were not only

possible, but that “[the ship’s] top speed of 60 knots could prove quite useful to the EU or

NATO counter-piracy operations.”556

As Norway slowly moved away from its somewhat parochial concept of territorial

defense towards a more multinational-oriented defense policy, so did the Royal Norwegian

Navy. Consecutive defense white papers in the mid-2000s stated that, apart from securing

Norwegian sovereignty, the contribution to multinational crisis management, which included

multilateral peace operations, was to be strengthened.557

“Our security cannot be maintained

through a one-sided focus on the conventional defence of Norwegian territory.”558

A further

publication in 2008 emphasized the latter point by postulating that “Norway’s most important

contribution to the strengthening of international, and therefore Norwegian security, is active

and constructive participation in the UN and NATO.”559

As a result of these decisions,

Norway’s shore defense artillery was disbanded560

and its naval forces engaged more actively

554

Toremans, “Skjold,” 129. 555

Note that these ships have been included in the graph. Norway therefore has a total of 11 capable surface

combatants. 556

Toremans, “Skjold,” 139. 557

Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Norwegian Defence 2006 (2006): 3-4. 558

Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Norwegian Defence 2004 (2004): 7. 559

Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Norwegian Defence 2008 (2008): 5. 560

See Ezio Bonsignore et al. “Norway,” Military Technology: The World Defense Almanac 2004, Issue 1

(2004): 149.

165

in a number of multinational operations, such as the E.U. anti-piracy operations off the coast

of Somalia and the joint exercises with its Scandinavian and Baltic neighbors, while its sister

services have since been deployed to Afghanistan, Mali, South Sudan and the Middle East.

In the long term, the focus of Norway’s concern, however, will remain directed

towards the High North and the Arctic. Fittingly, in 2010, the Armed Forces’ Joint

Headquarters was moved to Bod , inside the Arctic Circle and will lead all military

operations from there.561

This move was spurred by growing security concerns in the region.

Conflicting commercial interests, largely over fishing rights and the exploitation of natural

resources on and under the seabed, have led to disputes between the different parties in the

region while the possibility of increased instability and even hostility persist. In the future, the

fundamental question regarding the freedom of the seas will become more pressing, in

particular in the light of a possible sea route via the northern passage and the recent behavior

of Russia’s resurgent Northern Fleet.

“I worry about the question of the freedom of the seas”, the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice

Admiral Kjell Amund Prytz stated as early as 1995. “During the Cold War, [the] threat of

piracy was negligible”, he continued. “[L]awlessness at sea increases everywhere [and the]

Coast Guard has fired more shots in anger during the last six months than during the entire

duration of our neutrality guard operations in World War One.” 562

In the long term, the Royal

Norwegian Navy is likely to be confronted with increasing challenges across the intensity

spectrum. So far, it has been able to adapt to the diverse security environment of the post-

Cold War era. As long as the country’s leadership does not succumb to sea blindness, as is the

case with numerous other European nations, the Norwegian Navy will remain a relatively

small, yet credible naval force in the region.563

561

See Homepage of Norwegian Armed Forces: “Norwegian Joint Headquarters.”

http://mil.no/organisation/about/norwegianjointheadquarters/Pages/default.aspx.

Gerard O’Dwyer, “Norway Maintains Littoral Focus on High North,” Defence News, 10 January (2011): 12. 562

Prytz, “Way Ahead,”19. 563

Sloggett, “Norway Leads,” 23.

166

PART THREE

12) Analysis and Observations – Quo Vadis Europe?

After having outlined the mainstay of European naval capabilities, it is time to place the

development of European sea power within the larger picture. Purely by numbers, Europe, as

a whole, could be considered at least as powerful as the United States. The continent is more

populous than the U.S. and has a higher gross domestic product, thus making it the greatest

combined economic power in the world. In terms of per capita GDP, Europe’s wealth

becomes even more tangible: Thirteen of the twenty richest countries in the world are

European. Furthermore, two of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members are from

Europe (France and Britain) – both of which have nuclear forces – and together with Germany

and Italy represent half of the former G8 members. All European armies combined have more

military personnel than the U.S. Armed Forces and even its accreted naval forces, at first

glance, would seem more than sufficient in size to protect its interest at sea: Europe can

deploy a powerful nuclear aircraft carrier with an air-wing of highly capable aircraft, two

smaller carriers operating the venerable Harrier jump-jet, 15 amphibious warships able to

project aerial and naval assets over great distances and onto distant shores, eight strategic

ballistic missile submarines, a mix of 12 nuclear attack submarines and 50 diesel-electric

boats – some of which are the quietest submarines in the world – , over a hundred mine

countermeasure vessels compared to the United States’ 13, highly sophisticated missile attack

craft, stealthy corvettes and an escort fleet of more than 130 destroyers and frigates. How can

one speak of brinkmanship and decline in light of such impressive numbers?

Over thirty years ago, then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, famously asked: “Who

do I call if I want to call Europe?”564

And in fact, Europe’s strategic weakness lies in its

heterogeneity. Its power seems to be diffused and divided. The great amalgamate of strikingly

different states (take Finland and Turkey for example) with distinct cultural, religious and

social backgrounds naturally affect Europe’s foreign policy. Although cooperation, in

particular between the NATO members during the Cold War, had fostered close ties between

the individual armed forces, recent events have shown how little agreement can be found

between the political and military leadership of each country regarding military intervention

564

The precise wording of the quote is not known. However, in an interview with Der Spiegel Kissinger

acknowledges having asked such a question.

Henry Kissinger interview by Spiegel, “SPIEGEL Interview with Henry Kissinger: ‘Europeans Hide Behind the

Unpopularity of President Bush’ Spiegel Online International, February 18, 2008.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,535964,00.html.

167

and a common security and defense policy. As was noted, throughout the last decade U.S. or

NATO-led campaigns often consisted of an ad hoc coalition of more or less willing European

states, while other members watched from the sidelines. This disunity has led some defense

analysts to even question the deterrent nature of NATO’s Article 5 mutual-defense

agreement.565

Despite being a mighty force on paper, European sea power has been in steep decline

since the end of the Cold War. As my case studies revealed, the large majority of naval fleets

have been significantly reduced in size and many have ceded important capabilities as a result

of the post-Cold War peace-dividend and years of continued austerity measures.

Notwithstanding technological advancement in shipbuilding, far fewer warships are available

to deal with the current abundance of maritime tasks. The British Fleet, for example, has been

reduced by nearly 60 percent while the French Marine Nationale has to rely on a fleet half the

size of that in 1990. Italy’s forces will be stretched thin by the nation’s interests in the greater

Mediterranean theater and the increasing burden of mass migration and Spain is barely able to

maintain its multi-purpose fleet due to one of the lowest defense budgets in all of Europe.

Greece continues to be caught in the quagmire of the financial crisis and it is therefore

questionable if the country will be able to sustain its comparatively high defense expenditure

in the future. As a result, the Hellenic Navy is unlikely to retain its current capabilities.

Turkey, on the other hand, has been able to establish itself as a major naval power in the

Black Sea and the Aegean Sea and, maybe more importantly, over the past twenty-five years

has developed the ability to design and manufacture its own warships.

On Europe’s northern flank, the Netherlands, one of the richest countries in the world,

has cut its surface fleet by more than half, while its next-door neighbor Germany shows few

signs of stepping up to the plate. As the world’s fourth largest economy and Europe’s

industrial powerhouse, the Germans operate some of the most capable frigates in the world.

However, compared to other medium-sized powers such as the U.K. or France, it has

remained unwilling to align itself with the general trend towards operating a well-balanced

multi-purpose fleet.

565

Etienne de Durand, “NATO in an Era of Global Competition, Defending Borders,“ min: 52:00.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VLZSQjBpHNk.

168

Illustration 29: Although the French/Italian Horizon project ultimately delivered four highly capable air-defense destroyers, they replace a much larger fleet of AAW vessels. This fact has limited both navies’ ability to put more than a single task-force to sea at any given point in time.

On a somewhat more positive note, the Scandinavian navies have shown some

encouraging signs of effectively adapting to the post-Cold War environment. They have not

only modernized their armed forces but strengthened cooperation and interoperability in the

High North as well as the Baltic Region. However, with growing Russian military posturing

in the region and the forceful annexation of Crimea, Sweden and Finland as well as the

Poland and the Baltic states, remain largely oriented towards territorial defense. The latter

countries have not been included in this study as they operate comparatively small naval

forces. While Latvia,

Lithuania and Estonia

have modest defense

budgets and only a handful

of small warships, Poland,

despite efforts to expand

its capabilities in the

waters of the Baltic Sea,

will also have difficulties

in securing funding for

new surface combatants

and submarines. Its

borders with Russia’s ally

Belorussia and the Russian

exclave Kaliningrad are reason enough for the land component of the defense strategy taking

precedence over naval matters. As Waters notes, “[t]he overall future of the Polish Navy

continuous to look relatively bleak, […] given the increasing obsolescence of the two FFG-7

type [O.H. Perry-class] frigates and four Sokól class submarines that form the core of the fleet

and the priority given to financing army and air force.”566

Notwithstanding the possibility of

further Russian aggression in the theater, the aforementioned countries are unlikely to

significantly increase their defense expenditure but will rather want to rely on strengthening

cooperation with better-equipped partners.567

This, in turn, will put additional stress on those

European navies, which, such as in the case of Norway, are already having difficulties in

maintaining their current pace of operations.

566


Gerard O’Dwyer, “Nordic Support for Baltic Littoral Defenses,” Defense News, 9 Jan. (2012): 11.

More recently in Iain Ballantyne, “NATO Boss Make Vow TO PROTECT BALTIC,” Warships, Jan. (2015): 2.

169

In many instances the navies no longer have sufficient means to conduct their current

tasks in a period of relative peace. In the case of major conflict, little or no surge capabilities

are extant and no large-scale military operation can be maintained without the indispensible

assets of the United States. As has been noted, it is important for the European citizens to

realize the profound nature of the defense cuts over the past two decades. The austere

financial environment after the Cold War has forced many navies to continuously adapt to

new and more numerous challenges with less and less money, or as Parry puts it, “[t]he peace

dividend was spent a long time ago and, in some cases, many times over.”568

The end of the Cold War also heralded a period of strategic naval reorientation. The

principle of sea-control in the waters of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean against the

Soviets was replaced by the understanding that a modern navy also needed to be able to

conduct expeditionary warfare. The numerous stability operations and humanitarian

interventions during the 1990s called for naval forces to assume an expeditionary, out-of-area

role. Large investments were made to build amphibious assault ships and landing platform

docks. Both the U.K. and France had already maintained such forces at the end of the Cold

War and continued to expand these capabilities. By the year 2000, the Netherlands, Spain and

Italy, among others, had followed suit and today even small fleets, such as the Royal Danish

Navy, operate large warships for expeditionary warfare. However, these very expensive

capital ships account for a significant part of each navy’s budget and also need very large

crews to operate. At the same time, the shortage of manpower has become at least as pressing

of an issue as the limited number of warships, as most European armed forces have shifted

from mandatory service to a volunteer force. For that reason they almost all states in Europe

are finding it increasingly difficult to attract young citizens to join the military.

At the same time the predictions of the future are not encouraging. Not only are naval

forces called upon to conduct the entirety of military operations, from drug interdiction to

deploying special forces into hostile areas far from home. Naval sea power is also very likely

to become an even more important factor in an increasingly competitive world – one in which

the access to the ocean’s vital resources of fish, oil, gas, and raw materials is likely to become

even more heavily contested. Conflict between regional powers in Asia, in particular

regarding numerous islands in the South and East China Sea and the promise of large

exclusive economic zones in the region, are harbingers of these growing tensions at sea. In

this strategic environment, cooperation will be of the essence in order to avoid conflict and to

encourage peaceful economic and political exchange.

568

Parry, Highway, 329.

170

Both the European Union and NATO represent the foundations on which European

sea power is based. With the United States shifting its attention towards the Asian-Pacific

Region, the North Atlantic Alliance, Is likely to remain the defining element in Europe’s

security architecture. As Parry argues, “NATO will remain critical in maintaining equilibrium

in the Western hemisphere, just as suitable arrangements for the USA and its allies to provide

assurance and to support their friends (and interests) will be critical in the Eastern

hemisphere.”569

However, some prudent decisions will have to be made over the next years.

For European navies in particular, ground needs to be made up. The slow drawdown

from the Cold War and a succession of wars of choice by US and other leading

democracies diverted attention away from the sea. This strategic myopia was

compounded by the ways in which developed world governments introduced largely

incoherent defense reductions, with little regard for strategic coherence and the

balance of forces.570

One of the most promising developments over the last two decades has been the ability of

many European states to successfully join forces in building state-of-the-art ships and weapon

systems. Although some areas of high-end defense technology could not be sustained, British,

French, Italian, and Danish warships and their sensors, radars, missiles, artillery and

electronic countermeasures can rightfully be considered among the best in the world. “NATO

helps to reduce defense duplication and prevents the renationalization of defense. Without

NATO, the individual Alliance members would be forced to spend considerably more money

on defense than they currently do.”571

A number of these cooperative efforts have been addressed. In this day and age, it is

exorbitantly expensive to build a warship from scratch and quite frankly no European

country’s defense industry is able to provide all the necessary parts for such an undertaking.

Therefore, joint ventures such as the Franco/Italian Horizon and FREMM projects, the

trilateral cooperation between Spain, Germany and the Netherlands for a new air defense

frigate, the multi-national NH-90 helicopter program and the construction of the

Rotterdam/Galicia-class LPDs are high-profile examples of the successful and necessary

measures European governments have made so far.

In terms of interoperability, the European navies have made great strides in being able

to conduct a wide range of maritime missions with naval detachments from other countries.

NATO’s Standing Maritime Groups are continuously at sea, constituting an immediate

569


Ibid., 329. 571

Larrabee , Austerity, 106.

171

reaction force and a conventional deterrent. European warships, operating as part of

multinational naval operations, such as Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Atalanta,

provide an excellent basis for trust-building and interoperability among European and foreign

navies. Such increased interoperability also allows each navy to specialize in specific

capabilities to a greater degree. Chris Pegenkopf explains that

[w]ith enhanced coordination of the alliance’s operational capabilities, member states

[conceivably] could completely cede certain mission areas in which they struggle to

maintain a competency because of a scarcity of resources. This would allow them to

reallocate funding to focus on becoming a world-class capability leader in their

assigned mission areas. As a result, the overall NATO force would be more integrated

and effective, as it would be a confluence of capabilities leaders rather than a

collection of independent militaries that are jacks of all trades but masters of none.572

Although a trend towards more specialized navies is noticeable in some areas of operation,

both political as well as operational considerations have been a limiting factor in such a

process. Frankly, a highly specialized navy would find it more difficult to adapt to a rapidly

developing security environment and might be caught off guard, having invested large sums

of money in the wrong areas. At the same time the country’s leadership would realize that it is

utterly dependent on other states to conduct many principal missions its own navy cannot

perform. Italy, for example, would have found it very difficult to operate near the shore of

Libya in 2011 had it not commanded a well-balanced fleet able to defend its aircraft carrier

from air, surface and subsurface threats. Were Italy to decide to assign its submarine

protection duties to, say, the French Navy in order have sufficient funds to operate two

aircraft carriers instead of one, it would have to hope that France is also willing to take

military action in a future conflict. In times of ad hoc coalitions and alliances such a plan is

inherently risky. As has been pointed out, many naval scholars, therefore, disagree with

Pagenkopf and rather argue that operating a general purpose fleet – and be it small – is still

the best choice for most European navies.

A well-balanced multi-purpose navy can adapt to changes in the strategic

environment more easily and thus reduce the risk of having backed the wrong horse while

being left to its own devices by its supposed allies. In the Asian-Pacific Region a number of

states are actively engaged in building such naval forces. India, China, South Korea, Japan

and Australia are all strengthening their blue-water capabilities and are in the process of

creating more powerful multi-purpose navies, despite experiences major difficulties along the

572

Chris Pagenkopf, “Cooperation is the Key to NATO’s Future,” Naval Institute Proceedings, September

(2014): np. http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-09/cooperation-key-natos-future.

172

Illustration 30: The overall reduction in numbers has also affected the force of support and replenishment vessels – a key necessity in any form of naval operation today. Note the size of the replenishment vessel in the middle in comparison to the LPD and frigate.

way.573

In particular, the construction of aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, large

surface combatants and long-range submarines are the most obvious signs of this trend. The

graphs in the Appendices provide a valuable comparison between the rise of naval power in

the Asia-Pacific and the apparent decline of European sea power.574

In contrast, only four countries in Europe can claim to operate a modern, general

purpose naval force. Although some states, such as Norway and Denmark, are shifting from

littoral to blue-water operations, and others, like Turkey, are seeking to operate more

powerful fleets, their navies are limited by both smaller budgets and more limited strategic

interests than their Asian counterparts. It is, therefore, pivotal for the European navies to

retain as many capabilities as possible, and be they marginal. Even if short-term fiscal

restrictions are limiting factors in putting such capabilities into full effect, in times of crisis

they could be reestablished (although this process would possibly take considerably longer

than imagined). From a platform-centric point of view, provisions have to be made so that

surface combatants, submarines and aircraft can be incrementally upgraded over time.

Luckily, modern European warships have considerable room to grow. Many frigates and

destroyers, such as the Norwegian Nansen, the French La Fayette, and British Daring-class

are relatively lightly armed when compared to their Asian and American equivalents.

However, they have room

for additional weapons

systems and their sensor

suits can be updated if

necessary.

The ability to

quickly shift priorities at

sea is already visible in

operations in the North

Atlantic where European

anti-submarine warfare

capabilities are being put

to the test by Russian

573

A brief illustration of the malaise India’s naval sector finds itself in can be found in: Dave Sloggett, “India’s

Navy Falter,” Warships, July (2014): 12-13. 574

It is worth noting that the respective Asian navies already operated relatively large fleets in 1990. However,

many of the vessels at the time were obsolete while today a large part of these fleets is comprised of modern

warships.

173

naval operations. Formally a forte of the northern European states, in particular the United

Kingdom, twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War naval strategy and tactics for sea-

control have to be relearned. At the same time constabulary duties on the southern flank as

well as ongoing crisis throughout North Africa and the Middle East have put considerable

strain on the European navies operating in this theater.

What is more, Europe remains largely dependent on American key capabilities. This

includes the U.S. Navy’s auxiliary forces. Without these support vessels, large naval

operations are not sustainable. Unfortunately, current trends indicate that the so-called teeth-

to-tail ratio of combat ships to supply and replenishment vessels is becoming increasingly

critical. The same is the case in regard to Europe’s sea-lift capabilities. While European

powers were able to field, deploy, and sustain division-sized units in the war against Iraq in

1991, such an operation has become impossible today.575

In addition, even the two most

powerful amphibious forces in Europe, the French and the British, are “unlikely to be

deployed in a high-threat environment without considerable U.S. force protection.”576

In

essence, despite the strengthening its amphibious forces, Europe’s military lacks the ability to

get significant forces to the scene of action and it does not have the necessary sustainable

high-end capabilities to sufficiently protect them from harm once they get there. In particular

in the areas of air defense, close-air support, airborne-early warning, aerial-refueling,

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and long-range precision strikes577

Europe is far

from claiming military parity with the U.S. Armed Forces.

That the U.S. military might, and especially its naval power, stems from a sustained

defense expenditure of nearly four percent of the national GDP, more than twice that of the

average European state,578

seems to be more of a welcome convenience to the Europeans

rather than a goal worth aspiring to. In the long-term, the United States is likely to become

increasingly frustrated by its allies’ tendency to free ride on the backs of U.S. taxpayers. With

the United States’ focus of attention already shifting towards China and the greater Asian-

Pacific Region, Europe will have to carry a larger share of the security burden in the Western

Hemisphere as well as being more self-responsible for protecting its interests in other regions

575


Ibid. 86. 577

As a matter of fact, nearly every single air-campaign since the end of the Cold War has shown that Europe’s

arsenal of precision ammunition was quickly depleted. Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, “NATO runs short on

some munition in Libya,” The Washington Post, April 15, 2011.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some-munitions-in-

libya/2011/04/15/AF3O7ElD_story.html. 578

In 2013 the U.S. spent a total of $735 million on the NATO defense budget compared to a total of $288

million of all other allies. See Pagenkopf, “Cooperation,” np.

174

of the world. That it will have to do so with much smaller and often less capable naval forces

than twenty-five years ago seems to have been overlooked by Europe’s leadership.

13) Conclusion

It seems fair to say that by any reasonable estimate sea power will be one of the

defining elements in the future of world affairs. In principle, the twenty-first century will be

governed by various powers at sea, interacting with each other in both peaceful cooperation as

well as bloody conflict, just like the centuries before. While I have gone to great lengths to

provide substantial evidence for the ability to influence decisions on land by means of

economic and military power at sea, an important question has so far only been alluded to –

namely which actors will be able to utilize the maritime realm to a greater extent than the

others and thereby accrue wealth and power. Or in other words: Whose sea power will it be?

For now three basic trends are likely to remain extant in the foreseeable future. Firstly,

the United States will be able to maintain its global naval dominance by a considerable

margin for at least another thirty years. The U.S. Navy’s ability to maintain sea-control will

however be challenged by the emergence of increasingly sophisticated anti-access/area-denial

networks in close proximity to the shores of Russia, China, and to a lesser degree Iran and

North Korea. Moreover, the emergence of large blue-water navies in the Indian Ocean and the

Pacific will force the United States to rethink its current maritime strategy. Ultimately,

however, the U.S. Navy (and the Marine Corps) is likely to remain the only naval force able

to project significant power in any region of the world and sustain a military confrontation

over a longer period of time.

The second trend also coincides with arguably one of the most profound geopolitical

developments in modern history, the consequences of which will not be understood for some

time. Already in the mid-1980s maritime trade between the U.S. and Asia had eclipsed that of

trans-Atlantic trade. However, it has been the incredible ascent of previously poor countries

such as India, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam and (most importantly) China which, for the

first time in more than five hundred years, has caused the geopolitical focus of attention – in

particular that of the United States – to shift away from Europe and the Atlantic towards the

Asian-Pacific Region (APR). In many counties in the APR the maritime domain has taken a

prominent position. This is exemplified by Chinese naval scholars studying the writings of the

most renowned naval strategists, Alfred T. Mahan and Julian Corbett, while many navies in

175

the region are trying to emulate U.S. maritime capabilities. Apparently, the leaders in Peking,

Seoul and New Delhi have understood the strategic gains to be made by entertaining a large

commercial fleet as well as a strong navy to protect the country’s political and economic

interests at home and abroad. These efforts have been highly profitable for the

aforementioned states, strengthening the domestic shipbuilding industry as well as the

commercial market. However, the possibility of conflict looms large as the current naval arms

race among the conflicting actors in the region is joined by the United States and its military

in a contest over who will have the most to say in this part of the world.

The third trend allows us to infer which role Europe will play in this maritime century.

Over the course of the preceding chapters I have described the development of Europe’s

navies since the end of the Cold War in much detail. Every lager navy has been discussed at

length, paying particular attention to how each individual naval service has dealt with the

paradigmatic changes to the security environment that have come to pass. During the later

years of the Cold War, most European states were NATO members and thus part of the

overarching maritime strategy against the Soviet Union. Therefore, each navy had specific

tasks to fulfill, such as mining critical choke points through which the Soviet forces had to

pass in the case of war, defending the European flanks from Soviet incursion, or protecting

the strategic lines of communication between the United States and Europe on which the

essential reinforcement for the besieged European allies would be transported. The enemy’s

naval forces, in particular his submarines, had to be destroyed in order to maintain command

of the sea. This principle of sea-control formed the basic strategic tenet of Europe’s naval

forces. The Americans, for their part, would use combined aircraft carrier battle groups and all

available attack submarines to put full forward pressure on the Soviet flanks in the North

Atlantic and the Mediterranean (as well as in the Pacific).

With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War these plans were

shelved as the emergence of new forms of conflict necessitated novel approaches to maritime

warfare. Amphibious warfare capabilities were expanded in order to conduct military

interventions, stability operations and peace-keeping missions in distant regions of the world.

Soon, many European navies operated expeditionary forces, such as amphibious assault ships

and other large multi-purpose surface combatants capable of projecting power from sea onto

land. However, for strategic reasons, some states like Greece or Finland remained focused on

territorial defense in the brown-waters closer to shore.

Yet, of even greater relevance to European sea power was the fact that large sums of

money which would have formerly been allocated to national defense could now be invested

176

elsewhere. As part of the so-called ‘peace dividend’ the large standing armies in Europe

underwent drastic reductions. While ships were becoming more expensive to build, military

budgets were reduced incrementally, making it difficult for most European navies to

modernize their fleets. This process has continued for nearly twenty-five years and has been

exacerbated by the global economic crisis which took hold of Europe after 2008. As a matter

of fact, only days before submitting this thesis, the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research

released the figures for the global defense expenditures in 2014. Despite the Islamic State

waging war across Iraq and Syria; unabated conflict in North Africa – causing an influx of

refugees trying to make their way to Europe; Russia forcefully annexing Crimea, continuing

its hybrid warfare in support of the rebel forces in Eastern Ukraine and flexing its growing

military muscle along the European periphery; and, lastly, the Americans shifting their focus

of attention towards the Asian-Pacific Region, it is unlikely that we will see any significant

increases in European defense spending any time soon. As the data reveals, many countries

have, quite frankly, continued to make cuts to their defense budgets.579

Although the same can be said for the United States (the budget was reduced from 3.8

to 3.5 percent in 2014), it has again rushed to Europe’s assistance, re-deploying heavy

mechanized forces and combat aircraft as a response to Russia’s actions. To be fair, many

NATO members have also been actively engaged in confidence building measures across the

Alliance’s eastern border. Furthermore, the three Baltic States, Poland and possibly Germany

will be under pressure to increase their defense spending in the short term. Ultimately, such

provisions will however have little effect on the overall decline of European sea power. This

is partly due to the fact that in this theater of operation robust military forces for air and land

warfare are considered the quintessential linchpin in deterring Russia from further coercive

measures against the West.

[Therefore,] NATO’s pivot to Russia will shift attention away from the maritime

domain back to the continent. Armies and air forces will receive, once again, much

more attention than navies. While Putin’s aggression increased the importance of

NATO for its member states, maritime security’s relevance for member states and,

therefore, for the Alliance will [likely] decrease. In consequence, theaters like the

Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean will become of much less concern for NATO.580

579

“Baltische Länder erhöhen Militärausgaben,” news.ORF.at, 13. April, 2015.

http://orf.at/stories/2273071/2273070/. 580

Felix Seidler, “NATO’s PIVOT TO RUSSIA: COLD WAR 2.0 AT SEA?” CIMSEC, April 25, 2014.

http://cimsec.org/natos-pivot-russia-cold-war-2-0-sea/10723

177

Illustration 31: Joint maneuvers, such as the RIMPAC exercise held by the US Navy every year, provide valuable opportunity to build trust among states which otherwise have conflicting interests at sea. Such efforts will be particularly important in the Asian-Pacific Region.

As was pointed out, the defense budgets of the other NATO members meanwhile have either

remained stagnant or have been reduced even further. The armed forces of France, Greece,

Italy, and the Netherlands all have had to find ways of doing more with less money. Of the 28

NATO member states only four (apart from the United States) spend more than 2 percent of

their GDP on defense.

This figure has been stated on numerous occasions throughout this thesis as if it were

some sort of panacea to all of Europe’s defense ailments and in fact there is a consensus that

such a benchmark would constitute the best compromise in terms of feasibility and national

security within the Alliance. In consecutive NATO summits the European members have

pledged to “move towards the 2% guideline”,581

by increasing their defense budgets within a

decade: “These decisions will further strengthen the Transatlantic Bond, enhance the security

of all Allies and ensure a more fair and balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities,” the

official statement after the most recent NATO summit in Wales underscored.582

Unfortunately

these promises seem to remain merely lip

service as governments throughout Europe

and, maybe more importantly, the countries’

citizens are unwilling and unable to make

such financial concessions.

Although the security and prosperity

of all European states relies heavily on

maritime security and the unimpeded flow of

commerce on the ocean’s ‘great highways’,

the average person on the street will be

difficult to convince that more money has to

be allocated to the naval forces in order to

protect Europe’s interests and prosperity.

Therefore, it lies in the responsibility of the

current political and military leadership in

Europe not to continue down the current road

of brinkmanship. At the end of the day, the

581

NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, 5 September, 2014: np.

http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. 582

Ibid., np.

178

real issue is neither Russia’s rearmament nor the state of the transatlantic relationship, but in

fact money.583

After more than two decades of almost continuous cuts to national defense,

many European armed forces no longer have the capability to effectively deal with the

growing number of security challenges that confront them.

In numerous strategic defense papers discussed in this thesis, Europe’s naval forces

are not only called upon to fulfill their primary military function – to attack, to defend, or to

deter – but far more often are used for diplomatic and policing duties. At any given point in

time, the navies are conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, be it after

the earthquake in Haiti or by saving passengers from a sinking cruise ship in the

Mediterranean. British, Spanish and German destroyers and frigates, designed to protect an

entire battle group from the onslaught of enemy anti-ship missiles, regularly conduct anti-

piracy operations against small motorboats and modern-day freebooters armed with AK-47

rifles off the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, smaller, less sophisticated and less expensive ships,

which would be better designed for such tasks, are spread thin over the vast oceans,

conducting constabulary duties such as drug interdictions and fishery protection in their

countries’ territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. That this can be quite a

challenging undertaking in an area of over 11,000,000 km² with only a handful of ships, such

as in the case of France, needs no further explanation.

I have also made a point to stress the ramifications the reduction of naval capabilities

will likely have on Europe as a political entity as well as for its population. Over the past five

hundred years most major powers in the world have understood the utility of sea power, both

in economic as well as military terms. Colin S. Gray even goes so far as to argue that, “[g]reat

sea powers or maritime coalitions have either won or, occasionally, drawn every major war in

modern history.”584

Ultimately, however, it was the successful marriage of commercial and

military might (on which Mahan based his understanding of sea power) that put successive

European powers ahead of the rest of the world, enabling them to accumulate vast territorial

gains and in return secure wealth and political influence. After the end of the Second World

War the United States succeeded the British as the preeminent sea power and has remained

the “claviger and steward”585

of international trade regime while Europe’s economies

continue to free ride on the maritime security that the United States Navy has upheld for

nearly seventy years. In the future it is likely that this practice will no longer suffice. As we

583

The current problem of financing NATO operations in the Baltic States and Poland is discussed in detail in

De Durand, “NATO,” min: 14:00. 584

Gray, Leverage, Prologue. 585

Bobbitt, Consent, 537.

179

speak, the oceans are becoming an increasingly contested area of interests: “[S]tates will seek

to extend their jurisdiction, control and regulation over offshore areas up to the limits of their

exclusive economic zones (EEZs)”. They will try to “exploit the resources that lie on and

below the seabed and in the water column”,586

Parry warns. China’s current effort to build

artificial islands and archipelagos in the South China Sea provides evidence for this

proposition.587

Located considerably further from Chinese mainland than from Vietnam or the

Philippines, the Spratley Islands are one of the many areas in the PRC’s vicinity in which the

aforementioned maritime contest is taking shape. Being one of the most profitable fishing

grounds in the world, it is not surprising that numerous states want to claim sovereignty over

the small sandy islets in these waters, thereby expanding their EEZ.

While the United States has to carefully weigh its interest and response to these

developments in the Asia-Pacific, Europe will largely be incapable of having any direct

influence on the events unfolding in the region. Although “[t]he debate about a European role

in an East Asian major war is largely hypothetical, it teaches us three lessons,” Seidler points

out.588

Firstly, Europe’s political and military power has become severely weakened.

Considering the current trend towards further defense reductions, Europe’s ability to secure its

interests abroad will likely be limited even further. Secondly, the principal cause for this

development is the inability of the political leadership in many European countries to make

prudent decisions in times of fiscal austerity, the population’s aversion towards military

intervention, and their unwillingness to make sacrifices in both blood and money for the

greater good of their respective country. Lastly, Europe is becoming increasingly irrelevant in

geopolitical and strategic terms outside of its own sphere of influence and even within it will

be challenged to a greater extent than before. 589

Growing instability on Europe’s southern flank has been discussed at length in this

thesis. More funding will be needed to deal with the security challenges the influx of illegal

immigrants from Africa and the Middle East is causing. At the same time, on Europe’s eastern

border we are witnessing the reemergence of Russia as an important player in international

politics – a player skillfully applying hard power to expand his sphere of influence by

resorting to a strategy of hybrid warfare and fait accompli. Meanwhile, on Europe’s northern

flank the steady melting of the polar caps will likely make commercial shipping between

586


Sui-Lee Wee, “China explains why it’s building islands in the South China Sea,” Business Insider UK, April

9, 2015.

http://uk.businessinsider.com/china-explains-why-its-building-islands-in-the-south-china-sea-2015-4?r=US. 588


Ibid.

180

Europe and Asia via the North West Passage possible in the future. This circumstance would

reduce the distance between China’s production sites and the European market by 10,000

km.590

According to various predictions, vessels travelling on these routes will, however, still

need the assistance of icebreakers for many decades to come. Currently, “Russia maintains a

decided advantage in Arctic operations in its ownership of […] seven nuclear-powered

civilian vessels and nineteen diesel-powered variants, with six more planned in the near

future.”591

The Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are all

largely dependent on seaborne trade and would profit immensely from the emergence of this

new trade route. However, it would also place an additional burden on their naval forces, in

particular if Russia was to use its geographical and military advantage as political leverage.

To the reader it might seem as if I have drawn an overly drastic picture in the hope of

making a case for an increase in defense spending and the strengthening of the military forces.

This has not been my intention. Quite frankly, all observations have been based on factual

assertions of previous developments and current political and maritime trends. Many

European states still maintain robust naval forces – considered to be among the best in the

world – exhibit industrial prowess as well as technological ingenuity and also maintain large

commercial fleets. Europe as a whole would have all the ingredients to make it a truly great

sea power were it not for the apparent differences and incongruities among its member states.

Sadly, notwithstanding the common defense agreements within NATO and the growing

military cooperation as part of the European Union, the continent remains a conglomerate of

highly diverse states, all of which have their individual foreign and domestic interests to

satisfy. Nowhere does this instance become more apparent than when the lives of young men

and women, as well as substantial amounts of money are at stake.

During the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, basically every single European state (save

the neutral ones) provided military assistance to the U.S.-led campaign against Saddam

Hussein. Only a few years later, in the Balkan Wars, it took the European powers much longer

to agree on a common course of action. As a result of this inaptitude the United States had to

take the lead in the military campaign against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. After the

terrorist attacks of 9/11 the world again briefly gathered behind the United States. However,

as the hope of classical military victory turned out to be ephemeral in quagmires of

Afghanistan and Iraq, Europe’s commitments in many instances became somewhat half-

hearted. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 provided a turning point for the Western community.

590


Ibid., 146-147.

181

While Britain joined the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, Germany and France ruled out any

military engagement on their part and Spain withdrew from Iraq in 2005 after having been hit

by massive terrorist attacks on its capital. More recently Germany again abstained from

committing military forces to the NATO air-campaign against Libya’s long-time ruler

Muammar Gaddafi, despite the U.N. Security Council having passed a resolution that

legitimized the use of force in order to protect the Libyan population from repercussions. This

time Britain, France and Italy took the lead with even neutral Sweden participating in the

enforcement of the no-fly zone over Libya.

The apparent rifts within Europe and in particular its NATO members are not likely to

disappear any time soon, as the current effort to degrade and destroy ISIS in Syria and Iraq

exemplifies. While American and French combat planes are flying strike missions from

aircraft carriers stationed in the Persian Gulf, most other European countries have shown little

interest in stepping up to the plate in military terms. Meanwhile, the Italian Navy is heavily

engaged in humanitarian assistance operations in the Mediterranean. Yet to date, no

comprehensive approach in dealing with this human catastrophe has been put forward by the

European Union. Again, contradicting political views among the various states are a major

limiting factor in an effort to use military forces to full effect.

So is this divided Europe going to be relegated to the fringes of a world centered on

the Asian-Pacific Region as I postulated at the outset of this thesis? Perhaps the somewhat

encouraging answer is: not necessarily. The developments we have witnessed over the past

years are not irreversible. However, “[c]ountries need to be prepared for the long haul and the

long view, in anticipation of risks and opportunities.”592

This means that sufficient

investments have to be made to provide the respective populace with security and access to

the amenities of the global market. In the 21st century, sea power in the form of commercial

trade and naval forces will continue to represent the most effective tool in achieving both.

Much has been said in regard to burden sharing and strengthening cooperation among

the European partners. The progress that has been made in this area is laudable and should be

vigorously pursued. However, to date, even the most powerful European militaries first look

to Washington instead of Brussels for a response when conflict arises somewhere in the

world. As long as this is the case there will be little incentive for the European states to make

any cuts to, let us say, their welfare system, in order to strengthen their defense sector.

Unfortunately, given the drastic reductions of Europe’s naval forces since the end of the Cold

War, even the aforementioned efforts by many states to streamline their force structure and

592

Parry, Highway, 33.

182

effectively engage with friends and allies to somewhat alleviate the burden that is placed upon

each individual navy have only slowed the process of overall naval decline. Unless the

propensity apparent among Europe’s leadership to reduce the size, readiness and capabilities

of the naval forces is revoked and a comprehensive budget increase is put into place,

European naval power will continue to diminish.

The 21st century will in all likelihood be one of American sea power, challenged by

the rise of Asian sea power. On the basis of the past, current and future global trends analyzed

in this thesis, it is questionable if it will also be a century of European sea power.

183

Appendices

Figure 24

Figure 25

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

% o

f G

DP


Figure 24 United States: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 126 73 74


0

50

100

150

200

250

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 25 United States.: Number of Major Vessels

Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Miilitary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

184

Figure 26

Figure 27

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1

1,2

% o

f G

DP


Figure 26 Japan: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 16 17 16


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 27 Japan: Number of Major Vessels


185

Figure 28

Figure 29

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

4

4,5

% o

f G

DP


Figure 28 South Korea: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 0 7 12


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 29 South Korea: Number of Major Vessels


186

Figure 30

Figure 31: Note that many vessels, in particular a large number of submarines, had already been obsolete by 1990 and have since been put out of service.

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

% o

f G

DP


Figure 30 China: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 93 91 47


0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

100

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 31 China : Number of Major Vessels


187

Figure 32

Figure 33

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

% o

f G

DP


Figure 32 India: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

1990 2000 2014



Submarines 16 14 14


0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 33 India: Number of Major Vessels

Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Mililtary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

188

Figure 34

Figure 35: Note that these are highly tentative figures. The actual readiness of Russian warships is rather difficult to assess.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

% o

f G

DP


Figure 34 Russia: Defense Spending in % of GDP

Military Spending

2000 2014

Aircraft Carriers 2 1

Large Surface Combatants 51 34

Submarines 69 55

Assault/Amphibious 32 22

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Nu

mb

er

of

Ve

sse

ls

Figure 35 Russia: Number of Major Vessels

Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Mililtary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review

189

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List of Illustrations

All accessed on the 24.04.2015

Illustration 1: Arguably the most renowned naval strategist: Alfred Thayer Mahan, in:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c7/Alfred-Thayer-

Mahan.jpg/640px-Alfred-Thayer-Mahan.jpg ........................................................................... 15

Illustration 2: Map of Chinese Lines of Defense, Military Power of China 2009, in:

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ .................................................................................................. 26

Illustration 3: Map of main trade routes to China, Military Power of China 2009, in:

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ .................................................................................................. 27

Illustration 4: Picture of an American Carrier Battle Group under way in the Pacific, in:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Marcd30319/Marcd30319_original_Carrier_Strike_Group_

Three_rev_2#/media/File:US_Navy_090320-N-9928E-

304_The_aircraft_carrier_USS_John_C._Stennis_%28CVN_74%29_and_ships_of_the_John

_C._Stennis_Carrier_Strike_Group_are_underway_in_formation_with_naval_vessels_from_t

he_Republic_of_Korea.jpg ...................................................................................................... 29

Illustration 5: Danish warships being dissasembled, in: http://i.imgur.com/fIXBeGb.jpg ...... 31

Illustration 6: British destroyers are conducting operations on both ends of the intensity

spectrum, in: http://i.imgur.com/vqMT0e2.jpg. ...................................................................... 35

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiMRAhupqE0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIg_ZDHeoJg

208

Illustration 7: The HMS Sheffield burns after being hit by Argentinean anti-ship missiles, in:

http://belgranoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/HMSSheffieldBurning1.jpg .......... 38

Illustration 8: An artist’s impression of the cancelled Nimrod MRA.4 maritime patrol aircraft,

in: http://www.airforceworld.com/others/gfx/nimrod/nimrod_mra4_1.jpg. ........................... 40

Illustration 9: HMS Queen Elizabeth under construction, in: http://www.hornby.com/wp/wp-

content/uploads/2014/07/HMS-Queen-Elizabeth_Photo-Credit-Lee-Howard-Photography.jpg

.................................................................................................................................................. 43

Illustration 10: The Singapore version of the French La Fayette stealth frigate, in:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Singapore_Navy#/media/File:Singapore_Navy_gui

ded-missile_frigate_RSS_Steadfast.jpg ................................................................................... 55

Illustration 11: General Dempsey and Pierre de Villiers on French aircraft carrier, in:

http://l2.yimg.com/bt/api/res/1.2/iXWYwkStEhpvDet5Vh1wSw--

/YXBwaWQ9eW5ld3M7Zmk9ZmlsbDtoPTM3NztpbD1wbGFuZTtweG9mZj01MDtweW9m

Zj0wO3E9NzU7dz02NzA-

/http://media.zenfs.com/en_us/News/afp.com/6e74d87cb9a8c5e195af8b109c9338c7a59a4274

.jpg ............................................................................................................................................ 58

Illustration 12: French are troops are being stretched thin in numerous operations, such as the

one in Mali, in: https://metrouk2.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/ay102016400epa03549933-

fren.jpg ..................................................................................................................................... 60

Illustration 13: A picture of the French Mistral-class LHD also built for Russia, in:

http://www.lopinion.fr/sites/nb.com/files/2014/03/vladivostok_4.3.14_bp_0.jpg .................. 63

Illustration 14: Italian Maestrale frigate with Albatros SAM system, in:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0e/ITS-Maestrale-F570.jpg. ................... 70

Illustration 15: HADR in the Mediterranean, in: http://www.unhcr.org/thumb1/532c494c6.jpg

.................................................................................................................................................. 79

Illustration 16: European aircraft carriers at the end of the Cold War, in:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/66/551-R11-Foch-esDragon-

Hammer92b.jpg ........................................................................................................................ 86

Illustration 17: A cut-away drawing of the Juan Carlos-class LHD, in:

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/SHIP_LHD_Canberra_Class_Concept_Cutaway.jp

g ................................................................................................................................................ 90

Illustration 18: Turkish Milgem-class frigate being launched: http://www.trdefence.com/wp-

content/uploads/2010/04/milgem1-1.png ............................................................................... 103

Illustration 19: Hellenic guided-missile attack craft, in: http://www.defencegreece.com/wp-

content/uploads/2012/06/EKI_0059_Medium.jpg ................................................................. 107

Illustration 20: Cut-away drawing of the German Type-214 AIP submarine, in:

http://media.defenceindustrydaily.com/images/SHIP_SSK_U-214_Cutaway_lg.jpg ........... 118

209

Illustration 21: German F-124 air defense frigate, in: http://defense-update.com/wp-

content/uploads/2013/03/Sachsen_f124.jpg ........................................................................... 120

Illustration 22: Dutch Frigate turns hard while a Danish container ship passes by, in:

https://rogueadventurer.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/hnlms-evertsen.jpg ........................... 130

Illustration 23: Illustration of the highly flexbile Danish StanFlex system, in:

http://www.navalhistory.dk/images/Skibene/FLYV_projektet/FLYVEFISKEN-klassen-er-

modu.jpg. ................................................................................................................................ 133

Illustration 24: Artists Impression of the future backbone of the Dutch Fleet, in:

http://www.defensie.nl/binaries/content/gallery/defensie/content-

afbeeldingen/onderwerpen/materieel/schepen/joint-logistic-support-ship-jss/joint-logistic-

support-ship-jss.jpg ................................................................................................................ 143

Illustration 25: Visby-class corvette, in: http://www.mapps.l-

3com.com/photo_gallery/pg_VisbyClassCorvette.jpg ........................................................... 153

Illustration 26: Swedish coastal Artillery, in: http://coldwarsites.net/country/sweden/arholma-

nord-arholma-battery/. ............................................................................................................ 155

Illustration 27: Ship being hit by Königsberg Naval Strike Missile, in:

http://i.ytimg.com/vi/xJuoqu62K-4/maxresdefault.jpg .......................................................... 159

Illustration 28: The Skjold air-cushion warship operating amon Norwegian Fjords, in:

http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Skjold-Class-

Corvette.jpg ............................................................................................................................ 163

Illustration 29: All four Horizon-class air-defense destroyers, in:

http://www.deagel.com/library1/medium/2009/m02009050700006.jpg ............................... 168

Illustration 30: T Fleet Replenishment at high sea, in: https://s-media-cache-

ak0.pinimg.com/736x/27/37/28/273728d26362a60827424c8843038908.jpg. ...................... 172

Illustration 31: Chinese and Japanase commanders having a discussion during RIMPAC, in:

http://i.imgur.com/nCJevap.jpg .............................................................................................. 177

In the case of illustrations without common license, reproduction has been made without the

approval of the owner.