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Burhanuddin/Conspiracy of Jews 53 Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 5:2 (2007), 53-76 The Conspiracy of Jews: The Quest for Anti-Semitism in Media Dakwah BURHANUDDIN Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Indonesia THE EVENTS of September 11 th were reported with different nuances by various Islamic publications in Indonesia. The daily newspaper Republika published the headline: ‘4,000 Jewish employees did not attend work at the World Trade Centre (WTC) on 9/11.’ 1 This newspaper, which has a primarily Muslim-readership, sought to draw people’s attention to a grand conspiracy theory behind the tragedy. In addition to reporting the alleged absence of Jews from their work on the day of the explosions, Republika also made related claims that Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, was prevented from visiting New York and his planned speech to the United Jewish Communities of New York in September 2001 had been cancelled. 2 Not only did Republika promote the idea of the so-called Jewish conspiracy concerning September 11 th , but Islamic-based magazines such as Media Dakwah, Suara Hidayatullah and Sabili also repeatedly published claims relating to the Jews. As the official magazine of the modernist-Islamist group DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia or Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching), Media Dakwah has contributed to the creation and dissemination of Jewish conspiracy theories in the aftermath of September 11 th . Several narratives detailing a Jewish conspiracy were published by this magazine accusing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of planting Saudi Arabian passports at the WTC, as well as saying the attack on the WTC must have been the work of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents because only Americans have the capability to explode WTC. 3 The conspiracy stories pit the Jews against Islam as a part of its strategy to stigmatise Muslims around the world. Media Dakwah was not alone in such accusations as other Islamist mass-circulation media published these Jewish conspiracy theories along with other similar stories. 4 Another event that helped fuel this Jewish conspiracy in the Indonesian media was the resignation of President Suharto in 1998. The Islamic magazine Siar published an interview with Suharto in which he blamed the international Jewish community for his downfall. 5 He explicitly stated that a Zionist conspiracy was behind the 1998 Indonesian social-political unrest that forced his resignation. According to Suharto, as the world’s largest Muslim nation, Indonesia had been specifically targeted by Zionists. 6 In addition, respected American researcher Jeffrey Hadler, who investigated anti-Semitism in colonial and post-colonial Indonesia, has located several publications that accused Zionist networks of infiltrating Indonesian politics late in Suharto’s tenure through direct and indirect machinations. 7 Reformasi, which is as a symbol of resistance towards the Suharto dictatorship, has been described as Jewish in spirit. 8

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Burhanuddin/Conspiracy of Jews 53

Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies5:2 (2007), 53-76

The Conspiracy of Jews: The Quest for Anti-Semitism in Media Dakwah

BURHANUDDINSyarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Indonesia

THE EVENTS of September 11th were reported with different nuances by various Islamic publications in Indonesia. The daily newspaper Republika published the headline: ‘4,000 Jewish employees did not attend work at the World Trade Centre (WTC) on 9/11.’1 This newspaper, which has a primarily Muslim-readership, sought to draw people’s attention to a grand conspiracy theory behind the tragedy. In addition to reporting the alleged absence of Jews from their work on the day of the explosions, Republika also made related claims that Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, was prevented from visiting New York and his planned speech to the United Jewish Communities of New York in September 2001 had been cancelled.2

Not only did Republika promote the idea of the so-called Jewish conspiracy concerning September 11th, but Islamic-based magazines such as Media Dakwah, Suara Hidayatullah and Sabili also repeatedly published claims relating to the Jews. As the official magazine of the modernist-Islamist group DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia or Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching), Media Dakwah has contributed to the creation and dissemination of Jewish conspiracy theories in the aftermath of September 11th. Several narratives detailing a Jewish conspiracy were published by this magazine accusing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of planting Saudi Arabian passports at the WTC, as well as saying the attack on the WTC must have been the work of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents because only Americans have the capability to explode WTC.3 The conspiracy stories pit the Jews against Islam as a part of its strategy to stigmatise Muslims around the world. Media Dakwah was not alone in such accusations as other Islamist mass-circulation media published these Jewish conspiracy theories along with other similar stories.4

Another event that helped fuel this Jewish conspiracy in the Indonesian media was the resignation of President Suharto in 1998. The Islamic magazine Siarpublished an interview with Suharto in which he blamed the international Jewish community for his downfall.5 He explicitly stated that a Zionist conspiracy was behind the 1998 Indonesian social-political unrest that forced his resignation. According to Suharto, as the world’s largest Muslim nation, Indonesia had been specifically targeted by Zionists.6 In addition, respected American researcher Jeffrey Hadler, who investigated anti-Semitism in colonial and post-colonial Indonesia, has located several publications that accused Zionist networks of infiltrating Indonesian politics late in Suharto’s tenure through direct and indirect machinations.7 Reformasi, which is as a symbol of resistance towards the Suharto dictatorship, has been described as Jewish in spirit.8

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I will examine Media Dakwah as a case study on how Islamic print media responds to issues related or unrelated to Jewish issues. Specifically, the following questions will guide the trajectory of this article: To what extent is the idea of a Jewish conspiracy alive among Indonesian Muslims today? Are there any theological or Koranic bases for supporting anti-Semitic attitudes? Are theological concerns driving anti-Semitism or, is it also related to the existence of Israel? What is the role of print Islam in constructing ideas about a Jewish conspiracy? In an attempt to answer these questions, I will first briefly sketch the existence of the Jewish community in Indonesia. Following this, the transformation of Masyumi9 that eventually led to the establishment of the DDII will be explored to demonstrate the ideological background of the magazine, Media Dakwah. I will then look at the magazine’s coverage of the divisive debate between cultural Islam and its opponents, to uncover how Media Dakwah has actively been involved in popularizing the Jewish conspiracy. Then, special attention will be given to theological concerns that have their roots in a few verses of the Koran and Hadith.10 Some Muslims used these sources to excuse and “rationalize” the violation of a long-held religious understanding against Jews.

In order to understand the nature of stereotyping and how Media Dakwahrepresents Jews in its reports, I will employ contemporary poststructuralist theory. Finally, a conceptual framework of so-called “theories of conspiracy” attributed to Bale will be used in order to examine the extent of Media Dakwah’s belief in a Jewish conspiracy.11 Indeed, Bale’s article on conspiracy theories does not specifically comment on the subject of media, however, his theoretical constructs are useful in exploring the notions and practices of anti-Semitism12 and the belief in the Jewish conspiracy that appear in Media Dakwah.

A Small Community of JewsDuring Suharto’s New Order, Judaism was not one of the five officially recognized faiths in Indonesia. Based on the Circular Letter of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 477/74054 issued on 18 November 1978, all Indonesian citizens should profess adherence either to Islam, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism or Buddhism. In spite of the regime respecting all five religions without giving preferential treatment to any one of them, the followers of non-official faiths had no equal rights and opportunities. Still today, the post-Suharto regimes do not legally recognize Judaism. Nonetheless, there are a small number of Jewish families in Surabaya. Many studies have pointed out that the Jews have lived harmoniously in their neighbourhood and have neither been targeted by nor experienced racism or discrimination. For example, the renowned Canadian anthropologist Steve Ferzacca shows how, ‘Muslim neighbours greet them with the “cry of Shalom,” kosher is maintained with meat from a Muslim halal butcher, and for over a decade a Muslim family has served as caretakers of the small synagogue there.’13

Historical sources show that in the late 1690s, a group of Jews of Dutch and German descent as well as the descendants of Jews of Iraqi origin arrived in the Netherlands East Indies as traders.14 Historians state that at the time Jewish communities began to reside in Jakarta (Ashkenazim) and in Surabaya (Sephardim).15 Hasyim cited a survey that shows the Jews later established their own neighbourhood in one quarter of the Surabaya port city, a compound that includes a

Burhanuddin/Conspiracy of Jews 55

synagogue and private homes.16 Even though most of the Jews who lived in Surabaya engaged in commerce, a few of them held government posts. Interestingly, Hadler found evidence of Jews existing during colonial era outside Surabaya and Jakarta. He found a monthly Zionist newspaper that began publication in Padang (West Sumatra) in 1926 and later moved its publication to Bandung, West Java.17

Since the end of colonial occupation, the Ashkenazim and most of the Sephardim left Indonesia. Many of them immigrated to California, but they still continue, ‘to contribute to the journal De Indo and maintain an Indonesian-Jewish identity.’18 Regardless of the diminishing number of Jews in Indonesia after the colonial period, there were still reportedly a small number of Jews living in Jakarta and Surabaya in 1969. The Jewish community was then represented by the Board of Jewish Communities of Indonesia headquartered in Jakarta. Still today, the few Jewish families have a synagogue, but no rabbi or teacher.19 Accordingly, it can be said that the Jews in Indonesia are a tiny minority with no political, economic or social significance or power outside of their very small area.20

The Mission of Media DakwahIn order to understand Media Dakwah, it is necessary to look at the history of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) or Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching.21 The establishment of DDII can be traced to the ban of Masyumi by Sukarno’s regime due to its leaders' alleged involvement in the 1958 rebellion. After the fall of Sukarno, however, the new regime appeared to be reluctant to rehabilitate Masyumi, and instead formed a new party, the Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia),22

to cater to Masyumi’s constituency. The former party’s top leading figures appeared to split into two groups.23 Some leaders of Masyumi decided to join New Order’s political vehicle, Golkar. Another group of Masyumi’s prominent leaders, headed by Mohammed Natsir, aimed instead to revitalize dakwah24 rather than participate in politics in the traditional sense, by establishing the DDII.25

The activities of the DDII were initially focused on a serious attempt to conduct Islamic propagation or missionary activity among Indonesian Muslims in response to Christian missionary efforts throughout the country. Natsir and his friends realized that the rejection of the Jakarta Charter,26 which would have formalised Islam in the state, was evidence of the failure of political Islam. The phrase, ‘Indonesia’s umat27

was a majority with a minority mentality,’28 was repeated by Muslim political leaders to show the disunity of the umat, particularly in the political arena. As a vocal proponent of political Islam, Natsir believed that the essence of dakwah should be comprehensively conducted by integrating political and religious life (al-diin wa al-daulah).29 According to Natsir, Islam is not only a religious or theological construct, but also a political ideology.

More importantly, since the DDII was first established, the leadership has directed their attention towards the Middle East, most notably to Saudi Arabia. The DDII had a strong connection with the Islamic World League (Rabithat al-A’lam al-Islami), the worldwide Islamic organization that was regularly funded by the Saudi Kingdom, to which Natsir was appointed as one of the Vice-Chairmen.30 At the same time, the Saudi Kingdom sought to spread its political and religious influence. The Islamic World League was often seen as a part of the Wahhabi31 campaign across Muslim countries. Despite the fact that Wahhabi brings conservative and puritan

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brands of particular teachings of Islam, it is financially supported by Saudi Arabia because of its position as an officially recognized school of thought in the kingdom.

The DDII’s primary aims are to respond to two distinct perceived threats from within, Shi’ah and Cultural Islam or Liberal Islam, as well as threats from without, Christian and Jews.32 These distinctions are not exclusive and there is a considerable overlap between the two. Above all, however, the DDII blames the Jews, or at least implicates them in all manner of threats towards Islam. Jews are regarded as virtually omnipotent. In mainstream Muslim thought, the notion of Jews as embodying omnipotence has become ‘common sense,’ solidified through viewing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as a Zionist manifesto for world conquest.33 In addition, the founder of the DDII, Mohammed Natsir, was well known as a long standing anti-Semite. He characterized the Jews as, ‘worms on the leaves of banana trees.’34

Jews are also blamed for the emergence of Shi’ism. The Shi’ah is continually described by Sunni writers who are close to Saudi Arabia as a fatal deviation from Islam. It is portrayed as a sect, which was established by Abdullah bin Saba, a former Jew who, according to conservative Sunni groups, did not convert genuinely to Islam during the reign of Uthman bin Affan, the third caliph. Abdullah is described by Sunni clerics as the first person to perform special favours for Ali bin Abu Thalib, the Prophet’s son-in-law. He travelled in Muslim cities and towns, from Damascus to Kufa to Egypt, propagating among Muslims that Ali was the prophet’s most deserved successor. He provoked Muslims to assassin Caliph Uthman since he agitated that the caliph had occupied the seat of Ali. This story is repeatedly taught by the orthodox Sunnis to convince people that the Jewish conspiracy is a real threat and its ultimate goal is to destroy Islam from within. After the 1979 Iranian revolution, Wahhabi clerics and Rabithah publications were accused of spreading this story throughout the Islamic world, including in Indonesia. Furthermore, the Sunni tradition also attributes the divine punishment often associated with Jews to the Shi’ah. Based on Koranic verses and the prophetic tradition, Jews were cursed by Allah and turned into apes and pigs. Their hearts and faces would change their form at the time of their death. For radical Sunni groups, their rivals (Shi’ah) resemble Jews, ‘which should not be wondered at,’ as Dr. Abu Muntashir al-Baloushi explains on a Sunni website, ‘because the Jews invented the Shi’ah and [the Shi’ah] has been pervaded by [Jewish] beliefs and principles from the day it was created.’35

Likewise, Cultural Islam, which subsequently inspired the emergence of Liberal Islamic groups, are also denounced by the DDII clerics as — borrowing from a renowned anthropologist James T. Siegel’s term— a deviation from kiblat.36

Literally, the term kiblat is derived from the Arabic word for the direction that should be faced when a Muslim performs praying (salat). The kiblat is the direction towards the holiest mosque in the world, Masjid al-Haram. Furthermore, kiblat plays a more important role than just the salat because it is considered that every Muslim should turn his/her face toward the Masjid al-Haram. Other than for praying, the term kiblat is also used in a broader sense by Muslims who believe it will help them to make right decisions in life. Moreover, some intellectual Islamists, like Al-Mawdudi, strongly emphasise the distinctiveness of Islam and therefore objects to those who identify Islam with democracy, secularism, liberalism, communism and so forth. In this respect there are two concepts used to undermine so-called deviant Muslims who hold another kiblat. They are, firstly, modern jahiliyyah, which refers to communities

Burhanuddin/Conspiracy of Jews 57

that are antithetical to Islamic political-social-religious order. Secondly, ghazw al-fikr(intellectual attacks) are frequently used by all streams of Islamism to counter what is perceived Western ideological challenges to Muslim worldviews.

In this regard, together with other Islamic conservative groups, the DDII actively preaches that Cultural Islam seeks to interpret and understand Islam based on a set of un-Islamic principles. Since Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid’s Islamic reform movement, in which scholars coined the term, the DDII has propagated the view that the Cultural Islam movement is a secular approach to understand Islam.37 In recent years the ideas underpinning Cultural Islam have undoubtedly become institutionalised through the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal), which is regarded as a continuation of renewal projects by Islamic neo-modernists.38 The DDII makes the charge that liberal Islamic thinkers have adopted an alien method of thinking that is extremely deviant. The secular or liberal movement is framed as another kiblat,39 which is not an authentically Islamic concept. Ironically, Jews are subsequently charged with the emergence of liberal or progressive intellectual Muslims. The liberal Muslims are usually accused of being influenced by Orientalists, who are closely associated with Jews. Some leading figures of liberal Islam are labelled as agents of Judaism or Zionists.40

Curiously, the DDII appears to believe that Christian threats, notably Chinese Roman Catholics, are also a part of the Jewish conspiracy to undermine Islam.41

Siegel, for instance, argues that anti-Semitism associated with the, ‘mediatic Jew,’ enters into the day-to-day politics of Indonesia through the social, economic and political tensions between Muslims and Chinese.42 This has occurred partly because the few negative stereotypes of Jews in the Koran are coincidentally similar to ideas about Indonesian Chinese. These stereotypes are related to economic and social behaviour.43 That is, both groups are said to be greedy and deceitful in the way they conduct business. The consequences of this kind of stereotyping are that the Chinese in Indonesia have become a manifestation of the Jewish threat. Siegel states that the, ‘Chinese give the Jewish threat…a body and thus a place in Indonesia.’44 According to Siegel, the word ‘Jew’ in Indonesia is understood as a menace,45 albeit a formless or at least an irregular one that lacks a structure and pattern.

To some extent, the religious identity of Jews has merged with Christian identity.46 The description outlined above usually relies on Surah 2:120, in which Jewish and Christian adherents are mentioned together in one breath for their serious efforts to undermine Islam. In describing the Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troopers)47

phenomenon in the Indonesian transition period, Hasan found the same merging in the circulating of the, ‘Zionist-cum-Christian conspiracy theory’.48 Generally speaking, Christian threats are primarily associated with Chinese communities. Furthermore, a historian of Southeast Asia, Anthony Reid points out that in Southeast Asia generally there is a history of strong relations between Jews and the Chinese and, therefore, the Chinese were dubbed, ‘Jews-in-the-East.’49 Hence, the DDII leadership believes that Islam is under serious threat and they are sanctioned to defend Islam from both the internal and external threats explained above. According to the DDII, the threat to Islam mainly comes from a global conspiracy of Zionist and Crusaders (Jews and Christians), with Israel (Jews) as the leader of a global conspiracy to undermine Islam across the world.

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Since its inception, the DDII leadership has clearly been aware of the necessity of publications to articulate their own ideology and primary aims. One of four tasks identified by the DDII’s leadership50 is, ‘the publication of the written materials required for a more effective and ideologically informed predication.’51 The relationship of print and politics can be divided into two categories.52 First, print media – newspaper, bulletin, magazine, or tabloid – can result in revolutionary effects, but each print form has a different effect on its readership. The second category relates to the dialectical impact of print media. Hence, the reciprocal process between the world of the author and the world of the reader is crucial, because, ‘print affects not only those who read texts but also those who produce them.’53 This employing and deploying process of forms of print media can facilitate the emergence of a new social-political and religious culture for those who are involved in the process.54

The more apparent of the DDII’s hallmarks is its official publication, Media Dakwah. As American-born anthropologist Robert W. Hefner noted, unlike today, originally Media Dakwah formed, ‘an intermittent series of stencilled off-printsproduced for limited distribution among DDII preachers and supporters.’55 Its off-printed version was very simple and small, but regular and cheap. It was produced by the DDII to publish speeches, comments, articles, and policy statements made byNatsir and others in the DDII leadership at the beginning of its publication. At the height of Suharto’s era, there were strong regulations restricting mass distribution. All publishing businesses that circulated periodicals in society were required to have a general publishing license called the Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan dan Pers or SIUPP, which entailed a complicated and costly process. Because the management of Media Dakwah did not have a permit, the distribution of its materials was very limited.Media Dakwah was, however, still accessible to the predominantly urban network of Islamic activists, da’i (preachers) and lower-middle class business people on which the DDII was based.56

In the mid 1970s, the DDII was led by Mohammed Roem, who played a vital role in changing its format from an off-print version to a monthly news magazine. However, the new format still used inexpensive newsprint. In 1980, Media Dakwahchanged again to, ‘its present news magazine format, which includes newsprint-quality photos and occasional glossy inserts.’57 The standardization of its rubric and format was established. As can be seen now, it contains such primary sections as national news, mainly related to Islamic issues; international news, especially from the Muslim world; columns and opinions provided by the DDII authors; and, more importantly, multi-page reports on Indonesian political events.

Jews and Media DakwahThe most obvious characteristic of Media Dakwah is its tendency to homogenize Muslim communities, as if Muslim identity was not divided socially, politically and religiously. Media Dakwah does not portray Islam in Indonesia as rainbow-like, pluralistic, diverse and exposed to a range of different interpretations of Islamic teachings. Instead, Media Dakwah frequently speaks on behalf of all Muslim groups. This tendency can be seen in the magazine’s angle and writing style. In many cases, as can be seen in its reports on various issues, Media Dakwah refers to the concept of “umat Islam” (Islamic community) and maintains its claim as the representation of

Burhanuddin/Conspiracy of Jews 59

Indonesian Islam. In order to describe the magazine’s style of writing, it is necessary to understand its journalistic approach. Like Islamic publications elsewhere, it uses a normative approach by which it, ‘blends moral and religious language directly into its reporting, so that reports on current events invariably return to basic themes from the Qur'an and Islamic history.’58 Accordingly, the writing style and language tend towards what Hefner terms, ‘militantly middle-browist,’ that is, ‘dry’ (kering) and ‘harsh’ (keras), but, ‘accessible, philosophically unnuanced, and virulently uncompromising.’59

In the following section, I will focus on the magazine’s views of Jews, especially in its emphasis on the issue of a Jewish conspiracy. To begin with, it emphasizes the controversial issue triggered by an American Indonesianist, R. William Liddle, who wrote an article entitled, ‘Skripturalisme Media Dakwah: Satu Bentuk Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam Masa Orde Baru (Media Dakwah’s Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia).’60 In the article, Liddle had to confront the dilemma of being a non-Muslim scholar who engaged with deep doctrinal issues. As will be outlined below, at the time of the publication of Liddle’s article, Media Dakwah was fighting for the refutation of Islamic reform issues pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Even though his article was descriptively accurate, its tone was sympathetic to the ideological rival of Media Dakwah. The magazine was labelled by Liddle as ‘scripturalist,’ while the other contending group as ‘substantialist.’61

In reaction to Liddle’s article, Media Dakwah produced a cover story outlining the responses of its own writers or the DDII supporters. A large picture of Liddle was published on the cover of Media Dakwah No. 230 (August 1993) with the title printed in a large capitals, ‘Menjawab Liddle’ (To Answer Liddle). This conveyed a strong message to rival publications, notably the Ulumul Qur’an Journal, in which Liddle’s article had previously been published.62This particular cover caught my attention when I was looking through the Media Dakwah’ serials provided by the Menzies Library at the Australian National University (ANU), Canberra. Its caricature of Liddle behind a Star of David made a direct connection between the Liddle and Judaism, and by implication that Jews may have been responsible for the controversial article. In addition, Media Dakwah began the report with a short quotation from Amien Rais, ‘Saya tidak habis berpikir, bagaimana William Liddle, yang Yahudi “tengik” itu, dapat diberi halaman yang begitu panjang di Ulumul Qur’an’ (I could not understand why a rotten Jew William Liddle was given such a large space by the journal of Ulumul Qur’an).63 In fact, at the same time as the publication of Liddle’s article, the journal also published an article by noted Indonesian communication expert, Ade Armando, on the same topic, entitled ‘Citra Kaum Pembaru Islam dalam Propaganda Media Dakwah’ (The Image of Islamic Reformers in the Propaganda of Media Dakwah).64 Nonetheless, most of the reports in the edition were focused on Liddle with only a minor reference to Armando’s article. This appeared to be because Media Dakwah aimed to highlight a Jewish conspiracy embodied by Liddle, who was known as a Jewish follower, rather than Armando who is a Muslim. Aside from that, the magazine intended to launch counter attacks on Cultural Islam, which —according to Media Dakwah—largely benefited from the article written by Liddle.65

Coinciding with the publication of Liddle’s divisive article on Media Dakwah’s scripturalism, the DDII-sponsored magazine strongly backed the opponents of the

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reform movement headed by Nurcholish. For the editors, Liddle’s article was considered to be covert support for Nurcholish’s group, which was popularised by the magazine with the acronym of the Gerakan Pembaharuan Keagamaan (GPK) or religious reform movement.66 Broadly speaking, the main aim of the reform movement, known as Cultural Islam, was to reject much of the political Islamic agenda, to redefine the relation between state and religion and to propose tolerance between religions.67 As a vocal exponent of Cultural Islam, Nurcholish was asked to present his ideas in the Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM), Jakarta, in December 1992, which created a furore, particularly among conservative Muslims. He was subsequently labelled a Zionist agent and a part of the international Jewish conspiracy.68 Returning to Nurcholish’s talk in TIM, one of the most vocal opponents of Nurcholish, Daud Rasyid said that:

It is even harder to say that Nurcholish who claims to be rendering a service to Islam in Indonesia in fact actually damages Islamic thinking. The most difficult thing to say is that Nurcholish is a Zionist agent who ruins Islam from within.69

Above all, Media Dakwah’s authors believe that Islam is considered to be a real threat to the West, citing Huntington’s article on the ‘Clash of Civilizations,’ previously published in Foreign Affairs in 1993, as evidence of this. For Media Dakwah, the world’s sole superpower, America, is controlled by the Jewish lobby and threatened by the growth of Islam in the post-Cold war era. They believe that because of the failure of physical imperialism to colonise the Muslim world, the West, controlled by the Jewish conspiracy, seeks to control Muslims via the influence of secularist or liberal thought. In this way, they believe, Muslim communities will be directed towards, another kiblat. For Media Dakwah, the fact that gifted liberal Muslim thinkers have the opportunity to learn from a number of Orientalists at Western universities is due to the Jewish conspiracy. The following report published by Media Dakwahdescribes how the magazine accused the West of hiding a secret agenda by studying Islam and sending Muslim scholars to western universities.

After the West felt itself defeated in its attempt to control the Islamic community through political imperialism, the West struck out on another path. Among other things, they launched an attack from “within”. For that they made an analysis of Islam in order to find its weaknesses (according to their assumptions). Then they disseminated this widely within their own areas and in the midst of the Muslim community itself in order to shake the faith of the Muslim community in its religion.70

Apart from that Abu Ridlo writes that, ‘[t]he students of Orientalists are their tools, scattered throughout every Muslim country, and continuously held in control by force of these orientalists.’71

The Editor-in-Chief of Media Dakwah, Lukman Hakiem, argued that the fatal deviation of Nurcholish’s thought had much to do with his lengthy period of study at Chicago University, despite the fact that Nurcholish had already launched his liberal Islamic ideas before he arrived in Chicago. I conclude that Hakiem clearly made up the story or sought to confuse the readers without contextual information.

Burhanuddin/Conspiracy of Jews 61

Professor Leonard Binder, who became Nurcholish’s program adviser at the Department of Political Science at Chicago University, was characterized as, ‘a fanatical Jew.’72 Binder is an internationally recognized specialist on Islamic political thought and Middle Eastern politics who wrote a book entitled Islamic Liberalism in 1988.73 Nonetheless, Nurcholish was no longer supervised by Binder, because he decided to move out from the Department of Political Science to the other department in the university.74 Binder was reported to have proposed that, ‘this Indonesian Muslim intellectual be awarded the title of Doctor provided he denies the role of the Muslim community in Indonesian life in the past and the future.’75 Saidi also quotes Daniel Lev’s statement and frequently emphasizes that Lev is Jewish in order to associate Lev’s words with Nurcholish’s attempt at what he called, ‘undermining shari’a.’76

To strengthen their case regarding the danger of Jews, Media Dakwah published selected writings, including those from Western’s sources, which were supportive of its standpoint. It quoted William G. Carr’s book that claimed that 50% of the conflicts and wars among European nations since 1770 were caused by Jews.77 It also published tracts- in the original version and in translation- attributed to Benjamin Franklin, Napoleon, Martin Luther, James Abourezk, Senator J. William Fulbright, and the like as follows:

There is a grave danger for the USA. This great danger is the Jews, for in every land the Jews have settled they have depressed the moral level and lowered the degree of commercial honesty…I warn you, gentleman, if you do not exclude the Jews forever, your children and your children’s and your children’s children will curse you in your graves…78

...the Jews to be treated as special people. They are a state within a state. The Jews are the master robbers of the modern age. The evils of Jews do not stem from [the] individual but from the fundamental nature of this people.79

They ate [the] English nation to its bones.80

Media Dakwah also quoted Martin Luther’s 60,000 word treatise, ‘On the Jews and their Lies.’

I consider it is useful that this little book be widely read, so that it may be seen and understood how The Devil Rules in this world, so that men become wise and guard against him.81

The DDII-financed magazine is also influenced by the massive publication of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.82 This is a fable of Jewish-Satanic world domination and was compiled in the late 19th century. In the beginning of capitalism and ‘Aufklarung’,83 most of European Christendom feared the erosion of tradition and the urbanism and commerce of ‘modern’ society.84 Ironically, they blamed the European Jews as the root cause of uncertainty. This was based on the perception that the Jewish diaspora had significantly benefited economically from the emergence of capitalism.

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It is noteworthy that anti-Semitism in Indonesia at present is neither new nor Islamic in origin.85 In the struggle for Indonesian independence during Japanese occupation, Dr Sam Ratu Langie, a Christian ‘national hero’ from North Sulawesi, railed against Judaism as appeared in the journal of Asia-Raya.86 According to Hadler, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion was introduced by Ratu Langie to an Indonesian readership for the first time on the 29th of April 1943, regardless of the fact that his article in Asia Raya on Jews was not the first Indonesian text on Jews.87 Interestingly, Ratu Langie’s article, which quotes from the Protocols, has been reprinted in modern anti-Semitic publications, including Media Dakwah and Saidi’s book on Jews.

However, Media Dakwah by no means monopolizes the anti-Semitism stance in Indonesian Muslim publications. Panji Masyarakat and Al-Muslimun first published a special report on the conspiracy of Jews and Zionism based on the Protocols.88 In 1982, the Muhammadiyah’s institute, Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Agama (LPPA or Institute for the Research and Development of Religion) and Rabithat al-A’lam al-Islami both released books about Freemasonry, which was declared to be a front organization and a secret plot of the Jews as stated in theProtocols.89 The two organizations reaffirmed that the Protocols were behind the Jewish conspiracy and the translation and publication of the Protocols in diverse versions were massively organized by the Islamic publication press.90

As an off-shoot of Rabithat, Media Dakwah was inclined to think that Nurcholish’s proposals closely resembled those of Annie Besant and the Theosophical Society.91 Besant served as international president of the non-sectarian worldwide organization Theosophical Society from 1907 until her death. She was allegedly reported as Jewish in essence. According to Media Dakwah, Nurcholish, ‘whether he is aware of it or not… directly or indirectly, is campaigning for the thinking of the Theosofische Vereniging [Theosophical Society] which very clearly forms part of the net of the Jewish International.’92 In sum, the monthly magazine warned its readership to be careful of Nurcholish’s thought, because, ‘he can zig-zag in an astonishing way, peculiar to the character of Jews.’93 Nurcholish was also openly accused of joining the so-called clandestine Jewish organizations like Rotary and Lions Clubs, Freemasonry, etc., for the purpose of subverting Islam from within.

Above all, Media Dakwah relies heavily on the issue of Palestine to arouse anti-Semitic sentiment. Indeed, it is worth noting that Indonesian Muslims are not monolithic in responding to the issue of Palestine. They range from liberal Muslims who perceive Palestine as a universal issue, that is, beyond religion, to conservative Muslims who simply view it as a matter of Islam versus the Jews. The fact that there are Christians within the PLO’s (Palestine Liberation Organization) inner circle is ignored. Many Islamic communities have linked the occupation of Palestine to Islamic solidarity. This is mostly because the third most sacred mosque, Al-Aqsha, is situated in Jerusalem and, therefore, should be freed from the hands of the Zionist regime.94

Media Dakwah takes a stand on this position as well. It perceives that the Zionist government consists of Jews and vice versa.95 Accordingly, like the points of view of many other Indonesian Islamic organizations, it often demands that the government should give stronger support to the Palestinian struggle.96 This is viewed as the logical and moral consequence of being the world’s largest Muslim nation. Further, the monthly magazine strongly supported the government’s policy

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towards the Palestinians. In 1988, Indonesia’s recognition of the Palestine State was welcomed. When permission was granted for the Palestinians to establish an embassy in Jakarta in 1989, this was proudly celebrated by the Islamic groups in Indonesia, including the DDII as the organizational umbrella of Media Dakwah.97

When the Directorate General of Post and Telecommunication twice released stamps on the issue of Palestine, Ridwan Saidi, former chairman of HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or the Islamic University Students Association), who regularly writes a column in the magazine, was very grateful for the sustained support given by the government.98 The first stamp with a first day cover was issued on 15 May 1978. Its colour composition and illustration was a beautiful picture of Al-Aqshamosque with the rubric: ‘To the welfare of the families of the martyrs and freedom fighters of Palestine.’ Five years later, the government issued a second stamp, again with a first day cover, on 20 December 1983: ‘Inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.’99

On the contrary, Media Dakwah strongly opposes the government when it tries to change its policy of friendliness towards Palestine. As repeatedly stated by the government between the end of Suharto’s tenure until Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s rule, Indonesia would never recognise Israel, and Palestinians should be granted the independence to form a dignified state with an unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all remaining occupied territories. This position is clearly based on the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. The preamble states that colonialism and occupation should be wiped off the world’s map and, therefore, it gives a mandate to the government to contribute to creating a world order based on independence, peace and social justice.100 Also, it is often stated that Indonesia’s international relations policy should be based on the free and active principle (politik bebas dan aktif).101 For instance, Amien Rais’s interview published in the magazine, in which he warned the government to stick to the preamble responding to the visit of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in Jakarta, reflected Media Dakwah’s political aspirations.102

Theological JustificationAs indicated above, the demonizing of Jews has its roots in the sacred source, theKoran. The editors of Media Dakwah repeatedly recite Surah 2:120 to offer theological justifications for their point of view concerning the Jews. A full-page of Koranic verses Surah 2: 120-21 was placed at the front of the magazine’s response towards Liddle, that is:

120: Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou follow their form of religion. Say: "The Guidance of Allah,--that is the (only) Guidance." Wert thou to follow their desires after the knowledge which hath reached thee, then wouldst thou find neither Protector nor helper against Allah.103

121: Those to whom we have sent the Book study it as it should be studied: They are the ones that believe therein: Those who reject faith therein,--the loss is their own.104

It has been argued that a virulent strain of anti-Semitism has its roots in the body politic of Islam for which the Koran provides some negative stereotypes of Jews. It has also been argued that the tidal wave of anti-Semitism in the Muslim world is not merely a rhetorical by-product of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also has a

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long history due to the existence of the aforementioned verses. However, the Koran actually provides a wide range of contradictions in response to the relationship between Muslims and Jews. A closer look at Surah 2:62 also reveals the following statement: ‘Those who believe [in the Koran] and those who follow the Jewish [Scriptures] and the Christians and the Sabians, any who believe in Allah and the last days, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve’; equally Surah 109:6: ‘Unto you your religion and unto me my religion,’ and so on. Unfortunately, like Islamists elsewhere, Media Dakwah resorts to any particular verses, quoting them textually in isolation, and paying little or no attention to asbab al-nuzul, the socio-historic-anthropological context of their revelation. Neither do the DDII relate them to substantial values of Islam such as peace, justice and the like. In many instances, the DDII and Media Dakwah tend to highlight particular verses of the Koran that underline and support their objectives, and interpret them literally.

In addition, some Islamic activists who are closely associated with the DDII, such as Ahmad Sumargono and Adian Husaini, formed a new organization, the KISDI (Komite Islam Solidaritas untuk Dunia Islam or Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity). This was aimed at responding to international issues related to the Muslim world. The KISDI’s favorite issue appears to be the Israeli occupation of Palestine and they have often organized anti-Israeli demonstrations and held placards equating Nazi and Israeli symbols. When they opposed the PLO-Israeli Peace Agreement in 1993, they brought signs that were emblazoned with the symbol of HAMAS as a sign of resistance to the PLO led by Yasser Arafat at the time. The KISDI’s popular slogan in Arabic shouted by its protestors is the anti-Jewish slogan: ‘Khaibar, Khaibar ya Yahud, jaysh Muhammad saufa ya'ud!’ which translates into, ‘Khaibar, Khaibar, Oh Jews, the army of Mohammed is coming for you.’ Referring to the history of Mohammed, Khaibar was the name of a town in a rich and prosperous valley inhabited by a Jewish tribe, now in Saudi Arabia, that was exterminated by Mohammed.

Another widespread theological tactic in Media Dakwah’s articles is the depiction of Jews and Zionists as the descendants of apes and pigs. Although this rhetoric is at a rather low level, Media Dakwah is inclined to popularize it as propaganda against Jews. Ridwan Saidi quoted lyrics of ‘Manusia Kera’ (the human ape) written by Debby,105 in his article:

Kaulah bangsa penyebar dusta/Dalang dari bencana/Yang terjadi di jagat raya/Melanda manusia/Manusia kera…/Kaulah bangsa yang sekarang berkuasa/Di atas singgasana/Budak-budakmu di seluruh dunia/Ikut menjadi kera.106 (You are the nation which spreads lies/The mastermind of disasters/Which happen in the entire universe/Engulf humankind/The human ape…/You are the powerful nation now/On the throne/Your slaves are everywhere in the world/They have also become apes).

Referring to the Koran Surah 2:65, Saidi said that the Jews were the enemies of Allah and the descendants of apes and pigs.107 Media Dakwah has often popularized the stigmatization of Jews with descriptions such as evil offspring, infidels, distorters of words, prophet-murderers, prophecy-deniers and the like.108 These are more or less stated by the Koran in a variety of its verses, such as ‘falsehood’ (Surah 3:71), distortion (4:46), cowardice, greed, and being ‘corrupters of Scripture.’ Regarding

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the stigma of being like descendants of apes and pigs, the magazine relies heavily on three Koranic verses:

1.“...You have surely known the end of those from amongst you who transgressed in the matter of the Sabbath, in consequence of which we condemned them: Be ye like apes, despised” (2:65).109

2.“When, instead of amending, they became more persistent in the pursuit of that which they were forbidden, we condemned them: Be ye as apes, despised” (7:166).110

3.“...They are those whom Allah has cast aside and on whom His wrath has fallen and of whom He has made some as apes and swine…” (5:60).111

Jews have been stigmatised by these Koranic verses and their exegesis or interpretation (tafsir), the Prophet’s tradition (Sunnah or Hadith) and sermons of Muslim clerics. The divine punishment of Jews by which Allah cursed them and turned them into apes and pigs is a lesson offered by Muslim clerics as a warning. Rubin indicates that, ‘the Muslims threatened with being turned into animals were not ordinary sinners, but whose sin had a Jewish or Christian nature.’112 Further, Rubin explains that a Muslim who tries to imitate Jews or Christians will be punished, and, ‘the use of a punishment connected to Jews and Christians was aimed at fighting Jewish and Christian influences in Islamic society.’113

Media Dakwah, Jews, and RepresentationI have discussed at length that the stereotypes about Jews, Judaism (as a religious category) and Zionism (as a political category) overlap. Following the concept in contemporary post-colonial theory, the stereotype, according to Homi Bhabha, who draws upon Edward Said’s masterpiece, Orientalism, is a ‘a discursive strategy’ and ‘mode of representation’ or ‘form of knowledge and identification’ by which certain characteristics of a collective identity are repeated and stated categorically as facts.114

According to Stuart Hall, the process of stereotyping, ‘reduce[s] people to a few people, simple, essential characteristics which are represented as fixed by nature.’115

It may also be said that the stereotype is, ‘a preconceived and oversimplified idea of the characteristics which typify a person, situation, etc. an attitude based on such a preconception.’116 By its nature, some writers argue that the stereotyping is inevitable process, a necessary part of the categorizing process of the human mind, as an attempt to abstracting certain features, real or assumed, of a person or collective identity and making those features represent the whole.117 In brief, the stereotyping fixes differences.

In a similar vein, the stereotyping, ‘constitute[s] an inadequate way of representing the Others.’118 Borrowing from Stuart Hall’s study on representation and the relations between the West and the Rest, the analytical process of representation can be roughly divided into three distinctive approaches.119 First, representation is a genuine manifestation of reality. Second, representation is intentional. Third, representation is a construction. Of the three approaches, the latter is most widely applied within post-structural theories. Students of cultural

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studies tend to use the latter because it evokes questions of power and knowledge. Hence, the difference between the material world and the symbolic process is crucial in order to make it operative.120 Briefly speaking, representation as a construction brings up issues about the production of cultural stereotypes.121

One of the terms that has been widely used in the discussion of stereotype and representation is “ambivalence.” According to Bhabha, ambivalence is most importantly an in-between place that:

Gives the colonial stereotype its currency: ensures its repeatability in changing historical and discursive conjunctures; informs its strategies of individuation and marginalization; produces that effect of probabilistic truth and predictability which, for the stereotype, must always be in excess of what can be empirically proved or logically construed.122 (emphasis in original)

What is important for analysing narratives on the Jews in Media Dakwah is that ambivalence is useful for thinking about stereotypical classifications, religious and political identities, and how stable representations actually are in the end.

In this manner, the stereotypes about Jews and Judaism constructed by Media Dakwah are contradictory. First, Judaism is not an officially recognized religion in Indonesia. The population of Jews in Indonesia is numerically insignificant, but loom large on the coverage of the magazine. Second, the so-called social and theological constructions of the Jew in the Koran are ambiguous. The Koran has constructed the Jew as both within and without; a stranger and familiar; an object of esteem and odium. As indicated earlier, the Koran in fact provides a theological recognition to Judaism, saying that it is viewed as a revealed religion as well as Islam and Christianity and the Jews are clearly stated in the Koran as the residue of God’s chosen people.123 However, the magazine tends to exploit the negative stereotypes of Jews provided by the Koran grounded in selective remembering and forgetting.

Third, relying on a few negative narratives of the Jews in the Koran and taking advantage of the Palestine-Israeli conflict, the magazine is successful in giving a specific significance to the word ‘Jew’ to be understood as a menace. Even more so, Media Dakwah has acted as a regime of stereotyping by distorting the ‘social reality’ of a certain collective identity into a media image. I have long discussed how the magazine has represented the ‘Other’, which is almost invariably a negative linking of the Jews to the source of people’s suffering as well as designating them as the crux of all problems, both historical and current. The wave of anti-Jewish fantasy that appears in the magazine has constructed the Jews as the enemy or evil, creating as what David Smith termed, ‘the Jews of myth and rumour,’ then ‘Virtual Jews,’ and finally ‘Simulated Jews.’124 According to Smith, these are not real people, but, ‘projectively constructed enemies, mythic abstractions from history.’125

In the psychic economy of the magazine, the Virtual Jews are a metaphor for other real forces, the projection of other concerns, but are thereby related to real Jews in name only.126 This is the case when the Jews has been linked to social, economic and political tensions between Muslims and Chinese, thereby making the Chinese becomes— in Anthony Reid’s words—‘the Jews-in-the-East.’ Also, the Virtual Jews enter into a divisive debate involving Cultural Islam and Media Dakwah camp. Yet, the Jews could simultaneously be constructed by the magazine as being of the

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relatively far enemy and the nearer enemy. The former is linked to the real Jews, particularly in the context of Israeli occupation of Palestine. In this light, an Islamic identity, according to the magazine, transcends geographical boundaries by taking advantage of the concept of umat (Islamic community). The latter manifests in the Virtual Jews, given that there are only a very small number of Jews families in the country.

In order to complete a picture of anti-Semitism in Media Dakwah, I will delineate the magazine’s belief in Jewish conspiracies. Particular attention to the belief in Jewish plot in relation to international events involving narrative construction that shared similar storylines and framing sentiments about the Jews will be given.

Media Dakwah, Paranoia, and Conspiracy Theory There are a number of distinctive characteristics of conspiracy theories, but above all the most significant element is, ‘a belief in the existence of a vast, insidious, preternaturally effective international conspiratorial network designed to perpetrate acts of the most fiendish character’; acts which aim ‘to undermine and destroy a way of life.’127 To elaborate the extent of conspiracy theories at work in the context of Media Dakwah’s coverage Bale’s conceptual framework of conspiracy theories will be used. Firstly, it is possible to see how Media Dakwah endeavours to spread its interpretation of ‘patterns’ of ‘cause-and-effect’ in society by using reductionism and oversimplified explanations.128 As explained above, Nurcholish had launched his progressive thought before he began studying at Chicago University. He did not only study with Leonard Binder, but also with a number of professors at the university, including a Pakistan-born professor, Fazlurrahman. There are many issues covered by the magazine showing the extensive use of reductionism and oversimplification. Particular details of political, social, religious, and economic dimensions have been neglected in order to show that the root cause of human disasters is the Jews and, in effect, that the rest of the world suffers because of them. Ex-post factum analysis has been employed to fix the magazine’s prejudice towardscontemporary events.

Second, Media Dakwah believes that the Jewish conspiracy is seen as omnipresent, at least within its own sphere of operations.129 The Jewish group is perceived as being very strong and capable of operating virtually everywhere. In his speech reported by the magazine, Rasyid explained in detail what he called, ‘the facts of Jews’ crimes from the era of the Prophet until now.’130 He says:

The assassination of the Caliph Uthman or the Riddah war that occurred in Khalifah Abu Bakar’s era was caused by the Jews. The Jews were behind of all this. Likewise the conflict between the Caliph Ali and Muawiyah was actually driven by the Jews’ slanders, including the emergence of Khawarij and Mu’tazilah sects within Islam. The notion of Mu’tazilah is eventually pursued by Nurcholish’s group, and for many years has been massively and systematically taught by Professor Harun Nasution at the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Jakarta. Above all of this, the Jews are behind the scenario of a secret plot to destroy Islam from within.131

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Rasyid’s quotation above shows that, ‘anything that occurs which has a broadly negative impact or seems in anyway related to the purported aims of the [Jews’] conspirators can thus be plausibly attributed to them.’132 Further, Media Dakwah sees the net of Jewish conspiracy as what Bale called, ‘both international in its spatial dimensions and continuous in its temporal dimensions.’133 For the magazine, nothing that happens occurs by accident, but clearly by design. All internal conflicts that led Islamic communities to disunity are the result of Jews plotting beyond the course of history. In the words of Professor of Modern History at the University of Konstanz, Dieter Groh, Jews are described as:

The conspirators [who] planned and carried out evil in the past, they are successfully active in the present, and they will triumph in the future if they are not disturbed in their plans by those with information about their sinister designs.134

Third, as a consequence of the former framework of conspiracy, the Jewish plot is viewed as virtually omnipotent. Media Dakwah asserts that the Jewish conspiratorial groups are, ‘secretly working in every nook and cranny of society, and are making use of every subversive technique known to mankind to achieve their nefarious purposes.’135 For example, in describing the state visit of the sixth President of Israel (1983-1993), Haim Herzog, to Burma and Sri Lanka, Media Dakwahclaimed that:

Ironically, after the visit of Haim Herzog in Burma, Muslim communities were chased from the country and being forced to immigrate to Bangladesh. Similarly, after the state’s visit of Herzog to Sri Lanka, Tamil insurgency emerges and Muslim adherents in that country are being targeted.136

Fourth, the Islamic-based magazine perceives the Jewish conspirators as being, ‘both monolithic and unerring in the pursuit of its goals.’137 Jews and Zionists are being conflated in this way of thinking.138 Furthermore, it is not only the term “Jews” (al-yahuud) and “Zionists” (sahyuniyyun) that have been mixed up, but also the two have been used interchangeably with “Israelis”, or “Children of Israel” (banu Israel). In fact, Zionism does not necessarily represent the views of all Jews. The Jews against Zionist groups, for instance, publicly state that the existence of Israel as the ideological manifestation of Zionism is diametrically opposed to the teachings of traditional Judaism.139 The New York-based organization tries to disassociate Jews from Zionism by various activities such as, ‘providing historical and supporting documentation that Zionism is totally contrary to the teachings of traditional Judaism,’ and publicising the fact that all Jews do not support Zionism, something that is often ignored by the mainstream media.140 In the context of print Islam in Indonesia, unlike Media Dakwah, Republika occasionally reports the fact that Jews are not monolithic.141

In short, Media Dakwah’s belief in the viability of a Jewish conspiracy is not only a product of a paranoid mindset but also an effort to help their readership, ‘to make sense out of a confusing, inhospitable reality, rationalize their present difficulties, and partially assuage their feeling of powerlessness’.142 This is a defence mechanism,

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even a form of deniability, against the intensification of modernisation. Jews are often seen as a symbol of progress or modernisation.143 In the context of Suharto’s era, this notion is conflated with the idea of pembangunan (development), which was heavily associated with economic projects. Ironically, Media Dakwah portrays the Muslim community as suffering economic defeat in the face of the Chinese in the pembangunan process. Furthermore, secularist Muslims have played a politically prominent role in the decision-making process. Political Islam was totally defeated after the dissolution of Masyumi and the establishment of Parmusi. The policy of party fusion led Islamic political parties to join together within the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party in 1973.

ConclusionI have endeavoured to show that the Islamic political groups that are affiliated with Media Dakwah appear to look for scapegoats to remedy their own political and economic failures in competing with other groups. In addition to this, I have highlighted how Jews have been easily demonised, not only because a few Koranic verses and the Islamic traditions that stress hatred towards Jews, but also because Jews are often conflated with Zionism or Israel. As stated above, there are very few Jewish communities in Indonesia.144 Media Dakwah has benefited from this situation because they can use the imagery of Jews to blame their enemies and strengthen their Islamic point of view. If the Jewish community was significant in Indonesia Media Dakwah would have difficulty in propagating the existence of a Jewish conspiracy. The absence of Jews in public view has enabled Media Dakwah to point their finger at what they perceive to be to the real threat. Media Dakwah appears to materialise and institutionalise evils. Unfortunately, the evils they have created and associated with the unseen Jews are more often than not manifested in those people who disagree with the magazine’ standpoint on political and religious issues.

In summary, despite recent evidence of anti-Semitism in Indonesia, this phenomenon is neither new nor Islamic in origin. The demonising of Jews is widespread among Islamic communities in Indonesia. Because the country has very few Jewish communities it should come as no surprise that many scholars believe that Indonesia is a case of, ‘anti-Semitism without Jews.’145 The belief in a Jewish conspiracy is more or less supported by a few Koranic verses and the Islamic traditions that stigmatise the Jews. A number of conservative Muslims rely heavily upon these sources for theological justification of their standpoint.

In addition, Media Dakwah employs a particular stereotype to describe the Jews, most often relying on crudely oversimplified, but easily understood, preconceptions of the varied attributes that characterize the Jews. Indeed, the fortunes of anti-Semitism in the magazine have been on the whole, closely related to the peripeties of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Regardless of the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, Jews individually and collectively have been viewed by the magazine as sub-humans, prophecy-deniers, distorters of words, and the like. The establishment of Israel has raised the negative attitudes towards Jews to such a height that there seems to be no room for rational discussion. Further, the magazine perceives the Jews as a monolithic Other. In other words, the magazine has portrayed Jewish attributes and stereotypes in very much uniform representations.

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Finally, Media Dakwah has contributed significantly to a boost in anti-Semitic attitudes among Indonesian Muslims in the way that the DDII-sponsored magazine triggers a paranoid mindset against Jews. Everything that happens that has negative effects towards Islam is attributed to the Jews. Concerning its ideological rivalries in the Cultural Islam movement, Media Dakwah has sought to delegitimise its opponents, most notably Nurcholish, with the strong claim that he was part of a Jewish international conspiracy. Using Bale’s conceptual framework of theories of conspiracy, it is clear that Media Dakwah is caught up in a conspiracy theory. This is not only a fantastic product of its paranoid style, but also a tool for mobilizing support against its “enemies.”

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NOTES

1 Republika, 21 September 2001, p. 1. Previously, Republika ran a headline that Osama bin Laden denied the charge that he was behind the attacks (Republika, 13 September 2001, p.1). The newspaper appeared to whitewash Muslim communities of involvement in the tragedy (Republika, 14 September 2001, p. 1). The American Muslims were also reported as being under serious attack in the aftermath of the tragedy and of being targeted for discrimination (Republika, 15 September 2001, p. 1).

2 Republika, 21 September 2001, p. 1.3 For a comparison of the narratives of Jewish conspiracies in the aftermath of September 11 with

other Islamic publications, see Merlyna Lim, Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of Internet, Policy Studies 18, The East-West Center, 2005.

4 See, ‘Cover Story’, Media Dakwah, October 2001. For a detailed account of radical dualism whose addicted to conspiracy theories in the wake of September 11th, see M. Lin, Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of Internet, Policy Studies 18, the East-West Center, Washington, 2005.

5 Amal al-Ghazali et. al., ‘Wawancara Khusus dengan Pak Harto,’ SIAR, 19-25 April, 1999, pp. 12-19. For an English translation of a part of this interview, see J. Hadler, ‘Translations of Anti-Semitism: Jews, the Chinese, and Violence in Colonial and Post-Colonial Indonesia,’ Indonesia and the Malay World, Vol. 32, No. 94, November 2004, p. 308.

6 al-Ghazali et. al., pp. 12-19. 7 Hadler, pp. 307-8.8 ibid.9 Masyumi (Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia) was the largest of the pre-New Order Islamic

political parties in Indonesia. Its primary objective was to establish an Islamic state. During the Japanese occupation (1942-45), all Muslim organizations were merged in the Japanese-created umbrella organization Masyumi, which in the war for independence was to be transformed into a leadingpolitical party. However, the party failed to unify Indonesian Muslims marked by the emergence of conflict between the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the modernist wings within the party. Masyumi activists were generally educated in Western-type schools and universities. It gained the strongest support from West Java and the outer islands of Indonesia. For a detailed account of Masyumi, see R.E. Lucius, ‘A House Divided: The Decline and Fall of Masyumi (1950-1956),’ MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, 2003.

10 Hadith is generally known as traditions relating to the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (shahabat).

11 I am indebted to J.M. Bale, ‘Conspiracy Theories’ and Clandestine Politics,’ Lobsters: the Journal of Parapolitics, issue 29, June (1995).

12 In this article, anti-Semitism refers to hatred, hostility, antipathy or prejudice directed against Jews as a religious entity, ethnic or racial group. Generally speaking, scholars also define anti-Semitism in this way.

13 S. Ferzacca, ‘A Friendship, Some Mediated Imaginations, and Religiosity in Java/Elsewhere,’ Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia 6, March (2005), p. 6.

14For a detailed account of the arrival of Jews in the colonial era, see Hadler, pp. 291-305.15The Sephardim (plural of Sephardi) are the Jews who came from the Iberian peninsula. In recent

development, however, the word Sephardim has taken a much wider meaning and includes Jewish

communities who come from North Africa, Iraq, Syria, Greece, and Turkey. The word Ashkenazim has

had a similar broadening of its definition. Deriving from a Hebrew word meaning “German”, it now

includes not only German Jews, but also Eastern Europe and Russia as well. It has been argued that a

group of Jews who came from Dutch and German arrived in Jakarta and then began to reside in the city.

Meanwhile, the descendants of Jews of Iraqi origin arrived in Surabaya and began to establish their own

neighbourhood in the city. 16 Cited from M. Taufiqurrahman, ‘Historical Burden Encumbers RI-Israel Ties,’ Jakarta Post, 01

May 2006. 17 Hadler, p. 292. 18 ibid., p. 293. 19 Ferzacca, p. 24.

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20 I am deeply grateful to Robert Cribb for pointing out this explanation to me. 21 For purposes of space, I acknowledge that this sketch of the background of the DDII is necessarily

very brief. For a more substantial account, see A. Husin, ‘Philosophical and Sociological Aspects of Dakwah: A Study of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah,’ PhD thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1998.

22 Ken Ward indicated that the Suharto’s New Order interference in the formation of the Parmusi, and in the 1971 general elections, was heavy-handed. As a result, the party only generated less than 5.5% of the vote which was only a quarter of the Masyumi's strength in the 1955 elections. Soon after the 1971 elections, Suharto next step towards the further mass depolitization consisted in the 'reduction' of the party system. In this respect, all Islamic parties, including the Parmusi, were forced to fuse into the United Development Party (PPP). Meanwhile, all nationalist and Christian political parties were forced to fuse into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). For a substantial account of the Parmusi, see Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, NY, 1970.

23 M. van Bruinessen, ‘Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,’ Southeast Asia Research, 10, 2 (2002), pp. 122-23.

24 Dakwah literally means ‘call’ to Islam or religious propagation to revive faith or to protect the Islamic society from immorality. Broadly speaking, dakwah is proselytising, missionary work, or this means of propagating ad-din (religion). The activists of dakwah are called du’ah (plural form of da’i). This word is derived from Arabic for someone who holds religious propagation, preaches, and spreads the religious understanding of Islamic teachings.

25 Bruinessen, p. 122-123. 26 In the earliest stage of the independence, some Islamic figures fought for the inclusion in the

preamble to the constitution of a phrase which would have given the shari’a constitutional status. The Jakarta Charter attributed to the preamble that proclaimed Indonesia was based on ‘belief in God’ (Ketuhanan), followed by seven words: ‘Dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluknya’ (with the obligation to practice Islamic shari’a by its adherents). Those serious efforts failed because of the strong opposition from the secular-nationalist-Christian political parties. For a detailed account of the 1945 Jakarta Charter, see B.J Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971, pp. 25-27

27 The term umat is derived from Arabic umm, meaning mother. It refers to Muslim conceptions of political community. Even, in modern discourse, the notion of umat is seen as a central normative concept which appeals for unity across the global Muslim community. In the Indonesian context, the term umat often appears as religious-political calling for unity among Indonesian Muslim fractions and groups to increase their political and economic significances.

28 According to Fealy, authorship of this phrase is frequently attributed to W.F. Wertheim, despite it being commonly used by a number of Muslim leaders before he popularized it in his book, Indonesian Society in Transition, W. van Hoeve, The Hague, 1958. For details, see G. Fealy, ‘Divided Majority: The Limits of Political Islam in Indonesia,’ in S. Akbarzadeh & A. Saeed, eds, Islam and Political Legitimacy in Asia, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, p. 8.

29 Al-diin wa- al-dawlah is a favourite term for Islamists. This concept was coined by Sayyid Qutb, the Muslim brotherhood’s ideologue, to recognize that there is no separation between state and religion.The term is often seen as a manifestation of the concept of Islam Kaffah, which means literally ‘the faithful enter Islam completely’ based on the Koran, 2: 208. Broadly, kaffah is to practice Islam in a total way.

30 Bruinessen, p. 123. 31 Wahhabi is a reform movement of Islam, seeking to return to its roots (al-ruju’ ila al-Qur’an wa al-

Sunnah). This movement was established by Saudi-born Muslim intellectual, Muhammad ibn Abd al-

Wahhab, after whom the movement is named. This is a radical branch of Sunni Islam which is

predominantly found in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. 32 ibid., p. 127. 33 I list a number of typical examples in Indonesian books use of the Protocols. See, Dr. Darouza,

Mengungkap tentang Yahudi: Watak, Jejak, Pijak dari Kasus-Kasus Lama Bani Israel, Pustaka Progressif, Surabaya, 1982 (first published in Damascus, 1970); Dr. Majid Kailany, Bahaya Zionisme terhadap Dunia Islam, Pustaka Mantiq, Solo, 1988 (first published in Jeddah, 1984); Skenario Rahasia untuk Menguasai Dunia, Hizbul Haq Press, Bandung, 1989 (?); and, Ayat-Ayat Setan Yahudi: Dokumen Rahasia Yahudi Menaklukkan Dunia dan Menghancurkan Agama, P.T. Pustakakarya Grafikatama, Jakarta, 1990.

Burhanuddin/Conspiracy of Jews 73

34 M. Natsir, Masalah Palestina, Penerbit Hudaya, Jakarta, 1970, pp. 12-13. Siegel translated Natsir’s

statements from his book. Depicting, ‘the characteristics of Jews,’ he says, ‘It is in their character no matter where they are to be like worms on the leaves of banana trees. The leaves are destroyed, riddled with the holes they made, while their bodies get fat, just like worms on leaves. For that reason, they are a people who for centuries have been hated everywhere. Thus a few decades ago, before the Second World War, they were chased from Western Europe and Eastern Europe. They became a hated people. When Hitler was in power they were put into camps where, it is said, several million were killed.’ See, J.T. Siegel, ‘Kiblat and the Mediatic Jew,’ Indonesia 69, April (2000), p. 20. Unlike the Jews in Western countries, he underlines, the Jews are welcomed in Arab states and allowed to live.

35 See, the official website of the Iranian Sunni League, available at: http://www.isl.org.uk/ article.php?sid=11 (15 August 2006).

36 Siegel, pp. 16-17. 37 For further discussion of Cultural Islam, see Fealy, p. 1-17.38 In the discourse of Indonesian Islam, the term “Liberal Islam” itself first appeared when an

Indonesianist Greg Barton mentioned it in his book, Gagasan Islam Liberal: Telaah terhadap Tulisan-tulisan Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib dan Abdurrahman Wahid, 1968-80, [Liberal Islamic Thought: A study of the writing of Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahid and Abdurrahman Wahid] Paramadina, Jakarta, 1999, 609 pp. This Indonesian version was originally translated from Barton’s dissertation, see, Greg Barton, ‘The Emergence of Neo-Modernism: A Progressive Liberal Movement of Islamic Thought in Indonesia: A Textual Study Examining the Writings of Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib and Abdurrahman Wahid 1968-1980,’ PhD Thesis, The Department of Asian Studies and Languages, Monash University, Melbourne ,1995.

39 The DDII claims that Liberal or Secular Islam is not authentically Islam-based in origin. Liberal Islam is seen as an ideological or intellectual assault on Islam—but all of its activists incidentally are Muslims too. Its proponents are accused of using Western ideas such as liberalism, secularism, socialism, and the like rather than using ideas based on Islam.

40Siegel, p. 17. 41 Bruinessen, p. 127. 42 Siegel, pp. 9-40.

43 For instance, Surah 3:71 and 4:46.44 ibid., p. 39. 45 ibid. 46 ibid., pp. 25-26. 47 The Laskar Jihad was established in the end of January 2000 by its commander-in-chief, Ustadz

Ja’far Umar Thalib in Yogyakarta. It was a paramilitary wing of Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (FKAWJ) or Communication Forums of the Followers of Sunnah. Ustadz Ja’far claimed that the Laskar was formed in response to the social religious conflict in Ambon, Maluku where the Wahid government, it was claimed, was unable to resolve the conflict.

48 N. Hasan, ‘Faith and Politics: The Rise of Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia,’ Indonesia 73 (April), 2002, p. 163.

49 A. Reid, ‘Entrepreneurial Minorities, Nationalism, and the State,’ in D. Chirot & A. Reid, eds, Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1997, p. 55.

50 Apart from that, the main activities of DDII, according to Hefner, are 1) the training of skilled preachers; 2) the deployment of dakwah preachers to regions identified as vulnerable to non-Islamic proselytization; and 3) the analysis of the cultural and organizational requisites of dakwah consolidation in regions visited by predication teams. See, R.W. Hefner, ‘Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among Indonesian Muslims,’ Indonesia 64 (October) 1997, p. 84.

51 ibid.52 Edwards pointed out this relationship according to the study of print and politics in Afghanistan.

For a detailed discussion, see D. B. Edwards, ‘Print Islam: Media and Religious Revolution in Afghanistan,’ in J. Nash, ed., Social Movements: an Anthropological Reader, Blackwell Publishing, MA, USA, 2005, pp. 99-100.

53 ibid.54 ibid., pp. 100-1.55 Hefner, p. 87.

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56 ibid. 57 ibid., p. 89. 58 ibid. 59 ibid. 60 Liddle’s article on Media Dakwah was originally the English version and has not been published

elsewhere. After the publication of the article in Indonesian, a great debate among Indonesian Muslim was triggered. The English version of the article was published in a book edited by Mark R. Woodward, see R. W. Liddle, ‘Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia,’ in M.R Woodward, ed., Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, Arizona State University, Arizona, 1999, pp. 323-56. It was translated into Indonesian by Ulumul Qur’an journal’s editors, that are, A. Sahal & S. Mujani. See, the Ulumul Qur’an, July 1993, pp. 53-65.

61 For a detailed information of this account, see, W.R. Liddle, “Skripturalisme Media Dakwah: Satu Bentuk Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam Masa Orde Baru,” in Ulumul Qur’an, July 1993, pp. 53-65,

62 For an account of various print Islam and ideological rivalries, see Hefner, pp. 78-104.63 L. Hakiem, ‘William Liddle Mau Mengulang Sejarah Lama Memecah Belah Umat,’ Media Dakwah,

August 1993, p. 41.64 The Journal of Ulumul Qur’an, July 1993, pp. 66-76. 65 Media Dakwah No. 230, August ,1993.66 Hakiem, pp. 42-46. The acronym GPK was preferable, because its tone was much to do with

secessionist movements in Aceh and Papua labeled by the government as the GPK (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan or Gang of Disruptors of Security).

67 Fealy, p. 12. 68 Siegel, p. 10. For detail information on Nurcholish’s talk in TIM, see D. Ramage, Politics in

Indonesia Routledge, London and New York, 1995, pp. 75-122; R.W. Hefner, “Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia,” in R.W. Hefner, ed., Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1997, pp. 75-129.

69 Not my translation. I cite from Siegel, p. 16. For details of the original version in Indonesian, see D. Rasyid, ‘Kesesatan Dikemas dengan Gaya Ilmiah,’ in Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan Keagamaan: Debat Besar ‘Pembaruan Islam,’ Lembaga Studi Informasi Pembangunan (LSIP), Jakarta, 1995, p. 105. This was originally a paper delivered on December 1992 at TIM, where Nurcholish gave his talk.

70 Not my translation. I cite from Siegel, p. 14. For Indonesian-account of this quotation, see D. Rasyid, ‘Meluruskan Akidah, Menangkal Mu’tazilah,’ in Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan Keagamaan: Debat Besar ‘Pembaruan Islam,’ Lembaga Studi Informasi Pembangunan (LSIP), Jakarta, 1995, p. 240. This was originally published in Media Dakwah, June 1993.

71 Not my translation. I cite from Siegel, p. 14. For Indonesian-account of this quotation, see A. Ridho, ‘Hikmah Lain dari Polemik Itu,’ in Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan Keagamaan: Debat Besar ‘Pembaruan Islam,’ Lembaga Studi Informasi Pembangunan (LSIP), Jakarta, 1995, pp. 208; 195-213. This was originally published in Media Dakwah, June 1993.

72 Media Dakwah, June 1993.73 The main focus of the Binder’s book is the relation between Islamic liberalism and political

liberalism. Binder used the term Islamic liberalism to depict a political synthesis of Islam and liberalism. See, Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988.

74 I gratefully acknowledge Bill Liddle for pointing out this information. 75 Hakiem, ‘Nabi Gagal Menjalankan Misinya? Menguji Pemikiran Nurcholish,’ Media Dakwah,

December 1992, p. 41. For comparison of this story, see Liddle, Media Dakwah Scripturalism, p. 353, footnote 18.

76 Lev stated that, ‘as long as shari’a exists and Muslims still perform shari’a, it is impossible to “de-eksistensi” Islam.’ Nurcholish was often labeled as a destroyer of shari’a. Shari’a is broadly defined here as the code of law or jurisprudence derived from the Koran and Hadith. Above all, Saidi sought to make a story of the relations between Nurcholish and Jewish Indonesianist, Daniel Lev. See, Media Dakwah, January 1993.

77 Research Team, ‘Fakta dan Data untuk William Liddle,’ Media Dakwah, August, 1993. p. 51.78 These statements are attributed to Benjamin Franklin’s speeches. ibid., pp. 51-52.79 These words are attributed to Napoleon. ibid., p. 53.

Burhanuddin/Conspiracy of Jews 75

80 This statement is attributed to John’s Speed’s book, “The History of Great Britain. See, Ibid. 81 These words are attributed to Martin Luther’s book. See, ibid. 82 For details about the influence of the Protocols in contemporary Islamic discourse in Indonesia, see

M. van Bruinessen, ‘Yahudi sebagai Simbol dalam Wacana Islam Indonesia Masa Kini,’ Seri Dian II Tahun I, Dian/Interfidei, Yogyakarta, 1994, pp. 253-68.

83 Enlightenment refers to the 17th and 18th-century philosophical movement that emphasized rationalism.

84 A substantial account of the background of the book is Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: the Myth of the Jewish World-Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Scholars Press, Chico, CA, 1981.

85 Hadler, p. 305 86 ibid. 87 ibid. 88 Bruinessen, Yahudi sebagai Simbol, p. 261. 89 ibid. 90 See, endnote no. 30.91 R. Saidi, ‘Nurcholish Madjid and Annie Besant,’ Media Dakwah, December, 1992. This article was

then republished in R. Saidi, Fakta dan Data Yahudi di Indonesia: Dan Refleksi Kritis Perdamaian PLO-Israel, Lembaga Studi Informasi Pembangunan (LSIP), Jakarta, 1993, pp. 42-45.

92 See, ‘Penyerahan Diri,’ Yes, Islam, No,’ Media Dakwah, December, 1992.93 ibid., p. 47.94 See, ‘Anti-Zionis Bereaksi di TIM,’ Media Dakwah, November, 1993, p. 49. 95 See, a cover story of Media Dakwah, ‘Heboh Hubungan Indonesia-Israel,’ Media Dakwah,

November 1993, pp. 41-49. 96 A. A. B. Perwita, ‘New Chapter in Indonesia-Palestine Ties,’ Jakarta Post, June 06, 2006, available

at: http://www.thejakartapost.com (31 August 2006). 97 ‘Israel Brutal,’ Media Dakwah, November, 1993, p. 44. 98 Saidi, ‘Palestina dalam Musik dan Perangko Indonesia,’ in Saidi, Fakta dan Data, pp. 1-3. This was

originally published in Media Dakwah, October, 1991. 99 ibid. 100 Hakiem, ‚Maka Rabin pun Sowan ke Cendana,’ Media Dakwah November 1993, pp. 42-46. 101 ibid. 102 Amien Rais, ‘Jangan Bermain Api dengan Israel,’ Media Dakwah, November, 1993, p. 47.103 The English text of the verse by A. Y. Ali, available at:

http://www.sacredtexts.com/isl/quran/002.htm (19 August 2006). 104 ibid. 105 The music group of Gank Pegangsaan released an album entitled ‘Palestina.’ It consists of ten

songs such as Palestina, Jalan Sabang, Manusia Kera, dan Setan Tertawa. Some well-known musicians and celebrities in Indonesia at the time were behind the group, such as Fariz RM, Debby and Keenan Nasution, Sitoresmi Prabuningrat and so on. See, Saidi, “Palestina dalam Musik,” pp. 2-3.

106 ibid., p. 3. 107 ibid., p. 2-3 108 See, Media Dakwah, October, 1991; Media Dakwah, November, 1993. 109 Ali, available at: http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/quran/002.htm (19 August 2006). 110 ibid. 111 ibid. 112 Cited by A. Solnick, ‘Based on Koranic Verses, Interpretations, and Traditions, Muslims Clerics

State: The Jews are the Descendants of Apes, Pigs, and Other Animals,’ Memiri Special Report No. 11 November 1, 2002, available at: http://www.memri.org.bin/opener.cgi? Page=archives&ID=SR01102 (21 August 2006).

113 ibid. 114 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, Routledge, London and New York, 1994, pp. 66-67. As a

comparison, see Edward Said, Orientalism, Vintage, New York, 1979, p. 3.Initially, Bhabha uses the notion of stereotype as it is closely related to colonial power. He says, ‘The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction.’ See, Bhabha, p. 70.

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115 Stuart Hall (ed.), “The Spectacle of the ‘Other’, in Representation and Cultural Representations and

Signifying Practices, Sage, London, 1997, p. 257. 116 Frank Felsenstein, Anti-Semitic Stereotypes: A Paradigm of Otherness in English Popular Culture 1660-

1830, the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1995, p. 11. 117 For instance, see Oyvind Dahl, “The Use of Stereotypes in Intercultural Communication,” En:

“Essays on Culture and Communication,” in Torben Vestergaard (ed.), Language and Culture Contact 10, Aalborg University, Aalborg, 1995.

118 Pablo R. Christoffanini, The Representation of ‘the Others’ as Strategies of Symbolic Construction, Institute for Sprog Og International Kulturstudier, Department of Languages and Intercultural Studies, Aalborg University, Aalborg East, 2003, p. 11.

119 Stuart Hall (ed.), “The Work of Representation,” in Representation, pp. 24-26120 Pekka Rantanen, “Non-Documentary Burqa Pictures on the Internet: Ambivalence and the

Politics of Representation,” in International Journal of Cultural Studies, Vol. 8 (3), 2005, p. 333. 121 ibid. 122 Bhabha, p. 66. 123 For instance, Surah 5: 18; 2: 47; 3:64; 2:62; 109:6. 124 David Norman Smith, “The Social Construction of Enemies: Jews and the Representation of

Evil,” in Sociological Theory, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Nov., 1996), pp. 222. 125 ibid. 126 ibid. 127 Bale, p. 47.128 ibid., p. 47.129 ibid., p. 48. 130 A. S. Assad, ‘Diskusi Al-Furqan Menangkal Yahudi dan Orientalis,’ Media Dakwah, August 1993,

p. 15.131 ibid. 132 Bale, p. 49. 133 ibid., p. 48.134 D. Groh, ‘Temptation of Conspiracy Theory, Part I’, in C. F. Graumann & S. Moscovici, eds.,

Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, Springer, New York, 1987, p. 3. 135 Bale, p. 49. 136 Media Dakwah, November, 1993, p. 48.137 Bale, p. 48.138 Siegel, p. 25.139 For further information of this group, see

http://www.jewsagainstzionism.com/about/mission.cfm (23 August 2006).140 ibid. 141 Republika’s coverage about both ‘the Jews against Zionism’ and ‘Jewish Forum on Justice and

Human Right’ at the height of the war in Lebanon two months ago, helped to make a greater understanding among Indonesian Muslims on the diversity of Jews.

142 Bale, p. 48. 143 For instance, look at Reid’s statements in which he said that “the crudest racial formulations of

the demonology of modernization are directed against a ‘Jewish’ minority known only as a theoretical construct.” See Anthony Reid, p. 63. For a more substantial account of the relation of anti-Semitism and anti modernization, see Bruinessen, Yahudi sebagai Simbol, pp. 253-68.

144 Martin points out that anti-Semitism is often found in places in Europe and America where Jews are rare. See, Bruinessen, Yahudi sebagai Simbol, p. 259.

145 Hadler, p. 292.