the decemvriana conflict (december 1944)

The Dekemvriana: Communist Revolution,Rightist Coup, or Blunder?

by JOHN 0. IATRIDES

Commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Dekemvriana,the bloody events in and around Athens in December 1944,triggers widely conflicting sentiments. On the one hand, par-ticularly for Greeks who suffered through those terrible claysor have a strong emotional attachment to either side of theconflict, reviving painful memories is not a welcome prospect.Rather than reexamining old wounds that have barely healed,one might wish to simply consign to oblivion the events andpassions which caused Greeks to kill fellow Greeks and focusinstead on the process of reconciliation which the nation hasfostered since the mid-1970s. Indeed, nothing is more humanthan the desire to avoid having to relive a horrifying past.

There is, however, a different perspective and an equallyhuman propensity which compel us to take a retrospective lookat the Dekemvriana. Without in the least wishing to rekindleold passions and hatreds, we feel the urge to investigate thenation's past, including its darkest moments, to the fullest ex-tent allowed by reliable evidence and dispassionate interpreta-tion. The thirst for knowledge and understanding of the pastis a fundamental characteristic of the enlightened human con-dition. We want to know what happened and why, even ifwhat we learn is disturbing and challenges our perception ofevents we consider important. Genuine and lasting reconcilia-

JoHN 0. IATRIDES is professor of international politics at SouthernConnecticut State University. He is currently at work on a study ofGreece in the Cold War.

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tion is possible only if the bright spotlight of honest investiga-tion has explored complicated and controversial events and hasproduced conclusions supported by the evidence at hand.

Needless to say, history is never totally impartial andobjective. No matter how hard he tries to be objective, thehistorian remains the prisoner of his perceptions, values, andbias, as well as of the sources he has chosen to explore and ofthe issues he has selected to study. Nevertheless, whatever ourlimitations, we owe it to ourselves and to younger generationsto produce an account of the nation's past that is as complete,balanced, and objective as we know how. The "final" interpreta-tion and judgment must be left to the individual who cares toexamine the evidence produced and evaluate the conclusionspresented.

Another reason why the Dekemvriana needs to be revisitedis implied in the term "second round," which is often used torefer to that upheaval.' It is important to determine whetherthere is direct linkage between the events of December 1944in Athens and the other two so-called "rounds": the first wasthe clashes in the fall of 1943 between guerrilla bands belong-ing to several different resistance organizations, and the thirdwas the full-scale civil war of 1946-1949. Proof of a strong anddirect link between the three rounds strengthens the view thatall through the 1940s the Greek communists were bent onseizing power by force. Conversely, if one or more of the threecrises can be shown to have been isolated or spontaneous, sucha finding weakens considerably the claim that the Greek Com-munist Party moved systematically and methodically towardarmed revolution.

Moreover, if viewed as the direct prelude to the civil war,the Dekemvriana events assume much greater historical im-portance than if they are found to have been an isolated crisis.The civil war of the late 1940s profoundly rearranged the coun-try's political landscape under the influence of the center-rightparties, turning Greece briefly into a major episode of the ColdWar and a client of dominant external forces. It is hardy anexaggeration to claim that the civil war and its consequencesdefined Greek politics and culture until the collapse of the mili-

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tary dictatorship in 1974. But was the Dekemvriana an earlybattle of the civil war?

The literature on the enemy occupation, resistance, libera-tion and the Dekemvriana events, as well as on the civil war,is extensive, rich, and diverse. In addition to the many scholarlyworks, based largely on the archives of the United Kingdom,the United States, and of the Greek Communist Party, thereare countless memoirs, personal accounts, and historical nar-ratives by Greeks of every political persuasion? From EvangelosAveroff to Nikos Zahariadis, from Markos Vafeiadis to QueenFrederika, from Dimitris Vlantas to Dimitris Zafeiropoulos, vir-tually everyone who was involved in those momentous eventshas presented his or her side of the story. 3 Does this plethoraof scholarly and personal accounts mean that we know allthe facts surrounding the Dekemvriana? In fact, although al-most everything of importance has been established with rea-sonable certainty, several tantalizing questions remain.

One such question has to do with communications betweenMoscow and the Greek communist leadership prior to (andduring) December 1944. It is known that Soviet AmbassadorNikolai V. Novikov, accredited to the Greek government inexile in Cairo, met with Petros Roussos and possibly other Greekcommunists in Egypt. And a ten-member Soviet military missionunder Colonel Grigori Popov arrived by plane in July 1944 atELAS headquarters in Thessaly and at least Popov remained inGreece until the following January. But there is no reliable evid-ence that these contacts delivered directives from Moscow tothe Greek communist leadership or influenced the course ofevents which led to the Dekemvriana. Recently a. veteran ofBritish wartime intelligence wrote that during 1943-1944 theBritish intelligence service (SIS) intercepted "instructions thatwere being sent from the Kremlin to partisan groups andresistance movements under Communist control as to tactics tobe adopted as the day of liberation drew nearer."4 It is notknown whether such "instructions" were also sent to the Greekcommunists. Until Soviet (and British intelligence) archivesare opened to researchers, the tentative conclusion supported bythe evidence at hand has to be that, insofar as the Dekemvrianais concerned, the Greek communists acted on their own, pos-

The Dekemvriana 71

sibly with vague encouragement from their Yugoslav comrades.Another troublesome question pertains to the negotiations

conducted in October-November 1944 between Prime MinisterGeorge Papandreou and the leftist-communist EAM coalition onthe proposed demobilization of the guerrilla bands and thecreation of a national army. Did Papandreou agree to dissolvethe Rimini Brigade (which had been formed in the Middle Eastand was considered to be fanatically right-wing), or at leastsend it on extended home leave, but then change his mind,claiming that the British would not allow him to deactivate theBrigade? Or did the EAM representatives agree to demobilizeELAS even if the Rimini Brigade was retained, only to changetheir minds when the communist leadership vetoed the dis-arming of ELAS unless the Brigade was also disarmed? Thereare countless versions of these negotiations and of the formulafor demobilization but, in my view, the evidence is less thansolid no matter which explanation one finally adopts.

Despite such gaps in our knowledge most of the key factsare known; where there is wide disagreement is in the matterof interpretation. Examining the same events different authorsdraw dramatically diverging conclusions. Hence the title of thisessay: Was the Dekemvriana a communist revolution intendedto place the country under a Soviet-style one-party dictatorship?Was it instead a clever trap set by the British-backed Right todraw the Left into a fight and reimpose a royalist regime? Orwas it a classic tragedy: the unintended and unforeseen resultof mutual suspicion and fear, of a breakdown in communica-tion, of posturing and inept politics, in short, a horrible blunderfor which all involved bear responsibility?

The crisis of December 1944 can best be understood againstthe background of three critically important developments.First, since the 1920s a profound political division (ethnikosdihasmos) had sharply polarized the nation, undermined itsdemocratic institutions, and had made violence and interventionby the military a regular feature of the governing process. Inthe late 1930s and during the war and the occupation the in-stitution of the monarchy, and especially the person occupyingthe Greek throne, had emerged as the symbolic centerpiece ofthe dihasmos. King George II came to be viewed as the legatee

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of the prewar system of authoritarian rule, suppression ofbasic democratic freedoms, and of the pseudo-fascist ideologyarticulated by the dictator, General Ioannis Metaxas. Duringthe occupation the single crucial cause of the continuing dihasmoswas the failure of the government in exile, and of the Britishauthorities which sustained it, to reassure the Greek peoplethat King George would not be allowed to return until andunless he had been invited to do so after a democratic referen-dum. The festering uncertainty about this central constitutionalquestion overshadowed all other national issues, inflamed sus-picions, and rendered political compromise extremely difficult.

The second development was the impressive wartime re-sistance movement which began as a spontaneous and patrioticopposition to the foreign occupiers but split into rival, per-sonalized, and ideologically driven armed factions whose ambi-tions extended far beyond the desire to fight foreign enemies.The occupation and resistance movement gave the CommunistParty (KKE) the opportunity to sponsor and ultimately con-trol a remarkably popular coalition of republicans and leftists,the EAM (National Liberation Front) whose military arm, theELAS (National Peoples Liberation Army), became the largestand most effective of the guerrilla forces. By the end of theoccupation EAM/ELAS and its main rival organization, theEDES (National Republican Greek League), as well at theGreek military units formed in the Middle East under Britishsupervision (the Rimini Brigade and the Sacred Company) werelittle more than the military tools of political forces. The samecan be said of the city police and rural gendarmerie handeddown from the Metaxas and occupation periods and of theclandestine organization X, all of which were fanatically anti-communist and (for the most part) pro-monarchical. It is worthrecalling that EDES, commanded by Colonel Napoleon Zervas,had been founded as a staunchly republican organization but,under attack from its rival ELAS, ended up supporting theKing's return.

The third development that serves as a backdrop to theDekemvriana was the tremendous expansion of Britain's tradi-tional influence in Greek affairs to the point where virtuallyall important decisions concerning wartime and postliberation

The Dekemvriana 73

Greek problems were ultimately made by British authorities.To be sure, Britain's dominant role was made possible, if notinevitable, by the inability of Greek political leaders to handletheir country's affairs and keep foreign intervention to levelsconsistent with the fundamentals of national sovereignty. Thefact remains, however, that all through the period of theDekemvriana British officials decided what was to be done inGreece. Whether British policies served or damaged the long-term interests of Greece is a question that need not be answeredhere. What is clear, at least in retrospect, is that Britain'sdominant role in Greek affairs during October-December 1944,combined with the initially very small British forces in Greece,made a very difficult situation in Athens even more precarious.British officials issued commands without the ability to enforcethem. To make matters worse, the KKE leaders did not knowthat under the "spheres of influence" agreement of October1944, Marshal Stalin had given Prime Minister Churchill a freehand in Greece. EAM/ELAS wartime achievements had obviouslyinflamed the communists' self-confidence and ambitions. How-ever, it is very doubtful that they would have chosen to fightthe British in Athens if they knew that Stalin had in effectabandoned them to their enemies, and if the British had broughtto Greece adequate forces.

A brief chronology of the events surrounding theDekemvriana crisis may be useful at this point.

Prime Minister Papandreou returned to liberated Athenson October 18, 1944, as the German troops were evacuating thecountry in the north. He headed a government of national unity,a broadly based coalition formed in the Middle East in May ofthat year, following a stormy conference in Lebanon attendedby representatives of the entire politikos cosmos. Organizedunder British supervision, the conference had been made nec-essary by the collapse of the government-in-exile (headed atfirst by Emmanuel Tsouderos and then briefly by SophoclesVenizelos). The political crisis had sparked mutinees amongthe Greek armed forces in the Middle East and there had beenserious fighting between resistance bands in the Greek moun-tains (the first round). The communists and leftists of EAM,who had been severely criticized at the Lebanon conference for

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their attacks on their rivals, at first refused to enter the na-tional government and continued to support their own shadowgovernment in the mountains: the Political Committee of Na-tional Liberation (PEEA). Finally in September, just prior tothe country's liberation, the EAM leadership entered the govern-ment under Papandreou and received six of a total of twentyministries (the total was later increased to twenty-four). Alsoin September, at a meeting convened by the British authoritiesin Caserta, Italy, ELAS and EDES formally placed themselvesunder the Papandreou government and accepted the overall com-mand of a British officer, General Ronald Scobie, who, with aforce of about 10,000 British empire troops, escorted the Papan-dreou government to Athens. Under a key provision of theCaserta agreement ELAS troops were to remain outside theAttica region.

In the first exciting days of liberation and national celebra-tion the Papandreou government and its British escort werereceived with genuine enthusiasm. But as the jubilation subsidedtwo key issues emerged to bedevil the authorities. First, giventhe country's near-total devastation, the modest relief suppliescoming in (and the virtually nonexistent transportation sys-tem) were inadequate to stimulate recovery and alleviate humansuffering. Indeed, in some respects living conditions becameeven worse than they had been under the Germans. The pub-lic's confidence in the government's ability to solve the country'sbasic problems all but evaporated. Secondly, the authority ofthe Papandreou government did not extend much beyond theAthens-Piraeus region. The rest of the country, including thesecond largest city, Thessaloniki, remained under the effectivecontrol of EAM/ELAS and its newly created "civil guard (polito-fylaki). The much smaller forces of EDES controlled most ofEpirus. As a result of this anomalous situation government plansto restore order and provide the means for reviving the economycould not be implemented across the country. Accordingly, forPapandreou and his British advisers the establishment of thegovernment's administrative and police authority over all ofGreece became the essential starting point for all other measures.This could be accomplished only if the resistance bands weredisarmed and new national security forces, including a new

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police and army, were formed and stationed across the country.EAM/ELAS, and presumably the communist leadership be-

hind them, agreed in principle that all resistance bands wouldhave to be disarmed and demobilized, and so did the muchweaker EDES. The crucial question, however, was when and howwere the guerrilla bands to be dissolved. The leftists feared thatif they were deprived of the military power and political leveragewhich ELAS afforded them, giving their political enemies clearmilitary superiority, the entire leftist-republican movement wouldbe swept away, deprived of its wartime gains and kicked outof the political arena. On the other side, Papandreou and theBritish were afraid that, exploiting the popular EAM front, thecommunists would use ELAS to impose their will upon thecountry, as was already happening all across the Balkans. Sus-picions ran high and soon Athens was buzzing with rumorsof impending military coups, whether from the Left or fromthe Right.

The suspicions of leftists were further aroused when, onNovember 9, 1944, the only combat-worthy unit of the Greekarmy in the Middle East, the Rimini Brigade of about 4,000men, arrived in Athens, soon followed by the 500-strong SacredCompany. Both units were known for their strong anti-com-munist sentiments, and there was little doubt in Athens thatthey had been brought from the war front as a counterforceto ELAS. In retrospect, bringing them to Athens at that precisemoment without the consent of the EAM ministers in thecabinet was a serious mistake, especially since these troops wereno match for ELAS.

To deflect criticism that he was becoming the pawn of theRight, Papandreou announced that, by November 27, the exist-ing police and gendarmerie would be dissolved and replacedby a new "national guard" (ethnofylaki). This national guardwas to take over from EAM's civil guard, which was to bedissolved. Clearly, the purpose of this plan was to get rid ofthe leftist civil guard and replace it with a new security forcewhich would be free of the stigma borne by the existing policeand gendarmerie for having served the Metaxas dictatorship andthe German occupation authorities. Once the politically un-tainted national guard was in place, all guerrilla bands were to


be disarmed and dissolved, replaced by a new and presumablypolitically neutral national army. The details pertaining to thisdelicate transition from the guerrilla bands to the new nationalarmy remained to be worked out between Papandreou and therepresentatives of EAM in the cabinet.

While these negotiations were under way, the government'smilitary strength was further augmented by the arrival in Athens(on November 17) of two British and one Greek squadronsof fighterplanes. Two days earlier a meeting of senior ELAScommanders (kapetanioi) in Larissa, including Markos Vafei-adis and Aris Velouhiotis, discussed the unfolding politicalsituation and heard at least one kapetanios declare that, ratherthan demobilize, ELAS should seize Athens by force. This boldproposal was rejected by the communist leadership and thekapetanios was reprimanded for advocating a military solutionto EAM's problems with Papandreou. At the same time, how-exer, ELAS units in central Greece moved closer to the capital.

On November 22 Papandreou announced that all "volun-teer" military formations were to be demobilized. He did notmake it clear whether he included the Rimini Brigade and theSacred Company among the "volunteer" troops, although someneutral observers assumed that this was his intention. Four dayslater, in a high-handed move that offended the filotimo of manyamong the leftists, General Scobie summoned the commandersof EDES and ELAS, Napoleon Zervas and Stephanos Sarafis,and demanded that they sign orders dissolving their guerrillaarmies by December 10. Zervas agreed to sign for EDES. How-ever, Sarafis refused, arguing that such an order could only beissued by the Greek government. When Papandreou broughtScobie's order to the cabinet the EAM ministers refused toapprove it.

For a brief moment an ingenious solution to the impasseappeared to have been found. On November 28 the cabinetagreed to adopt a demobilization formula proposed by theEAM ministers. Under this proposal, the new national armywas to have a nucleus of troops consisting of two separatebrigades of equal strength: one brigade would contain theRimini Brigade, the Sacred Company, and an EDES unit. Theother brigade was to be made up entirely of ELAS men. The

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remaining ELAS and EDES forces were to be demobilized byDecember 10 (as demanded by General Scobie) and the restof the national army was to consist of fresh recruits. However,the next day (November 29), for reasons one can only specu-late about, the EAM ministers changed their minds, withdrewtheir support for the demobilization formula they themselveshad proposed, and demanded once again that the Rimini Brigadeand Sacred Company, as well as all ELAS and EDES forces,be dissolved and the entire new national army be created fromfresh recruits. Apparently on advice of British officials Papan-dreou rejected the EAM demands and made it clear that underno circumstances would the Rimini Brigade be demobilized.

To break the deadlock Papandreou opted for a showdown.He gave the EAM ministers a firm ultimatum: sign the de-mobilization decree or resign from the government. As Papan-dreou had privately predicted, the EAM ministers resigned, plung-ing the country into grave political crisis: could the governmentof "national unity" continue to function without the participa-tion of the Left? Papandreou thought it could, but he soondiscovered that he was no longer in control.

Determined to stand up to Papandreou and his supporters,EAM called for the prime minister's resignation and announceda mass demonstration and protest march on Constitution Squarefor Sunday, December 3; a general strike of indefinite dura-tion was to begin on Monday the 4th. On December 2 the ELASgeneral headquarters was reactivated, ELAS reservists were re-called to their units, and an ELAS force of about 2,000 beganmarching from Corinth toward Athens.

At first the authorities granted permission for the proposedmass demonstration but then rescinded it on the grounds thatthe police could not guarantee the public's safety. Ignoring thegovernment's ban, EAM went ahead with the protest march.On Sunday the 3rd, at about 11:00 A.M., when the first rowsof marchers reached Constitution Square from Leoforos Syngrou,the police tried to stop them. When the marchers broke throughpolice lines and started running across the square toward theHotel Grande Bretagne policemen opened fire and scores ofmarchers were killed or wounded. Despite many eyewitness ac-counts and official reports it remains unclear whether there


was an order to shoot, whether policemen panicked and firedwithout authorization, or whether the first shots came fromthe marchers themselves. At the square, after minutes of chaos,order was restored, and the demonstrators dispersed withoutfurther incident when a platoon of British soldiers, marchingsingle-file, placed itself across the square and between thecrowd and the police.

Elsewhere across the city, however, violence was spread-ing. ELAS units attacked police stations and known hangoutsof royalists and members of the organization X. For a fewdays the British forces in and around Athens remained inactiveand were not attacked. But when British troops were orderedto defend government buildings and prevent ELAS from seiz-ing the center of the capital, ELAS did not hesitate to take onthe British as well. The British made effective use of theirlight armor and Spitfire aircraft, and substantial troop reinforce-ments were rushed in from Italy. The worst of the fighting waslargely confined to the Athens-Piraeus area, but there was alsoviolence in Epirus where ELAS defeated the main body ofEDES, whose remnants were evacuated to the island of Corfuby British vessels. In the second half of December the rein-forced British troops began a systematic drive to expel ELASfrom Athens and its suburbs. This was accomplished by thefirst week of January, with much loss of life among the com-batants and the civilian population.

In the first days of the fighting Papandreou offered tostep down but was ordered to remain in office by Churchill,who had assumed personal direction of British policy in Greece.Churchill's dictum, which he repeated often and with greatemphasis, was "no peace without victory." There would be nopolitical solution until ELAS had been crushed and removedfrom Athens. On December 24, Christmas Eve, Churchill andForeign Minister Anthony Eden arrived in Athens and con-vened a conference with representatives of pro-goverment fac-tions and of the insurgents. While there was no immediateagreement on how to end the crisis, and insults and accusationsflew across the table, there was one major accomplishment:with Churchill's endorsement Archbishop Damaskinos was ac-cepted as Regent. Thus, the burning constitutional question

The Dekemvriana 79

regarding the monarchy's future could be formally shelved.King George, now living in London, would not return to Greeceuntil a referendum had given the nation the opportunity todecide his future. On December 30, after much pressure fromChurchill, the king accepted the arrangement and recognizedDamaskinos as Regent.

Although sporadic fighting continued for some days, ELASwas retreating, taking along as hostages thousands of prominentAthenians, many of whom died of exposure or were killed bytheir captors. A formal truce was signed on January 10 andwent into effect at 1:00 A.M. on the fifteenth. The Dekemvrianawas over. On February 12 the Varkiza Agreement called forELAS to be totally disarmed and demobilized (EDES was al-ready dissolved), granted partial amnesty for "political crimes"committed during the December events, and scheduled a plebis-cite on the monarchy question to be followed by national elec-tions for a new parliament and government. In the meantime,since January 4 and at the invitation of the British authorities,Nikolaos Plastiras, a staunch republican but equally staunch anti-communist, had replaced Papandreou as prime minister.

With this chronology of events in mind we may now turnto the question posed by the title of this essay: was the Dekemvri-ana a failed communist revolution, a right-wing gambit todestroy the Left by crushing its military arm, or a terrible blun-der for which both sides are responsible?

In retrospect there can be little doubt that the ELAS troopsthat fought in the Dekemvriana events were under the ultimatecontrol of the communist leadership. EAM may have been acoalition whose noncommunist factions had some say in decision-making, and many if not most ELASites were not communists.But ELAS's command and control were in communist hands.As for the KKE, by its very nature, ideology, structure, andoutlook it was a revolutionary party. It was committed to theeventual overthrow of the bourgeois-capitalist order and its re-placement by a communist system. The KKE considered itselfto be a unit of international communism and a loyal supporterof the Soviet leaders, the architects of a worldwide communistrevolution. In short, revolution was the ultimate goal of theKKE, and at the time of liberation in October 1944 it had at its


disposal a military force which could serve as the army of revolu-tion. For the first time in its history the KKE found itself in aposition where victory over its domestic foes was possible. Andyet, what happened in Athens in December 1944 was not acommunist revolution.

Whatever its long-term goals, at the end of World War IIand all through the Dekemvriana the KKE (and its partnersin EAM) was content to pursue its immediate objectives throughaggressive political confrontation, not armed revolution. Thecommunists wanted legitimacy and a major share of politicalinfluence, which they believed they had earned through theircontributions to the resistance movement and which wouldafford them the opportunity to help define the country's future.For the time being they were not contemplating seizing powerby force of arms. Nothing in the KKE's own communicationsprior to the Dekemvriana suggests a deliberate decision to launchan armed revolution or even to take the initiative in EAM'sconfrontation with Papandreou. Nor do the disposition andstate of alert of ELAS forces before December 2 suggest prep-arations for battle in Athens. At the last minute there was anattempt to energize ELAS units near the capital and prepare themto respond to the government's measures. These moves, how-ever, appear to have been defensive in nature rather than theopening phase of revolutionary war. In short, the Dekemvrianawas not the "second round" in a communist-inspired struggleto seize control and monopolize power. The KKE would switchfrom rough politics to armed revolution more than two yearsafter the crisis that produced the Dekemvriana events. By thenthe party's true Bolshevik, Nikos Zahariadis, who had spent thewar years in a Nazi extermination camp, was once again in charge.

If not a communist revolution, was the Dekemvriana theresult of a clever maneuver to disarm and destroy the Left,paving the way for the restoration of a right-wing monarchistregime?

After liberation and all through the difficult months ofOctober and November 1944 there were some in Greece—itis impossible to say how many—who would have welcomed aroyalist or right-wing coup. If successful such a coup wouldhave disarmed ELAS, dissolved EAM, and banished the entire

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leftist movement. Among those who harbored such views somewere true-blue monarchists and staunch conservatives; manymore had become so afraid of the communists hiding behindEAM/ELAS that they came to regard a right-wing regime asthe lesser evil. In the ranks of those favoring a right-wing coupwere civil servants who had become identified with the Metaxasdictatorship and the collaborationist governments of the occu-pation years, including men who had served in the SecurityBattalions which had been armed by the Germans for opera-tions against EAM/ELAS. There were also judges and justiceofficials, men of the police and gendarmerie, career army of-ficers, and those who had belonged to right-wing or anticom-munist groups and organizations such as X.

But if there were royalists and fanatical anticommunistsin postliberation Greece, they were hardly in a position to seizecontrol of the country or dictate policy. At the time of libera-tion virtually all of them were discredited and despised for theircollaboration with Metaxas, the Germans, or both. They hadno significant influence over either the Papandreou governmentor the public, and they were no match for the well-organizedand well-armed EAM/ELAS. Indeed, until the end of theDekemvriana and the disarming of ELAS most of the countryhad been under the control of the leftists, and in those areasit was the anticommunists who were the targets of persecution.In the aftermath of the Dekemvriana this situation was to bereversed. After February 1945, with ELAS disarmed, right-winggroups came to the surface with a vengeance and began asystematic persecution of the Left, especially veterans of EAM/ELAS. This attack on the Left (often called the "white terror- ),which the government could not or would not stop, served asthe backdrop for the civil war of 1946-1949.

As for Papandreou, while he was greatly alarmed by thepopular strength and boldness of the Left, he was hardly aman of the Right. Having been a liberal with socialist-republicanleanings, his agenda was that of a moderate centrist who hopedto win the public away from the Left by presiding over thecountry's successful recovery from the devastation of the warwith the help of Britain and the United States. Whatever his


faults, he had no wish to serve the cause of the monarchy andof right-wing politics.

Finally, the British were determined to prevent a communisttakeover and to keep Greece in Britain's postwar sphere inthe face of Soviet expansionism. However, they were equallyopposed to a rightist regime. Most of Ambassador ReginaldLeeper's warnings against any contemplated coups were directedagainst the Right. Even Churchill, whose support of the Greekking during the war contributed to political divisions, had nouse for the Greek Right and had a low opinion of King George.What Churchill wanted for Greece was a stable governmentthat would not become a tool of Moscow but would remainresponsive to Britain's increasingly threatened strategic interests.

In short, although the tactics of the Right, of Papandreou,and of the British added to the volatile situation in postlibera-tion Greece, the Dekemvriana cannot be viewed as the resultof a rightist plot.

We thus come to the third alternative explanation for theDekemvriana: a blunder.

The problems which plagued Greece at the end of WorldWar II were enormous and dangerous, but they were not beyondsolution. Other countries, including Italy and France, facedsimilar situations yet managed to keep their internal con-flicts from exploding into large-scale violent upheavals. Inretrospect, in the Greek setting it was the standoff over thedemobilization issue that became the spark which set off thepolitical powderkeg in Athens. Although complicated andseverely hindered by suspicions and mistrust, the negotiationsfor the demobilization of the various armed units could havebeen brought to a successful conclusion. What was required wasgreater diplomatic dexterity and less posturing, more patienceand confidenco ,building gestures, and fewer peremptory ordersfrom imperious-sounding British officials, and no ultimatumsfrom either side.

By failing to address effectively the problems of economicrecovery and to purge promptly and decisively the civil serv-ice and security forces of wartime collaborators, the Papan-dreou government contributed to the creation of an atmosphereof gloom and anger, allowing suspicions across the political

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divide to increase with each move and countermove. In hishandling of EAM Papandreou was too highhanded and in-flexible and too confident that no matter what happened, inthe end the British would bail him out. By setting short dead-lines and issuing public ultimatums and permitting GeneralScobie to do the same, by treating his cabinet as school-childrento be disciplined rather than persuaded, he backed the EAMministers and the communists into a corner where they couldeither capitulate or fight. For a national leader and head ofa fragile coalition government such tactics constituted a fatalmistake.

As for the Left, it became the victim of its own successduring the years of occupation. It emerged from the war con-vinced that it represented the wave of the future and that itscritics were little more than the "monarchofascists" of the Meta-xas and collaborationist governments. The leftist leaders refusedto consider that for many Greeks who were neither fascistsnor royalists EAM looked very much like the Trojan Horsethrough which the communists would capture the country. TheLeft was oblivious to its own image problems and ignored thefact that its tactics during the occupation, including the "firstround," had frightened away many who otherwise would havewelcomed radical reforms and even populist solutions to thecountry's problems Within the tenuous EAM coalition thecommunists emerged from the war without a concrete programof action, with a leadership that was experienced in clandestineoperations and the agitation of the masses but not in politicalcompromise with ideological adversaries. UnderestimatingBritain's determination to prevent a leftist victory in Greece,EAM and the communists chose the wrong tactics to challengePapandreou and his backers to a game of political chicken. Asa result of such misguided action by all concerned, the Greeknation blundered into the Dekemvriana.


NOTES

1The term came into use long before the publication of my bookRevolt in Athens. The Greek Communist "Second Round," 1944-1945(Princeton University Press, 1972). The present essay relies heavily onthe evidence presented in that volume.

2Although dated, Hagen Fleischer's "Greece under the Axis Oc-cupation: A Bibliographical Survey," in John 0. Iatrides, editor, Greecein the 1940s. A Bibliographic Companion (University Press of NewEngland, 1981) and its updated Greek edition (Themelio, 1984) re-mains the most useful guide to the literature on Greece during thedecade of the 1940s.

3Evangelos Averoff, By Fire and Axe: the Communist Party andthe Civil War in Greece, 1946-49 (Caratzas, 1978); Nikos Zahariadis,New Situation—New Duties (in Greek) (Nicosia, 1950) ; MarkosVafeiadis, Memoirs (in Greek) (Nea Synora, 1985); Frederika, Queenof the Hellenes, A Measure of Understanding (St Martin's Press, 1971);Dimitris Vlantas, Civil War 1945-1949 (in Greek) (Grammi, 1981);Dimitris Zafeiropoulos, The Anti-bandit Struggle, 1945-1949 (in Greek)(Athens, 1956).

4Robert Cecil, "Five of Six at War: Section V of MI6," Intelligenceand National Security, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1994), 352.

The Dekemvriana 85

the decemvriana conflict (december 1944)

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