By Khatchig Mouradian

On May 30, long-time humanrights activist in TurkeyProf. Baskin Oran receivedan email from the TurkishRevenge Brigade, a group

responsible for the assassination of aprominent human rights activist in1998. The email included a death threatand swear words aimed at Oran and theArmenians. The text was similar to theone Turkish-Armenian journalist HrantDink received before he was killed lastyear on January 19 in Istanbul.

Worried that this interview, con-ducted in May, could cause more prob-lems for Oran in Turkey, I decided topostpone its publication and shelve thetranscript indefinitely. I sent it to Oran,however, with a note explaining myreluctance to publish it. These are mywords, he said, and they will not changebecause of threats.

Baskin Oran is a regular contributorto Dink’s newspaper, Agos, and toRadikal in Turkey. Unlike Dink, he doesnot use the term “genocide” when refer-ring to the massacres of the Armeniansduring World War I. Yet, Oran is far frombeing a “genocide denier” and is an out-spoken critic of the Turkish state’s denialof the suffering of the Armenians. Healso believes that Armenian Genocideresolutions in countries like the U.S.make the job of Turkish democrats moredifficult when it comes to educating theTurkish public about 1915.

Khatchig Mouradian When talkingabout taboos in Turkish society, you oftenquote Sakalli Celal (Celal the Bearded),who said, “That much ignorance is onlypossible with education.” Talk about howeducation has promoted ignorance.

Baskin Oran Any nation-state is cre-ated mainly by using two instruments:compulsory military service andnational education. During this educa-tion, you are constantly taught this orthat and you come to believe in itbecause it’s very heavy indoctrination.Teaching something does not onlymean teaching something, it also meansnot teaching something. And this is thecase in Turkey with the 1915 massacres.

I heard about 1915 for the first timein the U.S., when I was 18, from a friendof mine called Bob Harabedjian. He wasa very funny guy. We were both in differ-ent cars, we stopped at the red light. Wewere high school students. He said, jok-ingly, “You dirty Turk, you killed mygrandparents.” I said, “F*** off, bastard”and we continued our way. Of course Iforgot the incident the very same day.This was in 1964. Afterwards, we cameto hear about it in 1973, when theASALA killings started. It was like beingawakened at 4 o’clock in the morningnot by a radio alarm clock, but by abomb under the bed. We immediatelysaid, “What the hell are they doing,these murderers?” This did not lead usto study what happened in 1915. On thecontrary, we only felt a very strong reac-tion vis-á-vis the killing of totally inno-cent people, the diplomats.

Later, and especially after Turkey’scandidacy became official in 1999, westarted reading publications by TanerAkcam and some members of theArmenian diaspora, and we came tolearn that a lot had happened in 1915–16.

But with the passing of time, theword “genocide” was so frequently pro-nounced that two parallel alleys devel-oped among us: the first was learningabout what happened in 1915 and thesecond was reacting to the word “geno-cide.” Because for the Armenian, “geno-cide” means one thing: 1915. But for theTurk, “genocide” means one thing also:1933–45. That simply means that Turksfelt the Armenians were telling them,“Your grandfather was a Nazi.”

On the other hand, a wing of thediaspora was (and is) trying to obstructTurkey’s candidacy to the EU. This was(and is) totally unacceptable for usTurkish democrats because this candi-dacy was (and is) the very occasion thathad permitted us to learn things thatwere concealed from us until then. Thelaws called “EU Harmonization Pack-ages” enacted between 2001–04 havebeen a benediction for democracy inTurkey, and they were made possiblethanks to seeing a light at the other endof the tunnel. By this I mean member-ship in about 15 years.

To sum up, this is a very typical caseof dialectics: The diaspora has taughtus, the Turkish democrats, what our“grandfathers” have done, and by thesame token the diaspora has prevented(and is preventing) us passing it on toour people. People block their earswhen they here the “g-word.” I person-ally have no objection to the horrors of1915 being called “crimes againsthumanity,” for instance. But this word isdefinitely counterproductive in Turkey.

The diaspora ended its terrorist tac-tics when the Orly bombing causedapprehension in the Western world andstarted the “Armenian bills.” Very clev-erly so. But in this particular case, thediaspora was not able to change thatendless tape of “It was genocide” andreplace it with more sophisticated dis-course, so it prevents us from teachingour people the facts.

Well, what about understanding theArmenian state of mind also, youwould say. Don’t worry about it; weknow how it is because we read about itand we learned about it from Armeni-ans of Turkey like Hrant. We know whythis word is sacrosanct. It’s because theArmenians were not able to mourn

their dead freely so this is the only wayto get satisfaction. They will never beable to get rid of a sentiment of revengeas long as the Turkish state continuesdenying the facts. I don’t know aboutthe other parts of the world but in theMiddle East, mourning your deadopenly is the only way you can get itout of your system. This is a sheer fact.

But let us not forget what Hrant, themost important student of Turkish-Armenian relations, had said: “BothTurks and Armenians are sick; the formerbecause of paranoia, the latter because oftrauma.” The Muslims destroyed theArmenians (and civilization in Anatoliaas well) and now deny everything. Thismakes the Armenians sick. And theArmenians are right now playing an end-less tape, and that makes the Turks sick.

K. M. Talk about the Armenian issuein the context of the wider problem of“silences” in Turkey.

B.O. The Turkish state and the Ottomanstate have never looked for rational solu-tions to major problems: from 1915 on,the Armenian massacres; from 1924 on,the Islam issue; from 1925 on, the Kur-dish issue; since the 1950’s, the Cyprusissue. We Turks have a habit of stuffingthose dead bodies in the closet, as theFrench say, or sweeping them under thecarpet, as the Turks say. And of coursethere, they rotted and started to stink.Now, they are coming out of the closet allat once, mainly because we are trying toenter the EU and we have to face allthose issues one by one, without whichwe cannot claim that we are Europeans.But we are scared to death. At least threezombies are chasing us.

This is one of the things that the EUand the Armenian side should be ableto comprehend. In the Armenian mind,there is one issue only; but in the Turk-ish mind, there are several problematicissues that need to be resolved. Andthey are linked to each other. Once youdecide to solve a problem, you have toopen your mind, and once you openyour mind, all things will enter.

This is, of course, our fault. We neversolved anything. But if Armenians, EUpeople, etc. don’t comprehend this, allsides will continue to suffer for a longtime and for nothing. Now, if the hawk-ish wing of the diaspora prefers tolengthen the suffering for reasons of itsown, which is understandable, it’s anoption of course. But I doubt it’s thegood one.

K. M. Talk about Turkey’s relationswith Armenia. On several occasions,you have talked about a missed oppor-tunity in 2000.

B. O. At the end of 2000, the Ministryof Foreign Affairs, the most rationalstate structure in Turkey because it’sthe most Westernized, proposed a planto start to solve the Armenian problemin three initial stages: 1) The bordertrade with Armenia would be encour-aged. Harbor facilities (Trabzon, prob-ably) and other economic benefitswould be provided to alleviate Arme-nia’s economic hardship in order todiminish the influence of hardliners; 2)A process would be set in motion todiscuss the Armenian massacres withinan academic framework; 3) The prob-lems of the Armenian minority inTurkey would be addressed.

Behind this was the thought of nor-malizing life in Armenia and thereforegetting Armenians ready to have nor-mal relations with Turkey. And this waythe pressure on Turkey would ease.

Nationalism is the ideology of badtimes. If you are enduring hardship,you become a nationalist. It’s like ananalgesic. Therefore, now both sidesfeel pressured, and if they have bettereconomic relations both will be betteroff. People are leaving Kars just as theyare leaving Armenia. So why not openthe border, enabling Armenia to getcheaper goods and Kars producers tomake money. This is a win-win situa-tion. But Prime Minister Bulent Ecevitkilled the proposal, saying, “Let us firstask Azerbaijan.” Of course, you canguess what Azerbaijan answered, andthe proposal was killed. Now that Azer-baijani oil is flowing to Mersin it’s evenmore difficult economically.

I personally am of the opinion thatany solution will start by a normaliza-tion of relations between Turkey andArmenia. But there are obstacles to it.I’ll just name them but will not dwellon them: 1) public opinion in Turkey; 2)Azerbaijan; 3) the Armenian diaspora.

If anyone is expecting Turkey toabide by the wishes of the Armenians ata clack of their fingers, this will nothappen. It must go in stages.

K. M. Talk about the road leading to1915.

B. O. Turks should learn about whathappened in 1915 and accept the facts.On the other hand, as 1915 did not start

8—The Armenian Weekly SATURDAY, JULY 12, 2008FEATURES

Baskin Oran“That much ignorance is only possible with education.”

L to R: Hrant Dink and his wife, Rakel; Oran’s wife, Feyhan; EtyenMahcupyan and Baskin Oran in Bodrum, Feb. 2006.

L to R: Journalist (and current editor of Agos) Etyen Mahcupyan,Baskin Oran and Hrant Dink in the garden of the Ecclesia (Greekchurch), Gumusluk, Bodrum, Feb. 2006.

An Interview with

in 1915, Armenians should learn moreabout the period from the 1850’s on.

In the mid-1850’s, the Muslim Circas-sians were driven out of Christian Rus-sia upon the defeat of Sheikh Shamil. Ina miserable way they took refuge in theOttoman Empire. The easiest way forthem to feed themselves was to pillagepeople who had something and whowere not protected, and these were theArmenians of eastern Anatolia, who alsohappened to be Christian.

Almost at the same era, the Kurdsstarted doing the same. The Kurdishtribal leaders had revolted (1806–43)against the centralizing policies of theTanzimat and were beaten at the end.The last and most powerful of them,Bedirhan Bey, was exiled to Crete.Then, the Kurds lost their tribal hierar-chy and, as a consequence, started tocut the hen that laid golden eggsinstead of continuing to do what theyhave been doing for centuries: collectthe golden eggs once a year, meaningcollect the yearly “protection money”from the Armenians who were muchwealthier and much weaker than theMuslims for a variety of reasons.

Under the pressure of the emigratedCircassians and the Kurds, the Armeni-ans made their grievances known toIstanbul—to the Armenian Patriarchateand the Amira (the Armenian bour-geoisie and nobles who were in verygood terms with the administration),and to the sultan. Neither of them cared.The Patriarchate would care only afterKhrimian, from Sivaz, became Patriarch(and this is why the Armenian questionis also the product of a class struggle).The sultan would have cared, but he wasin an even worse situation than thePatriarch. He could not possibly give theKurds, fellow Muslims, the impressionthat he was protecting the non-Muslimsagainst the Muslims, especially becausethe Muslims of the empire were alreadyvery hysterical about the egalitarian dis-course of Tanzimat. Also, the Westernpowers had happily started using thegrievances of the eastern AnatolianArmenians to interfere with the domes-tic affairs of the empire: The famous“Eastern Question” became nothing butthe “Armenian Question.”

In this mess, the Armenian pettybourgeois youth, already imbued withnationalist and also narodnik/anarchistideology in places like Saint Petersburg,Paris, Geneva, etc., found that the onlyway of surviving was to set up revolu-tionary bands and parties, and attackMuslim villages. This further provokedboth the Muslims of eastern Anatoliaand the sultan. Whether or not theyintended to, the Armenian revolution-aries perfectly reminded the adminis-tration in Istanbul of the “BulgarianModel,” i.e., the tactics of setting uparmed clashes to attract the attention ofthe Great Powers, and to obtain auton-omy first and independence later.

Therefore, just as there is more thanone zombie for Turkey now, there wasmore than one specter for the OttomanEmpire: the Russians in the East (calledMoskof, despised and feared); and theWestern powers (each one of whichwanted to get the lion’s share from anempire destined to dismember one dayor the other). Not counting the economicproblems, of course.

Under these circumstances, Abdul-hamid, a master of balance, thought he

could find a solution by founding in1890 the Hamidiye Regiments to killfour birds with one stone: to suppressArmenian upheavals; render happyMuslims alienated by Tanzimat; breedrivalry between the Kurds (only Sunniand selected tribes were admitted); andalso deprive the Great Powers of anyexcuses for intervention.

Then the real plight of the Armeni-ans started in eastern Anatolia. Untilthen, the massacres were sporadic andlocal in nature, and also mutual,although asymmetrical. When the regi-ments were started, the killing wasinstitutionalized.

The state kills when there’s an armedrising. But the Ottoman state was harsherwhen it came to the non-Muslims—espe-cially if they were conceived as being an“instrument” of the outside Christianpowers. I must remind you that the latterused the “Eastern Question” and then for-got all about the Armenians in the Treatyof Lausanne.

Everything was made even worsewhen the CUP entered the scene, addingits Turkist and even Touranist ideology tothese fears. Several things were workingtogether to annihilate the Armenians,starting with the panic prevalent in theminds of the CUP officials. As the resultof the Balkan War of 1912 especially, theempire had shrunk to a mere Anatoliaand “now the Armenians are selling it tothe Russians,” though the CUP officials.

To sum up: 1915 was a disgrace tohumanity. But it did not start in 1915.The period 1839–1915 must be studiedas a whole. The Turks are avoiding 1915,and the Armenians are avoiding theperiod leading to it. Nothing should beavoided.

K. M. For decades, you have been atthe forefront of the struggle for humanrights and democracy in Turkey,against all odds. What kept and keepsyou going?

B. O. My conscience, of course. Well,also my expertise on nationalism andminorities.

But this does not mean that I wasborn like that from my mother. On thecontrary, I was very much under theinfluence of Turkish nationalism (SakalliCelal!) well until the 80’s, although Ibecame a leftist while studying atMulkiye (Faculty of Political Science). In1982, I think, I first started working onthe Turks of W. Thrace, Greece. Thisminority enjoyed protection under Arti-cle 45 of the Lausanne Treaty, which saidthat the rights given to non-Muslims inTurkey (Articles 37 to 43) would alsoapply to Muslims in Greece. Would youbelieve that at that time I was not awareof the situation of non-Muslims inTurkey? That’s how I came to learn slowlyabout the non-Muslims and the Kurds.

Now, for me and my democrat friendsthe circle of the “oppressed andexcluded” is even larger. We were able toput this into action during our “CommonIndependent Left Candidate” campaignat the parliamentary elections of July2007. There we said at least three thingsunheard of before. We said, “When theleft became known in Turkey in thebeginning of the 60’s, it spoke only for theproletariat, the working class. In the 70’s,we hesitantly added a second oppressedand excluded element (despite our-selves, because we were staunch Kemal-

ists): the Kurds. But after the 80’s, newcategories of oppressed and excludedpeoples came into being, or came to ourattention: the Alevis, the non-Muslims,the Roma, the homosexuals . . . Now, tobe able to say that we are leftist, we haveto be the spokespeople for all theseoppressed and excluded categories.”

We also said the following, which, tomy mind, was even more original: “Sofar, all these excluded and oppressedpeople defended their kind only. Nowthey have to defend not themselves buteach other. This is the only way they cansave themselves from being excludedand oppressed: The socialist will defendthe Kurd, the Kurd the Armenian, theArmenian the homosexual, the homo-sexual the Alevi, the Alevi the Roma, etc.”I must remind you that this approachwas very much in line with Hrant’sapproach.

The third thing we said during thecampaign (and it brings me to mypoint): “We also call upon people whoare not oppressed and excluded, butwho have a conscience.” That’s wherethe conscience comes in.

I am a white Turk. A Turk does notmean an ethnic Turk in Turkey. It meansa Muslim Turk (because the Millet sys-tem, which was legally abolished in1839, is still prevalent in the minds of allMuslims). A Turkish WASP needs evenmore qualifications to be a maqbulTurk, that is to say a Turk that is welltrusted and liked by the establishment.This Turk has to be Hanefi (and notShafi—most Kurds are Shafi); has to beSunni (against Alevis); Muslim (againstnon-Muslim); and Turk (against thosewho do not say they are Turks). On topof all these qualifications, you also haveto be a secularist.

I am a white Turk, but with a con-science. All those who have a clean con-science should act like this. I gainnothing from being an advocate ofhuman and minority rights in Turkey.All I get is trouble. I was kicked out ofthe civil service four times during twomilitary coups. The first time was in1971, and I came back in a year or so oncourt order. At the end of 1982, I waskicked out three times and each time Icame back with a court order. Now, I amhaving security cameras and barbedwire installed to my home. But if I don’tspeak and write as I do now, how can Isleep? How can I look in the mirror?How can I face my wife? It’s as simple asthat, [while] defending Armenian rightsin the U.S. or France is a piece of cake!

K. M. You mentioned the court. Howdo you feel about the courts in Turkeytoday?’

B. O. It’s all upside-down now. Peopleshow their real face or stance in times ofhardship and fear. The judiciary inTurkey feels threatened. That was notthe case during the coup in 1971. Andonce the effect of the 1980 coup passed,they were instrumental in bringing peo-ple like me back to their work—applyingthe laws, nothing else. Now they feelthreatened by all the zombies. In Turk-ish we have a saying, “If the salt stinks,then there’s nothing to do.” Now thejudiciary is the salt. When people likeme were kicked out of their jobs, thejudiciary was the last resort. Now thejudiciary applies to me Articles 216 and301/2 because I wrote a report entitled

“Minority and Cultural Rights,” a reportrequired by Article 5 of the bylaws of theConsultative Council on Human Rightsattached to the prime ministry. We justtook our job seriously.

What I’ll say is that accusation underArticle 301/2 (denigrating the judiciary)is funny (I wrote very extensively aboutit all in the Regent Journal of Interna-tional Law), but 216 is unbelievable.This article was promulgated amongthe EU Harmonization Packages inorder to stop hate speech against thedisadvantaged . . . and they applied it tome (“dissemination of hatred andgrudge among people”).

Maybe you have noticed that thereis a great resemblance between theconditions in 1914 and 2008 in Turkeyfrom the point of view of perceivedfear. The subjects of the fear are ofcourse very different, but the strongperception is the same: Zombies willeat us. Zombies of “Islamism,” “Kur-dism,” and “genocide” nowadays.

In a way, all this fuss is to trying tosubstitute for the fear caused by com-munism, which unfortunately is nolonger there. But this is not “because ofeducation” only (Sakalli Celal again).People on the street also strongly feelvery insecure as a result of the deepeconomic, social, and political changein the country.

Turkey is undergoing the secondmodernizing revolution of its history.The first one, under the name ofKemalism, had happened in the 1920’s.It permitted a transition from a semi-feudal empire to a modern nation-state, from community to nation, fromthe subject of the sultan to the citizenof the republic. Now Turkey is in thedifficult process of completing thismetamorphosis: Making a pass fromthe monist nation-state, assimilator,and/or discriminator by definition, to ademocratic state; from an ethnicallyand religiously-defined nation to theconcept of citizenship defined by freechoice of the individual; from the citi-zen who was “compulsory” because thestate denied his infra-identity, to a citi-zen whose infra identity is recognizedand respected by the state. This is hap-pening thanks to the hope related tothe Turkish candidacy to the EU.

The most interesting thing in all ofthis is the radical change of the posi-tion of the actors: The revolution fromabove of Kemalists had met a religiousreaction from Islam in the 20’s. Now thesecond revolution meets the national-ist reaction of the Kemalists under thename of Sevres Paranoia. This para-noia, I already spoke about it, is mainlycharacterized by Islamic, Kurdish,genocide discourse. The CHP (People’sRepublic Party) and the Turkish armyare the spokespersons behind it.

Therefore, the second revolution ismore difficult than the first onebecause the Kemalists, victors of a lib-eration war, had no organized oppo-nents against them in an autocraticsetting. But today the sons of the then-revolutionary Kemalists are trying hardto keep all things like they were in 1930.

But thanks to the emerging civilsociety that did not exist before, thesecond revolution has a lot of chances.Against some odds, of course: Someunbelievable mistakes of the Islamists,terror of the PKK, and the endless tapeof a wing of the diaspora.

SATURDAY, JULY 12, 2008 The Armenian Weekly —9FEATURES

I gain nothing from being an advocate of human and minority rights in

Turkey. All I get is trouble . . . Now, I am having security cameras and barbed

wire installed to my home. But if I don’t speak and write as I do now, how can

I sleep? How can I look in the mirror? How can I face my wife?”

“