the cost of belonging: citizenship construction in the state of qatar

8/11/2019 The Cost of Belonging: Citizenship Construction in the State of Qatar

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MIDDLE EAST JOURNALVOLUME 68, NO. 3, SUMMER 2014

HTTP://DX.DOI.ORG/10.3751/68.3.14

Middle East Institute. This article is for personal research only and may not be copied ordistributed in any form without the permission of The Middle East Journal.

The Cost of Belonging:

Citizenship Construction in the State of Qatar

Zahra R. Babar

In Qatar, processes of constructing citizenship have been strongly state-driven

over the past four decades. This article reviews the primary influences on Qa-

tari citizenship laws, including historical and contemporary social contexts

that have impacted the development of relevant legislation. The article argues

that the existing financial privileges of Qatari citizenship as well as the pres-

ence of a dominant nonnational population have led to an ever more restrictive

legal environment around access to citizenship.

The interaction and interrelationship between citizenship and migration have beenstudied in many other contexts, but so far have been absent in scholarship on Qatar.This scholarly gap exists despite the fact that Qatar continues to demonstrate high

levels of migration inflows, with no sign that these will be diminishing soon. This

paper examines the evolution of citizenship laws in Qatar and reviews the particular

rights and privileges that Qatari citizenship provides. This analysis engages with the

broader literature on migration and citizenship, and draws causal explanations for why

citizenship laws in Qatar have continued to remain highly exclusive, and why they

have grown more restrictive over time. This article argues that in Qatar, as a result of

particular state-society relations, welfare benefits are exceedingly high for nationals,and consequently, the state shows great reluctance to expand citizenship, as it would be

economically burdensome. Additionally, the number of temporary migrants, who now

dominate the national population, has also increased pressure on the state to further

restrict citizenship access. While migration and material benefits of citizenship are not

the onlydeterminants of Qatari citizenship, they are certainly critical ones.

The manner in which concepts of citizenship evolve within a particular polity is

intrinsically linked to the development of migration policy and governance.1Citizenship

and nationality laws filter out those individuals who are not eligible, and create levels of

exclusion that impact migration governance.2

While the state builds citizenship aroundnorms of inclusion, in reality the process is just as potent for creating norms of exclusion.

In Qatar, processes of constructing citizenship have been strongly state-derived and state-

Zahra R. Babar is Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Regional Studies,

Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. She has previously written on migration

and citizenship in the Persian Gulf states, GCC regional integration, and food security in the Middle

East. She has edited, with Mehran Kamrava,Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf(Columbia University

Press, 2012) and with Suzi Mirgani, Food Security in the Middle East, (Oxford University Press, forth-

coming 2014). The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge Dwaa Osman, Dianna Manalastas, and

Aminah Ali Kandar for the contribution they provided in the preparation of this article.1. Zahra Babar, Free Mobility within the Gulf Cooperation Council, Center for International and

Regional Studies Occasional Paper No. 8 (2011), p. 14.

2. Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and

Law, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 61.


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404 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

driven over the past four decades. A normative creation of national citizenship has evolved

alongside a legal framework with stringent criteria of eligibility. This article reviews the

primary influences on Qatari citizenship laws, including historical and contemporary so-

cial contexts that have impacted the development of relevant legislation, and this analysis

suggests that the evolving processes of restricting citizenship are inexorably intertwined

with broader patterns of regional migration. It further posits that the existing financialprivileges of Qatari citizenship as well as the presence of a dominant nonnational popula-

tion have led to an ever more restrictive legal environment around access to citizenship.

In addition to the clear impact on the juridical-legal framing of citizenship, the

decades of hosting ever-increasing numbers of alien migrants have also impacted Qatari

citizens self-conceptualization. The continuous presence of a large number of foreigners

has reinforced citizens sense of their distinct Qatari-ness, and shaped a sense of national-

ity along clear lines of cultural belonging. The fact that the visible majority of the popula-

tion is nonnative presses Qataris to conceive of their own citizenship along rarified lines.

As Rainer Baubck has so eloquently stated:

How migration changes citizenship depends to a large extent on how states and their

citizensperceive migrants and on how they constructthe meaning of citizenship.

Migration is seen through the lenses of particular national conceptions of citizen-

ship, and this perception of migrants falls back into ideas about citizenship.3

CITIZENSHIP: INCLUSION/EXCLUSION

Citizenship is the legal and political relationship negotiated between a state and

individuals residing within its territory. Citizenship is conferred on the basis of prede-termined and selective criteria of eligibility, and comes with access to a host of social,

economic, and political rights and privileges. While much of citizenship is built on

the framing of juridical/legal status and ensuing rights and obligations, it also extends

conceptually to include the more fluid notions of participation and belonging. Citizen-

ship has theoretically evolved over time to encompass many new understandings and

debates, but as scholars continue to point out, its very nature and core continue to

center on questions of exclusion and inclusion. Despite the deepening body of current

scholarship that addresses the globalized dimensions of citizenship and raises ques-

tions of transnationalism and cosmopolitan citizenship and how these might intrudeon or stretch state-embedded notions of citizenship, in practice, citizenship remains

primarily the relationship between a sovereign state and individuals.4Citizenship is still

a privilege that is conferred by a state on an individual, and is built around an accepted

right to exclusivity. Citizenship bestows a certain form of membership within a state to

a person, and not just anyone located within a particular geopolitical territory can claim

to be its citizen through sheer virtue of being there.5

3. Rainer Baubck, How Migration Transforms Citizenship: International, Multinational and

Transnational Perspectives, IWE Working Paper Series No. 24 (2002), p. 2.4. Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg, and Gke Yurdakul, Citizenship and Immigration: Multi-

culturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State,Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 34

(2008), pp. 16465.

5. Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul, Citizenship and Immigration, p.155.


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CITIZENSHIP IN QATAR 405

Scholars of citizenship have largely addressed four separate but interrelated

subcategories: the legal framing of citizenship status, the rights of membership that

citizenship encompasses (economic, social, political, etc.), levels of participation and

engagement in the polity, and questions around identity and belonging.6This article is

guided principally by the first two subareas of citizenship, focusing on the legal fram-

ing of citizenship in the State of Qatar, and the assorted rights and privileges that Qataricitizenship currently confers. The selection of these two subareas has been defined by

the nature of the broader subject of the paper, namely the interrelationship between

migration and citizenship in Qatar, and how the policies and practices evolving over

time have informed one another. The purpose of this article is to identify current legal

and policy practices around citizenship in Qatar, and how these have been impacted by

the ongoing flow of migration to the country.

The omission of the subareas of participation and belonging is not intended to

minimize their essential conceptual contribution to citizenship. In the Qatari national

context, where the autocratic structures of governance give citizens limited access to

formal means of political participation, where political citizenship is largely absent, and

where citizenship comes with hardly any additional access to self-governance, extensive

focus on citizenship participation and how it relates to migrants participation would

be irrelevant. Currently in Qatar, migrants levels of engagement in the state are legally

and practically limited to their participation in the labor force. While the national/ethnic

construct that embeds Qatari citizenship within a narrative of cultural and historical be-

longing and how this construct relates to levels of exclusion or inclusion for migrants are

certainly worth further exploration, these topics are beyond the scope of this research.

CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION

Existing scholarship on the interrelationship between migration and citizenship

has focused largely on how policies and practices are negotiated in liberal democra-

cies.7At the core of these efforts is the belief that liberal democracies have a vested

interest in promoting enhanced participation and rights for their citizenry, and in ensur-

ing social justice and equality. Citizenship, which by its nature is exclusive, challenges

the notions of social justice within liberal democracies. The influx of migrants who are

denied the same access to rights and benefits to which citizens are entitled highlights

the need to address ways and means by which to ensure social justice for all, citizensand noncitizens alike. Much of the literature on migration and citizenship focuses on

issues of how liberal democracies reconcile this tension between citizenship laws and

migration, and much work has been done on migrants assimilation, integration, politi-

cal participation, and access to social and economic benefits.

Autocratically governed countries like Qatar are seldom included in citizenship

and migration studies. Existing empirical data available on the impact of migration

flows in small, oil-based economies has, to date, demonstrated that despite massive

inflows of migrants, citizenship laws remain extremely restrictive. Scholars analyzing

6. Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul, Citizenship and Immigration, p.154.

7. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration,

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp.13.


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this data have concluded that for small-population states, migration flows are often

unpredictable and may as a result have a limited impact on the legislative or regulatory

environments governing citizenship access.8

Considered to be highly exceptional based on a variety of factors the ex-

tremely high per capita earnings, deep rentier bargain arrangements, nonparticipatory

political systems, and increasingly high levels of temporary migration the Qataricase is not presumed to illuminate a great deal beyond its own exceptionalism. In Qa-

tar, political rights and active civic participation (considered foundational to authentic

citizenship) are absent, thus restricting academic interest in examining how Qatari

citizenship is constructed and implemented. Additionally, the normative arguments

based on social justice for granting equal rights and protections to citizens and non-

citizens alike are assumed to be inapplicable.

If the assumption is that, in autocratically governed countries, citizenship laws

develop independently of external factors such as migration and are formed instead

solely on the regimes choices at hand, Qatars situation indicates the opposite. The

framing of citizenship in Qatar and its modifications over time reflect the ongoing

negotiation within the state to define and refine the rights and benefits for Qatars citi-

zenry, even in the absence of political rights. Recent efforts to reform citizenship laws

in Qatar, in particular the addition of clauses on naturalization, demonstrate that the

legislative environment around citizenship is in fact sensitive to the demands of hosting

migrant populations. Naturalization legislation has developed tiered access to citizen-

ship benefits, so that naturalized citizens are not eligible for the same level of rights

as original citizens, a reflection of the ways in which the state protects the domain of

citizenship against encroachment and negotiates around existing pressures.

While Qatar is not a liberal democracy and may not need to balance between thestates interests versus demands for social justice and equality in the same manner that

liberal democracies do, the country is also not ruled by a regime that is insensitive to

its role as a benevolent guardian of the well-being of its society. The Qatari monarchy

bases its legitimacy on a historical and traditional vision of itself as serving to protect

the interests of the people and ensuring a healthy, functioning society. While the primary

focus may be the protection of citizens well-being, certainly this self-conception en-

compasses notions of creating broader social justice for all residents of the state. Qatar

is also well aware of its role within the global community. Qatars active engagement in

many different spheres at the international level has brought it increasingly into the lime-light. As the state pursues its global and strategic objectives, it is only natural that greater

scrutiny will be brought to its internal realm. This has recently been exemplified through

Qatars hosting of the 2022 World Cup, which has brought a great deal of international

attention regarding how Qatar manages the rights and protections of migrant workers

domestically. Within a globalized world, issues of social justice and equity are no longer

just the prerogative of liberal democracies. The State of Qatar sits at the juncture of a

major hub of global migration, and the story it has to tell about how a state negotiates

the management of international migration and national citizenship is an important one.

8. Graziella Bertocchi and Chiara Strozzi, Citizenship Laws and International Migration in His-

torical Perspective,FEEM Working Paper No. 71.05 (May 2005), p.28, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstract_id=603542.


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QATARI SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

Qatar is a small, wealthy Gulf state endowed with the third largest natural gas re-

serves in the world. The estimated population stood at 1.84 million people as of 2012,9

of which the local citizen population constitutes approximately 225,000.10 Close to

87% of the population are noncitizens, comprised of unskilled and skilled internationallabor migrants.11The labor force is even more demographically dominated by non-

Qataris 94% of the national labor force is foreign: Out of 1.35 million people active

in the Qatari labor force in 2012, a mere 85,187 were nationals. While the private sec-

tor in Qatar is significantly larger than the public sector, and employs 74% of all those

who are active in the labor market, Qataris continue to show a strong preference for

government employment.12According to the Ministry of Planning Development and

Statistics, in 2012, 84% of working Qataris were employed by the public sector. This

has been a persistent trend in the country over the course of the past decades. In 2011,

the vast majority of Qatari workers were also employed by the state: out of 952,653people actively employed in the private sector, only 6,279, or less than one percent,

were nationals. The 2011 data also demonstrated that the Qatari state was the employer

of the bulk of its nationals who were engaged in the labor market, with 55,170 Qataris

working in the public sector.13The country boasts one of the highest per capita gross

domestic products (GDPs)14in the world, and over the past few decades has been en-

gaged in a rapid modernization program that affects all aspects of life in the country.

The state has undertaken massive investments, not only in general infrastructure for

economic development and diversification, but also by building social capital through

intensive investment in education, training, and human capacity development.

Qatar is a dynastic monarchy and is governed by a system of hereditary ruleunder the Al Thani family. Power in Qatar is largely vested in the emir, the heir

apparent, and a few senior members of the princely family. Qatars current emir,

Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani is very new to his role, having assumed the

nations highest position of power only in June 2013. Qatars prior emir, Shaykh

Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, came to the throne in 1995 through a nonviolent coup,

and during the almost two decades of his rule had undertaken a host of progres-

sive measures towards modernization and national reform on many fronts. Among

Shaykh Hamads first steps as Emir was the dismantling of the archaic ministry of

information, which previously was mandated to impose strict censorship and controlover public expression. An additional step forward was taken in 1998, when the emir

decreed that a new constitution was to be produced, and one of its aims would be to

9. Qatar Statistics Authority (QSA),Labor Force Sample Survey 2012(Doha: QSA, 2012).

10. Hugh Eakin, The Strange Power of Qatar, The New York Review of Books, October 27, 2011,

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/oct/27/strange-power-qatar/.

11. Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries:

National patterns and trends,LSE Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalis-

tion in the Gulf States Paper No.15 (March 2011), p. 11.12. QSA,Labor Force Sample Survey 2012.

13. QSA,Labor Force Sample Survey 2011(Doha: QSA, 2011).

14. Figures vary but Global Financereports about US $106,394.Country Data: Qatar, Global

Finance, http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/195-qatar-gdp-country-report.html.


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establish a parliament.15The new permanent constitution of the State of Qatar was

finally completed in 2003 and was put into effect the following year.

Political and civic rights for all Qataris remain limited despite provisions within

the new constitution that promised, among other political reforms, an elected parliament.

The new constitution laid the ground for the establishment of an advisory council

comprised of 45 members (both male and female Qataris are eligible to be members),two thirds of whom would be elected and one third of whom would be appointed direct-

ly by the emir. The 2003 constitution also extended voting rights to women. For the past

decade, there has been no substantive move forward to implement these constitutional

provisions and hold elections for the advisory council. In 2012, public statements made

by the erstwhile emir, Shaykh Hamad, indicated that parliamentary elections would be

held in 2013, however, these elections never took place.16While Shaykh Hamad was

unable or unwilling to follow through on his commitments to implementing political

reform, it is still too early to state how his son, the new emir, will address this issue.

While provisions within the constitution enshrine the rights of freedoms of ex-

pression and assembly, these rights are in practice heavily restricted either through

self-censorship or through state intrusion. Despite the limitations on political rights,

the country is known for its abiding stability and its socioeconomic successes. While

several other states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been concerned over

the ongoing political tensions in the broader region since early 2011, there have been

no reverberations or direct spillover effects felt in Qatar itself.17

Since the 1970s, Qatar has been actively engaged in not only a state-building

process, but also in crafting a successful national identity for its citizenry. The modern

nation-states of the greater Middle East have often struggled to develop a cohesive and

viable national identity for their citizens, and state-building processes have been chal-lenged by the intrusion of competing ethnic, tribal, and sectarian identities.18While

tribal identities are certainly woven into the sociocultural self-identification of many

Gulf citizens and are accepted by the GCC states as such, each ruling regime has also

devoted considerable attention since the early 1970s to developing a unique national

identity.19Given the nature of tribal and kinship relationships historically present in the

Persian Gulf, and the fluid, migratory nature of peoples movements over the terrain, at

their time of independence the new nations had to struggle to assert both an imagined

and practical rule over the people and territories under their dominion.

Qataris, like other peoples across the GCC, have strong historical links and familyties that transcend national borders. Prior to the creation of an independent Qatar, people

moved freely across the region where delineated international boundaries did not exist,

15. Gianluca Paolo Parolin, Generations of Gulf Constitutions: Paths and Perspectives, Consti-

tutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf,eds. Abdulhadi Khalaf and Giacomo Luciani

(Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006), p. 70.

16. Habib Toumi, Qatar to Hold Parliamentary Elections in 2013, Gulf News, November 1, 2011,

http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-to-hold-parliamentary-elections-in-2013-1.921954.

17. For further explanation on this point, please see Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State Big

Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Universirty Press, 2013), pp. 4145.18. Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, third edition

(London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 5559.

19. Neil Partrick, Nationalism in the Gulf States, LSE Kuwait Programme on Development,

Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States Research Paper No. 5 (October 2009), pp. 912.


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population of Qatar is made up of nonnationals, ranging from a comparatively smaller

number of highly skilled foreigners to very high numbers of migrant workers who

populate the lower skilled level jobs in construction and domestic work.23Most of the

migrant workers come to Qatar from developing countries in South Asia, Southeast

Asia, and Africa, and stay on short-term, employer-sponsored work contracts.24Over

the past decade, rising state revenues have led to ambitious development plans for thecountry, all of which have been labor-intensive. This has resulted in a steady depen-

dence on inexpensive foreign labor, and despite policy makers continuously stating a

need to limit the number of foreigners present in the country, there is no sign of this

dependency abating. In addition, broader strategic development plans for the state

are embedded in the notion of creating a knowledge economy.25Efforts towards this

end have increased the need to bring in a range of skilled and highly skilled foreign

workers to populate jobs in higher education, scientific institutions, and the technol-

ogy sector. Hosting such a disproportionately large number of foreigners has certainly

impacted how the Qatari state and society view and guard their citizenship. There is a

great fear expressed by nationals that the presence of so many alien Others threatens

the cultural authenticity and social fabric of Qatar.26These fears have led to an across-

the-board agreement that migrants may only be allowed to spend limited periods of

time within the country, and the existing employee-sponsorship system is structured to

bind foreign workers to their employers for a predetermined contractual period. Even

those migrants who end up extending their contracts to work and live in Qatar for sev-

eral years have almost no pathways to citizenship available to them.27

To simply divide peoples statuses in Qatar into citizen or noncitizen, or national

or temporary migrant, elides the fact that that there are many ways in which people take

up long-term residence within the state. In addition to citizens who enjoy access to rightsand privileges, and temporary migrants who reside within a realm of carefully balanced

exclusions or inclusions, are the people who fall into other categories of residence, and

whose experiences are less documented and whose status is less understood. There are

the categories of skilled and highly skilled migrants who populate a range of critical em-

ployment sectors in the country, many of whom remain within the state well beyond the

two-year limit, and whom the state has an active interest in retaining. Additionally, long-

term communities of Iranians, Pakistanis, Palestinians, Yemenis, and other Arabs have

inhabited the country for decades, and have served as the backbone in certain sectors of

public and private employment. While there is no official or unofficial data available onthe number or composition of long-term residents, it is commonly understood that some

of these communities of migrants have resided in Qatar for several generations and can

23. Baldwin-Edwards, Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries, p. 11.

24. Andrzej Kapiszewski, Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries, United

Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region (May

2006); Steven D. Roper and Lilian A. Barria, Understanding Variations in Gulf Migration and Labor

Practices,Middle East Law and Governance, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2014), pp. 3252.

25. General Secretariat of Development Planning (GSDP), Qatar National Vision 2030

(Doha: GSDP, 2008).26. Regan Doherty, Qatars Modern Future Rubs up against Conservative Traditions, Reuters, September

27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/uk-qatar-modernism-idUSLNE88Q00D20120927.

27. Philippe Fargues, Immigration without Inclusion: Non-Nationals in Nation-Building in the

Gulf States,Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 20, Nos. 3/4 (2011), p. 284.


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no longer be considered temporary. These communities may not be eligible under the

legal framework to press for citizenship, but they certainly can lay a moral claim to citi-

zenship. As scholars of citizenship have pointed out, the longer the period of residence,

the more legitimate become assertions of eligibility to some form of membership.28Qa-

tars citizenship laws have evolved in response to these long-standing communities, who

both ethnically and linguistically are closer to the native population, and who havingbeen in the country through second and third generations have placed legitimate pres-

sure on the state.29The addition of naturalization clauses reflects the states awareness

not only of the presence of these communities, but also provides a pressure-valve to ease

potential censure for not allowing some pathways towards eventual citizenship.

CITIZENSHIP AS LEGAL STATUS IN QATAR

If all people have an equal right to participate in the communities where they live,

and have the same assured legal rights to obtain citizenship within the countries wherethey reside, exclusion would not remain such a heavily debated area of citizenship stud-

ies. The legal and regulatory framework governing nationality access within a state can

either enable a greater number of people to become citizens, or strictly limit member-

ship through imposing stringent criteria of eligibility. To assess the conditions for inclu-

siveness or exclusiveness in Qatari citizenship, it is essential to first look at the existing

nationality laws in order to understand how difficult or easy it is for people to become

citizens, and whether the state is working to limit or assist people in obtaining citizenship.

A host of different pieces of legislation governing nationality and citizenship have

been enacted in Qatar. At the broadest level, nationality law in Qatar is regulated by

Article 41 of the Constitution, which states the following: Qatari nationality and therules governing it shall be prescribed by law, and the same shall have the similar power

as that of the constitution.30This clause thus enables further specialized nationality

laws to be ratified, with the recognition that such laws are grounded in the Constitution.

Additional acts and laws on nationality have been instituted over time, including

Act 2 of 1961, which was amended by Act 19 of 1963 and further by Act 17 of 1966.

The 1961 act instituted an infamously restrictive nationality law that limited Qatari

citizenship to only those who could prove they were direct descendants of people liv-

ing in Qatar before 1930. Act 38 of 2005 is the most recent legal instrument in place

overriding previous legislation, and provides for nullification of the 1961 act and itsamendments.31The 2005 act has been in effect since January 2006. This act and its

provisions along with Article 41 of the Constitution are the most pertinent pieces of

legislation used to determine nationality and citizenship rights in Qatar.

Under current Qatari nationality laws, citizenship is only automatic for a person

who resided in Qatar prior to 1930 and has proof thereof. Jus soli, or the right of birth

28. Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration, pp. 13.

29. For further details on Qatars political history, see Kamrava, Qatar, pp. 10711.30. Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar, available in English translation on the website of

Hukoomi: Qatar e-Government, at http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/wcm/connect/5a5512804665e3afa5

4fb5fd2b4ab27a/Constitution+of+Qatar+EN.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.

31. State of Qatar, Law No. 38 of 2005 on the Acquisition of Qatari Nationality.


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within Qatar,32does not by itself confer citizenship. Citizenship is conferred through

jus sanguinis, meaning by parentage or by descent. Citizenship accorded through jus

solihas historically been considered to be more inclusive towards migrants or potential

new members of the population, whereasjus sanguinisis deemed to be more exclusive

and less welcoming.33As scholars of citizenship have noted,jus sanguinislegislation

is more common in states that are concerned with building an ethnocentric, cohesivenational identity.34Moreover, young nations that are still engaged in state-building pro-

cesses, that have historically experienced unstable or irregular borders, that have had

a colonial past, and that are concerned with preserving the ethnic legitimacy of their

populations, tend to adoptjus sanguinismodels of citizenship.35

Article 1 of the 2005 act determines who may be an automatic recipient of Qa-

tari nationality, or be considered as an original or native Qatari. This article limits the

potential recipients to the categories of: those who were settled in Qatar before 1930,

who subsequently maintained uninterrupted residence in Qatar and maintained their

citizenship until 1961; those who have proven themselves to be assets to the country,

who may not meet the above mentioned conditions but have been granted national-

ity through princely decree; individuals who lost their Qatari nationality, but had it

restored pursuant to provisions of law; and those born to a natural-born Qatari father

within Qatar or abroad.

Articles 810 of the 2005 act address nationality and citizenship issues for wom-

en in Qatar. Provisions include the granting of citizenship to foreign women who marry

Qatari men, the safeguarding the nationality rights of a naturalized Qatari female citi-

zen, even if she divorces her native Qatari spouse, and that a Qatari native woman does

not lose her citizenship status upon marrying a non-Qatari man. The 2005 act permits a

foreign woman who marries a Qatari man to obtain Qatari citizenship, but only throughwritten notification to the ministry of interior, and after she has been married for five

years. In contrast, the 2005 act does not allow for the same right to a non-Qatari man

who has married a Qatari woman. There are no provisions for a Qatari woman to assist

her non-Qatari spouse in obtaining nationality other than through the route of natural-

ization and meeting the mentioned conditions for naturalization.

The nationality law does not provide Qatari women with the same inherent rights

as Qatari men in terms of passing nationality on to their children. The original 1961 act

did not provide for the possibility of any kind of citizenship for the children of Qatari

mothers who had married non-Qatari men. The 2005 act signifies a marginal improve-ment over prior laws, as it allows for the children of a Qatari woman to apply for

naturalization. However, the act still continues to discriminate against Qatari women

by prohibiting their automatic right to transfer citizenship to their children and spouses

Article 2 of the 2005 act is the most significant development for Qatari citizen-

ship law, as it provides a mechanism by which one may become a naturalized Qatari

citizen. Prior legislation in Qatar allowed for naturalized citizenship only at the emirs

discretion, and there were no proscribed guidelines for making oneself eligible for the

32. For further explanation ofjus soliandjus sanguinis, see James Brown Scott, Nationality:Jus SoliorJus Sanguinis, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 1 (January 1930), pp. 5864.

33. Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, Citizenship Policies for the Age of Migration, 12.

34. Bertocchi and Strozzi, Citizenship Laws and International Migration, p. 10

35. Bertocchi and Strozzi, Citizenship Laws and International Migration, p. 18.


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acquiring of Qatari nationality. While Article 2 continues to ensure that citizenship may

only be legally conferred to a non-Qatari national by a princely decree, it does provide

a process by which one might apply to the emir for naturalization. While this article

has been a great step towards opening up Qatari citizenship, there are numerous condi-

tions in place which must be met for an applicant to be considered for naturalization.

The applicant must have resided in Qatar for 25 successive years, and must have notresided outside Qatar for more than two consecutive months during any one of those

25 years. The applicant must have been legally resident for the duration, must have a

sufficient means of income generation, must have maintained a good reputation, must

have demonstrated good behavior, must not have committed any criminal act or act of

moral turpitude, and must have a fair command of the Arabic language.

In addition, Article 2 states that, regarding granting naturalization, priority should

be given to those applicants who are foundlings, children of naturalized Qatari men,

and children of Qatari mothers. It is not clarified what this prioritization means in prac-

tice, as there are no stipulations stating that certain conditions may be exempted for

these prioritized candidates for naturalization.36The act, as such, does not specifically

state that the children of a naturalized Qatari male citizen will automatically acquire

native nationality, even if those children are born in Qatar. Given that the children of

naturalized Qatari men are listed as being a prioritized category, the implication is that

these children will still have to apply for citizenship. The act also does not recognize

a Qatari womans children as being automatically entitled to Qatari citizenship. While

a child born to a Qatari father is legally entitled to citizenship upon birth, regardless

of his or her country of birth, this is not true for children born to a Qatari mother. If

a Qatari woman marries a non-Qatari her children are not automatically entitled to

nationality, but will still be required to meet the conditions set out in Article 2 (i.e.,a 25-successive-year stay in Qatar, a legal means of livelihood, good reputation and

behavior, and good command of Arabic). There are no provisions within the act for

children born out of wedlock. Article 3 provides a mechanism for widows or children

of Qatari male nationals to apply for citizenship, if such nationality was not conferred

before his death. Further articles under this act provide for various means by which the

emir may confer citizenship directly.

Further articles in the act relate to the grounds on which nationality can be re-

voked. Articles 1214 provide justifications for the withdrawal of nationality from

naturalized citizens. Some of the conditions listed for nationality withdrawal are: ifa naturalized citizen was granted citizenship based on false statements or fraud; if a

naturalized citizen is convicted of a crime, felony, or an act of moral turpitude; if a

naturalized citizen is removed from his occupation and accused of fraud; and if a natu-

ralized citizen is not resident in Qatar for longer than a year. Additionally, Article 15 of

the 2005 act states that naturalized Qataris may not hold any legislative position until

ten years have passed since they became citizens. Article 16 states that naturalized Qa-

taris may not work for the public sector for the first five years after becoming citizens.

Finally, Act 38 allows a maximum of 50 noncitizen residents per year to be granted

citizenship through the naturalization process.

36. The assumption is that this prioritization is related only to the quota of a maximum of 50 non-

citizens a year who can be naturalized under the 2005 act.


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FRAMING EXCLUSION

A review of existing laws in Qatar shows that rights to nationality are heavily

guarded, and the stringent conditions that frame Qatari citizenship are highly exclusive.

The very first article of Act 38, concerning determination of original Qatari national-

ity, requires almost-unattainable criteria. Requiring proof of continuous settlement inQatar from 1930 to 1961 is problematic, as Qatar had no border controls for overseeing

admittance and residence until the early 1970s. Proving ones Qatari origins in the first

instance is thus an ambiguous matter, and places a great deal of power and leverage in

the hands of those administering and implementing nationality laws.

Qatari nationality law currently draws distinctions between different tiers of citi-

zenship, so that those members who are original or native Qataris are entitled to more

rights of citizenship than are those who acquire citizenship through naturalization.

There is a difference between original citizens and naturalized citizens both in terms of

how they are allowed to participate in the state, and also in terms of their right to accessa host of state benefits. Articles within the Act state that naturalized Qataris do not have

the right to serve in public office until ten years have passed since their naturalization,

and are not permitted to work in the public sector until five years have passed since

naturalization. In addition, naturalized citizens do not have the right to vote and to

stand for elections (though they can hold appointed positions), and have limitations on

their access to social and economic benefits. The 2005 act regards the child of a Qatari-

naturalized man to be Qatari-naturalized, instead of native Qatari, even if the child is

born after the parent was naturalized. Furthermore, Article 12 of the 2005 act provides

for the means by which naturalized Qataris may have their nationality revoked. Natu-

ralized Qatari citizens are, both in essence and in law, second-class citizens who donot enjoy full political rights and have limited socioeconomic rights. Additionally, this

second-class citizenship is actually inherited by the children of naturalized citizens and

passed down generationally.

Distinguishing between the political rights accorded to original citizens and natu-

ralized citizens, such as limitations on the right to vote and hold high office, is nor-

matively acceptable, and such limitations are imposed in many other countries.37Cur-

tailing economic and social rights and opportunities for naturalized citizens, however,

is considered more problematic and contravenes the global norms of naturalization.

Although patterns of discrimination in terms of access to economic and social rights inQatar may diverge from international models, the benefits accrued through citizenship

within Qatar also diverge from the global norm. In Qatar, citizenship is embedded in

a host of social and economic rights as opposed to political ones, and from the states

perspective, imposing limitations on those rights may make most political sense.

Qatar is not unique in imposing stringent conditions on citizenship acquisition,

nor is it exceptional that some of the eligibility criteria present biases based on gender,

heritage, or linguistic and ethnic affiliation. Citizenship in different countries has de-

37. Examples include the United States, which limits the presidency to natural-born citizens (Constitu-tion of the United States, Article 2, Section 2; Amendment XII); and Taiwan, which imposes a ten-year

probationary period on naturalized citizens from mainland China becoming civil service employees. For

more details, see Sara L. Friedman, Marital Immigration and Graduated Citizenship: Post-Naturalization

Restrictions on Mainland Chinese Spouses in Taiwan, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (2010), pp. 7393.


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veloped within particular historical and social contexts, and discriminatory nationality

laws have reflected the concerns or pressures faced by states and societies at different

junctures.38Different segments of populations have not all been situated in the same po-

sition vis--vis the state, and the creation of legal instruments differentiating between

categories of citizens is part of our historical past. Over time the normative concepts

of citizenship have evolved to challenge the idea that a nation-state has the right tolegislate particular sets of entitlements or rights for different categories of nationals.

Thus, for example, clear discrimination on the basis of gender or race is now largely

considered to be unacceptable in most countries.

While in Qatar, these exclusive notions of citizenship originate from historical

challenges of managing porous borders and nomadic movements, the continuation of

exclusiveness several decades on reflects more contemporary concerns. Qatars most

recent experiences of managing peoples movements are visible in the large flows of

labor migrants to the country. With a development boom that has brought an additional

million nonnationals into the country over the past eight years, the State of Qatars in-

terest in guarding citizenship as an exclusive domain is hardly surprising. In addition,

over time Qatari citizenship rights have translated into ever-increasing financial and

economic rights, which makes citizenship highly costly to the state.

THE HIGH COST OF QATARI CITIZENSHIP

The Qatari state spends extensively and deliberately on its own citizens. From

providing nationals with lucrative public sector jobs, to providing multiple housing

benefits, to ensuring access to a full range of social sector benefits in education and

health care, to generous pension and unemployment allowances, the Qatari governmentspends a great deal of money to ensure that its people feel well taken care of. Regard-

less of whether these are strategic, politically motivated expenditures on the part of a

regime seeking to buy loyalty from its citizens, or whether such decisions arise more

out of a push for modernization and a desire to ensure a measure of greater equity and

economic success for all Qataris, the increasing economic cost of citizenship has cer-

tainly placed a heavy financial burden upon the state.

The highest financial costs placed upon the state most likely result from the high

cost of providing public sector employment for nationals. Despite the increasing policy

statements from Qatari government officials stressing that a greater number of Qatarisneed to be employed in the private sector, currently by far the largest numbers of na-

tionals are working for the state. Out of the 85,187 Qataris economically active and en-

gaged in the labor market, 55,170 work directly for the government, while an additional

9,017 work for a government-sponsored company or corporation. A mere 6,279 Qatari

citizens are identified as working in the private sector.39

The Qatar Human Resources Law Number 8 of 2009 provides detailed stipula-

tions for hiring practices for the public sector, sets a structure for salaries and assorted

benefits to be accrued through public sector employment, and designates the categories

38. Linda K. Kerber, The Meanings of Citizenship, The Journal of American History, Vol. 84,

No. 3 (December 1997), p. 839.

39. QSA,Labor Force Sample Survey 2011.


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of employees that are to be prioritized in the hiring process. Priority for hiring purposes

must be given to Qataris, followed by the children of a Qatari married to a non-Qatari,

followed by citizens of other GCC countries, then by citizens of non-GCC Arab states,

and finally by other nationalities.40

The Human Resources Law delineates a salary structure in accordance with

13 different grades of public sector employment, and also sets allowances and ben-efits in accordance with the same grades. For the lowest-grade jobs the monthly

salary band ranges from QAR (Qatari riyals) 2,2003,000 (US $604824), for the

mid-level grades the monthly salary band ranges from QAR 8,00010,000 (US

$2,1982,747), and for the high-level grades, the monthly salary band ranges from

QAR 17,00025,000 (US $4,6706,868). In addition, for those employed above

the highest graded category, such as in the positions of undersecretary or assistant

undersecretary at a ministry, the monthly salary is set to a maximum of QAR 37,000

(US $10,164) and QAR 28,000 (US $7,692), respectively.41 Salaries for nationals

employed at the ministerial level are not provided in the law. While corroborative

data is absent, the assumption is that Qataris do not populate the lowest three or

four tiers of public sector employment. In addition to setting the monthly salary

levels, the human resources law specifies a number of financial allowances for all

government employees. Article 26 provides a monthly social increment (ilawa

ijtimaiyya shahriyya) that ranges from QAR 1,500 to 2,500 (US $412687) for

single employees and from QAR 3,000 to 4,000 (US $8241,099) for married em-

ployees. Article 27 provides a monthly housing allowance, which ranges from QAR

1,500 to 3,500 (US $412962) for unmarried employees and from QAR 3,000 to

6,000 (US $8241,648) for married employees. Article 27 clarifies that that does

not preclude employees from benefiting from the separate Qatari laws on housing.Article 29 provides for a transportation allowance, Article 45 provides for a commu-

nications allowance, and Article 31 even provides for a furniture allowance, a lump-

sum payment provided to a public sector employee only once, which can amount to

as much as QAR 50,000 (US $13,736).42

Central to the structure of social welfare benefits provided to Qatari citizens is the

system of housing allotments. Governed principally through the Housing System Law

2 of 2007 and a number of additional pieces of legislation, primarily a host of Coun-

cil of Ministers resolutions, all Qataris have rights to government-sponsored housing.

These housing laws specifically provide all eligible Qataris with a plot of land at nopersonal cost and with assistance in obtaining a loan for building a home on that land.

All Qatari male citizens above the age of 22 are eligible to benefit from the housing

system.43If eligible beneficiaries wish to not receive the housing allotment in the shape

of a plot of land, they can instead receive a cash amount and use it to directly purchase

a home. In this case a beneficiary will receive QAR 800,000 (US $219,780) for the

purpose of purchasing a home.44

40. State of Qatar, Law No. 8 of Year 2009 on the Promulgation of the Human Resources

Management Law.41. State of Qatar, Law No. 8 of 2009, Schedule 1.

42. State of Qatar, Law No. 8 of 2009.

43. State of Qatar, Housing System Law No. 2 of 2007, Article 6.

44. State of Qatar, Council of Ministers Resolution No. 14 of 2008, Article 1.


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The Qatari state has also, in recent years, substantially increased its spending

on social services, to ensure broad improvements in the standards of health care and

education available to the public. In 2011, Qatar spent over US $2.6 billion on health

care, 77.5% of which was funded by the Qatari government, primarily through its Su-

preme Council of Health.45In ten years, Qatars annual expenditure on health care has

increased fivefold, and in the coming years it is expected that Qatar will continue to in-vest heavily in the health-care sector, both through investment in infrastructural devel-

opments and service delivery.46According to the World Health Organization (WHO),

Qatar is at the top of the list of GCC states for per capita health expenditure. 47These

investments are in line with the policy articulated in Qatars National Development

Strategy, which stresses the governments commitment to improving education, health

care, and social protection for all Qatari citizens.48The Qatari public health service

provides free or highly subsidized healthcare to both citizen and noncitizen residents

of the state. In addition to access to free health care within Qatar, citizens may also opt

for medical treatment abroad that will be fully paid for by the government. Not only

will the state pay for the costs of medical care for citizens seeking overseas treatment,

but it will also cover the costs of travel and accommodation for the patients and their

families while they are receiving medical care overseas.49According to the National

Health Strategy of Qatar, treatment abroad is considered an intrinsic component of the

full health-care system available to all citizens.50Each year, an increasing number of

patients are being referred for treatment outside the country. Seeking treatment abroad

is not reserved for special cases that require medical services not available locally. In

fact, many of the cases are for nonemergency elective treatments.51For example, in

2011 the state spent over $328 million on overseas medical care for an undisclosed

number of citizens.52In the past, though, these overseas medical treatments have costthe state as much as $144,000 per person on average.

Enhancing the populations access to high quality education, from the primary to

the tertiary level, has been one of Qatars key objectives over the last decade.53As part of

this effort, the state has invested heavily in the education system and in establishing insti-

45. Qatar Releases Health Spending Report, Qatar is Booming, June 22, 2011, http://www.

qatarisbooming.com/2011/06/22/qatar-releases-health-spending-report/, accessed October 25, 2012.46. Marius, Qatars National Health Strategy, International Insurance News, April 13, 2011,

http://www.globalsurance.org/blog/qatar_25e2_2580_2599s-national-health-strategy-339720.html/.

47. World Health Organization (WHO), World Health Statistics 2011 (Geneva: WHO Press, 2011),

pp. 12837. General Secretariat, Supreme Council of Health (SCH), Qatar National Health Accounts

Report 2011: A Trend in New Classification(Doha: SCH, 2012), pp. 910.

48. General Secretariat for Development Planning (GSDP), Qatar National Development Strategy,

20112016: Toward Qatar National Vision 2030(Doha: GSDP, 2011), p iii.

49. Habib Toumi, Qatar Spends 500m Qatari Riyals on Overseas Health Care,Gulf News, April 5, 2011,

http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-spent-500m-qatari-riyals-on-overseas-health-care-1.787714.

50. National Health Strategy (Qatar) official website, http://www.nhsq.info.

51. Toumi, Qatar Spends 500m Qatari Riyals on Overseas Health Care.52. Concern over Huge Overseas Health Bill, The Peninsula (Qatar),December 11, 2012, http://

thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/217591/concern-over-huge-overseas-health-bill.

53. Dominic J. Brewer et al.,Education for a New Era: Design and Implementation of K12 Edu-

cation Reform in Qatar,(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007).


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tutions for supporting human capacity development.54Expenditure on education has been

increasing every year, and currently stands at five percent of GDP.55Improving opportu-

nities for tertiary education have included expanding the Qatar Foundations Education

City campus and reforming Qatar University (QU). Much of Qatars expenditure has re-

cently been on capital investment due to the increasing population and the need for more

schools. Excluding the costs of infrastructure, in 2009/10, the Qatari government spentQAR 24,500 (US $6,731) per student in primary school, QAR 30,500 (US $8,379) per

student enrolled in lower secondary/preparatory school, and QAR 39,000 (US $10,714)

per student enrolled in secondary school.56For domestic tertiary education, Qatar pro-

vides its citizens with either the opportunity to study at QU or at one of the eight branch

campuses of international universities located at Qatar Foundations Education City. Qa-

taris enrolled at QU are exempted from all tuition fees, while those opting for academic

programs at the Education City campuses have their tuition paid for by the state.

Through the Supreme Council of Education (SEC), the state organization respon-

sible for spearheading and administering all aspects of the Qatari educational system,

citizens who wish to complete undergraduate or graduate programs overseas have ac-

cess to full government scholarships which cover their tuition and living costs at any

one of the 675 universities approved by the SEC. In addition, special scholarship re-

cipients attending one of 30 select universities may be eligible for a financial bonus.

Those who demonstrate high academic performance are rewarded in the form of annual

bonuses, which can amount to as much as QAR 50,000 (US $13,736) for undergradu-

ate students, QAR 200,000 (US $54,945) for masters students, and QAR 250,000 (US

$68,681) per year for PhD candidates.57The SEC documents do not stipulate exactly

what the student is expected to score to receive this bonus. The annual bonus is set

against generalized categories of academics grades of good, very good, and excellent.While the Supreme Council of Education does not provide data or information on the

topic, there is anecdotal evidence that Qatari citizens also receive monthly allowances

while they are at university. These student salaries range from around US $1,000 per

month for students enrolled at universities within the state, to as much as three times

that for students who are studying overseas.

In addition to the benefits of public sector salaries and allowances, as well as

social sector benefits, citizens are also eligible for retirement income and generous

redundancy packages. Law 24 of 2003 governs the provision of social protection to re-

tired nationals and their families, with pension amounts determined on the basis of lastreceived salary. If a citizen working for the public sector is made redundant before re-

tirement age, he/she continues to be eligible for a substantial portion of his/her salary.58

54. For further critical analysis of education in Qatar, see Brewer et al.,Education for a New Era;

Cathleen Stasz, Eric R. Eide, and Francisco Martorell et al., Post-Secondary Education in Qatar:

Employer Demand, Student Choice, and Options for Policy(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007); and ,

Joy S. Moiniet al., The Reform of Qatar University, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009).

55. Qatar National Development Strategy, 20112016, p. 50.

56. GSDP, Qatars Third Human Development Report: Expanding the Capacities of Qatari Youth;

Mainstreaming Young People in Development(Doha: GSDP, 2012), p. 32.57. Scholarship Programs, Supreme Education Council official website, http://www.sec.gov.qa/

en/secinstitutes/highereducationinstitute/offices/pages/missionsandscholarships.aspxQatar 2012.

58. Claude Berrebi, Francisco Martorell, and Jeffery C. Tanner, Qatars Labor Markets at a Cru-

cial Crossroad, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 63, No. 3(Autumn 2009), p. 438.


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CONCLUSION

For decades, both government authorities and the people of Qatar have main-

tained that their state is not a destination of immigration or a permanent settlement,

despite the fact that the bulk of the population has been and for the foreseeable future

will continue to be foreign. Qatari citizenship law has mirrored this fact, serving thepurpose of creating a protected domain for citizenship by injecting stringent criteria

of eligibility to ensure citizenship remains off-limits to foreign interlopers. The bulk

of migrants present in Qatar have come legally, not as asylum seekers or political or

economic refugees, but specifically to meet the states development needs. Their pres-

ence is a factual and composite manifestation of the socioeconomic landscape, and no

matter how many restrictions or boundaries exist to limit their impact on the state it is

undeniable that impact it they do.

The predicament in which Qatar currently finds itself is that it recognizes that this

dependency on foreign labor will continue well into the future. Over the course of thepast eight years, the population has grown from 700,000 to over 1.8 million, and the

expectation is that, by 2017, the population will need to grow to 2.4 million in order to

meet projected labor market needs.59Anticipated development needs combined with a

segmentation of the labor market which places nationals in public sector jobs and non-

nationals in the private sector, means that for the foreseeable future Qatar will continue

to rely on importing labor regardless of the demographic imbalance this creates. Mul-

tiple cross-sectoral strategic policy and planning documents reflect the awareness that

this demographic trend cannot be radically altered in the short term, and that in fact it

is to be anticipated and planned for.60

While much official commentary suggests that over time the Qatari labor mar-ket will evolve towards a higher proportion of skilled workers and fewer low-skilled

workers (as it transitions to the knowledge economy), a number of policy documents

acknowledge that in the short term there will still be a need for many foreign workers

to occupy positions in construction and associated infrastructural development sectors.

The longer-term goal presented through the Qatar National Vision 2030 guiding policy

document seeks to change the qualitative nature of the foreign work force in Qatar, to

make it more appealing and attractive to the highly skilled, to perhaps seek ways of

retaining them for longer durations within the national labor market.

Currently in Qatar we see the migrant community characterized by persistentdisadvantages when compared with citizenry. A review of various policy statements

coming out of different sections of the Qatari government seems to present a consis-

tent message. Regarding the situation for the many unskilled, lower-income, foreign

workers present in the country, the articulated policy is to examine their conditions in

relation to labor law, rights protection, work environment, and living standards, and

seek ways of improving their work and living conditions and ensuring their rights.61

59. The Demographic Profile of Qatar, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for

Western Asia official website, http://www.escwa.un.org/popin/members/qatar.pdf.60. GSDP, Qatars Third National Human Development Report; GSDP, Qatar National Develop-

ment Strategy, 20112016; and, Permanent Population Committee (PPC), Integrating Foreign Work-

ers Issues into Qatar Strategies and Policies, Population Studies Series No. 14 (December 2011).

61. PPC, Integrating Foreign Workers Issues into Qatar Strategies and Policies,pp. 3335.


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Region-wide, there has been acknowledgement that the sponsorship system and the

two-year contracts that bind workers need to be reconfigured, as they place too much

power directly in the hands of employers, and create a grave potential for the abuse

of workers rights. Processes and plans on how the kafalasystem is to be dismantled

are still evolving,62but it is quite clear that there is little inclination to provide low-

skill workers with opportunities to extend their period of residency for longer termsettlement. There is certainly no inclination to push the direction of the conversation

to include discussion on options for greater social integration or potential citizenship

for migrant workers. The lack of citizenship access and rights for temporary migrants

is defensible in principle, if it is accompanied by a greater provision of protection to

safeguard their legal status, secure their human rights, and ensure their greater mobility

within the labor market. The case for long-standing migrant communities is different,

and the opening of citizenship through naturalization clauses implies that the State of

Qatar also considers that some form of limited access must be considered.

While refraining from any discussion of possible pathways to long term resi-

dency for low skill migrants, these same policy documents raise the need to implement

changes for recruiting and retaining highly skilled foreign workers, especially if the

country is committed to building a knowledge based, diversified economy. The Perma-

nent Population Councils document released in 2011 states that in order to recruit and

preserve highly skilled foreign workers, the government must implement a program

that grants permanent residence to the highly skilled.63This strategic goal would have

to be aligned with serious considerations on what entitlements permanent residency, or

perhaps even citizenship access, would provide to new entrants.

The greater the redistributive structures within a welfare state, the less likely are

the chances for openings in citizenship laws for the inclusion of greater numbers ofmigrants through naturalization. The existing financial privileges of Qatari citizenship

combined with the existence of a dominant nonnational population have placed pres-

sure on the state and regime. In Qatar, citizenship has become the means by which the

state reserves valuable public goods for a select class of resident, conferring a range of

financial benefits only to its citizenry. This translates into a legal structure and frame-

work which places rigid controls over the rights to citizenship, and where openings are

made (such as through naturalization) they are done so cautiously. In its current shape,

expanding Qatari citizenship would be a drain on public resources and threaten the

existing social contract. Unless the economic benefits of citizenship are vastly reduced,it is likely that further efforts to broaden citizenship in Qatar will continue to produce

tiered and differentiated classes of citizens.

62. For more information on the kafalasystem which requires migrant laborers in Qatar and

other Gulf states to have an in-country sponsor (kafil) see, Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, eds.,

Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

63. PPC, Integrating Foreign Workers Issues into Qatar Strategies and Policies,pp. 3335.

the cost of belonging: citizenship construction in the state of qatar

Documents