the consolidation of the anglo-saxon/european consensus on price stability. from international...

7/27/2019 The Consolidation of the Anglo-Saxon/European Consensus on Price Stability. From International Coordination to a

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The Consolidation of the Anglo-Saxon/European Consensus on Price Stability

F I C R-BM R

A K

N. 47 | O 2012

WORKING PAPER


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2 | KFGWorking Paper No. 47 | October 2012

KFG Working Paper Series

Edited by the Kolleg-Forschergruppe T Tv Pw E

T KFG W P S v K-F

v . I w

E E U.

A KFG W P v KFG w www.. v

-@-..

C : A K

E : C B S R

K, A 2012: T C A-S/E C P S: F I

C R-B M R, KFG W P S, N. 47, O 2012, K-F(KFG) T Tv Pw E F Uv B.

ISSN 1868-6834 (P)

ISSN 1868-7601 (I)

T G R F (DFG).

F Uv B

K-F

T Tv Pw E:

T E U D I

I. 26

14195 B

G

P: +49 (0)30- 838 57033

F: +49 (0)30- 838 57096

-@-.

www..


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From International Coordination to a Rule-Based Monetary Regime | 3

The Consolidation of the Anglo-Saxon/EuropeanConsensus on Price Stability

From International Coordination to aRule-Based Monetary Regime

A K

A

D 1990, ww

v w . S , -

, w v w v w

. I , I v , w v w

w

v. I G US v v

, z , w z

w . T v

E G-5/7 w-

- . T v w -

w v

. F, v w w

.

T A

A K P Fw KFG T Tv Pw

E. H

v v,

v

: .@.


4/35


C

1. I 5

2. D S I C 7

3. S P I D 10

3.1 Domesc Factors 10

3.2 Internaonal Factors 12

3.3 Method 13

4. F N-C D N 14

4.1 Non-Coordinaon Period 14

4.2 Direct Negoaon and Country-Specic Recommendaon 15

4.3 Coordinaon and Surveillance 17

4.4 Obstacle of Coordinaon 18

5. T EU: F EMS EMU 19

5.1 The Delors Report: Framing the Problem 195.2 The EU and Inaon Targeng 20

5.3 The EU as the a Promoter of Central Bank Independence 21

6. T BIS IMF R D 22

6.1 The BIS 22

6.2 IMF Research Department 23

7. T Iz N P S T 24

7.1 World Economic Outlook:

Instuonalizaon of the Norm of Inaon Targeng 25

8. A C 26

L 29

A 34


5/35


1. I1

Fw E , G

w E w US (US) I M F (IMF). T -

-

: T v w z

1990 w, v w

v w w .

R, IMF q v w -

[s]table and low inaon was presented as the primary, if not exclusive, mandate of central banks. This

was the result of a coincidence between the reputaonal need of central bankers to focus on inaon

rather than [economic] acvity () and the intellectual support for inaon targeng provided by the

New Keynesian model. (Blanchard et al. 2010: 3)

T ww v

- .

D 1990, ww

v w . I 1990, IMF [] w

w z jv

(C . 1991: 1; IMF 2000). I, w , , v,

v, , w, ,

, , v (M . 1989).

T w wv -

jv w

jv (T 2003; IMF 2006). W Nw

Z 1988 (T 2000),

w 1990 (P/G 2005; M 2005). T M

T w w E C (EC). Fw

C B, E z

- E E (B

2010; Bj . 2000). T L A S-E A w

1 T w v w K-F (KFG)

T Tv Pw E. I w Tj Bz, T R Dv Lv-F, P

M B L v . I w S F

w , w . I KFG w

v v D S. L , w

KFG .


6/35


IMF v (B/L 2006). B

1990, . A P

Nw Y F Rv B , [] .

P (MD 1997: 1).

T w w

v . Hwv, w -

z 1990 w, , q v.

F, v v w , w 2 2 .

S v w . S, v v w sole

jv , v jv w,

. T, commitment v w

v . A , v v w all countries

v .

W v zz in pracce

w . I , S F ,

1990 jv -

2 ( C . 2000; F 2010). Mv,

w , G M IMF

(B . 2010). Hw ?

T v w

v. I . T,

v . T , wv,

v w w I w. I , I v , w -

z v v . T

, , w -

E G-5/7. I I

. F, I v w w

v , v

. S, I v w -

, , G US. F, I E

v , , E v w

w v w z .

T w. T -

w w. T

- v . I , I

v, w w . T -

w . T

2 P Ivw w S F, T Avv, J 2011.


7/35


w v. S (

) G-5/7 1980

Pz Lv A. T Ez G

D C v G w.T vw D B I

S (BIS) D IMF R D

. I w - -

E M U (EMU), D R. T v

z E IMF v

R D.

2. D S I C

S , v -

(Ej/ H 1996; A/S 1993; C 1992). A -

, - . W K

- , -

w z -

- v - . T -

v v v - j-

v ( ). T, w

w w

v (C 1992; A/S 1993). E

US w - P V F

Rv - (T 2010).

W - -

, US U K (UK),

v w 1990 global norm v .

F, 1980, v w w. D ,

v G-5 w 5 . T G-7 1988 [] 1980

, w v v

(T S 1988). T vw w W E O IMF (WEO 1987: 5).

W, , w - z w

w ?

S, - 1970 1980

v w w ,

, w . I , v,

- v j


8/35


.3

T, onlyv v vv

q, . T vw v . W w v , v v w -

jv.4 H, q w w

w v . W w v

j ?

F, 1980 G-5/7 w

v . T -

, v

(T D 1986; Lv A 1987; B 2001: 247). T z-

v w w

IMF (B 2001: 250). W , w w w

, v ? T

- v w q.

T v q. L v-

(Mv 1998; Mv/S 2003) w : T

v

v v . N

. O v, -

v v w.

T v

(Mv 1998). P v v w . F, z -

. S, v

v v ( ) -

(R-K 1995: 285; Mv 1998: 256, 268;

P 1988).

I , I v w, w w q. F, -

- z -

-

. A Mv S , -

- v,

v , - (Mv/S 2003: 72). T

.

3 T vw . I v

- .

4 D F 1991 (10-15 ),

w w

w w (D/F 1991).


9/35


T vw - w

z . Tj Bz w w

. T v v v

. T v - (Bz 2011: 10). T v .

T v, w . T q , , w

v w

, ? T,

I : -,

- . T w q w w

. S, Mv,

. I

, , , w

w . Mv, I

: M- w -, -

.

Mv v w , w

(D 1994; MN 1998; D/F 1999; V 1999). D

[] v w v

EMS [E M S] EMU (D 1994: 257). V -

. S v

, w v

w w -

(V 1999: 323). T - w v v .


10/35


3. S P I D

T w- - , ,

- w . I w , I

. I w

w .

3.1 Domesc Factors

W -

v w ? I , I - w

, -

v v w w jv .

F v, (w

) (w v ). Hwv,

w ,

- w (B 2008). D v -

- v w . T,

v

.

I 1980 1995, w -

. F, A-S z , w

w (

II 1). T US UK w -

(Z 1984) R -

T (H 1986). T,

w . Mv, US w

. F,

z z - ,

v . I v v-

, w - ,

w w (R-K 1995: 285). T w US

UK - v.

T w F. F

. A , wv, w . T -

j , -

w ( III). T


11/35


-j q v

. D E M S (EMS),

E w q . I 1985 1988, w

G-5-7.

T F -, - -

v (Z 1984). Mv,

F w v:

z. T EMS w F shield against global pressures,

part of globalizaon. L , w- w -

j

- . A , - v

j, , , - w

- w v . T US, w

w w- .

F, , w -

. T w G (C I).5 T G -

v w

, B (N 1998; P 2009). I

, wv, w G v .

T G , -

. W G w w E, v

v F . U D R

G w w E ( j-

) E j . T , wv, w

A-S . A D R, z E -

z w E, E v G

, v w G US .

5 T w A R BIS w G , , J

v v v - (BIS 1990: 231).


12/35


Table 1: Rules vs. Discreon; Coordinated vs. Floang Exchange Rates:

Naonal Preferences Regarding Domesc and Internaonal Monetary Regimes

E P (E R)

F C

E R

I Lz-F

D R I

Germany

M T

II

UK (T M);

US (R S-

)

D

P

D D

(D-SE;

K)

III

FEMS

(B Lw: 1985-1988)

S: A I

3.2 Internaonal Factors

W w

, v . T

w w . F, w w

w 1980

w w v

. I v w ,

v , ,

. I w, w

. I w, w v,

w . W v

v v v , w v v

-

.

T w v w I

shared sense of crisis. A w -

v v v v w v . A

v w

v w v . T, -

w v


13/35


v w. T w

1980 -1980. I

, US G v .

T w -

q -

? T q w w.

3.3 Method

T v -

1980 1990. T v v v: -,

w - . M

, w

1980 1990.

T v , , -

(- -), (z -z),

( ). T -

: G, F, UK US. T w

w .

T w Cq G-5 G8,

P IMF B Gv I C, A R B

I S, IMF , W E O A R

IMF. I , I w w . S,

w Mv (Mv 1991; Mv 1998) D D F

(D 1994; D/F 1999) , w

w .


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4. F N-C D N

I z w G-5/7 E

, v v w1980 1990 -. F, period of non-coordinaon (1980-1984): I

1980, US z w

. E w F EMS. T

w US F v . S, period of direct negoaon

(1985-1988): Fw J B T 1985, US

-v w v Pz Lv

A. T, period of rule-based regime building (1989-1991): Fw D R, G

C B, E -

v z - . T w E v

w A-S/E - . A , period

of consolidaon of the regime (1992 1990): T w -

z z domesc v. I w , I

w .

4.1 Non-Coordinaon Period

U 1985, G-5 v v -

. T w w US F -

w v . T US R

PD R, , B S, C E Av,

P V F Rv B v

. T vw z , w -

v w , A-S

j - . O w

, w , w w v

z - v - w -

(E 1996: 140, 147).6 E w v ,

, A , w v v

(B 2001: 190).

O F , M, D, L G vw. D

w F ,7 v F v vw

6 V z v

- v- (E 1996: 146).

7 M w - F E w-

w. S , wv, F w EMS

v v. W M , D, C L G


15/35


v w w , ,

v v (B 2001: 190). I w, F

w w E M S.

T EMS v F w v w w .

T US F v . I,

w . W US -

, F z .8

Hwv, v -

z . T US w z -

w F w z -, - (Z

1984). T, v w F

US. Mv, Nw Y, L, w , , US

, w w. F, US

w w E

, , v w v w (F

. 1989: 199).

4.2 Direct Negoaon and Country-Specic Recommendaon

I 1983 1987, w US

J G w v (C 1, A).

T w z z -E -

.9 H, v . T w

w G-5 v

. T w v w

w w w w

w v w . P

US G w w -

.

T v w J

v EMS (E 1996: 166; H 1996: 142).

8 R D w w z

(D 1976). T j

v v (R 2002).

9 Mv v E w

z S E A (Mv 1998: 317). I ,

z.


16/35


B S T F 1985 R . B w

v . I B w -

(B 2006: 32; T F T L 1986). I v,B w -v -1980 US

. J v A P, IMF A

M, w, v ,

q w

(IMF 1987: 106).

T US B w US F .

R M v -

B W (B 2001: 203). T w B v

v w j -

(IMF 1987: 106). T B F M N Lw

vw [w] , -

. Mv, w v z ,

- , (IMF 1987: 89).

T w Pz Lv A 1985 1987, v.

T w A - w w

. F F v, A (- -

) E

v. T , B, F Gv IMF,

Lv , , v w,

, v (IMF 1987: 34).

T G , K O P, w -

, j -

z v

j (IMF 1987: 81). T

v w A-S F- E w

.

T w . F, -

v w v EMS E v.

W EMS , , E w w

j w D-M, , , v ,

j. S, w-

v, US

.


17/35


4.3 Coordinaon and Surveillance

T w

W E O (WEO), w 1980. T Pz Lv A w w , -

v. T v

v - (V 2004). A

D IMF R D , A v -

vw (F .

1989: 187). T - v

w ,

j (D 1994: 160).

T G-5/7 w q -

. T w z World Economic Outlook(WEO). T WEO w

IMF w v

. T

WEO w 1980 j w R D w

IMF (WEO 1986, v, 20). T IMF v-

w - V S 1982. T G-7 w

w IMF w v (G 7 1982). T w

IV IMF A A w F v

v , v

w . T v 1985 w

G-5 . J B w v v (B 1986). I 1986,

WEO w I C IMF v

, v (WEO 1986:

20). I v , WEO . T G-7

WEO (G

7 1987). J B v v -

v , w,

(IMF 1987: 108). I w F vw v

w WEO (B 2001: 205).

T IMF v 1988 , I w w,

- 1989, w w z ,

v .


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4.4 Obstacle of Coordinaon

D v , w w -

. T Lv Pz A w w G-5/7

. T w v US w z

v w w

v (Bw 2005: 374) F, w w -

z .

T US v w

w US w US

. M F, v C C E

Av C E Av P R R, US

(F 1988: 10). S F,

M I T (MIT) S M, V P

C E W B, w q , -

w w

v (F 1987: 49). T US -

w E w [] US

[]

US , E (T F

T 1986).

Hwv, , US -

w w v US -

: I w v v

(B 2006: 32; W 1995: 226; H/D 1988).

T w w-v , w

w v

.

T , , w

w v z v.

Cw, - w j,

z v.


19/35


5. T EU: F EMS EMU

T - E

v. T w w .

5.1 The Delors Report: Framing the Problem

I w Pz A, F w EMU

v , - -

j. D 1987, w B-N

F-G K. I 1987, C v z

w G E C F M C

B Gv. A F , C w -

z (D 1994: 124). T F w G-5/7

: w -v . T

F v, , D C w v

E .

A G , 1987, w v F EMS

w j E M U. T G F M H-D

G w . I 1988, G M

C M U E C B, w

vw B w E

. G v w E

F v w F , G

w G w w

v jv (D 1994: 331; V 1999). G

v v E

G w w, w .

T D C w E w -

w EMS. T C, E C, w

EMU. I w v EC

w G M B I S, A L,

Jq D, P E C F F M.

T C G G- E .

F , j j .

A C R, EMS w v

(D 1989: 8; E 1996: 163; Gvzz/Gv 1990). A v


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3.1, v z z w

. T - w EC , w

, w j w

v . T , C (D 1989: 11). T R w v -

z . T w, , w

, , . T E w

.

The Governors [of the central banks] would [] manage the proposed system for [European] Community

exchange rate relaons, which would progressively lead to a narrowing of the uctuaon bands.

Progress in the convergence of economic and monetary policies should be such in the course of the

second stage [of the EMU] that Member States no longer have to resort on an autonomous basis to the

instrument of parity adjustment.(D 1989: 559)

H, D v EU -

E . T, Ez G

w j

z .

5.2 The EU and Inaon Targeng

A D C w vw K O P,

B (D/F 1999; Mv 1998).10 P

C w G w. D D C

w D, F w w C. I w C w

. T w w F w

, v .

F w w : A w--

w EU, w w

G . G, , - w -

. T, K w

G : E w

F (D/F 1999: 124).

T UK v D C. T Gv

10 A C - w G

(P Ivw w A C, 18 J 2011; G 2007).


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B E C w . T v v

. Nv, D R jv

v B

w E j. T, E B , B - v UK w

G w F (D/F 1999: 606, 678). A Mv

, w E w [B] (Mv

1998: 324).

5.3 The EU as the a Promoter of Central Bank Independence

F , D w

E . T w

v; w w . T R

w EMS v

(D 1989: 8). T,

[i]n these circumstances the eecveness of naonal monetary policies will become increasingly depen-

dent on cooperaon among central banks. Indeed, the growing coordinaon of monetary policies will

make a posive contribuon to nancial market integraon and will help central banks gain the experi-

ence that would be necessary to move to a single monetary policy.(D 1989: 16)

T D C

E S C B C (ESCB)

(D 1989: 22). T , v w ,

w jv (D 1989: 21). I , -

w j EMU (Ej/ H

1996).

H, D R, E v v

w jv . T

w v v -

. I , w z w E w

EMU.


22/35


6. T BIS IMF R D

I - .

T w v -E v w v. Hwv,

w w- w , -

z BIS IMF w

. T w

.

6.1 The BIS

T BIS w 1920 G .

I E (S 1993; T 2005; M

2008). Fw S W W, E

v. T EC v BIS M D BIS, A

L, D C. T, E C

B, BIS w z w E.

L, w D R, w R

v v. Gv v w -

, w v

w v .

I C, v q

. H w

v [] , w E

v v (L 1989, 93, 96). S w v,

L , w . I , L w

w - w z:

The combinaon of a small Community budget with large, independently determined naonal budgets

leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of scal coordinaon, the global scal policy of the EMU

would be the accidental outcome of decisions taken by Member States []. As a result, the only global

macroeconomic tool available within the EMU would be the common monetary policy implemented by

the European central banking system []. But such a situaon would appear even less tolerable once

the EMU was regarded as part and parcel of the world economy, with a clear obligaon to cooperate

with the United States and Japan in an aempt to preserve (or restore) an acceptable paern of external

balances and to achieve exchange rate stabilizaon. To have even the smallest chance of reaching these

objecves, all cooperang partners will need exibility in their policy mixes.(L 1989: 101)


23/35


L z w -

D R. M , ,

w

v (BIS 1990: 236, 179). A - v w w -jv. L j vw

A-S , w -

z (BIS 1990: 211). R, w q []

[] q -

(BIS 1990: 231).

6.2 IMF Research Department

A w R D IMF v.

J F, R D (1987-1991), w v v -

. U IMF 1991, vw

. F , M G,

v w BIS

E : I w v w w jv: -

. D ,

w jv.

F F, w internaonal collecve goods q -

v v . W

v ,

(F .1989: 209). I w, w

- z w (F . 1989: 196).

F G vww 1990

v v . T w vw

w, j

w z

(F . 1989: 189, 195). Mv, v

- [] -

v (F . 1989: 210).11

T WEO F R D vw. T

v (WEO 1987: 17) w

11 F G v

1980, z ( B . 1990; F 1983; F

. 1989, 1990, 1991; M . 1989; G 1995).


24/35


, v v v

v (WEO 1987: 17). T WEO v 3.5 v -

(WEO 1987: 5).

T v

w (WEO 1987: 6). Fw Lv A, w

w [] v -

(WEO 1988: 4-5).

T w D R vw BIS R D IMF

EMU w .

Mv, 1991 w

v w v .

7. T Iz N P S T

D 1980, IMF . T w -

C, D F, v,

(B 2001). D , IMF

.

U 1989, IMF v. A v w

. W

- , IMF w

z w ,

T IMF v . M C, M D,

F F A M S 1989, -

D R, w (IMF

1989: 11). R w w

v w (IMF 1989: 13). A IMF

,

. A w

- v - w

(C/G 1987).

T v A-S w C

. N B, A S T

w B, w (IMF

1989: 39). Lw, B M, w w


25/35


w v w -

. B , , w

[] v v w -v v (IMF 1989: 90). A , UK j

E M M (ERM) 10 . W v

B j w j T ERM w

w (W 1986; D/F 1999: 548), 1990, J Mj j

UK j ERM - (T F T 1990).

D , G M F, T W, w w.

H w w ,

w (IMF 1989: 78). H w

w

v (IMF 1990; 85). Ev F M, P Bv, w

: [E]

w (IMF 1990: 39).

7.1 World Economic Outlook: Instuonalizaon of the Norm of Inaon Targeng

O w v IMF, w z

R D. I 1991, M M F

R D. M w v US C E Av

R (1986-1988). H C B S,

w w - . M w -

. A W P, M w IMF

, v w, v (B 2012).

M w w v (M 1993) -

vw

v (M 1993: 36).

A R D, M w WEO.

M w IMF v (L 2012). T,

v w . R v -

v, w v w -

z , ,

. A C , [w] , ,

w , v , - j

w w- (IMF 1989: 13).


26/35


T 1992 R WEO

consensus reached among the industrial countries at the beginning of the 1980s that medium-term

objecves were best served by adhering to an-inaonary monetary policies, by reducing scal de-cits (preferably by restricons on government spending rather than tax increase), and by eliminang

structural rigidies (WEO 1992: 16). It was stated that the reducon of inaon to only 2.5 percent

[] in the industrial countries as a whole stands out as a major achievement.(WEO 1995: 2)

I w . T WEO -

w v w

(WEO 1995: 20). I w

1990 1980 1970 w

.

T WEO vw v w w

v v . T WEO 1995

[] w w v ,

v (WEO 1995. 18). T vw w A-S vw

v. Mv, WEO z

. W v v (WEO

1989; WEO 1990), w z [] -

v , v

(WEO 1993: 48).

8. A C

T v w

1980 1990. T v w

w . I

v w -

v w .

I w , v w v w -

w B W 1970

-. I 1970 1980, w

, w z w

. T w w 1990. W

v w v , I , z

w v . T

w w W

z w, US G.


27/35


U v, v

: 1980, -1980

- -1980 1990. T

- w v v ,

. T

- w v w.

T v . F,

v w . I v w w

economic raonale polical raonale. T , -

v w w v v,

w v . I w

w z

w w v

, .

T v w w w

w . I w v . P

w , , v v. Hwv,

v, 1990 v w

w v w.

S, v -

EMU (V 2010). T q w w

EMU Mv

(1998), w

D F (1999) . V

w v (V 1999).

T w w -

- v w .

T v w -

v

(H 1992). I EMU, w w

. E z BIS

IMFz EMU -

. T

EMU w

EMU. T z


28/35


z w .12

T, w E

. Mv z z w v E -

(Mv 1998: 410). Hwv, q

w E 1990

.13 T v

w 1990, , , w v

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