The Challenges of Armed Group Organization in Socially Fragmented Environments Will Reno Northwestern University Armed group cohesion in general terms: How do different armed groupcommunity relationships emerge? What are the consequences of these relationships for armed group recruitment and organizational cohesion in war zones? Known #1: Armed groups use coercion and information to establish control over people and territory, leading to a threshold of collaboration over time (Kalyvas). Example: Abu Musab al Zarqawi & the Omar Brigade Iraqi practitioners of territorial control (via targeted assassinations). This affected how those armed groups managed their local environment. Known #2: Prewar community institutions matter, shaping different forms of rebel governance (Arjona) Weak local institutions -> culus regio, eius religio; the people obey the strongest force Strong local institutions -> keep rebels (or the state) at bay. Institutions matter more than resources & rebel goals. Known #2.1: Pre-existing networks (political parties, religious associations, student & veteran groups, etc.) shape the organization of armed groups at the outset (Staniland). Networks, even if re-purposed for war, shape the organizational options for armed groups to recruit, discipline and motivate members. A Puzzle: Why would armed groups that face weak state institutions and dominate local communities fail to utilize these advantages to increase internal cohesion? No holiday from history: State context matters Early nation-states guerrilla rebels Industrializing states urban insurgency Periphery state-builders Maoist liberated zones Periphery Patronage states fragmented rebels A related question: If armed group fragmentation is the dominant mode, why do cohesive armed groups appear in some cases? State collapse produces a distinct context for conflict, blurring the rebel-government distinction *Field vacation. Not field research. Pre-conflict states of reciprocal infiltration & violence Patronage state networks infiltrate other social networks as an alternative way to exercise authority Patronage politics supplemented with violence: creative tension to undermine collective action Reverse infiltration of networks of violence into the state regime; workable if the original hierarchy is maintained Disruption, often externally induced, fragments the state patronage and other social networks, leading to civil war The Desert of the Real Two Kinds of Armed Groups Town Rebels: Vice President Riek Machar, political insider, at his rebel HQ, April 2014 Bush Rebels: I dont know who he is, but he is appears to be outside the establishment * What R.M. reads: Ashraf Ghani, Fixing Failed States, Acemoglu & Robinson, Why Nations Fail, Kevin Mauer, No Easy Day * Sheikh Munajjid ruled that creating a snowman is sinful Data & Measurement Counting conflicts: If the character of warfare changes, what should we count? There is no consensus on how to count, many ignore non-state dimensions of organized violence. Collecting Data: Where should data come from? Conceptualization: Are state-centric data collection / approaches increasingly unhelpful? A non-state realm, even within formal parameters of states, and its interactions may provide more useful insights for understanding contemporary patterns of conflict. Armed Group Cohesion Measured in terms of the degree of autonomous capacity to manage social relationships and obligations of group members. High cohesion is manifest in capacities to recruit selectively, discipline effectively, and promote a program. Low cohesion: Symmetrical irregular warfare of clan-based militias in the South Sudan slide High cohesion: Rebels sustaining liberated zones, such as Al-Shabaab, ISIS, etc. A model of armed group control in collapsed states Network CommunityMarginal Community Town Rebels Violence: Intimidate local people to gain direct access to resources. symmetrical irregular (gang) warfare; self- appointed criminal bosses. Community: Weak local authorities, incapable of collaboration. Bush Rebels Violence: Selective to identify potential collaborators, social base Community: Protect victims of violence at cost of attachment to intensely local personal agendas Violence: Compete to control people in extant networks, Territorial where social structures can be fought over Community: Struggle to coopt local authorities who assert a collective interest. Violence: Discriminate (high) territorial battle to isolate & control civilians Community: Repurpose local marginalization as an organizational asset The other two-by-two Networked: [Dependent on patronage networks of the state] Marginal: Excluded or poorly integrated into patronage networks of the state] Town RebelsMogadishu warlords Mahdi Army in Kamaliyah & Amin Shebelle warlords Mahdi Army in Beladiyat & Mashtal Bush RebelsSomali Shabaab Nationalists Islamic Army in Iraq in Samarra Kenya, Khatumo, Shebelle Shabaab (The Internationalists social terrain) ISIS The importance of ground checking concepts (and GIS) For more on these coordinates: Somali Rabbit Hole Mesopotamian Rabbit Hole