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Mcthodolegy ( 107 )
Chapter VII
The Anumana.
Anumana or inference is defined as the instrument of
judgment or inferential knowledge. 1 When finding smoke rising
from a hill, we remember that since smoke cannot be without
fire, and thus come to the conclusion that there must also be
fire on the hill, it is an Anumana. Here from the knowledge
of the observed mark ( Linga ) we get the knowledge of the thing possessing it. Anumli.na is the process of ascertaining,
not by perception or direct observation, but through the
instrumentality or medium of a mark, that a thing possesses a
certain character.
In inference what is perceived points to something else,
not perceived, with which it is connected. 2 The basis of infereace
1 '' aT .:~f+rfa<ti{IJJ+J'I''l'Fil{ 1 '' T arka-sangraha, p. 34. ... ... 2 " ~~~T f~~-tt~~~~ '"ll~(~~lS'-11~~'11~~ I '' Vatsyayana-bha~ya on ... '\ "'
Gautama's Nyaya-~iitra, p. 16.
Methodology ( 108)
1s an observed fact. So it ts also defined as knowledge which
is preceded by perception. 1 Vatsyayana holds that no inference
can follow in the absence of perception. Thus inference is
knowledge that follows other knowledge. Inference operates
neither with regard to things unknown, nor with regard to
those known definitely for certain; it functions only with regard
to things that are doubtful. 2
In the process of inference there is, first, the knowledge
or apprehension of smoke, which is associated as a mark ( Liilga
or Hetu ) with the hill, which is the subject with reference to
which something is inferred ( Pak~J. ). Secondly, there is the
recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance ( Vyapti) between smoke and fire as we have observed in the past.
After the consideration of the mark as possessed by the subject,
111 relation with the invariable concomitance, there results,
thirdly, the knowledge of the existence of the unperceived fire
in the hill which is intended to be inferred ( Sadhya ). This
process of inference is called consideration of the mark ( Liilga
paramarsa ). So Anumana is also defined as Linga-paramarsa. 11
1 " tri'liiSIJIUI(~~E'-1 ~'ili:~'-1 Sl faq~'(~'~Tirll 1 " \" atsyayana-bha~ya
on Gautama's NyAya-siitra, p. 127.
2 " ~ ~CRS~ if ~offasif o:~'-'= Sl<fda, Ai aft, ~f"'~s~ 1 " Vatsyayana-bhafta on Gautama's Nyaya-siitra, p, 3.
Methodology ( 109)
To make a correct inference, the follow!ng five conditions
must be fulfilled:- ( 1 } The Hetu or Linga must be present
in the Pak~a ( Pak~a-sattva ). ( 2} It must be present in all
other known objects similar to the Pak~a, in having the Sadhya
in it ( Sapak~a-sattva ). ( 3) It must not be present in any such
object as does not possess the Sadhya ( Vipak~a-vyavrtti }.
( 4 ) The inferred assertion should not be· such that it is invali
dated by direct perception or testimony of the Sastra ( Abadhita
vi~ayatva ). ( 5) The Linga should not be such that by it an
inference in the opposite way could also be possible ( Asat
pratipakfatva ). 1
In the process of inference appn;:hension of Vyapti or
invariable concomitance has a very great importance. It cannot
be said that Vyapti necessarily depends n pon the relation of
identity ( Tadatmya) between the Linga and the Sadhya, nor the
relation of causation ( Tadutpattitva ) between them, though in
some cases of concomitance these relations may be existing.
For the apprehension of Vyapti, it is sufficient, that as a result
of adequate observation one thing is known to accompany the
other invariably, although the inner connection between them
is not demonstrabk. :t Cloven hoofs and horns furnish an example
1 '' aTf"'l qs:"f~qrflf I qf:5'<Hl~~ ~q!S
~t~t~:Ifaqf:5toi ~fa 1 '' Tarka-bhata, p, 41.
2 "~T~"'~frJllm o'1Tfl=r: 1 " Tarka-sarigraha, p. 34.
Methodology ( 110)
of such invariable concomitance. It is therefore quite legitimate
to deduce the presence of the one from the presence of the other.
The process of inference includes both induction and
deduction. 1 In the apprehension of Vyapti we have to depend
upon induction. The Nyaya method of induction can be analysed
into the following steps:-
( 1 ) · Observation of a relation of agreement in presence
( Anvaya) between two things.
( 2 ) Observation of a relation of uniform agreement in
absence ( Vyatireka ) of those things.
( 3 ) Observation of absence of any contrary instances
( Vyabhicaragraha ).
1 cf. " The inference of the Oriental systems was in
no respect on all fours with what we call induction and de
duction. It testifies neither to a passage from the general to
the particular or vice versa, nor to the passage of fact into
law or vice versa. The A11umana, as inference is called,
designates a knowledge ' by connection ', which grasps the
solidarity of two attributes of a single substance ........ but which
nevertheless apprehends them both sim::1ltaneously, the one being
perceived, so to speak, through the other. ''
P. Masson-Oursel ; Comparative Philosophy, p. 145-146.
Methodology ( Ill )
{ 4 ) Elimination of adventitious conditions on which
the relation may depend ( U padhinirasa ).
( 5 ) Indirect proof by the method of reductio ad
absurdum ( Tarka ).
( 6 ) Samanya-lakfal}.a perception, or the intuition involved
m the apprehension of the universals.
Thus in the process of induction Nyaya employs all the
three methods viz. enumeration, indirect proof and intuition.
Inference is said to be of two kinds, v1z. Svartha. or
that which resolves a doubt in one's own mind, and Parartha
or that which does so in another's. 1 In Parartha Anumana a
man intends to demonstrate the truth of the conclusion to
other men. 2 It is couched in language, and takes the form of
a syllogism. It has five members, viz. ( 1 ) Pratijfia or the
proposition, ( 2 ) Hetu or the reason, ( 3 ) U dahara:t;la or the
explanatory examlJle, ( 4 ) Upanaya or the application, and
( 5 ) Nigamana or the statement of the conclusion. 3 Its several
stages are thus expressed :-
1 '' ~~ ft;Jefl[ ~<n~ ~1'1 :q 1 " Tarka·sailgraha, p. 37.
2 11 ~~ ~~li \l'IT~Ji~q;r~ qurfatR~'i q$'q1Cf~iliffcfti sr~~·~ a~r.r-~ *" .... ..:1 "" ...:il
;rr;!il,l " Tarka-sangraha, p. 37.
3 "sr~~UJ1~f~;l¥t;rl .. liC(?:IifT: t " Gautama's Nyaya-siitra,
I. i. 32.
Methodology ( 112)
( 1 ) The hill is fiery. ( Pratijiia ) .
( 2 ) Because it has smoke. ( Hetu ) •
( 3 ) Whatever has smoke has fire, e. g. the kitchen.
( U daharaJ;la ) .
( 4) The hill has smoke, such as is always accompanied
by fire. ( Upanaya ).
( 5) Therefore the hill is fiery. ( Nigamana ).
Inference for the sake of others is rather a formal
exposition, of the process of the movement of thought. In it
the last two members are unnecessary from the stand-point of
logic, though they are useful for debate. So later on the
three-membered syllogism came to be recognised as a valid
syllogistic form.
In inference, as a PramaJ;la, the form was never considered
to be essentially important. If the syllogistic form is described
as Anumana, it is only by courtesy. The verbal view of logic
was never accepted in Indian philosophy. It was never for
gotten that the subject matter of logic is thought and not, in
any sense, the linguistic forms in which it may find expression. 1
So the inference arrived at by a syllogism, even by dropping
the third member, was considered to be valid, since the
1 Hiriyanna : Outlines of Indian P~ilosophy, p. 255.
Methodology ( 113)
general proposition IS implied m the reason. This form
corresponds to enthymeme, and is found much in use in the
treatises of Indian philosophy. This explains why Vada does
not necessarily require argumentation through the method of
Five Factors of reasoning, as mentioned before.
Another classification describes inference as of three kinds,
viz. Purvavat, Se~avat and Sci.manyato-dr~~a. 1 Purvavat is the
inference of the effect from the cause, e. g. that of rain
from clouds. Se~avat is the inference of the cause from the
effect. Samanyato-dr~ta is the inference in all cases other than
those of cause and effect. This classification is given by Gautama
and is accepted by other early writers of Nyaya.
The new school of logic gives still another classification
of Anumana. According to these Naiyayikas inference is of
three kinds according as its Linga is ( 1 ) Anvaya-vyatireki,
( 2 ) Kevalanvayi or ( 3 ) Kavala-vyatireki. The first IS an
inference where the invariable concomitance is observed in all
instances by agreement both in presence and absence. 1 The
second is arrived at through the method of agreement in presence
only, as there is no negative instance of their agreement in
1 :t a:Jtl Q~~cti f?lfq\1'~ '{c"f<r~tilq~JIItritm :q 1 " Gautama's
Nyaya-siitra, I. i. 5.
2 " a:Jo:c(~"l c~M~ur :q ~TfR~~o~f~Pfi 1 " Tarka-sangraha, p. 40.
Methodology ( 114)
absence; as for example the inference- ' the pot is nameable,
since it is knowable. ' 1 The third is arrived at by means of
a Vya.;ti only through the method of agreement in absence,
since there is no instance of agreement in presence; as for
example the inference- ' the earth is different from other ele·
ments, since it has smell. 1 2 This classification is more logical
inasmuch as it is based on the nature of induction by which
we get the knowledge of Vyapti, on which the inference depends.
The N yay a school is chiefly responsible for the systematic
development of the theory of Anumana, and the contribution of
this system to the topic is so great that other systems of Indian
philosophy tacitly accept the general structure of the Nyaya
theory in this respect, only occasionally suggesting innovatiom;
for harmonising it to their tenets or for making it more conve
nient for the proofs of their doctrines.
In the Vaise{!ika system, the Ka:Q.ada.sutras show the
beginnings of the logical theory of inference. In this work, the
knowledge of concomitance between Hetu and Sadhya was
assumed but the idea seems to be more loose than the technical
1 " ~7:1;n'Ji~C?:IlfH~ iti~Cif~ ~til ~i'rsfl1~?;j: Slit?;j(Cffiq~CIQ, I '' Tarka
sailgraha, ?· 40.
2 '' ~fa~olflftt<i itiCfii5o?;jftl'tf.t; ?;j~l 'l~~a't~) ~a ttr'C{CI~CIH\ 1 ''
Tarka·sangraha, p. 40.
.. -
Methodology ( 115 )
Vyapti of the Nyaya theory. 1 The types of inferences referred
to by Kal}.ada are (1) inference of non-existence of some things from
the existence of some other things, ( 2 ) of the existence of some
things from the non-existence of some other things, ( 3 ) of the
existence of some things from the existence of others.
Later on, however, the Vaise~ika and the Nyaya developed hand
in hand, so the theory of inft~rence mentioned before was the
one accepted by the combined N yaya-Vaise~ika system.
According to the Sail~hyas, inference is divided into
two kinds, viz. Vita and Avita. Vita inference is based on
affirmative concomitance and is sub-divided into Purvavat and
Samanyato-dn~a. Avita inference is based on negative concomi
tance and corresponds to the S(~.lvat variety of the Nyaya
system. 2 The five-membered form of the syllogism is admitted.
Vyapti, which is constant concomitance, is the result of obser
vation of the agreement in presence and the non-observation of
the presence of one while the c.ther is absent.
The Sankhyas utilize the Samanyato-dr~ta variety of
inference in transcendental matters, and thus restrict the scope
of Vedic testimony considerably. For instance, through such
1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,
p .. 304.
2 II :r:JJ;cp.J'I~ Sl~ilJ;j fq\ll~ili q1d~ I ;~f~itiliJR~Of Sl~Hlill<i f~'<1'i'lCftQ+{ I . ' ~ -
Vacaspati Misra: Tattva-kaumudi, p. 11.
Methodology ( 116)
inference the existence of supersensuous Pralqti is postulated.
Sailkhyas appeal to the authority of scripture only where not
even this type of inference is possible.
The Yoga theory of inference is similar to that of the
Sailkhya system, and has nothing special about it. Like the
latter it accepts the theory of mental modification, and hence
inference is the mental modification through which we cognise
the generic nature of objects.
In the Mirnai}lsa, with respect to Anumana there is a
general resemblance with the Nyaya-Vaisel;ltka. Its theory about
inductive generalization ( Vyapti ) etc. is similar to that of the
Nyaya system. According to Sahara when a certain fixed or
permanent relation has been known to exist between two things,
we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is
perceived. This kind of knowledge is called inference. 1 He
divides inferences into two kinds, viz. Pratyak~1to·dn~a, when
the invariable relation holds between objects which are
perceptible, and Samanyato-dH~a, where the relation is not
apprehended by the senses, but known only as general notions.
The first corresponds to the Piirva vat & Sel;la vat varieties of
N yaya, while the second to the Samanyato-dr~ta.
Cinnasvamisastri: Tantrasiddhanta-ratnavali, p. 57.
Methodology ( 117 J
As regards the number of members necessary for the
explicit statement of the process of inference for convincing
others, both Kumarila and Prabhakara hold that only three viz.
Pratijiia, Hetu and· Dr~~ii.nta are quite sufficient.
Sankarii.cii.rya has not discussed the nature of Anumana,
since according to the Vedanta theory it is of very little impor·
tance. in metaphysical matters. In this respect we have mainly
to depend on the writers who followed his views. The
Advaita theory of inference 1s very much similar to that of the
Bhii.Ha school of M1mii.yp3ii..
According to the Advaita view, Anumana is a kind of
means for Parok~a or mediate knowledge. It is of the nature of
a Vrtti of the internal organ in which the Sii.k~in is immanent. 1
Inference is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance,
acting ·through specific past impression~, roused on a perceptual
cognition. In this system the nature of concomitance is altogether
subjective; inference has no material validity, but only subjectiv~
and formal validity. s
1 M. Hiriyanna : Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 145.
2 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. It
p. 473.
Methodolog7 ( 118)
The nction of concomitance being altogether subjective,
the Advaita Vedanta docs not emphasize the necessity of
perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases. Even
one case of concomitance is regarded as being sufficient for making
an inference, Thus seeing the one case of appearence, e. g.
silver in the conch-shelJ, to be false, we can infer that all
things except Brahman are false.
As is argued by Sri-har~a, Advaita Vedanta does not sub
scribe to the Nyaya view that, for the establishment of invariable
concomitance there must be a mental contact with class-concepts
or universals, whereby an affirmation of all individuals of
a class without experiencing them all becomes possible.
According to the Vedanta such mental contact with the class
concept need not he the basis of a Vyapti. 1 It does not
recognise the Samanya-lak~at;ta perception at all. 1
In the same way it is pointed out that Tarka or
eli min a tory consideratio!! cannot be the basis of forming
Vyapti. It may only be helpful in judging the possibilities. a
1 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II,
p. 139. 2 " lf!~re'lil ~f~~f<'ail~:::( ~~voi ef~<t;q il~lfi:qst;: I " ... ...
Jhalkikar: Nyaya-kda, p. 1015. 3 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II,
p. 140.
:rrreth'odology ( 119 )
Advaita Vedanta accepts only the concomitance expressed
in a universal affirmative proposition. Kevalii.nvayi and Kevala
vyatireki inferences arc not accepted in this system.l The
chssification of inferences as Svartha and Parirtha finds its
place here also. The latter type of inference has only the
first three or the last three members instead of five as in Nyaya.
In Anumana, even though the mind functions through
its modification, the Pramar;:ta does not give immediate knowledge.
Inferential knowledge is mediated through relation with the
Liilga or reason. 2 Though mediate it is none the less knowledge
just like perception, since its nature is manifestation of the
object. The difference between perception and inference is that
in inference the inferred object does not form a datum and there
is no direct and immediate contact of the inner organ with
the inferred object. In inference the inner organ is in touch
only ·with the reason or Linga and through this there arises an
idea in the mind which is called inference"
Sankaracarya 1s fully aware that inference cannot be
helpful as a means for the knowledge of a super-sensuous
entity like Brahman. He has frequently stated that the purpose
·1. S. · Radhakrishn~n: Indian Philosophy, Vol. II,
p. 493-494.
2 S. Dasgupta: A ·history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II,
p. 106.
.....
Methodology ( 1~0)
of Brahma-sutra is not to establish the nature of Brahman by
means of logical arguments. He asserts that the nature of
Brahman can be known through U panifJ.ds only. 1
The Vedanta Sutras can claim only to interpret the
revealed sayings of the U pani~adic texts; they do not intend to
advance independent inferences not warranted by Sruti texts.
The Sfttras merely afford opportunities to collect the material
from Sruti for thought and discussion, consequent on which.
Olnd not simply due to inference and other PramfiQas, there
springs up the knowledge of Brahman. 2 Inference is welcomed
and is considered to be a serviceable instrument of knowledge,
if it is brought forward to strengthen the conclusions of Srutis.•
BadarayaQa himself has asserted the futility of logical
reasoning or Anumfina in super-sensuous matters in his Siitra:-
6'fitqffisor~1~t1.1•7.i'tr-j_il7.if'lfa ~~q~1.ifq+i'r~~ell: l • In commenting on this
Sankaracarya eloquently makes it clear, how inferential conclusions
cannot come to finality. He is aware that reasoning affords
1 .. a~,n~·~'!.? ~"'la1Rt1.iltl1.11~~'1.ilf'tfll+r: 1 '' Brahma .. sfttra Sankara
bha,ya, I I. i. 27. 2 11 ~~t•a<tt'f':nfot fq: ~~h~Tf;;E1.i fq:qT~o:a 1 qr<f~ttif~:;;n~un~7.f'l6t~fot~~t
f{ Jilll<ltt!a<~i•un~T~tr+nuwad<t~"'ll '' Brahma-sfttra Sankara-bha~ya, I. i. 2 . ..:. .
3 " ~~~"' ~ 6(11-i(il"f a~1.il~~'Ctat<rn{ l " Brahma-siitra Sankara·
bh~ya, I. i. 2. 4 Brahma-siitra, II. l· 11.
Methodo1o'' ( 121 J
permanent scope for correction of already admitted propositions, t
but he makes it clear that only this much is not sufficient to
arrive at right knowledge. Though reasoning may appear to
hold good in certain cases, still with regard to the unfathomable
nature of Reality, it is of no use unless it is backed up by
Sruti. 2 S.1il~ara.:iirya rightty points out th1.t even when the
ordinary things such as gems and herbs produce different
opposite effects on different o~casions and in different placei
and times, and thereby baffle the intellect of man if it is not
properly instructed, it must be much more difficult to fathom
the powers of Brahman by mere intellect.
So according to Sailkadkarya reasoning cannot be applied
to what is unthinkable; we must resort to Sruti alone to know
the super-sensuous. 3 Brahman is neither the object of perception
nor of inference; it has neither form nor sound to be seen or
heard, nor any sign en account of ·which it is to be inferred.~
1 '' at~W-1 a~~"t~1iTU ~~f'af10acci ~~'' 1 ~ f( m~~a~q~~~Ti'lwt f<lH~~a~:
srfatre•~) 11<rfu 1 '' Brahma-siitra Sailkara-bha~ya, I I. i. 11.
2 " wt {t~qfalJ'ij\'( lll'fi.IT'llc'li '!fmF-IiJ•'l~llllftJ'fi'citiJf1c'lf\lliJ~ ~if'.lil. 1 ''
Brahma-siitra Sailkara-bhafya, I I. i. 11.
3 " a~qJ•iJ·~~ ~iitftfil'1.1'f'i-!Ut~H~?.Ilf'clrur: l " Brahma-siitra Sankara
bha~ya, I I. i. 27.
4 II ~qlflq'[qJf~ OITq'Pl: Sl~qttJll')~{:, fts~llfl!~l''f
Brahma-siitra Sankara-bh~ya, II. i. 11.
Methodology ( 122 )
~ankaradi.rya is fully a ware that C()nclusions arrived at
by reasoning or inferences may vary according to the abilities
of the reasoners. That is why from the same data different
conclusions are arrived at by different logicians. As the subjective
factor influences the conclusions of reasoning, Sankaracarya is
not prepared to accept that inference can be of any use for
the knowledge Brahman. Mok~a is impossible to be attained by
any other means except through the right kind of knowledge
given to us by U pani~ads.
SJ.nkaradi.rya points out that Anumiina has no scope
for establishing the validity of scripture. 1 Scripture being a
Pramal}.a which produces new, uncontradicted and unambiguous
knowledge is self-valid. 2 It does not require any other means
to prove its validity. So he declares that Upanifads are valid,
even though they do not enjoin actions like other portions of
the Veda. 3 The authoritativeness of the U panifads cannot be
made dependent on instances observed elsewhere.
Though Sankaraciirya
metaphysical matters, he
I. i. 4.
denies validity for
docs not thereby
reasoning tn
preclude this
2 11 aTill~Ol~f"liltn~f~l'tf'll~\fl;JCf.t~ f( ~'flUT~<f ll''llUflrtt Q'i:q' ~"tl ~~q .. .. "fl~(llf 1 '' Va-:aspati-misra : Bhamatl, p. 65. . ....
3 11 ~'-JC~r~?{ ~<:_i!lif<-tl~j fqf"cUilq~~i(I'Uf ll''flUH<{ rt ti', ~'fl~tc'lfCI:uTiltll q:j~qlo:mcn~ 6ft;:t.~~t~ ~1~{~ Sll'll"zi ~if~ ll'~~l~~l~~ 1" Brahma-siitra Sankarabha~ya, .I. i. 4.
Methodology ( 123}
important means of knowledge from· the. province of philosophy.
The spirit of inquiry, the spirit of affording constant scope
for examining and re-examining the postulates in the light of
newer and newer propositions, the spirit of constant questioning
for the attainment of truth 1s a principle on which
philosophising prides itself. Sankarfi.:li.rya, though not prepared
to give finality to reasc..ning, does not hamper this spirit of
inquiry. He affords due scope for all means of knowledge in
their proper spheres.
Sankaracli.rya ts an astute logician, as is revealed by
even a superficial examination of his Bha~ya. None can doubt
his staunch faith in the revealed nature and the infallibility of
the Srutis.J. None can also doubt his sincerity when he states
that his doctrine is purely based on the authority of U pani~1.dic
texts and that he thinks that he is only the interpreter of th~
BadarayaQ.a Sutras, which illustrate, investigate and remove the
doubts in the Vedanta texts. 2 Granting all this, there remains the
fact that Sankaracarya has given a new turn to the whole inter
pretation of the Vedanta by his genius which shows astounding
logical acumen, but which is not. accepted by many as a
faithful interp. etation.
·~ ..
Brahma-sii:ra S.lil cara-bh5fya, I. i. 3.
2 11 ~pu 'ifl1.11l~a e~~t it~-=ar.~t a'-11 Cf~'R~t ~'l~!li~llhn~t Sl~ilfll'~: 1 " Brahma-sutra Sail~ara-bhft;a, Introduction.
Methodology ( 12 4 )
In order to i11ustrate the above remarks, a few instances
may be cited. The introductory part of his commentary,
called Adhyasa Bhatya, clearly shows his power of subtle
reasoning and his ability to arr: ve at inferences irrefutable by
severe and critical counter-reasoning. As this part is an
Utsfitra Bhafya, a discussion not based on any Sfltra, it plausibly
raises the doubt, whether the view·p::>int arrived at by Sankaracii.rya
is purely based on a studious interpretation of the Prasthana
trayi or is also the outcome of his subjective cogitation. 1 The
rigour of his reasoning here as well as through-out his Bha{lya
has driven his opponents to impute him with the charge of
foisting his own view-point on the BadarayaJ;la Sutras instread
of faithfully interpreting them.
The second Pada of the second Adhyaya in his Bha~ya
is also noteworthy in this connection. Sankaracarya has copiously
quoted U pani~adic texts in all parts of his Bhfifya, except
this Pada called the Tarka Pada. , ; Herein he does not depend \ .
on scriptural authority at all. This portion is purely logical.
In this he refutes the theories of antagonistic philosophers on
their own grounds, by showing their internal contradictions. In
refuting the tenets of different antagonistic philosophical systems;
1 cf. Govindananda's attempt to prove that the Adhyasa
Bh~ya is a regular part of the Bha~ya- 11 -g;ij;f ~Jqfmtlt<rT~e
~·~) ot "115llf~Jfa fot~~tlll.l " Govindananda : Bhii.fya-ratna-prabha, p. 4.
Methodology ( 125 )
by means of pure reasoning, s~n!{ara::arya proves hi~self sup:!r~ as a logician. From his arguments we find that he is endowed
with asto:mding power of subtle analysis and marvelous insight
in fundamental principles. He is quite an adept in using inference
as a means of proof and three-membered syllogistic form as a
weapon of argumentation.
Ramanujadi.rya did not write any work for propounding
his views of logic consistent with the system of his philosophy.
Some of his followers, however, have revised Gautama's logic
in accordance with the Visi{ltadvaita tradition.
According to the Ramanuja school, inference is the result
of Padi.mar~.l or the knowledge of the existence of reason in the
object. It is a process by which, from universal proposition, we
can make an affirmation regarding a particular case.
The principle of Vyapti is defined as unconditional and
in variable association. It does not
temporal co-existence of the Vyapya
assume the spatial or the
and the Vyapaka. In many
cases of Vyapti sp<itio-temporal co-existence is observed to exist
but that does not exhaust all cases, as for example, the sunset
and the surging sea.l
1 S. Dasgupta: A history of ~ndian Philosophy, Vol. III,
p. 226.
Methodology ( 126)
A single instance is considered to be :sufficient to suggest
the Vyapti or the general proposition. 1 But in order to remove
doubts, a wide experience of concomitance is held to be indis
pensable for the affirmation of a general propo~ition.
In the establishment of Vyapti, we have to make use
of both the positive and negative instances, eliminate the non
essentials and arrive at the right concomitance. This requires
that the obsrrvation of many instances is indispensable for the
formation of Vyapti. 1
RarnAnuja logic admits the necessity of Tarka as an
i:ldispensable means of inferential conclusion, since it helps the
process of forming inductive generalisation. 3
Ramanuja's own intention regarding the types of inference
that may be admitted, seems to be uncertain. From the references
in Sri-bha~ya it appears that he divides the Anumana into
Vi~e.ato-dr~~a and Samanyato-dHta. 4 His followers, however,
accept the classifications as are given by later N aiyayikas,
p. 226.
1 S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 673.
2 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vul. III,
3 S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 673.
4 " if'!1=llif'l'lo:{l{ 1 fC{i\~~ ri UTIW'<I(f) ~i C{J 1 '' Riimanuja : Sri-"'
bha~ya, I. i. 3.
M ethodolagr ( 127 ~
The treatment of inference according to the Rimanuja.
school is very much the same as that in the Nyaya system.
There are, however, certain points in which Vi~i~~advaita ·logic
differs from Nyaya .. One of such important points is the refusal
on the part of the former to accept the Kevala-vyatireki form of
inference, which is admitted by'the latter. Concomitance through
the joint method of agreement and difference ( Anvaya-vyatireki)
and by pure agreement ( Kevalanvayi ) is admitted. 1 It is consi
dered that the Kevala-vyatireki form of inft~rence cannot be
legitimately accepted since inference through mere negative con-
comitance can never lead to the affirmation of any positive
characier. In this connection it may be noted that Yamunacarya
has also rejected the Kevala-vyatireki form of inference.
Inference is always limited to those cases in which
the general proposition has been enunciated on the basis of
experience derived from sensible objects. It cannot be employed
for the affirmation of ultra-sensuous objects, since things
which trans:end the sense cannot be grasped by inference.
Like Sankaracarya, Ramanujacarya also believes that only
scripture is the means of knowing transcendental things.
Inference 1s acceptable merely for strengthening the statemenh
' 1 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III~
p. 228.
Methodology ( 126 J
of scripture. 1 Following BadarayaQ.a, Ramanuja accepts the
inconclusive nature of reasoning.
As inference is based on perception, and is consequently
futile in grasping transcendental things, it cannot be the means
of the knowledge of Brahman. Ramanuja rightly observes that
inference, whether arrived at through the particular way of
deduction or arrived at through the generic way of induction,
is not the means of proving Brahman. The first type of
inference is imposible to be the ·means because there is no
knowledge of its relating to anything which is beyond the
senses. There is also no such basis of inductive inference as
is seen to give rise to generalisation and as is invariably
associated with the Lord who is capable of directly perceiving
all things and actually bringing those things into existence. 1
Ramanuja does not accept that the existence of God can
be inferred, as is done by the N aiyayikas. The fact that the
Lord is the creator of this universe cannot be made out on
1 " stc:i'ls~'lr;~~s~ ~1~iter !liJlOfll.; a~~~""~"' a<& ;oqJ~'-1:; a'-U =-1T~
' an~ 'CI'JiN~ld ~ ~~~161Tf<iU~T lll~acfi'l~~~:e v 'CI'~ it~ ~a~: I " Ramanuja:
Sr'i-bha~ya, II. i. 12.
Also:- " ~1~~<tstii1UJi<i1~ illlar: 1 " Ramanuja: Eri- bha~y3, I. i. 3.
2 " ;nt~~'ilWill, I f<~il"'ffi' t! VTII1•1.io) ~ <iT I atcfr~irq 1(~ ~Jifo:~
<r<TRUJf<i~ fC~~cO Ulf I ~'i~aCf<g~.n~R'iil~~f.ir'!TGre'i~~~f<ii!ISif.1~Hf ~ffi Uqfq '\
~ ~•ll'~'t~~a 1 " Ramanuja : Sri-bha,ya, I. i. 3. ' ...
Methodology ( 1~9)
the basis of an inference of th<:: cause of all causes. 1 So like
other Bhafyakaras, Ramanuja depends on scripture for proving
the nature of Brahman.
As regards the number of members necessary for a
5yllogism, the system of Rarnanuja does not insist that all the N) aya. It is regarded
They may be either
speaking the number
five are necessary, as is done by the
that only three members are sufficient.
the first three or the last three. Really
of members in a syllogism is not considered important, according to
this system. So many propositions as are necessary to make
the inference convincing may be admitted.
Syllogism as an instrument of polemics is very efficiently
employed by Rarnanuja in his Bha~ya. In its polemical parts,
especially when he attacks the postulates of the Advaita system,
he shows marvellous skill in the employment of formal
5yllogisms. They occur to him naturally in the course of the debate.
The following may be cited as typical examples of these:-
( 1 ) That ignorance, which is the subject of our dispute,
is not capable of being removed by knowledge; because it does
1 '' ~~'dl, 61<r~<ft<flf~ 'lilii 6~ Glm{, 'filq:so<f a~.qa~~f~illil'l..il;i ~'~fllfa
W~~~flf~~iUJa~t~f;!NifilGiit~:q(}~: ttif,;-q~"J.~q -.,fa I a~~:mq_, I ''
Ramauuja : Sri-bha~ya, I. i. 3.
Methodology ( 130)
not possess the power of concealing the objects of knowledge.
Whatever non-knowledge is removed by knowledge, that conceals
the objects of knowledge, like the non-knowledge relating to
the shell etc. 1
( 2) That knowle.dge, which is acquired with the help
. of the accepted means of proof, and which is the subject of
our dispute, has not, for its antecedent in time, any ignorance
which is different from its own antecedent non-existence; because
that possesses the character of such knowledge as is obtained
with the help of accepted means of proof, like the knowledge
which, being derived with the help of the accepted means of
proof, proves the ignorance that is admitted by you. 2
( 3 ) That ignorance, which has the nature of an entity,
1s not capable of being destroyed by knowledge; because it
possesses the nature of an entity, like pots etc. 3
1 '' ~crl~qtfea~~·;i "" ~~"'!~crt~~ • ~t"'l~6l~totlcr~OJtCi'lf(. 1 ~\i~~~crti~~r;:f "\
ai{ti~~·ncr\cri <~t~r ~f.fa'li,e.nti~~- l " Ramii..1uja : Sri-bha~ya, I. i. 1, p. 90.
2 " fo.p.ft~t\i<{Tfea ~~rOJ~Ft ~crt~Ft+rl'~lfaf\if~T~~'l.~~ ~ +rcrfa 1 ~'liOJ~~tcrltt,. 1
ilcr~'l'lal:ulot61~~~"'fll~•ol"Hll '' h.an,a.lU j a : Sri- bna~ya, I. i. 1, p. 9J-:J 1.
3 " lltcr•q~m;t ~ ~r~fcr~tll~~ • ~ncr&=qccrtf(. 1 t:l?;Jf~crf~fu 1 " "\
Ra.di.nuja : Sri-bha~ya, I. i. I, p. 91.
Methodolog~· ( 131 )
( -4) The earth, the mountain etc., which are the subject
of our discussion, are produced effects; because they are made
up of constituent parts, as is the case with pots etc. 'l
( S ) The earth, the ocean, the mountain etc., which
are the subject of our discussion, are produced effects; because,
being themselves gross, they possess the property of ,;:being set
in motion, as is the case with a pot. •
( 6) The body, the world etc. ha,·e t\1e individual souls,
for their agents; because they possess the character of being
produced effects, as a pot does. 3
( 7 ) The Lord is no agent; because he has no purpose,
just as the released souls.4o
( 8) The distinctions of bondage and liberatio':'l and
1 " P<f<~r~tt1.1Tf~Hi ~'!_'tl\tf~ Clit~ ~n·P~<IcCffit ~~~f~cm: 1 ''
Ramanuja : S 1- bha~ya, I. i. 3.
2 " f<~<~t~T~~tf6(1'!Cff;Jqjwf\;l''l~l'Cl~lf~ Clil~, 'I{~ efa fiji~TCI~CIH( ~Tf~C{(( I "
Ramanuja : S. i-bha~ya, I. i. 3.
3 " ~~<~;n~ 15';1~!fi~ifi Clil~c•no:. ~~qo:, 1 " Ramanuja: Sri-bha.~ya, I. i. 3.
4 " {~ref~: 'li«i ot ~<fftr, lfllt~~.,:-<it<fl~mi!l<( r " J\aminuja: Sri:-bl.i.f ,a, I. i. 3.
Methodology ( 132 )
thoae of oneself ~nd others are imagined by ignorance, since
they are unreal, like the distinctions seen in a dream etc. 1
( 9 ) Other bodies also are the products of my ignorance, since they are bodies, since they are effects, since . they
are non-sentient, or since they are products, just like this body .1
( 10) All sentient things, which are the subject of our
dispute, are identical with me, since they are sentient; whatever
is not identical with me is observed to be non-sentient as a
pitcher. 8
In the Sri:-bra~ya, Farranuja bas occasionally displayed
.such feats of formal logic, and has proved himself to be versatile
m the employment of this important missi1e in the armoury
of disputants. Such occasions, however, are not too many.
1t must be said to the credit of Ran anu;acarya, that he has
never lost sight of the pursuit of truth, by losing himself in
labyrinth of formal logic. He is fully aware that logical
1 " il"~'lliSo~~~~T: ~IR,o~CI~'flJI:"f ~~fCI~JT<tif~q(n:, SlqJ~'flN<fit<fl({, ~~t;{
(!c~~~"'ll!lf~fa 1 " Ran,anuja: S1i-bLii~Ja, I I. i. 15.
2 " ~'\'hto:a~lll~fq ~~fcl;n<fif~q(itfif, ~'\,~cC!Hl,. ~t.l~c~T~, ~c<mr"' <lifitqatl!llit,
~'i\R·l~~a~1 " Rarna.~uJa : ~:ni-bhii~Ja, II. i. 15.
3 " fclcn~~~~f~Hi ~a~a'~~tWi, ~ailc<ll~, ~~-.~~ a~~a.i aq, ~~~ Iii~: ' "
Rarr.anuja : Sri~u1.a ... .t, I I. i. 15.
~I -
Methodology ( 133)
technique is only an instrument for arnvmg at right know
ledge. On the whole, the arguments in his Bha{!ya follow the
traditional method of Vada 1 wherein propositions are proved by
means of Pramai_las independently or through formal syllogisms.
The Bhit{!ya of Nimbltrka, which purports to give
simply the intepretation of the Veda.1ta Sutras, does not
contain lengthy discussions. So inference as a means of know
ledge, and syllogism as a means of argumentation h:tve very little
scope in this Bh;'i~ya.
The followers of Kimbilrka have accepted the Nyltya
theory of Anurnana in general and have employed it in the
elucidation of their doctrines. Their theories of concomitance etc.
are the same as those of the Nyaya system. The two divi-
sions of Anurnana, viz. Svartha and
Though the Nirn barkaites generally
Parartha, are
follow the
admitted.
Ramanuja
views about Prarnfi.l)as, there is a difference of opinion with
respect to the classification of Anumana. The followers of
Nimbarka admit all the three kinds of inference, v1z. Anvaya·
vyatireki, Kevalanvayi and Kevala-vyatireki. In the theory of
Vyapti, the followers of Nimburka have a special point deserving
notice. In addition to the well-known concomitance arising from the
above three ways, represented by the three kinds of Anumi.1as,
scriptural assertions arc also regarded as cases of concomitance. 1
1· S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, p. 427.
~.1 cthol!ology ( 134)
Like the other Bhn.~yakaras, Kim l arka also believes that
Brahman can be known only through the Vedas. Inference is of
no use in achieving that purpose. The Naiyayika tenet of
inferring God from the effect, viz. the universe, is refuted
by Srimvasa. 1
According to Madhvadi.rya, inference is only an Anupram!l)a,
and as such it is only externally instrumental in producing
knowledge. Like other Anupramfi.Q.a!;, it gives knowledge only
indirectly. ' Thus in the theory of Madhvacarya we cannot
dic;tinguish between Pratyak~a and Anumana as immediate and
mediate means of knowledge. Accoruing to this system, percep
tion, inference and testimony are the three kinds of means of
Parok~a or mediate knowledge.
Madhvfi.c1lrya does not give much importance to infer
ence in knowing the important philosophical principles. The
Veda is the only means that can be helpful m solving the
riddle of the universe. As is stated before, Madhva cites the
authority of many scriptural texts, especially the PuraQ.as and
points out that inferences are quite useless to arrive at important
1 '' ~ci fttc1.1~·~~~<~t · Rf~lo:Jt ifit~ionqfq 'lil~(~o:J ~•ilo:J 01 un:nml "\~ "\ . -.:;
\'IIH~ I" Srinivasacarya : Vedanta- kaustubha, p. 1 6.
2 M. Hiriyanna: The Essentials of Indian Philosophy,
p. 197.
--------------------~~ ..
Methodology ( 13.5 )
philosophical conclusions, as they are indefinite. 1 Thus
in the province of Brahma-jfif.na, inference has very little
independent scope. Inference is incapable of supplying us with
new facts. At the most it can help us to test and systematize
the facts obtained through other means, especially through the
scriptures. That is why Anumana is denied any independent
position as a Pramii.Q.a, in the system of Madh,a:arya. If there
is any doubt in reconciling the . apparently contradictory state
ments of scriptures, Anumana may be of some use. 2
As Madhva ~~cepts only three Pramll.:Q.as, U pamuna is
~onsidered to be a variety of inference. 3 In his Brahma-siitra
Bha~ya, Madhva has employed inference only occasionally. The
use of syllogisms is also found only in rare cases. Madhva
depends more on scriptural quotations than reasoning for proving
his view-point.
Vallabhadi.rya has no special point as regards the theory
of Anumana. He holds the opinion that in metaphysical matters
Sastra is the final authority and our reason cannot protest.
1 Chapter IV, p. 64-65.
2 " Sli?:J~~Tuli'I?:Jt~U't f~~?:JT~ ~ l ~"lllf~) ~ ~ar'Jiu sr111UJq~iill ~~:
._ "' bhifya, II:i. 18.
3 S. Radhakrishnan: Indian
p .. 739.
n ~ ~lliN'IaiSl 1 " Madhva-
PhU<;lSOphy, Vol. II,
..•
Methodology ( 136)
aganist it. He asserts that his main doctrine, that Brahman is
the substratum of contradictory qualitles, is proved by scriptural
'texts and there is no questioning about it by logic.1 Like
perception, inference is not indevendently valid. It depends on
extraneous circumstances for its validity. Like other Adi.ryas,
Vallabhacarya fully q.ccepts that the nature of inferential conclu
sions is indefinite, and asserts that mere reasoning, unsupported
by. scriptural texts, has no scope in knowing the real nature
of Brahman.'
Vallabhacarya exhibits considerable skill in argumentation.
His arguments are, howevert mainly based on scriptural texts
and not on inferences. Even in the :polemical.i parts of his
AQ.-!bhifya, he take3 his stand mainly on scriptural texts.
1 u ~ Sl ~~6il~'~ ~~~li ~~ llfaqJV~ OR:?tl~~~ii~~'<II'~ I "
AQ.u-bhaf/a, I. i. 19.
2 II ~~sii 'J.'ititi~IIJ Sl~~ ... ~llll"''f~'Qq_ I m~SI~'OJ;Il<{ I , AI,lu-bha~ya, I. l. 11.