the agent intellect in aquinas: a metaphysical condition ... · iii things themselves with a mode...
TRANSCRIPT
TheAgentIntellectinAquinas:AMetaphysicalConditionofPossibilityofHumanUnderstandingasReceptiveof
ObjectiveContent
by
AndresAyala
AThesissubmittedtotheFacultyofTheologyattheUniversityofSt.Michael’sCollegeandtheGraduateCentreforTheologicalStudiesoftheTorontoSchoolofTheology.
InpartialfulfilmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyinTheology
awardedbytheUniversityofSt.Michael’sCollege.
©CopyrightbyAndresAyala2018
ii
TheAgentIntellectinAquinas:AMetaphysicalConditionof
PossibilityofHumanUnderstandingasReceptiveof
ObjectiveContent
AndresAyala
DoctorofPhilosophyinTheology
UniversityofSt.Michael’sCollege
2018
Abstract
ThefollowingisaninterpretationofAquinas’agentintellectfocusingonSummaTheologiae
I,qq.75-89,andproposingthattheagentintellectisametaphysicalratherthanaformala
prioriofhumanunderstanding.Aformalaprioriisresponsiblefortheintelligibilityas
contentoftheobjectofhumanunderstandingandisrelatedtoKant’sepistemological
views;whereasametaphysicalaprioriisresponsibleforintelligibilityasmodeofbeingof
thissameobject.WecanfindinAquinas’textmanyindicationsthattheagentintellectis
notproductiveoftheuniversalascontentbutis,rather,productiveoftheabstractedor
intelligiblemodeofbeingoftheuniversalnature.ThisisbecauseforAquinastheuniversal
nature,whichistheobjectofhumanunderstanding,ispresentinthethingsthemselvesbut
withadifferentmodeofbeing.
Chapter1isintendedtoestablishthefactwhichrequiresforAquinasanagentintellect,
andprovidestwoveryimportantprinciples:oneisthattheobjectofhumanunderstanding
(theuniversalnature)ispresentinthethingsthemselvesand,theother,thatitisnotinthe
iii
thingsthemselveswithamodeofbeingwhichmakesitavailabletotheintellectualeye.
ThesetwoprinciplesleadustothemainpointofChapter2,namelythedistinctionbetween
theintelligibleobjectanditsintelligiblemodeofbeing.Now,becauseknowingisreceptive
oftheintelligibleobject(Chapter3),whichispresentinthethingsthemselves(Chapter1),
theagentintellectisproductivenotoftheobject’sintelligiblecontent,butofitsabstracted
orintelligiblemodeofbeing(Chapter4).
iv
Acknowledgments
Behindthisdissertationand,oneachpage,Icanseethecontributionsofmanypeople.I
wanttothankparticularlyNancyMarrocco,fortheEnglishcorrectionsandinspirational
advice;AmandaWagnerfortheformatcorrections;PatFlemingandtheInstituteofthe
IncarnateWordfortheireconomicsupport;andJeremyWilkinsforhisadvicetowriteon
theagentintellect.Forhisconstantsupportandwiseadvice,IthankFr.GillesMongeau,SJ,
mysupervisor;IthankProfessorsR.Sweetman,J.Ginther,M.Levering,J.Berkman,Giulio
SilanoandDennisO’Harafortheirprecioussuggestionsandcorrections.Fortheirprayers
andtheirconstantencouragement,Iwouldlikealsotothankinparticulartheparishioners,
SistersandstaffofSt.Michael’s,Cobourg,andofSt.JohntheBaptistandSacredHeart,
Peterborough(theparisheswhereIservedaspastorduringthewritingprocess).Aspecial
thankyoutoRitaMarroccoandMargaretNewman.ThanksalsotoFr.GerardusHauwert,
IVEandDr.DonaldGraham,andmanyotherpriestsandprofessorsfortheiradviceand
support.Iwishtothankalsoallthosewho,duringmyyearsofformation,handedontome
sogenerouslythatwhichtheythemselveshadreceived.Finally,allthoseotherswhohave
supportedandhelpedme,thoughnotnamedhere,arenolessappreciated.
v
TableofContents
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................iv
TableofContents.........................................................................................................v
AbbreviatedReferences.............................................................................................vii
OpeningNote...............................................................................................................1
Introduction..................................................................................................................21)MainConcepts,MethodandProcedure..............................................................52)TheControversywithLatinAverroism...............................................................103)SomeRenownedScholars..................................................................................12ÉtienneGilson.....................................................................................................12JosephOwens.....................................................................................................16EleonoreStump..................................................................................................20ArmandA.Maurer..............................................................................................24W.NorrisClarke..................................................................................................32JohnF.X.Knasas.................................................................................................37
4)CornelioFabro....................................................................................................444.1.AMetaphysicalAPrioriinTheMetaphysicalNotionofParticipation........454.2.AMetaphysicalAPrioriinLaSvolta...........................................................474.3.IntellectualKnowingasReceptiveinFabro................................................50
5)OtherRelevantAuthors......................................................................................51
ChapterOne:TheThomisticFactandtheRoleoftheAgentIntellect.......................571)TheThomisticFact..............................................................................................572)TheObjectofIntelligenceinitsFormalAspect:TheUniversalasDifferentfrom
theParticular.....................................................................................................663)TheObjectofIntelligenceinitsRealAspect:TheUniversalisintheThings
Themselves........................................................................................................834)TheRoleoftheAgentIntellectanditsNecessity:ToMake IntelligibleinActtheUniversalinre................................................................102
ChapterTwo:TheThomisticDistinctionbetweentheObjectandtheModeofBeingoftheObject(resintellectaandmodusreiintellectae)...................1101)TheDistinctionin84,1,c.:The“PlatonicProblem”........................................1112)TheDistinctioninOtherTexts..........................................................................1153)TheTwoMeaningsofUniversal.......................................................................1193.1.IntheSumma.............................................................................................1203.2.TwoMeaningsof“Universal”inotherWorksofAquinas.........................123
4)TheDistinctionbetween“expartereiintellectae” and“exparteintelligentis”..............................................................................1295)ConcludingRemarks........................................................................................130
vi
ChapterThree:KnowingasReceptive......................................................................1351)TheMetaphysicalExplanationofKnowingasa“Remedy”..............................1372)AlterityandIdentityinHumanKnowing..........................................................1442.1.Alterity.......................................................................................................1442.2.Identity:WhatIdentityisNot....................................................................149
3)TheIdentityisbyMeansoftheSpecies...........................................................1513.1.TheAristotelianIdentity............................................................................1553.2.Species,IdentityandAlterity.....................................................................159
4)KnowingasReceptive.......................................................................................1715)TheComparisonbetweenIntelligenceandSensitivity.....................................1906)Corollaries:AgentIntellect,PossibleIntellectandWill....................................197
ChapterFour:TheThomisticAgentIntellectasaMetaphysicalAPrioriratherthanaFormalAPriori.......................................................................2091)TheTextofSt.Thomas:theAgentIntellectasaFormalAPriori?...................2101.1.InfinityintheHumanIntellect...................................................................2101.2.“Quodammodoomnia”..............................................................................2171.3.TheProcessofLearning.............................................................................2201.4.TheNaturalDesiretoKnow.......................................................................2221.5.“Naturaliternotavelindita”......................................................................2261.6.TheTextof84,6:materiacausae.............................................................2321.7.TheAgentIntellectas“actusintelligibilium”.............................................244
2)TheAgentIntellectasaMetaphysicalAPriori.................................................2572.1.Thetextusprinceps....................................................................................2592.2.NotaFormalbutaMetaphysicalAPriori..................................................2612.2.a.NotaFormalAPriori..............................................................................2612.2.b.TheOriginoftheIntelligibleContent.....................................................2652.2.c.AMetaphysicalAPriori...........................................................................2752.3.TheComparisonoftheAgentIntellectwithLight.....................................281
Conclusion................................................................................................................2931.Summary...........................................................................................................2932.Contributions....................................................................................................2943.LimitsandFutureLinesofResearch.................................................................296
Epilogue:KnowingafterKant...................................................................................303
Bibliography..............................................................................................................304A)St.ThomasAquinas..........................................................................................304B)OtherAuthors...................................................................................................305
Appendix:OtherAuthors,Excursus,LatinTextsandTranslations...........................308
vii
AbbreviatedReferences1
BT:Heidegger,Martin.BeingandTime.
CG:Aquinas.LiberdeveritatecatholicaeFideicontraerroresinfideliumseuSummacontra
Gentiles.
DeSpir.Creat.:Aquinas.Quaestiodisputatadespiritualibuscreaturis.
DeVer.:Aquinas.Quaestionesdisputataedeveritate.
EIA:Sellés,JuanFernando.Elintelectoagenteylosfilósofos:Venturasydesventurasdel
supremohallazgoaristotélicosobreelhombre.
InBoet.DeTrin.:Aquinas.SuperBoetiumDeTrinitate.
InDeAnima:Aquinas.SentencialibriDeanima.
InMet.:Aquinas.InduodecimlibrosMetaphysicorumAristotelisexpositio.
KRV:Kant,Immanuel.CritiqueofPureReason.
LS:Fabro,Cornelio.LaSvoltaAntropologicadiKarlRahner.
NMP:Fabro,Cornelio.LaNozioneMetafisicadiPartecipazionesecondoSanTommaso
d’Aquino.
PP:Fabro,Cornelio.PercezioneePensiero.
Q.D.DeAnima:Aquinas.Quaestionesdisputataedeanima.
RC:Gilson,Etienne.Réalismethomisteetcritiquedelaconnaissance.
RM:Gilson,Etienne.Leréalismeméthodique.
Summa:Aquinas.SummaTheologiae.
TTDV:Knasas,JohnF.X.“TranscendentalThomismandDeVeritateI,9.”
WLTL:Knasas,JohnF.X.“WhyforLonerganKnowingCannotConsistin'TakingaLook'.”
1Inalphabeticalorder.Cf.Bibliographyforeditions.
viii
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1
OpeningNote
TheagentintellectisasealoftheDivinityinus.Itisproofofabeatifyingtruth,thetruththatalthoughweourselvesunderstand,understandingisagiftandeveniftheoriginofthegiftisintheOther,thisOtherdoesnotdiminishusbythegift,butraisesusuptoHimself.ThelightofunderstandingisaparticipationoftheUncreatedLight,andhumanbeingsarelivingimagesofthisLightbyanactofGod’slove.Godislove,humanbeingisloved.GodisCreator,humanbeingisgifted.Godisrich,humanbeingispoornolongerbecauseGodhaslookedwithfavouronthenothingnessofHisservant.Howrichishumanbeing?TowhatextentdoweresembleGod?Whatindependence,whatsubjectivitybestowedonusthisSubsistentFreedom?Theanswertothesequestionsisofthegreatestrelevance.Onlybyknowingourselvescanweachievethemeaningofourexistence.Butwemovebetweenindependenceandlimitation,betweenanunlimitedhorizonandanolessunlimitedthirst.Wheredoesourperfectioncomefrom?WhereisGod?IsGodtobefoundintheintimaterecessesofthesoul,orabovetheHeavens?Both!But,theradicalquestionisdifferent:isGodmywater,ormythirst?ButifGodismywater,whatisthewaytothewellspringofsalvation?IfGodismythirst,whatisthemeaningofallofthis?Itisnoteasytoseethewaybutthemodernhumanbeingshouldnotdespair.Isnottheagentintellect“likethelight”2agiftwhichhelpsustoseetheway?Asintheoriginalchaos,thedarknessisdispelledbyGod’scommand:“Lettherebelight!”
2Aristotle,DeAnimaIII,c.V,430a15.
2
Introduction
ThedoctrineoftheagentintellectinAquinasisrelatedtotheproblemofthe
universals.3Fromagnoseologicalpointofview,theanswertothisproblemcantaketwo
forms.OneishistoricallyrepresentedbyPlatoandKant,theotherbySt.ThomasAquinas.
Theproblemoftheuniversalsisthathumanunderstandingisuniversaland
necessary,yetreality—becauseitisparticularandcontingent—doesnotseemtomatchthe
objectofourunderstanding.Whatisthevalueoftheuniversalconcept,then?Doesthe
universalconceptcorrespondtoanythinginreality?Or,isitasubjectiveevent—a
subjectivemodification—relatedsomehowtowhatisparticular?
Asuperficialapproachmaygivetheimpressionthat,actually,KantandPlatoarethe
mutuallyopposingalternatives.ForPlato,infact,theuniversalcorrespondstosomethingin
3Quotationswillbereferencedinbriefform,thoseformsprovidedintheindexcalled
“AbbreviatedReferences.”ForAquinas’works:Aquinas’nameisalwaysomitted,anabbreviatedformofthetitlebeginsthequotationandasimpleindicationoftheplacefollows,inlettersandnumbersofevidentmeaning.AnexceptiontothisarethequotationsfromtheSummaTheologiaeI,qq.75-89,themainsourceofthisdissertation:theyalwaysbegindirectlywiththenumberofquestion.AnotherexceptionistheCommentarytoAristotle’sDeAnima:IhaveusedtheLeonineedition,therefore,Iquotethebook,thechapterandthelinesbynumber.Theworksofotherauthorsarequotedinthisway:lastname,onewordorafewlettersindicatingthetitleofthework(onlywhenmorethanoneworkofthesameauthorisquotedinthisdissertation)andthepagenumber.Othermoreparticularindicationswillbegivenasneeded.
EmphasisinLatintextsisalwaysmine,unlessotherwiseindicated.Translations:Aquinas’textistranslatedusingthetranslationbytheFathersoftheEnglish
DominicanProvince,availableathttp://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/index.html,unlessotherwiseindicated.Myeditingofthistranslationismadeevidentwithsquarebrackets.Whenthetranslationismine,thisisindicatedimmediatelyafterthetranslatedtext.TheLatintextofAquinasisalwaysprovidedinthefootnotes.AuthorsotherthanAquinasareofferedinEnglish(mytranslations,unlessanEnglisheditionisquotedinBibliography).
SeeAppendix(p.308)for24importantnotesallowingmorepreciseand/orexpandedreferenceonparticularpoints;thisAppendixcontainssomeLatintexts,theirtranslationsandcertainvaluableexcursus.
3
reality,whichistheideain-itselfwhereas,forKant,theuniversalisasubjectiveevent
which—preciselybecauseofitscharacteristicasuniversal—cannotcorrespondformallyto
theparticularrealityofexperience.
Inbothcases,however,theuniversaldoesnotcorrespondtotheparticular.Andin
bothcases,Isubmit,itisforthesamereason:becausetheuniversalistakenasaneventof
consciousness,asanideawhich,exactlybecauseofitsabstractedcondition,canhave
nothingtodowiththerawmaterialofexperience.Forboth,PlatoandKant,universalityisa
subjectivecharacteristicofideasorthoughts,acharacteristicnotfoundintheparticular
reality.Now,forPlato,becauseourthoughtsmustcorrespondtoreality,thesolutionwasto
duplicateourideasinaworldofideas.ForKant,instead,becauseourideasrelatetothe
particularreality,andgrantedthattheiruniversalitycannotcomefromexperience,the
solutionistomakeuniversalitytheresultofasubjectivefunction.Universalityandnecessity
are,forKant,theresultofthesubject'sactivityontherawmaterialofexperience.Whereas,
forPlato,theuniversalistheresultofaparticipationfromtheidea,forKanttheuniversalis
theresultofasubjectiveactivityonthematerialofexperience.InbothPlatoandKant,the
factneedingexplanationistheideaasitisinthemind.
IsthiswhatAquinasthought?Inthisthesis,itwillbesuggestedthat,forAquinas,
becausethereisadistinctionbetweentheuniversalascontentandastheabstractedmode
ofbeingofthatcontent,thereisonesenseinwhichintelligibilityistheresultofasubjective
function,andanothersenseinwhichintelligibilityanduniversalitybelongtothethings
themselves.
4
Whenwesaythattheagentintellectisametaphysicalapriori,wemeanthatthe
agentintellectproducesintelligibilityastheabstractedmodeofbeingoftheuniversal
content;wedistinguishthismetaphysicalapriorifromtheKantianformalapriori,whichis
sourceofintelligibilityascontentofanotherwiserawmaterialofexperience.Thatis,a
formalaprioriisthesubjectivefunctionbywhichintelligibilityis“produced”inthesensible
material.Inotherwords,aformalaprioriisthesourceofintelligiblecontent,whereasa
metaphysicalaprioriisthesourceoftheabstractedmodeofbeingofthecontent.Onthe
onehand,adoctrineoftheagentintellectasametaphysicalaprioripresupposesthatthe
intelligiblecontentbelongstothethingsthemselves;aformalapriori,ontheotherhand,
presupposesthattheintelligiblecontentistheresultoftheactivityofthesubjectonan
otherwisenon-intelligiblematerialofexperience.
ThereasonforbringingKantandPlatotogetheristobetterunderstandtheradical
differencebetweenAquinasandKant.Inotherwords,whatSt.ThomassaysofPlato,inthis
respect,appliestoKant.AndthereasonforshowingthedifferencebetweenSt.Thomasand
KantistomakeourinterpretationofSt.Thomasmoremeaningfulfortoday’sreflection.In
myview,ifSt.ThomasisconfusedwithKant,thecontributionofSt.Thomasislost.Such
confusionismadepossiblebythefactthatboththeThomisticagentintellectandthe
Kantianformalaprioricanbesaidtoprovideintelligibility,ortomakeintelligibletheobject
ofexperience.Whatissuggestedinthisdissertationisthat“intelligible”isusedineachcase
inadifferentsense.Inordertoavoidthisconfusion,twoessentiallyrelatedelementsare
suggested:first,theThomisticdistinctionbetweenresintellectaandmodusreiintellectae,
andsecondlytheThomisticdoctrineofthepresenceoftheuniversalinthethings
5
themselves.Aswewillsee,thesetwoelements—aswellasotherrelatedelements—arenot
alwaysclearinmodernThomism.
WhatisproposedinthisthesisistheinterpretationofAquinas’agentintellectasa
“metaphysical”apriori,insofarasitproducesnottheintelligiblecontent,buttheintelligible
modeofbeingofthecontent.Thisclaimimpliesmanyassumptionswhichwillneedtobe
discussedintheirproperplaces,inthebodyofthisdissertation.
Mygoalinthisintroductionis,firstly,tooutlinethemainconcepts,methodand
procedureinwhatwillfollow;secondly,toreferbrieflytothemedievalcontroversywith
Averroesregardingtheagentintellect;thirdly,toexaminetheworkofsomerenowned
scholarsinordertoframethethesispositioninamoreunderstandablefashion;fourthly,to
brieflyintroduceCornelioFabro(inwhomwefirstfoundthisideaoftheagentintellectasa
metaphysicalratherthanaformalapriori),4inordertoshowhowandtowhatextenthis
workisthesourceofinspirationforthisthesis;fifthlyandfinally,toreportsomepertinent
findingsfromotherauthors.
1)MainConcepts,MethodandProcedure
BecauseoftheimportanceandsystematiccharacteroftheSummaTheologiae,5this
workwillbethefocus.OtherThomisticworkswillbebroughtintoplayinordertoconfirm
theinterpretationproposed,toshowAquinas’consistencyonthistopicthroughouthis
4Cf.CornelioFabro,LaSvoltaAntropologicadiKarlRahner,OpereComplete,volume25
(Segni:EDIVI,2011),52and116.5Cf.IªPars,qq.75-89.
6
career,and/ortoqualifythefindingsinsomeway.6Theconcernisnottoindicateallofthe
paralleltextsforeachreferenceoftheSumma.Particularlyimportantwillbethereference
toAquinas’CommentarytotheAristotelianDeAnima,7becauseofAquinas’constant
referencetoAristotleindealingwiththeagentintellect.8
6Cf.EleonoreStump,Aquinas(NewYork:Routledge,2003),1:“AlthoughAquinasis
remarkablyconsistentinhisseveraldiscussionsofthesametopic,itisoftenhelpfultoexamineparallelpassagesinhiswritingswhenfullyassessinghisviewsonanyissue”;JuanFernandoSellés,Elintelectoagenteylosfilósofos:Venturasydesventurasdelsupremohallazgoaristotélicosobreelhombre,[vol.]I,SiglosIVa.C.-XV,(Pamplona:EUNSA,2012),268:“ThomasAquinasexplainstheexistenceoftheagentintellectinthiswork,themostmature[i.e.,theSummaTheologiae],withthesameargumentasinhisfirstwritings”and270:“[Aquinas]maintainsuntiltheendofhisproductionthattheproperfunctionoftheagentintellectistoabstract.”
7Sellés(cf.EIA,23)saysthatthethirdbookoftheDeAnimaisthebookmostcommenteduponinthehistoryofPhilosophy,andthatthepassagethatregardstheagentintellectisthemostdiscussed.Sellés’researchinElIntelectoAgenteylosFilósofoshasthemeritofincluding52pagesofessentialbibliography,althoughtheauthor’sinterpretationoftheagentintellectinAristotleisgroundedinquestionableprinciples.Still,evenifhedisagreeswithalmostallinterpretationsofAristotleinhistory,includingAquinas’,hispresentationofthevariousauthorsisfairandwelldocumented.
8Schmidt(cf.CiroE.SchmidtAndrade,“SantoTomásyelDeAnima:ComentarioalosCaps.4y5delLibroIIIdelDeAnimadeAristóteles,”AnalogíaFilosófica:RevistaDeFilosofía8,no.1[1994]:124)veryinsightfullyproposesthatSt.ThomasgoesbeyondAristotlebutdoesnotcontradicthim(sameremarkinCornelioFabro,LaNozioneMetafisicadiPartecipazionesecondoSanTommasod’Aquino,OpereComplete,volume3[Segni:EDIVI,2005],276).ItisamostfittingcommentbecauseitgivesanaccountofAquinas’evidentintelligenceofAristotlebut,atthesametime,acknowledgesthatnoteverythingthatSt.ThomassaysisexplicitinAristotle.FortheAngelic,Isubmit,thefactthatsomethingisnotwritteninthebookdoesnotmeanthatAristotledidnothaveitinhismind.Still,tomakehiscase,St.Thomasalwaystriestofindtextualsupportforhisclaims,orherefershisinterpretationtoexplicitprinciplesthatAristotlemaintainsinotherplaces,orhestressestheinternalcoherenceofthetext.ItisnotdifficulttoagreewithStumpinthisregard:“InarecentvolumeofessaysonAristotle’sDeanima,MarthaNussbaumdescribesAquinas’sworkas‘oneoftheverygreatestcommentariesonthework’and‘veryinsightful.’T.H.Irwin,aleadinginterpreterofAristotle,acknowledgesthatatonepointintheSententialibriEthicorum(CommentaryonAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics),Aquinas‘actuallyexplainsAristotle’sintentionmoreclearlythanAristotleexplainsithimself’.SuchjudgmentsapplyprettygenerallytoAquinas’sAristoteliancommentaries,allofwhicharemarkedbyhisextraordinaryabilityasaphilosophicalcommentatortodiscernalogicalstructureinalmosteverypassageheexaminesineverysortoftext:notonlyAristotle’sbutalsothoseofothers,fromBoethiustoStPaul.”(Stump,8-9,cf.notes8and9).
7
Theinterpretationbeingofferedisthattheagentintellectisametaphysicalapriori
ofhumanunderstandingasreceptiveofobjectivecontent.Anaprioriisaconditionof
possibility.Aconditionofpossibilitygivesintelligibilitytoafact.Thatiswhythestarting
point(Chapter1)willbetoidentifythefactthatrequiresanagentintellectasitscondition
ofpossibility.9Identifyingthisfactwillhelptoshowthatthedoctrineoftheagentintellect
isrelatedtotheproblemoftheuniversals,andthusrelatestothecriticalproblem.10The
fact,forAquinas(section1),isthatweknowthenaturesofbodies,butthosenaturesare
notinthebodieswithanintelligiblemodeofbeing;itisthisfactwhichresultsinthe
requirementofanagentintellect.Theimplicationisthat,forSt.Thomas,theobjectof
intelligenceinitsformalaspect(section2)istheuniversal,thenatureofthecorporealthing
initsabsoluteness,notthematerialofsensibility.Anotherimportantimplication(section3)
isthattheobjectofintelligence,theuniversal,subsistsinthecorporealthingandbelongsto
it.ItishopedthatallofthiswillallowustoconcludeChapter1(section4)withabetter
understandingoftheroleoftheagentintellectanditsnecessityinrelationshiptothe
problemoftheuniversals;thatis,theroleoftheagentintellectistomakeintelligibleinact
9Cf.TsenaySerequeberhan,“AquinasandKant:aComparativeStudy,”Dialogue:Journalof
PhiSigmaTau26(1984):43,“Thequestionoftheagentintellectisraisedandansweredinordertosatisfythefunctionbywhichactualunderstandingisacquired[…]Aquinasmovesfromwhattheintellectdoestowhatitneedsinordertoaccomplishwhatitactuallydoes.”
10ByproblemoftheuniversalsIunderstandtheanswertothequestion“Whatisitthatwepredicateofthemany?Isitaname,aconceptoranature?”BycriticalproblemIunderstandtheanswertothequestion,“Whatisthevalueoftheuniversalknowledgeofreality?Isitentirelygivenaposterioriorisitratheranaprioriadditiontothedataofexperience?”Thesecondproblempointsexplicitlytotheoriginofthecontentofconsciousness,thefirstonepointsrathertotheuniversal’spropermetaphysical“place.”TheThomisticconsiderationoftheuniversalasnature(andsouniversaleinre)leads,inmyview,toanswerthecriticalprobleminthedirectionofanaposteriorismoftheuniversalcontentofconsciousness.
8
theuniversalinre,i.e.thenatureofthecorporealthings,sothattheymaybeseenbythe
possibleintellect.
Thefirstchapterwillopenthedoortomanyconsiderationswhichwilltaketheir
properplacesinthefollowingchapters.InChapter2theessentialdifferencebetweenSt.
ThomasandKantintheirrespectiveapproachestotheproblemoftheuniversalsisstudied;
namely,St.Thomasmakesadistinction(whichKantdoesnot)betweenthemodeofbeing
ofthe(intellectual)objectandtheobjectitself,betweentheresintellectaandthemodus
reiintellectae.Infact,claimingthattheagentintellectisametaphysicalaprioriistoclaim
thattheagentintellectproducesnottheresintellecta,butthemodeofbeingofthesame.
Inotherwords,to“producetheintelligible”(referredtotheagentintellect)doesnotmean
toproducethecontentofintellectualknowing,buttoproducethemodeofbeingofthat
content.Thecontentisnotproduced.Thecontentisalreadyinthethingsthemselves,
althoughwithadifferentmodeofbeing(whichisthepointofChapter1).Thecontentis
receivedandthisisthepointofChapter3.Chapter2iskeytotheinterpretationofAquinas’
textforthefollowingreason.Inordertounderstandwhatitmeans“tomakethe
intelligible”,adistinctionmustbedrawnbetweentwowaysinwhichtheterms“intelligible”
and“universal”areusedintheSumma.Thatis,onewayisasreferredtotheobject,andthe
otherwayisasreferredtoitsmodeofbeinginthemind.
Asanticipated,Chapter3treatsaveryimportantissuewhichunderliesthewhole
doctrineoftheagentintellectinAquinas:intellectualknowingisoriginallyreceptive,
9
intentionalaspossessionoftheother,definedbyalterity.11Theintelligiblecontentis
received.Therefore,theroleoftheagentintellectinhumanunderstanding,activeby
definition,isnotproductiveofcontent.ForAquinas,ifanythingcomesfromthesubject,itis
notthecontentbecausethecontentperfectsthesubjectandis,originally,otherthanthe
subject.InthisChapter,ourdesignationofhumanunderstandingas“receptiveofobjective
content”willbecomemoreclear.Humanunderstandingimpliesanintentionalreceptionof
theperfectionofother(thecontent),whichiscommontobothsenseandintelligencein
theirfirstactuations(wheretounderstandisacertain“seeing”).Because,forSt.Thomas,
thecontentisreal(andinthatsense“objective”,asbelongingtotherealobject),the
“mediation”ofabstractiondoesnotimplylosinganycontactwithreality.12
If,forAquinas,intellectualknowingrefersinitiallytoauniversalobject,andifthat
universalisimbeddedintheparticular,andifknowingisreceivingthatuniversal,theagent
intellectcannotbeaformalapriori,responsiblefortheintelligiblecontent.Thisisthe
precisequestionofChapter4,whichwillhavetwomainsections.Thefirstsectionwill
includediscussionofthetextsseemingtosuggestthatAquinasadmitsaformalaprioriin
intellectualknowing,orthattheagentintellectisthisformalapriori.Inthesecondsection,
evidencewillbeofferedtotrytoshowthat,forAquinas,theagentintellectisnotaformala11Also,theroleofidentityinhumanknowingwillbeexploredinthisChapter.12Cf.InBoet.DeTrin.6,3,c.:“Thus,theintellectisabletoconceivewithoutmediationthe
quiddityofthesensiblething,butnotthequiddityofanintelligiblething.”(mytrans.)[Etsicimmediatepotestconcipereintellectusquiditatemreisensibilis,nonautemalicuiusreiintelligibilis.];DeVer2,3,ad3:“…fortobedirectedtothelikenessofathingisthesameastobedirectedtothethingwhichisknownthroughthislikeness.”[…idemesteiferriinsimilitudinemrei,etinremquaepertalemsimilitudinemcognoscitur.];SummaTheologiaeI,12,9,c.(Stump’stranslation,cf.Stump,256note50):“…tocognizethingsbymeansoftheirsimilitudesexistinginthecognizeristocognizethosethingsastheyareinthemselves,orintheirownnatures…”[…cognoscereresperearumsimilitudinesincognoscenteexistentes,estcognoscereeasinseipsis,seuinpropriisnaturis…]”
10
priori,butametaphysicalapriori,productivenotofthecontentbutoftheintelligiblemode
ofbeingoftheuniversalnaturesubsistinginreality.
2)TheControversywithLatinAverroism
Thedoctrineoftheagentintellectisfoundmanytimesinthecontextofthe
controversywithLatinAverroism13which,accordingtoSellés,hadgrowninrelevance
duringSt.Thomas’scareer.14AccordingtoSellés,whatSt.ThomascriticizedinAverroeswas
hisclaimthatboththepossibleandtheagentintellectarerespectivelyoneforallhuman
beings,inthatwaydenyingtheimmortalityofthesoul.15St.Thomastriestoshowhow
inconclusivearetheargumentstakenfromAristotle’sDeAnimatosupporttheAverroistic
claimthattheagentintellectdoesnotbelongtothesoul.16
SellésconsidersAquinas’interpretationofAverroestobebasicallycorrect,despite
thefactofitsbeingsaidthatAverroeswouldhavemaintainedtheimmortalityofthesoul,
amongotherreligiousprinciples.17HesuggeststhatthereasonfortheArabictendencyto
considertheintellectasoneisacertainsearchforAristotle’scompatibilitywithIslam,
whichcouldalsohaveaccountedfortheNeoplatonicreadingofthePhilosopher.18In
13IntheSumma,cf.79,4-5and88,1.14Cf.Sellés,EIA,200.HenoticesthatSt.AlberttheGreat’sDeunitateintellectus(1256)is
addressed“againstAverroes”whereasthesame-titledworkofSt.Thomas(1270)isaddressed“againstAverroists.”HequotesalsoSummaI-II,77,a.3,wherethefollowersofAverroesaresaidtobe“many.”
15Cf.JuanFernandoSellés,“LaCríticaTomistaalaInterpretaciónÁrabeyJudíadelIntelectoAgente,”Espíritu:CuadernosDelInstitutoFilosóficoDeBalmesiana52,no.128(2003):219;Stump,266.
16Cf.HernánMartínezMillán,“SunandLight,orontheAgentIntellect,”RevistaEspañolaDeFilosofíaMedieval20(2013):50.
17Cf.Sellés,EIA,211.18Cf.Sellés,EIA,181-186.
11
Stump’sview,St.Thomaswouldalsoadmitthathumanknowingmustderiveinsomesense
fromtheDivineintellect;this,however,doesnotleadhimtoagreewithAverroes,butto
postulatethattheagentintellectexistsineachhumanbeingasalightparticipatedfrom
God.19
Stumpsaysthat“[Aquinas’]naturalpreoccupationduringthisperiodwiththe
writingofSummaTheologiaeIªmayalsohelptoaccountforthefactthathisotherworkof
thattime20showsaspecialinterestinthenatureandoperationsofthehumansoul,the
subjectmatterofQuestions75–89ofIª.”21Itcouldcertainlybesuggestedthatthe
controversywithLatinAverroismwouldalsohavebeenastrongreasonforAquinas’focus
onthesetopics,particularlyifwekeepinmindthat,accordingtoStump,InDeAnimaishis
firstAristotelianCommentary.Heprobablyrealizedthatthebestwaytofacethechallenge
ofAverroes’followerswastoofferabetteralternativeregardingAristotelianinterpretation.
ThecontroversywithAverroescertainlyworksasthehistoricalframeworkforsome
ofthetextswewilldiscuss.Thefocusofthisdissertation,however,willbetheroleofthe
agentintellectregardingtheproblemoftheuniversals,whichwasnotthecontroversial
questionthen.AccordingtoCory,forexample,thereisa“growingscholarlyappreciationof
thesharedphilosophicaltraditionlinkingmedievalArabicandLatinphilosophers,showing
19Cf.Stump,266:“…[I]nrejectingtheAverroisticlinethattheremustbeonlyoneagent
intellectforallhumanbeings,[Aquinas]saysitmustnonethelessbethecasethatallourintellectsderivefromtheoneseparateintellectthatisGod,becauseallhumanbeingsshareacommonsetoffirstprinciples.”
20AccordingtoherdatingofSt.Thomas’works,Q.D.DeAnima(1265-1266),InDeAnima(1267-1268)andQ.D.DeSpirit.Creat.(1267-1268)belongtothisperiod(SummaIªpars,1266-1268).Cf.Stump,xvi-xx.
21Stump,10.
12
thatAquinas’scritiqueofAverroes’sseparateIntellectsdoesnotprecludehisappropriating
theconceptualframeworkofAverroes’sabstractiontheory.”22Theroleoftheagent
intellectintheabstractionoftheuniversalnatureispreciselythatwhichisrelevantforthe
presentpurposes:inthisway,thenecessityandthenatureofanagentintellectinAquinas
canbeseenfromamoresystematicpointofview.
3)SomeRenownedScholars
Toclarifyandthustounderstandthisparticularsystematicviewoftheagent
intellect’srole,someimportantscholarsintheirdiverseaccountsofknowingwillnowbe
studied.Thisstudywillbelimitedtothosepertinentissuesorpointsinotherscholarly
worksconsideredhelpful,eitherbysimilarityorbycontrast,inunderstandingtheview
beingproposedhere.
ÉtienneGilson
TheworkofÉtienneGilson(1884-1978)23isverymuchinthesamedirectionbeing
proposedhere,buthearticulateshispositionwithelementsthatareintensionwiththe
proposedinterpretationofSt.Thomas.Thepositiveelementswillbeacknowledgedand
thenthetensionswillbeexamined.
ForGilson,thesourceofuniversalcontentisnotaprioributaposteriori.Thisisthe
maindifferencebetweenAquinasandKant.24ForKant,theactofthesubjectisrequired,as
22ThereseS.Cory,“AverroesandAquinasontheAgentIntellect'sCausationof
Intelligibles,”RecherchesdeTheologieetPhilosophieMedievales82(2015):4.23Cf.EtienneGilson,Leréalismeméthodique(Paris:Téqui,1935),abbreviatedRM;Etienne
Gilson,Réalismethomisteetcritiquedelaconnaissance(Paris:Vrin,1939),abbreviatedRC.24Cf.RC151.Inthissection,referencestoGilson’sworkswillnotincludehisname.
13
conditionofpossibility,fortheobjectofintellectualknowledgetobeitself.Universalityand
necessityintheobjectcanhaveonlyanapriorisource,andthefacultiesofknowledgeare
consideredasapowerofunificationofthematterofexperience.25
AlsoinLeRéalismeMéthodique,theintellectualcontentcomesfromthethings
themselvesandnotfromthesubject.26Gilsonrejectstheprincipleofimmanence:thefact
thatanintellectualcontentisgiveninourknowledgedoesnotmeanthatknowledgeisthe
causeofthiscontent,andthefactthateveryobjectisgivenwithinourthoughtdoesnot
implythatitisreducedtoourthought.27Heaffirmstheoriginalalterityoftheobjectof
humanunderstanding28andrejectsanotionofepistemologyasthestudyofthinking
(wherethinkingisconsciousnessofacertainknowledge)infavorofastudyofknowledge
itself(asapprehensionofanobjectdistinctfromtheactofknowing).29
Moreparticularly,regardingourtopic,GilsonsaysthatKantisobligedtolocatethe
sourceoftheintelligibilityofexperienceinhumanknowingitself,becauseKanthad
rejectedthepossibilityofanintelligibledatum,ofsomethingexteriorthatcouldfecundate
rationalknowledge.30Inaratherhiddenreferencetotheagentintellect(rarelymentioned
inthetwoessaysexamined),Gilsonadmitsthatthelightoftheintellectplaysarolein
formingtheintellectualprinciples,butnotthattheircontentcomesfromit.Thecontentof
thefirstprincipleshasitssourceinthesensibledata,andGilsonisclearlyrejectingthe
25Cf.RC139-141.26Cf.RM82,101,106-107.27Cf.RM97.28Cf.RM66.29Cf.RM101-103.30Cf.RC168,173.
14
interpretationofAquinasthatwouldmakeofthefirstprinciplessomethinglikeapriorilaws
tobeappliedtosensibility.31
Gilsondeniestheagentintellectthecharacterofanaprioriconditionofhuman
knowingand,thus,mayseemtoopposethecurrentlyproposedviewoftheagentintellect
asametaphysicalapriori.Whatheactuallyopposes,however,istheagentintellectasa
Kantianandformalapriori;heaffirms,instead,thatthefacultiesofknowing,inatruly
ThomisticandAristotelianprospective,arepsychologicalfacultiesandthereforebeings.32
Now,inwhatsensedoesGilsonadmitthatthesourceofintellectualcontentisin
experienceratherthaninthesubjectitself?ForGilson,theuniversaliscausedby
experience,butitisnot“in”experience,becauseitisnotreal.Thatistosay,Gilsonbelieves
thatthereissomethingintheindividualobjectofexperience(itsnature)thatisthesource
oftheintelligiblecontent,notthoughinsofarasitisintuitedinsomeway,butinsofarasitis
thecauseofthesensiblemanifestations,whichareinturnthecauseofourconcept.The
intelligiblecontent(forGilson,thequidditas)isrelatedtothenaturethatisinreality,not
thoughasthatsamenatureinadifferentmodeofbeing,butasanintelligibleeffectofthat
natureinintelligence.33ThisiswhyGilsoncanrejecttheKantianapproach,sayingthatthe
sourceoftheuniversalisaposteriori,andatthesametimecandenytheuniversalas
contentanyexistenceinreality.ThedifferencebetweenGilson’sinterpretationandthe
currentoneproposedhereispreciselythefactthathedeniesanidentitybetweenthe
contentofourconceptandthenatureofthethingitself;thisdenialresults,itseems,from
31Cf.RC200-202.32Cf.RC137-138.33Cf.RC218-223.
15
hisoverlookingSt.Thomas’insistencethatthedifferentmodeofbeingofthesameobject
doesnotchangetheobjectitself.34
InthissenseGilsonaffirmsthattheintellectconceiveswhatitdoesnotperceive,
because“man”and“existence”aremerelyconceptsoftheintellect,andnotsomethingreal
andconcrete.35Still,heacknowledgeswithSt.Thomasthattheintelligibleisinthethings
themselves,andthatwethinkitinthephantasmbecauseitisthere.36Butinwhatsense,if
theyarejustconcepts,andonlythesingularexists?37Whatisthereisnotwhatweconceive
(quidditas)butthatfromwhichweconceive,theessence,andthatiswhywemaysaythat
weknowthequidditasofthesensiblenatures,andnotthenatureitself.38Classicrealism,
hesays,restsonthefactthatourknowledgetrulyattainsthereal,becauseitiscausedinus
bytherealitself,andnotbyanallegedintuitionoftheintelligible.39Thereason,forGilson,
thattheessencesofthesensiblethingscannotbeintuitedisthattheirformsare“purely
intelligible.”Thisstatementistrulysurprisinggiventhat,forSt.Thomas,thereasonthey
cannotbeseenintheirnaturalmodeofbeingispreciselytheopposite.Thereason,
accordingtoSt.Thomas,isthattheyarenotintelligibleinact,whichispreciselywhySt.
Thomasintroduces,withAristotle,theagentintellect.
34Idonotclaimthatthisintentionalidentityisperfect(itislimitedbytheprecisionofthe
phantasmineachsubjectandbythepossibilitiesofhumanexperience),butIdoclaimthatwhatisknownispreciselywhatthethingis.Onedoesnotneedtoknowsomethingperfectlytosaythatoneknowsit.
35Cf.RC204.36Cf.RC208.37Cf.RC210,RM73.38Cf.RC218-219.39Cf.RC222-223.Hewillsaythattheintellect“seesdirectly”theconcept(cf.RC215),but
becausehedoesnottake“concept”astherealthingitself.
16
TheveryvaluableinsightinGilson’sapproachisthattheintelligiblecontentcomes
fromthethingsthemselves.Thedifficulty,however,ishisinterpretationwithregardtothe
objectofintelligence.Thatis,becauseGilsondoesnotdifferentiatethemodeofbeingthe
objecthasinrealityfromthemodeofbeingtheobjecthasinthemind,hedeniesthe
identitybetweenthem,andunderstandsthecontentofknowingasaneffectofthenatures
ofthingsthroughtheirsensibleeffects.Inthisway,morethananintentionalidentity,he
seemstoproposeanintentional“proportion”betweenthecontentofknowingandthe
naturesofthings,theproportionbetweencauseandeffect.40Inthecurrentlyproposed
interpretationofSt.Thomas,instead,theagentobjectisanintelligibleinact(notthe
sensiblephantasm)whichrepresentsthethingitself,onlyinitsnature,abstractedfromthe
individualconditionsinthematter.
JosephOwens
JosephOwens(1908-2005),inhisCognition:AnEpistemologicalInquiry41intuitsthe
mostimportantelementsofThomisticGnoseology,includingthetwomodesofbeingthat
explaincognition,42thealterityoftheobjectofknowing,43theintentionalidentitybetween
objectandsubject,theoriginoftheuniversalcontentinsensiblethings.44Still,whenit
40Inthissensetheformalidentityorconvenientiainformabetweensubjectandobject
whichGilsonproposesinRM56-57maybeunderstood.IwillcomebacktothisinChapter3,whentreatingtheAristotelianidentity.
41Cf.JosephOwens,Cognition:AnEpistemologicalInquiry(Houston:CenterforThomisticStudies,1992).Inthissection,Iwillquoteonlythepagenumberofthiswork.
42Cf.38-40;45note22;351-353;357-358.43Cf.3;33-35;326-327.44Cf.70andnote5;82(interpretationdoesnotaddanyradicallynewcontent);334,cf.also
343note28.
17
comestohisfinalsynthesis,Owensdoesnotseemtocreateaconvincingsystem,45nordoes
heappeartorecreatetheThomistone.46
ThemaintensionbetweentheviewbeingproposedhereinandOwens’viewishis
lackofproperdistinctionbetweencontentandmodeofbeingofthecontent.Hedeniesthe
commonnature–initself–anyreality.47TheaforementionedlackofdistinctionleadsOwens
toaffirmthattheabstractedobjectisidenticalwiththewholeindividual,butwithout
explaininginwhatsense,then,theyaredifferent,oronwhatgroundsthereisanidentity.48
Inpp.324-325,Owensinitiallydeniesthenatureinitselfanykindofbeing,andthensays
thatoneandthesameobjecthasthetwokindsofbeing.Now,ifitisnothinginitself,how
canthenatureadmitevenonekindofbeing?Whathemeanstosayisevident;thatis,that
thenatureneverexistswithoutoneofthesetwomodesofbeing.However,thismeans
preciselythat,inbothmodesofbeing,thenatureitselfispresent,oneandthesame.In
otherwords,whatiscommontobothmodesofbeingispresentineachofthem.Whatis
45Forexample,Ifoundparticularlychallenginghisconclusionsontheproblemofthe
universals,cf.154-158.46Cf.140andnote2,whereheimpliesthattheissueoftheagentintellectisnotaconcern
inEpistemology.Now,Aquinas’recoursetotheagentintellectiscrucialtounderstandhisapproachtotheproblemoftheuniversals,whichisthemostimportantprobleminEpistemology.
47Cf.154ff,whereheclaimsthatthereisnothingcommonreallyexistingintheindividuals,becausethenatureexistsinthemindividualizedonly,notascommon;171,“Youcannotgiveauniversal,oranatureascommon,anyrealexistence”andOwensrefersheretop.163note19,wherewefindthetextofDeEnte,3.85-87Leonineed.:“…humannatureisnotfoundinindividualsasone…”(mytrans.)[…noninveniturinindividuisnaturahumanasecundumunitatem…]Inthatplace,however,St.ThomasisclearlyreferringtothePlatonicuniversal,whichisonenumericallyforalloftheindividuals.TheAristoteliannatureisonespecificallyinalloftheindividuals,andthereforetrulycommoninthatsense.Thepointisthat,forSt.Thomas,thereisarealdistinctionbetweentheessenceofathinganditsindividuatingprinciples,thoughnotarealseparation.Theyarenotthesamething(thing=co-principle,aswhenAristotlecallsmatteracertain“substance”),despitethefactthattheyaretogetherinthesamething(thing=substanceinitsfirstmeaning,therealparticularthing).Thisisoneofthemostimportantelementsinmyinterpretation.
48Cf.141-143.
18
this?Itisthecontent,whichisone.But,becauseOwens’viewconfusesthenumericalunity
oftheconceptwiththespecificunityofthecontent,hecannotadmitthatthenatureitself
isone.And,therefore,hesays:“anyexistencewhatsoeverwouldtieit[thenature]
inexorablytoeithertheparticularortheuniversalandwouldrenderimpossiblethe
thoroughgoingidentityofpredicatewithsubjectthatisrequiredforsayingtheoneisthe
other.”49ThisseemspreciselytheoppositeofwhatSt.ThomassaysinInMet.1,lect.10,
15850andSummaI,84,1,c.;thatis,St.Thomasholdsthatitisnotnecessaryforthething
understoodtoexistinrealitywiththesamemodeofbeingasithasintheintellect,asPlato
thought.ForAquinas,thesamethingadmitstwomodesofbeing.InOwens’interpretation,
thethingunderstoodcannotbeseparatedfromitsmodeofbeing,whichisthesame
problemfoundinPlato.
AnotherhermeneuticproblemapparentinOwensisacertainconfusionbetween
intentionalandrealidentityinhumanknowing,thatis,betweentheidentitysubject-object
(“animaestquodammodoomnia”),andtheidentityintellect-species(“intellectuminactu
estintellectusinactu”,whichherewillbecalledthe“Aristotelianidentity”).51InChapter3it
willbeshownhow,forAquinas,theyaredifferent.Theintellectinactandthespeciesby
whichitunderstands52areoneassubjectivepotencyanditsownsubjectiveact,i.e.,they
49350,myemphasis.50ThelastnumberinthequotesfromtheCommentarytotheAristotelianMetaphysicsisthe
paragraphnumberoftheeditionIused(cf.Bibliography).51Althoughboth“identities”canbereferredtoAristotle,weprefertocallafterthe
Philosophertheonethatistrulyanidentity(becausereal),whichisalsotheonethatmostfrequentlyconfusestheinterpretersofAquinas.
52Clearly,forSt.Thomas,itisnotthefacultywhichoperates,butthesubjectthroughthefaculty.Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10ad15:“Nowitmustnotbesaidthattheagentintellect
19
areoneandthesamerealthing.Buttheintellectandthethingunderstoodareoneina
differentway,onlyquodammodo,insofarastheperfectionofanotherthingispresentinthe
knower.Inotherwords,thespeciesistheintellectinactbuttheobject,representedinthe
species,isnottheintellectitself.Aswewillsee,this“confusionofidentities”isatworkin
otherinterpretationsofSt.Thomasaswell.53Connectedwiththislackofdifferentiationof
theidentitiesisthat,forOwens,bothsubjectandobjectareknownsimultaneously,
althoughtheknowerindirectly.54Thisconfusionjeopardizestheoriginalalterityofthe
objectofknowing.
ItisclearthatOwensintendstoopposetheviewofknowingwhichattributestothe
subjectalloftheresponsibilityfortheintellectualcontentofhumancognition.55Inthat
sense,Owensisverymuchinlinewiththecurrentlyproposedviewoftheagentintellectas
ametaphysicalapriori,ascauseofanintelligiblemodeofbeing,andnotoftheobjectitself.
Owensstates,“Thepercipientgivesexistencetotheactivitiesofsensiblecognitionand
perception,inwhichnonewobjectisproducedbutnewcognitionalexistenceisgiventoan
alreadyreallyexistentthing.Inintellectionthenaturesofthethingsareabstractedand
understandsinisolationfromthepossibleintellect,butthatthemanunderstandsbymeansofboth…”[Nonestautemdicendumquodintellectusagensseorsumintelligatabintellectupossibili:sedhomointelligitperutrumque…]Still,tosimplifytheexpression,manytimesthefacultywillbereferredtoastheone“doing”things.
53ForOwens,cf.41-43;142-143;348.AninterestingtextfromOwensquotedbyStump:“Youarethethingsperceivedorknown.Knowerandthingknown[…]becomeoneandthesameintheactualityofcognition.Fromthestrictlyepistemologicalstandpoint,thisthoroughgoingidentityofknowerandthingknownisthemostimportantandmostfundamentaltenetintheAristotelianconceptionofknowledge”(Stump,274,andinnote:“Owens1992,p.114.”ThequoteisnotfromhisCognition,althoughfromthesameyear).
54Cf.39;46;49:bothknown,thedifferencebeinginfocusonly,whichatfirstisontheobject;348:thereisaquestionofwhichoneisepistemologicallyprior.
55Cf.9;40;320.
20
givencognitionalexistencebytheknower.”56Still,ifthenaturesofthethingsarenotseen
astrulydistinctfromtheirindividualconditionsinthematter,theoriginoftheuniversal
contentisatriskofbeingseenasdependentonthefunctionsofthesubject,orperhaps
merelyaneffectoftheobjectofperception,57asinGilson.
EleonoreStump
EleonoreStump(1947-)58offersclearinsightintosomeofthemostimportant
elementsofThomisticEpistemology,butcertainprinciples,probablycomingfromher
philosophicalviews,canbeseenasinterferingwithanaccurateinterpretationofSt.
Thomas.
LetusbeginbyexaminingthepositiveelementsofStump’sinterpretation,as
follows.Knowingisverifiedbythereceptionofaspeciesinthefaculty,andthereisa
distinctionbetweenphantasmandintelligiblespecies.59Theintellect’sproperobjectisthe
particularthing’suniversalnature60andtheactoftheintellectisa“discovering”(rather
thancreatingorinventing)featuresoftheexternalworldthatareindependentfromthe
operationsoftheintellect;61inotherwords,thesourceofintelligiblecontentisinthethings
themselves.Assheherselfsays:“Aquinassupposesthatthecookiedoughofrealitycomes
56320.57Cf.40-43.58Cf.EleonoreStump,Aquinas(NewYork:Routledge,2003).Therelevantessaysare:
“FoundationsofKnowledge”(pp.217ff)and“TheMechanismsofCognition”(pp.244ff).Iwillquoteonlythepagenumber.
59Cf.17-18.60Cf.19.61Cf.231.
21
pre-cutintoparticularkindsofthings;and,unlikeKantians,Aquinasassumesthatweall
naturallyrecognizethoseverykindsofthingswiththenaturestheyreallyhave.”62
AmostinsightfulelementinStump’swork,intermsofAquinas’Epistemology,isher
recognitionoftheimportanceofdistinguishingthetwomodesofbeingoftheformofthe
known;thatis,respectively,itsmodeofbeinginrealityanditsmodeintheknower.Thatis
whytheonewhoknowstheformofathingdoesnotbecomeinrealitythatthingitself,but
onlycognitionally.Forher,however,thecognitionalreceptionofaformisstillamaterial
receptionoftheformoftheknown,accordingtowhatmightbecalledher“encoded
informationtheory.”63InStump’swords:
Thereceptionis“spiritual”or“immaterial”inthesensethat,forexample,thewayinwhichthematterofDNAcontainstheformsofhemoglobindoesnotturnthematteroftheDNAintohemoglobin.Or,asAquinaswouldputit,theDNAisassimilatedtotheproteinasregardstheformbutnotasregardsthematter.Aquinas’s“spiritual”receptionofformsisthuslikethecodingofmapsorblueprints.Thisis,ofcourse,alsothewayweourselvesthinksensationoccurs,encodedinformationbeingreceivedinvirtueofachangeinthematterofacorporealsenseorgan.64
Aftergiving,asanexample,thepresenceoftheformoftheproteinintheDNA,and
speakingaboutsensibleknowing,shesays:
WhatAquinasreferstoasthespiritualreceptionofanimmaterialform,then,iswhatwearemorelikelytocallencodedinformation[…]Scholarshavedisputedthepoint,butIthinkthatthetextsaredecisivelyinfavoroftheconclusionthat,forthesenses,thespiritualreceptionofsensiblespeciesisachangeinthematterofthebodilyorganofthesense.65
62265-266.63Cf.17;250-253.64254.65Cf.253.
22
Afewlineslater,sheinterpretsAquinas’textasifhehimselfweresuggestingthat
theintentionalreceptionisamaterialreception.66Sheclaimsalsothatthesenseswouldbe
madeintointellect,accordingtoAquinas,werewetoacceptanimmaterialreceptionofa
forminthesenses,andadds:“Itisthereforeclearlypossibleonhisviewforthespiritual
receptionofanimmaterialformtoconsistinthealterationofmatter.”67
Theseconceptsareappliedtotheintellectalsosince,forher,itisclearthatAquinas
“turnsouttohavebeenwronginhisviewthattheintellectusesnobodilyorgan.”68Atthe
conclusionofChapter8,shesays:
Inthemodeinwhichtheformisinthethingcognized,theformmakesthatthingwhatitis–awolf,say.Butinthemodeinwhichtheformisinthethingcognized[sic],69spirituallyorintentionally,asencodedinformation,itdoesnotmakethecognizerbeawolf.Althoughwhenitisinthecognizer,itisthesameformastheforminthewolf,thedifferenceofmodemakesitthecasethatthecognizerdoesnotliterallyturnintoawolfwhencognizingone.70
Apparently,Stumpdoesnotcarryallthewaytoitsfinalconsequencestheprinciple
ofintentionalityandofthetwomodesofbeing;instead,shereducestheThomistic
intentionalmodeofbeingtothematerialone(“encodedinformationtheory”),andthatis
whyshecanwonderwhetherthisThomisticprinciplemakesanysenseinthejustificationof
knowing.71Becausesheviewsthepresenceoftheformintheknowerasamaterialcopy,
66SheinterpretsAquinas’statement:“Andsoitmustbethatasensereceivescorporeally
andmateriallythesimilitudeofthethingwhichissensed.”(InDAII.12.377,cf.Stump,253),andasimilartextofQDVII.5ad2(cf.254note40)asifSt.Thomasweresaying“materially”intherealsense,andnot“withthematerialconditions”,whichisaqualificationofthecontent,notofthemodeofbeingofthecontentintheknower.
67Cf.254.68Cf.264.69Ithinkitisclearthatshemeansnot“thingcognized”but“cognizer.”70275,myemphasis.71Cf.275-276.
23
Stumpisnotconvinced;sheknowsthatforSt.Thomasthetwomodesofbeingarethe
explanation,andthisishergreathermeneuticinsightinAquinas;butbecauseherapproach
doesnotseemtofullyappreciatethemeaningandtheconsequencesofsuchadistinction,
shecannotseehowthiscanbeaplausibleexplanationofknowing.Thesuggestion72canbe
madethat,forAquinas,twomodesofbeingmeanspreciselytwomodesofbeing,suchthat
thetwocannotbereducedtoone.Thetheoryoftwomodesofbeingpresupposesthefact
ofknowingaspresenceoftheobjecttothesubject,ascommunionoftwo.Thedoctrineof
Aquinascanmakesenseonlyfromthat“Thomisticfact.”Whetherornotthatfactisgranted
isanotherstory.73
Finally,asregardsAquinas’text,Stumpappearsnottodifferentiatebetweenwhat
wecallintentionalidentity(subject–object,animaestquodammodoomnia)and
Aristotelianidentity(speciesandfacultyofknowing,intellectuminactuestintellectusin
actu).Shesays:“WearenowinapositiontounderstandAquinas’sfrequentlyrepeated,
frequentlycitednotionthat‘allcognitionarisesfromtheassimilationofthecognizertothe
thingcognized’,that‘theintellectinactisthethingunderstoodinact’,sothat‘thesoulis
allthings’.”74Aquinasmakesadistinctionbetweentheseidentities,aswewillseein
72InChapter2,IwillelaborateuponthistheoryofthetwomodesofbeinginAquinas.73RegardingotherEpistemologicalmattersingeneral,Stumpdoesnotbelievethatthe
EpistemologyofAquinascanholditselfwithoutrecoursetotheprinciplethatGodcreatedthefacultiesofknowingandthereforetheyfunctionproperlyandarereliable(cf.21,234,276).Shealsosupposesthat,forSt.Thomas,thefirstprinciplesarenotindubitable(cf.231);andthathisreliabilisticandoptimistictheoryofknowledgewouldnotbeabletoovercomeskepticaldoubts(cf.237).
74273.Cf.Stump,17,whereAquinas’viewofknowledgeissaidtoinvolve“…somesortofformalidentitybetweentheextramentalobject(O)andthecognizingfaculty(F)initsactuallycognizingO.However,Aquinastakesthat(Aristotelian)identityclaimtomeanonlythattheformofOissomehowinF[innote:85,2ad1].”IwouldsuggestthatSt.Thomasinthattextisnotapplying
24
Chapter3.Itistobenoted,however,thatsometimestheissuemaybeamatteronlyof
textualinterpretationbecausesomeauthors,whomisreadAquinas’text,dounderstand
thatthereisadifferencebetweenthespeciesandtheobjectknown,andthatthereisa
differencebetweenthetwowaysof“receiving”theform.Thisseemstobetrueinthecase
ofStump.75Still,itisimportanttonoticethistextualmisinterpretationbecauseitmayresult
inascribingtoSt.Thomasanidentitybetweensubjectandobjectwhichwouldbeforeignto
hismind.
ArmandA.Maurer
TheworkofArmandMaurer(1915-2008)76rendersaperfectunderstandingofthe
problemofintellectualknowledge,thatis,howitispossiblethatuniversaltruthscome
fromexperience.Hedoesnotbelievethattheuniversalessencehasanyotherkindof
existenceoutsidethemindandtherefore,forMaurer,universalitymustbeasubjective
aspectofhumanknowing,dependingonthespiritualityofthesubject,andgroundedin
somewayintherealityofexperience.Also,becausethehumansubjectishistorical,and
realityalsoissubjecttocontingency,thereisnosuchthingascreatedeternaltruth.Maurer
believesthatthisdoctrinecouldbesubstantiatedonThomisticprinciples,althoughhe
theAristotelianidentitytotheintentional,butsayingthattheformer(realidentityspecies-intellect)doesnotjeopardizethelatter(whichisakindofidentitywithsomethingotherthanourselves).
75Cf.249-250.76AllofthequotesarefromArmandA.Maurer,BeingandKnowing:StudiesinThomas
AquinasandLaterMedievalPhilosophers(Toronto:PontificalInstituteofMediaevalStudies,1990).Therelevantessaysare“St.ThomasandEternalTruths”(pp.43ff)and“St.ThomasandHistoricity”(pp.95ff).Wewillindicatepagenumberonlyinthissection.
25
realizesthetensionswiththeactualdoctrineofAquinas.Herebeginsamoredetailed
explorationoftheseissues.
TheproblemofknowledgeissetupinverycleartermsbyMaurer.Paraphrasing
Fackenheim,Maurerwrites:“Itmustbeinquiredwhether,andifsohow,theworldof
experience,whichishistorical,canprovideagroundforuniversalandtranscendenttruth.”
Maurer’sgoalisclearinhisstatement:“Myconcerninthepresentlectureis[…]howSt.
ThomasAquinasaccountsforuniversalandnecessaryphilosophictruthsdrawnfroma
changingworldbytemporallysituatedhumans.”77
ThegreatesttensionbetweenMaurer’sviewandtheviewcurrentlybeingofferedis
thelackofdistinctioninMaurer’sviewbetweentheuniversalityofthecontentand
universalityasamodeofbeingofthecontent,adistinctionwhichwillbeshowncrucialfor
amoreaccurateinterpretationofAquinas.78Duetothislackofdistinction,Maurerdenies
theuniversalanyexistenceoutsidethemind.Anexampleofthisisfoundinhissection“St.
ThomasandEternalTruths”,79thefirstsectionwewillexamine:
Truth,St.Thomascontends,isoneofthosenotionsthathaveafoundationinrealitybutreceivetheirformalcharacterandcompletionfromanactoftheintellect.Timeanduniversalsareotherexamplesofthistypeofnotion.Theydonotexistassuchoutsidethemind,thoughtheyhavesomebasisinreality.80
Nothingisstableinthechangingworld.Thisiswhy,forMaurer,theeternityoftruth
impliestherealimmutabilityofitssubject,whichisgivenonlyinGod.Maurerstates:“Ifwe
taketruthtobetheinherentmeasureoftruethings(thetruthwefindinthingsandin
7796-97,note3.78Cf.Chapter2.7943-58.8046.
26
createdintellectsandtheirpropositions),thentruthisnoteternal,forneitherthethings
themselvesnortheintellectsinwhichtruthinheresexistforalleternity.”81Andso,in
humanbeings,Maurertransformsthehistoricityofthesubjectiveintelligiblebeingintothe
historicityoftheintelligiblecontent.
AproblemarisesfromMaurer’snotdifferentiatingsufficientlybetweenwhat
Aquinassaysabouteternaltruths(adiscussionregardingthesubjectivebeingofjudgments
orideas)82andthenecessityoruniversalityoftruthingeneral,inreferencetothecontent
ofthosejudgmentsorideas.Maurerhimselfreferstheterm“eternity”toa“modeof
durationofbeing”which,assuch,belongstoGodalone.83ItisinthissensethatAquinas
deniestheexistenceofeternaltruthsoutsidethedivinemind.DoesMaurermeantosay
thesame?Maurer’sremarkstowardstheendofthearticleindicatethatheisgoingfurther:
Wehavealreadyremarkedthat[St.Thomas]doesnotascribeanessentialbeingtoessencestakenjustinthemselves.Thoughhegrantsthatessencesmaybeconsideredinthemselves,hedoesnotbelievetheyhaveabeingorentityinthemselves.Theonlybeingtheyhaveisthatofthesubjectinwhichtheyexist;inthemselvestheyaresimplynothing[…]ThereisnoroominSt.Thomas'thoughtforcreatedeternaltruths,forthiswouldimplythatGodcouldgivetruthseternalbeing,whichisreservedforhimalone[…]Onlyonthesuppositionthateternaltruthshaveakindofentityinthemselvesdoesthelatemedievalandearlymodernphilosophicaldiscussionconcerningtheirpossiblecreationornon-creation,andtheirpossibleindependenceofthedivinemindandwillmakesense[…].Butatthesametimedoesthisnoteliminatethedistinctionbetweennecessaryandcontingenttruths?Ifessencesperishwiththeexistencesofthings—iftheyhavenoessentialbeingoftheirowndistinctfromtheirexistentialbeing-sotoodonecessarypropositions,inwhichessentialpredicatesareattributedtoasubject.Thesepropositions,then,arenoteternalornecessarybutcontingenttruths.84
8148.82Cf.56.83Cf.56.8457,myemphasis.
27
Maurerisnolongerspeakingmerelyofthesubjectivebeingofthetruth,butofthe
necessityofthepropositions.Maurer’sconclusionisascribedtoSt.Thomas,whosays
“Thereisnonecessarytruthincreatures.”85Maurerhimself,however,hadrecognizedthat,
inthesameplace,St.Thomasmakesanimportantdistinction.Thatdistinctionisbetween
thetwowaysofregardinganatureoressence,onewaybeinginitself,theotherwaybeing
eitherasitexistsinrealityorasitexistsinthemind.Maurerhadalsogranted,withSt.
Thomas,thatthenatureinitselfcouldbecalledeternal.86ThusMaurerappearstosuggest
thefollowingreasoning:theessenceinitselfdoesnotexistexceptinoneofthosetwo
modesofbeing(inrealityorinthemind);now,neitherofthosetwomodesofbeingis
eternal;therefore,noessenceiseternalornecessary,andsonotruthaboutessencescan
benecessary.
Thisreasoning,however,raisesaquestion:isthisnotexactlytheerrormadeby
Plato,againstwhichSt.ThomaslinesupwithAristotle?87St.Thomasjustifiesthe
universalityandnecessityofhumanknowingbydistinguishingbetweenthewaynatures
existinrealityandinthemind,andnotbydenyingthatthoseverynaturesexistinthe
particular,asPlatodid.AndAquinasjustifiesabstractionnotbysayingthattheessences
needtoexistabstractedfromtheparticulardeterminations,asPlatowould,butbysaying
that,inthefirstoperation,weknowtheessencewithoutconsideringitsparticular
determinations.ForAquinas,thethingsthatexisttogethercanbeknownseparately,
becauseoneisnottheother,evenifonecannotexistwithouttheother.ForAquinas,two
8557,quotingInISent.,d.19,q.5,a.3.86Cf.51.87Cf.SummaI,84,1,c..
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“things”cancomposeone“thing”,asdoessenceandesse,actandpotency,matterand
form,substanceandaccidents,etc..Nocreaturecanbesaidtobewithoutcomposition,
eveniftheelementsofsomeofthesecompositionscannotexistseparatelyincreatures.
Thisisthefoundationofabstraction.
ForAquinas,thereisnoabsolutenecessityandstabilityinhumanknowingas
subjectivecharacteristic,norassomethingcomingfromthesubject:inthissensethereare
noeternaltruths.Butthereisstabilityandnecessityinhumanknowingonthesideofthe
object,becausethereisstabilityintheparticularrealityweknow,byreasonofitsspeciesor
nature.88Whatcomesfromthesubject,namelyfromtheagentintellect,isnotthis
objectivestabilitybutanintelligiblemodeofbeing,whichcanbeasnecessary89oras
contingentasanyothercreatedmodeofbeing.
Thesection“St.ThomasandHistoricity”,90cannowbeexamined.Here,Maurer
recognizesthat,forSt.Thomas,thereissuchathingasapermanentnatureoressencein
things,butMaurerqualifieshisownstatement:“St.Thomasneverdoubtedthatwehavea
permanentnatureoressencethatspecifiesusashumanbeings,buthewasequally
convincedthatwedonotknowthisnatureinitself.”91
UnderstandingclearlywhatAquinasmeansbythetemporalityoftruth,inthesense
ofthesubjectivetemporalityofourjudgmentoftruth,Maurerstates:“Thetruthofthe
88Cf.SummaI,84,1,c.;Chapter2.89Imustmentionatleastthat,forAquinas,thereissuchathingasnecessityincreated
beings(separatesubstances)aswell,whichisnecessitystrictlyspeaking,evenifitisnotabsoluteinthewaythatthenecessityofGodisabsolute.
9095-116.91104.
29
humanmind,onthecontrary,isnoteternalbuttemporal.St.Thomasleavesusinnodoubt
onthematter:‘Becauseourmindisnoteternal,neitheristhetruthofpropositionswhich
areformedbyuseternal,butithadabeginningintime.’”92Afewlineslaterhesays,
Humantruth,then,isnoteternal,andneitherisitunchangeable.OnceagainSt.Thomasisexplicit:"Thetruthofthedivinemindisunchangeable,butthetruthofourmindischangeable."Hedoesnotmeanthatatruth,sayofmetaphysicsormathematics,issubjecttochange,butthatthetruthofourintellectis.93
And,evenifMaurerdoesnotgivetothetruthanykindofexistenceoutsidethe
mind,hedoesnotconfoundthesubjectiveeternitywiththenecessityofthecontent
consideredjustinitself:
“Aretherenotinthemindofthemathematicianandmetaphysiciannecessarytruths,i.e.truthsthatcannotbeotherwise?St.Thomasdoesnotdenythis,orthat(asweshallsee)themindcanthinkaboutthesetruthsjustinthemselves,quiteapartfromtheirexistenceinanymind.Whatheisdenyingisthatanytruthexistsnecessarilyinacreatedmind.”94
However,thisisnotthequestionofhistoricityoftruth.ModernPhilosophyisnot
worriedabouttheeternityoftruthinthissense,butabouttheoriginofuniversalityand
necessityinhumancognitionasanobjectivecharacteristic,whichisalsoMaurer’sconcern
inthisarticle.95Forthisreason,onemaywonderwhyhedoesnotdistinguishbetweenthe
presenceofthenecessarycontentinthemindandinthethingsthemselves.Onemayalso
wonderwhyhesaysthatwe“canthinkaboutthesetruthsinthemselves,quiteapartfrom
theirexistenceinanymind,”anddoesnotadd“apartfromtheirexistenceinthethings
92109.93110.94111.95Cf.96-97,note3.
30
themselves.”Itseemsclearthat,forMaurer,thereasonisthattherearenosuchthingsas
universalityortruthinthethingsthemselves,butonlyinthemind.
Afewpageslaterhesaysthatwehavethe“abilitytoabstractnaturesfromspatial
andtemporalconditions.Wecanformuniversalconceptsandmakeuniversaljudgments
aboutthethingsweexperiencewhicharetruealwaysandeverywhere.”96Regarding
judgments,hesaysthatwecan,
[T]hinkaboutthemjustinthemselves,orabsolutely,abstractingfromtheexistencetheyhaveinamind.Wecanfocusourattentiononthem,withoutconsideringwhethertheyexisttemporallyinusoreternallyinGod.Wecandothesamethingwithanatureoressencewhenwethinkofitjustinitself,orabsolutely,withoutconsideringwhetheritexistsasauniversalinthemindorasanindividualinreality.97
Butdothosethingsexistinrealityornot?“Becausetruthscanbeconsidered
absolutelyorinthemselves,itistemptingtothinkthattheyhaveakindofentityin
themselves,distinctfromthebeingofthemindinwhichtheyexist.”98Heascribesthaterror
tothePlatonicdistinctionbetweentheesseessentiaeandtheesseexistentiae,whichis
certainlyforeigntothespiritofSt.Thomas.ButMaurerdoesnotseemtorealizethatitis
alsoPlatonictothinkthattheuniversaldoesnothaveanyotherbeingdistinctfromthe
beingithasinthemind,becauseitisPlatonictonotdistinguishthemodeofbeingofthe
natureinthemindfromthemodeofbeingithasinreality.99
Afewlineslater,MaurerappliestotheobjectivecontentoftruththatwhichAquinas
saysaboutthesubjectiveeternityoftruth,bysayingthatwecanreach“universaltruths
96113.97113-114.98114.99Cf.InMet.1,lect.10,158;Chapter2.
31
thattranscendthelimitsoftimeandmatter,whilefallingshortofeternity.”100Whatdoes
Maurermean?Universaltruths,thatis,objectiveuniversaltruths,arealesserdegreeof
eternity.However,theonlyeternitybeingdiscussedinAquinasisthesubjectiveeternityof
truth.InMaurer,therefore,thereappearstobeanidentificationbetweeneternityasa
conditionoftheobjectandasaconditionofthesubject,whichgoesbeyondtheintention
ofAquinas.Afterhavingdeniedanyexistenceoftheuniversalessenceoutsidethemind,
Maurerisaffirmingthatuniversalityisastateofhumanknowingdependentonthespecific
spiritualityofthehumansubject,whichisnoteternalbecausethehumanmindisnot
eternal.Inotherwords,thatbecausewehumanbeingssubjectivelytranscendmatterand
time,ouruniversalknowledgecanalsotranscendthem;101therefore,then,thatwhichgives
anaccountofthetranscendenceoftheobjectisthetranscendenceofthesubject.
Maurer’sunderstandingofAquinas’basicorientationisseenwherehesays,
“cognitionfromtheoutsetopensuponameaningfulworldbeyondcognition[…]onewhose
intelligibilityrevealsitselftothemindandwhichwecansharewithothers.”102These
remarksdonotnecessarilyimplythatheagreeswithSt.Thomas.Hetriestosupporta
theoryofhistoricityoftruthusingThomisticprinciples,namelythesubjectivetemporalityof
humantruthandthenon-existenceofessencesinastateofabstraction.However,Maurer
seemstooverlookamorefundamentalprinciple,thatbeingtheexistenceoftheuniversal
asnatureintheparticularthingsthemselves,theverybasisforSt.Thomas’position
regardingthisissue.Maurer,allthesame,hastherealmeritofdealingopenlyandclearly
100114.101Cf.113.102116.
32
withthemostimportantquestionforThomismtoday,thatbeingitsanswertoHistoricism
andtheKantianturntothesubject.
W.NorrisClarke
W.NorrisClarke(1915-2008),103inhisresearchonthesourcesandoriginalityof
Thomism,linesupenthusiasticallywithFabro.ItisinterestingtonotehowClarke’sslight
preferenceforaviewdifferentfromtheItalianphilosopher’sinthefirstarticle(forClarke,
St.ThomasisanAristotelianismspecifiedbyNeoplatonismratherthanviceversa,asFabro
wouldpropose),104becomesanalmostcompleteagreementwithFabrointhesecond.105In
thissense,Clarke’sworkcanserveasaperfectintroductiontoFabro’soverallinterpretation
ofAquinas.
Asidefromthis,andforthepresentstudy,Clarke’smostimportantandpertinent
insighthastodowiththeroleofthemetaphysicalnotionofparticipationasregardsthe
problemoftheuniversalsandabstraction.ThisnotionhelpsAquinastoexplainthe
realizationoftheoneinthemany,insuchawaythatthereisarealcompositioninthe
manybetweenparticipatedperfectionandparticipant(participationalwaysimpliesa
composition)and,atthesametime,thereisanabsolutemetaphysicaldistinctionbetween
theparticipantsandtheseparateperfection(thatis,God).TheThomisticnotionof
participation,understoodinthisway,impliesadoublemetaphysicaldistinction:a
103Cf.W.NorrisClarke,SJ.,ExplorationsinMetaphysics:Person,God,Being(NotreDame:
UniversityofNotreDamePress,1994,reprinted2008).Therelevantessaysare:"TheLimitationofActbyPotencyinSaintThomas:AristotelianismorNeoplatonism?"(pp.65ff)and"TheMeaningofParticipationinSaintThomas"(pp.89ff).
104Cf.82.105Cf.98.
33
distinctionintrinsictotheparticipant(betweenparticipatedformandparticipantpotency)
andadistinctionbetweenthebeingbyparticipationandtheintensiveunlimitedsource,the
beingperessentiam.CrucialtothisThomisticnotionisthat“participation”isapplied
analogicallytothedifferentmetaphysicallevels(esse–essence,form–matter,substance-
accident,etc.)andthatthereisalsoanalogybetweenitsmetaphysicalandlogicaluses.
Therelevanceforourtopiccomesfromthenotionofparticipationasthe
explanationorconditionofpossibilityoftherealpresenceoftheone(=thespecifically
common)inthemany.Theuniversalnatureispresentinalloftheindividualsthat
participateit.Andthis,inturn,willbetheconditionofpossibilityofabstraction,aswillbe
seen.Clarke,byinterpretingAquinas’notioninametaphysicalsense,agreesbasicallywith
theinterpretationofAquinasbeingproposedinthisthesis.
Clarke’sreadingofPlatoisveryhelpful,whereClarkesays:“Inadditiontothe
obviousdefectinthePlatonictheoryofitsconfusionbetweenthelogicalandthe
ontologicalorders,wewouldliketocallattentiontoanotherdeficiencytoofrequently
overlooked”,106adeficiencythat,inClarke’smind,isPlato’sinabilityto“expressthe
participationstructureintermsofthelimitedreceptionbytheparticipantsofaperfection
thatexistsinitssourceinastateofillimitationorinfinity.”107Inotherwords,whatis
“obvious”toClarkeisthatPlatowantstheontologicalordertoperfectlyparallelthelogical
order(lackofdistinctionbetweenthetwomodesofbeingoftheobjectofknowing)anda
furtherdefect(consequenceofthefirstone)isPlato’soverlookingthefactthatthesame
10690.10790.
34
perfectionisrealizedintwodifferentwaysintheparticipantandinthesource.Thishelpsus
toseethat,forClarke,Thomisticparticipationimpliesthepresence(thoughlimited)ofthe
source’sperfectionintheparticular.
ClarkeseessimilardefectsinthetheoryofparticipationheldbyAquinas’
Neoplatonicsources,forexample,thetheory’s“lackofcleardistinctionbetweengenuine
ontologicalparticipationsandmerelogicalsubordinationofabstractconcepts.”108Clarke
continues:
St.Thomas’soriginalityhasconsistedintheskillwithwhich,guidedbyhiskeensenseofanalogyandofthedifferencebetweentheontologicalandtheconceptualorders(alwayssoblurredintheNeoplatonists),hehasadaptedthisframeworktoarealisticmetaphysicsofexistenceandanepistemologyofabstraction.109
Thisisaveryinsightfulremark.AsClarkeseemstoimply,whatallowsSt.Thomasto
givetheworldrealityistoadmitthatperfection(andthusbeing)canbelimited(andsoina
particularindividual),thankstothenotionofparticipation.Thereisnoneedtodenyor
diminishtherealityoftheparticular,becausetheperfectionoftheuniversalsubstancescan
befoundinthem,althoughinalimitedway.AndneitheristhereaneedforAquinasto
postulateaseparatesourceofintelligiblecontentthatcouldmatchtheuniversalityofour
concepts:thecontentofourconceptsisinthethingsthemselves(participatednature).For
thisreason,thatwhichexplainsknowingisabstractionfromtheindividual,andnotan
illuminationfromabove(inthesenseofaparticipationoftheagentobjectitself110).
ThedoctrineofparticipationisforClarke,
10891.10995.110InChapter4wewillseeinwhatsenseAquinasadmitsadivineilluminationinnatural
humanknowing,namelyasaparticipatedlightthat“makesintelligible.”
35
atheoryforrenderingintelligiblea“many”inanyorderintermsofahigherone,inotherwords,forexplainingthecommonpossessioninmanysubjectsofagivenattribute,whetherinthelogicalortheontologicalorder,byreferencetoahighersourcefromwhichallreceiveorparticipateinsomewaytheperfectiontheypossessincommon.111
NotehowClarkesupposesthattheperfectionisontologicallypossessedincommon
bythoseparticipatingit.Thesamecanbeinferredfromhisconsiderationofthe
participatedbeingasacompositeunity.ForClarke,Aquinasmanagestomakesenseofthe
unityoftheparticipatedbeingbystrengtheningtheNeoplatonicnotionofparticipation
withtheAristoteliantheoryofactandpotency;thisisbecause,intheend,whatrequiredan
explanationwastheunityoftheparticipatedbeing,notitscomposition.Clearly,Clarke
considersthat,forSt.Thomas,thereisacompositionofperfectionandlimitingpotency,
whichistosaythatbotharepresentyetdistinct:
Inotherwords,whatSt.ThomashasdoneistoputhisfingeronwhatwasperhapsthegreatestsingleweaknessoftheNeoplatonicdoctrinethroughoutitswholetradition,namely,thelackofanyadequatemetaphysicalexplanationtosafeguardtheintrinsicunityofthecompositionsresultingfromparticipation.112
ForClarke,whatispresentineachindividualcouldverywellbecalleda“common
nature,”presenttotallyandequallyineachmemberofthespecies:
Sinceeverymemberofaspeciesreceivesitsspecificformtotallyandequallyinthequalitativeorder,limitationherecanmeanonlyrestrictioninthespatial-quantitativeorderbycomparisonwithasourcewhichcanexistonlyintentionallyasanideainamind,whereitisendowedwithaninfinitythatisonlythenegativeinfinityofindeterminationofauniversalideaassuch.113
11192.11296.11397.IthinkitisevidentthatClarkeisnotsuggestingthattheuniversalinthehumanmind
isthesourceofthenatureintheindividuals,asifthepresenceintheindividualwereexplainedbyouractofjudgment,etc..Thecontextofthearticlediscouragessuchaninterpretation.Fabro
36
TheThomisticdoctrineofparticipationis“appliedwithaconsummatesenseof
analogytothedifferentordersbothofrealityandofideas.”114
ItisimportanttohavementionedClarkeatthebeginningofthisstudy,notonlyfor
hiscloseconnectionwithFabro,butparticularlyforraisingthenotionofparticipationin
relationtothetheoryofabstraction.115Clarkehelpsustoseethatthenotionof
participation,oncethelimitsofPlatohavebeenovercome,andoncethenotionitselfhas
beencompletedbytheAristotelianframeworkofactandpotency,isabletoresolvethe
problemoftheoneandthemany.Themanyareone,becausetheoneperfectionis
participated(partlyrealized)ineachofthem;buttheyarestillmanybecause,togetherwith
theparticipatedperfection,thereisapotencythatentersintocompositionwiththe
perfection.Theuniversalandnecessaryknowledge,then,correspondstorealitybecauseit
ispossibletoknowseparatelythethingsthatarereallydistinct(realcompositionofthe
participatedbeing),althoughnotreallyseparated(realunityofactandpotency).
Inotherwords,theThomistictheoryofabstraction,ascurrentlybeingproposed,
wouldnotmakeanysenseifitwerenotatleastplausiblethatsomethinglikeacommon
perfection,specificnatureoressenceexistsintheparticularindividual.Thisalonewould
makesenseofthecurrentclaimthat,forAquinas,theuniversalcontentcomesfrom
outsidethemind.Now,theThomisticnotionofparticipation,becauseitspeaksofasingle
(=oneascommon)perfectionthatisrealizedindifferentsubjects,seemstoofferthat
explainsthenotionandchallengesofpredicamentalparticipationandunivocalparticipationinNMP,143ff.
11498.115Cf.95,quotedabove.
37
plausibleexplanationoftheonebeingpresentinthemany,andoftherealdistinctionof
theco-principlesintheindividualsubstance.
JohnF.X.Knasas
JohnKnasas(1948-)116sharesthebasicinterpretationofAquinasofferedinthis
thesis.KnasasconsidersAquinasanaposteriorism,holdingthattheintellectualcontent
comesfromthesensiblethings,andthatthecognitivepowersdonotformallyconstitute
theobject.FurtherinterpretationincommonwithKnasasincludesthealterityinknowing,
thedistinctionbetweentwomodesofbeingoftheobjectastheexplanationofknowing,
andtheunderstandingofintentionalidentityinknowing.
Knasasgivesus,asitwere,adefinitionofaformalaprioriasregardsintellectual
knowing.Forhim,TranscendentalThomismholds“therevisionistclaimthatAquinas’
understandingofthehumanintellectincludesacrucialaprioridimensionfunctioningasa
constitutivefactorinourconsciousnessofobjects.”117Infact,Knasassays:
Maréchal,Rahner,andLonerganallregardthedynamismoftheintellecttowardsBeingasaconstitutivefactorforourconsciousnessofbeings[later,quotingMaréchal]‘forthesubjectisreallyknowingassuchonlytotheextentthatheformallytakespartintheedificationoftheobject’.118
Theoppositeofthisaprioristvisionisexplainedinthefollowingterms:
BycallingAquinasanaposterioristIamnotdenyingtheelaboratestructureofknowingpowersinthehumansoul,e.g.,externalsenses,commonsense,imagination,agentandpossibleintellects.Isimplymeanthatinrelationtoactual
116Cf.JohnF.X.Knasas,“TranscendentalThomismandDeVeritateI,9,”inThomisticPapers
VI,ed.JohnKnasas(Houston:CenterforThomisticStudies,1994),229–250(abbreviatedTTDV);JohnF.X.Knasas,“WhyforLonerganKnowingCannotConsistin'TakingaLook,'”ACPQ78,no.1(2004):131–150(abbreviatedWLTL).InthereferencesofthissectionIwillomitKnasas’name.
117TTDV230,cf.232.118TTDV232,cf.WLTL132-133,note2.
38
cognition,thesepowersarepureconditionsforknowledge.Thestructureoftheknowingpowerperformsnoconstitutiverolevis-à-vistheknownobject.119
Thatistosay,KnasasdoesnotdenyinAquinasan“activity”ofknowing,theevident
subjectiveaspectofknowing,buthedoesnotseethatactivityasconstitutiveoftheobject.
HowthisactiveaspectlooksinKnasas’accountcanbetakenfromhisremarks:“Inmy
opinion,thenature-as-finalityidea[ofMaréchal]asappliedtotheintellectneedmeanonly
theintellect’sordinationtoabstractintelligiblecontentfromthereal.Byitselftheideafails
tomeananyprojectionofcontentuponthedata.”120Inotherwords,forKnasas,the
oppositeofaformalaprioriisasubjectivitythattakesfromrealitytheintelligiblecontent.
Suchsubjectivityisabletotakefrom,nottoprojectupon,nortoproduce:
Whattheintellecthasofitselfisnotadrivetothenotionofbeingthatisthenusedconstitutivelyinregardtosense.Rather,theintellectofitselfisinclinedtoabstracttheratioentisfromthesensedatathatitcanappreciateasreal[…]LonerganandTranscendentalThomistsassumethateveryinclinationofapowerisaninclinationtoimposeatendency.Butinclinationcanalsobeaninclinationtoabstractratherthantoproject.121
Knasassays:“BothBoyerandmyselfunderstandthetruthjudgmentasbearingupon
amentalactwhosecontenttheintellecthasdrawnfromthesensiblereal.[…]No
constitutiveapriorifactorprecedestheformationoftheproposition.”122
Inanaposterioristictheory,Knasassays,“…whatisseeninthedataisthedecisive
epistemologicalmomentforassessingthecorrectnessofthejudgment.”123andquotes
Owensinconfirmation:“Thecauseandcriterionofthecertaintyistheexistencethatis119TTDV229-230note2.120TTDV230note2.121WLTL149-150.AsforKnasas’doctrineregardingjudgment,Idonotnecessarilyshareall
ofit.122TTDV245note27.123WLTL136.
39
apprehended.”124ForKnasasitisaproblemthat“thedataofsenseareaccordedrealityin
andthroughitsrelationtosomethingsubjective–themind’sintentionofbeing.”125Itis
clearthatforKnasas,injudgmentalso,theintelligiblecontentistakenfromthesensible.
HedoesnotbelievethatcertainpassagesoftheSummacouldbeusedtosupport
theoppositeview:
Angelshaveinnatespeciesofthings,andhumanshaveinnateknowledgeoffirstprinciples.Butthetextsadmittheinterpretationthatinourcasethefirstprinciplesareinbornbecausewearenaturallydisposedtoabstractthemsoeasily.Similarly,wesaythatsomeoneisanaturalbornbaseballplayer.Thisremarkdoesnotmeanthattheindividualisbornwiththeabilitytothrowacurveball.126
Althoughratheralongtext,thefollowingisusefulinmakingclearthat,forKnasas,
theagentintellectisnotaformalaprioriandtheintelligiblecontentcomesfromsensible
thingsbyabstraction:
Wilkinsends…byclaimingthattheefficientcauseofunderstandingistheagentintellect,whichhedescribesasthespiritofwonderandtheactiveorientationtowardstheunknown.CitingS.T.I-II,94,2,Dever.11,1c,andC.G.II,83,Wilkinsidentifiestheunknownwiththenotionofbeingwhichshouldbedistinguishedfromtheconceptofbeingasthemoreprimitivefromthederived.[…]Inmyopinion,thisistheThomisticAchilleshealofTranscendentalThomism.Thereisnodistinctionbetweenthenotionofbeingandtheconceptofbeing,paceRousselot.TakinguptheDever.I,1’sprimumcognitumdescriptionoftheratioentis,Dever.XXI,1c,characterizestheratioentisasthe“primaconceptiointellectus.”Also,atWilkins’scitedDever.XI,1c,theratioentis,againdescribedasoneof“primaconceptionesintellectus,”isnotregardedasbelongingtotheagentintellectbutasknownimmediatelybyabstractionfromsensiblethings.ContraLonergan,whatantedates
124QuotedagaininWLTL141.125WLTL137,cf.WLTL138.126WLTL139.TextslikethesewillbediscussedinChapter4.IfindKnasas’sinterpretation
verymuchinlinewithmyown.
40
theconceptofbeingisnottheintendingofbeingbutsensiblethingsandanabstractionfromsensiblethings.127
Thefollowingtextmayhelptoexplainapreferenceforspeakingofintellectual
knowingasbeing“receptiveofobjectivecontent.”Hesays:“Sensationisnothingotherthan
adirectandimmediatepresenceofsomethingreal,orasAquinassaysatDeVer.2,2c:
“Existensperfectiounius,estnataesseinaltero.”128Whatisinterestingisthatinthistext,
Aquinasisdefiningnotonlysensation,butcognitioningeneral.Isuggestthat,insofarasthe
universalcontentisreal,andisimmediatelypresentthroughtheintelligiblespecies,the
simpleapprehensioncanbesaidtobe“receptiveofobjectivecontent,”assensationis.This
ismeantnotinsofarasthereisnomediationatall(whichwouldbethecasewithsensible
intuition),butinsofarasthereisnoobjectivemediation;whatisknownispreciselywhatis
“outthere,”the(common)nature,andtheintellecthasdirectcontactwithit.129
ItseemsapparentthatKnasasconsidersitcrucialtodistinguishthemodesofbeing
oftheknownperfectionintheexplanationofknowing:“formalreceptionofformassures
thatthereceivedformremainsnumericallyidenticalwiththeformoftherealthing.As
Owenssays:‘[…]Itisindividuallythesameform,actuatingbothchildandpercipientintwo
differentwaysofexisting.Itmakesthepercipientbetheindividualthatexistsinreality’”
andinnote,stillOwens:“Intheobject[ofsensation]therearethequidditativeand
127WLTL147.AnothertextfortheoriginoftheintelligiblecontentisinWLTL148:“The
experienceofanimalsdoesnotgeneratequestionsinthem,becauseanimalsdonotabstractbeingfromtheirexperience.”
128WLTL142.129Perhapsrelatedwiththeprevious,KnasasalsopointsoutthatAquinasdoesnotmind
speakingaboutintelligenceintermsofvision:“IhavenotedthatatInISent.d.19,q.5,a.1,ad7m,Aquinasislockedintoocularity.Aquinasdescribesthecharacterofthefirsttwooperationsas‘respicere.’”(WLTL146).
41
existentialfactors.Asimpressedpassivelyonthesentientpowerboththoseaspectsenter
intotheactuationofthefaculty.”130
Itake“formal”receptiontomean“intentional”reception.Ifindveryappealingthe
factthatKnasasconsiderstheidentity“numerical.”Thatis,itisagreatinsight,butatthe
sametime,itinvolvesagreatdanger.Theinsightisthat,ifwhatisknownispresentinthe
knowerinsomeway,therecanbeabsolutelynodifferencebetweentheknownoutthere
andtheknownpresentinthesubject,insofaraswespeakofthecontent.However,ifthe
distinctionbetweencontentandmodeofbeingofthecontentisnotmade,thereresults
eithertheproblemofidentifyinginrealitytheobjectwiththesubject(whichisoneofmy
concernswithsomeinterpretationsofAquinas)ortheproblemofnotexplainingproperly
thisidentity-in-alteritywhichknowingseemstobe.Inotherwords,itisnotenoughto
affirmthatthereisanidentityoftwothingsthatarenotthesame:weneedtoexplainthis
identity’sconditionofpossibility.Or,ifoneprefers,itisenoughtoaffirmthefactaslongas
thematterissetfordiscussion;butoncethisisdone,itisherethatEpistemologybegins.
Forthereasonspreviouslyexposed(particularlyhisapparentlackofinterestinthe
theoryoftheagentintellect)itdoesnotseemthatOwens,inhisCognition,givesthe
explanationthatisrequired.Ifthereisadifferentmodeofbeingofthesamething(the
object),thereneedstobeanexplanationofthisdifferentmodeofbeing,andthis
explanationistobefoundinthedoctrineoftheagentintellect.Knasasisverymuchin
130WLTL142,myemphasis.
42
agreementwiththeEpistemologyofOwens,asKnasashimselfclaims,131butitisnotknown
tomeifKnasasgivesabetterexplanationelsewhere.ThepointIwouldsuggestisthatthe
emphasisontheefficiencyoftheobjectdoesexplainthepresenceofthecontent(insofaras
thepresenceofthelikeisexplainedbythelike),butitismissingtheexplanationofthe
differentmodeofbeingoftheobject,andparticularlyofthestateofabstractionthatthe
objectfindsinintelligence.Itmaybethat,becausethetextsquotedreferratherto
sensibility,thenecessityofanexplanationofthemodeofbeingdoesnotseemnecessary
(becauseanagentsenseisnotrequired).However,iftheeffectofthesensibleobjectisnot
onlyphysicalbutcognitional,dowenotneedtheThomisticcelestialbodiesorseparate
substancestomakesenseoftheintentionaleffect?Inwhatsense,otherwise,istherea
“numerical”identityofknownandknower?Thenaturalefficiencyisnotenough,because
theformswouldbeonly“specifically”identical.
Accusedoffallinginto“knowingbyconfrontation,”Knasassays:“Infact,sincemy
realismisimmediate,myrealismisknowledgebyidentityratherthanconfrontation.”132
Theproblemwiththeconfrontationparadigm,itissaid,isthatthereneedstobeabridge
toreachtheobject.ButthatbridgeisnotrequiredforKnasas,because“Therealisnotjust
‘theoutthere.’Therealisalso‘theouttherethatisinhere.’”133Wefindtheoutsideinside,
andthatiswhytheso-calledbridgeisnotneeded.Itisapowerfulexpositionofthefactof
131“IfWilkinsisinterestedintheentiresweepoftheepistemologyinwhichmyremarksare
embedded,hecouldreadJosephOwens’s,Cognition:AnEpistemologicalInquiryandPartThreeofhisElementaryChristianMetaphysics”(WLTL146).
132WLTL144.133WLTL144.
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knowing,andKnasasistalkingaboutidentityastheintentionalpresenceoftheobjectto
thesubject.
However,considerationshouldbegiventospeakingaboutthisasnotsimply
identity,inordertonotdilutetheothernessoftheobject.Thereisinknowinga
confrontation,insofarasthereisan“outthere”,andthereisalsoanidentity,insofarasthe
outthereis“inhere”or“immediatelypresent,”asKnasassays.“Intentionalidentity”or
“intentionalpresence”couldconveythesesamethoughtsinabetterfashion.Because
knowingisamodeofbeingas“presencein/totheother,”sayingonly“identity”may
obscurehalfofthemystery.This,however,ismoreamatteroftermsthanofdoctrine.
Knasassays:
Identityofsenseandsensibleisonlyhalfthestory.Asnotedabove,whensensereceivestheform,sensedoesnotsubjectivizetheform.Rather,sincethereceptionisformal[read:“intentional”],theothernessofthereceivedformisleftintact.Theobjectivityofsensationisguaranteed[…]Again,knowledgebywayofidentitymeansthattheknowerbecomesthereal.134
IagreewithKnasasinhisaposterioristicreadingofAquinasandhisdefinitionofa
formalapriori.WithgreaterexposuretoKnasas’works,itmightbepossibletoseewhether
heiselsewheremorespecificregardingtheexplanationofthedistinctionofthemodesof
beingoftheknown,andofidentityinknowing.However,hisunderstandingof
intentionalityandofthecognitionalfactareveryprecise,wherehesays:“Therealisnot
just‘theoutthere.’Therealisalso‘theouttherethatisinhere.’”135
134WLTL145-146,myemphasis.135WLTL144.MyinterpretationofDeVer.1,9isdifferentfromtheoneproposedbyKnasas
in“TranscendentalThomismandDeVeritateI,9.”Basically,andinmyview,Aquinasisfirsttalkingaboutthepresenceoftruthineveryjudgment(Consequitur,etc.),andsecondaboutthepresenceof
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4)CornelioFabro
Finally,wearriveatCornelioFabro(1911-1995),136thephilosopherwhoinspiredthis
discussionabouttheagentintellectasametaphysicalapriori.Althoughtheinterpretation
oftheagentintellectinthecurrentproposalisbasedonthesamegeneralepistemological
orientationasthatofFabro,theagentintellectasmetaphysicalaprioriisspokenof
somewhatdifferentlyinthecurrentviewthaninFabro’s.Tobegin,letusconsidersomeof
theprinciplesofhisEpistemology,andthenmoreparticularlyhisdoctrineontheagent
intellect.
Thealterityoftheobjectofknowing,theexplanationofknowingbythedistinction
ofthemodesofbeingoftheknownperfection,andtheoriginoftheintellectualcontentin
theobjectitself,areclearfeaturesofFabro’sdoctrineaboutknowingasparticipation:
Itseemsthereforethat“knowing”realizes,intherealmofnature,“participating”inthefullsenseoftheterm.Toknowistoassimilateandtobecomesimilar,istopossesstheactandtheformofanotherthinginsofarastheactandtheformare
truthasknowninMetaphysics(Cognoscitur,etc.).Thatiswhytheintellecthastoknowfirstitsownnature(aspartofthedefinitionoftruth,adaequatioreietc.);andthisisthereflectionSt.Thomasistalkingabout,ametaphysicalreflection,whichisthesameasthereditiocompletathatallowstheintellecttoknowitsessentiapropria.Inotherwords,wedonotneedtoknowtheessenceoftheintellecttoknowatruth,thatis,toknowthetruthregardingsomethingandtoaffirmit:inthiscase,weneedonlytoknow“what’sgoingon.”Butwedoneedtoknowtheessenceoftheintellectasthefacultyofknowingbeing,inordertoknowwhattruthis,asadaequatioreietintellectus.TheobjectionthatSt.Thomasisalsospeakingabouttruthinsensibility(inthefirstsense),shouldbeputintocontext,noticingthathespeaksaboutajudgmentinthesensesaswell,andthatthesensesknowthattheysense:heisthereforenotspeakingofanyfacultyofsense,butofaparticularoperationoftheinternalsenses,thatisanalogoustojudgment,andonlyinthatsensecanbesaidtopossessthetruth.Itshouldbeclearthat,forSt.Thomas,thetruthisadaequatioreietintellectusjudicantis,andthereforethesenses(andeventheintellectinsofarasitapprehends)areexcludedfrompossessingthetruth,properlyspeaking.
136ThefollowingremarksfocusonFabro,Cornelio,LaNozioneMetafisicadiPartecipazionesecondoSanTommasod’Aquino(NMP);andLaSvoltaAntropologicadiKarlRahner(LS),alreadyquoted.AsIhavebeendoingwithotherauthors,IwillomitFabro’snameinthereferencestohisworksinthissection.
45
andremainoftheotherthing.Isitthecase,then,thatoneandthesameactis,atthesametimeandunderthesamerespect,actofdifferentsubjects,theknowerandtheknown?Yes,butThomisticAristotelismaddsimmediately,notinthesameway.Theactandtheformarepresentintheobjectknowninaphysicalandrealway,inthesubject,instead,inanobjectiveand“intentional”way,thatistosaybymeansofan“intermediary”,the“species”(impressa)whichisthequalitythatdisposesthesubjecttoenterintothatparticipation.Bymeansofthisqualitativemodification,whichhasallitsratio[italian:ragione]andstructurefromtheobjectandthatcomestoemergeuponthebeingoftheknowerasafloweruponthestem,itappearsclearthatknowingistrulya“participating.”137
RegardingAquinas’agentintellect,FabroinLaSvolta(cf.LS52and116)referstoit
asametaphysicalaprioriinoppositiontoRahner’sformalapriori.InLS,Fabrorefersto
whathehadwritteninhispreviousNMP(cf.272-273).Therespectivecontextsofthetwo
worksaredifferentfromeachother.Letusexamineeachofthem.
4.1.AMetaphysicalAPrioriinTheMetaphysicalNotionofParticipation
InLaNozioneMetafisicadiPartecipazione(NMP),FabroisdistinguishingthePlatonic
“objective”participationoftheintelligible(i.e.,thecontentofknowingasbestowedon
humanintelligence)fromtheThomistic“subjective”participationofalightmaking
intelligible.Fabroheredoesnotusetheterms“metaphysical”participationnor“apriori”
fortheagentintellect,butitisevidentthat1)theagentintellectis,forFabro,asubjective
participationinsofarasitisarealsubjectivefacultyderivedfromGodinordertomake
intelligible,andthat2)humanknowingisnotverifiedbyaparticipationoftheintelligible
contentinaPlatonicway.Although,inusingtheterm“intelligible,”Fabrodoesnot
differentiatebetweenthecontentanditsmodeofbeing,138itseemsclearthatheconsiders
137NMP270.138“Theagentintellectisprincipleproductive[fattivo]oftheintelligibleandthisintelligible
comestous,notbydirectparticipationfromGod,butbyacomplexworkofabstractionexercised
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thecontentoftheintelligibleascomingfromthesensiblethings,“byacomplexworkof
abstractionexercisedbytheparticipatedlight,theagentintellect,intherealmofthe
concreteanddiffuseparticipationofthesensibleworld”(thenhequotesthetextof
Aquinasat84,4ad1,inwhichthecontentofknowingissaidtocomefromtheformsof
sensiblethings).Withoutsayingitexplicitly,Fabrosuggeststwoparticipationsinintellectual
knowingandboth,ofcourse,asderivedfromGod.Thefirstisaparticipationofthelight
(subjectiveparticipation,theagentintellect)andthesecondisaparticipationofthe
content,whichalsocomesfromGod,notdirectly,butthroughtheformsofsensiblethings.
AndpreciselybecauseourdirectparticipationfromGodisnotofthecontent,butofthe
lightmakingintelligible,theagentintellectisasubjective,notanobjectiveparticipation.
ThecontentaswellcomesremotelyfromGod,asthesourceofalltruth,butonly(naturally)
throughtheconcreteparticipationsofHiseternalideasintheformsofthesensiblethings.
ForFabro,thecontentofintellectualknowingisthenatureexistinginthesensible
things.Infact,hesaysthatthehumanideaisnotanintensiveintelligible“totality”,likethe
infusedideaoftheangels,becauseitdoesnotcomeby(objective)participationbutby
abstraction.Andhecontinues:
Matter,whichinconcretebeingsisprincipleofontologicallimitationoftheform,becomesforourabstractingmindanobstacletointelligibility[…]Fromanobjectivepointofview,thatistosay,thepointofviewofthenoeticcontent,thehumanidea,possessedbyabstraction,issaidknowledgebyparticipationinthestrongsense[…]
bytheparticipatedlight,theagentintellect,intherealmoftheconcreteanddiffuseparticipationsofthesensibleworld”(NMP272-273,seethecompletetextinquestioninAppendix,Note22).Inmyview,thefirst“intelligible”isthespecieswithitscontent,butthesecondisratherthecontentofthespecies.Itisevidentthat,forFabro,whattheagentintellectproducescomesalso,inacertainsense,fromthesensiblethings,buthedoesnotmakeacleardistinction,intheuseoftheword“intelligible”,betweentheaspectthatisproducedandtheonethatis,rather,received.
47
insofaras[it]“estsimilitudoformaetantum”;itdoesnotreachthematter,andsothehumanidea,assuch,willarrivealwaysatageneralandundeterminedcontent.139
FromNMPcanbeseenthattheagentintellectisasubjectiveparticipationinsofaras
itisnotaparticipationoftheintelligiblecontent(whichcomesfromthethingsthemselves)
butaparticipationofalightinthesubject,alightthat,byabstraction,makesintelligiblethe
formsoftherealthings.Thereisnotacleardistinction,inwhatFabrocallsthe“intelligible,”
betweencontentandmodeofbeingofthecontent,andsoitmaynotbesoclearinwhat
sensetheagentintellect“makesintelligible.”However,hedoessaythattheintelligible
species“hasallitsratio[ragione]andstructurefromtheobject”140andhealsodistinguishes
inthehumanideathe“pointofviewofthenoeticcontent”141inwhichthehumanideaisa
likenessoftheformofthesensiblethings.Therefore,evenifFabrodoesnotrefertothe
agentintellectexplicitlyasproductiveoftheintelligiblemodeofbeingofthecontent(that
whichImyselfcall“metaphysicalapriori”),hewouldsurelydenythatitisproductiveofthe
intelligiblecontentitself.Thecontentofhumanknowingisaparticipationoftheformof
sensiblethingsbywhichweareperfected,andnotaparticipationofourownlightinthem,
bywhichtheywouldreceiveintelligibilityascontent.
4.2.AMetaphysicalAPrioriinLaSvolta
InLaSvolta(LS),Fabrospeaksexplicitlyoftheagentintellectasametaphysicala
prioriinoppositiontoRahner’sformalapriori.Therearetwocleartexts,bothinfootnote:
LS52,andLS116.InthefirstFabroclaimsthat,inRahner,theagentintellectisaformala139NMP274.140NMP270.141NMP274.
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prioriinthesenseofaKantiantranscendental,andFabrousestheterm“metaphysical”to
expresshisownreadingoftheagentintellectinAquinas.142Inthesecond,Fabrodoesnot
usetheterm“metaphysical”but“productive”[fattivo].Hereheexplainsalittlemoreof
whathemeanstosay.However,becausethecontextsaresomehowdifferent,andhis
expressionsareverydense,itappearsnecessarytoofferanexplanationofwhatFabro
meant,inordertoshowthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenhispositionandthe
positionbeingproposedinthisthesis.
InLS116,thecontextisthefollowing.ForFabro,Rahneridentifiesabstractio,
conversioandreditioinintellectualknowinginthisway:abstractio(toknowtheintelligible)
isreditio,i.e.,toknowoneself(theonlyintelligible)asbeingintheworld(conversioad
phantasmata);inotherwords,toknowtheintelligible(abstractio)isanactionofself-
consciousness(andsoareditio)uponthematerialofsensibility(conversio).Fabro,in
respondingtoRahner,uses84,6(thetextof“materiacausae”143)toshowthat,forAquinas,
therelationshipwithsensibilityisnotthatwhichaloneverifiesintellectualknowing,but
intellectualknowingisanoperationofahigherlevel,exerciseduponahigherobject.Atthis
pointcomes,inafootnote,Fabro’sobservationthatRahnerusesthesametext144todraw
theoppositeconclusion,thattheagentintellectisaformalapriorior,inotherwords,that
theactionofintelligenceisexercisedonthematerialofsensibilityinaKantianfashion.
142FabroquoteshereNMP272-273.143WewillexaminethisparticulartextinChapter4,section1.144SummaI,84,6.
49
Fabroclaimsthat,forAquinas,theagentintellectisratheranaprioriaseffective[fattivo]
principle,asfaciensintelligibilia,andnotaformalorconstitutiveprinciple.145
Theagentintellect,forFabro,isnotthatwhichprovidesintelligibilitytothematerial
ofsensibility(andthereforeintelligibilityascontent),norisitaprojectionofconsciousness
(thefirst“object”ofintelligence)onthesensiblematerialfromexperience.Theagent
intellectis,instead,thatwhichmakestheintelligiblefromthesensible,andthatintelligible
isthefirstobjectofintelligence.WhatAquinassaysin84,6,forRahner,isthattheagent
intellectinformsthematerialofsensibilitywithintelligibilityascontentand,therefore,that
theactionoftheintellect(theknowingaction)isexercisedonthesensible;whereasfor
Fabro,Aquinasissayingtheopposite,thatis,thattheactofintelligenceisexercisednoton
matterbutonsomethinghigher(theuniversal),whichrequirespreciselytheactionofthe
agentintellectonthematerialofsensibility:not,though,asinformingitwithintelligible
content,butasmakingtheuniversalspecies.Itisthis“makingtheuniversal”whichrenders
theagentintellectanaprioriasproductiveprinciple,andnotaformalone,asifitwerea
formal(intelligible)“part”oftheobjectitself.
Therefore,wheninLS52Fabrospeaksof“metaphysicalapriori”,hemeansa
subjectiveparticipationwhichistheconditionofpossibilityofintellectualknowinginsofar
asitproducestheintelligiblespecies,whichistheagentobjectoftheknowingoperationof
intelligence.Asaformalapriori,instead,thelightoftheagentintellectconstitutesformally
theobjectofknowing,providingintelligibilityascontenttoanotherwisesensibleobject.
145Thedifferencebetween“productive”and“formal”isrelatedtothedifferencebetween
anefficientcauseandaformalcause.Theformalcauseconstitutesthe“formed”thingtogetherwiththematter,whereastheefficientcauseproducesthepresenceoftheforminthematter.
50
Fabrodoesnotsay,therefore,thattheagentintellectisametaphysicalapriori
insofarasitproducestheintelligiblemodeofbeingofthecontent(whichisthewaythat
expressionisusedinthisthesis),butinsofarasitproducestheintelligiblespecies(without
furtherspecifications).However,Fabro’sdenialoftheagentintellectinAquinasasaformal
aprioriandhisaffirmationsregardingtheoriginofthenoeticcontentinthesensiblereality,
areverymuchinlinewiththeclaimpresentlybeingmade.
4.3.IntellectualKnowingasReceptiveinFabro
Wehaveconsideredtheuseoftheterm“metaphysicalapriori”inFabro.Now,in
thisdissertation,theintellectualapprehensionisportrayedasreceptionoftheuniversal
content,areceptionverifiedbyabstractionofthatcontentfromexperience,throughthe
workoftheagentintellect.Thisinterpretation,aswehavesaid,isameanstoopposethe
Kantiannotionofintellectualactivityas,insomeway,providingtheuniversalcontent.For
Fabro,inasimilarway,thedifferencebetweenAquinasandModernPhilosophyisthat
Aquinasmaintains,atthebeginningoftheprocessofintellectualknowing,anabstractive
absoluteapprehensionparalleltotheintuitiveabsoluteapprehensionwithwhichthe
processofsensibleknowingbegins.146Theinterpretationbeingofferedhereisinagreement
withFabro,insofarasforKanttheuniversalisaproductoftheintellectualactivity(asgiving
intelligibleformtotherawmaterialofexperience)whereas,forAquinas,itisthebeginning
ofthatactivity(asoriginalreceptionofintelligiblecontent).
146Cf.CornelioFabro,PercezioneePensiero,2ndRevisedEdition(Brescia:Morcelliana,
1962),423(abbreviatedPP).
51
5)OtherRelevantAuthors
Althoughthecontributionsofcertainauthorswillbestudiedinthebodyofthis
dissertation,itseemsusefulthatthefollowingauthorsbegivenatleastabriefmentionin
theintroductiontothiswork.147
TsenaySerequeberhan,148asregardstheagentintellectinAquinasandtheKantian
categories,rightlyrelatesbothtothesolutionofthesameproblem,namely,theintellectual
anduniversalknowledgeofreality.However,Serequeberhanconsidersthatwhichisrather
asuperficialanalogybetweenthesetworealities(thefactthatbothareactiveintheir
respectivesystems)149tobeasharedfundamentalviewbetweenKantandAquinas.150What
isinterestingaboutthisarticleisthat,sinceSerequeberhanisnotdeceivedaboutKant’s
147ThreeotherworksarebrieflystudiedinAppendix,Note1:JohnHaldane,“Aquinasand
theActiveIntellect,”Philosophy(UK)67(1992):199-210;WayneJ.Hankey,“ParticipatioDiviniLuminis,Aquinas'DoctrineoftheAgentIntellect:OurCapacityforContemplation,”Dionysius22(2004):149-178;R.E.Houser,“PhilosophicalDevelopmentthroughMetaphor:LightamongtheGreeks,”ProceedingsoftheAmericanCatholicPhilosophicalAssociation64(1990):75-85.
148Cf.TsenaySerequeberhan,“AquinasandKant:aComparativeStudy,”Dialogue:JournalofPhiSigmaTau26(1984):40-48.Theauthors’namesareomittedinthissection’sreferences,aslongasthereferenceisunderthecorrespondingtitle.
149The“concepts”ofAquinasareseparatedbyKantfromtheiroriginal“paradigm”buttheyarepreservedwithanew“content”inKant’sownparadigm:“thepassiveintellectbecomestheFacultyofSensibility,whichisthereceptiveandpassivefacultyofthemind;theagentintellectbecomestheFacultyofUnderstanding,whichisthespontaneousandactivefacultyofthemind;andtheSoulbecomesTranscendentalApperception,whichisthegroundingofthewholecompositeofsensibilityandunderstanding”(44,cf.47-48).
150Serequeberhan,inhisconclusivephrase,saysthat“despitetheirradicallydifferingphilosophicalperspectives,theysharecertainfundamentalviewswhicharenotobvious”(48,myemphasis).Hedoesshowanunderstandingoftheradicaldifferencebetweenthetwo,butifwhatisradicalandwhatisfundamentalarebothdifferingandshared,Ireallywonderifthisdoesnotbetrayanattempttomixwaterandoil.Itneedstobeclarified,however,thatSerequeberhanwrotethisarticleveryearlyinhiscareer,andisnowspecializedinAfricanPhilosophy,soIcannotascertainbythisonearticlehisoverallphilosophicalposition.
52
andAquinas’151differingrespectiveviewsontheoriginoftheintellectualcontent,the
dangeroflikeningtheagentintellecttotheKantiantranscendentalismoreevidentand,for
aproperinterpretationofAquinas,thenecessityofadistinctionbetweenthatwhichthe
agentintellectproducesandthatwhichthecategoriescontributebecomesmorepressing.
HernánMartínezMillán152triestoshowhowtheanalogiesofthesunandthelight
areintegratedinAquinas’doctrine.Theanalogyofthesunsatisfiestheneedforafirst
causeinhumanknowing(somethingmoreChristianandPatristic),153andtheanalogyofthe
lightshowshowthenecessityofafirstcausedoesnottakeawayaproperlevelof
proximatecausalityinthecreature(somethingmoreAristotelianand,inMartínezMillán’s
view,“existentialist”,maybeintheanti-Platonicsenseofattributingrealbeingtothe
particularthings).ThesereflectionsseemhelpfulfortheinterpretationofAquinas,since
theyprovideaplausibleexplanationforthesystematicunityofelementscomingfrom
differentsources.
ChristopherCullen’s154worriesaboutaKantianinfluenceinTranscendentalThomism
areveryclear.OneofCullen’sconcernsistheideathattheoriginofintellectualcontentis
notinsensibleexperience:“Donceelevensays,‘ForTranscendentalThomism…beingis
contributedaprioribytheintellectitself.’Beingcomestousthroughthesensesbutinno151“Aquinasderivestheagentintellectfromthefactthathumanbeingsactuallyengagein
theprocessofabstraction[…]theformsofmaterialthings[…]donotexistasdistinctentities,butinhereinmatter[…]Humanintellect,whenitunderstandsmaterialthingsbygraspingtheir‘species,’doessobypenetratingthenaturesorformsofsensiblethings”(42-43).
152Cf.HernánMartínezMillán,“SunandLight,orontheAgentIntellect,”RevistaEspañolaDeFilosofíaMedieval20(2013):49-56.
153Cf.55.154Cf.ChristopherM.Cullen,S.J.,“TranscendentalThomism:RealismRejected”inThe
FailureofModernism:TheCartesianLegacyandContemporaryPluralism,ed.BrendanSweetman(AmericanMaritainAssociationPublications,1999),72-86.
53
wayfromthesenses.”155RegardingRahnerinparticular,Cullensays:“Rahneralsogives
muchemphasistotheimportanceofthejudgment,forheseeksanapriorigroundforall
affirmationoffiniteesse.Rahnerbelievesthatsensationcannotgrounduniversalityor
necessity.”156
CullenworriesthatthedoctrineoftheagentintellectisusedtoproduceaKantian
interpretationofAquinas.Cullensays:“RahnerisveryclearthatAquinasdoesnotthink
thereareanyinnateideas.Nevertheless,Rahnerdoesarguethatthereisanapriori
elementofknowledgeandthatthisapriorielementiscontributedbytheagent
intellect.”157“DonceelexplainsthatTranscendentalThomistsarguethattheagentintellect
contributes‘something’tosenseexperience.”158Toconsidertheagentintellectaformala
prioriis,forCullen,amisinterpretationofAquinas:
TheTranscendentalThomistshavemisinterpretedAquinas’sdoctrineoftheagentintellectinvariousways.First,theyhavemadethelightoftheagentintellecttobetheformalcauseofourknowledge.Secondly,theyhavemadethelightoftheagentintellecttobethehabitualknowledgeofthefirstprinciples(alwaysimplicitbutmadeexplicitinthescienceofmetaphysics)159directlycontradictingAquinas’steachinginhisDisputedQuestionsontheSoul[herefersq.5c,whichisQ.D.DeAnimaa.5,c.]160
Cullenalsosays:“ThismisinterpretationoftheagentintellectdoctrineinThomas
leadstheTranscendentaliststojustifytheirtranscendentalturn,whichinturnleadstotheir15575.15677.15778.15878.159Cf.Cullen,79:“Donceelarguesthatweare‘entitledtoconcludethatthelightofthe
agentintellectconsistspreciselyinthetruthofthefirstprinciples,’andthatthesefirstprinciplesare‘theaprioricontributionofourintellecttoeveryobjectweknow.’”
16083.Cf.Cullen,85:“ForSt.Thomasbeingisnotcontributedtoknowingbytheintellectnorisittheformalcauseofknowledge.Buttomakethetranscendentalturnistoisolatetheintellectwithintheintellectualorder.”
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fundamentalmetaphysicaldoctrines.”161Itisinterestingthat,forCullen,itisa
misinterpretationofSt.Thomas’agentintellectwhichleadstothe“justification”ofa
Kantianturntothesubject.NotethatCullendoesnotsaythattheagentintellectistakenas
an“excuse”fortheKantianturn.WhatCullen’sstatementarguablymeansisthat,oncethe
transcendentalturnistakenforgranted,thatis,astheonlyrationalwaytodophilosophy
today,Aquinas’doctrineoftheagentintellect,misinterpreted,canjustifytheturnfroma
Thomisticpointofview,giventheconcernsthatModernPhilosophyhasalwaysraisedin
Catholicenvironments.RegardlessofhisinterpretationofTranscendentalThomism,
Cullen’sstatementhelpsustoseetherelevanceofaninterpretationofAquinaswhich
distinguishesclearlytheThomistagentintellectfromaKantianformalapriori.Hopefully,by
tryingtoidentifyinAquinasandKanttwodifferingapproachestothesameproblem(thatof
theuniversals),somethingmorehelpfulwillbeofferedtomodernscholarshipthanwhat
couldbeofferedbyfocusingonotherauthors’interpretationsofAquinas.
ElenaBaltuta162seemstoproposethattheuniversalexistsintheextramentalthing
itself,andisabstractedfromitbytheagentintellect.163Althoughshedoesnotemphasize,
asisdoneherein,thattheuniversalcontentisthesamebutthemodeofbeingisdifferent
(inrealityorinthemind),shedoesleadtothispointbycomparingtheagentintellecttoan
16183-84.162Cf.ElenaBaltuta,“ThomasAquinasonBridgingtheGapbetweenMindandReality,”
RevueRoumaineDePhilosophie56,no.1(2012):147-60.163“Themarkoftheindividualitypresentintheimagesmustberemovedand,atthesame
time,theobject’suniversalessence,theinformationalcoreoftheextramentalobject,mustbekept.Thisisperformedbytheactionoftheagentintellect,whichilluminatesandabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromtheimages”(151).
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x-rayapparatuswhichletshiddenthingsbeseenwhileleavingtherestinvisible.164Inmy
view,Baltutadoesnotmaintainthattheagentintellecthasacognitivecharacter,although
somepassagesfromherworkmayleadustothinkthatway.165ForBaltuta,rather,the
agentintellectseemstobeaconditionforthepossibilityoftheextramentalthings’
universalessenceshavingvisibility.
HéctorZagalArreguín,inhisarticle,166stronglycriticizesAquinas’interpretationof
theAristotelianagentintellect,pointingoutseveralinconsistenciesheperceivesinSt.
Thomas,bothinternal(lackofsystematiccoherence)andexegetical(lackoffaithfulnessto
Aristotle).InZagalArreguín’sappreciationofAquinasthereseemstobeacertainlackof
familiaritywiththemeaningofimportantThomisticmetaphysicalnotionsanddistinctions
(particularly,thenotionofparticipation,thedistinctionsbetweenactiveandpassive
potency,etc.).Moreacquaintancewiththesenotionswouldprobablyhelpthisauthorto
seeatleasttheinternalcoherenceofAquinas’doctrine.Still,inhisinterpretationof
Aquinas,ZagalArreguínexpressesverywelltheproposedportrayaloftheagentintellectas
ametaphysicalapriori,whenhesays,
Whatmakes[theagentintellect]thereforeinactwithrespecttointeligibleobjectsisthefactthatitisanactiveimmaterialforceabletoassimilateotherthingstoitself,164“Whatwasfirstvisibleonlyinpotency[…]becomesvisibleinactand,atthesametime,
theskin,itscolor[…]becomeinvisible.Actingjustlikesuchanapparatustheagentintellectdoesnotneedtheabilityto‘see’bothsensibleparticularsandimmaterialuniversalsforbeingabletoabstractthelatteronesfromtheimages”(157).
165“Theagentintellectremovestheindividualandmaterialcharacteristicsoftheobjectfromitsessence.Buthowcantheagentintellecttellthedifferencebetweenwhatisparticular(individual)andwhatisuniversalinanimage?[…]wouldwebeentitledtobelievethat,sinceithasthepowerofdiscriminatingandremovingindividualelementsfromuniversalones,ithasaccesstobothparticularanduniversalfeatures?”(155).
166Cf.HéctorZagalArreguín,“TheSeparateSubstancesandAquinas'IntellectusAgens,”RevistaPortuguesaDeFilosofia64,no.1(2008):359-377.
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i.e.,immaterializethem.Inthiswayitrendersactuallyintelligiblesomethingthatwasonlypotentiallyintelligible:likelight,whichwithoutcontaininganyparticularcolor,bringscolorsintoact.167Thisreviewofseveralauthorshashopefullymadeclearthetimelinessandpossible
benefitsofadiscussion,suchasthatbeingproposedinthisdissertation,abouttheroleof
theagentintellectinAquinas.SeveralissuesofinterpretationofAquinas’texthavebeen
raised,thosebeingthequestionofacommonnature,thedistinctionbetweenintelligibility
ascontentandasmodeofbeingofthecontent,thepropermeaningoftheAristotelian
identity,etc..Itishopedthatwhatfollowswillbehelpfulregardingtheseandotherrelated
questions.
167367.
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ChapterOne:TheThomisticFactandtheRoleoftheAgentIntellect
1)TheThomisticFact
InordertounderstandwhattheagentintellectisforSt.Thomas,itisimportantto
understandwhySt.Thomasrequiresanagentintellectinhumanintellectualknowing.The
precisetextinwhichhedealswiththispointintheSummais79,3.Theimmediatepurpose
istoshowhow,forSt.Thomas,thefactthatweknowtheuniversalaspectofcorporeal
things,theirnature,requiresanagentintellectasitsconditionofpossibility.Theagent
intellectisthe“light”makingintelligibleinactthenatureofcorporealthings.
Inthecorpus,St.Thomasbeginstomakehispointbyestablishingacontrastwith
thePlatonicdoctrineofideas:
AccordingtotheopinionofPlato,thereisnoneedforanactiveintellectinordertomakethingsactuallyintelligible[…]ForPlatosupposedthattheformsofnaturalthingssubsistedapartfrommatter,andconsequentlythattheyareintelligible:sinceathingisactuallyintelligiblefromtheveryfactthatitisimmaterial.Andhecalledsuchforms‘speciesorideas’.168
BothforAristotleandforPlato,theobjectofhumanunderstandingisthenatureor
formofcorporealthings.However,becauseinthePlatonicsystemthoseformsarealready
intelligibleinactintheirrealbeing,anagentintellectisnotneededforPlato,atleastnotin
thewayitisneededforAristotle:“ButsinceAristotledidnotallowthatformsofnatural
thingsexistapartfrommatter,andasformsexistinginmatterarenotactuallyintelligible;it
16879,3,c.:“SecundumopinionemPlatonis,nullanecessitaseratponereintellectum
agentemadfaciendumintelligibiliainactu[…]PosuitenimPlatoformasrerumnaturaliumsinemateriasubsistere,etperconsequenseasintelligibilesesse,quiaexhocestaliquidintelligibileactu,quodestimmateriale.Ethuiusmodivocabatspecies,siveideas…”Cf.InIDeAnima4,106-111.
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followsthatthenaturesorformsofthesensiblethingswhichweunderstandarenot
actuallyintelligible.”169
Thispointisimportant.ForSt.Thomas,itisafactthatweunderstandthenatureof
thesensiblethings.Thisisthereasonheinterruptstheflowofthephrasewiththerelative
sentence,“quasintelligimus.”Ontheotherhand,itisalsoafactthat,sincetheirrealbeing
isindividuatedinmatter,thoseformsarenotintelligibleinact.Thesetwofactsor,better
said,thisdouble-sidedfact,iswhatrequiresanagentintellectasitsconditionofpossibility:
Nownothingisreducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomethinginact;asthesenses[are]madeactualbywhatisactuallysensible.Wemustthereforeassignonthepartoftheintellectsomepowertomakethingsactuallyintelligible,byabstractionofthespeciesfrommaterialconditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactiveintellect.170
Inotherwords,ifweunderstandthenatureofcorporealthingsitisbecausethey
areforusalreadyintelligibleinact.171Wewouldnotunderstandthosethingsinactifthey
16979,3,c.:“SedquiaAristotelesnonposuitformasrerumnaturaliumsubsisteresine
materia;formaeauteminmateriaexistentesnonsuntintelligibilesactu,sequebaturquodnaturaeseuformaererumsensibilium,quasintelligimus,nonessentintelligibilesactu.”
17079,3,c.:“Nihilautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicutsensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem.”
171Cf.85,1,ob.4.Thereisametaphysicalpriorityoftheintelligibleinact(=speciesimpressa)overtheintellectinact(=speciesexpressa).Theresultoftheactionoftheagentintellectonthephantasmistheintelligibleinact,butnotyet“intellected”inact;theintelligibleinact,asagentobject,“causes”thepossibleintellecttounderstand,topassfrompotencytoactofunderstanding.Theagentintellectproducesthepassagefrompotencytoactofbeingintelligible(regardingthenatureofcorporealthings);theagentobject(alreadyintelligibleinact)producesthepassagefrompotencytoactofunderstanding.Thetwopassagesareclearforexamplein79,7,c.:“Neverthelessthereisadistinctionbetweenthepoweroftheactiveintellectandofthepassiveintellect:becauseasregardsthesameobject,theactivepowerwhichmakestheobjecttobeinactmustbedistinctfromthepassivepower,whichismovedbytheobjectexistinginact.”[Diversificaturtamenpotentiaintellectusagentis,etintellectuspossibilis,quiarespectueiusdemobiecti,aliudprincipiumoportetessepotentiamactivam,quaefacitobiectumesseinactu;etaliud
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werenotalreadyintelligibleinact(ourintellectisinpotencytoallintelligiblethings).But
becausethosenaturesdonotsubsistinthatway(intelligibleinact),thereisaneedfor
someefficientpowertomakethempassfromintelligibleinpotency172tointelligibleinact.
Hereinliesthenecessityforanagentintellect.Andbecausewhatpreventssomethingfrom
beingintelligibleinactismatter,thewaytomakeitpassfrompotentiallytoactually
intelligibleisasortofseparationofitsnaturefromitsindividualmatter;thisiscalled
abstraction.Itisthissortofactionwhichtheagentintellectwillbecalledtoperform.The
wholeofThomisticEpistemologyannouncesitself.Ourimmediateconcern,however,isto
establishasitwereapointofdepartureforthisdiscussion,orbettersaid,theThomistic
pointofdepartureor“Thomisticfact.”Nothingcanbeunderstoodifitisnotintelligiblein
act.Nothingisintelligibleinactifitisnotseparatedfrommatter.Now,wedounderstand
thenatureofcorporealthingsandcertainlytheyarenotseparatedfrommatter(thisisthe
“Thomisticfact”).Therefore,whatisrequiredisapowerwhichmakesintelligibleinactthe
natureofcorporealthings,bymeansofacertainseparationfromtheirindividualconditions
inmatter.173
potentiampassivam,quaemoveturabobiectoinactuexistente.]Cf.section4ofthisChapter,andChapter3,section4,wherethenatureofthis“movement”ofthepossibleintellectisalsoexplored.
172Themeaningofthisbeing“intelligibleinpotency”willbeexploredinmoredetailinChapter4,section2.
173AninterestingparallelregardingthenecessityoftheagentintellectinhumanbeingsisfoundinSummaI,54,4,c:“Thenecessityforadmittinganactiveintellectisduetothis—thatthenaturesofthematerialthingswhichweunderstanddonotexistoutsidethesoul,asimmaterialandactuallyintelligible,butareonlyintelligibleinpotentialitysolongastheyareoutsidethesoul.Consequentlyitisnecessarythatthereshouldbesomepowercapableofrenderingsuchnaturesactuallyintelligible.”[Necessitasautemponendiintellectumagentemfuit,quianaturaererummaterialium,quasnosintelligimus,nonsubsistuntextraanimamimmaterialesetintelligibilesinactu,sedsuntsolumintelligibilesinpotentia,extraanimamexistentes,etideooportuitessealiquamvirtutem,quaefaceretillasnaturasintelligibilesactu.]
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Asclearastheseissuesmayseem(atleastfromadirectreadingofAquinas’text),a
wholerangeofquestionsbeginstoarise.Someofthemwillbetreatedinthefollowing
pages,buttwoofthemcanbeproposednow.Firstly,doesthisdoctrinemakesense?Could
Aquinasreallymeanthat?Althoughthesecondquestionistheimmediateconcernofthis
dissertation,itisactuallythefirstwhichpreventssomeofAquinas’readersfrom
understandinghim.Still,itisbydirectlyfacingthesecondquestion,whichisaquestionof
interpretation,thatthepathfortheclarificationofthefirstquestionmaybeopen.Inother
words,ifaplausiblecasecanbemadethatAquinasreallymeantthedoctrinethatishere
suggestedand,ifacoherentreadingofthisdoctrinecanbeoffered,itwillbeeasierto
answerthequestionoffact,thatis,whetherthingsactuallyareasAquinasseemstothink.
Someothertextsmaybehelpfultocomplementthissection,andtopreparethe
groundforthefollowing.Rightfromthebeginning,St.Thomasinhistreatisepresupposes
thatweknowthenatureofcorporealthings.Inthecrucialtextof75,2c.,thisisthepoint
ofdepartureforarguingthesubsistenceofthehumansoul:“Foritisclearthatbymeansof
theintellectmancanhaveknowledgeof[thenaturesof]allcorporealthings.”174These
naturesareperfectionsofanother(“aliorum”)thataresomehowreceivedinthesubject175
throughknowledge:“Nowwhateverknowscertainthingscannothaveanyoftheminits
ownnature;becausethatwhichisinitnaturallywouldimpedetheknowledgeofanything
17475,2,c.:“Manifestumestenimquodhomoperintellectumcognoscerepotestnaturas
omniumcorporum.”175Lateron,inChapter3,thereceptivecharacterofknowledgewillbetreated,butitis
alreadysuggestedin75,2.Knowingisacertaininessethatwouldnotbepossibleiftheperfectiontobeknowninessetnaturaliteralready.
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else…”176ThisfactallowsAquinastodrawtheconclusionintended:thehumansouldoes
nothavethenatureofabody,becausewhatisabletoreceivethosenaturesinacognitive
waycannothavethatnaturemetaphysicallyinitself.Itisnotourpurposeheretoassessthe
strengthoftheThomisticargument,buttotakefromthistextthefollowingthree
suggestions.
1)ForAquinas,thenatureofabodyisametaphysicalpropertyofthings,i.e.,it
belongsmetaphysicallytothembutnottothehumansoul(thesoulisnotabody).
2)Thereisadifferencebetweenthecognitiveandthemetaphysicalpresenceofthe
natureofabody.Inthehumansoul,thelatterisdeniedwhereastheformerisadmitted
(thesoulisabletoknowthenatureofallbodies).
3)Thehumansoulisinpotencyofreceivingcognitivelythenatureofallbodies.
ThiscrucialtextofAquinas,therefore,supportsthefirstsideofwhatwehavecalled
theThomisticfact,namely,thatweknowthenatureofcorporealthings.
Whatweknowintellectuallyisthenatureofcorporealthings.Thenatureisoutside
themindbutnotwiththesamemodeofbeingwithwhichitisknown.Thenaturewe
understandisuniversal:
Butthereisthisdifference,accordingtotheopinionofAristotle,betweenthesenseandtheintelligence—thatathingisperceivedbythesenseaccordingtothedispositionwhichithasoutsidethesoul—thatis,initsindividuality;whereasthenatureofthethingunderstoodisindeedoutsidethesoul,butthemodeaccording
17675,2,c.:“Quodautempotestcognoscerealiqua,oportetutnihileorumhabeatinsua
natura,quiailludquodinesseteinaturaliterimpediretcognitionemaliorum…”
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towhichitexistsoutsidethesoulisnotthemodeaccordingtowhichitisunderstood.177
Whatweunderstandisnottheintelligiblespecies,butthethingitselfthroughits
likeness.Thespeciesistheformthroughwhichtheactionofknowingisperformed.Afew
linesbeforetheprevioustext,St.Thomassays:
Forwhatisunderstoodisintheintellect,notaccordingtoitsownnature,butaccordingtoitslikeness;for‘thestoneisnotinthesoul,butitslikenessis,’asissaid,DeAnimaiii,8.Yetitisthestonewhichisunderstood,notthelikenessofthestone;exceptbyareflectionoftheintellectonitself:otherwise,theobjectsofscienceswouldnotbethings,butonlyintelligiblespecies.178
ThislatterremarkclarifiesthemeaningofwhatwecalltheThomisticfact:toknow
thenatureofcorporealthingsmeanstoknowsomethingthatbelongstothethings
themselves,notsomethingthatpertainstothesubject.TheThomisticspeciesisasubjective
modificationthroughwhichtheintellecthasdirectcontactwiththething,notwithitself.179
ThisideaisrepeatedinoneofthemostrelevantarticlesforThomisticGnoseology:
Thereforeifwhatweunderstandismerelytheintelligiblespeciesinthesoul,itwouldfollowthateverysciencewouldnotbeconcernedwithobjectsoutsidethesoul,butonlywiththeintelligiblespecieswithinthesoul;thus,accordingtotheteachingofthePlatonistsallscienceisaboutideas,whichtheyheldtobeactuallyunderstood.180
17776,2ad4:“Sedhoctantuminterestintersensumetintellectum,secundumsententiam
Aristotelis,quodressentitursecundumillamdispositionemquamextraanimamhabet,insuaparticularitate,naturaautemreiquaeintelligitur,estquidemextraanimam,sednonhabetillummodumessendiextraanimam,secundumquemintelligitur.”Theobjectofunderstandingastheuniversalnature,andnotthethinginitsparticularity,willbethefocusofthenextsection.
17876,2ad4:“Idenimquodintelligiturnonestinintellectusecundumse,sedsecundumsuamsimilitudinem,lapisenimnonestinanima,sedspecieslapidis,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.Ettamenlapisestidquodintelligitur,nonautemspecieslapidis,nisiperreflexionemintellectussupraseipsum,alioquinscientiaenonessentderebus,seddespeciebusintelligibilibus.”
179Cf.InIVSent.,d.49,q.2,a.1ad16;DeVer2,3,ad3.18085,2,c.:“Siigitureaquaeintelligimusessentsolumspeciesquaesuntinanima,
sequereturquodscientiaeomnesnonessentderebusquaesuntextraanimam,sedsolumde
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ThementionofPlatoremindsusofthefirsttextexamined181andisimportantfor
ourpurposes.Tosaythatthesubjectivemodificationassuch(thespecies)istheobjectof
humanunderstandingisasmistakenastosay,withPlato,thattheseparateideasarethe
objectofunderstanding.Inbothcases,infact,humanunderstandingwouldnotrefertothe
realthings,whicharethesensiblecorporealthings.Andinbothcases,themistake
accordingtoSt.Thomasisthesame.Thatis,itisamistaketothinkthattheobjectof
humanunderstandingneedstobeseparatedfrommatterinitsown(real)beingor,inother
words,tothinkthatthereisnothingintelligibleintheparticular,thatthereisnothing
universalsubsistinginthematter.Asweshallsee,St.ThomaswouldblameKantforthe
samemistake.Theneedoftheagentintellectarisesbecausethemodeofbeingofwhatwe
knowisnotintelligibleinact,notbecausethereisnothingintelligibleincorporealthings.182
In79,3ad3,Aquinassaysthattheintelligibleinactdoesnotexistinrealityassuch,
regardingthenatureofsensiblethings:“Nowtheintelligibleinactisnotsomethingexisting
speciebusintelligibilibusquaesuntinanima;sicutsecundumPlatonicosomnesscientiaesuntdeideis,quasponebantesseintellectainactu.”
18179,3.182Cf.InIDeAnima4,106-111:“Platotooktheobjectsknownbytheintellecttobethingsin
themselves,existingapartfrommatterinperpetualactuality,andthecausesofknowledgeandofbeinginthingsofsense.ForAristotlethisviewinvolvedsomanydifficultiesthathewascompelledtoexcogitatethetheoryofthe‘agentintellect’…”[Platoposuit,quodintelligibiliaessentpersesubsistenciaetseparataetessentsemperinactu,etessentcausacognitionisetesserebussensibilibus(quodAristotilestamquaminconveniensvolensevitare,coactusestponereintellectumagentem)…];InIIIDeAnima6,297-305:“Andthemindinactisitsobjectineveryway;for(asanobjectincludesmatterinitsnotionordoesnotincludeit,inthesamewaythisobjectisperceivedbytheintellect).AndjustbecausePlatooverlookedthisprocessofabstractionhewasforcedtoconceiveofmathematicalobjectsandspecificnaturesasexistinginseparationfrommatter;whereasAristotlewasabletoexplainthatprocessbytheagentintellect.”[Etomninointellectusinactuestresintellecta,quiasicutresinsuirationehabentmateriamvelnonhabent,sicabintellectupercipiuntur.EtquiahuncmodumabstractionisPlatononconsideravit,coactusfuitponeremathematicaetspeciesseparatas,lococuiusadpraedictamabstractionemfaciendamAristotelesposuitintellectumagentem.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,c..
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innature;ifweconsiderthenatureofthingssensible,whichdonotsubsistapartfrom
matter.”183Still,thenaturesofsensiblethings,whicharetheobjectofintelligence,are
distinguishedfromthematterinwhichtheysubsist(asisimpliedinthecorpus).184Thereis
aperfection,namelythenatureofcorporealthings,whichcannotsubsistwithoutmatter,
butisnotconfoundedwiththematteritself.St.Thomasalsodistinguishesthesenatures
fromothernaturesthatdonotneedmattertosubsistand,becauseofthat,areintelligible
inact(thisisthemeaningoftheclarification,“quantumadnaturamrerumsensibilium”).
ThefactthattheobjectofhumanintelligenceisnotinrealityintelligibleinactbringsSt.
Thomas,nottofindtheoriginoftheintelligiblecontentoutsiderealityandinthesubject
(likeKant),buttofindinthesubjectacapacityofabstractingtheintelligiblecontent(the
nature)fromitsindividualconditionsinthematter,thusmakingtheintelligibleinact(the
speciesrepresentingthisintellectualcontent).185ThatiswhySt.Thomasconcludesthe
previoustextwiththefollowing:“Andthereforeinordertounderstandthem,the
immaterialnatureofthepassiveintellectwouldnotsufficebutforthepresenceofthe
activeintellectwhichmakesthingsactuallyintelligiblebywayofabstraction.”186What
18379,3ad3:“Intelligibileauteminactunonestaliquidexistensinrerumnatura,quantum
adnaturamrerumsensibilium,quaenonsubsistuntpraetermateriam.”184Cf.79,3,c.:“ButsinceAristotledidnotallowthatformsofnaturalthingsexistapartfrom
matter,andasformsexistinginmatterarenotactuallyintelligible;itfollowsthatthenaturesofformsofthesensiblethingswhichweunderstandarenotactuallyintelligible.”[SedquiaAristotelesnonposuitformasrerumnaturaliumsubsisteresinemateria;formaeauteminmateriaexistentesnonsuntintelligibilesactu,sequebaturquodnaturaeseuformaererumsensibilium,quasintelligimus,nonessentintelligibilesactu.]
185Thedistinctionbetweenthetwomeaningsof“intelligibilis”and“universalis”(asintellectualcontentandasmodeofbeingofthecontent),whichisacrucialelementofourinterpretationofSt.Thomas,willbethefocusofChapter2.
18679,3ad3:“Etideoadintelligendumnonsufficeretimmaterialitasintellectuspossibilis,nisiadessetintellectusagens,quifaceretintelligibiliainactupermodumabstractionis.”
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Aquinasmeansisthat,inorderforintelligencetoreceivetheintelligibleinact,itisnot
enoughtobeitselfimmaterial(astheobjectionproposes),butwhatisalsonecessaryisan
intelligibleinactwhichcouldbereceived.Itisthefunctionoftheagentintellecttoproduce
thisintelligibleinact,forthereasonsexposedandinthesenseexplained.
Ourimmediatepurposewastosituatetheroleoftheagentintellectasthe
explanationoftheThomisticfact.Giventhatweknowthenaturesofcorporealthings,but
thesenaturesdonotsubsistinthecorporealthingsinawaythatwecantakeholdofthem,
thereneedstobeanagentintellectthatmakesthosenaturesavailabletothepossible
intellect,bymakingthemintelligibleinact.187Thenaturesofcorporealthingsareintelligible
onlyinpotency(becausetheyareimbeddedinmatter);ourintelligenceisalsoinpotencyof
understanding(becauseitistabularasa);inordertounderstand,weneedthosenaturesto
beintelligibleinact.Thisispreciselythefunctionoftheagentintellect:tomakethenature
ofcorporealthingsintelligibleinact,bymeansofanabstractionfrommatter.Inthisway,
thosenatureswillbeabletoactualizethepossibleintellect.188
187AsimilarinterpretationoftheThomisticfactcanbefoundinMartínezMillán,55-56:“As
AquinasnotesinDeAnima,AristotlewantedtoovercomethenegativeeffectsofPlatonicphilosophy,whichhadreducedsensiblethingstonothingmoretanshadows,objectsofopinionbutnotofknowledge[…].Aristotle[…]hadpostulatedtheagentintellectinordertosavethesensibleworldfromtheunknowable”;andSerequeberhan,42-43:“Aquinasderivestheagentintellectfromthefactthathumanbeingsactuallyengageintheprocessofabstraction[…]theformsofmaterialthings[…]donotexistasdistinctentities,butinhereinmatter.[Humanintellectunderstands]bypenetratingthenaturesorformsofsensiblethings.”
188Cf.InIIIDeAnima4,54-63:“ThereasonwhyAristotlecametopostulateanagentintellectwashisrejectionofPlato’stheorythattheessencesofsensiblethingsexistedapartfrommatter,inastateofactualintelligibility;[hence,]forPlatotherewasnoneedtopositanagentintellect.ButAristotle,whoregardedtheessencesofsensiblethingsasexistinginmatter[andnotintelligibleinact],hadtoinvokesomeabstractiveprincipleintheminditselftorendertheseessencesactuallyintelligible.”[InduciturautemAristotelesadponendumintellectumagentem,adexcludendumopinionemPlatonis,quiposuitquidditatesrerumsensibiliumesseamateria
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2)TheObjectofIntelligenceinitsFormalAspect:TheUniversalas
DifferentfromtheParticular
ThepurposeofthefollowingsectionsofthisChapteristoclarifytheThomisticfact.
Thepresentsectionintendstoshowhow,forSt.Thomas,theobjectofintelligenceisnot
thematerialofsensibility,northeparticularassuch,buttheuniversalasnatureofthe
corporealthing.
Aswehaveseen,theneedofanagentintellectcomesfromthefactthattheobject
ofintelligenceisnotintelligibleinactinreality.Theobjectofintelligence,forSt.Thomas,is
theuniversalasthenatureofcorporealthings.Themetaphysicalframeworkofthis
assertionisthefollowing:theuniversal,“theonethatissaidofthemany,”isinthefirst
placethenaturethatispredicatedofmanyindividualsofthesamespecies,becauseit
subsistsinallofthem.Thereforetheuniversalassuchisdistinguishedfromtheparticular
individualasacertain“part”fromthewhole.189Thenatureistheprinciplebywhichthe
individualiswhatitis(specifically);butinordertobethisindividualanotherprincipleis
required,namelythematter.Becausematteristhatwhichdifferentiatesindividuals,and
thenatureinsteadisthatwhichunitesthem,natureandprincipleofindividuationare
separatas,etintelligibilesactu;undenonerateinecessariumponereintellectumagentem.SedquiaAristotelesponit,quodquidditatesrerumsensibiliumsuntinmateria,etnonintelligibilesactu,oportuitquodponeretaliquemintellectumquiabstraheretamateria,etsicfacereteasintelligibilesactu.]
189Thenatureasthespecificperfectionofeachindividualcanbeconsideredapartofthewholethatisthisindividual.Buttheindividualitselfcanalsobeconsideredpartoftheother“whole”whichisthespeciesasthegroupofthosewhoparticipateinacommonspecificperfection.
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distinctintheindividual.190ForSt.Thomas,thenatureisthedirectobjectofhuman
understanding.
Thereisnoquestionthat,forSt.Thomas,thisistheobjectofintelligence:“Butsince
Aristotledidnotallowthatformsofnaturalthingsexistapartfrommatter,andasforms
existinginmatterarenotactuallyintelligible;itfollowsthatthenaturesofformsofthe
sensiblethingswhichweunderstandarenotactuallyintelligible.”191Heisnotshyof
repeatingitmultoties:“Thefirstobjectofourknowledgeinthislifeisthe‘quiddityofa
materialthing,’whichistheproperobjectofourintellect,asappearsaboveinmany
passages.”192
Thehumanintellectdoesnotacquireperfectknowledgebythefirstactofapprehension;butitfirstapprehendssomethingaboutitsobject,suchasitsquiddity,andthisisitsfirstandproperobject;andthenitunderstandstheproperties,accidents,andthevariousrelationsoftheessence.Thusitnecessarilycomparesonethingwithanotherbycompositionordivision…193
“Ourintellect'sproperandproportionateobjectisthenatureofasensiblething.”194
“Andthereisyetanother,namely,thehumanintellect,whichneitherisitsownactof
190WiththeseaffirmationsIdonotclaimtohavedemonstratedtheThomisticmetaphysical
framework.ImeantoofferitasahelpfulinterpretativekeythatmakessenseofAquinas’texts.19179,3,c.:“SedquiaAristotelesnonposuitformasrerumnaturaliumsubsisteresine
materia;formaeauteminmateriaexistentesnonsuntintelligibilesactu,sequebaturquodnaturaeseuformaererumsensibilium,quasintelligimus,nonessentintelligibilesactu.”
19288,3,c.:“Primumautemquodintelligituranobissecundumstatumpraesentisvitae,estquidditasreimaterialis,quaeestnostriintellectusobiectum,utmultotiessupradictumest.”;cf.84,7;85,8;87,2ad2.
19385,5,c.:“Intellectushumanusnonstatiminprimaapprehensionecapitperfectamreicognitionem;sedprimoapprehenditaliquiddeipsa,putaquidditatemipsiusrei,quaeestprimumetpropriumobiectumintellectus;etdeindeintelligitproprietatesetaccidentiaethabitudinescircumstantesreiessentiam.Etsecundumhoc,necessehabetunumapprehensumaliicomponereveldividere…”
19484,8,c.:“Propriumobiectumintellectuinostroproportionatumestnaturareisensibilis.”ThatthenaturesofcorporealthingscanbeintelligibleobjectscanbetakenalsofromCGII,99,par.
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understanding,norisitsownessencethefirstobjectofitsactofunderstanding,forthis
objectis[somethingextrinsic,thatis,]thenatureofamaterialthing.Andthereforethat
whichisfirstknownbythehumanintellectisanobjectofthiskind…”195
Thisintellectualobjectisclearlydistinguishedfromtheobjectofsensibility.Both
intelligenceandsensitivityareapprehensive,butasdifferentspeciesofthesamegenus:
“Indeed,thepassivepoweritselfhasitsverynaturefromitsrelationtoitsactiveprinciple.
Therefore,sincewhatisapprehendedbytheintellectandwhatisapprehendedbysense
aregenericallydifferent;consequently,theintellectualappetiteisdistinctfromthe
1-2:“Thus,throughtheintelligibleformsinquestionaseparatesubstanceknowsnotonlyotherseparatesubstances,butalsothespeciesofcorporealthings.Fortheirintellect,beingwhollyinact,isperfectinpointofnaturalperfection,and,therefore,itmustcomprehenditsobject—intelligiblebeing—inauniversalmanner.Now,thespeciesofcorporealthingsarealsoincludedwithinintelligiblebeing,andtheseparatesubstance,therefore,knowsthem.”[Perdictasigiturformasintelligibilessubstantiaseparatanonsolumcognoscitaliassubstantiasseparatas,sedetiamspeciesrerumcorporalium.Cumenimintellectusearumsitperfectusnaturaliperfectione,utpotetotusinactuexistens,oportetquodsuumobiectum,scilicetensintelligibile,universalitercomprehendat.Subenteautemintelligibilicomprehendunturetiamspeciesrerumcorporalium.Easigitursubstantiaseparatacognoscit.]
19587,3,c.:“Estautemaliusintellectus,scilicethumanus,quinecestsuumintelligere,necsuiintelligereestobiectumprimumipsaeiusessentia,sedaliquidextrinsecum,scilicetnaturamaterialisrei.Etideoidquodprimocognosciturabintellectuhumano,esthuiusmodiobiectum…”ItisnotourconcerntofocusonthevariouswordsthatAquinasuses,natura,formaorquidditas.ItcouldbegrantedthatSt.Thomasisalwaysspeakingoftheformaluniversalprincipleofamaterialindividualthing(cf.InMet.8,lect.3,1710,textonp.100).BergeralsosaysthataccordingtoSt.Thomas,thehumanintellectpossesesaproperobject:thenaturesorquidditiespresentincoporalmatter(cf.AndrédeDeusBerger,“Acondiçãodohomemnoestadodavidapresentecomodeterminanteparaateoríadoconhecimentotomasiana:SumadeTeologiaIª,84,”Kínesis:RevistaDeEstudosDosPós-GraduandosEmFilosofia2,no.3[2010]:35);cf.RichardT.Lambert,“ATextualStudyofAquinas’ComparisonoftheIntellecttoPrimeMatter,”NewScholasticism56(1982):87,“Matterreceivesitsformsbycontractingthem,toindividuality,whileformsareinthemindasuniversals[andhequotesDeSpir.Creat.,1].”Cf.Stump,270.
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sensitive.”196Inthenexttwotextsitisclearalsothatbothobjects,beingdifferent,are
neverthelessextrinsic,“outthere”:197
Thereisanothergenusinthepowersofthesoul,whichgenusregardsamoreuniversalobject—namely,everysensiblebody,notonlythebodytowhichthesoulisunited.Andthereisyetanothergenusinthepowersofthesoul,whichgenusregardsastillmoreuniversalobject—namely,notonlythesensiblebody,butallbeinginuniversal.Whereforeitisevidentthatthelattertwogeneraofthesoul'spowershaveanoperationinregardnotmerelytothatwhichisunitedtothem,butalsotosomethingextrinsic.198
Itfollowsofnecessitythatthissomethingextrinsic,whichistheobjectofthesoul'soperation,mustberelatedtothesoulinatwofoldmanner.First,inasmuchasthissomethingextrinsichasanaturalaptitudetobeunitedtothesoul,andtobebyitslikenessinthesoul.Inthiswaytherearetwokindsofpowers—namely,the"sensitive"inregardtothelesscommonobject—thesensiblebody;andthe"intellectual,"inregardtothemostcommonobject—universalbeing.Secondly,forasmuchasthesoulitselfhasaninclinationandtendencytothesomethingextrinsic.199
19680,2,c.:“…[I]psapotentiapassivapropriamrationemhabetexordineadsuumactivum.
Quiaigiturestalteriusgenerisapprehensumperintellectumetapprehensumpersensum,consequensestquodappetitusintellectivussitaliapotentiaasensitiva.”
197Theprecisemeaningof“extrinsic,”“outthere,”“outsidethemind,”“inre,”etc.,willhopefullybecomeclearinthefollowingsectionandchapters.Itistobenoted,fornow,thatitisAquinaswhosaysthattheobjectis“extraanimam.”Itmeansthatthecontentofourknowingisoutthere,evenifitisnotouttherewiththemodeofbeingithasinourfaculty.Inthatsense,theobjectisoutthereinact(itisthere)althoughitisnotthereinitscognitivemodeofbeing.Othernuances,therelevanttexts,etc.,willbeofferedlater.Cf.ourstudyofCGII,77par.2,attheendofChapter4;SummaI,79,4ad4;InBoet.DeTrin.5,3,c.(quotedonp.90)andInMet.8,lect.1,1687(seeAppendix,Note5).
19878,1,c.:“Estautemaliudgenuspotentiarumanimae,quodrespicituniversaliusobiectum,scilicetomnecorpussensibile;etnonsolumcorpusanimaeunitum.Estautemaliudgenuspotentiarumanimae,quodrespicitadhucuniversaliusobiectum,scilicetnonsolumcorpussensibile,seduniversaliteromneens.Exquopatetquodistaduosecundagenerapotentiarumanimaehabentoperationemnonsolumrespectureiconiunctae,sedetiamrespectureiextrinsecae.”
19978,1,c.:“Necesseestextrinsecamrem,quaeestobiectumoperationisanimae,secundumduplicemrationemadanimamcomparari.Unomodo,secundumquodnataestanimaeconiungietinanimaessepersuamsimilitudinem.Etquantumadhoc,suntduogenerapotentiarum,scilicetsensitivum,respectuobiectiminuscommunis,quodestcorpussensibile;etintellectivum,respectuobiecticommunissimi,quodestensuniversale.Alioveromodo,secundumquodipsaanimainclinaturettenditinremexteriorem.”
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Becausetheobjectofintelligenceisnotthesameastheobjectofsensitivity,and
becausebothfacultiesareapprehensive,“…thephantasmscannotofthemselvesaffectthe
passiveintellect,andrequiretobemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect…”200
“Sensitiveknowledgeisnottheentirecauseofintellectualknowledge.Andthereforeitis
notstrangethatintellectualknowledgeshouldextendfurtherthansensitiveknowledge.”201
“Furtherthansensitive”etc.meansthatwhatisunderstoodisanobjectformallydifferent
fromtheobjectofsensitivity.Theobjectwhichperfectshumanintelligenceisnotthe
phantasm(phantasmatanonsufficiunt),buttheintelligibleinact.202Moreaboutthiscrucial
textwillhavetobesaidlater.203
Thereis,however,aseriesoftextsthatseemstochallengethemainpointofthis
section,thatis,thattheobjectofintelligenceistheuniversalnature.ReferringtoAristotle’s
IIIDeAnima,St.Thomasaffirmsthat“…thephantasmistotheintellectwhatcoloristothe
20084,6,c.:“Sedquiaphantasmatanonsufficiuntimmutareintellectumpossibilem,sed
oportetquodfiantintelligibiliaactuperintellectumagentem…”20184,6ad3:“Sensitivacognitiononesttotacausaintellectualiscognitionis.Etideononest
mirumsiintellectualiscognitioultrasensitivamseextendit.”202Cf.InIIIDeAnima7,105-113:“[Aristotle]distinguishesbetweenintellectandimagination
[first,regardingthesecondoperation,andthenheshows]howtheprimaryintellectualnotions,theunderstandingofindivisibleobjects,differfromphantasms;andherepliesthatwhilethesearealwaysattendedbyphantasms,theydifferfromphantasms;[becausephantasmsarerepresentationsofparticulars,whereasthethingsunderstoodareuniversal,abstractedfromindividuatingconditions…]”[…ostenditdifferenciaminterfantasiaetintellectum(…)inquodifferantprimiintellectus,idestintelligentiaeindivisibilium,quodnonsintphantasmata.Etrespondet,quodnonsuntsinephantasmatibus,sedtamennonsuntphantasmata,quiaphantasmatasuntsimilitudinesparticularium,intellectaautemsuntuniversaliaabindividuantibuscondicionibusabstracta…]
203Cf.Chapter4,section1.Itcouldbearguedthattheagentintellectmakesthephantasmitselfintelligibleinact,inwhichcasethephantasmwouldbetheobjectperfectingthepossibleintellect,andtheagentintellectwouldtaketheroleofaformalapriori.However,itwillbeshownlaterthat,iftakenincontext,thepertinenttextofAquinascannotproducethisconclusion.
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sight.”204Itwouldseemthat,ifcolouristheobjectofvision,thenthephantasmof
sensitivityistheobjectofintelligence.205Tobeginwith,thesetextswillbeexaminedintheir
respectivecontextsandthenotherreferenceswillbeusedtocompletethevisionbeing
presented.
In75,2,St.Thomasisdemonstratingthesubsistenceoftheintellectualprinciple.In
ordertodothat,heshowsthatithasanoperationinwhichthebodydoesnotparticipate.
Therefore,becauseoperaresequituresse,theintellectualprincipledoesnotneedthebody
tosubsist,butsubsistsinitself.Tosaythatthebodydoesnotparticipateintheactivityof
understandingmeansthatthebodyisnotthefacultynortheinstrumentofunderstanding.
Itdoesnotmeanthatabodycannotbetheobjectofunderstanding(herethephantasm
comesintoplay).Whatdoesobjectmeanhere?Thisisthepointofconfusion.St.Thomas
saysintheAdTertium:
Thebodyisnecessaryfortheactionoftheintellect,notasitsoriginofaction,butonthepartoftheobject;forthephantasmistotheintellectwhatcoloristothesight.Neitherdoessuchadependenceonthebodyprovetheintellecttobenon-subsistent;otherwiseitwouldfollowthatananimalisnon-subsistent,sinceitrequiresexternalobjectsofthesensesinordertoperformitsactofperception.206
Itmustbenotedthatrationeobiectidoesnotnecessarilymeansicutobiectum
formale.Thefollowingcomparisonwiththesubsistenceofanimalsmaybeenlightening:an
animalsubsistsinitselfevenifitneedsexterioribussensibilibusinordertoknow.Colorad
20475,2ad3:“…[P]hantasmaenimcomparaturadintellectumsicutcoloradvisum.”Cf.76,
1,c.;54,4sc;asanobjectionin85,1ob.3;InIDeAnima2,60-69.205ThisseemstobeCory’sinterpretation.SeeAppendix,Note2.20675,2ad3:“Dicendumquodcorpusrequirituradactionemintellectus,nonsicutorganum
quotalisactioexerceatur,sedrationeobiecti,phantasmaenimcomparaturadintellectumsicutcoloradvisum.Sicautemindigerecorporenonremovetintellectumessesubsistentem,alioquinanimalnonessetaliquidsubsistens,cumindigeatexterioribussensibilibusadsentiendum.”
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visum,therefore,meansthecolourinthethingitself,notinthefacultyasperfectiveofit.In
thesameway,thephantasmisneededasthebodilyrepresentationoftheexternalthing,
notasanimageperfectingthefacultyitself.Rationeobiectimeans,therefore,thatthe
phantasmislikeamaterialobjectfortheintelligence,207insofarasitisrequiredinorderto
havesomethingtounderstand.208St.Thomas’pointintheAdTertiumisthis:theneedofa
bodytoperformanactionwouldimplythenon-subsistenceofthesoulonlyifthebody
wereneededasaninstrumentoftheaction;but,becausethebodyisneededonlyasa
materialobjectofthisaction,theargumentdoesnotconclude.209St.Thomasisnotstating
207ThesenseinwhichAquinasspeaksaboutobjectcanbeilluminatedwithInBoet.DeTrin.
6,2,ad5:“Thephantasmisprincipleofhumanknowing,asthatfromwhichtheintellectualoperationbegins:notthoughassomethingtemporary,butasacertainpermanentgroundoftheintellectualoperation,inthewaytheprinciplesofdemonstrationmustremainintheprocessofscience;thephantasms,infact,arerelatedtotheintellectasobjects,inwhichtheintellectseeseverything,eitherbyperfectrepresentationorbynegation.”(mytrans.)[…phantasmaestprincipiumnostraecognitionis,utexquoincipitintellectusoperationonsicuttransiens,sedsicutpermanensutquoddamfundamentumintellectualisoperationis;sicutprincipiademonstrationisoportetmanereinomniprocessuscientiae,cumphantasmatacomparenturadintellectumutobiecta,inquibusinspicitomnequodinspicitvelsecundumperfectamrepraesentationemvelpernegationem.]“Inquibus”isreferredtothematerialobjectivityofthephantasm,“quod”totheformalobjectivityoftheuniversal.
208ForAquinas,itseems,thecoloursandthephantasmshavethesamerelationshiptovisionandintelligenceinsofarastheystandfortheobjectinitsrealbeing.Itcouldbeobjectedthatthephantasmisjustanimage,butforAquinasthephantasmisanimagepreciselyinsofarasitrepresentstherealcontent.Whatweunderstandiswhatisrepresentedinthephantasm,i.e.,therealthing.
209ThefirstmentionofthisAristoteliantextinInDeAnimacanbehelpfulhere.ItisInIDeAnima2,60-69:“…[F]orunderstandingisnotaccomplishedwithabodilyorgan,thoughitdoesbearonabodilyobject;because,aswillbeshownlater,inBookIII,thephantasmsintheimaginationaretotheintellectascolourstosight:ascolours[aretheobjectsofsight,sophantasmsaretheobjectsoftheintellect…]”[…intelligereenimnonestperorganumcorporale,sedindigetobiectocorporali.SicutenimPhilosophusdicitintertiohuius,hocmodophantasmatasehabentadintellectum,sicutcoloresadvisum.Coloresautemsehabentadvisum,sicutobiecta:phantasmataergosehabentadintellectumsicutobiecta…]Cf.alsoInIIIDeAnima6,130-134:“…[I]fintellectisrelatedtophantasmsasthesensestotheirobject,thenjustasthesensescannotsensewithoutanobject,sothesoulcannotunderstandwithoutphantasms.”[…siphantasmatasehabentadanimam
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thattheformalobjectofintelligenceisthephantasm,orthatthephantasmperfectsthe
intelligenceasthecolour(=speciescoloris)perfectsthevision.
Thetextof76,1,c.isevenclearer.Thearticleisaboutthekindofunionbetween
thesoulandthebody.Afterdiscardingthepossibilitythatmanisonlyhissoul,St.Thomas
says:“ItfollowsthereforethattheintellectbywhichSocratesunderstandsisapartof
Socrates,sothatinsomewayitisunitedtothebodyofSocrates.”210Hethenexamines
Averroes’solution:
TheCommentatorheldthatthisunionisthroughtheintelligiblespecies,ashavingadoublesubject,inthepossibleintellect,andinthephantasmswhichareinthecorporealorgans.211Thusthroughtheintelligiblespeciesthepossibleintellectislinkedtothebodyofthisorthatparticularman.212
RememberthatforAverroesthepossibleintellectisoneforallhumanbeings.
AquinasrejectsAverroes’solution,andourtextcomesintoplayhere:
Butthislinkoruniondoesnotsufficientlyexplainthefact,thattheactoftheintellectistheactofSocrates.Thiscanbeclearlyseenfromcomparisonwiththesensitivefaculty,fromwhichAristotleproceedstoconsiderthingsrelatingtothe
intellectivamsicutsensibileadsensum;sicutsensusnonpotestsentiresinesensibili,itaanimanonpotestintelligeresinephantasmate.]
21076,1,c.:“RelinquiturergoquodintellectusquoSocratesintelligit,estaliquaparsSocratisitaquodintellectusaliquomodocorporiSocratisuniatur.”
211Inordertoclarifyinwhatsensethephantasmis“subjectum”forAverroes,cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,c.:“Thusanintelligiblespecieshastwosubjects:oneinwhichitexistswithanintelligiblemodeofexisting,andthisisthepossibleintellect:anotherinwhichitexistswitharealmodeofexisting,andthissubjectisthephantasms.”[Sicigiturspeciesintelligibilishabetduplexsubiectum:unuminquoestsecundumesseintelligibile,ethocestintellectuspossibilis;aliudinquodestsecundumessereale,ethocsubiectumsuntipsaphantasmata.]
21276,1,c.:“HancautemunionemCommentator,inIIIDeAnima,dicitesseperspeciemintelligibilem.Quaequidemhabetduplexsubiectum,unumscilicetintellectumpossibilem;etaliudipsaphantasmataquaesuntinorganiscorporeis.Etsicperspeciemintelligibilemcontinuaturintellectuspossibiliscorporihuiusvelilliushominis.”
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intellect.Fortherelationofphantasmstotheintellectisliketherelationofcolorstothesenseofsight,ashesaysDeAnimaiii.213
HowdoesAquinasunderstandwhatAristotlesaid?
Therefore,asthespeciesofcolorsareinthesight,soarethespeciesofphantasmsinthepossibleintellect.Nowitisclearthatbecausethecolors,theimagesofwhichareinthesight,areonawall,theactionofseeingisnotattributedtothewall:forwedonotsaythatthewallsees,butratherthatitisseen.Therefore,fromthefactthatthespeciesofphantasmsareinthepossibleintellect,itdoesnotfollowthatSocrates,inwhomarethephantasms,understands,butthatheorhisphantasmsareunderstood.214
Whatneedstobeunderstoodisthemeaningofthewordshere.Phantasmataare
thephantasmssubsistingintheorgansofsensitivity,ascoloresarethecolourssubsistingin
thebodies(inpariete).Speciescolorumaretheobjectiverepresentationsofthecoloursin
thefacultyofvision,asspeciesphantasmatumaretheobjectiveintelligiblerepresentations
ofthephantasmsinthepossibleintellect.Thatiswhy,asthewalldoesnotseejustbecause
itpossessesthecolour,onedoesnotunderstandjustbecauseonepossessesthe
phantasms.Thevisionseesinsofarasitpossessesthespeciescoloris,andthepossible
intellectunderstandsinsofarasitpossessesthespeciesintelligibilis,herespecies
phantasmatum(inthesenseofspeciesreferringtothephantasms).215St.Thomasisnot
21376,1,c.:“Sedistacontinuatioveluniononsufficitadhocquodactiointellectussitactio
Socratis.Ethocpatetpersimilitudineminsensu,exquoAristotelesproceditadconsiderandumeaquaesuntintellectus.Sicenimsehabentphantasmataadintellectum,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima,sicutcoloresadvisum.”
21476,1,c.:“Sicutergospeciescolorumsuntinvisu,itaspeciesphantasmatumsuntinintellectupossibili.Patetautemquodexhocquodcoloressuntinpariete,quorumsimilitudinessuntinvisu,actiovisusnonattribuiturparieti,nonenimdicimusquodpariesvideat,sedmagisquodvideatur.Exhocergoquodspeciesphantasmatumsuntinintellectupossibili,nonsequiturquodSocrates,inquosuntphantasmata,intelligat;sedquodipse,veleiusphantasmataintelligantur.”
215MaybeinthissensecanbeunderstoodalsoInIDeAnima6,248-254,whereAquinassays:“…[A]sAristotlehasproved,theintellectualpotencyisbroughtintoactpreciselybymeansofthe[speciesofsensiblethings];sothatitismovedbytheminthisway.”[…sicutAristotilesprobat,
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sayingherethatthephantasmistheperfectionofintelligence,butpreciselytheopposite:
“Therefore,fromthefactthatthespeciesofphantasmsareinthepossibleintellect,itdoes
notfollowthatSocrates,inwhomarethephantasms,understands,butthatheorhis
phantasmsareunderstood.”216Hereitismostclearthatthespeciesphantasmatum,which
areinthe(separate)possibleintellect,aredistinctfromthephantasms,whicharein
Socrates.Speciesphantasmatumandphantasmata,inthistext,aredifferentnotions.217
TheAristotelianphraseisalsousedin85,1ob.3.Thearticleisaskingwhetherwe
understandcorporealthingsbymeansofabstractionfromphantasms:
ThePhilosophersays(DeAnimaiii,7)thatthephantasmistotheintellectualsoulwhatcoloristothesight.Butseeingisnotcausedbyabstractionofspeciesfromcolor,butbycolorimpressingitselfonthesight.Thereforeneitherdoestheactofunderstandingtakeplacebyabstractionofsomethingfromthephantasm,butbythephantasmimpressingitselfontheintellect.218
intellectuspossibilisreduciturperipsa,scilicetperspeciesrerumsensibilium,inactumetideooportetquodmoveaturabeishocmodo.]Itcouldbethatheisreferringinsteadtothephantasmintheaforementionedsense,asmaterialobject.ThecontextistheoppositiontoPlatoregardingtheroleofsensiblethingsinintellectualknowing.
21676,1,c.:“Exhocergoquodspeciesphantasmatumsuntinintellectupossibili,nonsequiturquodSocrates,inquosuntphantasmata,intelligat;sedquodipse,veleiusphantasmataintelligantur.”
217TheparallelintheInIIIDeAnima1,342-352isworthquoting:“[Theobjectofwhichthespeciespresentintheknowingfacultyisarepresentation,doesnottherebybecomeknower,butratherknown.]Iftheeyecontainsalikenessofacolouredwall,thisdoesnotcausethecolourtosee,but,onthecontrary,tobeseen.Thereforeiftheintelligibleideaintheintellectisasortoflikenessofourphantasms,itdoesnotfollowthatweperceiveanythingintellectually,butratherthatwe--ormorepreciselyourphantasms--areunderstoodbythatseparatedintellectualsubstance.”[Idenimcuiussimilitudoestspecies,invirtutealiquacognoscitivaexistens,nonexhocfitcognoscens,sedcognitum.Nonenimperhocquodspeciesquaeestinpupilla,estsimilitudocolorisquiestinpariete,colorestvidens,sedmagisestvisus.Perhocigiturquodspeciesintelligibilis,quaeestinintellectupossibili,estsimilitudoquaedamphantasmatum,nonsequiturquodnossumusintelligentes,sedquodnos,velpotiusphantasmatanostrasintintellectaabillasubstantiaseparate.]
21885,1ob.3:“InIIIDeAnimadiciturquodphantasmatasehabentadanimamintellectivamsicutcoloresadvisum.Sedvisiononfitperabstractionemaliquarumspecierumacoloribus,sedper
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Inotherwords,whatwouldperfecttheintellectisthephantasm,andnotanalleged
speciesabstractedfromit.Aquinas’responseisinlinewith76,1c.,bytakingcoloresand
phantasmataastheobjectsintheirparticularmaterialbeing,distinctfromtheirrespective
speciesorsimilitudines:“Colors,asbeinginindividualcorporealmatter,havethesame
modeofexistenceasthepowerofsight:thereforetheycanimpresstheirownimageonthe
eye.”219NoteAquinas’precisionregardingtheobjection:whatisimpressedinvisionisthe
similitudinem(species)ofthecolours,andnotthecoloursintheirrealbeing,proutsuntin
materiacorporaliindividuali,astheobjectioncouldhavesuggested(ob.3:“visiononfitper
abstractionemaliquarumspecierumacoloribus,sedperhocquodcoloresimprimuntin
visum”).Now,eundemmodumexistendimeansherethatboththepotencyofvisionand
thecolourinrealityareparticularandindividual.Thissamemodeofbeingallowsthe
colourstoimpressthepotencyofvisionbymeansoftheirspecies.Butthisdoesnotapply
tothephantasmsregardingthepotencyofunderstanding:“Butphantasms,sincetheyare
imagesofindividuals,andexistincorporealorgans,havenotthesamemodeofexistenceas
thehumanintellect,andthereforehavenotthepowerofthemselvestomakean
impressiononthepassiveintellect.”220Thephantasmisnotthatwhichperfectsthepotency
ofunderstanding.Whatisit,then?“Thisisdonebythepoweroftheactiveintellectwhich
hocquodcoloresimprimuntinvisum.Ergonecintelligerecontingitperhocquodaliquidabstrahaturaphantasmatibus,sedperhocquodphantasmataimprimuntinintellectum.”
21985,1ad3:“Adtertiumdicendumquodcoloreshabenteundemmodumexistendiproutsuntinmateriacorporaliindividuali,sicutetpotentiavisiva,etideopossuntimprimeresuamsimilitudineminvisum.”
22085,1ad3:“Sedphantasmata,cumsintsimilitudinesindividuorum,etexistantinorganiscorporeis,nonhabenteundemmodumexistendiquemhabetintellectushumanus,utexdictispatet;etideononpossuntsuavirtuteimprimereinintellectumpossibilem.”
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byturningtowardsthephantasmproducesinthepassiveintellectacertainlikenesswhich
represents,astoitsspecificconditionsonly,thethingreflectedinthephantasm.”221Hereit
seemsclearthatthephantasm(assensiblespecies)andtheintellectualspeciesaretwo
differentthings,onerepresentingtheparticularassuchandtheotherrepresentingthe
samething(whatelseifnot?)butonlyinitsnature,initsuniversalcontent.Therearetwo
differentspecieswithtwodifferentcontents,becausetherearetwodifferentfacultiesand
twoformallydifferentobjects:particularanduniversal.222
ThelasttexttobepresentedisactuallyoutsidethesectionoftheSummabeing
studied,butitmaybehelpful:
22185,1ad3:“Sedvirtuteintellectusagentisresultatquaedamsimilitudoinintellectu
possibiliexconversioneintellectusagentissupraphantasmata,quaequidemestrepraesentativaeorumquorumsuntphantasmata,solumquantumadnaturamspeciei.”Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad18:“Aphantasmmovestheintellect[insofarasitismadeintelligibleinact]bythepoweroftheagentintellect,towhichthepossibleintellectisrelatedaspotencyisto[itsrespectiveactivepower].Thisisthewayinwhichtheintellecthassomethingincommonwithaphantasm.”[Phantasmamovetintellectumproutestfactumintelligibileactu,virtuteintellectusagentisadquamcomparaturintellectuspossibilissicutpotentiaadagens,etitacumeocommunicat.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,c.:“Forspeciesareactuallyintelligibleonlybybeingabstractedfromphantasmsandbyexistinginthepossibleintellect.”[Speciesenimnonsuntintelligibilesactunisiperhocquodaphantasmatibusabstrahuntur,etsuntinintellectupossibili.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ob.7:“Inasmuchasintelligibleformsinhereinthesoul,theyareindividuated;butasthelikenessesofthings,theyare[universal],representingthingsaccordingtotheircommonnatureandnotaccordingtotheirindividuatingprinciples.”[Formaeintelligibilesexillapartequainhaerentanimae,suntindividuatae;sedexillapartequasuntrerumsimilitudines,suntuniversales,repraesentantesressecundumnaturamcommunem,etnonsecundumprincipiaindividuantia.]
222Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad17:“Aspecieswhichisintheimaginationisofthesamegenusasaspecieswhichisinasense,becausebothareindividualandmaterial.Butaspecieswhichisinanintellectbelongstoanothergenus,becauseitisuniversal.Andconsequentlyanimaginedspeciescannotimprintanintelligiblespeciesasasensitivespeciesimprintsanimaginedspecies;andforthisreasonanactiveintellectualpowerisnecessary,whereasanactivesensepowerisnot.”[Speciesquaeestinimaginatione,esteiusdemgeneriscumspeciequaeestinsensu,quiautraqueestindividualisetmaterialis;sedspeciesquaeestinintellectu,estalteriusgeneris,quiaestuniversalis.Etideospeciesimaginarianonpotestimprimerespeciemintelligibilem,sicutspeciessensibilisimprimitspeciemimaginariam;propterquodnecessariaestvirtusintellectivaactiva,nonautemvirtussensitivaactiva.]
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Thedistinctionofactiveandpassiveintellectinusisinrelationtothephantasms,whicharecomparedtothepassiveintellectascolorstothesight;buttotheactiveintellectascolorstothelight,asisclearfromDeAnimaiii.Butthisisnotsointheangel.Thereforethereisnoactiveandpassiveintellectintheangel.223
Thecomparisonheregoesbeyondthepossibleintellecttoincludeacomparison
withtheagentintellect.Thistextreinforcestheinterpretationpreviouslypresentedof
coloursandphantasmsasobjectsintheirconcreteandrealbeing,andnotasalready
perfectingthefaculty.Ifthecomparisonwiththepossibleintellectcouldhaveleftthings
ambiguous,thecomparisonwiththeagentintellectleaveslittleroomfordoubt.The
colourswhicharesubjecttotheinfluenceoflightarethecoloursintheirrealbeing,also
beforeknowledgehappens.Thephantasmwhichiscomparedwiththeagentintellect
representstheparticularthinginsofarasitisorcanbeilluminated,andthenintellectually
known.Theinfluenceoflightisanecessaryconditionofactualknowing,asmaking
knowabletherealobject.AccordingtoAquinas,therefore,colourandphantasminthe
Aristoteliantextstandfortheobjectsintheirrespectiverealities,andnotfortheperfective
objectsofvisionandofpossibleintellect.Theperfectiveobjectoftheintellect,ashasbeen
shown,isadifferentspeciesrepresentingthesamethingasisrepresentedinthephantasm,
butonlyinitsnature.224
22354,4,sc.:“Sedcontraestquodinnobisintellectusagensetpossibilisestper
comparationemadphantasmata;quaequidemcomparanturadintellectumpossibilemutcoloresadvisum,adintellectumautemagentemutcoloresadlumen,utpatetexIIIDeAnima.SedhocnonestinAngelo.ErgoinAngelononestintellectusagensetpossibilis.”
224AnothertextinwhichthisAristoteliantextisquotedisInBoet.DeTrin.6,3,c.:“Inthepresentstateoflife,ourintellectisnotabletoreferimmediatelytotheDivineessenceorotherseparatesubstances,sinceitrefersimmediatelytothephantasms,towhichtheintellectiscomparedassighttocolours,aswereadinIIIDeAnima.Inthisway,theintellectisabletoapprehendimmediatelyonlythequiddityofasensiblething,notthequiddityofanintelligiblething.”[Immediatequidemintellectusnosterferrinonpotestsecundumstatumviaeinessentiam
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ThissolutionisconsistentwithotherworksofAquinas,forexampleintheContra
Gentiles:
Now,thespeciesunderstoodiscomparedtothephantasmastheactuallyvisiblespeciestothecoloredthingoutsidethemind;indeed,Averroeshimselfusesthiscomparison,asdoesAristotle.Throughtheintelligibleform,therefore,thepossibleintellectisintouchwiththephantasminus,evenasthepowerofsightisintouchwiththecolorpresentinthestone.Butthiscontactdoesnotmakethestonetosee,butonlytobeseen.225
Deietinaliasessentiasseparatas,quiaimmediateextendituradphantasmata,adquaecomparatursicutvisusadcolorem,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.Etsicimmediatepotestconcipereintellectusquiditatemreisensibilis,nonautemalicuiusreiintelligibilis.]Again,thatthephantasmisobjectdoesnotmeanthatthephantasmistheobjectquod.ComparewithInIIIDeAnima2,178-186:“…[W]ecouldnotmakeanycomparisonbetweentheuniversalandtheindividualifwehadnotafacultywhichperceivedboth[…].Theintellectthereforeknowsboth[…],butindifferentways.Itknowsthespecificnatureoressenceofanobjectby(reaching)outdirectlytothatobject;butitknowstheindividualthingindirectlyorreflexively,byareturntothephantasmsfromwhichitabstractedwhatisintelligible.”[…nonpossemuscognoscerecomparationemuniversalisadparticulare,nisiessetunapotentiaquaecognosceretutrumque.Intellectusigiturutrumquecognoscit,sedalioetaliomodo.Cognoscitenimnaturamspeciei,sivequodquidest,directeextendendoseipsum,ipsumautemsingulareperquamdamreflexionem,inquantumreditsuperphantasmata,aquibusspeciesintelligibilesabstrahuntur.]Inthissecondtext,thephantasmisconsideredinitssingularity,andthatiswhyitisnottheimmediateobjectofintelligence.Inmyview,inthesetexts,“immediate”and“direct”couldmeanthesame.
225CGII,59,par.10:“Speciesautemintellectacomparaturadphantasmasicutspeciesvisibilisinactuadcoloratumquodestextraanimam:ethacsimilitudineipse[Averroes]utitur,etetiamAristoteles.Similisigiturcontinuatioestintellectuspossibilisperformamintelligibilemadphantasmaquodinnobisest,etpotentiaevisivaeadcoloremquiestinlapide.Haecautemcontinuationonfacitlapidemvidere,sedsolumvideri.”Cf.alsoCGII,59,par.13:“Hence,thespeciesofathing,aspresentinphantasms,isnotactuallyintelligible,sinceinthisstateitisnotonewiththeintellectinact,butisonewithitaccordingasthespeciesisabstractedfromthephantasms.Justso,thespeciesofcolorisnotactuallyperceived[insofar]asit[is]inthestone,butonly[insofar]asit[is]inthepupil.”[Speciesigiturrei,secundumquodestinphantasmatibus,nonestintelligibilisactu:nonenimsicestunumcumintellectuinactusedsecundumquodestaphantasmatibusabstracta;sicutnecspeciescolorisestsensatainactusecundumquodestinlapide,sedsolumsecundumquodestinpupilla.]Cf.Stump,257note55.Theword“species”indicatesheresomethingthatisbothinrealityandinknowing,sonotsomuchthesimilitudobutratherthecontentofit.ItisonemoreexampleshowingthefreedomwithwhichAquinasusestheterms.
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InothertextsSt.Thomassaysexplicitlythattheperfectingobjectofintelligenceis
notthephantasm.226Inthatwhichfollows,thedifferencebetweenthespeciesofthe
sensesandoftheintellectisalsoclear.Thatis,numericallydifferentphantasmsreferto
onlyoneintelligiblespecies(species=cognitionalsimilitudo),becausethephantasms,and
thereforethethingsrepresented,areofthesamespecies(species=natureasmetaphysical
formalprinciple).
Butthephantasmitselfisnotaformofthepossibleintellect;itistheintelligiblespeciesabstractedfromthephantasmthatisaform.Nowinoneintellect,fromdifferentphantasmsofthesamespecies,onlyoneintelligiblespeciesisabstracted;asappearsinoneman,inwhomtheremaybedifferentphantasmsofastone;yetfromallofthemonlyoneintelligiblespeciesofastoneisabstracted;bywhichtheintellectofthatoneman,byoneoperation,understandsthenatureofastone,notwithstandingthediversityofphantasms.227
Ourintellectisabletoknowcorporealthings,notbymeansofcorporealimages
(phantasms)butbymeansofintelligiblespecies:
ThesewordsofAugustinearetobeunderstoodasreferringtothemediumofintellectualknowledge,andnottoitsobject.Fortheintellectknowsbodiesbyunderstandingthem,notindeedthroughbodies,northroughmaterialandcorporeal
226Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,c.:“…[A]phantasmisnotthesubjectofanintelligiblespecies
inasmuchas[it]is[whatis]actuallyunderstood.Onthecontrary,[whatisactuallyunderstoodismade]byabstractionfromphantasms.[Ontheotherhand,]thepossibleintellectisthesubjectofanintelligiblespeciesonlyinasmuchasanintelligiblespeciesisalreadyactuallyunderstoodandabstractedfromphantasms.”[…phantasmanonestsubiectumspecieiintelligibilissecundumquodestintellectuminactu,sedmagisperabstractionemaphantasmatibusfitintellectuminactu.Intellectusautempossibilisnonestsubiectumspecieiintelligibilis,nisisecundumquodestintellectaiaminactu,etabstractaaphantasmatibus.]ThecontextisalsothepolemicwithAverroes.
22776,2,c.:“Sedipsumphantasmanonestformaintellectuspossibilis,sedspeciesintelligibilisquaeaphantasmatibusabstrahitur.Inunoautemintellectuaphantasmatibusdiversiseiusdemspecieinonabstrahiturnisiunaspeciesintelligibilis.Sicutinunohomineapparet,inquopossuntessediversaphantasmatalapidis,ettamenabomnibuseisabstrahiturunaspeciesintelligibilislapidis,perquamintellectusuniushominisoperationeunaintelligitnaturamlapidis,nonobstantediversitatephantasmatum.”ItshouldbenotedthatthecontextistheimportantpolemicagainstAverroes’theoryofoneintellect.
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species;butthroughimmaterialandintelligiblespecies,whichcanbeinthesoulbytheirownessence.228
Theformalobjectofintelligenceisthenatureinitsabsoluteness,notinits
particularity:“Buttheintellectualsoulknowsathinginitsnatureabsolutely:forinstance,it
knowsastoneabsolutelyasastone;andthereforetheformofastoneabsolutely,astoits
properformalidea,isintheintellectualsoul.”229“Nowthereceptivepotentialityinthe
intellectualsoulisotherthanthereceptivepotentialityoffirstmatter,asappearsfromthe
diversityofthethingsreceivedbyeach.Forprimarymatterreceivesindividualforms;
whereastheintelligencereceivesabsoluteforms.”230
22884,1ad1:“DicendumquodverbumAugustiniestintelligendumquantumadeaquibus
intellectuscognoscit,nonautemquantumadeaquaecognoscit.Cognoscitenimcorporaintelligendo,sednonpercorpora,nequepersimilitudinesmaterialesetcorporeas;sedperspeciesimmaterialesetintelligibiles,quaepersuiessentiaminanimaessepossunt.”Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.:“Norcanitbesaidthatmyactofunderstandingisdifferentfromyouractofunderstandingbyreasonofthediversityofthephantasms;becauseaphantasmisnotathingthatisunderstoodinact,butthislatterissomethingabstractedfromit,whichisheldtobeaword.Hencethediversityofthephantasmsisextrinsictointellectualactivity,andthuscannotcausedifferencesinit.”[Necpotestdiciquodintelligeremeumsitaliudabintelligeretuoperdiversitatemphantasmatum;quiaphantasmanonestintellectuminactu,sedidquodestabeoabstractum,quodponituresseverbum.Undediversitasphantasmatumestextrinsecaabintellectualioperatione;etsicnonpotestdiversificareipsam.]
22975,5,c.:“Animaautemintellectivacognoscitremaliquaminsuanaturaabsolute,putalapideminquantumestlapisabsolute.Estigiturformalapidisabsolute,secundumpropriamrationemformalem,inanimaintellectiva.”
23075,5ad1:“Estautemaliapotentiareceptivainanimaintellectiva,apotentiareceptivamateriaeprimae,utpatetexdiversitatereceptorum,nammateriaprimarecipitformasindividuales,intellectusautemrecipitformasabsolutas.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima1,323-329:“Thereforetheintelligibleideacannotbetheformoftheintellectualpoweruntilitisactually[intelligible];andthiscannothappenuntilitisdisengagedfromphantasmsbyabstraction.Hence,preciselyinthedegreethatitisjoinedtotheintellectitisremovedfromphantasms.Notinthiswaythereforecouldanintellectualpowerbeunitedwithus.”[Speciesigiturintelligibilisnonestformaintellectuspossibilis,nisisecundumquodestintelligibilisactu:nonestautemintelligibilisactu,nisisecundumquodestaphantasmatibusabstractaetremota.Manifestumestigitur,quodsecundumquoduniturintellectui,estremotaaphantasmatibus.Nonigiturintellectusperhocuniturnobiscum.]ThecontextisthepolemicwithAverroes.
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Thusitseemsclearthat,forSt.Thomas,theobjectofintelligenceinitsformal
aspectisdifferentfromtheobjectofsensitivity.231Itisdifferentinitscontent,anditis
knownthroughadifferentspecies.232Althoughtherehavebeensomeanticipations,the
subsistenceofthisobjectinrealityasaformalperfectionofcorporealthingsoutsidethe
mindwillbethefocusofthenextsection.Andthecharacteristicofknowingasreceptive,
andinthissensesimilartosensibility,willbethefocusofChapter3.
231Cf.InMet.12,lect.8,2540-2541:“Nowitsproperintelligibleobjectissubstance,since
theobjectoftheintellectisaquiddity.Hencehesaysthattheintellectisreceptiveofsomethingintelligibleandofsubstance.[…]Butitshouldbeborneinmindthatmaterialsubstancesarenotactuallyintelligiblebutonlypotentially;andtheybecomeactuallyintelligiblebyreasonofthefactthatthelikenessesofthemwhicharegottenbywayofthesensorypowersaremadeimmaterialbytheagentintellect.Andtheselikenessesarenotsubstancesbutcertainintelligibleformsreceivedintothepossibleintellect.ButaccordingtoPlatotheintelligibleformsofmaterialthingsareself-subsistententities.”[Intelligibileautemproprieestsubstantia;namobiectumintellectusestquodquidest;etpropterhocdicit,quodintellectusestsusceptivusintelligibilisetsubstantiae.(…)Sedsciendumestquodsubstantiaematerialesnonsuntintelligibilesactu,sedpotentia;fiuntautemintelligibilesactuperhocquodmediantibusvirtutibussensitivisearumsimilitudinesimmaterialesreddunturperintellectumagentem.Illaeautemsimilitudinesnonsuntsubstantiae,sedquaedamspeciesintelligibilesinintellectupossibilireceptae.SedsecundumPlatonem,speciesintelligibilesrerummaterialiumerantpersesubsistentes.]Theintelligiblespeciesiscalled“immaterial”andiscomparedwiththePlatonicidea,forwhichitcannotbethephantasm.Cf.Stump,248andnote12.
232Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,ad5:“…[T]hespeciesexistinginthemediumandinthesenseisaparticularandnothingmore.Thepossibleintellect,however,receivesspeciesofahighergenusthanthosepresentintheimagination;becausethepossibleintellectreceivesuniversalspecies,whereastheimaginationcontainsonlyparticularspecies.Thereforewerequireanagentintellectinthecaseofintelligiblethings…”[…cumspeciesinmedioetinsensunonsitnisiparticularis.Intellectusautempossibilisrecipitspeciesalteriusgenerisquamsintinimaginatione;cumintellectuspossibilisrecipiatspeciesuniversales,etimaginationoncontineatnisiparticulares.Etideoinintelligibilibusindigemusintellectuagente…]
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3)TheObjectofIntelligenceinitsRealAspect:TheUniversalisinthe
ThingsThemselves.
Thepurposeofthissectionistoshowthat,forSt.Thomas,theobjectofintelligence,
whichisformallydifferentfromtheobjectofsensibility,233subsistsinthecorporeal
things.234Inotherwords,theuniversals,asobjectsofunderstanding,areintheparticular
thingsthemselves,neitherinadifferentworldofPlatonicideas,norascomingfromor
belongingtothesubjectivity.
Twosections,alreadyquoted,of78,1,c.willhelptoshowthat,forSt.Thomas,both
sensibilityandintelligencerelatethesoultothatwhichisexternaltoit.Thisimpliesthatthe
universalissomethingextrinsic,somethingobjectiveas“outthere.”Afterspeakingabout
thevegetativepotenciesofthesoul,Aquinassays:
Thereisanothergenusinthepowersofthesoul,whichgenusregardsamoreuniversalobject—namely,everysensiblebody,notonlythebodytowhichthesoulisunited.Andthereisyetanothergenusinthepowersofthesoul,whichgenusregardsastillmoreuniversalobject—namely,notonlythesensiblebody,butallbeinginuniversal.Whereforeitisevidentthatthelattertwogeneraofthesoul'spowershaveanoperationinregardnotmerelytothatwhichisunitedtothem,butalsotosomethingextrinsic.235
233Cf.theprevioussectioninthisChapter.234Cf.InIDeAnima3,198-203;8,125-131.23578,1,c.:“Estautemaliudgenuspotentiarumanimae,quodrespicituniversalius
obiectum,scilicetomnecorpussensibile;etnonsolumcorpusanimaeunitum.Estautemaliudgenuspotentiarumanimae,quodrespicitadhucuniversaliusobiectum,scilicetnonsolumcorpussensibile,seduniversaliteromneens.Exquopatetquodistaduosecundagenerapotentiarumanimaehabentoperationemnonsolumrespectureiconiunctae,sedetiamrespectureiextrinsecae.”
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Afewlineslater,hestressesthatthisrelationshipwiththeextrinsicthingisverified
bymeansofanimage(similitudo)andisdifferentfromtherelationshipestablishedbythe
appetitivefaculties:
Itfollowsofnecessitythatthissomethingextrinsic,whichistheobjectofthesoul'soperation,mustberelatedtothesoulinatwofoldmanner.First,inasmuchasthissomethingextrinsichasanaturalaptitudetobeunitedtothesoul,andtobebyitslikenessinthesoul.Inthiswaytherearetwokindsofpowers—namely,the"sensitive"inregardtothelesscommonobject—thesensiblebody;andthe"intellectual,"inregardtothemostcommonobject—universalbeing.Secondly,forasmuchasthesoulitselfhasaninclinationandtendencytothesomethingextrinsic.236
Asintheprevioustext,ifthereisadifferencewithsensibility,thatdifferencedoes
notlieintheobjectofintelligencenotbeing“outthere”:
Butthereisthisdifference,accordingtotheopinionofAristotle,betweenthesenseandtheintelligence—thatathingisperceivedbythesenseaccordingtothedispositionwhichithasoutsidethesoul—thatis,initsindividuality;whereasthenatureofthethingunderstoodisindeedoutsidethesoul,butthemodeaccordingtowhichitexistsoutsidethesoulisnotthemodeaccordingtowhichitisunderstood.237
23678,1,c.:“Necesseestextrinsecamrem,quaeestobiectumoperationisanimae,
secundumduplicemrationemadanimamcomparari.Unomodo,secundumquodnataestanimaeconiungietinanimaessepersuamsimilitudinem.Etquantumadhoc,suntduogenerapotentiarum,scilicetsensitivum,respectuobiectiminuscommunis,quodestcorpussensibile;etintellectivum,respectuobiecticommunissimi,quodestensuniversale.Alioveromodo,secundumquodipsaanimainclinaturettenditinremexteriorem.”
23776,2ad4:“Sedhoctantuminterestintersensumetintellectum,secundumsententiamAristotelis,quodressentitursecundumillamdispositionemquamextraanimamhabet,insuaparticularitate,naturaautemreiquaeintelligitur,estquidemextraanimam,sednonhabetillummodumessendiextraanimam,secundumquemintelligitur.”
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ThisisthemeaningofrealismforSt.Thomas:ifthethingsweknowbyour
intellectualfacultywerenotoutthere,238ourknowingwouldnotrefertothethings
themselves.Immediatelypreceedingthequotationabove,Aquinassays:
Forwhatisunderstoodisintheintellect,notaccordingtoitsownnature,butaccordingtoitslikeness;for‘thestoneisnotinthesoul,butitslikenessis,’asissaid,DeAnimaiii,8.Yetitisthestonewhichisunderstood,notthelikenessofthestone;exceptbyareflectionoftheintellectonitself:otherwise,theobjectsofscienceswouldnotbethings,butonlyintelligiblespecies.239
Asimilarremarkoccursin85,2,c.,whereitisclearthat“outthere”forSt.Thomas
doesnotmeanoutsidetheworldofcorporealthings:
Thereforeifwhatweunderstandismerelytheintelligiblespeciesinthesoul,itwouldfollowthateverysciencewouldnotbeconcernedwithobjectsoutsidethesoul,butonlywiththeintelligiblespecieswithinthesoul;thus,accordingtotheteachingofthePlatonistsallscienceisaboutideas,whichtheyheldtobeactuallyunderstood.240
Whatweknowbymeansoftheintelligiblespeciesarethenaturesofcorporeal
things,andthatiswhyweneedconversioadphantasmata:“Weneedfurthertomakeuse
238Itisnotpossibletotreatthoroughlythemediationofthephantasminintellectual
knowing,butcertainprinciplesmayorientthereadertounderstandmyposition.SeeAppendix,Note3.
23976,2ad4:“Idenimquodintelligiturnonestinintellectusecundumse,sedsecundumsuamsimilitudinem,lapisenimnonestinanima,sedspecieslapidis,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.Ettamenlapisestidquodintelligitur,nonautemspecieslapidis,nisiperreflexionemintellectussupraseipsum,alioquinscientiaenonessentderebus,seddespeciebusintelligibilibus.”
24085,2,c.:“Siigitureaquaeintelligimusessentsolumspeciesquaesuntinanima,sequereturquodscientiaeomnesnonessentderebusquaesuntextraanimam,sedsolumdespeciebusintelligibilibusquaesuntinanima;sicutsecundumPlatonicosomnesscientiaesuntdeideis,quasponebantesseintellectainactu.”
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ofthem[i.e.‘speciespreservedinthepassiveintellect’]inamannerbefittingthethingsof
whichtheyarethespecies,whichthingsarenaturesexistinginindividuals.”241
Particularlycleararethestatementsin85,2ad2,anditisworththelongquotation.
ForSt.Thomas,theobjectofknowingandthemodeofbeingofthisobjectintheknower
arenotthesame.Whatweknowisinthethingitself,althoughnotwiththesamemodeof
being,andthisapplieseventothesenses:
Inthesewords‘thethingactuallyunderstood’thereisadoubleimplication—thethingwhichisunderstood,and[itsbeing]understood.Inlikemannerthewords‘abstractuniversal’implytwothings,thenatureofathinganditsabstractionoruniversality.Thereforethenatureitselftowhichitoccurstobeunderstood,abstractedorconsideredasuniversalisonlyinindividuals;but[itsbeing]understood,abstractedorconsideredasuniversalisintheintellect.[Wecanseethepointbyacomparisonwiththesenses].Forthesightseesthecoloroftheappleapartfromitssmell.Ifthereforeitbeaskedwhereisthecolorwhichisseenapartfromthesmell,itisquiteclearthatthecolorwhichisseenisonlyintheapple:butthatitbeperceivedapartfromthesmell,thisisowingtothesight,forasmuchasthefacultyofsightreceivesthelikenessofcolorandnotofsmell.Inlikemannerhumanityunderstoodisonlyinthisorthatman;butthathumanitybeapprehendedwithoutconditionsofindividuality,thatis,thatitbeabstractedandconsequentlyconsideredasuniversal,occurstohumanityinasmuchasitisbroughtundertheconsiderationoftheintellect,inwhichthereisalikenessofthespecificnature,butnotoftheprinciplesofindividuality.242
24184,7ad1:“oportetquodeis[i.e.‘speciesconservataeinintellectupossibili’]utamur
secundumquodconvenitrebusquarumsuntspecies,quaesuntnaturaeinparticularibusexistentes.”
24285,2ad2:“Cumdiciturintellectuminactu,duoimportantur,scilicetresquaeintelligitur,ethocquodestipsumintelligi.Etsimilitercumdicituruniversaleabstractum,duointelliguntur,scilicetipsanaturarei,etabstractioseuuniversalitas.Ipsaigiturnaturacuiacciditvelintelligivelabstrahi,velintentiouniversalitatis,nonestnisiinsingularibus;sedhocipsumquodestintelligivelabstrahi,velintentiouniversalitatis,estinintellectu.Ethocpossumusviderepersimileinsensu.Visusenimvidetcolorempomisineeiusodore.Siergoquaeraturubisitcolorquividetursineodoremanifestumestquodcolorquividetur,nonestnisiinpomo;sedquodsitsineodoreperceptus,hocacciditeiexpartevisus,inquantuminvisuestsimilitudocolorisetnonodoris.Similiterhumanitasquaeintelligitur,nonestnisiinhocvelinillohomine,sedquodhumanitasapprehendatursineindividualibusconditionibus,quodestipsamabstrahi,adquodsequiturintentiouniversalitatis,
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Theobjectofintelligenceinitssubsistenceinrealityisthenatureasformalprinciple
ofthecorporealthing.Insofarasitisconsideredinitsabstraction,theuniversalis
principiumcognoscendi;butinsofarasitsubsistsinreality,itisprincipiumessendi:
Theuniversal,asunderstoodwiththeintentionofuniversality,is,indeed,inaway,aprincipleofknowledge,insofarastheintentionofuniversalityresultsfromthemodeofunderstandingbywayofabstraction.[…]Butifweconsiderthegenericorspecificnatureitselfasexistinginthesingular,thusinawayitisinthenatureofaformalprincipleinregardtothesingulars…243
Inthefollowingtext,theword“species”standsforformalprincipleinreality,and
notinthesenseofimage.Thereisinrealitysomethingthatallowsustosaythatvarious
individualsarenotdifferentintheirspecies,butonlyinnumber:“Thedifferenceofform
whichisdueonlytothedifferentdispositionofmatter,causesnotaspecificbutonlya
numericaldifference:fordifferentindividualshavedifferentforms,diversifiedaccordingto
thedifferenceofmatter.”244
accidithumanitatissecundumquodpercipiturabintellectu,inquoestsimilitudonaturaespeciei,etnonindividualiumprincipiorum.”
24385,3ad4:“Universale,secundumquodaccipiturcumintentioneuniversalitatis,estquidemquodammodoprincipiumcognoscendi,proutintentiouniversalitatisconsequiturmodumintelligendiquiestperabstractionem[…]Siautemconsideremusipsamnaturamgenerisetspecieiproutestinsingularibus,sicquodammodohabetrationemprincipiiformalisrespectusingularium…”
24485,7ad3:“Differentiaformaequaenonprovenitnisiexdiversadispositionemateriae,nonfacitdiversitatemsecundumspeciem,sedsolumsecundumnumerum;suntenimdiversorumindividuorumdiversaeformae,secundummateriamdiversificatae.”Thetwomeaningsof“species”(onerealandonegnoseological)canbeseenatworkin76,2,c.,inwhichvariousphantasmsaresaidtobeofthesamespecies:“Butthephantasmitselfisnotaformofthepossibleintellect;itistheintelligiblespeciesabstractedfromthephantasmthatisaform.Nowinoneintellect,fromdifferentphantasmsofthesamespecies,onlyoneintelligiblespeciesisabstracted;asappearsinoneman,inwhomtheremaybedifferentphantasmsofastone;yetfromallofthemonlyoneintelligiblespeciesofastoneisabstracted;bywhichtheintellectofthatoneman,byoneoperation,understandsthenatureofastone,notwithstandingthediversityofphantasms.”[Sedipsumphantasmanonestformaintellectuspossibilis,sedspeciesintelligibilisquaeaphantasmatibusabstrahitur.Inunoautemintellectuaphantasmatibusdiversiseiusdemspecieinonabstrahiturnisiunaspeciesintelligibilis.Sicutinunohomineapparet,inquopossuntessediversaphantasmata
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Ashasalreadybeenshownin79,3,andwillyetbeshownespeciallyinChapter2,
thefactthatthenatureofcorporealthingsisnotintelligibleinactdoesnotenableoneto
concludethatthenatureisnottherewithanothermodeofbeing.Todrawsucha
conclusionispreciselyPlato’serrorand—itwillbeargued—Kant’serroralso:“Having
observedthatallknowledgetakesplacethroughsomekindofsimilitude,hethoughtthat
theformofthethingknownmustofnecessitybeintheknowerinthesamemannerasin
thethingknown.[…]Whereforeheconcludedthatthethingswhichweunderstandmust
haveinthemselvesanexistenceunderthesameconditionsofimmaterialityand
immobility.”245
ForSt.Thomas,wemayconclude,thatwhichisknownbyintelligenceistheformal
principlesubsistingincorporealthings,theirnatureorspecies,theformalprincipleoftheir
being,whichsubsistsincompositionwiththeprincipleofindividuationinthethingitself.
Thissamenature,concretelysubsistentinthething,isknowninastateofabstraction.The
differentmodeofbeingdoesnotaffecttheobjectivityofthecontent.
AnexamenofotherworksofAquinasfollows.246Becausethetruthintheintellect
dependsonthethingsthemselves,theremustbesomethinginthethingsthatcorresponds
toourknowing:“…forourintellectualconceptionsaretrueinasmuchastheyactually
lapidis,ettamenabomnibuseisabstrahiturunaspeciesintelligibilislapidis,perquamintellectusuniushominisoperationeunaintelligitnaturamlapidis,nonobstantediversitatephantasmatum.]
24584,1c.:“…[C]umaestimaretomnemcognitionempermodumalicuiussimilitudinisesse,crediditquodformacognitiexnecessitatesitincognoscenteeomodoquoestincognito.[…]Etideoexistimavitquodoporteretresintellectashocmodoinseipsissubsistere,scilicetimmaterialiteretimmobiliter.”
246Ifollow,ingeneral,thechronologicalorderofferedbyStump,xvi-xx:DeVeritate(1256-1259),InBoet.DeTrin.(1257-1258),ContraGentiles(1259-1265),Q.D.DeAnima(1265-1266),InDeAnima(1267-1268),DeSpirit.Creat.(1267-1268),InMet.(1270-1273).
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representthethingknownbyacertainprocessofassimilation.Otherwisetheywouldbe
false,thatis,iftheycorrespondedtonothing.”247Thattheuniversalsubsistsinthethings
themselvesimpliesthatthereisacertainnecessityandstabilityinthem:
ThedifficultyofthisquestionobligedPlatotopostulatehisideas.Infact,because[…]hebelievedthatallofsensiblethingswerealwaysinmovement[…]andthereforehethoughtitwasimpossibletohavescienceofthem,hepostulatedcertainsubstancesseparatedfromsensiblethings,whichwouldbetheobjectsofthevarioussciencesandofdefinitions.Butthismisconceptioncamefromthefactthathedidnotdistinguishthatwhichbelongstosomethinginitselffromthatwhichisaccidental[…].AsitisdemonstratedinVIIMetaphysicae,giventhatinthesensiblesubstancewefindthewhole,thatis,thecomposite,andalsotheratio,thatis,itsform;wemustsaythatwhatisgeneratedandcorruptedinitselfisthecomposite,nottheratioorform,unlessbyaccident.[…]Now,anythingcanbeconsideredwithoutthosethingsthatdonotbelongtoitinitself.Thustheformsandrationesofthings,evensubjecttomovement,arewithoutmovementinsofarastheyareconsideredinthemselves.Itisinthiswaythattheyareobjectsofthevarioussciencesandofdefinitions,asthePhilosophersaysintheabovementionedplace.Andthesciencesofsensiblesubstancesarenotbasedontheknowledgeofsubstancesseparatedfromsensiblethings,asitisalsotheredemonstrated.248(mytrans.)
247DeVer.2,1,c.:“…[C]onceptioenimintellectusnostrisecundumhocveraest,prout
repraesentatperquamdamassimilationemremintellectam;aliasenimfalsaesset,sinihilsubessetinre.”
248InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,c.:“PropterdifficultatemhuiusquaestioniscoactusestPlatoadponendumideas.Cumenim[…]crederetomniasensibiliasemperesseinfluxu[…]etitaexistimaretdeeisnonposseessescientiam,posuitquasdamsubstantiasasensibilibusseparatas,dequibusessentscientiaeetdarenturdiffinitiones.Sedhicdefectusacciditexeoquodnondistinxitquodestperseabeoquodestsecundumaccidens[…]UtautemprobaturinVIIMetaphysicae,cuminsubstantiasensibiliinveniaturetipsumintegrum,idestcompositum,etratio,idestformaeius,persequidemgeneraturetcorrumpiturcompositum,nonautemratiosiveforma,sedsolumperaccidens[…]Unumquodqueautempotestconsiderarisineomnibushisquaeeinonpersecomparantur.Etideoformaeetrationesrerumquamvisinmotuexsistentium,proutinseconsiderantur,absquemotusunt.Etsicdeeissuntscientiaeetdiffinitiones,utibidemPhilosophusdicit.Nonautemscientiaesensibiliumsubstantiarumfundantursupercognitionealiquarumsubstantiarumasensibilibusseparatarum,utibidemprobatur.”Thisstabilityinmaterialthingsisaffirmedinothertextsaswell.Cf.InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,ob.6etad6(textinAppendix,Note4);InIDeAnima3,198-205(textinAppendix,Note4);DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad8(textinAppendix,Note4);InMet.11,lect.6,2232.
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Themind’sdependenceonrealityinknowingtheabstracteduniversalisstressed
herealso:
Themathematicianinabstractingdoesnotconsiderhisobjectdifferentlythanitis.Infact,hedoesnotunderstandthelineasbeingwithoutsensiblematter,butratherheconsidersthelineanditspropertieswithoutconsideringsensiblematter.Inthisway,thereisnodiscrepancybetweentheintellectandthethingbecause,evenwithregardtothethingitself,thatwhichbelongstothenatureofthelinedoesnotdependonthatwhichmakesthemattertobesensible,butratherviceversa.Thusitisevidentthatthereisnofalsityregardingabstraction,asitissaidinIIPhysicorum.249(mytrans.)Thesimpleapprehensioncorrespondswiththenatureasametaphysicalprinciplein
thethingitself:
…[A]ccordingtothePhilosopherinIIIDeAnima,theintellecthastwooperations:onethatiscalledintelligenceoftheindivisible,bywhichtheintellectknowsofeachthingwhatitis;theotherone,bywhichtheintellectcomposesanddivides[…]Andthesetwooperationscorrespondtotwothingsthatareinthethingsthemselves.Thefirstoperationregardsthenatureitselfofthething,accordingtowhichthethingunderstoodobtainsacertaindegreeintherealmofbeings,beitacompletething,likeacertainwhole,oranincompletething,likeapartoranaccident.Thesecondoperationinsteadregardsthebeingitselfofthething,whichresultsfromthecongregationofthething’sprinciplesincomposites,oraccompaniesthething’ssimplenatureitself,asithappensinsimplesubstances.250(mytrans.)
249InBoet.DeTrin.5,3,ad1:“Mathematicusabstrahensnonconsideratremaliterquamsit.
Nonenimintelligitlineamessesinemateriasensibili,sedconsideratlineameteiuspassionessineconsiderationemateriaesensibilis,etsicnonestdissonantiainterintellectumetrem,quiaetiamsecundumremid,quodestdenaturalineae,nondependetabeo,quodfacitmateriamessesensibilem,sedmagiseconverso.Etsicpatetquodabstrahentiumnonestmendacium,utdiciturinIIPhysicorum.”
250InBoet.DeTrin.5,3,c.:“…[S]ecundumPhilosophuminIIIDeAnimaduplexestoperatiointellectus.Una,quaediciturintelligentiaindivisibilium,quacognoscitdeunoquoque,quidest.Aliavero,quacomponitetdividit[…].Ethaequidemduaeoperationesduobus,quaesuntinrebus,respondent.Primaquidemoperatiorespicitipsamnaturamrei,secundumquamresintellectaaliquemgraduminentibusobtinet,sivesitrescompleta,uttotumaliquod,siveresincompleta,utparsvelaccidens.Secundaverooperatiorespicitipsumesserei,quodquidemresultatexcongregationeprincipiorumreiincompositisvelipsamsimplicemnaturamreiconcomitatur,utinsubstantiissimplicibus.”
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Theuniversalasnatureissomethingwhichisknownseparatelyevenifitdoesnot
existseparatelyinthethingitself.Whatisactualinthecompositesubstanceallowsusto
knowitsnature:
…[B]ymeansofthefirstoperation,theintellectisabletoabstractthosethingsthatarenotseparateinreality;not,however,allofthem,butonlysome.Infact,sincesomethingisintelligibleinsofarasitisinact,aswereadinIXMetaphysicae,itisnecessarythatweunderstandthething’snatureorquiddityeitherinsofarasthenatureitselfisacertainact,asithappensinsimpleformsandsubstances,orinthatwhichisactofthatnature,asweunderstandcompositesubstancesbytheirforms…251(mytrans.)
Thatwhichensuresobjectivityinourintellectualknowingisthefactthat,aswiththe
senses,thatwhichisknownissomethingbelongingtothethingsoutsidethemind:
Consequently,intheactofunderstanding,theintelligiblespeciesreceivedintothepossibleintellectfunctionsasthethingbywhichoneunderstands,andnotasthatwhichisunderstood,evenasthespeciesofcolorintheeyeisnotthatwhichisseen,butthatbywhichwesee.Andthatwhichisunderstoodistheveryintelligibleessenceofthingsexistingoutsidethesoul,justasthingsoutsidethesoulareseenbycorporealsight.Forartsandscienceswerediscoveredforthepurposeofknowingthingsasexistingintheirownnatures.252
Thatwhichisapprehendedbytheintellectis“somethingone”becausethereis
“somethingone”inthethingitself.Again,knowingdependsonthings;whateverisin
knowingmustbesomethingthatisinthethingsthemselves:
251InBoet.DeTrin.5,3,c.:“…[S]ecundumprimamoperationempotestabstrahereeaquae
secundumremseparatanonsunt,nontamenomnia,sedaliqua.Cumenimunaquaequeressitintelligibilis,secundumquodestinactu,utdiciturinIXMetaphysicae,oportetquodipsanaturasivequiditasreiintelligatur:velsecundumquodestactusquidam,sicutacciditdeipsisformisetsubstantiissimplicibus,velsecundumidquodestactuseius,sicutsubstantiaecompositaepersuasformas…”
252CGII,75,par.7:“Habetseigiturspeciesintelligibilisreceptainintellectupossibiliinintelligendosicutidquointelligitur,nonsicutidquodintelligitur:sicutetspeciescolorisinoculononestidquodvidetur,sedidquovidemus.Idveroquodintelligitur,estipsaratiorerumexistentiumextraanimam:sicutetresextraanimamexistentesvisucorporalividentur.Adhoceniminventaesuntartesetscientiaeutresinsuisnaturisexistentescognoscantur.”
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Moreover,itproducestheseintelligiblesbyabstractingthemfrommatterandfrommaterialconditionswhicharetheprinciplesofindividuation.Andsincethenatureassuchofthespeciesdoesnotpossesstheseprinciplesbywhichthenatureisgivenamultipleexistenceamongdifferentthings,becauseindividuatingprinciplesofthissortaredistinctfromthenatureitself,theintellectwillbeabletoreceivethisnatureapartfromallmaterialconditions,andconsequentlywillreceiveitasaunity[i.e.,asaone-in-many].253
Theindivisibilityoftheintelligiblenatureinthethingitselfisthereasontoaffirmthe
indivisibilityoftheintellect(noteagainthereasoningfromtheobjecttothesubjective
conditions).Whatisrelevantforthepresentpurposesisthatthematerialityofathingdoes
notpreventitfromhavinganindivisiblenature.
NoticethatAristotleisimplyingherethatintellectisindivisibleofitsnature.Whatisintelligibleinanythingisitsessenceornature;whichispresentwhollyineverypartofit,asthespecificnatureiswhollypresentineachindividualofthespecies;thewholenatureofmanineachindividualman;andtheindividualassuchisindivisible.Hencewhatisintelligibleinanythingisindivisible;andthereforesoistheintellect254
253Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,c.:“Facitautem[intelligibiliainactu]perabstractionemamateria,et
amaterialibusconditionibus,quaesuntprincipiaindividuationis.Cumenimnaturaspeciei,quantumadidquodperseadspeciempertinet,nonhabeatundemultipliceturindiversis,sedindividuantiaprincipiasintpraeterrationemipsius;poteritintellectusaccipereeampraeteromnesconditionesindividuantes;etsicaccipieturaliquidunum.”Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad8:“…accordingtoAristotle,thefactthattheintellectunderstandsaone-in-manyinabstractionfromindividuatingprinciples,istobeattributedtotheintellectitself.Andthoughnothingabstractexistsinreality,theintellectisnotvoidofanyrealcontent,norisitmisrepresentativeofthingsastheyare;because,ofthosethingswhichnecessarilyexisttogether,onecanbetrulyunderstoodornamedwithoutanotherbeingunderstoodornamed.Butitcannotbetrulyunderstoodorsaidofthingsexistinginthisway,thatoneexistswithouttheother.Thuswhateverexistsinanindividualwhichpertainstothenatureofitsspecies,andinrespectofwhichitislikeotherthings,canbeknownandspokenoftrulywithouttakingintoconsiderationitsindividuatingprinciples,whichdistinguishitfromallotherindividuals.”[…secundumsententiamAristotelishocestabintellectu,scilicetquodintelligatunuminmultisperabstractionemaprincipiisindividuantibus.Nectamenintellectusestvanusautfalsus,licetnonsitaliquidabstractuminrerumnatura.Quiaeorumquaesuntsimul,unumpotestvereintelligiautnominari,absquehocquodintelligaturvelnomineturalterum;licetnonpossitvereintelligiveldici,quodeorumquaesuntsimul,unumsitsinealtero.Sicigiturverepotestconsiderarietdiciidquodestinaliquoindividuo,denaturaspeciei,inquosimileestcumaliis,absqueeoquodconsiderenturineoprincipiaindividuantia,secundumquaedistinguiturabomnibusaliis.]
254InIDeAnima8,123-131:“Etnotandum,quodhicAristotelesocculteostendit,quodintellectusdenaturasuanonestpartibilis,sedquidimpartibile.Intelligibileeniminunaquaquere
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ThemostcleartextinSt.Thomas’commentaryontheDeAnima,regardingthe
presenceoftheuniversalnatureinthethingsthemselves,seemstobethefollowing.The
differencebetweenSt.Thomas’viewandPlato’sisnotthattheobjectofknowingisextra
animambutthat,forSt.Thomas,itisnotseparatefromthematerialthings(asitisfor
Plato).Moreover,thepresenceoftheobjectinthematerialthingsisametaphysical
presence,totheextentthattheindividualconditionsaccompanytheuniversalnature:
Theintellect’sproperobjectisindeedtheessenceofthings;butnottheessencebyitself,inseparationfromthings,asthePlatoniststhought.Hencethis‘properobject’ofourintellectisnot,asthePlatonistsheld,somethingexisting,outsidesensiblethings;itissomethingintrinsictosensiblethings;andthis,eventhoughthemodeinwhichessencesaregraspedbytheminddiffersfromtheirmodeofexistenceinsensiblethings;fortheminddiscernsthemapartfromtheindividuatingconditionswhichbelongtothemintheorderofsensiblereality.255
estquidditas,etnaturareiesttotainqualibetparte,sicutnaturaspecieiesttotainquolibetindividuo:totaenimnaturahominisestinquolibetindividuo,ethocestindivisibile:undeilludquodestintelligibileinqualibetre,estindivisibile,etperconsequensintellectus.”
255InIIIDeAnima2,240-249:“…[P]ropriumobiectumintellectusestquidditasrei,quaenonestseparataarebus,utPlatoniciposuerunt.Undeillud,quodestobiectumintellectusnostrinonestaliquidextraressensibilesexistens,utPlatoniciposuerunt,sedaliquidinrebussensibilibusexistens;licetintellectusapprehendataliomodoquidditatesrerum,quamsintinrebussensibilibus.Nonenimapprehenditeascumconditionibusindividuantibus,quaeeisinrebussensibilibusadiunguntur.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima2,63-86:“AndwhilstPlatohadseparatedthequiddities(calledbyhim‘ideas’or‘species’)ofthingsfromthingsintheirsingularity,Aristotlewasconcernedtoshowthatquidditiesareonlyaccidentallydistinctfromsingularthings.Forexample,awhitemanandhisessencearedistinct[…]Andthesameistrueofanythingwhoseformexistsinmatter;thereissomethinginitbesidesitsspecificprinciple.Thespecificnatureisindividualisedthroughmatter;hencetheindividualisingprinciplesandindividualaccidentsarenotincludedintheessenceassuch.Thatiswhytherecanbemanyindividualsofthesamespecificnature—havingthisnatureincommon,whilsttheydifferinvirtueoftheirindividuatingprinciples.Hence,inallsuchthings,thethinganditsessencearenotquiteidentical.Socratesisnothishumanity.”[EtquiaPlatoponebatquidditatesrerumesseseparatasasingularibus,quasdicebatideas,velspecies;ideoostendit,quodquidditatesrerumnonsuntaliudarebusnisiperaccidens;utputanonestidemquidditashominisalbi,ethomoalbus(…)Hocautemcontingitinomnibushabentibusformaminmateria,quiaineisestaliquidpraeterprincipiaspeciei.Namnaturaspecieiindividuaturpermateriam:undeprincipiaindividuantiaetaccidentiaindividuisuntpraeteressentiamspeciei.Etideocontingitsubunaspecieinveniripluraindividua:quaelicetnondifferantinnaturaspeciei,differunttamensecundumprincipia
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Anothertextafewlineslatertellsusthattheobjectofintelligence,thequidditas,is
presentinthethingsthemselvesasmuchasistheobjectofsensibility.Becauseofthiswe
cansaythatscienceisofthethingsthemselves,andnotofthespeciesassubjective
modifications:
Furthermore,itisclearthattheintelligibleideasbywhichthepotentialintellectisactualisedarenotinthemselvestheintellect’sobject:fortheyarenotthatwhich,butthatbywhichitunderstands.For,aswithsighttheimageintheeyeisnotwhatisseen,butwhatgivesrisetotheactofsight(forwhatisseeniscolourwhichexistsinanexteriorbody),soalsowhattheintellectunderstandsistheessenceexistinginthings;itisnotitsownintelligibleidea,exceptinsofarastheintellectreflectsuponitself.Because,obviously,itiswhatthemindunderstandsthatmakesupthesubject-matterofthesciences;andallthese,apartfromrationalscience,haverealitiesfortheirsubject-matter,notideas.Clearlythen,theintellect’sobjectisnottheintelligibleidea,buttheessenceofintelligiblerealities.256
ThefollowingtextcanbetakenasaclearexpressionoftheThomisticfactashas
beendiscussedinsection1ofthisChapter.257Here,whatisrelevantisthatthequidditas
individuantia.Etpropterhocinomnibushabentibusformaminmateria,nonestomninoidem,etresetquodquidesteius.Socratesenimnonestsuahumanitas.]
256InIIIDeAnima2,264-279:“Manifestumestetiam,quodspeciesintelligibiles,quibusintellectuspossibilisfitinactu,nonsuntobiectumintellectus.Nonenimsehabentadintellectumsicutquodintelligitur,sedsicutquointelligit.Sicutenimspecies,quaeestinvisu,nonestquodvidetur,sedestquovisusvidet;quodautemvideturestcolor,quiestincorpore;similiterquodintellectusintelligitestquidditas,quaeestinrebus;nonautemspeciesintelligibilis,nisiinquantumintellectusinseipsumreflectitur.Manifestumestenimquodscientiaesuntdehisquaeintellectusintelligit.Suntautemscientiaederebus,nonautemdespeciebus,velintentionibusintelligibilibus,nisisolascientiarationalis.Undemanifestumest,quodspeciesintelligibilisnonestobiectumintellectus,sedquidditasreiintellectae.”
257Cf.inthesamesenseDeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.:“Andsimilarlyitwouldnotbenecessarytopositanagentintellectiftheuniversalswhichareactuallyintelligiblesubsistedofthemselvesoutsidethesoul,asPlatoasserted.ButbecauseAristotleassertedthattheseuniversalsdonotsubsistexceptinsensibleobjects,whicharenotactuallyintelligible,henecessarilyhadtopositsomepower,whichwouldmaketheobjectsthatareintelligibleinpotencytobeactuallyintelligible,byabstractingthespeciesofthingsfrommatterandfromindividuatingconditions;andthispoweriscalledtheagentintellect.”[Etsimiliternonessetnecesseponereintellectumagentem,siuniversaliaquaesuntintelligibiliaactu,persesubsisterentextraanimam,sicutposuitPlato.SedquiaAristotelesposuiteanonsubsisterenisiinsensibilibus,quaenonsuntintelligibiliaactu,necessehabuitponerealiquamvirtutemquaefaceretintelligibiliainpotentiaesseintelligibiliaactu,
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notbeingintelligibleinactgoestogetherwiththequidditasbeinginthematerialthings,
contrarytoPlato’sideaofthequidditasbeingseparatefromthematerialthings:
ThereasonwhyAristotlecametopostulateanagentintellectwashisrejectionofPlato’stheorythattheessencesofsensiblethingsexistedapartfrommatter,inastateofactualintelligibility.ForPlatotherewasclearlynoneedtopositanagentintellect.ButAristotle,whoregardedtheessencesofsensiblethingsasexistinginmatterwithonlyapotentialintelligibility,hadtoinvokesomeabstractiveprincipleintheminditselftorendertheseessencesactuallyintelligible.258
DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad8shouldbequotedinitsentirety.259Inthecorpus,Aquinas
says:“Foroneparticularman,suchasSocratesorPlato,makesthingsintelligibleinact
abstrahendospeciesrerumamateriaetconditionibusindividuantibus;ethaecvirtusvocaturintellectusagens.]
258InIIIDeAnima4,54-63:“InduciturautemAristotelesadponendumintellectumagentem,adexcludendumopinionemPlatonis,quiposuitquidditatesrerumsensibiliumesseamateriaseparatas,etintelligibilesactu;undenonerateinecessariumponereintellectumagentem.SedquiaAristotelesponit,quodquidditatesrerumsensibiliumsuntinmateria,etnonintelligibilesactu,oportuitquodponeretaliquemintellectumquiabstraheretamateria,etsicfacereteasintelligibilesactu.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima6,274-276:“Thereforetheintellectabstractsthingspresentinthesense-objects,notunderstandingthemtobeseparate,butunderstandingtheminseparationanddistinctly.”(mytrans.)[Eaergoquaesuntinsensibilibusabstrahitintellectus,nonquidemintelligenseaesseseparata,sedseparatimetseorsumeaintelligens.];7,64-77:“…[T]hedoctrinejuststated[…]mightleadonetosupposethattheintellectdidnotdependonthesenses;aswouldbethecaseindeediftheintelligibleobjectsattainedbyourmindhadtheirexistenceapartfromsensiblethings,asthePlatoniststhought[…]First,then,heobservesthat,sincealltheobjectsofourunderstandingareincludedwithintherangeofsensiblethingsexistinginspace,thatistosay,thatnoneseemstohavethatsortofdistinctexistenceapartfromthingsofsensewhichparticularthingsofsensehaveapartfromoneanother,itfollowsthatalltheseintelligibleobjectshavetheirbeingsintheobjectsofsense…”[…possetaliquiscredere,quodintellectusnondependeretasensu.Ethocquidemverumessetsiintelligibilianostriintellectusessentasensibilibusseparatasecundumesse,utPlatoniciposuerunt(…)Dicitergoprimo,quodquianullaresintellectaanobis,estpraetermagnitudinessensibiles,quasiabeisseparatasecundumesse,sicutsensibiliavidenturabinvicemseparata:necesseestquodintelligibiliaintellectusnostrisintinspeciebussensibilibussecundumesse…]
259Cf.Appendix,Note4(partiallyquoted).Mostinterestingisthefinalphraseofthisresponse:“Nowitdoesnotmattermuchifwesaythatintelligiblethingsthemselvesareparticipated[…]fromGod,orthatthelightwhichmakesthemintelligibleisparticipated[…]fromGod.”[Nonmultumautemrefertdicere,quodipsaintelligibiliaparticipenturaDeo,velquodlumenfaciensintelligibiliaparticipetur.]Morethanaconciliatoryphrase(betweenSt.AugustineandAristotle),itseemstometheassumptionofthemostpowerfulintuitionoftheDoctorofHippo:in
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whenhepleases,thatis,byapprehendingauniversalformfromparticulars,whenhe
separatesthatwhichiscommontoallindividualmenfromthosethingswhicharepeculiar
toeach.”260Onceagain,thatwhichiscommonistakentoexistincompositionwiththe
individuatingfeatures,anditisdistinguishedfromthem.
ThetextinDeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6willoccupyusmoredirectlyandextensivelyin
Chapter2,butashortreferencemayconfirmthepointathand:
ForthereisnodifferencebetweenAristotleandPlato,exceptinthis:thatPlatoassertedthatthethingwhichisunderstoodhasactualbeingoutsidethesoulinexactlythesamewayastheintellectunderstandsit,thatis,assomethingabstractanduniversal;butAristotleasserted"thatthethingwhichisunderstoodisoutsidethesoul,butinanotherway,becauseitisunderstoodintheabstractandhasactualbeingintheconcrete.[…]WhereasPlatosaidthatthescienceshavetodowithseparatedforms,Aristotlesaidthattheyhavetodowiththequidditiesofthingsthatexistinthosethings.261
SometextsfromAquinas’commentaryonAristotle’sMetaphysicswillbepresented
nowtoshowhow,forAquinas,theuniversal-natureexistsinthesingularmaterialthings.262
anycase,asSt.Augustinesawclearly,thereisaparticipationfromGod,Godmustbethesourceoftruth.Notthoughasprovidingthetruthascontent(astheholyDoctorseemstohaveproposed)butasprovidingwithnatureaninfalliblelighttodiscoverthetruthofthings.
260DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,c.:“Unusenimhomoparticularis,utSocratesvelPlato,facitcumvultintelligibiliainactu,apprehendendoscilicetuniversaleaparticularibus,dumsecernitidquodestcommuneomnibusindividuishominum,abhisquaesuntpropriasingulis.”
261DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6:“NonenimestdifferentiainterAristotelemetPlatonem,nisiinhocquodPlatoposuitquodresquaeintelligitureodemmodohabetesseextraanimamquomodoeamintellectusintelligit,idestutabstractaetcommunis;Aristotelesveroposuitremquaeintelligituresseextraanimam,sedaliomodo,quiaintelligiturabstracteethabetesseconcrete.[…]Platoquidemdixitscientiasessedeformisseparatis,Aristotelesverodequidditatibusrerumineisexistentibus.”Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c..
262InmyinterpretationofInMetaphysicorum,theuniversalasthecommonnatureexistingintheconcretecoincideswiththequodquideratesse,whichforAquinasisfirstofalltheformalprinciple(withthematterofthespeciesincluded)oftherealmaterialsubstance(cf.InMet.7,lect.2,1275;lect.5,1379;lect.7,1422;lect.9,1470;lect.10,1491.1497;lect.11,1535).Thedefinitionisalsoofthequodquideratesse(sometimescalledalsoquodquidest)andthereisanidentityofcontentbetweentheobjectofdefinitionandthecommonnatureinreality.Thedifferenceisinthe
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Thefactthatthenaturealsoincludesmatter,inasense,doesnotmakeitless“universal”:
Aquinasdrawsadistinctionbetweenthematterthatbelongstothespeciesandthe
individualmatter.Whatisrelevantforusnowisthatthecommonspecies,matterandform,
belongstotheindividualandisdistinguishedfromitsindividualmatter;andthatitisthis
specieswhichistheobjectofdefinition:
For,aswassaidabove,whatthedefinitionsignifiesistheessence,anddefinitionsarenotassignedtoindividualsbuttospecies;andthereforeindividualmatter,whichistheprincipleofindividuation,isdistinctfromtheessence.Butinrealityitisimpossibleforaformtoexistexceptinaparticularsubstance.Henceifanynaturalthinghasmatterwhichispartofitsspecies,andthispertainstoitsessence,itmustalsohaveindividualmatter,whichdoesnotpertaintoitsessence.Therefore,ifanynaturalthinghasmatter,itisnotitsownessencebutissomethinghavinganessence;forexample,Socratesisnothumanitybutsomethinghavinghumanity.263
Whentheexistenceoftheuniversalsisdenied,itisonlyinthesenseofexistingas
such,asoneseparatefromthemany:
Hence,ifuniversalsasuniversalsarethings,theymustbedistinctfromsingulars,whicharenotuniversals.[…]However,forthosewhoclaimthatgeneraandspeciesarenotthingsornaturesdistinctfromsingularsbutarethesingularthings
modeofbeing(withtheindividualconditionsinreality,abstractedfromtheminthedefinitionoftheintellect).Thedefinitionisthespeciesexpressaofthesimpleapprehension,andthereforenotajudgment;andthedefinitionrepresentsthequodquideratesse,andnotthepropositionthatattributesthequodquideratessetoathing.ThesegeneralremarksmayassistinunderstandingforexampleSummaI,85,2ad3.
263InMet.7,lect.11,1535:“Sicutenimsupradictumest,quodquideratesseestidquodsignificatdefinitio.Definitioautemnonassignaturindividuis,sedspeciebus;etideomateriaindividualis,quaeestindividuationisprincipiumestpraeteridquodestquodquideratesse.Impossibileestauteminrerumnaturaessespeciemnisiinhocindividuo.Undeoportetquodquaelibetresnaturae,sihabeatmateriamquaeestparsspeciei,quaeestpertinensadquodquidest,quodetiamhabeatmateriamindividualem,quaenonpertinetadquodquidest.Undenullaresnaturaesimateriamhabeat,estipsumquodquidest,sedesthabensillud.SicutSocratesnonesthumanitas,sedesthumanitatemhabens.”
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themselves(forexample,thatthereisnomanwhoisnotthisman),itdoesnotfollowthatsecondsubstancesignifiesanaccidentormodification.264
Theuniversaldoesnotexistasone(separate)thing,butitdoesexistasacommon
thingintheparticulars:
Unityitselfcannotbepresentinmanythingsatthesametime;forthisisopposedtothenotionofunity,[solongaswearetalkingaboutaunitywhichexistsbyitselfasasubstance].Butwhatiscommonispresentinmanythingsatthesametime,forcommonmeanswhatmaybepredicatedofmanythingsandbepresentinmanythings.265Henceitisclearthatacommonunitycannotbeoneinthesensethatitisonesubstance.Furthermore,itisevidentfromallthepointsalreadydiscussed
264InMet.7,lect.13,1582f:“Siergouniversalia,inquantumuniversaliasunt,sintres
quaedam,oportebitquodsintaliaeresasingularibus,quaenonsuntuniversalia[…]Sedponentibusquodgeneraetspeciesnonsuntaliquaeresvelnaturaealiaeasingularibus,sedipsametsingularia,sicutquodnonesthomoquinonsithichomo,nonsequiturquodsecundaesubstantiaesignificentaccidensvelpassionem.”Cf.InMet.12,lect.4,2482andpassim.Everytimehesaysthattheuniversaldoesnotexist,hemeansthatthenatureofsensiblethingsdoesnotexistinrealityinastateofintellectualabstraction,inthePlatonicsense;inotherwords,thatitdoesnotexistseparatefromtheparticularthings.Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,c.:“Moreover,theintelligible[…]whichthepossibleintellectunderstandsdoesnotexistinreality(asanintelligible);forourpossibleintellectunderstandssomethingasthoughitwereaone-in-manyandcommontomany[…]However,suchanentityisnotfoundsubsistingin(sensible)reality,asAristotleprovesintheMetaphysics.”[Intelligibileautemperintellectumpossibilemnonestaliquidinrerumnaturaexistens,inquantumintelligibileest;intelligitenimintellectuspossibilisnosteraliquidquasiunuminmultisetdemultis.Taleautemnoninveniturinrerumnaturasubsistens,utAristotelesprobatinVIIMetaphys..]
265Cf.InMet.10,lect.3,1963-1964:“…nouniversalcanbeasubstancewhichsubsistsofitselfbecauseeveryuniversaliscommontomany.Auniversalalsocannotbeasubsistingsubstancebecauseotherwiseitwouldhavetobeonethingapartfromthemany,andthenitcouldnotbecommonbutwouldbeinitselfasingularthing[…]andthusitmustbeinsomewayaone-in-many,andnotsomethingsubsistingapartfromthem.”(underlinemine)[…nullumuniversaliumessepotestsubstantia,quaescilicetpersesitsubsistens;quiaomneuniversalecommuneestmultis.Necpossibileestuniversaleessesubstantiamsubsistentem;quiasicoporteretquodessetunumpraetermulta,etitanonessetcommune,sedessetquoddamsingulareinse(…)oportetquodaliquomodositunuminmultis,etnonseorsumsubsistensabeis.];InMet.10,lect.1,1930:“Forindistinctsingularthingsthereisnonaturenumericallyonewhichcanbecalledaspecies,buttheintellectapprehendsasonethatattributeinwhichallsingularsagree.Hencethespecies,whichisdistinctindistinctindividualsinreality,becomesundividedwhenapprehendedbytheintellect.”[Nonenimindiversissingularibusestaliquanaturaunanumero,quaepossitdicispecies.Sedintellectusapprehenditutunumidinquoomniainferioraconveniunt.Etsicinapprehensioneintellectus,speciesfitindivisibilis,quaerealiterestdiversaindiversisindividuis.]“Realiterdiversa”meansthateachindividualhasitsownnature,andthereforeisnotunanumero.Butthatnatureiscommon(unaformaliter),insofarasthereissomethinginwhichalloftheindividualsconcur(“conveniunt”).
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aboveinthischapterthatnouniversal—eitherbeingorunityorgeneraorspecies—hasaseparatebeingapartfromsingularthings.266
Thespeciesentersintorealcompositionwithindividualmatterand,becauseofthat,
therealparticularsubstanceiscorruptible.Noticehowthespeciesiscalled“rationem
conceptam”insofarasitisthecontentofdefinition:
AndIsaythatthesediffer;i.e.,‘thatthelatter,’whichissubstanceinthesenseoftheconcretewhole,issubstancetakenassomethinghavingitsintelligiblestructureconceivedwithmatter;buttheformer,whichistheformorintelligiblestructureoressenceofathing,istheintelligiblestructureorformingeneral,andthisdoesnothaveindividualmatterconnectedwithit.Thereforeallthosethingswhicharecalledsubstanceinthesenseofacompositearecapableofbeingcorrupted.267
266InMet.7,lect.16,1641:“…[H]ocipsumquodestunum,nonpotestapudmultasimul
inveniri.Hocenimestcontrarationemunius,sitamenponaturaliquodunumperseexistensutsubstantia.Sedilludquodestcommune,estsimulapudmulta.Hocenimestratiocommunis,utdemultispraedicetur,etinmultisexistat.Patetigiturquodunumquodestcommune,nonpotestessesicunumquasiunasubstantia.Etulteriuspalamestexomnibuspraedictisinhoccapitulo,quodnullumuniversale,necens,necunum,necgenera,necspecieshabentesseseparatumpraetersingularia.”AswithmanytextsinAquinas,theexistenceoftheuniversalintheparticularscouldbetakentomeanthattheyareintheparticularsinsofarastheyarepredicatedofthem,andsotheirin-existenceintheparticularwoulddependonasubjectivefunctionoraction.ButthiswouldbenottorealizethatwhatSt.ThomasisdoingispreciselypresentinganalternativetoPlato,withAristotle.Platohaddeniedthepresenceoftheuniversalobjectofunderstandinginthematerialthingsthemselves;St.Thomasisopposinghimonthatpoint,bymeansofadistinctionbetweenthemodeofbeingoftheuniversalinrealityandintheintellect,withtheintellectalwaysdependingonreality(cf.InMetI,lect.10,158;InMet.9,lect.11,1896-1898;InISent.d.2,q.1,a.3,c.).Inasense,thiswholedissertationismeanttoclarifythispointintheinterpretationofAquinas.
267InMet.7,lect.15,1606f:“Dicoautemeasessealterasquiahocquidem,scilicetsubstantia,quaeesttotum,sicestsubstantiasicuthabensrationemconceptamcummateria;illavero,quaeestsicutformaetratioetquodquideratesse,esttotaliterratioetformanonhabensmateriamindividualemadiunctam.Quaecumqueigiturdicuntursubstantiaehocmodosicutcomposita,eorumpotestessecorruptio.”
Thereasonforcallingthespeciesorformratio(cf.alsoInMet.12,lect.10,2595)canbetakenfromInMet.8,lect.1,1687(textinAppendix,Note5).Noticehow,althoughthenameratiocomesfromreason,whatisinreasoncomes(“sumitur”)fromreality.Noticealsohowtheformofthethingissomething“actu”:thecontentofintellectualknowingisalreadyactualinthissense;itisinpotencyonlyofitsintelligiblemodeofbeing.Thecontentofintellectualknowingistheperfectionofamaterialthingwhich,becauseofitscharacterasperfection,isalreadyinact.Thefactthatitisinmatterdoesnotmakeitintopotency,butratheritmakestheperfectionconcrete.
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Whatisknowninthesimpleapprehension(=“quodsignificatdefinitio”)isthesame
naturewhichispresentinthethingitselftogetherwiththeindividuatingprinciples.Notice
how,inthistext,quodquideratesseisequatedwithnaturaspeciei,quidditasandquod
quidestessesuum:
Thereasonforthispositionisthatessenceiswhatthedefinitionsignifies,andthedefinitionsignifiesthenatureofthespecies.Butifthereissomethingwhichiscomposedofmatterandform,theninthatthingtheremustbesomeotherprinciplebesidesthenatureofthespecies.Forsincematteristheprincipleofindividuation,theninanythingcomposedofmatterandformtheremustbecertainindividuatingprinciplesdistinctfromthenatureofthespecies.Hencesuchathingisnotjustitsownessencebutissomethinginadditiontothis.Butifsuchathingexistswhichisonlyaform,itwillhavenoindividuatingprinciplesinadditiontothenatureofitsspecies.Foraformthatexistsofitselfisindividuatedofitself.Thereforethisthingisnothingelsethanitsownessence.268
Theintellect’sfirstoperationischaracterizedasareachingouttograsp(attingere)
somethingofthethingitself,namelyitsquodquidestorquidest:
Theintellectisdeceivedaboutaquiddityonlyaccidentally;foreitherapersoncomesincontactwithathing’squidditythroughhisintellect,andthenhetrulyknowswhatthatthingis;orhedoesnotcomeincontactwithit,andthenhedoesnotknowwhatitis.Hence,withregardtosuchathingtheintellectisneithertruenorfalse.269
268InMet.8,lect.3,1710:“Ethuiusratioest,quiaquodquideratesseestidquodsignificat
definitio.Definitioautemsignificatnaturamspeciei.Siautemaliquaresest,quaesitcompositaexmateriaetforma,oportetquodinillaresitaliquidpraeternaturamspeciei.Cumenimmateriasitindividuationisprincipium,oportetquodinquolibetcompositoexmateriaetformasintprincipiaindividuantia,quaesuntpraeternaturamspeciei.Undehuiusmodiresnontantumestquidditassua,sedaliquidpraeterhoc.Siquaveroresest,quaesitformatantum,nonhabetaliquaprincipiaindividuantiapraeternaturamspeciei,cumipsaformaperseexistensperseipsamindividuetur.Etideoipsaresnihilaliudestquamquodquidestessesuum.”
269InMet.9,lect.11,1907:“Circaquodquidestnondecipiturintellectusnisiperaccidens:autenimperintellectumattingitaliquisquodquidestrei,ettuncverecognoscitquidestres;autnonattingit,ettuncnonapprehenditremillam.Undecircaeamnonverificaturnequedecipitur.”
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Stump,270Berger,271andBaltuta272seemtosharetheinterpretationhereinproposed
regardingthepresenceoftheuniversalnatureinthethingsthemselves.Forthereasons
previouslyexposed,Owensismorereticenttoaffirmsomethinglikethat,andinterprets
Aquinas’denialoftheexistenceoftheuniversalinreality273asadenialofacommonnature
inthethingsthemselves.274Corysays:“Thephantasm[…]ispotentiallyintelligibleand
individualthrough-and-through,whereasactuallyintelligible,universalhorsenessexists
onlyintheintellect”275andinnotegivesaninterestingclarification:
[QuotingQ.D.DeAnima,a.4]Intelligitenimintellectuspossibilisnosteraliquidquasiunuminmultisetdemultis.Taleautemnoninueniturinrerumnaturasubsistens.276ThisisnottodenyAquinas’srealismaboutessences;heholdsthatMarengoandotherhorsesreallydoshareacommonnature,althoughthisnatureexistsextramentallyonlyasinstantiatedasindividualhorses(hencethefamousstatementfromDeenteetessentia2[Leon.43.374:80–82]:[I]nSortenoninueniturcommunitasaliqua,sedquicquidestineoestindividuatum277).Whetherthis
270Cf.Stump,264:“By‘quiddity’hereAquinasmeansthatformofathingthatputitinto
oneratherthananotherspeciesorgenus,itsnatureoressence.Naturesdonotexistintheworldontheirown;intheworldtheyexistonlyasincorporatedintothethingsthathavenatures.”Andinnote“See,e.g.,InDAIII.8.705–706.”
271Cf.Berger,44:“Theintellectualactreferstothenaturesofthesensiblethings,understoodasimmaterialformsofmaterialthings.”
272Cf.Baltuta,151.273Cf.InMet.11,lect.2,2189:“Althoughuniversalsdonotexistofthemselves,itisstill
necessarytoconsideruniversallythenaturesofthingswhichsubsistofthemselves.”[Licetuniversalianonperseexistant,tamennaturaseorumquaepersesubsistuntestconsiderareuniversaliter.]
274Cf.theIntroductionofthisdissertation;Owens,134:“Thereasonweneedanexpressspeciesisbecausetheobjectdoesnotexistinuniversalfashioninthesensiblething.”
275ThereseCory,“RethinkingAbstractionism:Aquinas'sIntellectualLightandSomeArabicSources,”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy53,no.4(2015):613.
276“Forourpossibleintellectunderstandssomethingasthoughitwereaone-in-manyandcommontomany.However,suchanentityisnotfoundsubsistinginreality”(Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,c.).
277“InSocratesthereisnocommonness,butwhateverisinhimisindividuated”(DeEnteetEssentia,2).
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positionisinfactconsistentwithrealismaboutessences,isnotwithinthescopeofthispaper.278
Now,inordertotrulyunderstandabstraction,isthisreallyaproblemwecanset
aside?Abstractionisnotsimplythespiritualizationofthephantasm,butanoperationthat
givesusadifferent(heterogeneous)content.The“scandal”ofabstractionisnotthatthe
phantasmreceivesadifferentmodeofbeing,butthatIknowauniversalnature,awhatness
inthephantasm,thatseemsnottoberealbecauseitisnotparticular.Isthatuniversal
contentrealornot?Thisismostrelevantbecausethisistheconditionofpossibilityof
abstraction.279
4)TheRoleoftheAgentIntellectanditsNecessity:ToMake
IntelligibleinActtheUniversalinre
IntheprevioussectionswehavetriedtoclarifywhatisforSt.Thomasthe
cognitionalfactrequiringanagentintellectasitsexplanation.Thefactisthatweknowthe
natureofthecorporealthing,thatis,itsuniversalaspect,butthisnatureisnotintelligiblein
act.Wehavealsoconsideredsomeofthepresuppositionsofthisfact,namely,thespecific
differencebetweentheobjectofintelligenceandtheobjectofsensibility,andalsothe
278Cory,Rethinking,613note21.279Isuggestthatamorehelpfulapproachtothecausalproblem(cf.Cory,Averroes,4)in
Aquinaswouldbetotakeasapointofdeparture,nottheimmaterialityoftheeffectofthephantasminthepossibleintellect,buttheuniversalityoftheknown(intelligibilityascontent),andthefactthatthiscontentispresentintheintellectwithamodeofbeingthat(thesamecontent)doesnothaveinitspresenceinthephantasm.Inotherwords,thepointofdepartureforthecausalproblem(whatIcallthe“Thomisticfact”)shouldbetheintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheuniversalcontent,nottheintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheparticularcontent(Cf.Section1ofthisChapter).IhavetheimpressionthatCory’spointofdepartureisthelatteralternative.Cf.Cory,Averroes,23:“TheAgentIntellectmustaccomplishsomesortofmetaphysicalchangethatmakesimagescapableofaffectingtheMaterialIntellect.”
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subsistenceoftheobjectofintelligence(theuniversal)intheparticularrealthings.Inlight
oftheseconsiderations,wenowturntostudymorecloselythatwhichSt.Thomassays
abouttheroleoftheagentintellect.Theviewhereinproposedisthattheroleoftheagent
intellectistomakeintelligibleinacttheuniversalinre,i.e.thenatureofthecorporeal
thing,sothatthisnaturemaybeseenbythepossibleintellect.
Theroleoftheagentintellectischaracterizedas“facereintelligibiliainactu.”In
ordertounderstandwhatSt.Thomasmeanswhenhespeaksaboutthis“facereintelligibilia
inactu,”whatmustbekeptinmindisaseriesofactualizationswhich,inAquinas’mind,
musttakeplaceinordertoexplainthefactthatwesimplyunderstand.Thisfactisalready
anactualization;thatis,wepassfromunderstandinginpotencytounderstandinginact.
Theperfectionwhichallowsustounderstand,thatwhichformallyactualizesourfaculty,is
theintelligiblenatureofacorporealthing,alreadyinactofbeingintelligible.Now,that
intelligibleisnotavailabletotheintelligence,insofarasthenatureofacorporealthingis
notouttherealreadyintelligibleinact;theintelligibleexistsonlyinthepotentialityofthe
phantasm.Inorderfortheintelligibleinpotency,whichisinthephantasm,tobecome
intelligibleinact,anagent,anefficientcauseisneeded.Therefore,itistheagentintellect
which,inanefficientway,actualizestheintelligibleinpotencysothatitbecomesintelligible
inact;butitistheintelligibleinactwhich,inaformalway,actualizesthepossibleintellect,
whichwaspreviouslyinpotency.280Wecouldgoevenfurtherbyaffirming,withSt.Thomas,
280ThenecessityoftheintelligibleinactinhumanunderstandingcouldbefoundinPlato
also,butnotthenecessityofanagentintellect(atleastnotintheAristoteliansense,cf.79,3).Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.:“Andsimilarlyitwouldnotbenecessarytopositanagentintellectiftheuniversalswhichareactuallyintelligiblesubsistedofthemselvesoutsidethesoul,asPlatoasserted.
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apreviousactualization:thephantasm,againbytheactionoftheagentintellect,receives
theabilitythatfromitselfintelligiblespeciesmaybeabstracted;inotherwords,receives
thepotentialintelligibilityitself.281Thisisbecause,forSt.Thomas,itdoesnotseemrightto
ascribeanintelligiblepotentiality,whichisofadifferentorder,tosomethingmerely
material.282
ButbecauseAristotleassertedthattheseuniversalsdonotsubsistexceptinsensibleobjects,whicharenotactuallyintelligible,henecessarilyhadtopositsomepower,whichwouldmaketheobjectsthatareintelligibleinpotencytobeactuallyintelligible…”[Etsimiliternonessetnecesseponereintellectumagentem,siuniversaliaquaesuntintelligibiliaactu,persesubsisterentextraanimam,sicutposuitPlato.SedquiaAristotelesposuiteanonsubsisterenisiinsensibilibus,quaenonsuntintelligibiliaactu,necessehabuitponerealiquamvirtutemquaefaceretintelligibiliainpotentiaesseintelligibiliaactu…]
281Cf.85,1ad4:“Notonlydoestheactiveintellectthrowlightonthephantasm:itdoesmore;byitsownpoweritabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm.Itthrowslightonthephantasm,because,justasthesensitivepartacquiresagreaterpowerbyitsconjunctionwiththeintellectualpart,sobythepoweroftheactiveintellectthephantasmsaremade[…]fitfortheabstractiontherefromofintelligibleintentions.”[Phantasmataetilluminanturabintellectuagente;etiterumabeis,pervirtutemintellectusagentis,speciesintelligibilesabstrahuntur.Illuminanturquidem,quia,sicutparssensitivaexconiunctioneadintellectivamefficiturvirtuosior,itaphantasmataexvirtuteintellectusagentisreddunturhabiliautabeisintentionesintelligibilesabstrahantur.]
282Ispeakhereaboutintelligibilityasmodeofbeing,whichimpliesimmateriality(wewillseeespeciallyinChapter2thetwomeaningsofintelligibleanduniversalinAquinas).TheThomisticdoctrineofthecelestialbodies’influenceinsensibleknowingisinmyviewrelatedtothis.FabrotreatsthisissueinPP64-68,quotingextensivelyAquinas’DePotentia,q.5,a.8.InFabro’sreading,Aquinasaffirmsinthesensiblebodiesadoublecausalitybytheinfluenceofthecelestialbodies:onephysicalandtheotherintentional,bywhichthesensiblebodiesareabletoperfectthefacultiesofthesensesnotonlyphysicallybutalsocognitively.Itis,Isuggest,thesameprinciplethatAquinasusesin85,1ad4.Inorderforsomethingtobeknown,itmustbeknowableinact;forsomethingtobeknowableinact,itmustbeknowableinpotency,thatistosay,itneedstohavetheabilitytobeknowableinact.Butknowability,inpotencyorinact,isaqualitythatdoesnotbelongtoasensiblebodymerelyforbeingwhatitis.Thisisbecauseitimpliesacapacitytoperfectafacultyofknowing,aperfectionwhichforSt.Thomasisa“secondmodeofbeing”(cf.DeVer.2,2)differentfromthephysicalmodeofbeing.Whatproducesinthesensiblebodiesthiscapacityofproducingsensibleknowingisthe(secondkindof)influenceofthecelestialbodies;whatproducesinthephantasm(whichstandsfortheparticularsensiblething)thisabilityofbeingintelligibleinactistheagentintellectitself.Wedonotneedanagentsensebecause,grantedtheinfluenceofthecelestialbodies,theperfectiontobeknown(content)isalreadyparticular,andsosensibleinactinitsphysicalmodeofbeing.Wedoneedthesecondactionoftheagentintellectbecause,evengrantedthefirstactionofillumination,theperfectiontobeknown(inthephantasm)isstillmaterial,andsonotintelligible
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Therefore,whenSt.Thomassays“facereintelligibiliainactu”hemeansthatthe
agentintellectproducesfromthepotentialityofthephantasmanintelligiblespecies
representingthenatureofacorporealthing,aspecieswhichisable(becauseitisinact)to
perfectthepossibleintellectwiththeknowledgeofthatnatureitself.283
Letusnowreviewsometexts.Probablythebestisagain79,3,c.“Nownothingis
reducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomethinginact;asthesensesaremadeactual
inactinitsphysicalmodeofbeing.Thecelestialbodiesandthefirstactionoftheagentintellecteffectintheconcretethingstheabilitytoproduceacognitivespeciesoutofthemselves(DePot.q.5,a.8:“atcommunicatingacertainlikeness[of]itsformtothe‘medium,’whichmaybecomparedtothespiritual‘intention’whichthingsimpressonthesensesorintelligence”[adquamdamdiffusionemsimilitudinisformaeinmediosecundumsimilitudinemspiritualisintentionisquaerecipiturdereinsensuvelintellectu];85,1ad4:“phantasmsaremade[…]fitfortheabstractiontherefromofintelligibleintentions”[phantasmata(…)reddunturhabiliautabeisintentionesintelligibilesabstrahantur])or,perhapsbettersaid,theabilityinordertoperfectcognitivelyafacultyofknowing.Inthesenses,becausetheperfectiontobeknownisalreadyparticular(sensibleinact),thisinfluenceisenoughtomaketheactofsensationpossibleregardingtheobject.Inintelligence,thisinfluenceisenoughtoelevatetheconcretethingtotheintentionalintelligiblerealmbutonlyasabeinginpotencyandnotinact.Inotherwords,thisinfluencegivestothephantasmasitwereanintelligiblequality,makingitintelligibleinpotency,i.e.abletobethesourceofanintelligiblespecies.Granted,asaconditionofpossibility,thisfirstactionofillumination,thesecondactionoftheagentintellectisrequiredtoproducetheintelligibilityinactofthecontent,bymeansofaseparationfromitsindividualconditionsinmatter.Thatacosmologyofcelestialbodiesistodayatleastquestionable,doesnottakeawaythemetaphysicalproblemthatAquinassees,northepossibilityofitssolutionbymeansoftheseparatesubstances’influence.IwillcomebackbrieflytothistopicinChapter4.
283Inthissection,wearenotfocusingontheactofabstractiondirectly,butontheroleoftheagentintellectintheprocessofunderstanding,particularlyitsrelationshiptotheactofthepossibleintellect.Abstractionandmakingintelligiblearecertainlyrelated.Cf.InIIIDeAnima4,50-53:“Theagentintellect,ontheotherhand,actualisestheintelligiblenotionsthemselves,[whichwerepreviouslyinpotency,]abstractingthemfrommatter:[itisinthiswaythattheyareintelligibleinact].”[Intellectusautemagensfacitipsaintelligibiliaesseinactu,quaepriuserantinpotentia,perhocquodabstrahiteaamateria;sicenimsuntintelligibiliainactu,utdictumest.]Itisveryimportanttokeepinmind,withCromp,thetwomeaningsofabstraction:asactionoftheagentintellectandasconsideration(orbetter“non-consideration”)ofthepossible(cf.GermaineCromp,L'intellectagentetsonrôled'abstraction[Canada?:1980],16ff.).St.Thomasspeaksaboutthisabstractionasnon-considerationin85,1,ad1andad2.
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bywhatisactuallysensible.”284Thesewordsrefertotheformalactualizationbymeansof
theintelligibleinact,astheparallelwiththesensessuggests.Butbecausetheobjectof
intelligenceisnotintelligibleinactinthecorporealthings,ashealreadysaysatthe
beginningofthecorpus,285St.Thomascontinues:“Wemustthereforeassignonthepartof
theintellectsomepowertomakethingsactuallyintelligible,byabstractionofthespecies
frommaterialconditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactiveintellect.”286Theactionof
theagentintellect,calledhere“abstraction,”isthatwhichallowstheactofthepossible
intellect,thatis,understanding.Thesearetwodifferentpassagesfrompotencytoact,by
twodifferentfaculties:“Neverthelessthereisadistinctionbetweenthepoweroftheactive
intellectandofthepassiveintellect:becauseasregardsthesameobject,theactivepower
whichmakestheobjecttobeinactmustbedistinctfromthepassivepower,whichis
movedbytheobjectexistinginact.”287Inthislattertext,thetwoaforementioneddistinct
processesofactualizationcanbeseenclearly.
28479,3,c.:“Nihilautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicut
sensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.”285Cf.also79,3ad3:“Nowtheintelligibleinactisnotsomethingexistinginnature;ifwe
considerthenatureofthingssensible,whichdonotsubsistapartfrommatter.Andthereforeinordertounderstandthem,theimmaterialnatureofthepassiveintellectwouldnotsufficebutforthepresenceoftheactiveintellectwhichmakesthingsactuallyintelligiblebywayofabstraction.”[Intelligibileauteminactunonestaliquidexistensinrerumnatura,quantumadnaturamrerumsensibilium,quaenonsubsistuntpraetermateriam.Etideoadintelligendumnonsufficeretimmaterialitasintellectuspossibilis,nisiadessetintellectusagens,quifaceretintelligibiliainactupermodumabstractionis.]
28679,3,c.:“Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem.”
28779,7,c.:“Diversificaturtamenpotentiaintellectusagentis,etintellectuspossibilis,quiarespectueiusdemobiecti,aliudprincipiumoportetessepotentiamactivam,quaefacitobiectumesseinactu;etaliudpotentiampassivam,quaemoveturabobiectoinactuexistente.”
107
Anotherimportantpassageaboutthenatureandroleoftheagentintellect,in
polemicwithAverroes,is88,1,c.:
Aswasshownabove,theactiveintellectisnotaseparatesubstance;butafacultyofthesoul,extendingitselfactivelytothesameobjectstowhichthepassiveintellectextendsreceptively;because,asisstated(DeAnimaiii,5),thepassiveintellectis‘allthingspotentially,’andtheactiveintellectis‘allthingsinact.’Thereforebothintellects,accordingtothepresentstateoflife,extendtomaterialthingsonly,whicharemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect,andarereceivedinthepassiveintellect.288
Thedistinctionbetweenthetwofacultiesandtheirrespectiverolesisherevery
clear.Bothfacultiesrefertothesameobjectinsofaraswhatisreceivedbythepossible
intellectiswhatismadebytheagentintellect:anintelligibleinact.Butthesetwofaculties
differfromeachother,insofarastheactionoftheagentintellectisthatofan“efficient
causality”oractivepotency,andtheactofthepossibleintellectthatofa“materialcause”
orpassivepotency.289Thefactthatthepossibleintellectpresupposestheproductofthe
agentintellectinordertoact,makesevenmoreevidentthedistinction:itisnotjusta
temporaldistinction,butametaphysicalone.Thereisnowaywecanthinkofthe
28888,1,c.:“Supraostensumestquodintellectusagensnonestsubstantiaseparata,sed
virtusquaedamanimae,adeademactiveseextendens,adquaeseextenditintellectuspossibilisreceptive,quia,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima,intellectuspossibilisestquoestomniafieri,intellectusagensquoestomniafacere.Uterqueergointellectusseextendit,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,admaterialiasola;quaeintellectusagensfacitintelligibiliaactu,etrecipiunturinintellectupossibili.”
28985,1ad4shouldbeunderstoodinthissamesensewhenspeakingonabstraction:“Furthermore,theactiveintellectabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm,forasmuchasbythepoweroftheactiveintellectweareable[totakeintoourconsiderationthespecificnaturewithouttheconditionsofindividuality,sincetheimageofthatspecificnature]informsthepassiveintellect.”[Abstrahitautemintellectusagensspeciesintelligibilesaphantasmatibus,inquantumpervirtutemintellectusagentisacciperepossumusinnostraconsiderationenaturasspecierumsineindividualibusconditionibus,secundumquarumsimilitudinesintellectuspossibilisinformatur.]Thecharacterizationoftheagentintellectisactive,whereasthepossibleintellectistheonewhichreceives(“accipere”)orisactualized(“informatur”)bythespeciesproducedbytheagentintellect.
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actualizationofthepossibleintellectifthereisnotanintelligibleinactand,therefore,
somethinglikeanagentintellectmakingtheintelligibleinact.Thepossibleintellectcannot
beactualizedwithanythingelse.
Inthefollowingtext,theseriesofactualizationsalsoisclear,andparticularlyclearis
thewayinwhichwecouldspeakoftheagentintellectactualizingthepossibleintellect:itis
bymeansoftheintelligiblespeciesproducedinabstraction.
[Ourintellect]understandsitselfaccordingasitismadeactualbythespeciesabstractedfromsensiblethings,throughthelightoftheactiveintellect,whichnotonlyactuatestheintelligiblethingsthemselves,butalso,bytheirinstrumentality,actuatesthepassiveintellect.Thereforetheintellectknowsitselfnotbyitsessence,butbyitsact.290
Theagentintellect,byanefficientcausalityonthematerialofsensibility,produces
anintelligibleinactwhichisthenabletoactualizethepossibleintellect.ForSt.Thomas,the
possibleintellectcanreceive—orbeinformedby—anintelligibleinactonly.Human
intelligence,i.e.,thefacultythatunderstands,isinpotencyoftheintelligible.Thatiswhy,if
somethinglikeintellectualknowinghappens,anintellectualagentisrequiredinorderto
makethatintelligibleinactandimpressitonthepossibleintellect.
Doesthisnotimplythattheagentintellectproducestheobject,oratleast
completesitformally?InthenextChapter,thecrucialdistinctionbetweenresintellectaand
modusreiintellectaewillbeexamined,andthetensionbetweenThomismandKantian
philosophywillbebroughtmoreclearlytothefore.
29087,1,c.:“…[C]onsequensestutsicseipsumintelligatintellectusnoster,secundumquod
fitactuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractasperlumenintellectusagentis,quodestactusipsorumintelligibilium,eteismediantibusintellectuspossibilis.Nonergoperessentiamsuam,sedperactumsuumsecognoscitintellectusnoster.”Themeaningoftheagentintellectas“actusipsorumintelligibilium”(cf.also87,1ad2)willbeexaminedlater,inChapter4,section1.
109
ItmaybehelpfultocollectthefindingsofthisfirstChapterandassesswhatremains
tobediscussed.Sofar,thefactthatbringsAquinastointroduceanagentintellectinhuman
knowinghasbeenelucidated.Itisadouble-sidedfact.Onesideofthisfactisthatour
intelligenceknowsthenatureofcorporealthingsassomethingdistinctfromtheirsensible
contentandalsopresentinthethingsthemselves.Althoughalreadyimpliedinmanytexts,
thecharacterizationofintellectualknowingasreceptiveofthiscontent(thenaturepresent
inthethingitself)willbediscussedinmoredetailinChapter3.Theothersideofthis
Thomisticfactisthatthosenaturesweknowarenotintelligibleinact;thatistosay,they
cannotbeknownbyourintelligencewiththemodeofbeingtheyhaveinthethings
themselves.Therefore,thefactthatweactuallyknowthemnecessarilyimpliesthatthereis
anagentintellectproducingthatmodeofbeing,thatintelligibility,whichallowsthose
naturestobereceivedcognitivelybythepossibleintellect.However,thisThomistic
distinctionbetweenintelligiblecontentandintelligibilityasamodeofbeing,already
anticipatedtoacertainextent,willbetheprecisefocusofthenextChapter.
Asisclear,theintentionwasnottodemonstratetheThomisticfact,butto
demonstratethatthisisafactforAquinas,exactlythefactthat,inhismind,requiresan
agentintellectasaconditionofpossibility.Still,thedemonstrationsofarmaybefound
lacking,becausetheissuesindicatedinthepreviousparagraphhavenotbeendiscussedin
detail.Icanonlysaythattheissueathandisverycomplex,andonecouldhavebegunina
differentway,butastartingpointwasnecessary,anditseemedfairtobeginbythe“fact,”
inthisway,andsimplyanticipateforthereaderwhatwillbefoundinthenextchapters.
Hopefully,attheend,thereaderwillbesatisfiedregardingtheseanticipations.
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ChapterTwo:TheThomisticDistinctionbetweentheObjectandtheModeofBeingoftheObject
(resintellectaandmodusreiintellectae)
Itisherethatthequestionoftheagentintellectisseentoberelevanttothecritical
problem.AccordingtoKant,becauseinrealitythereisnothinguniversal(allrealityis
particular),theoriginoftheuniversalinscientificknowledgemustbethesubjectitself,291
nottherealityoutthere.Consideredcarefully,thislineofthinkingexposesthesameerror
asthatofPlato.Thatis,becauseKantdoesnotfind,inthe(particular)reality“outthere,”
theobjectofunderstandinginthewayitisinourconsciousness,Kantmustplacetheorigin
ofthisobject,notinanold-fashionedPlatonicworldofideas,butinamoremodern
conceptofsubjectivity.292LikePlato,Kantbelievesthattheobjectofunderstandingmust
existinthesamewayweknowit;inotherwords,Kantdoesnotdifferentiatebetweenthe
objectanditsmodeofbeing.293Becausematerialrealitycanhavenothingtodowithour
spirit(Descartes),becausetheparticularismerelymultipleandtheuniversalismerelyone,
andbecausenothinglikeauniversalcanbeseenintheparticular,ifthereisuniversalityin
291Cf.ImmanuelKant,CritiqueofPureReason,trans.GuyerandWood(NewYork:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),B1-4.292Cf.Owens,323-324,wherePlatoisportrayedasadmittingadoubleoriginforhuman
cognition,onebeingtheknowledgeofeverchangingthingscomingthroughthesenses,andtheotherbeingtheknowledgeofstablethingscomingfromsomewhereelse,byanamnesis.
293In84,2c.,thesameerrorisattributedtotheNaturalphilosophers(“Theythoughtthattheformofthethingknownisintheknowerinthesamemodeasinthethingknown.”[Existimabantautemquodformacognitisitincognoscenteeomodoquoestinrecognita.]),butinsteadofmakingimmaterialtheresintellectainitssubsistence,asdoesPlato,theymakethesoulitselfmaterial,orcomposedofthesameprinciplesofthematerialthings.Cf.InIDeAnima4,19-36;12,10-15(bothtextsinAppendix,Note6).
111
ourknowing,itmustcomefromthesubjectitself;and,iftheuniversalisreferredtothe
particular,itmustbebyafunctionofthesubject.
St.Thomas,bycontrast,iscarefultodistinguishtheobjectthatisunderstoodfrom
themodeofbeingoftheobject.Healsorealizes,withPlatoandKant,thatnothinginreality
isintelligibleinact,andthatrealityisparticular;buthecannotdenythecognitivefactthat
weunderstandcorporealthings,thatweknowthemnotonlyintheirindividualitybutalso
intheirnature,intheirspecificperfection.Hecannotovercomethealterityoftheobjectof
understanding:itisforSt.Thomasafact.Therefore,iftheobjectofunderstandingisout
there(extraanimam),butnotinthewayweunderstandit,itisevidentforhimthatthere
mustbeadifferencebetweentheobjectandthewayinwhichtheobjectisknownor
receivedinourfacultiesofknowing.
Therefore,whatevertherelateddoctrinaldifficultiesmaybe,itseemsclearthat,for
Aquinas,becausewhatweunderstandistrulyimbeddedintheparticularthings
themselves,theresintellectaandthemodusreiintellectaecannotbethesame.Thisisthe
immediateconcernofthisChapter.Thealterityoftheobjectofknowinginsteadwillbe
treatedinthenextChapter.294
1)TheDistinctionin84,1,c.:The“PlatonicProblem”
IntheSumma,thepassagethatmostclearlyaddressesthisissueis84,1,c.The
questioniswhetherthesoulknowsthecorporealthingsbymeansofintelligence,andthe
pointislocatedpreciselyintheproblemoftheuniversals.Havingconsideredthosewho
294Thedistinctionbetweenthespeciesassubjectivemodificationandtheobjectofknowing
willbetreatedinChapter3,section3.
112
deniedthepossibilityofascientificknowledgeofrealitybecauseofitsinstability,having
consideredalsoPlato,whoputstabilityoutsidethe“apparent”realityinatrue“worldof
reality”(his“ideas”),andhavingshowntheinconvenienceofPlato’ssolution,Aquinasgoes
totherootoftheproblem.Thetextwillbequotedextensively,andcommenteduponwhen
needed:
“NowitseemsthatPlatostrayedfromthetruthbecause,havingobservedthatall
knowledgetakesplacethroughsomekindofsimilitude,hethoughtthattheformofthe
thingknownmustofnecessitybeintheknowerinthesamemannerasinthething
known.”295Thisisthemainproblemintheformofageneralprinciple.296Thefollowingisan
explanationofPlato’serrorintheintellectualrealm:
Thenheobservedthattheformofthethingunderstoodisintheintellectunderconditionsofuniversality,immateriality,andimmobility:whichisapparentfromtheveryoperationoftheintellect,whoseactofunderstandinghasauniversalextension,andissubjecttoacertainamountofnecessity:forthemodeofactioncorrespondstothemodeoftheagent'sform.297Whereforeheconcludedthatthe
29584,1,c.:“VideturauteminhocPlatodeviasseaveritate,quia,cumaestimaretomnem
cognitionempermodumalicuiussimilitudinisesse,crediditquodformacognitiexnecessitatesitincognoscenteeomodoquoestincognito.”
296Cf.85,1ad2:“BecausePlatofailedtoconsiderthetwofoldkindofabstraction,asaboveexplained[…],heheldthatallthosethingswhichwehavestatedtobeabstractedbytheintellect,areabstractinreality”[EtquiaPlatononconsideravitquoddictumestdeduplicimodoabstractionis,omniaquaediximusabstrahiperintellectum,posuitabstractaessesecundumrem.]Cf.alsoInMet.1,lect.10,158;InIDeAnima4,30-33;InIIIDeAnima2,261-263.
297Cf.89,6,c.:“Actionofferstwothingsforourconsideration—itsspeciesanditsmode.Itsspeciescomesfromtheobject,wheretothefacultyofknowledgeisdirectedbythe(intelligible)species,whichistheobject'ssimilitude;whereasthemodeisgatheredfromthepoweroftheagent.Thusthatapersonseeastoneisduetothespeciesofthestoneinhiseye;butthatheseeitclearly,isduetotheeye'svisualpower.”[Inactuestduoconsiderare,scilicetspeciemactus,etmodumipsius.Etspeciesquidemactusconsideraturexobiectoinquodactuscognoscitivaevirtutisdirigiturperspeciem,quaeestobiectisimilitudo,sedmodusactuspensaturexvirtuteagentis.Sicutquodaliquisvideatlapidem,contingitexspecielapidisquaeestinoculo,sedquodacutevideat,contingitexvirtutevisivaoculi.]
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thingswhichweunderstandmusthaveinthemselvesanexistenceunderthesameconditionsofimmaterialityandimmobility.298
HeretheThomisticdistinctionbetweentheresintellectaandthemodeofbeingof
thesameisalreadyveryclear.St.ThomasproceedsbyshowingtheinconsistencyofPlato’s
principle,andhetriestomakeitmoreclearbyusinganinterestingprogression.Inhisfirst
step,heconsidersthesensiblerealminitsobjectivity:“Butthereisnonecessityforthis.For
eveninsensiblethingsitistobeobservedthattheformisotherwiseinonesensiblethanin
another:forinstance,whitenessmaybeofgreatintensityinone,andofalessintensityin
another:inonewefindwhitenesswithsweetness,inanotherwithoutsweetness.”299That
29884,1,c.:“Consideravitautemquodformareiintellectaeestinintellectuuniversaliteret
immaterialiteretimmobiliter,quodexipsaoperationeintellectusapparet,quiintelligituniversaliteretpermodumnecessitatiscuiusdam;modusenimactionisestsecundummodumformaeagentis.Etideoexistimavitquodoporteretresintellectashocmodoinseipsissubsistere,scilicetimmaterialiteretimmobiliter.”Cf.regardingtheerrorofPlato:InMet.7,lect.15,1606;InMet.12,lect.1,2423:“Theydidthisbecausetheyinvestigatedthingsfromtheviewpointofdialectics;fortheythoughtthatuniversals,whichareseparateaccordingtotheirmodeofdefinitionfromsensiblethings,arealsoseparateinreality,andthattheyaretheprinciplesofparticularthings.”[Ethocideo,quialogiceinquirebantderebus.Universaliaenim,quaesecundumrationemsuntabstractaasensibilibus,credebantetiaminrerumnaturaabstractafore,etprincipiaparticularium.];InMet.12,lect.2,2426:“Forjustasatwofoldmethodofseparatingisfoundinreason[…]inasimilarwaytheymaintainedthatbothuniversals,whichtheycalledseparateForms,andalsotheobjectsofmathematics,areseparateinreality.”[Sicuteniminvenitursecundumrationemduplexmodusseparationis(…)itaetsecundumremponebantetuniversaliaesseseparata,quaedicebantspecies,etetiammathematica.];InMet.8,lect.1,1683:“Certainparticularthinkers[…]claimthattheFormsandtheobjectsofmathematicshaveseparateexistence.Theyadoptedthispositionbecausetheythoughtthatforeveryabstractionoftheintellectthereisacorrespondingabstractioninreality.”[Quidamposueruntsingularitereas(substantias)esse,quiponuntspeciesetmathematicaseparatasecundumesse,volentesquodcuilibetabstractioniintellectus,respondeatabstractioinessererum.]Noteinthislasttexthowtheuniversalissaidtoexistsingulariter,insofaras,forPlato,itexistsinrealityasonething,separatedfromtheparticularthings.ThisiswhatAquinaswillalwaysdeny,andnottheuniversal’sexistenceinthesingular.Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad8whereitisalsoveryclearthepresenceofthecommonnatureintheparticularthing(textquotedinAppendix,Note7).
29984,1,c.:“Hocautemnecessariumnonest.Quiaetiaminipsissensibilibusvidemusquodformaaliomodoestinunosensibiliumquaminaltero,putacuminunoestalbedointensior,inalioremissior,etinunoestalbedocumdulcedine,inaliosinedulcedine.”
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istosay,therealaccidentalqualityalbedo,beingthesameineverywhitething,cansubsist
indifferentmodesindifferentwhitethings.St.Thomasistryingtoshowinthisfirststep
howeasyitisforustoconceivethatoneandthesamequalitymayexistindifferentmodes.
Thesecondstepisalreadyinthegnoseologicalrealm:“Inthesamewaythesensibleformis
conditioneddifferentlyinthethingwhichisexternaltothesoul,andinthesenseswhich
receivetheformsofsensiblethingswithoutreceivingmatter,suchasthecolorofgold
withoutreceivinggold.”300ItseemsthemainreasonSt.Thomasusesthesensesasan
examplehereistheeasewithwhichonecanacceptthat,whenweseethecolour,we
receivethecolournotasitsubsistsinreality(withthegoldincluded,intheexample),butin
anotherway.St.Thomasthusopensthewaytothesolution:
Soalsotheintellect,accordingtoitsownmode,receivesunderconditionsofimmaterialityandimmobility,thespeciesofmaterialandmobilebodies:forthereceivedisinthereceiveraccordingtothemodeofthereceiver.Wemustconclude,therefore,thatthroughtheintellectthesoulknowsbodiesbyaknowledgewhichisimmaterial,universal,andnecessary.301
Itseemsclearthat“quaesuntmaterialesetmobiles”referstotheplural“species”
andnotto“corporum,”whichisneutral.Itshouldalsobeclear,however,thatthespecies
arematerialinsofarastheysubsistinthematter,butnotasiftheywerenothingotherthan
matter.Thewholeargumentwouldbepointless.St.Thomasishighlightingpreciselythat,
eveniftheformdoesnotsubsistinthesamewayintheintellectasitdoesinreality,this
30084,1,c.:“Etperhuncetiammodumformasensibilisaliomodoestinrequaeestextra
animam,etaliomodoinsensu,quisuscipitformassensibiliumabsquemateria,sicutcoloremaurisineauro.”
30184,1,c.:“Etsimiliterintellectusspeciescorporum,quaesuntmaterialesetmobiles,recipitimmaterialiteretimmobiliter,secundummodumsuum,namreceptumestinrecipientepermodumrecipientis.Dicendumestergoquodanimaperintellectumcognoscitcorporacognitioneimmateriali,universalietnecessaria.”
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factdoesnotpreventtheintellectfromknowingthatsameform.St.Thomasisimplying
thatthestabilitydeniedbythenaturalphilosophers(regardingcorporealthings),and
projectedbyPlatoinaparallelworld,isactuallyimbeddedinthematerialthingsastheir
formorspecies,butnotintheimmaterialwayinwhichitisknown.302
2)TheDistinctioninOtherTexts
In85,2ad2,thedistinctionbetweenwhatisunderstoodanditsmodeofbeingis
alsoclear,indirectresponsetotheobjectionthatwhatisunderstoodinactdoesnot
subsistinthethingoutsidethesoul:
Inthesewords‘thethingactuallyunderstood’thereisadoubleimplication—thethingwhichisunderstood,and[itsbeing]understood.Inlikemannerthewords‘abstractuniversal’implytwothings,thenatureofathinganditsabstractionoruniversality.Thereforethenatureitselftowhichitoccurstobeunderstood,abstractedorconsideredasuniversalisonlyinindividuals;but[itsbeing]understood,abstractedorconsideredasuniversalisintheintellect.303
Itcannotbemoreclearthatthenaturethatweunderstandsubsistsinthethingout
there,totheextentthatitjust“happens”toitthatitisunderstood.304“Natura”ishere
302ThisstabilityinsensiblethingsisalsoaffirmedinInBoet.DeTrin.5,2,c.;InMet.11,lect.
6,2232(cf.othertextsquotedonp.87).MartínezMillántellsus:“InordertoovercomePlato’sTheoryofForms,Aristotlehastoemphasizeinmanydifferentwaysthepossibilitythatlivingthingscanbetheobjectsofknowledgedespitethefactthattheyaremovableandperishable”(MartínezMillán,50).“AsAquinasnotesinDeAnima,AristotlewantedtoovercomethenegativeeffectsofPlatonicphilosophy,whichhadreducedsensiblethingstonothingmoretanshadows,objectsofopinionbutnotofknowledge[…]Aristotle[…]hadpostulatedtheagentintellectinordertosavethesensibleworldfromtheunknowable”(Ibid.,55-56).
30385,2ad2:“Cumdiciturintellectuminactu,duoimportantur,scilicetresquaeintelligitur,ethocquodestipsumintelligi.Etsimilitercumdicituruniversaleabstractum,duointelliguntur,scilicetipsanaturarei,etabstractioseuuniversalitas.Ipsaigiturnaturacuiacciditvelintelligivelabstrahi,velintentiouniversalitatis,nonestnisiinsingularibus;sedhocipsumquodestintelligivelabstrahi,velintentiouniversalitatis,estinintellectu.”
304Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad14:“Theuniversal,whichtheagentintellectcauses,isonethinginallthebeingsfromwhichitisabstracted;andhencetheagentintellectisnotdiversifiedon
116
slightlydistinguishedfrom“universale,”theformerwithaclearmetaphysicalmeaning,the
latterwithamoregnoseologicalone.St.Thomas,again,drawsacomparisonwiththe
sensiblerealmtomakethesolutionmoreclear(thistimeonlyingnoseologicalterms):
[Wecanseethepointbyacomparisonwiththesenses].Forthesightseesthecoloroftheappleapartfromitssmell.Ifthereforeitbeaskedwhereisthecolorwhichisseenapartfromthesmell,itisquiteclearthatthecolorwhichisseenisonlyintheapple:butthatitbeperceivedapartfromthesmell,thisisowingtothesight,forasmuchasthefacultyofsightreceivesthelikenessofcolorandnotofsmell.305
Again,theresintellectaisinthethingitself,butitsabstractmodeofbeingdepends
onourunderstandingit.Becauseofthis,theuniversalasaspecies-imagereferstothe(real)
natureinthething,notdirectlytoitsconcreteness:
Inlikemannerhumanityunderstoodisonlyinthisorthatman;butthathumanitybeapprehendedwithoutconditionsofindividuality,thatis,thatitbeabstractedandconsequentlyconsideredasuniversal,occurstohumanityinasmuchasitisbroughtundertheconsiderationoftheintellect,inwhichthereisalikenessofthespecificnature,butnotoftheprinciplesofindividuality.306
thebasisoftheirdiversification.However,itisdiversifiedonthebasisofadiversityofintellects:becauseeventheuniversaldoesnotderiveitsonenessfromthestandpointofitsbeingunderstoodbymeandbyyou;foritisaccidentaltotheuniversalthatitisunderstoodbymeandbyyou.Andhencethediversityofintellectsdoesnotaffecttheonenessoftheuniversal.”[Universalequodfacitintellectusagens,estunuminomnibusaquibusipsumabstrahitur;undeintellectusagensnondiversificatursecundumeorumdiversitatem.Diversificaturautem[i.agens]secundumdiversitatemintellectuum:quiaetuniversalenonexeapartehabetunitatemquaestameetateintellectum;intelligienimameetateaccidituniversali.Undediversitasintellectuumnonimpeditunitatemuniversalis.]“Universal,”here,isthecontent-naturepresentinrealitytowhich“happens”tobeknown.Theunityoftheuniversalisobjective,notsubjective.Thistextalsohelpsustoseetheword“universal”asindicatingacontent,andnotdirectlyitsmodeofbeingintheintellect(cf.nextsection).
30585,2ad2:“Ethocpossumusviderepersimileinsensu.Visusenimvidetcolorempomisineeiusodore.Siergoquaeraturubisitcolorquividetursineodoremanifestumestquodcolorquividetur,nonestnisiinpomo;sedquodsitsineodoreperceptus,hocacciditeiexpartevisus,inquantuminvisuestsimilitudocolorisetnonodoris.”
30685,2ad2:“Similiterhumanitasquaeintelligitur,nonestnisiinhocvelinillohomine,sedquodhumanitasapprehendatursineindividualibusconditionibus,quodestipsamabstrahi,adquodsequiturintentiouniversalitatis,accidithumanitatisecundumquodpercipiturabintellectu,inquoestsimilitudonaturaespeciei,etnonindividualiumprincipiorum.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima2,240-249:
117
AsimilartextintheContraGentilesdistinguishesalsotheobjectfromitsmodeof
being:
NorneedwefollowPlatoinholdingthat,becausescienceisaboutuniversals,universalsareself-subsistingentitiesoutsidethesoul.For,althoughthetruthofknowledgerequiresthecorrespondenceofcognitiontothing,thisdoesnotmeanthatthesetwomusthavethesamemodeofbeing.Forthingsunitedinrealityaresometimesknownseparately;inathingthatisatoncewhiteandsweet,sightknowsonlythewhiteness,tasteonlythesweetness.[…]Similarly,althoughthegenericnatureandthespecificnatureneverexistexceptinindividualthings,theintellectneverthelessunderstandsthosenatureswithoutunderstandingtheindividuatingprinciples;andtodothisistounderstanduniversals.Thus,thereisnoincompatibilitybetweenthefactthatuniversalsdonotsubsistoutsidethesoul,andthatinunderstandinguniversalstheintellectunderstandsthingsthatdoexistoutsidethesoul.307InearlierworksAquinas’doctrineisthesame.Despitethedifferenceinthemodeof
beingoftheknownandthemediationofthespecies,intelligenceisabletoreachdirectlyto
“Hencethis‘properobject’ofourintellectisnot,asthePlatonistsheld,somethingexisting,outsidesensiblethings;itissomethingintrinsictosensiblethings;andthis,eventhoughthemodeinwhichessencesaregraspedbytheminddiffersfromtheirmodeofexistenceinsensiblethings;fortheminddiscernsthemapartfromtheindividuatingconditionswhichbelongtothemintheorderofsensiblereality.”[Illud,quodestobiectumintellectusnostrinonestaliquidextraressensibilesexistens,utPlatoniciposuerunt,sedaliquidinrebussensibilibusexistens;licetintellectusapprehendataliomodoquidditatesrerum,quamsintinrebussensibilibus.Nonenimapprehenditeascumconditionibusindividuantibus,quaeeisinrebussensibilibusadiunguntur.]
307CGII,75,par.8:“Nectamenoportetquod,quiascientiaesuntdeuniversalibus,quoduniversaliasintextraanimampersesubsistentia:sicutPlatoposuit.Quamvisenimadveritatemcognitionisnecessesitutcognitioreirespondeat,nontamenoportetutidemsitmoduscognitionisetrei.Quaeenimconiunctasuntinre,interdumdivisimcognoscuntur:simulenimunaresestetalbaetdulcis;visustamencognoscitsolamalbedinem,etgustussolamdulcedinem[…]Similiterautem,licetnaturagenerisetspecieinunquamsitnisiinhisindividuis,intelligittamenintellectusnaturamspecieietgenerisnonintelligendoprincipiaindividuantia:ethocestintelligereuniversalia.Etsichaecduononrepugnant,quoduniversalianonsubsistantextraanimam:etquodintellectus,intelligensuniversalia,intelligatresquaesuntextraanimam.”
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thethingitself.308Thecontent,theobjectunderstood,isdistinguishedfromitsmodeof
being:
Corporealcreaturesarenotsaidtobeimmediatelyseen,unlessthatwhichinthemisabletobeunitedtosightisactuallyunited.Now,theyarenotabletobeunitedthroughtheirownessencebecauseoftheirmateriality.Thus,theyareimmediatelyseenwhentheirrepresentationsareunitedtotheintellect[…]Moreover,therepresentationofacorporealthingisreceivedinsightwiththesamecontentithasinthatthing,eventhoughthemodeofbeingisnotthesame;andforthisreason,thisrepresentationleadsdirectlytothethingitself.309(mytrans.)
Therefore,thesenotionsthusabstractedcanbeconsideredintwoways.Thefirstoneistoconsidertheminthemselves.Inthisway,theyareconsideredwithoutmovementanddesignatedmatter:thisisfoundintheaforementionednotionsonlywithregardtothebeingthattheyhaveintheintellect.Theotherwayistoconsiderthemwithregardtothethingsofwhichtheyarenotions,thingsthatcertainlysubsistinmatterandmovement.Andinthiswaythesenotionsareprinciplesofknowledgeofthosethings,becauseeverythingisknownbymeansofitsform.Thus,bymeansofthesenotions,immobileandconsideredwithoutparticularmatter,wehaveknowledge(innaturalscience)ofmobileandmaterialthingswhichexistoutsidethesoul.310(mytrans.)
308Cf.DeVer2,3,ad3:“Fortobedirectedtothelikenessofathingisthesameastobe
directedtothethingwhichisknownthroughthislikeness.”[...idemesteiferriinsimilitudinemrei,etinremquaepertalemsimilitudinemcognoscitur.]
309InIVSent.,d.49,q.2,a.1ad16:“[C]reaturaecorporalesnondicunturimmediatevideri,nisiquandoidquodineisestconjungibilevisui,eiconjungitur:nonsuntautemconjungibilesperessentiamsuamrationematerialitatis;etideotuncimmediatevidenturquandoeorumsimilitudointellectuiconjungitur[…]Etpraetereasimilitudoreicorporalisrecipiturinvisusecundumeamdemrationemquaestinre,licetnonsecundumeumdemmodumessendi;etideosimilitudoilladucitinillamremdirecte.”Inthistextwecanalsoseethecomparisonofintelligencewithsensitivity(cf.Chapter3,section5),tothepointthatSt.Thomasuses“vision”tospeakabouttheintellectualactofunderstanding.ThistextispartiallyquotedinStump,246note5(onpage527).
310InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,c.:“Possuntergohuiusmodirationessicabstractaeconsideraridupliciter.Unomodosecundumse,etsicconsiderantursinemotuetmateriasignata,ethocnoninveniturineisnisisecundumessequodhabentinintellectu.Aliomodosecundumquodcomparanturadres,quarumsuntrationes;quaequidemressuntinmateriaetmotu.Etsicsuntprincipiacognoscendiilla,quiaomnisrescognosciturpersuamformam.Etitaperhuiusmodirationesimmobilesetsinemateriaparticulariconsideratashabeturcognitioinscientianaturaliderebusmobilibusetmaterialibusextraanimamexsistentibus.”
119
“Theformsinourintellects,however,arereceivedfromthings.Hence,theydonot
excelthings,andare,asitwere,equaltothemasfarasrepresentationgoes,eventhough
theymayexceltheminmodeofbeingbecausetheir[being]isimmaterial.”311
3)TheTwoMeaningsofUniversal
TherearesometextsinwhichSt.Thomasspeaksabouttwomeaningsof“universal”
andtwomeaningsof“intelligible,”aswehavesomewhatanticipated.312Thisdistinguishing
oftwomeaningsrelatestothemainpointofthisChapter,becauseoneofthemeaningsof
“universal”isrelatedtothecontent,andtheotheroneisrelatedtothemodeofbeingof
thecontentinthemind.ThisdistinctionmakesusmorecarefulinhowweinterpretSt.
Thomaswherehesaysthattheagentintellect“makestheintelligible”;whatisbeing
proposedinthisdissertationisthattheagentintellect“makestheintelligible”insofarasit
producestheintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheintelligiblecontent,andnotinsofarasit
producestheintelligiblecontent.Inotherwords,theagentintellect’sactionreferstooneof
311DeVer.8,10ad3:“Sedformaeintellectusnostriaccipiunturexrebus;undenonsunt
superexcedentesrebussedquasiadequataequantumadrepraesentationem,licetsintexcedentesquantumadmodumessendiinquantumhabentesseimmateriale.”StumpbringsothertextsfromDeVer(hertranslation)wherewecanseethisdistinctionbetweentheobjectanditsmodeofbeinginthecognizer:“thesimilitudeoftwothingstooneanothercanbegroundedintwo[different]ways.Inoneway,insofarasthereissharingofanature(convenientiainnatura),andsuchasimilitudeisnotneededbetweenacognizerandwhatiscognized.Inanotherway,accordingtorepresentation,andthis[sortof]similitudeisneededonthepartofacognizerwithrespecttowhatiscognized.QDV2.3ad9”(Stump,255note48);“asimilitudeexistinginacognitivepowerisnotasourceofthecognitionofan[extramental]thinginaccordancewiththebeingwhichthesimilitudehasinthecognitivepower,butinaccordancewiththerelationshipwhichthesimilitudehastothecognizedthing.Andforthisreasonan[extramental]thingiscognizednotbymeansofthemodeinwhichthesimilitudehasbeingintheonecognizing,butratherbymeansofthemodeinwhichthesimilitudeexistingintheintellectisrepresentativeofthatthing.QDV2.5ad17”(Stump,272note119).
312Cf.85,2ad2,studiedinsection2ofthisChapter.
120
themeaningsofuniversal,butnottotheother.Letusbeginbyseeingthisdistinctionin
sometextsoftheSumma,andthen,inotherworksofAquinas.
3.1.IntheSumma
Letusexaminethepassageof85,3ad4.Noteherehowtheword“universale”hasa
meaningwhichincludesconnotationsbothgnoseologicalandnatural(ormetaphysical).The
firstconnotationanalyzedisthegnoseologicalone:“Theuniversal,asunderstoodwiththe
intentionofuniversality,is,indeed,inaway,aprincipleofknowledge,insofarasthe
intentionofuniversalityresultsfromthemodeofunderstandingbywayofabstraction.”313
“Universale”isanotionthatmayimplyamodeofbeingwhichdependsonour
understanding:aswecansee,thedifferencebetweenresintellectaandmodusrei
intellectaeisalreadysuggested.Intheobjectionitisarguedthat,becausetheuniversalsare
certainprinciples,theyareknownposteriorlybytheireffects.Theconfusionisbetweenthe
principlesofbeingandtheprinciplesofknowing,andhereSt.Thomasclarifies:“Butwhatis
aprincipleofknowledgeisnotofnecessityaprincipleofexistence,asPlatothought:since
attimesweknowacausethroughitseffect,andsubstancethroughaccidents.”314Aquinas’
criticismofPlatoisthesameasin84,1,c.,asthenotesoftheOttawaeditionsuggest.
“Whereforetheuniversalthusconsidered,accordingtotheopinionofAristotle,isneithera
31385,3ad4:“Universale,secundumquodaccipiturcumintentioneuniversalitatis,est
quidemquodammodoprincipiumcognoscendi,proutintentiouniversalitatisconsequiturmodumintelligendiquiestperabstractionem.”
31485,3ad4:“Nonautemestnecessequodomnequodestprincipiumcognoscendi,sitprincipiumessendi,utPlatoexistimavit,cumquandoquecognoscamuscausampereffectum,etsubstantiamperaccidentia.”
121
principleofexistence,norasubstance,ashemakesclear(Metaph.vii).”315“Universalesic
acceptum”isagainaclearindicationofthepossibilityofemployingtheterm“universal”in
adifferentway,asAquinasillustratesimmediatelyinourpassage:“Butifweconsiderthe
genericorspecificnatureitselfasexistinginthesingular,thusinawayitisinthenatureof
aformalprincipleinregardtothesingulars.”316St.Thomas,then,isshowingthedistinction
betweentheuniversalsasprinciplesofknowingandasprinciplesofbeing,becausethetwo
meaningsofuniversalareconfusedintheobjection.Whatisimportantforourpurposesis
that,forAquinas,thereissuchathingasauniversalinre(thenaturaproutestin
singularibus),whichisnottobeconfoundedwiththeuniversalcumintentione
universalitatis;butatthesametime,thedifferenceisbetweenmodesofbeingofthesame:
“intentiouniversalitatisconsequiturmodumintelligendiquiestperabstractionem.”
Thetwodifferentmodesofbeingoftheuniversalarealreadydistinguishedinthe
answertothefirstobjection:317“Theuniversalcanbeconsideredintwoways.First,the
universalnaturemaybeconsideredtogetherwiththeintentionofuniversality[…]Secondly,
theuniversalcanbeconsidered[regarding]thenatureitself—forinstance,animalityor
humanity,[insofarasitexists]intheindividual.”318Inthesectionomitted,St.Thomas
explainswhathemeansbyintentiouniversalitatis,anotionusedinbothAdunumandAd
31585,3ad4:“Undeuniversalesicacceptum,secundumsententiamAristotelis,nonest
principiumessendi,nequesubstantia,utpatetinVIIMetaphys.”31685,3ad4:“Siautemconsideremusipsamnaturamgenerisetspecieiproutestin
singularibus,sicquodammodohabetrationemprincipiiformalisrespectusingularium.”31785,3ad1.31885,3ad1:“Universaledupliciterpotestconsiderari.Unomodo,secundumquodnatura
universalisconsideratursimulcumintentioneuniversalitatis[…]Aliomodopotestconsiderariquantumadipsamnaturam,scilicetanimalitatisvelhumanitatis,proutinveniturinparticularibus.”
122
quartum:“Andsincetheintentionofuniversality—viz.therelationofoneandthesameto
many—isduetointellectualabstraction,theuniversalthusconsideredisasecondary
consideration.Henceitissaid(DeAnimai,1)thatthe‘universalanimaliseithernothingor
somethingsecondary’.”319WhenAquinassays“intentiouniversalitatis,”“intentio”is
“referenceto,”“relationtowards,”inthesensethattheonemeaningisreferredtothe
manyparticulars.Now,inwhatsensedoesSt.Thomassaythattheuniversalisposterior
and,withAristotle,eithernothingorposterior?Aquinascertainlydoesnotmeantodeny
thatthereissomethingcommonintheparticulars;heaffirmsthisafewlineslater,aswe
havealreadyseen.Whathemeansisthatoneandthesamething(unumetidem)as
referredtothemany,isnotinrealityassuch(becauseeveryindividualthingactuallyhasits
ownnatureasanintrinsicprinciple,thoughonlynumericallydifferent)butfollowsthe
processofabstraction;abstractionproducesthisonething(theintelligibleinact)which
referstothemany,fromtheknowledgeofthemany(therealmoftheparticular);itisin
thissensethattheuniversalisposterior.Thisisalsorelatedtowhathemeansbyintentio
universalitatis:hemeansthereferenceoftheuniversalasknowntotheparticularsfrom
whichitisabstracted.Theuniversalasknown(inthestateofabstraction)isoneasone
thing(unumetidem),asoneuniqueprincipleofknowingthemany.Butthisdoesnotdeny
thattheuniversalsubsistsassomethingcommonintheparticulars,oneasformallyor
specificallyone,whichisthenatureofthedifferentindividualsofthesamespecies(“ipsam
naturam,scilicetanimalitatisvelhumanitatis,proutinveniturinparticularibus”).Inthe
31985,3ad1:“Etcumintentiouniversalitatis,utscilicetunumetidemhabeathabitudinem
admulta,proveniatexabstractioneintellectus,oportetquodsecundumhuncmodumuniversalesitposterius.UndeinIDeAnimadiciturquodanimaluniversaleautnihilest,autposteriusest.”
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conclusionofthispassage,Aquinasunderlinesoncemorethedifferencebetweenhisview
andPlato’s:“ButaccordingtoPlato,whoheldthatuniversalsaresubsistent,theuniversal
consideredthuswouldbepriortotheparticular,forthelatter,accordingtohim,aremere
participationsofthesubsistentuniversalswhichhecalledideas.”320Again,Plato’suniversal
ideaandSt.Thomas’universalnatureproutinveniturinparticularibusarebothreal.In
Plato,however,theideasubsistsinrealitycumintentioneuniversalitatis,i.e.,asonething
(unumetidem)referredtothemany,ashappensintheintellect.ForSt.Thomas,instead,it
isnotnecessarythatwhatisknownhaveinrealitythesamemodeofbeingasithasinthe
intellect.
3.2.TwoMeaningsof“Universal”inotherWorksofAquinas.
ConsiderInIDeAnima1,215-230,St.Thomas’examinationoftheAristotelian
“animalautemuniversale,autnihilest,autposterius.”Aquinas’explanationfollowsby
distinguishing,nottwo,butthreepossiblemeaningsofuniversal.Anumberingsystemhas
beeninsertedintothefollowingtextinordertomakemorecleartheremarksaboutit
whichcomeafter:
Wemustunderstandthatonecanspeakofa‘universalanimal’intwoways:either(1)asuniversal,i.e.asonenatureexistingin,orpredicatedof,manyindividuals;or(2)asanimal.[Asuniversal,again,it]canberegardedeither(1A)inrelationtoexistenceintherealworldor(1B)asexistinginthemind.Asregardsexistenceintherealworld,Platoheldthattheuniversalanimaldidsoexist(i.e.,1A)andexistedpriortoparticularanimals;because,ashasbeensaid,hethoughtthattherewereuniversalsandideaswithanindependentexistence.Aristotle,however,saidthatthe
32085,3ad1:“SedsecundumPlatonem,quiposuituniversaliasubsistentia,secundumhanc
considerationem[thatis,theuniversalcumintentioneuniversalitatis]universaleessetpriusquamparticularia,quaesecundumeumnonsuntnisiperparticipationemuniversaliumsubsistentium,quaedicunturideae.”
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universalassuchhadno[existenceintherealworld],andthatifitwasanythingatallitcameaftertheindividualthing(i.e.,1B).Butifweregardthenatureofanimalsfromadifferentpointofview,i.e.notasauniversal(i.e.,2),thenitisindeedsomethingreal[andprior,]asthepotentialprecedestheactual.321
Asitappears,(1)and(2)correspondtothedivisionof85,3ad1yad4(universal
regardedasnatureorastheabstractedmodeofbeingofthatnature)andthefurther
division(1Aand1B)isactuallythedoctrinaldivisionbetweenPlatoandAristotle(the
universalsubsistsinrerumnaturaforPlato,andforAristotleonlyintheintellectafterthe
processofabstraction,andbecauseofthis“posterius”).Buttheuniversalasnature(2)is
first,preciselybecausethenatureasabstractedcomesfromit;thatis,thenatureofthe
animalisinpotencyofbecominguniversalinthesecondsense(1B).Inthistext,then,the
natureinthethingitselfiscalleduniversalinonesense,andinpotencyofbeinguniversalin
asecondsense.
Inthefollowingtext,alsofromInDeAnima,thedivisionistheusual.Noticethe
duplexesseattributedtothenature(thetwomodesofbeingunderdiscussion):
Notethattheterm‘universal’canbetakenintwosenses.Itcanrefertothenatureitself,commontoseveralthings,insofarasthiscommonnatureisregardedinrelationtothoseseveralthings;oritcanrefertothenaturetakensimplyinitself.[…]Nowanature—say,humannature,—whichcanbethoughtofuniversally,hastwomodesofexistence:one,material,inthemattersuppliedbynature;theother,immaterial,intheintellect.[…]Nevertheless,thereisnodeceptionwhenthemindapprehendsacommonnatureapartfromitsindividuatingprinciples;forinthis321InIDeAnima1,215-230:“Sciendumest,quoddeanimaliuniversalipossumusloqui
dupliciter,quiaaut(1)secundumquodestuniversale(quodscilicetestunuminmultisautdemultis),aut(2)secundumquodestanimal;[sisecundumquodest]universale,ethocvel(1A)secundumquodestinrerumnatura,vel(1B)secundumquodestinintellectu.Secundumautemquodestinrerumnatura,Platovoluitanimaluniversalealiquidesse(i.e.,1A)etessepriusparticulari,quia,utdictumest,posuituniversaliaseparataetydeas;Aristotilesautem,quodnichilestinrerumnatura;etsialiquidest,dixitilludesseposterius(i.e.,1B).Siautemaccipiamusnaturamanimalisnonsecundumquodsubiacetintentioniuniversalitatis(i.e.,2),sicaliquidestetprius,sicutquodinpotentiapriusestquamilludquodestinactu.”
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apprehensiontheminddoesnotjudgethatthenatureexistsapart;itmerelyapprehendsthisnaturewithoutapprehendingtheindividuatingprinciples[…].Forthetruthofourconceptionsdoesnotrequirethat,merelyapprehendinganything,weapprehendeverythinginit.[…]Itisclear,then,thatuniversalitycanbepredicatedofacommonnatureonlyinsofarasitexistsinthemind:foraunitytobepredicableofmanythingsitmustfirstbeconceivedapartfromtheprinciplesbywhichitisdividedintomanythings.Universalsassuchexistonlyinthesoul;butthenaturesthemselves,whichareconceivableuniversally,existinthings.322
AlthoughAquinasseemstoprefertheword“universal”forthenatureinitsstateof
abstraction,itisimportanttonotethereasonforhisallowingalsothenatureinthething
itselftobecalled“universal.”Herefersthiswordmoretotheabstractednature,becauseit
isonlyinthissensethatatrulyone(witharealunity)issaidofthemany.However,the
reasonhecallsalsothenatureinitself“universal”isthathewantstoexplaintheobjectivity
ofknowing;thatis,thereasonthereisonlyoneformintheintellect,isthatthereisreallya
commonperfectioninthethingsthemselves,whichisformallyone.Inthisway,St.Thomas
safeguardsthecorrespondenceofthemindtothethingsthemselves.323
322InIIDeAnima12,95-147:“Considerandumest,quoduniversalepotestaccipidupliciter.
Unomodopotestdiciuniversaleipsanaturacommunis,proutsubiacetintentioniuniversalitatis.Aliomodosecundumse.[…]Istaautemnatura,cuiadvenitintentiouniversalitatis,putanaturahominis,habetduplexesse:unumquidemmateriale,secundumquodestinmaterianaturali;aliudautemimmateriale,secundumquodestinintellectu[…]Nectamenintellectusestfalsus,dumapprehenditnaturamcommunempraeterprincipiaindividuantia,sinequibusessenonpotestinrerumnatura.Nonenimapprehendithocintellectus,scilicetquodnaturacommunissitsineprincipiisindividuantibus;sedapprehenditnaturamcommunemnonapprehendendoprincipiaindividuantia[…]Nonenimexigituradveritatemapprehensionisquodquiapprehenditremaliquam,apprehendatomniaquaeinsuntei.[…]Sicigiturpatet,quodnaturaecommuninonpotestattribuiintentiouniversalitatisnisisecundumessequodhabetinintellectu:sicenimsolumestunumdemultis,proutintelligiturpraeterprincipia,quibusunuminmultadividitur.Underelinquitur,quoduniversalia,secundumquodsuntuniversalia,nonsuntnisiinanima.Ipsaeautemnaturae,quibusacciditintentiouniversalitatis,suntinrebus.”
323ThedistinctionofthetwomeaningsofuniversalisalsofoundinInMet.7,lect.13,1570ff.:“Fortheclarificationofthischapteritmustbenotedthatthetermuniversalcanbetakenintwosenses.First,itcanbetakentomeanthenatureofthethingtowhichtheintellectattributestheaspectofuniversality,andinthissenseuniversalssuchasgeneraandspeciessignifythesubstancesofthingsinasmuchastheyarepredicatedquidditatively;foranimalsignifiesthe
126
Inthefollowingtext,Aquinaspreferstouse“universal”forthecontent,and
“intelligible”forthemodeofbeing.Theuniversalissomethinginthethingsthemselves,
somethingneedingtobeseparatedfrommatterbecauseitentersintocompositionwith
matter.Thisseparationfrommattermakestheuniversalintelligible:
Scientificknowledgeisonlyaboutuniversals.ButGodisnotauniversal,foreveryuniversalishadbyabstraction.TherecanbenoabstractionfromGod,however,sinceHeisperfectlysimple.Hence,GoddoesnotknowHimself.[…]Auniversalisintelligibleindirectproportiontoitsseparationfrommatter.Hence,thosethingswhichhavenotbeenseparatedfrommatterbyanactofourintellectbutare,inthemselves,freefromallmatter,aremostknowable.Consequently,Godismostknowable,eventhoughHeisnotauniversal.324
Thetwomeaningsof“universal”“and“intelligible”areatplayinothertexts,even
thoughthedistinctionisnotexplicit.Inthefollowingtext,theangelicinfusedspeciesare
called“intelligible”(anindicationoftheirmodeofbeing)andarethemeanstounderstand
notonlytheseparatesubstancesbutalsothespeciesofcorporealthings.Thesespeciesare
alsocalled“intelligible”(ascontent):
Thus,throughtheintelligibleformsinquestionaseparatesubstanceknowsnotonlyotherseparatesubstances,butalsothespeciesofcorporealthings.Fortheirintellect,beingwhollyinact,isperfectinpointofnaturalperfection,and,therefore,itmustcomprehenditsobject—intelligiblebeing—inauniversalmanner.Now,the
substanceofthethingofwhichitispredicated,andsoalsodoesman.Second,auniversalcanbetakeninsofarasitisuniversal,andinsofarasthenaturepredicatedofathingfallsundertheaspectofuniversality.”[Sciendumestautem,adevidentiamhuiuscapituli,quoduniversaledupliciterpotestaccipi.Unomodoproipsanatura,cuiintellectusattribuitintentionemuniversalitatis:etsicuniversalia,utgeneraetspecies,substantiasrerumsignificant,utpraedicanturinquid.Animalenimsignificatsubstantiameius,dequopraedicatur,ethomosimiliter.Aliomodopotestaccipiuniversaleinquantumestuniversale,etsecundumquodnaturapraedictasubestintentioniuniversalitatis.]
324DeVer.2,2,ob.4andad4:“[S]cientianonestnisideuniversali.SedDeusnonestuniversale:quiauniversaleomneestperabstractionem;aDeoautem,cumsitsimplicissimus,nonpotestfieriabstractio.ErgoDeusnoncognoscitseipsum[…]Universaleprotantoestintelligibile,quiaestamateriaseparatum;undeillaquaenonsuntperactumintellectusnostriamateriaseparata,sedperseipsasuntabomnimaterialibera,maximecognoscibiliasunt;etsicDeusmaximeintelligibilisest,quamvisnonsituniversale.”Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5(textinAppendix,Note8).
127
speciesofcorporealthingsarealsoincludedwithinintelligiblebeing,andtheseparatesubstance,therefore,knowsthem.325
Whatisnoteworthyisthattheintelligibilityofthespecies(=natures)ofmaterial
thingsisaffirmedand,affirmedalso,istheintelligibilityofthespecies(=subjective
representation)bywhichweknowthosenatures.Oneandthesameword,“intelligible”,is
beingusedintwodifferentways.
“Andsimilarlyitwouldnotbenecessarytopositanagentintellectiftheuniversals
whichareactuallyintelligiblesubsistedofthemselvesoutsidethesoul,asPlatoasserted.
ButbecauseAristotleassertedthattheseuniversalsdonotsubsistexceptinsensible
objects,whicharenotactuallyintelligible…”etc.,326whereitisclearthatauniversal(inre)
isnotintelligibleinact.ThetextoftheAdSextum,besidesshowingthisdistinctionatplay,
illustratesseveralpointsmadethusfarinthisthesis,aswellaspointingoutthealterityof
theobject(whichwillbetreatedsubsequentlyinmoredetail):
ForthereisnodifferencebetweenAristotleandPlato,exceptinthis:thatPlatoassertedthatthethingwhichisunderstoodhasactualbeingoutsidethesoulinexactlythesamewayastheintellectunderstandsit,thatis,assomethingabstractanduniversal;butAristotleassertedthatthethingwhichisunderstoodisoutsidethesoul,butinanotherway,becauseitisunderstoodintheabstractandhasactualbeingintheconcrete.Andjustas,accordingtoPlato,thethingitselfwhichisunderstoodisoutsidethesoulitself,soitisaccordingtoAristotle:andthisisclearfromthefactthatneitherofthemassertedthatthescienceshavetodowiththosethingswhichareinourintellect,aswithsubstances;butwhereasPlatosaidthatthescienceshavetodowithseparatedforms,Aristotlesaidthattheyhavetodowith325CGII,99,par.1-2:“Perdictasigiturformasintelligibilessubstantiaseparatanonsolum
cognoscitaliassubstantiasseparatas,sedetiamspeciesrerumcorporalium.Cumenimintellectusearumsitperfectusnaturaliperfectione,utpotetotusinactuexistens,oportetquodsuumobiectum,scilicetensintelligibile,universalitercomprehendat.Subenteautemintelligibilicomprehendunturetiamspeciesrerumcorporalium.Easigitursubstantiaseparatacognoscit.”
326DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.:“Etsimiliternonessetnecesseponereintellectumagentem,siuniversaliaquaesuntintelligibiliaactu,persesubsisterentextraanimam,sicutposuitPlato.SedquiaAristotelesposuiteanonsubsisterenisiinsensibilibus,quaenonsuntintelligibiliaactu…”
128
thequidditiesofthingsthatexistinthosethings.Butthecharacterofuniversality,whichconsistsincommonnessandabstractness,ismerelytheresultofthemodeofunderstanding,inasmuchasweunderstandthingsabstractlyanduniversally;butaccordingtoPlatoitisalsotheresultofthemodeofexistenceoftheabstractforms:andconsequentlyPlatoassertedthatuniversalssubsist,whereasAristotledidnot.327
ThedifferencebetweenPlatoandAristotleisnotadifferencebetweenknowingby
confrontationandknowingbyidentity:forbothofthemwhatisknownistheuniversal,and
itisoutsidethesoul.Thedifferenceisbetweenthemodesofbeingattributedbyeachto
theobjectofhumanunderstanding.TheoriginalityofAristotle,atleastinAquinas’
interpretation,isinestablishingthedifferencebetweenresintellectaandmodusrei
intellectae.
Sometextsmaygivetheimpressionthat,forAquinas,theuniversaldoesnotexistin
anywayinthethingsthemselves.Letusexamineonesuchtext.Itscontextisanapparent
contradictioninAristotle.Thatis,Aristotlebeginsbysayingthatthequodquideratesseand
thethingtowhichitbelongsareoneandthesamething,withoutexcludingmaterial
substances;butthenheexcludesthem,sayingthatonlyinseparatesubstancesdoesthe
speciescoincidewiththeindividual.WhydoesAristotlenotpreviouslyexcludethematerial
substances?St.Thomasexplainsthatthisisbecauseofadifferentconsiderationofthe
327DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6:“NonenimestdifferentiainterAristotelemetPlatonem,nisiin
hocquodPlatoposuitquodresquaeintelligitureodemmodohabetesseextraanimamquomodoeamintellectusintelligit,idestutabstractaetcommunis;Aristotelesveroposuitremquaeintelligituresseextraanimam,sedaliomodo,quiaintelligiturabstracteethabetesseconcrete.EtsicutsecundumPlatonemipsaresquaeintelligiturestextraipsamanimam,itasecundumAristotelem:quodpatetexhocquodneutereorumposuitscientiasessedehisquaesuntinintellectunostro,sicutdesubstantiis;sedPlatoquidemdixitscientiasessedeformisseparatis,Aristotelesverodequidditatibusrerumineisexistentibus.Sedratiouniversalitatis,quaeconsistitincommunitateetabstractione,sequitursolummodumintelligendi,inquantumintelligimusabstracteetcommuniter;secundumPlatonemverosequituretiammodumexistendiformarumabstractarum:etideoPlatoposuituniversaliasubsistere,Aristotelesautemnon.”
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natureofmaterialthings:whenthenatureisconsideredinitsstateofabstraction,thenitis
alsoonlyoneforeachspecies,ashappenswiththeseparatesubstances.Thetextsays:
Noweventhoughmandoesnotexistapartfromsingularmeninreality,neverthelessmanisseparableinhisintelligibleexpression,whichpertainstothedomainoflogic.Therefore,above,whereheconsideredessencefromtheviewpointoflogic,hedidnotexcludematerialsubstancesfrombeingtheirownessence;formanasauniversalisthesameashisessence,logicallyspeaking.Andnowhavingcometonaturalprinciples,whicharematterandform…328
Now,becauseitisconsideredinitsreality,thenaturecannotbesaidtobeoneand
thesamethingwiththattowhichitbelongs;ineachthing,togetherwiththecommon
nature,therearealsoindividuatingprinciples.Asitseemsclear,thetextissayingthatthe
universalisnotinrealityinitsstateofabstraction,butthesametextisimplyingthatthe
speciesisinrealitytogetherwiththeindividuatingprinciples.329
4)TheDistinctionbetween“expartereiintellectae”and“exparte
intelligentis”
ForSt.Thomas,thedifferencebetweentheresintellectaandthemodusrei
intellectaecanbeseenalsoinagroupoftextsreferringtothedistinction(regardingtheact
ofunderstanding)betweenwhatbelongstoitexpartereiintellectaeandexparte
intelligentis.Letussee,forexample,85,1ad1:
If,therefore,theintellectissaidtobefalsewhenitunderstandsathingotherwisethanasitis,thatisso,iftheword‘otherwise’referstothethingunderstood;forthe328InMet.7,lect.11,1536:“Licetautemhomopraetersingularianonsitinrerumnatura,
esttameninrationequaepertinetadlogicamconsiderationem.Etideosuperiusubilogiceconsideravitdequodquideratesse,nonexclusitsubstantiasmateriales,quininillisetiamessetidemquodquidest,cumeocuiusest.Homoenimcommunisestidemcumsuoquodquidest,logiceloquendo.Nuncautempostquamiamdescenditadprincipianaturaliaquaesuntmateriaetforma...”
329Cf.forexampleInMet.7,lect.11,1535.
130
intellectisfalsewhenitunderstandsathingotherwisethanasitis;andsotheintellectwouldbefalseifitabstractedthespeciesofastonefromitsmatterinsuchawayastoregardthespeciesasnotexistinginmatter,asPlatoheld.Butitisnotso,iftheword"otherwise"betakenasreferringtotheonewhounderstands.Foritisquitetruethatthemodeofunderstanding,inonewhounderstands,isnotthesameasthemodeofathinginexisting:sincethethingunderstoodisimmateriallyintheonewhounderstands,accordingtothemodeoftheintellect,andnotmaterially,accordingtothemodeofamaterialthing.330
5)ConcludingRemarks
ForSt.Thomas,Plato’serrorishisdenyingtheuniversalnatureofcorporealthingsa
subsistenceinthematter.Kantmakesthesameerror.ThereasonPlatomakesthismistake
isthathefailstodistinguishtheresintellectafromthemodusreiintellectaeor,inother
words,hesupposesthattheobjectofknowledgemustsubsistinrealitywiththesame
modeofbeingasitdoesintheintellect.ThisisalsowhatKantdoes.OfPlato,Aquinassays:
33085,1ad1:“Cumergodiciturquodintellectusestfalsusquiintelligitremaliterquamsit,
verumestsilyaliterreferaturadremintellectam.Tuncenimintellectusestfalsus,quandointelligitremessealiterquamsit.Undefalsusessetintellectus,sisicabstraheretspeciemlapidisamateria,utintelligereteamnonesseinmateria,utPlatoposuit.Nonestautemverumquodproponitur,silyaliteraccipiaturexparteintelligentis.Estenimabsquefalsitateutaliussitmodusintelligentisinintelligendo,quammodusreiinexistendo,quiaintellectumestinintelligenteimmaterialiter,permodumintellectus;nonautemmaterialiter,permodumreimaterialis.”Cf.85,7,c.;DeVer2,2,ad9;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad12:“Thereisoneessenceofnumbersinallminds,justasthereisalsooneessenceofastone;andthisessenceisoneonthepartofthethingthatisunderstood,butnotonthepartoftheactofunderstanding,whichisnotessentialtothethingthatisunderstood;foritisnotessentialtoastonethatitbeunderstood.”[Sicestunarationumeroruminomnibusmentibus,sicutetunaratiolapidis;quaequidemestunaexpartereiintellectae,nonautemexparteactusintelligendi,quodnonestderationereiintellectae:nonenimestderationelapidisquodintelligatur.];DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6;InBoet.DeTrin.5,1,c.:“Somethingbelongstotheobjectofspeculation,whichisobjectofthespeculativepotency,withregardtotheintellectualpotencyandsomethingelsebelongstoitwithregardtothehabitofsciencebywhichtheintellectisperfected.Whatbelongstotheobjectofspeculationwithregardtotheintellectisitsbeingimmaterial,becausetheintellectitselfisimmaterial.Whatbelongstothisobjectwithregardtoscienceisitsbeingnecessary,becausescienceisofthenecessary,asitisdemonstratedinIPosteriorum.”[Speculabiliautem,quodestobiectumspeculativaepotentiae,aliquidcompetitexparteintellectivaepotentiaeetaliquidexpartehabitusscientiaequointellectusperficitur.Expartesiquidemintellectuscompetiteiquodsitimmateriale,quiaetipseintellectusimmaterialisest;exparteveroscientiaecompetiteiquodsitnecessarium,quiascientiadenecessariisest,utprobaturinIPosteriorum.]
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“ThePlatonistspositedIdeaschieflyinorderthattheymightapplythembothtodefinitions
anddemonstrations,whichhavetodowithwhatisnecessary,sinceallthesesensible
substancesseemedtobeinmotion.”331
ItmightbesaidthatthespeculativegeniusofPlatoandKantiscombinedwithano
lesssurprisingintellectual“adolescence.”Theirgeniusisseenintheirsafeguardingthe
rightsofintellectoversensibility;likeParmenides,theycannotgiveupthelifeofthespirit,
theydonotwanttosurrendertothetorrentofeverchangingreality.Atthesametime,
however,theycannotovercometheappearances;theycannotseeinrealityotherthan
change,becausetheycannotovercomethedataofsensibility.Thedataofsensibilitycause
themanxiety,asastormcauseschildrentobeafraid.Theyescapethestormonlytofind
refugeinthemselves;theycreateaworldofcategorieswhereeverythingcorrespondsto
theirconceptions,whereeverythingseemssafe...andKant(ifnotPlatoaswell)
engenderedforWesternculturealifewithoutrealadventure:theaprioriworld.
Itisnotamatterofgivinglifetothespiritoutofadesireforadventure:instead,itis
atruePhenomenologyofperceptionwhichwillhelpEpistemologytomatureandto
overcomeKantianbiases.Fabrodevotesmuchofhisresearchtothisissue.332Neitherisita
matterofdenyingthedepthofPlatoandKant,thesetwo“AristocratsoftheSpirit”;which
otherthinkershavemanaged,ashavethey,toinspiresomanyphilosophersand
theologiansafterthem?ThethrustoftheSpiritisfascinating...Buttheweaknessesin
331InMet.7,lect.15,1606:“Platoniciadhocpraecipueponebantideas,uteisadaptarentur
etdefinitionesetdemonstrationes,quaesuntdenecessariis,cumistasensibiliavideanturomniainmotuconsistere.”
332ParticularlyhisLaFenomenologiadellaPercezioneandPercezioneePensiero(cf.Bibliography).
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PlatoandKantmustberecognizedinordernottoconfoundinspirationwiththefinished
workofasolidsystem.Evidently,St.Thomas’certaintythattheuniversalbelongstothe
thing,andisnotaproductofsubjectivity,isrootedinhisunchangingconsiderationof
knowledgeasbeingdefinedbyalterity,knowledgeasanencounterwiththeother.Thisis
oneofthepointsinChapter3.
Itshouldbenoted,however,thattheexpresspurposeofthisdissertationisto
understandtheroleoftheagentintellectintheactofunderstandingforAquinas.The
necessityofdrawingthecomparisonwithKant(throughPlato)istoshowthattheefficiency
oftheagentintellect,forAquinas,isnot“formal,”asproductiveoftheuniversalnatureas
contentofknowledge(resintellecta),but“metaphysic”asproductiveofamodeofbeingof
theuniversalnaturethatistheobjectofunderstanding.333
Ifourreflectionssofarhavenotmissedthepoint,itisclearthatthenature(or
betterquidditas)ofcorporealthings,whichistheresintellectaortheproperobjectof
humanunderstanding,admitstwodifferentmodesofbeing:itssubsistenceinthe
particular,materialiter;anditspresenceintheintellect,cumintentioneuniversalitatisand
inastateofabstraction.334Theagentintellectisrequiredbecausethemodeofbeingofthe
333GermaineCromp(+1990)exemplifieshow,whenthedistinctionbetweenthetwo
meaningsof“intelligibility”isnotmade,theagentintellectnecessarilybecomesaformalapriori(cf.Cromp,204,167-168,192,201,206-208).Shesuggeststhatthecontentcomesinasensefromthephantasm(cf.200),andraisesthreetimesthequestionofhowthisispossible(cf.167,180,192);butbecauseshedoesnotdistinguishtheintelligiblecontentfromanaddedmodeofbeingofthephantasmbytheagentintellect,shedoesnotescapefrommakingtheagentintellectresponsiblefortheintelligiblecontent.
334Lambertseemstobewellorientedwhenhesays:“Humanabstractedconceptsareidenticalincontenttothingsintherealphysicalorderandinthatrespectarenevermorethantheequalofthings;theirsuperiorityliesexclusivelyintheirfunctionas“re-presentation”ofthosethingsinanimmaterialmode”(Lambert,98).Thoughwellorientedalsoinmanyotherrespects,hedoes
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naturesinthematterisnotproportionatetotheintellectualfaculty.Theagentintellectis
broughtintoplaytoproduceintelligibilityasamodeofbeing,andnotintelligibilityas
content(resintellecta).335Thedistinctionofthesetwomeaningsofuniversalandintelligible
inAquinasisexplicit,ashasbeenargued.Aswillbeshown,theagentintellectforAquinasis
requiredtoseparatetheresintellecta(orintelligenda)fromitsindividualconditionsinthe
matter,nottocompletethematterwithanintelligibleunitythatwouldnototherwisebe
there.
Whatstillneedstobeshowninmoredetailisthatintellectualknowing,forAquinas,
isoriginallyverifiedbythereceptionofthisabstractedquidditas.Havingbroughttothefore
thecrucialdistinctionbetweenthatwhichisunderstoodanditsmodeofbeing(andthe
relateddistinctionbetweenthetwomeaningsofuniversal),itnowbecomespossibleto
betterunderstandwhatAquinasmeanswhenhespeaksaboutreceptivity,alterityand
identityinhumanknowing.Brieflyput:ontheonehand,receptivityandalterityare
referredtotheresintellecta,insofaraswhatisreceivedbythepossibleintellectisthe
perfectionoftheknown(whichforAquinasis“other”initsrealmodeofbeing,subsistingin
notseemtomanagetodistinguishbetweenthetwomeaningsofintelligibility,consideringintelligibilitysolelyasarealmodeofbeing,asseparationfrommatter.Thispreventshimfromexpressingclearlyinwhatwaymaterialthingscanbeintelligible(cf.90-92,99).Healsoseemstoconfuseimmateriality,asreferringtoknowingingeneral,withspiritualimmateriality,riskingtheexclusionofsensibleknowingfromitsproperimmateriality.
335ThisdistinctioncouldalsoprovehelpfultoovercometheworriesofJuanF.Sellés(cf.Sellés,EIA,256nota72).Heacknowledgesthat,forSt.Thomas,theagentintellectiscognitiveonlyinsofarasitconcurswiththepossibleintellect,neitherbeforenorapartfromit.Butinevidentdisagreement,hewonders“…howisitthatsomethingwhichisnon-cognitiveisabletosubsequentlygenerateknowledgeinthepossibleintellect?”Mysuggestionwouldbethat,becauseintheobjectofknowledgeAquinasdistinguishesbetweenitscontentanditsmodeofbeing,theagentintellectgenerates(=makespossible)knowledgeinsofarisitproducestheintelligiblemodeofbeingofthecontent.“Intelligibility”isananalogousnotionthatdoesnotreferonlytothecontentofunderstanding,butalsotoitsmodeofbeinginthemind.
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thematter)inanintelligiblemodeofbeing.Ontheotherhand,identityisreferredtothis
intelligiblemodeofbeing,insofarastheintellectinitsoperationisoneandthesame,not
withtheresintellecta(whoseperfectionreceivesintentionallyandnotphysically)butwith
thespeciesassubjectivemodification,i.e.,withthespeciesasperfectingsubjectivelythe
intellect.ThesematterswillbetreatedinthenextChapter.
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ChapterThree:KnowingasReceptive
AtopicintroducedinChapter1istheconsiderationofintelligenceasacertain
“vision.”Thusarisesaveryimportantissueunderlyingthewholedoctrineoftheagent
intellectinAquinas;thatis,intellectualknowingisoriginallyreceptive,intentionalas
possessionoftheotherandevendefinedbyalterity.Inotherwords,tosaythattheagent
intellectisametaphysicalaprioriofintellectualknowingasreceptiveofobjectivecontent,
impliesthatunderstandingisnotacertain“perfecting”ofsomething,buta“being
perfected”bysomething;tounderstandisnottocommunicateaperfection,buttoreceive
aperfection.Therefore,theagentintellectwhichisbydefinitionsomething“perfecting,”is
notthefacultyofunderstanding,butsomethingrequiredbythepossibleintellectinorder
tounderstand(andinthatsenseapriori).Ifweshowthat,forAquinas,understandingis
originallyreceptiveoftheperfectionoftheotherassuch,whatbecomesmoreclearisthe
questionabilityofanyconceptionoftheagentintellectascontributingtheuniversalcontent
ofknowingorascompletingformallythematerialofsensibility.Ifknowingisnot
performance336oftheobjectbutreceptionoftheother,theagentintellectcannotbe
336Iuseboth“performative”and“productive”torefertotheformalapriori.Thefirstterm
seemstohaveamorecognitiveconnotation,thesecondseemsmore“physical”,andbecause“performative”hasbeenusedinotherinterpretations,aclarificationisinorder.Iamnotsuggestingthataformalaprioriissimplyaphysicalactivityoforganizationora“puttingtogether”aphysicalmaterialelement.WhatImeantosayisthat,if1)weconsidertheobjectofhumansciencelikea“composite”ofmatterandform(whichisalreadyalimitedanalogyfromthephysicalorder),2)weconsiderthe“matter”ofthisobjectthatwhichcomesfromexperience(particularincontent),3)weconsiderthe“form”ofthisobjectthe“unity”ofuniversalitywhichthismaterialfromexperiencefindsinhumanmind,and4)weconsiderthatthisunityofuniversalitydoesnotcomefromexperiencebutfromthehumanminditself,becausewetaketheuniversalityofthecontenttobeaneventofconsciousnessandnotadatumfromexperience,then5)wemaintainaformalapriorithat
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productiveoftheobject,butproductiveonlyoftheintelligiblemodeofbeingofthe
other.337
Thiscentralissuewillbeapproachedbyattendingtosixgroupsoftexts:
1. Passagesinwhichtheroleofknowingincreationischaracterizedasaremedyfor
thespecificimperfectionofcertaincreatures.
2. Textsreferringtoalterityandidentityinknowing,tryingtoestablishinwhat
senseAquinasspeaksofthesethings.
3. TextsshowinghowforAquinastheidentityinknowledgeisbasedonthe
species338andisnotanontologicalidentitywiththeknown.
4. Textsinwhichknowingispresentedasacertain“receiving,”whichreinforcesthe
ideaofalterityasacharacteristicofknowing.
5. Textsshowingthesofrequentcomparisonbetweenintelligenceandsensitivity
willbeanotherconfirmationofthealterityandreceptivityofknowing.
is“productive”oftheintellectualobject,insofarasuniversality,whichisconsideredthe“form”oftheobject,isacharacteristicoftheobjectcomingfromthemind.Iftheanalogy,insofarasitcomesfromthephysicalorder,doesnotmanagetoconveyperfectlytherealityofanepistemologicalformalapriori,itdoesallowtounderstandthat,asinthephysicalrealmwhateverisperfectinabodycomesfromtheagentcauseandnotfromthematter,inasimilarway,intheintentionalrealm,whateverisdefined(determined)intheobjectcomesfromthesubject,andnotfromexperience.
337WesupposeinthisChapterourpreviousfindings,particularlythattheobjectofunderstandingisthenaturesubsistingintheparticularandnottheparticularassuch.Thereforetheotherwearetalkingaboutisnotjustthematerialofsensibility.
338Imeanspeciesassubjectivemodification.Inthissense,thespeciesisnottheknown,butthemeansbywhichtheknownispresenttothemind.Aquinascanalsouse“species”inthesenseofnatureorcontentofknowing.Iwilltrytoavoidconfusionsinmyusageofthisword.
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6. Finally,asacorollaryofthepreviousreflections,ifknowingisneithera“tending
towards”nora“making,”itmeansthatthereis,forAquinas,acleardistinction
betweentheagentintellect,thepossibleintellectandthewill.
Therationaleofthisdivisionwillbemoreclearinwhatfollows.Itcouldbehelpfulto
notehowever,onthedoctrinalside,thatthetensionbetweenidentityandalterity,ashas
beenanticipatedinChapter2,willberesolvedbyreferringidentitytothespecies(andsoto
themodeofbeingoftheknownintheintellect),andalteritytotheknownperfectionitself.
1)TheMetaphysicalExplanationofKnowingasa“Remedy”
ForAquinas,knowingiswhatallowscertaincreaturestoremedytheirnatural
imperfection,eventothepointofobtainingalikenessofthesupremeperfectionofGod.
Thereasonforbringingthisideaof“remedy”intoourconsiderationsisthatitmayhelpto
establishknowingasabeingperfected,ratherthanasaperfectingactivity.
St.Thomasreferstothispointpreviously,inDeVer.2,2,c.Whatisinterestingabout
thispassageisthatitlocatesknowingaspartoftheuniversalplanofcreation;itgivesus,as
itwere,thereasonforknowledgetoexist.
Athingisperfectintwoways.First,itisperfectwithrespecttotheperfectionofits[being],whichbelongstoitaccordingtoitsownspecies.But,sincethespecific[being]ofonethingisdistinctfromthespecific[being]ofanother,ineverycreatedthing,[thiskindofperfectionineachthing]fallsshortofabsoluteperfectiontotheextentthatthatperfectionisfoundinotherspecies.Consequently,theperfectionofeachindividualthingconsideredinitselfisimperfect,beingapartoftheperfection
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oftheentireuniverse,whicharisesfromthesumtotaloftheperfectionsofallindividualthings.339
Thefirstmodeofperfectioncanbecallednatural,physicaloreven“real”being.The
secondisintentionalbeing,thebeingoftheknownintheknower.ForSt.Thomas,this
secondkindofpossessingaperfectionisacertainremedyfortheoriginalspecific
“imperfection”ofcreatures:
Inorderthattheremightbesomeremedyforthisimperfection,anotherkindofperfectionistobefoundincreatedthings.Itconsistsinthis,thattheperfectionbelongingtoonethingisfoundinanother.Thisistheperfectionofaknowerinsofarasheknows;forsomethingisknownbyaknowerbyreasonofthefactthatthethingknownis,insomefashion,inthepossessionoftheknower.340
Knowing,therefore,iswhatallowshumanbeingstoarriveatacertain“universal”
perfection.Anditshouldbestressedfromthebeginningthathumanbeingsdonotalready
possessthisuniversalperfectionbut,rather,thisperfectionissomethingtowhichhuman
beingsareinpotency.ThisisthemeaningoftheAristotelian“quodammodoomnia”:339DeVer.2,2,c.:“Resaliquainveniturperfectadupliciter.Unomodosecundum
perfectionemsuiesse,quodeicompetitsecundumpropriamspeciem.Sedquiaessespecificumuniusreiestdistinctumabessespecificoalteriusrei,ideoinqualibetrecreatahuiusmodiperfectioniinunaquaqueretantumdeestdeperfectionesimpliciter,quantumperfectionisinspeciebusaliisinvenitur;utsiccuiuslibetreiperfectioinseconsiderataesitimperfecta,velutiparsperfectionistotiusuniversi,quaeconsurgitexsingularumrerumperfectionibus,invicemcongregatis.”
340DeVer.2,2,c.:“Undeuthuicimperfectionialiquodremediumesset,invenituraliusmodusperfectionisinrebuscreatis,secundumquodperfectioquaeestpropriauniusrei,inalterareinvenitur;ethaecestperfectiocognoscentisinquantumestcognoscens,quiasecundumhocacognoscentealiquidcognosciturquodipsumcognitumestaliquomodoapudcognoscentem.”Cf.InIDeAnima4,18-26.InSummaI,78,3c.,St.Thomasdistinguishesinthesensesbetweennaturalandspiritualimmutatio,where“spiritual”referstothissecondmodeofbeing.AsStumpclarifies:“Aquinastendstouse‘immaterial’,‘intentional’,and‘spiritual’roughlysynonymouslytorefertothiskindofchangeorreceptionofform”(Stump,251,note35,cf.note36).Cf.InIDeAnima10,191-195:“Herethereisnomovementofthematerialsubstanceitself,butonlya‘spiritual’movementofcognition:forexample,theactofseeingisnotamaterialmodification;itis‘spiritual’receptionintotheeyeofsensibleforms.”[Inhisenimnonestmotussecundumessenaturae,sedsolumsecundumessespirituale,sicutpatetinvisucuiusoperationonestadessenaturale,sedspirituale:quiaestperspeciessensibilessecundumessespiritualereceptasinoculo.]
139
Hence,itissaidinTheSoulthatthesoulis,‘insomemanner,allthings,’sinceitsnatureissuchthatitcanknowallthings.Inthiswayitispossiblefortheperfectionoftheentireuniversetoexistinonething.Theultimateperfectionwhichthesoulcanattain,therefore,is,accordingtothephilosophers,tohavedelineatedinittheentireorderandcausesoftheuniverse.Thistheyheldtobetheultimateendofman;[which,inourview,]consistsinthevisionofGod;for,asGregorysays:‘WhatistherethattheydonotseewhoseeHimwhoseesallthings?’341
AccordingtoSt.Thomas,then,itisbymeansofknowledgethat“possibileest”(not
actual)thatthisuniversalperfectionmayexistinthesoul;thisperfectionis“ultima
perfectio”atwhichthesoulmayarrive,notsomethingitpossessesfromthebeginning.Itis
clearthen,thatknowingissomethingallowingahumanbeingtoarriveathisorherfinal
perfectionbyanacquisitionoftheperfectionofotherthings,suchperfectionbeingfoundin
himorherwiththissecondmodeofbeing.Preciselybecauseeachcreaturedoesnothave
initselftheperfectionofothercreatures,thissecondmodeofbeingprovidessome
creatureswitha“remedy”forthis“imperfection”;knowingallowsthemtopossessthe
perfectionofothers,sothatacertainlikenesstothefirstprinciplemaybeattained.
Asimilartextisfoundin80,1,c.,whereAquinasisdealingwiththenecessityof
attributingappetitivepotenciestothehumansoul.Hesays:“Forinthosewhichlack
knowledge,theformisfoundtodetermineeachthingonlytoitsownbeing—thatis,toits
nature.Thereforethisnaturalformisfollowedbyanaturalinclination,whichiscalledthe
341DeVer.2,2,c.:“EtideoinIIIDeAnimadicitur,animaessequodammodoomnia,quia
nataestomniacognoscere.Etsecundumhuncmodumpossibileestutinunaretotiusuniversiperfectioexistat.Undehaecestultimaperfectioadquamanimapotestpervenire,secundumphilosophos,utineadescribaturtotusordouniversi,etcausarumeius;inquoetiamfinemultimumhominisposuerunt,quodsecundumnos,eritinvisioneDei,quiasecundumGregorium,“quidestquodnonvideantquividentemomniavident?”
140
naturalappetite.”342ThisisthefirstmodeofbeingconsideredpreviouslyinthetextofDe
Veritate,thenaturalbeing.Thesecondmodeisintroducedimmediately:
Butinthosethingswhichhaveknowledge,eachoneisdeterminedtoitsownnaturalbeingbyitsnaturalform,insuchamannerthatitisneverthelessreceptiveofthespeciesofotherthings:forexample,sensereceivesthespeciesofallthingssensible,andtheintellect,ofallthingsintelligible,sothatthesoulofmanis,inaway,allthingsbysenseandintellect:andthereby,thosethingsthathaveknowledge,inaway,approachtoalikenesstoGod,‘inWhomallthingspre-exist,’asDionysiussays.343
WealsohaveherethereferencetotheAristotelian“quodammodoomnia”inthe
samesense;thatis,thosebeingswhoareabletoknowarecertainlydeterminedintheir
specificbeing,butinsuchawaythattheyarealsoabletoreceivetheperfection(here
“species”)ofotherbeings.Theword“receptivum”clearlyexpressesapassivepotentiality;
theword“appropinquant”alsoremindsusofthe“pervenire”inDeVeritate,inthesense
thatthereisaprogresstowardsan“ultimaperfectio,”whichishere“Deisimilitudinem.”We
shouldalsonotethecontrastbetweenhumanbeings,whomust“approach”thelikenessof
God,andGodhimself,inwhomallthingspre-exist,thatistosay,inwhomallofthese
perfectionsarealreadyactually(virtually)presentasintheirfirstcause.Inthistext,
knowingisthemeansbywhichhumanbeingsarriveattheirultimateperfection(distinct
34280,1,c.:“Inhisenimquaecognitionecarent,inveniturtantummodoformaadunumesse
propriumdeterminansunumquodque,quodetiamnaturaleuniuscuiusqueest.Hancigiturformamnaturalemsequiturnaturalisinclinatio,quaeappetitusnaturalisvocatur.”
34380,1,c.:“Inhabentibusautemcognitionem,sicdeterminaturunumquodqueadpropriumessenaturaleperformamnaturalem,quodtamenestreceptivumspecierumaliarumrerum,sicutsensusrecipitspeciesomniumsensibilium,etintellectusomniumintelligibilium,utsicanimahominissitomniaquodammodosecundumsensumetintellectum,inquoquodammodocognitionemhabentiaadDeisimilitudinemappropinquant,inquoomniapraeexistunt,sicutDionysiusdicit.”
141
fromtheirnaturalinitialperfection),thatultimateperfectionbeingacertainlikenessto
God,inwhomallthingspre-exist.
Theword“remedy”isalsousedintheSummainatextthatmayilluminatethis
notionofknowingasameansofprogresstowardsperfection.Ahumanbeingisableto
attainhisorherultimateperfectionbymeansofmanyoperations,accordingtohisorher
statusinthescaleofbeings.Again,thedifferencebetweenusandGodisthat,forGod,this
ultimateperfectionisapossession,notsomethingtobeattainedbyoperations.Whatis
deniedinGod,however,isnottheoperationitself,butthe“tobeattained”element,which
ispropertocreatures.ThemetaphysicaldistinctionbetweenGodandhumanbeings
illuminateswhatiscreatedknowledgeforSt.Thomas,namely,asecondaryperfection,the
endorgoalofthedevelopmentoftheknowingcreature.
Ofnecessitywemustplaceseveralpowersinthesoul.Tomakethisevident,weobservethat,asthePhilosophersays(DeCoeloii,12),thelowestorderofthingscannotacquireperfectgoodness,buttheyacquireacertainimperfectgoodness,byfewmovements;andthosewhichbelongtoahigherorderacquireperfectgoodnessbymanymovements;andthoseyethigheracquireperfectgoodnessbyfewmovements;andthehighestperfectionisfoundinthosethingswhichacquireperfectgoodnesswithoutanymovementwhatever.Thusheisleastofalldisposedofhealth,whocanonlyacquireimperfecthealthbymeansofafewremedies;betterdisposedishewhocanacquireperfecthealthbymeansofmanyremedies;andbetterstill,hewhocanbyfewremedies;bestofallishewhohasperfecthealthwithoutanyremedies.Weconclude,therefore,thatthingswhicharebelowmanacquireacertainlimitedgoodness;andsotheyhaveafewdeterminateoperationsandpowers.Butmancanacquireuniversalandperfectgoodness,becausehecanacquirebeatitude.Yetheisinthelastdegree,accordingtohisnature,ofthosetowhombeatitudeispossible;thereforethehumansoulrequiresmanyandvariousoperationsandpowers.Buttoangelsasmallervarietyofpowersissufficient.InGodthereisnopoweroractionbeyondHisownEssence.344
34477,2,c.:“Necesseestponerepluresanimaepotentias.Adcuiusevidentiam,
considerandumestquod,sicutPhilosophusdicitinIIDeCaelo,quaesuntinrebusinfima,non
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InDeVeritate,the“illness”seemstobemoretherelativeimperfectionofeach
creatureregardingtheperfectionoftherest(andsoamore“static”imperfection),andin
theSummathe“illness”istheimperfectionoftheintellectualcreatureasabeingin
potencytowardsitsfinalend(andsoadynamicimperfection).Inthefirsttwotexts,St.
Thomasreferstobothsensibleandintellectualknowledge,whereasinthethirdtexthe
refersonlytointellectualknowing;thatisprobablywhyhepreferstospeaksimplyabout
Deisimilitudineminthesecondtextandofbeatitudineminthethird.Inallthreetexts,
finally,knowinginhumanbeingsisabeingtowardsGod,notabeing-in-the-world;itisa
meanstoobtaintheirfinalendbythegradualacquisitionofperfections,andisnota
perfectingactivityofanykind.345Inotherwords,knowingisabeingtowardsGodasanall-
inclusiveuniversalperfection;quodammodoomniaandDeisimilitudinemrefermore
universallytothelikenessofGod,attainablealsobysensibleknowingorbypurelynatural
knowledge;visioneDei,universalemetperfectambonitateminsteadaremorerestrictedto
thefinalendofintellectualcreaturesobtainedonlybygrace.
possuntconsequiperfectambonitatem,sedaliquamimperfectamconsequunturpaucismotibus;superioraverohisadipiscunturperfectambonitatemmotibusmultis;hisautemsuperiorasuntquaeadipiscunturperfectambonitatemmotibuspaucis;summaveroperfectioinveniturinhisquaeabsquemotuperfectampossidentbonitatem.Sicutinfimeestadsanitatemdispositusquinonpotestperfectamconsequisanitatem,sedaliquammodicamconsequiturpaucisremediis;meliusautemdispositusestquipotestperfectamconsequisanitatem,sedremediismultis;etadhucmelius,quiremediispaucis;optimeautem,quiabsqueremedioperfectamsanitatemhabet.Dicendumestergoquodresquaesuntinfrahominem,quaedamparticulariabonaconsequuntur,etideoquasdampaucasetdeterminatasoperationeshabentetvirtutes.Homoautempotestconsequiuniversalemetperfectambonitatem,quiapotestadipiscibeatitudinem.Esttameninultimogradu,secundumnaturam,eorumquibuscompetitbeatitudo,etideomultisetdiversisoperationibusetvirtutibusindigetanimahumana.Angelisverominordiversitaspotentiarumcompetit.InDeoverononestaliquapotentiavelactio,praetereiusessentiam.”
345TheHeideggerian“being-in-the-world”,inmyview,isindirectoppositiontoAquinas’viewofhumanunderstanding.
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Thelattertext346situatesknowinginAquinas’metaphysicalworld.ForAquinas,only
GodisHisownbeing,andonlyinHimarebeingandoperationthesame.Godiscomplete,
perfect,possessingHisownperfection.Allothercreaturesneedtoobtaintheirfinal
perfectionbymeansofoperations,whicharesecondaryperfectionsaddedtoasubstantial
primaryperfection.Whatisoneinthesourceismultipleinitseffects.Everycreatureisa
likenessofGod,insofaraseachhasreceivedfromGodaparticipationofGod’sgoodness.
Butthisoriginal“fall”347fromthesourceimpliesadistinctionbothatthestaticlevelof
being(essentia–esse)andatthedynamiclevel(essesubstantialis–operatio).Ifthissecond
distinctiondidnottakeplace,neitherwouldthefirstmakeanysense:ifacreaturewere
perfectjustbecauseofwhatitis,itwouldmeanthatitsessenceandbeingwouldalsobe
thesame,andthereforeitwouldnotbeacreaturebutGod.This,Isuggest,isthewayto
understandknowledgeinAquinas;thatis,knowingisoneoftheoperationsallowingcertain
creaturestoobtaintheirend,theirsecondaryperfection.Itisaremedytotheirsubstantial
imperfection,notanoverflowingoftheirperfectionontootherthings.348
AconnectionwithChapter2maybehelpfulatthispoint.Knowingisaremedyfor
theimperfectionoftheknowerinsofarastheperfectionoftheknowndoesnotbelong
specificallytotheknower;weare,therefore,talkingabouttheresintellecta.Thefactthat
34677,2,c..347Inthesensethatthecreature“fallsshortof”theperfectionoftheCreator,andthatthe
creaturecomesfromtheCreatorasacertain“descending.”Inotherwords,thecreatureparticipatesoftheCreatorinbothastaticsense(asalimitedrealizationofthedivinefullnessofperfection)andadynamicsense(asreceivinghispartialperfectionfromGod).Itisthisbeingperparticipationemthatisthereasonforthedifferentlevelsofcompositionincreatures.
348Animagesomewhatsimilartothatof“remedy”isthefigureof“food.”Cf.InIIDeAnima6,156-161(SeeAppendix,Note9).
144
theagentintellect“remedies”thelackofintelligibilityoftheobjectisnotagainstthe
aforementionedbecause,inthiscase,“intelligibility”referstothemodusreiintellectae.The
knowerreceivesaperfectionascontent,whereastherealnatureintheobject(represented
inthephantasm)receivesaperfectionasamodeofbeing.349
2)AlterityandIdentityinHumanKnowing
2.1.Alterity
InAquinas,theoriginalalterityoftheobjectofknowingisclear.Forexample,in75,
2,c.:“Foritisclearthatbymeansoftheintellectmancanhaveknowledgeof[thenatures
of]allcorporealthings.Nowwhateverknowscertainthingscannothaveanyoftheminits
ownnature;becausethatwhichisinitnaturallywouldimpedetheknowledgeofanything
else.”350Preciselybecausetoknowistoreceivetheperfectionofothers,itisnecessarythat
thefacultyofknowingnotbealreadyperfectedwithanatural(andso“own”)perfectionof
349AninterestingtextinInDeAnimaalsosuggeststhatthe“remedy”whichhumanknowing
is(here“salus”)referstoreceivingtheperfectionoftheotherassuch(the“resintellecta”).Thisisrelatedtotheparticularkindofreceptivitythatknowledgeimplies,whichwewilldiscusslaterinsection4ofthissameChapter:“Inanotherandloosersensetheterm(passio)connotesanyreceptionofsomethingfromoutside.Andasareceiveristowhatitreceivesasapotencytoitsactuality;andasactualityistheperfectionofwhatispotential;sobeingactedupon(i.e.,passio)inthissenseimplies,[notthatacertaincorruptiontakesplace,but]ratherthatacertain[“salvation”]andperfectionofathinginpotencyisreceivedfromathinginact.”[Aliomodopassiocommuniterdicituretminusproprie,secundumscilicetquodimportatquamdamreceptionem.Etquiaquodestreceptivumalterius,comparaturadipsumsicutpotentiaadactum:actusautemestperfectiopotentiae;etideohocmododiciturpassio,nonsecundumquodfitquaedamcorruptiopatientis,sedmagissecundumquodfitquaedamsalusetperfectioeiusquodestinpotentia,abeoquodestinactu.](InIIDeAnima11,109-117).Humanknowingisthisreceivingtheperfectionofotherthingsasaremedyforouroriginalimperfection.
35075,2,c.:“Manifestumestenimquodhomoperintellectumcognoscerepotestnaturasomniumcorporum.Quodautempotestcognoscerealiqua,oportetutnihileorumhabeatinsuanatura,quiailludquodinesseteinaturaliterimpediretcognitionemaliorum.”
145
thesamekind.Later,St.Thomasdesignatesalterityasacommonalitysharedbysensibility
andintelligence,despitethedifferenceineachasregardsthemodeofbeingoftheknown:
Butthereisthisdifference,accordingtotheopinionofAristotle,betweenthesenseandtheintelligence—thatathingisperceivedbythesenseaccordingtothedispositionwhichithasoutsidethesoul—thatis,initsindividuality;whereasthenatureofthethingunderstoodisindeedoutsidethesoul,butthemodeaccordingtowhichitexistsoutsidethesoulisnotthemodeaccordingtowhichitisunderstood.351
Whatisknown,theobject,is“extraanimam.”In84,2,c.(aparallelofDeVer.2,2),
inexplainingtheimmaterialityofknowing,St.Thomassays:“Thereasonofthisis,because
theactofknowledgeextendstothingsoutsidetheknower:forweknowthingseventhat
areexternaltous.”352Thereferencestotheexteriorityoftheknownareclearalsoin78,1,
c.,alreadyquoted.Referringtosensitiveandintellectualpotencies,hesays:“…[T]helatter
twogeneraofthesoul'spowershaveanoperationinregardnotmerelytothatwhichis
unitedtothem,butalsotosomethingextrinsic.”353Knowingisnodoubtrelatedtothething
“extraanimam,”althoughinadifferentwaythanaretheaffectivepotencies.354
35176,2ad4:“Sedhoctantuminterestintersensumetintellectum,secundumsententiam
Aristotelis,quodressentitursecundumillamdispositionemquamextraanimamhabet,insuaparticularitate,naturaautemreiquaeintelligitur,estquidemextraanimam,sednonhabetillummodumessendiextraanimam,secundumquemintelligitur.”Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6(quotedonp.96).
35284,2,c.:“Ethuiusratioest,quiaactuscognitionisseextenditadeaquaesuntextracognoscentem,cognoscimusenimetiameaquaeextranossunt.”
35378,1,c.:“…[I]staduosecundagenerapotentiarumanimaehabentoperationemnonsolumrespectureiconiunctae,sedetiamrespectureiextrinsecae.”
354Cf.78,1,c.:“Itfollowsofnecessitythatthissomethingextrinsic,whichistheobjectofthesoul'soperation,mustberelatedtothesoulinatwofoldmanner.First,inasmuchasthissomethingextrinsichasanaturalaptitudetobeunitedtothesoul,andtobebyitslikenessinthesoul.Inthiswaytherearetwokindsofpowers—namely,the"sensitive"[…]andthe"intellectual"[…].Secondly,forasmuchasthesoulitselfhasaninclinationandtendencytothesomethingextrinsic.”[Necesseestextrinsecamrem,quaeestobiectumoperationisanimae,secundumduplicemrationemadanimamcomparari.Unomodo,secundumquodnataestanimaeconiungiet
146
Thereferencetotheexternalthingisdirect,despitethemediationofthespecies,as
wehavealreadyseenin76,2ad4.Tosaythat“lapisnonestinanima”isthesameastosay
thatitis“extraanimam.”355
Inthefollowingtext,Aquinasalmostdefinesunderstandingbyalterity.Thequestion
iswhethertheseparatesoulcanhaveanyknowledgeoftheseparatesubstances(other
separatesoulsorangels).Theanswerisaffirmative,buttheperfectionofthisknowledge
varies,dependingontheobject;otherseparatesoulscanbeknownperfectly;theangels,
instead,canbeknowninanimperfectway.Thereason,forSt.Thomas,isasfollows:“Now,
everyseparatesubstance‘understandswhatisaboveitselfandwhatisbelowitself,
accordingtothemodeofitssubstance’(DeCausisviii):forathingisunderstood[insofar]as
itisintheonewhounderstands;whileonethingisinanotheraccordingtothenatureof
thatinwhichitis.”356Theactofunderstanding,forSt.Thomas,isverifiedbythepresence
oftheobjectintheknowingsubject,whichisa“species”ofonethingbeingpresentin
inanimaessepersuamsimilitudinem.Etquantumadhoc,suntduogenerapotentiarum,scilicetsensitivum(…)etintellectivum(…)Alioveromodo,secundumquodipsaanimainclinaturettenditinremexteriorem.]Ashasbeenshownbefore,andhereagain,whatisextrinsicforSt.Thomasisnotonlytheobjectofsensitivity,butalsotheobjectofintelligence,i.e.,thenatureofthematerialthing.
35576,2ad4:“Forwhatisunderstoodisintheintellect,notaccordingtoitsownnature,butaccordingtoitslikeness;for‘thestoneisnotinthesoul,butitslikenessis,’asissaid,DeAnimaiii,8.Yetitisthestonewhichisunderstood,notthelikenessofthestone;exceptbyareflectionoftheintellectonitself:otherwise,theobjectsofscienceswouldnotbethings,butonlyintelligiblespecies.”[Idenimquodintelligiturnonestinintellectusecundumse,sedsecundumsuamsimilitudinem,lapisenimnonestinanima,sedspecieslapidis,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.Ettamenlapisestidquodintelligitur,nonautemspecieslapidis,nisiperreflexionemintellectussupraseipsum,alioquinscientiaenonessentderebus,seddespeciebusintelligibilibus.]St.Thomasalsousestheexpression“extraanimam”inCGII,75,par.8(quotedonp.114).
35689,2,c.:“Estautemcommuneomnisubstantiaeseparataequodintelligatidquodestsuprase,etidquodestinfrase,permodumsuaesubstantiae,sicenimintelligituraliquidsecundumquodestinintelligente;estautemaliquidinalteropermodumeiusinquoest.”
147
another.357Althoughwhatispresentintheother(other=theknower)isthethingitself,the
modeinwhichitispresentdependsontheknower.Thisisnottosaythatthethingwhichis
presentisnolongerthesameandbecomestheknower,butexactlytheopposite.St.
ThomasmakesthisverypointinDeVer.2,2,referringtoeveryknowledge:
Inorderthattheremightbesomeremedyforthisimperfection,anotherkindofperfectionistobefoundincreatedthings.Itconsistsinthis,thattheperfectionbelongingtoonethingisfoundinanother.Thisistheperfectionofaknowerinsofarasheknows;forsomethingisknownbyaknowerbyreasonofthefactthatthethingknownis,insomefashion,inthepossessionoftheknower…358
Althoughinthesetextsalterityisreferreddirectlytotheknower,itisobviousthat
theoppositeofthe“other”isalso“another.”Evenmore,itissignificantthatthefocusison
theperfectionoftheknown,andthatthe“other”isthesubjectasreceptiveofit;itisnot
theperfectionoftheknowerwhichisintheknown,buttheperfectionoftheknownwhich
isintheknower.
357Cf.Lambert,90:“Thenecessitythataknowingbeingbeabletoasumeotherformsis
expressedinthisdefinitionofknowledge,whichshowsimmaterialitytobeonlyonecomponent:‘Topossesssomethinginoneselfformallyandnotmaterially,inwhichknowingconsists,isamostnoblewayofpossessingorcontainingsomething’[mytrans.,originalLatinfollows:Sicutautemhaberealiquidinseformaliteretnonmaterialiter,inquoconsistitratiocognitionis,estnobilissimusmodushabendivelcontinendialiquid](InDeCaus,lect.18,n.339).”
358DeVer.2,2,c.:“Undeuthuicimperfectionialiquodremediumesset,invenituraliusmodusperfectionisinrebuscreatis,secundumquodperfectioquaeestpropriauniusrei,inalterareinvenitur;ethaecestperfectiocognoscentisinquantumestcognoscens,quiasecundumhocacognoscentealiquidcognosciturquodipsumcognitumestaliquomodoapudcognoscentem…”Cf.InIDeAnima4,19-36“Thetruth,infact,isthatknowledgeisverifiedbythepresenceofalikenessofthethingknownintheknower;fortheknownmustbeintheknowersomehow.”(mytrans.)[Veritasautemest,quodcognitiofitpersimilitudinemreicognitaeincognoscente:oportetenimquodrescognitaaliquomodositincognoscente.]
148
Thisoriginalfact,thepresenceofsomethinginanother(theknower),isthatwhich
requiresadifferentmodeofbeingofthatperfection,359aswehaveseeninChapter2,and
weseehereagain:
Theperfectionofonethingcannotbeinanotheraccordingtothedetermined[being]whichithasinthethingitself.Hence,ifwewishtoconsideritinsofarasitcanbeinanother,wemustconsideritapartfromthosethingswhichdetermineitbytheirverynature.Now,sinceformsandperfectionsofthingsaremadedeterminatebymatter,athingisknowableinsofarasitisseparatedfrommatter.Forthisreason,thesubjectinwhichtheseperfectionsarereceivedmust[also]beimmaterial;for,ifitwerematerial,theperfectionwouldbereceivedinitaccordingtoadeterminate[being].Itwould,accordingly,notbeintheintellectinastateinwhichitisknowable,thatis,inthewayinwhichtheperfectionofonethingcanbeinanother.360
359Stumpoffersasimilarinterpretationwhenexplainingthis“distinctionofAquinas’s
betweentwodifferentwaysofreceivingaform”:“But[theform]istransferredinsuchawaythatitdoesnotconferontheeyethesubstantialoraccidentalcharacteristicsofastone.Apurplestonevisuallycognizeddoesnotmaketheeyepurpleeventhoughtheformofthestone’scoloristransferredtotheeye”(Stump,252).ThedistinctionofthetwomodesofbeingofDeVer2,2canbereadinthefollowingtextofInIIDeAnima14,262-268:“Imeanby‘materialchange’whathappenswhenaqualityisreceivedbyasubjectaccordingtothematerialmode(of)thesubject’sownexistence,ase.g.whenanythingiscooled,orheated,ormovedaboutinspace;whereasbya‘spiritualchange’Imean,here,whathappenswhenthelikenessofanobjectisreceivedinthesense-organ,orinthemediumbetweenobjectandorgan,asaform,causingknowledge,andnotmerelyasaforminmatter.Forthereisadifferencebetweenthemodeofbeingwhichasensibleformhasinthesensesandthatwhichithasinthethingsensed.”[Dicoautemimmutationemnaturalemproutqualitasrecipiturinpatientesecundumessenaturae,sicutcumaliquidinfrigidaturvelcalefitautmovetursecundumlocum.Immutatioverospiritualisestsecundumquodspeciesrecipiturinorganosensusautinmediopermodumintentionis,etnonpermodumnaturalisformae.Nonenimsicrecipiturspeciessensibilisinsensusecundumilludessequodhabetinresensibili.]
360DeVer.2,2,c.:“Perfectioautemuniusreiinalteroessenonpotestsecundumdeterminatumessequodhabebatinreilla;etideoadhocquodnatasitesseinrealtera,oporteteamconsiderariabsquehisquaenatasunteamdeterminare.Etquiaformaeetperfectionesrerumpermateriamdeterminantur,indeestquodsecundumhocaliquaresestcognoscibilissecundumquodamateriaseparatur.Undeoportetutetilludinquosuscipiturtalisreiperfectio,sitimmateriale;sienimessetmateriale,perfectioreceptaessetineosecundumaliquodessedeterminatum;etitanonessetineosecundumquodestcognoscibilis;scilicetut,existensperfectiounius,estnataesseinaltero.”Cf.Lambert,94:“Theimmaterialityofaknowingbeingbestowsonittheabilitytotranscendcontractionandisolationandtoappropriatetoitselfformsotherthanitsown.”
149
Noticehow,intheend,beingasknown(“cognoscibilis”)isidentifiedwithbeingin
theotherasother(“existensperfectiounius,estnataesseinaltero”).Thereisnodifference
betweenthisdoctrineandtheSumma’s,exceptforthemoreexplicitexpressionsofalterity
inknowing.
2.2.Identity:WhatIdentityisNot
Butwhataboutidentity?Istherenotanidentityinknowing,asSt.Thomashimself
saysmanytimes?Whatthatidentityisnotwillbemorethefocusinthissection;inthe
next,thefocuswillbewhatthatidentitymeansforAquinas.
Tobeginwith,theidentityisnotabsoluteorperse,butquodammodoandby
participation:“Theintellectualsoulforasmuchasitisactuallyunderstanding,participates
thethingunderstood:for,inaway,theintellectinactisthethingunderstoodinact.”361
Then,ifthereisanidentity,itisnotanontologicalidentityatthelevelofthe
(substantial)beingoftheknower,ashasbeenshownattheendofsection1ofthisChapter.
Substantialbeingandcognitiveoperationaredistinctinallcreatures,evenintheangels.362
ForAquinas,thepotencyofbeing(essentia)cannotbethepotencyoftheoperation,
36184,4ob.1:“Animaintellectiva,secundumquodestactuintelligens,participatipsa
intelligibilia,intellectuseniminactu,quodammodoestintellectuminactu.”362Cf.77,1sc:“Dionysius(Coel.Hier.xi)saysthat‘heavenlyspiritsaredividedintoessence,
power,andoperation.’Muchmore,then,inthesoulistheessencedistinctfromthevirtueorpower.”[SedcontraestquodDionysiusdicit,XIcap.Caelest.Hier.,quodcaelestesspiritusdividunturinessentiam,virtutemetoperationem.Multoigiturmagisinanimaaliudestessentia,etaliudvirtussivepotentia.]and77,1,c.:“WhereforetheDivinepowerwhichistheprincipleofHisoperationistheDivineEssenceitself.Thiscannotbetrueeitherofthesoul,orofanycreature;aswehavesaidabovewhenspeakingoftheangels.”[UndeDeipotentia,quaeestoperationisprincipium,estipsaDeiessentia.Quodnonpotestesseverumnequeinanima,nequeinaliquacreatura;utsupraetiamdeAngelodictumest.]
150
becausethatwouldmeananidentityof(substantial)beingandoperation(esseetoperare),
whichispropertoGodalone.
Letusnextexaminethetextwhichwilloccupyusmoredirectlyinthefollowing
section.Accordingto85,2ad1,anidentitybetweentheknowninactandtheintelligence
inactcannotmeanthattheintellectknowsitsownsubjective(natural)perfection,thatis,
thespeciesasperfectingthefacultysubjectively(accordingtothefirstmodeofbeingofDe
Ver.2,2).363Thisidentity(theAristotelian“intellectuminactuestintellectusinactu”)and
thepresenceoftheknownintheknower(bymeansofthespecies)aretwodifferent
concepts:
Thethingunderstoodisintheintellectbyitsownlikeness;anditisinthissensethatwesaythatthethingunderstood[inact]istheintellectinact,becausethelikenessofthethingunderstoodistheformoftheintellect,asthelikenessofasensiblethingistheformofthesenseinact.Henceitdoesnotfollowthattheintelligiblespeciesabstractediswhatisactuallyunderstood;butratherthatitisthelikenessthereof.364
ForAquinas,inknowledgetherearetworealmsofactualization:theactofthe
intellectasaccidentalfacultyinitsnaturalbeing,andtheactoftheintellectinsofarasit
understands.Thefirstperfectionisreal,anditisthespeciesinitsrealbeing(asaccidental
orsecondaryactoftheintellectasoperativepotency).Thesecondperfectionisintentional,
thatistosay,theperfectionoftheknownintheknower,bymeansofthespecies.The363ItischallengingtoindicatewithonetermthefirstmodeofbeingofDeVer2,2,and
therefore“subjective”,“real”,“natural”or“metaphysical”willbeusedalternatively,asseemsmorefitting.Noterm,inmyview,isexemptfrommisunderstanding,sincetheintentionalpresencecouldalsobereferredtoassomethingreal,metaphysical,andsoon.Ihopethat,bythecontextofoppositionwith“intentional”,thereaderwillhaveacleargraspofwhatismeant.
36485,2ad1:“Dicendumquodintellectumestinintelligentepersuamsimilitudinem.Etperhuncmodumdiciturquodintellectuminactuestintellectusinactu,inquantumsimilitudoreiintellectaeestformaintellectus;sicutsimilitudoreisensibilisestformasensusinactu.Undenonsequiturquodspeciesintelligibilisabstractasitidquodactuintelligitur,sedquodsitsimilitudoeius.”;cf.85,2,ob1.
151
speciesasimagehas,then,adoubleaspect:itisarealbeingwhichrepresentssomething
else,likeaphotocontainingbothitsownbeingaspaperandthepresenceofsomeone(the
onewhosephotowastaken).Theknownisintheknowerintentionally(“Intellectumestin
intelligentepersuamsimilitudinem”),whereasthespeciesperfectstheintellectnaturally,
subjectively(“similitudoreiintellectaeestformaintellectus”).Thespeciesistherealbeing
(formaquo)whichallowstheknowertobeperfectedintentionally,bringingtotheknower
theperfectionoftheknown(formaquod)inamodeofbeingproportionatetothepotency.
Therefore,itmustbenotedfromthebeginningthattheidentityinthetextof
Aristotle,accordingtoSt.Thomas,isnotsimplytheidentityofintellectum(object)and
intellectus,buttheidentityofintellectuminactuandintellectusinactu.Intellectuminactu
connoteshere,forSt.Thomas,themodeofbeingoftheknownasknown(becauseitisnot
intelligibleinactinreality),andthereforeinthisphraseitsignifiesforSt.Thomasthe
speciesasreal(notintentional)perfectiveformoftheintellectasfaculty.Asaconsequence,
Intellectusinactumeansheretheintelligenceasoperativepotencyperfectedbyitsproper
formand,becausethisformistherealactoftheintellectasarealoperativepotency,
nothingpreventsusfromidentifyinga(real)thingwithitsown(real)perfection,here
respectivelytheintellectandthespecies.Morewillbesaidinthenextsubsection.
3)TheIdentityisbyMeansoftheSpecies
Ifknowledgeisoriginallyknowledgeoftheother,theonlysenseinwhichanidentity
withthisobjectcanbeconceivedisinsofarasthesubjectbecomessomehowtheobject.
Thesubjectisindeedperfected,insomeway,withtheperfectionthatispropertothe
object,butinsuchawaythatthisperfectionremainspropertotheobject.Thisperfectionis
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presentinthesubjectasbelongingtotheobject.Thatiswhyitissaidtobe“intentionally”
present,asanattempttoexpressinwordsanoriginalphenomenonthatdoesnotadmit
furtherresolutionorimages:itispresentinsofarasIamsubjectivelymodified,developed,
bythe“possession”ofanewperfection;butthispresenceis“intentional,”insofarasthat
presencedoesnotbringtheobjecttobephysicallyinme,butratheritisIwhoinsomeway
refertoit,itisIwhoenterintoanewrelationshipwiththeobject.Theobjectmodifiesme
insofarasIrefertoit.Butitisnotmyreferencethatperfectstheobject;rather,itisthe
objectthatperfectsme,orratherIwhogrowwiththeperfectionoftheobject,inmy
intendingofit.TheprobleminEpistemologyistounderstandthisfact,orrathertoaccept
it,insteadoftryingtoreduceittoaphysicalphenomenon,easiertotransformintoimages
ofphysicalcausality.St.Thomastookasapointofdeparturethisfact,andthatiswhy,
whereSt.Thomasisspeakingaboutknowing,hecannotbeunderstoodbythosewho
interprethiminphysicalterms.Whenonethingperfectsanotherinthephysicalrealm,the
perfectionoftheagentbecomestheperfectionofthepatient,andtheactofthepatientis
itsown.St.Thomassaysin85,2thatknowingisnotlikethat.Whenanobjectperfectsa
subjectintheintentionalrealm,theperfectionoftheobjectbecomestheperfectionofthe
subjectinsofarasitremainstheperfectionoftheobject,insofarasitbelongstotheother
(theobject)whichisdistinctfromthesubject.
This“identityinalterity”365inhumanknowingisverifiedbymeansofthespecies.
Thespeciesistherealmodificationofthesubjectthatallowshimorhertointendthe
365“Greekreason[…]wasabletoseethatthehumanintellect,inidentifyingitself
immaterially,intentionaliter,withthebeingofthings,trulyreachesthatwhichexistsoutsideour
153
objectasother.Itisareal-subjectivebecomingormodificationthatallowstheintellectto
becomeintentionallywhattheknowingsubjectisnot(really-subjectively).366Itseemsthat
thebestexampleisapicture,367socommoninourhumanexperience.Weknowperfectly
wellthat,inthepicture,thepersonisnotreallypresent,andyet,thepictureenablesusto
knowtheperson,withourfullrealizationthatwhatweareseeingisonlyanimage.Wedo
nothaveanydifficultyinrecognizingthatthereisbothapictureandsomethingelsethatis
pictured,withallofthatinonerealpicture.Therealthingandthereferenceareboththere.
Tworealthingsarepresentthough;thatis,thepersonalsoisthere,althoughnotinthe
samewayasisthematerialofthepicture.Therealpersonispresenttherewithanother
modeofbeing.Thisisan“image”ofwhathappenswiththecognitivespecies.
Theimmediatepurposeofthissectionisnottoexplainthenatureofthespecies.It
shouldbeenoughtounderstandthatthespeciesisasubjectivequalityintheintelligence
thatallowsthisfacultytorefertoanobjectassuch.Itisverydifficulttosaymorewithout
fallingintoimagesfromthephysicalrealmthatmoreobscurethanclarifywhatknowingis.
Thebestthatcanbesaidaboutknowing,Isuggest,iswhatSt.ThomassaysinDeVeritate:
thatknowingisamodeofperfectiondifferentfromthenaturalmodeofbeing,accordingto
whichtheperfectionofonethingispresentinanotherasother.
Theimmediatepurposeofthissection,then,istoshowthatforAquinasthe
Aristotelian“intellectuminactuestintellectusinactu”referstothespecies,andnottoan
minds”(JaquesMaritain,ThePeasantoftheGaronne[NewYork:Hold,RinehartandWinston,1968],p.18inCullen,72).
366ThisisareferencetothefirstmodeofbeingofDeVer.2,2.367Owensusesthisexampleaswell:cf.Owens,37and127.
154
ontologicalidentitybetweenknowerandknown.Severalreasonsforthishavealreadybeen
expressed.First,theontologicalbeingoftheknowerforSt.Thomasisdifferentfromthe
knower’soperation(aswehaveseenpreviously368).Secondly,knowingisnotperfectiveof
theobjectbutisperfectedbyit(whichisthepointofthiswholesection);ifknowingwere
theformoftheknownassuch,itwouldmakeperfectsensetosaythattheknowndoesnot
haveanyotherperfectionthantheactoftheknower.Thirdly,Aquinasneverdefines
knowingasarealidentitywiththeknown,369andhedoes,instead,characterizeknowingas
analteritybetweentheperfectionoftheknowerandtheknown(aswasshowninthe
previoussection).Itremains,however,todealmoredirectlywiththetextwherethe
Aristotelianidentityisexplicitlytreated370andtoexploreothertextsthatmayenlightenthe
roleofthespeciesregardingtheidentityinknowing.
Someremarksmaybehelpfulinordertosummarizetheproposedinterpretation.
ForAquinas,thereiscertainlyanidentitybetweenintellectandspecies(asubjective
identityofactualizedpotencyanditsownact);but,becausewhatisknownisnotthe
species,thisrealidentitydoesnottakeawaythealterityofknowing,thatistosay,the
referenceoftheintellecttotheother;rather,thespeciesistheformalprinciple(principium
quo)ofthereferenceoftheintellecttotherealobject.
Thepresenceoftheknownintheknowerisnotcalledidentitybutrathera“being
in”,presencein,beingintheother,etc.,whichisverifiedbymeansofthespecies.The
368Cf.section2ofthisChapter.369ThefactthatAquinasacknowledgesacertainknowingthatimpliestheidentityofknower
andknown(atleastintheseparatesubstances),doesnotmeanthathecharacterizesknowingasessentiallyanidentity.
37085,2ad1.
155
mediationofthespeciesdoesnottakeawaythedirectcontactwiththeobject.Itwould
takeitaway,ifthemediationwere“objective”;thatistosay,ifthespecieshadtobeknown
firstinordertoknowthethingitself.ButforSt.Thomas,thespeciesisasubjective
mediation,asubjectivemodificationthatmakesthedirectobjectivereferencepossible.
Thereisadistinctioninthespeciesbetweenthespeciesitselfandwhatisrepresented,
betweenitsrealbeingassubjectivemodificationandthecontentitpossessesasimage.The
faculty,bymeansofthissubjectivemodification,hasaccesstothethingrepresented,as
onewhoseesapicturerecognizesthepersonhimorherself,andnotnecessarilythe
materialsofthepicture.
3.1.TheAristotelianIdentity
LetusnowexaminesometextsthatmayshowmoreclearlythepositionofSt.
Thomasinthesematters.Aquinas’specificinterpretationoftheAristotelian“Thething
understoodinactistheintellectinact”(“Intellectuminactuestintellectusinactu”)has
beenanticipatedintheprevioussection.In85,2ob.1,itissuggestedthatthepresenceof
theobjectintheintellectisthesameasthepresenceofthespeciesinitasitsperfection;
therefore,speciesandobjectoftheintellectarethesamething.371Theargumentisthe
Aristoteliantext,totheauthorityofwhichSt.Thomaswillnotobject.ButAquinassaysin
37185,2ob.1:“Itwouldseemthattheintelligiblespeciesabstractedfromthephantasmis
relatedtoourintellectasthatwhichisunderstood.Fortheunderstoodinactisintheonewhounderstands:sincetheunderstoodinactistheintellectitselfinact.Butnothingofwhatisunderstoodisintheintellectactuallyunderstanding,savetheabstractedintelligiblespecies.Thereforethisspeciesiswhatisactuallyunderstood.”[Videturquodspeciesintelligibilesaphantasmatibusabstractae,sehabeantadintellectumnostrumsicutidquodintelligitur.Intellectumeniminactuestinintelligente,quiaintellectuminactuestipseintellectusinactu.Sednihildereintellectaestinintellectuactuintelligente,nisispeciesintelligibilisabstracta.Ergohuiusmodispeciesestipsumintellectuminactu.]
156
theAdUnum:“Thethingunderstoodisintheintellectbyitsownlikeness.”372Noticehow,
fromthebeginning,heisnottalkingabout“intellectuminactu”butabout“intellectum”,
whichstandsfortheobjectitselfandnotforthespecies(here“similitudinem”);thisisthe
confusionintheobjection.Aquinascontinues:“Anditisinthissensethatwesaythatthe
thingunderstood[inact]istheintellectinact,becausethelikenessofthethingunderstood
istheformoftheintellect,asthelikenessofasensiblethingistheformofthesensein
act.”373ThisisthepreciseinterpretationoftheAristoteliantextforAquinas.Thatis,the
identity(“est”canbeinterpretedinthatwaytosomeextent)istheidentityofanactualized
operativepotency(intellectusinactu=intellectusformatum)withitsperfectiveform
(similitudoreiintellectae=intellectuminactu).ThismaynotbeAquinas’interpretationof
theAristoteliantextinothercontexts,anditmayalsobeamisinterpretationofAristotle;
however,forAquinas,here,intellectuminactudoesnotmeanobjectoftheintellect(quod
actuintelligitur).Therefore,hecanconclude:“Henceitdoesnotfollowthattheintelligible
speciesabstractediswhatisactuallyunderstood;butratherthatitisthelikeness
thereof.”374ThespeciesiscertainlytheperfectiveformoftheintellectforAquinas,andstill
itisnotwhatisunderstood,butarepresentationofwhatisunderstood.Thatiswhy,ifan
identityissupportedwiththisAristoteliantextinAquinas,itisnottheidentitybetween
37285,2ad1:“Intellectumestinintelligentepersuamsimilitudinem.”37385,2ad1:“Etperhuncmodumdiciturquodintellectuminactuestintellectusinactu,
inquantumsimilitudoreiintellectaeestformaintellectus;sicutsimilitudoreisensibilisestformasensusinactu.”
37485,2ad1:“Undenonsequiturquodspeciesintelligibilisabstractasitidquodactuintelligitur,sedquodsitsimilitudoeius.”
157
objectandknower,northeidentitybetweenthebeingoftheobjectandthebeingofthe
knower,buttheidentityoftheintellectwithitsspeciesasperfectiveform.375
OtherworksofAquinascanhelpustoconfirmourinterpretation:“Theknownisa
perfectionoftheknower,notbyitssubstance(forthethingisoutsidetheknower),but
ratherbythelikenessbywhichitisknown;foraperfectionexistsintheperfected—andthe
likenessofthestone,notthestone,existsinthesoul.”376Inthefollowingtext“species”
standsfortheperfectionthatisknown:
Hence,thespeciesofathing,aspresentinphantasms,isnotactuallyintelligible,sinceinthisstateitisnotonewiththeintellectinact,butisonewithitaccordingasthespeciesisabstractedfromthephantasms.Justso,thespeciesofcolorisnotperceived[inactinsofar]asitexistsinthestone,butonly[insofar]asitexistsinthepupil.377
Whatisinterestingisthatthespeciesissomethingthatispresentinthethingitself,
butinthethingitselfisnotunitedtothefaculty(andthereforeisnotknowninact).Whatis
unitedtothefacultyistheabstractedspecies(inthecaseoftheintellect),nottherealities
themselvesintheirnaturalbeing.Althoughitisclearthattheperfectionitselfisonewith
theintellectinactandthatSt.ThomasisreferringtotheAristotelianidentity,itiseven
moreclearthatthisidentitydoesnotcomeaboutonaccountofthecontent,buton
accountofthemodeofbeingofthecontent.Inotherwords,thenatureofthestoneinits
375ThesameinterpretationcanbeseenclearlyinothertextsandworksofAquinas:cf.CGII,
98,par.14-19;Ibid.,99,par.5-7;InIIIDeanima7,37-48;SummaI,14,2(seeAppendix,note10).376DeVer.2,3ad1:“Intellectumnonestperfectiointelligentissecundumillamremquae
cognoscitur(resenimillaestextraintelligentem),sedsecundumreisimilitudinemquacognoscitur,quiaperfectioestinperfecto;lapisautemnonestinanima,sedsimilitudolapidis.”
377CGII,59,par.13:“Speciesigiturrei,secundumquodestinphantasmatibus,nonestintelligibilisactu:nonenimsicestunumcumintellectuinactusedsecundumquodestaphantasmatibusabstracta;sicutnecspeciescolorisestsensatainactusecundumquodestinlapide,sedsolumsecundumquodestinpupilla.”Cf.par.10.
158
abstractedmodeofbeing,i.e.,thespecies(=representation)ofthenatureofthestone(=
universalcontent),istheperfectionoftheintellectinact.Thisisthesamedoctrineasthat
oftheSumma.
ItseemsthatInDeAnimausestheword“species”moresotoindicatethecognitive
representation:“Buttheseintelligibleideasarenotpreciselywhatthemindunderstands;
theyareonlythelatter’slikenesspresentinthesoul;henceitisquitepossibleformany
intellectstopossesslikenessesofoneandthesameobject,sothatonethingisunderstood
byall.”378Inthefollowingtextwehaveanalternative
expressionoftheAristotelianidentity:Scientia=intellectusinactuandscibileinactu
=intellectuminactu.379Speciesisagaintherepresentationofthethingknown.Thetext
says:“Speculativeknowledgeandwhatisknowable‘inthisway’(i.e.inact)areidentical.
Thereforethe[species]oftheactuallyunderstoodthingisalso[thespecies]ofthe[intellect
itself],throughwhichthelattercanunderstanditself.”380Becausetherepresentationofthe
378InIIIDeAnima2,285-289:“Nonenimestspeciesintelligibilis,ipsumintellectum,sed
similitudoeiusinanima:etideosisuntpluresintellectushabentessimilitudinemuniuseteiusdemrei,eriteademresintellectaapudomnes.”
379Inthesamewayshouldbeunderstoodthefollowingtext,althoughthewordingisslightlydifferent.InIIIDeAnima4,173-176:“Hestatesthreepropertiesofintellectinact.First,itsactualknowledgeisidenticalwiththethingknown;whichisnottrueofintellectaspotential.”[Tresponitconditionesintellectusinactu:quarumprimaest,quodscientiainactu,estidemreiscitae.Quodnonestverumdeintellectuinpotentia.]Cf.InIIIDeAnima5,263-269:“Herepeatswhathehassaidofintellectinact,thatactualknowledgeisonewith(thethingknowninact).”[Resumitquiddamquodsupradictumestdeintellectusecundumactum(…)etdicitquodscientiasecundumactumesidemreiscitesecundumactum.”](myunderline,Leon.emphasis)InthislattertextSt.Thomashimselfclarifiesthatthefirsttextreferredtotheintellectuminactu,andnotsimplytotheresintellecta.Cf.InMet.12,lect.11,2620.
380InIIIDeAnima3,78-82:“Ipsaenimscientiaspeculativaetsicscibile,idestscibileinactu,idemest.Speciesigiturreiintellectaeinactu,estspeciesipsiusintellectus;etsicpereamseipsumintelligerepotest.”(Leon.emphasis)Cf.InMet.12,lect.8,2539:“Foranintellectbecomesintelligiblebyreasonofthefactthatitapprehendssomethingintelligible.Hence,sincetheintellect
159
thingknownistheform(“species”assubjectiveactuality)oftheintellectitself,bymeansof
thisspecies(representation)ofthethingalreadyunderstood(“reiintellectae”)theintellect
cansubsequentlyknowitself(“seipsumintelligerepotest”).ForAquinas,thefirstobjectof
humanunderstandingisnottheintellectitself,butthenatureofcorporealthings,anditis
bytheknowledgeofthemthattheintellectbecomesintelligibleinactand,thus,objectof
itsownunderstanding.381
3.2.Species,IdentityandAlterity
Letusnowexaminesometextsabouttheroleofthespeciesconcerningthe
aforementioned.Indoingso,wearetryingtoemphasizethat,forAquinas,thereisa
distinctionbetweenspeciesandobjectofknowledge.Identityinknowingreferstothe
species,whereasalterityreferstotheobject.Thattheobjectisnotthephantasmbuta
universalcontentabstractedfromitsindividualconditionsinmatterhasalreadybeen
discussed.382
becomesintelligiblebyconceivingsomeintelligibleobject,itfollowsthattheintellectanditsintelligibleobjectarethesame.”[Fitenimintellectusintelligibilisperhocquodattingitaliquodintelligibile.Etideo,cumipseintellectusfiatintelligibilisconcipiendoaliquodintelligibile,sequeturquodidemsitintellectusetintelligibile.]
381Thefactthatitisalreadyanimmaterialreality(andsoinact,inasense)doesnottakeawaythefactthatthehumanintellectisinpotencyregardingitsproperact(beforethesubjectunderstandssomething,thehumanintellectistabularasa)andthereforetheintellectcannotbeknowninitself,becausewhatisknownisknowninsofarasitisinact.Therealityoftheintellectbeforethesubjectunderstandsisimmaterial,andsoitcouldbeintelligibleforsomeonewhoseobjectofunderstandingistheseparatesubstances.Butourintellectiscompletelypotential,anditismovedtounderstandbyanagentobject(thenatureofcorporealthings):onlythendoesitpassfrompotencytoactofunderstanding,andsobecomesactualandintelligibleforus.Inotherwords,thepresenceoftheintellecttoitself,whileitisinpotencyofunderstanding,doesnotproduceknowledgeofitself,becausewhatisinpotencycannotbeknownassuch,norbeanagentobject.Cf.InMet.12,lect.8,2539,justquoted.ForotherstudiedtextsinsupportofourinterpretationoftheAristotelianidentity,comingfromInMetaphysicorum,seeAppendix,Note11.
382Cf.Chapter1,sections2and3.
160
ForAquinas,thespeciesisprincipiumquo(nottheobject)ofknowing,forboth
senseandintellect.Forexample:“Theintelligiblespeciesistotheintellectwhatthe
sensibleimageistothesense.Butthesensibleimageisnotwhatisperceived,butrather
thatbywhichsenseperceives.Thereforetheintelligiblespeciesisnotwhatisactually
understood,butthatbywhichtheintellectunderstands.”383Principiumquomeansthatthe
speciesisaformorperfectionbywhichacertainoperationisaccomplishedormadereal.384
Similarlyin89,6,c.,intalkingabouttheactofunderstandingintheseparatesoul,the
speciesisclearlyprincipiumquoandnottheobject:
Actionofferstwothingsforourconsideration—itsspeciesanditsmode.Itsspeciescomesfromtheobject,wheretothefacultyofknowledgeisdirectedbythe(intelligible)species,whichistheobject'ssimilitude;whereasthemodeisgatheredfromthepoweroftheagent.Thusthatapersonseeastoneisduetothespeciesofthestoneinhiseye;butthatheseeitclearly,isduetotheeye'svisualpower.385
38385,2,sc.:“Speciesintelligibilissehabetadintellectum,sicutspeciessensibilisadsensum.
Sedspeciessensibilisnonestilludquodsentitur,sedmagisidquosensussentit.Ergospeciesintelligibilisnonestquodintelligituractu,sedidquointelligitintellectus.”Thisdistinctionbetweenspeciesandobjectcanbeseeninothertextsaswell:cf.DeVer2,3,ad2,ad3andad10;CGII,75,par.7and9;Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5;Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad7;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad12.(seeAppendix,Note12).
384Cf.85,2,c.:“Thereisatwofoldaction(Metaph.ix),onewhichremainsintheagent;forinstance,toseeandtounderstand;andanotherwhichpassesintoanexternalobject;forinstance,toheatandtocut;andeachoftheseactionsproceedsinvirtueofsomeform[…]Hencethatbywhichthesightseesisthelikenessofthevisiblething;andthelikenessofthethingunderstood,thatis,theintelligiblespecies,istheformbywhichtheintellectunderstands.”[Cumenimsitduplexactio,sicutdiciturIXMetaphys.,unaquaemanetinagente,utvidereetintelligere,alteraquaetransitinremexteriorem,utcalefacereetsecare;utraquefitsecundumaliquamformam(…)Undesimilitudoreivisibilisestsecundumquamvisusvidet;etsimilitudoreiintellectae,quaeestspeciesintelligibilis,estformasecundumquamintellectusintelligit.]
38589,6,c.:“Inactuestduoconsiderare,scilicetspeciemactus,etmodumipsius.Etspeciesquidemactusconsideraturexobiectoinquodactuscognoscitivaevirtutisdirigiturperspeciem,quaeestobiectisimilitudo,sedmodusactuspensaturexvirtuteagentis.Sicutquodaliquisvideatlapidem,contingitexspecielapidisquaeestinoculo,sedquodacutevideat,contingitexvirtutevisivaoculi.”
161
Thespeciesistherealactoftheintellectasoperativepotencyand,becauseofthis,
itisthespeciesthatcanmaketheintellectanobjectofknowinginitself:“[Theintellect]
understandsitselfaccordingasitismadeactualbythespeciesabstractedfromsensible
things,throughthelightoftheactiveintellect,whichnotonlyactuatestheintelligible
thingsthemselves,butalso,bytheirinstrumentality,actuatesthepassiveintellect.”386This
takesustotheimportantdifferenceinthespeciesbetweenwhatitisandwhatit
representsasimage.Thespeciesmakestheintellectintelligibleinactbecauseofwhatthe
speciesisinitself387but,asimage,thespeciesmakesknowndirectlytherepresented
object.Thatiswhy,forSt.Thomas,thespeciesinitselfisknownonlyinasecondmoment,
byreflection:“Butsincetheintellectreflectsuponitself,bysuchreflectionitunderstands
bothitsownactofintelligence,andthespeciesbywhichitunderstands.Thusthe
intelligiblespeciesisthatwhichisunderstoodsecondarily;butthatwhichisprimarily
understoodistheobject,ofwhichthespeciesisthelikeness.”388Theendofthecorpus
reinforcesthesamepoint,thatthespeciesisaforminthesoul(realbeing)thatmakesus
knowthethingoutsidethesoul(intentionalbeing):
Thisalsoappearsfromtheopinionoftheancientphilosophers,whosaidthat‘likeisknownbylike.’Fortheysaidthatthesoulknowstheearthoutsideitself,bytheearthwithinitself;andsooftherest.If,therefore,wetakethespeciesoftheearthinsteadoftheearth,accordingtoAristotle(DeAnimaiii,8),whosays‘thatastoneis
38687,1,c.:“Consequensestutsicseipsumintelligatintellectusnoster,secundumquodfit
actuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractasperlumenintellectusagentis,quodestactusipsorumintelligibilium,eteismediantibusintellectuspossibilis.”
387Cf.InMet.12,lect.8,2539(quotedonp.158atfootnote380)andfootnote381.38885,2,c.:“Sedquiaintellectussupraseipsumreflectitur,secundumeandemreflexionem
intelligitetsuumintelligere,etspeciemquaintelligit.Etsicspeciesintellectasecundarioestidquodintelligitur.Sedidquodintelligiturprimo,estrescuiusspeciesintelligibilisestsimilitudo.”
162
notinthesoul,butonlythelikenessofthestone’;itfollowsthatthesoulknowsexternalthingsbymeansofitsintelligiblespecies.389
Knowingisofthethingsoutsidethesoul,notofthespecies:“Thereforeifwhatwe
understandismerelytheintelligiblespeciesinthesoul,itwouldfollowthateveryscience
wouldnotbeconcernedwithobjectsoutsidethesoul,butonlywiththeintelligiblespecies
withinthesoul.”390
Thefollowingtexthasalreadybeenquoted,butitalsoshowshowtherealpresence
ofthespeciesinthemindisperfectlycompatibleforAquinaswiththereferencetothe
thingoutsidethemind.Thethingisinthemindbymeansofthespecies:“Itfollowsof
necessitythatthissomethingextrinsic,whichistheobjectofthesoul'soperation,mustbe
relatedtothesoulinatwofoldmanner.First,inasmuchasthissomethingextrinsichasa
naturalaptitudetobeunitedtothesoul,andtobebyitslikenessinthesoul.”391
Significantly,itisthethingthatisinthemind,andnotthemindinthething,whichisthe
characteristicofthesecundaratioaccordingtowhichthemindiscomparedtotheexternal
thing.
38985,2,c.:“Ethocetiampatetexantiquorumopinione,quiponebantsimilesimilicognosci.
Ponebantenimquodanimaperterramquaeinipsaerat,cognosceretterramquaeextraipsamerat;etsicdealiis.Siergoaccipiamusspeciemterraelocoterrae,secundumdoctrinamAristotelis,quidicitquodlapisnonestinanima,sedspecieslapidis;sequeturquodanimaperspeciesintelligibilescognoscatresquaesuntextraanimam.”This“doublebeing”ofthespecies,i.e.,itsrealbeingassubjectivemodificationandits“representative”being,canbeseeninothertexts:cf.DeVer2,3,ad9;InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,c.;Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ob.7(seeAppendix,Note13).
39085,2,c.:“Siigitureaquaeintelligimusessentsolumspeciesquaesuntinanima,sequereturquodscientiaeomnesnonessentderebusquaesuntextraanimam,sedsolumdespeciebusintelligibilibusquaesuntinanima…”
39178,1,c.:“Necesseestextrinsecamrem,quaeestobiectumoperationisanimae,secundumduplicemrationemadanimamcomparari.Unomodo,secundumquodnataestanimaeconiungietinanimaessepersuamsimilitudinem.”
163
Knowing,ifnotbyidentity,canbesaidtobebylikeness.392Butthislikenessimplies
preciselythedistinctionbetweenknowerandknown;likenessimpliesa“formal”oneness,
notasubstantialone.393Inthefollowingtext,forexample,thematerialthings,evidently
differentfromtheknower,arethemainobject.Moreover,knowingdoesnotimplya
physicallikeness,asthenaturalphilosopherssupposed.Inthecaseofourknowingof
materialthings,knowingimplies,instead,adistinctionbetweenthemodeofbeingofthe
knowninthemind(“similitudinibus…aphantasmatibusabstractis”)andoutsidethemind
(“materialia”).Inknowingthereisalikenessbecausethesameperfectionispresent,but
notinaphysicalway:itispresentbymeansofaspecies,whichisnottheknownbuta
likenessoftheknown.
Thelikenessofnatureisnotasufficientcauseofknowledge;otherwisewhatEmpedoclessaidwouldbetrue—thatthesoulneedstohavethenatureofallin
392Attheconclusionofthissectionwewillseeinwhatsensewecouldstillspeakaboutan
identityinknowing(namelyasintentionalidentity).Iprefernottospeakaboutidentityasaprimordialcharacteristicofknowinginsofarasidentitymeans(ingeneralandinthetextoftheAristotelianidentity)anontologicaloneness.Aswehaveseen,inhumanknowingthepriority,phenomenologicallyspeakingandforAquinas,belongstoalterity,insofarasthe(ontological)identitybetweenthespeciesandtheintellectisthemeansbywhichthismoreoriginalidentity-in-alterityisexplained.Inotherwords,identitycomestoexplainthepresenceoftheotherinthesubject.AssuggestsGillesMongeau(TSTprofessor),“likeness”refersto(theperfectionof)theobjectaspresentbythespecies,and“identity”tothespeciesasperfectingtheintellect;knowingbylikenessandnotbyidentitymeans,therefore,thatwhatispropertoknowingisnotthatweareonethingwithourspecies(realidentity),butthattheobject(originallyother)ispresenttousbymeansofitsspecies.
393By“formal”onenessIsimplymeanhere“intentional.”SeemyremarksonKnasas’“numerical”identityonp.40ff.Theintentionalidentitycouldbecalled“numerical”inawidesense,insofarasthereisnodistinctionbetweencontentofknowingandthethingthatisknown;anditcouldbealsocalled“formal”identity,againinawidesense,insofarasthereisacertaindistinctionbetweenthethingitself(whichisnotinthemindinitsrealbeing)andthecontentinitscognitivemodeofbeing.Butbecausebothwordsexpressimperfectlythephenomenonofknowing,“intentional”seemstobethebestwordtoindicatethisidentity-in-alterity.ThisiswhyIthinkthatthephenomenonofknowing(theintentionalidentity)cannotbereducedto(meta)physicalcategories,suchas“formal”or“numerical”identity.
164
ordertoknowall.Butknowledgerequiresthatthelikenessofthethingknownbeintheknower,asakindofformthereof.Nowourpassiveintellect,inthepresentstateoflife,issuchthatitcanbeinformedwithsimilitudesabstractedfromphantasms:andthereforeitknowsmaterialthingsratherthanimmaterialsubstances.394
Thespecies,eveninthecaseofthesecondintellectualoperation,isneveran
objectiveintermediarythatwouldblockthewaytotheextra-mentalreality.395Thepointis
worthnotingbecause,inthecaseofjudgment,whatisrepresentedisactuallynotinreality
assuch;thatis,theaffirmationisanactofthemindthatisnotfoundinreality.396Still,
becausetheaffirmationreferstoreality,theenunciationsalsorefertorealitythroughthe
species,andnotprimarilytothespeciesthemselves.Thisisanotherindicationthat,forSt.
Thomas,thedirectcontactwithrealitydoesnotneedtorelyonarealidentitywiththe
known.Rather,itisthemediationofthespeciesthatensuresthecontactwithreality.
Inthefollowingpassage,thedistinctionbetweentheknown(eaquaecognoscit)and
thespeciesbywhichitisknown(eaquibus)isclear,anditcanalsobeseenthatthe
39488,1ad2:“Dicendumquodsimilitudonaturaenonestratiosufficiensadcognitionem,
alioquinoporteretdicerequodEmpedoclesdixit,quodanimaessetdenaturaomnium,adhocquodomniacognosceret.Sedrequirituradcognoscendum,utsitsimilitudoreicognitaeincognoscentequasiquaedamformaipsius.Intellectusautemnosterpossibilis,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,estnatusinformarisimilitudinibusrerummaterialiumaphantasmatibusabstractis,etideocognoscitmagismaterialiaquamsubstantiasimmateriales.”Here,thatwhichhasbeendiscussedinChapter1regardingtheformalobjectofintelligenceisveryclear.Thespeciesisalikenessofthematerialthings(becauseitisalikenessoftheirnature)andatthesametimeitisabstractedfrommatter(theintelligiblespeciesthatinformstheintellectisnotthephantasm).Thespeciesisnotareferenceoftheintellecttothephantasm,butalikenessofthequidditasofthatphantasm.Theconversiowillthereforebethereferenceoftheabstractedspecies(asactofthepossibleintellect)tothephantasm.
395Cf.85,2ad3;85,5,sc.FabrodistinguishesbetweenthespeciesofDemocritus(objective–objective:perceptionisreducedtoaphysicalrelationshipandcausalitybetweenobjectandfaculty,cf.PP40-44),thespeciesofidealism(subjective–subjective:thesubjectknowsonlyhisorhersubjectivemodification)andtheThomisticspecies(subjective–objective:arealmodificationinthesubjectthatmakesintentionallypresenttheperfectionoftheobject).Cf.PP463-476,especiallypage472.
396Cf.DeVeritate,q.1,a.3c..
165
distinctionbetweenthemodeofbeingofthespeciesandthemodeofbeingoftheknown
isnotanobstacletotheobjectivityofknowing:
ThesewordsofAugustinearetobeunderstoodasreferringtothemediumofintellectualknowledge,andnottoitsobject.Fortheintellectknowsbodiesbyunderstandingthem,notindeedthroughbodies,northroughmaterialandcorporealspecies;butthroughimmaterialandintelligiblespecies,whichcanbeinthesoulbytheirownessence.397
Thefactthatmanythingscanbeknownbymeansofonespecies398isanotherway
tosaythat,inthespecies,thereisadifferencebetweenitsrealbeing(one)andwhatit
represents(inthiscase,themany).Becausetheintellectisone,andthespeciesisreally-
subectivelyperfectiveofthatintellect,therecanbenomorethanonespeciesatagiven
time.Butthesamedoesnotapplytotheobject,atleastnotforthesamereason.Again,
whatisunderstoodisnotthespeciesinitsidentitywiththeintellect,butthethingitself
throughthespecies.
In84,7,thereasonfortheconversioadphantasmataisthereferenceofthe
intelligiblespeciestothematerialthingoutsidethemind.IntheAdUnum,wecanseeagain
39784,1ad1:“DicendumquodverbumAugustiniestintelligendumquantumadeaquibus
intellectuscognoscit,nonautemquantumadeaquaecognoscit.Cognoscitenimcorporaintelligendo,sednonpercorpora,nequepersimilitudinesmaterialesetcorporeas;sedperspeciesimmaterialesetintelligibiles,quaepersuiessentiaminanimaessepossunt.”
398Cf.85,4,c.:“Theintellectcan,indeed,understandmanythings[asaunity],butnotasmany:thatistosaybyonebutnotbymanyintelligiblespecies.Forthemodeofeveryactionfollowstheformwhichistheprincipleofthataction.Thereforewhateverthingstheintellectcanunderstandunderonespecies,itcanunderstandatthesametime[…]Thereforeitisimpossibleforoneandthesameintellecttobeperfectedatthesametimebydifferentintelligiblespeciessoasactuallytounderstanddifferentthings.”[Intellectusquidempotestmultaintelligerepermodumunius,nonautemmultapermodummultorum,dicoautempermodumuniusvelmultorum,perunamvelpluresspeciesintelligibiles.Nammoduscuiusqueactionisconsequiturformamquaeestactionisprincipium.Quaecumqueergointellectuspotestintelligeresubunaspecie,simulintelligerepotest(…)Impossibileestergoquodidemintellectussimulperficiaturdiversisspeciebusintelligibilibus,adintelligendumdiversainactu.]
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adoubleaspectinthespecies.Oneaspectallowspresenceandpossession,insofarasthe
speciesiskeptinthepossibleintellect(identity).Anotheraspectallowsobjectivity,insofar
asitrepresentsthenaturessubsistingintheparticular(alterity).Thetextsays:“Weneed
furthertomakeuseoftheminamannerbefittingthethingsofwhichtheyarethespecies,
whichthingsarenaturesexistinginindividuals.”399
“Species”maysometimesrefermoretotheobjectthantotheimageinits
subjectivebeing:
Inthesamewaythesensibleformisconditioneddifferentlyinthethingwhichisexternaltothesoul,andinthesenseswhichreceivetheformsofsensiblethingswithoutreceivingmatter,suchasthecolorofgoldwithoutreceivinggold.Soalsotheintellect,accordingtoitsownmode,receivesunderconditionsofimmaterialityandimmobility,thespeciesofmaterialandmobilebodies:forthereceivedisinthereceiveraccordingtothemodeofthereceiver.400
Inthefollowingtext,also,theword“species”in“naturamspeciei”refersto
somethingrealinthethingwhereas,in“speciemintelligibilem,”thesamewordhasthe
meaningofformoftheintellect.Thespeciesasformoftheintellectisrepresentativeofthe
universalnaturesubsistentintheparticular,asthephantasmisrepresentativeofthe
individualprinciplesofthesamething:“Thisiswhatwemeanbyabstractingtheuniversal
fromtheparticular,ortheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm;thatis,byconsideringthe
39984,7ad1:“…oportetquodeis[speciesconservataeinintellectupossibili]utamur
secundumquodconvenitrebusquarumsuntspecies,quaesuntnaturaeinparticularibusexistentes.”
40084,1,c.:“Etperhuncetiammodumformasensibilisaliomodoestinrequaeestextraanimam,etaliomodoinsensu,quisuscipitformassensibiliumabsquemateria,sicutcoloremaurisineauro.Etsimiliterintellectusspeciescorporum,quaesuntmaterialesetmobiles,recipitimmaterialiteretimmobiliter,secundummodumsuum,namreceptumestinrecipientepermodumrecipientis.”
167
natureofthespeciesapartfromitsindividualqualitiesrepresentedbythephantasms.”401
SimilarlyintheAdTertium:
Thisisdonebythepoweroftheactiveintellectwhichbyturningtowardsthephantasmproducesinthepassiveintellectacertainlikenesswhichrepresents,astoitsspecificconditionsonly,thethingreflectedinthephantasm.Itisthusthattheintelligiblespeciesissaidtobeabstractedfromthephantasm…402
Thisinterpretationoftheword“species”here,however,couldbeconsidered
questionable.Therefore,animportantclarificationisinorder.Ashasbeenshown,the
speciesorsimilitudoiscertainlycalledquodintelligiturandintellectuminactubyAquinas.
WhatAquinasmeansisnotthattheintellectknowsitsownsubjectiveperfection,butthatit
knowsthenatureofthecorporealthinginsofarasitispresentinanintelligiblemodeof
beinginthespecies.Inotherwords,thespeciesisquodintelligiturinsofarasitisthenature
understood(intellectum)inamodeofbeingproportionatetothefaculty(inactu,i.e.,inact
ofbeingintelligible).Forthesamereason,theobjectofintelligenceseems,atleastinthe
twoprevioustexts,tobecalledspeciesintelligibilis.WhatAquinasmeansisnotthatwe
knowthespeciesassubjectivemodification,butthatweknowthespeciesofthething(=
therealnaturesubsistinginthething)inanintelligiblemodeofbeing.403Inanycase,and
40185,1ad1:“Ethocestabstrahereuniversaleaparticulari,velspeciemintelligibilema
phantasmatibus,considerarescilicetnaturamspecieiabsqueconsiderationeindividualiumprincipiorum,quaeperphantasmatarepraesentantur.”
40285,1ad3:“Sedvirtuteintellectusagentisresultatquaedamsimilitudoinintellectupossibiliexconversioneintellectusagentissupraphantasmata,quaequidemestrepraesentativaeorumquorumsuntphantasmata,solumquantumadnaturamspeciei.Etperhuncmodumdiciturabstrahispeciesintelligibilisaphantasmatibus…”
403StumpalsoacknowledgesasimilartensioninAquinas’useof“species”,particularlyinsensibleknowing:“Itisimportanttoemphasizethatasensiblespeciesisnotitselfwhatissensed.Insteaditisthemeansbywhichthesensessenseextramentalthings.Thereisroomforconfusionhere,becauseAquinasdoestalkaboutthesensorypowerapprehendingthesensiblespecies,andlocutionsofthissortcangivethemistakenimpressionthatwhatthesensessense,onAquinas’s
168
hopefullyenoughevidencehasbeenofferedforthis,Aquinasdoesnotconfuseobjectwith
species,hedeniesexplicitlythattheobjectofknowingisthespecies,andhedoesnot
explaintheAristotelianidentityasanidentitybetweenknowingsubjectandwhatis
understood(object),butasanidentitybetweenknowingsubjectandthespeciesasa
perfectiveform(intellectuminactuinthesenseexplained,notsimplyintellectum).
Itcouldbeobjectedthatsuchanaccountdoesnotrelysomuchonthewordsof
Aquinasasitdoesontheinterpretationofthewords.Thisisexactlythepoint.Thewordsof
Aquinascanbeusedinanysense(ashasbeendoneforcenturiesevenwiththeBible).But
aninterpretationofhiswordsmustlookfortheunitythatwasinhismind.Itwouldbevery
difficulttosubstantiateaclaimthatAquinaschangeshismindinthespaceoffifteen
questionsoftheSumma.Granted,then,thathemaintainsthesameEpistemologyallthe
waythrough,itisnecessarytolookforcoherenceinhisstatements.Explicitstatements
needtobeusedtoclarifythemoreobscure.If,then,Aquinasdoesnotexplicitlydenythat
whichheexplicitlyaffirmsseveraltimes,andifhismoreobscuretextsfindaplausible
explanation,wemayhaveahumanhopeofreachinghismind.Thatahumanworkis
perfectibleandevenfallibleshouldnotmakeusshyawayfromofferingthefruitsofour
work.
AfinalremarkontheimportanceoftheintellectualcognitivespeciesinAquinas
wouldnotbeoutofplace.Althoughtheintellectisaparticipationoftheuncreatedlight,in
which(intheuncreatedlight)theeternalreasonsarecontained,westillneedspecies
view,isinfactthesensiblespecies,contrarytowhatIjustclaimed”(cf.Stump,249);andshequotesAquinas:“Tocognizethingsbymeansoftheirsimilitudesexistinginthecognizeristocognizethosethingsastheyareinthemselves,orintheirownnatures”(cf.256,innote:STIa.12.9).
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comingfromthecorporealthingsinordertoknowthem.Thespeciesisthusessentialin
Thomisticgnoseology,anditisnottobeconfoundedwiththelightoftheintellect:“But
sincebesidestheintellectuallightwhichisinus,intelligiblespecies,whicharederivedfrom
things,arerequiredinorderforustohaveknowledgeofmaterialthings;thereforethis
sameknowledgeisnotduemerelytoaparticipationoftheeternaltypes…”404Wewilllater
discussmoreextensivelythispassage.405
Itseemsclear,then,thatforAquinastheidentityintheAristotelianphrase
“intellectuminactuestintellectusinactu”isreferredtothespeciesinitssubjective,real
beingasactoftheintellect,andnottotheobject,asifitwereanidentityofknowerand
known.Itistheidentitybetweenoperativepotencyanditsownformaquo,thelatter
carefullydistinguishedbySt.Thomasfromtheobject(formaquod).
Ifacertainidentitywiththeobjectitselfweretobeaffirmed,itshouldbefirstofall
clearlydistinguishedfromarealidentity(theonenessinsubstance,orinthenaturalbeing);
then,itshouldbeestablishedonthebasisofthespeciesaslikeness(andsoonthebasisof
acertainformalorqualitativeoneness);finally,itcouldbecalledan“intentionalidentity,”
providedthattheterms“natural”and“intentional”areclearlydistinguished(asinDe
Veritate)andthattheword“intentional”impliesthemoreoriginalalterityoftheobject.
ThebestformulatospeakaboutthisidentitysecundumquidisalsoAristotelian,andSt.
Thomasembracesit:“animaestquodammodoomnia.”Thesoulcanbeallthings,atleastin
40484,5,c.:“Quiatamenpraeterlumenintellectualeinnobis,exigunturspeciesintelligibiles
arebusacceptae,adscientiamderebusmaterialibushabendam;ideononpersolamparticipationemrationumaeternarumderebusmaterialibusnotitiamhabemus…”
405Cf.Chapter4,section2.
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asense,insofarasbyknowingthemitbecomestheotherthings,itdoesreceivetheir
perfection.Butbecausethatperfectionisnotreceivedsubjectively,thatis,becausethe
becomingisnot“real”,theidentityisquodammodo,onlyinacertainsense.406Whenwesay
“intentionally,”Isuggest,wedonotsaymuchmorethanthis,norareweabletosaymuch
more.407
ItisnotuncommontofindacertainconfusioninThomismbetweentheAristotelian
“intellectusinactuestintellectuminactu”andtheintentionalidentitybetweenobjectand
subject.408InthecaseofGilson,suchconfusionappearstobeattheleveloftextual
interpretationonly;GilsonusestheAristotelianphrasetoindicatetheintentionalidentity
betweenknowerandknown,butatthesametimehedistinguishestheintentional
presenceoftheobjectfromitssubjective-realbeing.409Hesaysthattheidentitybetween
theactualityofsubjectandobjectisnotnumerical,butformal.Itisnotnumerical,because
thebeingofeachthinginitselfispreservedwhenweknow(alterityinknowing).Itisformal
because,forGilson,thereisnootheridentitybetweentheformoftheobjectitselfandof
theobjectasknown.Thisformalidentityisactuallytheidentitybetweenthespeciesas
suchandthethingitself.Now,thisidentityisnottheAristotelianidentity,firstlybecause406ThefollowingtextinInDeAnimaputstogetherbeautifullythesetwo“identities.”InIIDe
Anima12,76-79:“Now,allknowledgeimpliesthatthethingknownissomehowpresentintheknower,thatis,presentbyitssimilitude.Theknowerinact,infact,isthethingknowninact.”(mytrans.)[Cognitioautemomnisfitperhoc,quodcognitumestaliquomodoincognoscente,scilicetsecundumsimilitudinem.Namcognoscensinactu,estipsumcognituminactu.]Theknowerpossessesinacertainsensetheknown,becausetherepresentationoftheknownisreallyonewiththeknower.
407ForaninterestingtextinwhichSt.Thomasspeaksaboutthisintentionalidentitywithoutquodammodo,cf.InIIIDeAnima6,297-305(seeAppendix,Note14).
408AsimilaruseoftheAristotelianphrasetoindicateanidentitybetweensubjectandobjectcanbeseeninCromp,37.
409Cf.RM56-57.
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thelatterisnumerical(asapotencyisonewithitsownact)andsecondlybecausethis
identityisnotbetweenthespeciesandtheobjectinitsrealbeing,butbetweentheintellect
inactandtheabstractedspecies.Still,isthisformalidentityenoughtoexpressthe
intentionalpresenceoftheobjecttothesubject,andisthisformalidentitynotmakingof
thespeciesanobjectiveintermediarybetweentheintellectandthethingitself(i.e.,
somethingtobeknownfirst,beforethethingitself,andnotsomethingthatmakesknown
immediatelythethingitself,asSt.Thomassuggests)?410Postulatingasimplyformalidentity
betweenthespeciesandtheobjectinitsrealbeingmayleadtotheproblemofthebridge
andtoconsideringtruthasacopyofreality.
4)KnowingasReceptive
Atthispoint,itmaynotbeoutofplacetorecalltheaimofthisresearch.Ithasbeen
importanttoclarifyinwhatsenseAquinasspeaksofidentityandalterityinknowing,in
ordertoshowthat,forhim,intellectualknowingisnottoprovideintelligiblecontenttothe
object,buttoreceiveitfromtheobject;thatis,knowingisabeingperfectedbya
410Cf.Gilson,Thomisme:IntroductionalaPhilosophiedeSaintThomasd’Aquin,Cinquième
ÉditionRevueetAugmentée,Paris:Vrin,1944,p.320inBerger,36:“Itiscrucialtounderstandthatitisnotthatthespeciesofanobjectisonething,andtheobjectitselfanotherthing;thespeciesistheobjectitselfasspecies,thatis,theobjectconsideredinitsactionandinitsefficacywhichitexercisesonasubject.Onlyinthissensecanitbesaidthatitisnotthespeciesoftheobjectthatwhichispresentinthinking,buttheobjectitselfthroughitsspecies;andinthesamewaythattheobject’sformistheobject’sactiveanddeterminantprinciple,itisalsotheobject’sformwhichbecomes,byitsspecies,theintellectthatunderstandsit”(myemphasis).AsIhavesuggestedintheIntroduction,itseemstomethatagreaterdistinctionbetweencontentandmodeofbeingofthecontentcouldhavemadethingsmoreclear:thespeciesistheobjectinsofarasitrepresentsit,anditisnottheobjectinsofarasitisasubjectivemodificationofthesubject.Myworryisthattheagency(“efficace”)inGilsonisnottheintentionalagencyoftheagentobject(thespeciesimpressa)onthepossibleintellect,butacertain“real”causalityoftheobjectinitselfontheintellect,wheretheobjectproducessomethingsimilartoitself(therepresentation).
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perfectionbelongingtotheobjectandlackinginthesubject.Theagentintellectthen,ifitis
toprovideanintelligibilityofsomesort,itwillbeintherealmofwhathasbeencalled
intelligibilityasmodeofbeing,notascontent.Thatwhichshouldalsobeclearisthereason
forstressingtheinterpretationoftheAristotelianidentityinAquinasasanidentity,not
betweenintellectandobject,butbetweenintellectandspecies;ifthesubjectiveperfection
oftheintellect(intellectusinactu)andtheperfectionoftheobjectascontentwerethe
same,thatis,ifunderstandingitselfweretheformoftheknown,itwouldbepossibleto
considerintelligibilityasaneffectoftheintellect,andtoascribetotheagentintellectthis
activefunction.Now,because,forAquinas,theperfectionoftheknownascontentisits
own,the“materiaprima”whichisactualizedwiththeformoftheknownisthepossible
intellect.Theagentintellectperfectsthephantasmwithintelligibilityasamodeofbeing,
butthisisaconditionofpossibilityofknowing,notknowingitself,andthisimpliesthatthe
contentisalreadypresentinthematerialthing,andisdistinctfromitsindividual
conditions.411
Thepresentsectionisdevotedtothosetextsinwhichknowing(bothingeneraland
asintellectual)ispresentedasakindofreceiving.Thispresentationofknowingasreceiving
willreinforcetheideaofalterityasacharacteristicofknowing,aswellastheideathat
understandingcannotbeidentifiedwiththeactivityoftheagentintellect;andasa
consequence,thenotionofknowingasabeingperfected,andnotaperfectingactivity.That
theagentintellectisnotaformalbutametaphysicalapriorimeans,infact,thattheagent
intellectisnotresponsiblefortheperfectionoftheknownascontent,butratherallowsthis
411Cf.Chapter1.
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perfectionoftheknowntobeintentionallyperfectiveoftheknower(initspossible
intellect).
TheintellectischaracterizedfromthebeginningofAquinas’treatiseonhuman
beingasareceptivepotency:“Nowthereceptivepotentialityintheintellectualsoulisother
thanthereceptivepotentialityoffirstmatter,asappearsfromthediversityofthethings
receivedbyeach.Forprimarymatterreceivesindividualforms;whereastheintelligence
receivesabsoluteforms.”412
Thecomparisonwiththemateriaprimadeservessomeattention,asthereareboth
similaritiesanddifferences.In84,3,Aquinasisdenyingthatweknowbymeansofinnate
ideas.Thesecondobjectionsays:“Theintellectualsoulismoreexcellentthancorporeal
primarymatter.ButprimarymatterwascreatedbyGodundertheformstowhichithas
potentiality.ThereforemuchmoreistheintellectualsoulcreatedbyGodunderintelligible
species.Andsothesoulunderstandscorporealthingsthroughinnatespecies.”413The
41275,5ad1:“Estautemaliapotentiareceptivainanimaintellectiva,apotentiareceptiva
materiaeprimae,utpatetexdiversitatereceptorum,nammateriaprimarecipitformasindividuales,intellectusautemrecipitformasabsolutas.”ThesenseinwhichAquinasspeaksaboutpassivityinhumanknowingcanbetakenfromInIIDeAnima11,109-117(quotedonp.144atfootnote349);cf.InIDeAnima10,202-208:“In[theactoftheintellect]thereisnomovementofthematerialsubstance,asinthecaseofvegetativeactivities,norevenanyalterationof[amaterial]subject,asinthecaseofsense-awareness.Thereisonlyanactivitywhichiscalledmovementsimplybecausethemindgoesfrompotencyintoact.”[Naminoperationeintellectusnonestmutatiosecundumessenaturale,sicutestinvegetabili,necsubiectumnaturalequodimmutetur,sicutestinsensibili.Sedestibiipsaoperatio,quaequodammododiciturmotus,inquantumdeintelligenteinpotentiafitintelligensinactu.];InIIDeAnima11,173-179;Q.D.DeAnima,a.6,c.:“Toreceive,tobeasubject,andotherthingsofthissort,arenotfoundinthesoulandinprimematterinthesamespecificway.”[Recipereetsubjicietaliahuiusmodinonsecundumeamdemrationemconveniuntanimaeetmateriaeprimae.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.6,ad5(thelasttwoquotesalsoinLambert,87-88).
41384,3ob.2:“Animaintellectivaestnobiliorquammateriaprimacorporalis.SedmateriaprimaestcreataaDeosubformisadquasestinpotentia.Ergomultomagisanimaintellectivaest
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comparisonisestablishedonthebasisthatbothmatterandintellectarepotenciesof
certainrealperfectiveforms(firstmodeofbeingofDeVeritate).St.Thomasdoesnotdeny
thatthespeciesarerealperfectionsoftheintellect;theyarenot,however,itssubstantial
perfection,butratheraccidentalones.Thecomparisonintheobjectiondoesnotwork:
“Primarymatterhassubstantialbeingthroughitsform,consequentlyithadneedtobe
createdundersomeform:elseitwouldnotbeinact.Butwhenonceitexistsunderone
formitisinpotentialitytoothers.Ontheotherhand,theintellectdoesnotreceive
substantialbeingthroughtheintelligiblespecies;andthereforethereisnocomparison.”414
Again,thedifferencewiththemateriaprimaisnotinthepotentialityregardingtheforms;
St.Thomas,inthisarticle,isdenyingpreciselythattheseformsarealreadypresentinthe
intellect.Thedifferencebetweenmateriaprimaandintellectlieshereinthemetaphysical
“level”oftherealperfectionsthattheyreceive:themateriaprimaisinpotencyto
substantialforms,whereastheintellect,asaccidentaloperativefacultyandalreadyexisting
inasubstantialsubject,canbeinpotencyonlytoaccidentalforms(thespecies);also,the
differenceliesinthefactthatthemateriaprimaisinpotencyofothersubstantialforms,
butitalreadyhasitsown;whereastheintellect,existingalreadyasanaccidentalfaculty,is
inpotencytoallforms,havingoriginallynone.415Finally,itisclearinthearticlethatthe
speciesistherealsubjectiveformbywhichtheknowledgeofcorporealthingsisattained.
creataaDeosubspeciebusintelligibilibus.Etsicanimaintelligitcorporaliaperspeciessibinaturaliterinditas.”
41484,3ad2:“Materiaprimahabetessesubstantialeperformam,etideooportuitquodcrearetursubaliquaforma,alioquinnonessetinactu.Subunatamenformaexistens,estinpotentiaadalias.Intellectusautemnonhabetessesubstantialeperspeciemintelligibilem;etideononestsimile.”
41584,3,sc.:“tabularasa.”
175
Thereasonfordenyingtheoriginal(innate)presenceintheintellectofspeciesasformaquo
ofknowingthings,isthefactthatthisknowingitselfisoriginallyinpotency,andtherefore
wearealsoinpotencyofthoseformsbywhichknowingisverified.416Thereisnoconfusion
betweenobjectofknowingandspecies,evenifbotharestrictlyrelated.417
Thecomparisonbetweenintellectandmateriaprimaregardingtheirreceptivity
appearsagainin87,1,c.:“Nowthehumanintellectisonlyapotentialityinthegenusof
intelligiblebeings,justasprimarymatterisapotentialityasregardssensiblebeings;and
henceitiscalled‘possible’.”418Inthisandintheprevioustext,419however,theintellectis
consideredinpotencyofthespeciesassubjectiveform;in75,5ad1,instead,the
potentialityseemsrathertorefertotheformoftheknown(content).Inbothcases,still,it
isclearthattheintellectisinpotencyofknowingotherthingsand,thus,receptiveoftheir
contentaswell.
Intellectandsensibilityareconsidered“apprehensive”faculties.420Inthefollowing
text,theapprehensivefaculty(here“apprehensive”iscognitiveasopposedtoappetitive)is
416Cf.84,3,c..417Moreaboutthisrelationshipwillbesaidinthefollowing,cf.p.182.41887,1,c.:“Intellectusautemhumanussehabetingenerererumintelligibiliumutensin
potentiatantum,sicutetmateriaprimasehabetingenerererumsensibilium,undepossibilisnominatur.”
41984,3.420“Apprehension”orsimilarwordsareusedinothertextsaswell.Cf.80,2,c.:“Indeed,the
passivepoweritselfhasitsverynaturefromitsrelationtoitsactiveprinciple.Therefore,sincewhatisapprehendedbytheintellectandwhatisapprehendedbysensearegenericallydifferent;consequently,theintellectualappetiteisdistinctfromthesensitive.”[…ipsapotentiapassivapropriamrationemhabetexordineadsuumactivum.Quiaigiturestalteriusgenerisapprehensumperintellectumetapprehensumpersensum,consequensestquodappetitusintellectivussitaliapotentiaasensitivo.];83,4,c.,studiedbrieflyinAppendix,Note15.
176
broughttoactinthereceptionofsomething.HereSt.Thomaspreferstosayactusrather
thanactio,thelatterreservedfortheappetitiveact:
Fortheactoftheapprehensivepowerisnotsoproperlycalledamovementastheactoftheappetite:sincetheoperationoftheapprehensivepoweriscompletedintheveryfactthatthethingapprehendedisintheonethatapprehends:whiletheoperationoftheappetitivepoweriscompletedinthefactthathewhodesiresisbornetowardsthethingdesirable.421
Buthesaysexactlythesamething,usingthewordsactio–actusintheexact
oppositeway:“Foraswehavesaidabove,theactionoftheintellectconsistsinthis—that
theideaofthethingunderstoodisintheonewhounderstands;whiletheactofthewill
consistsinthis—thatthewillisinclinedtothethingitselfasexistinginitself.”422Inboth
cases,however,heisstressingthatunderstandingisverifiedbythepresenceofthething
understoodinthesubject.
Theword“apprehension”inreferencetoknowingappearsalsointhefollowing
text,423whereitisclearthattoapprehendmeanstheoppositeofpossessingaform
naturally.Theformpossessednaturally(beitaccidental,asafaculty,424orsubstantial)is
followedbyanaturalappetite,whereastheformthatisapprehendedisfollowedbya
differentkindoftendency,whichiscalled“appetitivefaculty.”Thus,itissuggestedagain
thatknowingisreceptiveofaformwhichisnotnaturallyinthesubject:
42181,1,c.:“Actusenimapprehensivaevirtutisnonitapropriediciturmotus,sicutactio
appetitus,namoperatiovirtutisapprehensivaeperficiturinhoc,quodresapprehensaesuntinapprehendente;operatioautemvirtutisappetitivaeperficiturinhoc,quodappetensinclinaturinremappetibilem.”
42282,3,c.:“Utenimsupradictumest,actiointellectusconsistitinhocquodratioreiintellectaeestinintelligente;actusverovoluntatisperficiturinhocquodvoluntasinclinaturadipsamremproutinseest.”
42380,1,c..424Cf.80,1ad3.
177
Therefore,asformsexistinthosethingsthathaveknowledgeinahighermannerandabovethemannerofnaturalforms;somusttherebeinthemaninclinationsurpassingthenaturalinclination,whichiscalledthenaturalappetite.Andthissuperiorinclinationbelongstotheappetitivepowerofthesoul,throughwhichtheanimalisabletodesirewhatitapprehends,andnotonlythattowhichitisinclinedbyitsnaturalform.425
Knowingisverifiedbythepossessionofaform,butnotasaformalreadypossessed
naturally.Theintellectisinformed(isperfected)byintelligibleimagesofthingsabstracted
fromthesenses:
Thelikenessofnatureisnotasufficientcauseofknowledge;otherwisewhatEmpedoclessaidwouldbetrue—thatthesoulneedstohavethenatureofallinordertoknowall.Butknowledgerequiresthatthelikenessofthethingknownbeintheknower,asakindofformthereof.Nowourpassiveintellect,inthepresentstateoflife,issuchthatitcanbeinformedwithsimilitudesabstractedfromphantasms:andthereforeitknowsmaterialthingsratherthanimmaterialsubstances.426
Thelanguageofreceptivity,thistimeinexplicitcomparisonwiththeagentintellect,
isalsousedin88,1,c.Inthistext,thedistinctionbetweenpossibleintellectandagent
intellectisasclearasitcanbe:
Aswasshownabove,theactiveintellectisnotaseparatesubstance;butafacultyofthesoul,extendingitselfactivelytothesameobjectstowhichthepassiveintellect
42580,1,c.:“Sicutigiturformaealtiorimodoexistuntinhabentibuscognitionemsupra
modumformarumnaturalium,itaoportetquodineissitinclinatiosupramoduminclinationisnaturalis,quaediciturappetitusnaturalis.Ethaecsuperiorinclinatiopertinetadvimanimaeappetitivam,perquamanimalappeterepotesteaquaeapprehendit,nonsolumeaadquaeinclinaturexformanaturali.”
42688,1ad2:“Similitudonaturaenonestratiosufficiensadcognitionem,alioquinoporteretdicerequodEmpedoclesdixit,quodanimaessetdenaturaomnium,adhocquodomniacognosceret.Sedrequirituradcognoscendum,utsitsimilitudoreicognitaeincognoscentequasiquaedamformaipsius.Intellectusautemnosterpossibilis,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,estnatusinformarisimilitudinibusrerummaterialiumaphantasmatibusabstractis,etideocognoscitmagismaterialiaquamsubstantiasimmateriales.”Cf.DeVer2,3,ad9.Theword“perfici”orientsusinthesamesense(knowingasreception),forexamplein85,4,c.:“Thereforeitisimpossibleforoneandthesameintellecttobeperfectedatthesametimebydifferentintelligiblespeciessoasactuallytounderstanddifferentthings.”[Impossibileestergoquodidemintellectussimulperficiaturdiversisspeciebusintelligibilibus,adintelligendumdiversainactu.]
178
extendsreceptively;because,asisstated,427thepassiveintellectis‘allthingspotentially,’andtheactiveintellectis‘allthingsinact.’Thereforebothintellects,accordingtothepresentstateoflife,extendtomaterialthingsonly,whicharemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect,andarereceivedinthepassiveintellect.428
Inotherplaces,St.Thomasreferstointellectualknowingasakindofvision,
perception,etc..In84,7,c.,preciselyreferringtotheintellect’sconversiontothe
phantasms,hesays:“And,therefore,fortheintellecttounderstandactuallyitsproper
object,itmustofnecessityturntothephantasmsinordertoperceivetheuniversalnature
existingintheindividual.”429Theverb“speculari”isusedinplaceof“intelligere.”Theverb
“percipere”isusedinreferencetounderstandingimmediatelyafterbeingusedforsensible
knowledgein85,2ad2:
427DeAnimaiii,5.42888,1,c.:“Sexto,quiasupraostensumestquodintellectusagensnonestsubstantia
separata,sedvirtusquaedamanimae,adeademactiveseextendens,adquaeseextenditintellectuspossibilisreceptive,quia,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima,intellectuspossibilisestquoestomniafieri,intellectusagensquoestomniafacere.Uterqueergointellectusseextendit,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,admaterialiasola;quaeintellectusagensfacitintelligibiliaactu,etrecipiunturinintellectupossibili.”ItisinterestingthatSt.Thomasisnotshyofcallingtheactionoftheagentintellect“intelligere”,althoughinahypotheticalstatement,inthetextimmediatelyfollowing:“Henceinthepresentstateoflifewecannotunderstandseparateimmaterialsubstancesinthemselves,eitherbythepassiveorbytheactiveintellect.”[Undesecundumstatumpraesentisvitae,nequeperintellectumpossibilem,nequeperintellectumagentem,possumusintelligeresubstantiasimmaterialessecundumseipsas.]Finally,inwhatotherwaycouldtheactionofanintellectbedescribed?ButfromheretosayingthatunderstandingforSt.Thomasisanactiveperformance,thereisalongdistance.Forlanguageof“receptivity”,cf.alsoQ.D.DeAnima,a.4,ad5:“…[T]hespeciesexistinginthemediumandinthesenseisaparticularandnothingmore.Thepossibleintellect,however,receivesspeciesofahighergenusthanthosepresentintheimagination;becausethepossibleintellectreceivesuniversalspecies,whereastheimaginationcontainsonlyparticularspecies.Thereforewerequireanagentintellectinthecaseofintelligiblethings…”[…speciesinmedioetinsensunonsitnisiparticularis.Intellectusautempossibilisrecipitspeciesalteriusgenerisquamsintinimaginatione;cumintellectuspossibilisrecipiatspeciesuniversales,etimaginationoncontineatnisiparticulares.Etideoinintelligibilibusindigemusintellectuagente…]
42984,7,c.:“Etideonecesseestadhocquodintellectusactuintelligatsuumobiectumproprium,quodconvertatseadphantasmata,utspeculeturnaturamuniversaleminparticulariexistentem.”
179
[Wecanseethepointbyacomparisonwiththesenses].Forthesightseesthecoloroftheappleapartfromitssmell[…]butthatitbeperceivedapartfromthesmell,thisisowingtothesight,forasmuchasthefacultyofsightreceivesthelikenessofcolorandnotofsmell.Inlikemannerhumanityunderstoodisonlyinthisorthatman;butthathumanitybeapprehendedwithoutconditionsofindividuality,thatis,thatitbeabstractedandconsequentlyconsideredasuniversal,occurstohumanityinasmuchasitis[perceivedby]theintellect,inwhichthereisalikenessofthespecificnature,butnotoftheprinciplesofindividuality.430
ThefactthatSt.Thomasusestheword“percipere”forbothsensibleandintellectual
knowingisonemoreindicationthatforhimknowingisreceptive,abeingperfected,and
notaperfectingactivity.
Theobjectisthatwhichperfectsthefacultyofknowing:“Theremustneedsbesome
proportionbetweentheobjectandthefacultyofknowledge;suchasoftheactivetothe
passive,andofperfectiontotheperfectible.Hencethatsensibleobjectsofgreatpowerare
notgraspedbythesenses,isduenotmerelytothefactthattheycorrupttheorgan,but
alsototheirbeingimproportionatetothesensitivepower.”431Nothingcanbemoreclear
thanthecharacterizationofknowingingeneralasa“beingperfected”:
Nownothingisreducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomethinginact;asthesenses[are]madeactualbywhatisactuallysensible.Wemustthereforeassignonthepartoftheintellectsomepowertomakethingsactuallyintelligible,by
43085,2ad2:“Ethocpossumusviderepersimileinsensu.Visusenimvidetcolorempomi
sineeiusodore[…]sedquodsitsineodoreperceptus,hocacciditeiexpartevisus,inquantuminvisuestsimilitudocolorisetnonodoris.Similiterhumanitasquaeintelligitur,nonestnisiinhocvelinillohomine,sedquodhumanitasapprehendatursineindividualibusconditionibus,quodestipsamabstrahi,adquodsequiturintentiouniversalitatis,accidithumanitatissecundumquodpercipiturabintellectu,inquoestsimilitudonaturaespeciei,etnonindividualiumprincipiorum.”Cf.84,1,c.,wheresimilarexpressionsoccur(quotedonp.166).
43188,1ad3:“Requirituraliquaproportioobiectiadpotentiamcognoscitivam,utactiviadpassivum,etperfectionisadperfectibile.Undequodexcellentiasensibilianoncapianturasensu,nonsolaratioestquiacorrumpuntorganasensibilia;sedetiamquiasuntimproportionatapotentiissensitivis.”
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abstractionofthespeciesfrommaterialconditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactiveintellect.432
Theactoftheintelligenceistheactofapassivepotencyneedinganagentpowerin
ordertobeactualized:“Ourpassiveintellectisreducedfrompotentialitytoactbysome
beinginact,thatis,bytheactiveintellect,whichisapowerofthesoul,aswehavesaid;
andnotbyaseparateintelligence,asproximatecause,althoughperchanceasremote
cause.”433
Thesameideacanbeseenregardingthepossibleintellect(inthefollowingtext),
butheretheword“agent”isreferringmoredirectlytotheintelligiblespecieswhichcanbe
impressedintheintellect:“Nownothingcorporealcanmakeanimpressiononthe
incorporeal.Andthereforeinordertocausetheintellectualoperationaccordingto
Aristotle,theimpressioncausedbythesensibledoesnotsuffice,butsomethingmorenoble
isrequired,for‘theagentismorenoblethanthepatient,’ashesays.”434
Thetextof84,4ad3(justquoted)raisesaninterestingquestion.Couldwesaythat
theintellectreceivesnottheobjectitself,northespecies,butrathertheintellect’saction
ontheobject?IsitnotwhatAquinasmeans,whenhesaysthattheagentintellect
43279,3,c.:“Nihilautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicut
sensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem.”
43384,4ad3:“Dicendumquodintellectusnosterpossibilisreduciturdepotentiaadactumperaliquodensactu,idestperintellectumagentem,quiestvirtusquaedamanimaenostrae,utdictumest,nonautemperaliquemintellectumseparatum,sicutpercausamproximam;sedfortesicutpercausamremotam.”Thedistinctionbetweenagentintellectandpossibleintellectwillbeapproachedinsection6ofthisChapter.
43484,6,c.:“Nihilautemcorporeumimprimerepotestinremincorpoream.Etideoadcausandamintellectualemoperationem,secundumAristotelem,nonsufficitsolaimpressiosensibiliumcorporum,sedrequirituraliquidnobilius,quiaagensesthonorabiliuspatiente,utipsedicit.”
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actualizesthepossible?Isitnotinthissensethatthepossibleintellectisapassivepotency?
Letusproceedwithsomeorder.Wehavealreadyshownthattheobjectofintelligence,as
universalcontent,isotherthantheintellectandisreceivedasaremediumofitsoriginal
poverty.435Therefore,itcannotbedeniedthat,forSt.Thomas,theintellectisreceptiveof
theperfectionoftheobject.Aswell,wehaveshownthattheintellectisalsoinpotencyof
itsown(subjective)act,whichisthespecies(initsrealbeing).Wehavealsoshownthat
speciesandobjectarenotthesame,suchthatweunderstandtheobject,notthespecies.436
Still,aquestionmayremain.Isthespeciesdifferentfromtheactionoftheintellect?Insofar
asthespeciesistheformbywhichweunderstandsomething,thatis,ifweconsiderthe
specieswithoutitscontent,thereisnodifferencebetweenspeciesandactionofthe
intellect;indeed,theactionoftheintellectistheactbywhichweunderstandanobject,
whichisalsothedefinitionofthespecies.437Now,wemaydistinguishtheminfieri
(intelligereistheactofunderstandingasproceedingfromthefacultytowardstheobject,
speciesistheactofunderstandingascompleted),438butbecausetheactionoftheintellect
isnotamovement,fieriandfactumarenotdistinctinreality.Now,isthisintelligere
producedbytheagentintellect?Wecouldaskthesamequestioninotherwords:isthe
435Cf.section1ofthisChapter.436Cf.section2and3ofthisChapter.437AndthisisexactlythemeaningoftheAristotelianidentity,aswehaveseeninsection3
ofthisChapter.438Orratherthedistinctionisbetweentheoperationassuch,initsessence(intelligere),
abstractedfromtheobject,andtheoperationinfactoesse,whereitcannotbeseparatedfromthespeciesoftheobject,whichisthesubjectiveformoftheintellectinact,andsotheoperationitself.Weneedtokeepalwaysinmindthatunderstandingisanintentionaloperation,andthereforeitsactisonanobjectassuch:itisnotaphysicaloperationthatproducesamodificationinanobjectbymeansofitsownmovement,butratheritistheobjectthatmovesthepotencytoattainitasobject,asother,asitis.
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agentintellectthecauseofthespeciesinthepossible?Inordertoanswer,weneedto
distinguishspeciesimpressaandexpressaand,inbothspecies,bothcontentandthe
subjectivebeingofthespecies.439Innocaseistheagentintellectcauseofthecontent;
instead,theagentintellectiscauseoftheabstractedmodeofbeingofthecontent.440Isthe
agentintellectcauseofthespeciesimpressainitssubjectivebeing?Yes,itis:theresultof
theprocessofabstractionistheintelligible(notyetintellected)inactwhich,precisely
becauseofitsabstractionfrommatter,isabletobeunderstoodbythepossibleintellect.441
Thisspeciesimpressa,however,isnottheactofthepossibleintellect,butthe“catalyst”of
thisact,theagentobjectwhichisabletoactualizethepossibleintellectandwilldoso.Is
theagentintellectthecauseofthespeciesexpressa?Itiscauseoftheagentobject(the
speciesimpressa),andtheagentobjectiscauseoftheactoftheintellectpreciselyasagent
439Cf.Stump,267:“Althoughtheabstractingofanintelligiblespeciesisthebeginningor
sourceofanactofintellection,thatactofintellectionisnotcompleteuntiltheintellecthasusedtheintelligiblespeciestoformanintention”(shequotesextensivelyinsupportCGI,53);Stump,268-269:“Theresulting[fromabstraction]intelligiblespeciesarereceivedspirituallybythepotentialintellect.Actualizedinthiswaybytheintelligiblespecies,theintellectengagesinafurtheract,transformingtheintelligiblespeciesintoamentalconcept”;FrancisA.Cunningham,“ATheoryonAbstractioninSt.Thomas,”ModernSchoolman:AQuarterlyJournalofPhilosophy35(1958):253,“Itisthefunctionofthepossibleintellecttoreceivetheseintelligiblespeciesandconceivethecorrespondingverbum”;CGII,59,par.14:“Forcolorsexistingoutsidethesoulareinthepresenceoflightactuallyvisible,ashavingthepowertomovethesight;butarenotactually(seen)inthesenseofbeingactuallyperceivedastheresultofbecomingonewiththesensepowerinact.Andsimilarly,phantasmsaremadeactuallyintelligiblebythelightoftheagentintellect,sothattheyareabletomovethepossibleintellect;butnotsoastobeactuallyunderstood,throughunionwiththepossibleintellectactualized.”[Coloresenimextraanimamexistentes,praesentelumine,suntvisibilesactuutpotentesmoverevisum:nonautemutactusensata,secundumquodsuntunumcumsensuinactu.Etsimiliterphantasmataperlumenintellectusagentisfiuntactuintelligibilia,utpossintmovereintellectumpossibilem:nonautemutsintintellectaactu,secundumquodsuntunumcumintellectupossibilifactoinactu.]
440Cf.Chapter1,especiallysection1and4,andChapter2;still,itisthemainpointofthedissertation,andsoitwillbeshownmoreclearlyinChapter4.
441Cf.79,3,c..
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object.442Theagentintellectdoesnotneedtomovethepossibleintellectinanyotherway
becausethepossibleintellectisalreadytranscendentallyorderedtoitsownobject.Itisthe
possibleintellectitselfthatunderstands,thatembracesintentionally(andthuspossesses)
theobjectwhichhasbeenpresentedbytheagentintellect.443Itdoesnotseemnecessaryto
addadivinepre-motiontothepossibleintellect,butunderstandingshouldbeconsidered
asanintentionalpotency(thatis,movedbyitsproperobject)andnotasaphysicalpotency,
needingtobemovedbyacauseinorderto“reach”or“affect”theobject.Inanycase,a
divineinfluenceshouldbesupposedonthesideoftheagentintellectandoftheagent
object.
Thattheagentintellectisnotthecauseofanallegedactionofthepossibleintellect
onthephantasmhasalreadybeenprecludedbythefactthat,forAquinas,theactionofthe
possibleintellectisnotonthephantasm:understandingisoftheuniversalnature,notof
thephantasm;444andtheconversioadphantasmataisnottheactofunderstanding,buta
modeoftheactofunderstandingtheuniversalnature.445Theagentintellectcouldbe
442Cf.87,1,c.:“[Ourintellect]understandsitselfaccordingasitismadeactualbythe
speciesabstractedfromsensiblethings,throughthelightoftheactiveintellect,whichnotonlyactuatestheintelligiblethingsthemselves,butalso,bytheirinstrumentality,actuatesthepassiveintellect.Thereforetheintellectknowsitselfnotbyitsessence,butbyitsact.”[…consequensestutsicseipsumintelligatintellectusnoster,secundumquodfitactuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractasperlumenintellectusagentis,quodestactusipsorumintelligibilium,eteismediantibusintellectuspossibilis.Nonergoperessentiamsuam,sedperactumsuumsecognoscitintellectusnoster.]
443AsfarasIcansee,itisnotthatthepossibleintellectproducestheexpressaasadifferentspecies,butratheritonly“embraces”thespecies(theimpressa)thatisalreadythere:inthissense,theimpressa“becomes”theexpressawhenitisunderstood.
444Cf.Chapter1,section2.445Cf.84,7,c.:“And,therefore,fortheintellecttounderstandactuallyitsproperobject,it
mustofnecessityturntothephantasmsinordertoperceivetheuniversalnatureexistingintheindividual.”[Etideonecesseestadhocquodintellectusactuintelligatsuumobiectumproprium,quodconvertatseadphantasmata,utspeculeturnaturamuniversaleminparticulariexistentem.]
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consideredasmuchcauseoftheconversioasitiscauseoftheactofunderstanding,thatis,
onlyinsofarasitproducesthespeciesimpressaand,strictlyspeaking,onlyinsofarasit
producestheabstractedmodeofbeingoftheuniversalnature.446
SometextsinwhichAquinasseemstocharacterizeknowinginanactivewaywill
nowbeexaminedbut,first,amore“methodological”remarkneedstobemade.Thatis,St.
Thomasisnotoverlyconcernedabouttechnicalwordsandexpressions.Herespectsthe
normaluseofwords;wordscanbeusedindifferentsenses,aslongasacertaincoreof
meaningisrespected.Normally,onedoesnotsay“cold”whenreferringto“heat”,butmay
say“cold”torefernotonlytotheweather,butalsotoananswer,orapersonality.St.
Thomas,byrespectingthisfact,makeshiswritingsnotmoreobscure,butmoreclear.Ifhe
hadlockedhimselfupinaworldoftechnicalexpressions,hewouldhavehadtospend
countlessanduselesspagesdefininghistechnicalities,andthenalwayswiththeriskofnot
beingunderstood.Instead,trustingintheunderstandingofthereader,hesimplyspeaks
humanly.Hesometimessaysthesamethingtwice,usingdifferentwords;hemayusea
comparison,orhemayuseanopposition,tomakesurethatthereaderunderstandswhat
hemeans;andmostimportantly,healwaysbeginsbytellingthereaderwhatheistalking
about,whattheproblemis,andwhatthesolutionisnot,sothatthereader,bythe
combinationofsomany“phantasms”,mayarriveatunderstandinghim.Thisisnotto
suggestthatunderstandingSt.Thomasisparticularlyeasy,northatpreparationisnot
neededtoapproachhistext.However,onecannottakeaphrasefromSt.Thomastomakea
446Thetextin89,5,c.,referringtoscienceas“acquired”andtothespeciesremaininginthe
separatesoul,mayalsohelptoshowthereceptivecharacterofknowing.
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statement,andthensaythatitisso“becauseSt.Thomashassaidthatitisso.”Because
whatSt.Thomasmeansisnotboundtothewordsheuses,butisfree,onemustfollowthe
livingcurrentofhisthinking,andthenexpress,notone’spreferredthoughtabouthim,but
whatAquinasisactuallysaying,inwordsmeaningfultooneselfandone’sowntime.This
implies,ofcourse,thatthereisameaningbehindthewords,andthatwe,humanbeings
thatweare,havetheabilitytogetbehindthewordsanddiscoverthatmeaning.Nowadays,
manypeoplethinkthatthisisnotthecase.However,St.Thomasappearstohave
composedhisworksthinkingthatthisispreciselythecase.
Inthefollowingtext,then,St.Thomasreferstounderstandingasanactionbut,at
thesametime,notanactionthatperfectsanotherthing.Heisnotdenyingthatknowing
referstoanotherthingasobject,ashesaysinotherplaces.However,ifthereisareference
toanother,thatreferenceisperfectiveofthesubject,notoftheobject.Itwouldbevery
difficulttousethistexttoaffirmthatknowing,forSt.Thomas,isactive,ortoaffirmthat
knowingdoesnotimplyalterity.Theformerisexplicitlydenied,andthelatterisnotsaid
anddoesnotfollow.
Secondly,becausesinceSocratesisanindividualinanatureofoneessencecomposedofmatterandform,iftheintellectbenottheform,itfollowsthatitmustbeoutsidetheessence,andthentheintellectis[to]thewholeSocratesasamotortothethingmoved.Whereastheactofintellectremainsintheagent,anddoesnotpassintosomethingelse,asdoestheactionofheating.ThereforetheactionofunderstandingcannotbeattributedtoSocratesforthereasonthatheismovedbyhisintellect.447
44776,1,c.:“Secundoquia,cumSocratessitquoddamindividuuminnaturacuiusessentia
estuna,compositaexmateriaetforma;siintellectusnonsitformaeius,sequiturquodsitpraeteressentiameius;etsicintellectuscomparabituradtotumSocratemsicutmotoradmotum.Intelligere
186
Asimilartextfollows,inwhichSt.Thomasusesart(arsfactibilium)ratherthan
calefactiotodifferentiatebetweenimmanentandtransientoperations.Again,thedenialof
alterityisdenialinthesensethatknowingisnotanactivityperfectinganotherbut,rather,a
beingperfected:“Nowtheultimateperfectionoftheintellectconsistsinitsownoperation:
forthisisnotanacttendingtosomethingelseinwhichliestheperfectionofthework
accomplished,asbuildingistheperfectionofthethingbuilt;butitremainsintheagentas
itsperfectionandact,asissaid[in]Metaph.ix.”448Again,inthistext,inalmostthesame
context,Aquinasuses“actio”forthetransientactions,and“actus”insteadfortheintellect.
Thattheperfectionoftheintellectis,inonesense,thespeciesand,inanother
sense,theobjectknown,hasalreadybeensaid,butitbearsrepetition:epistemologically,
speciesandobjectarestrictlydependentoneachother.Thespecies,however,isforthe
sakeoftheobject,andnottheobjectforthesakeofthespecies;itisunderstandingas
receivingtheperfectionofotherthingswhichisthepurposeofknowing(understandingas
remedium).Still,itistheperfectionofthesubjectwhichisthepurposeofknowing;
however,thisisnotaperfectionbestowed,butaperfectionrealizedintheintentional
receptionandpossessionoftheother.Finally,theultimateperfectionofthesubjectisnot
inunderstandingthematerial-otherbutinunderstanding,throughthecorporealthings,the
Authoroftheuniverse,atleastintheAuthor’sexistenceasfirstcause.
autemestactioquiescensinagente,nonautemtransiensinalterum,sicutcalefactio.NonergointelligerepotestattribuiSocratipropterhocquodestmotusabintellectu.”
44887,3,c.:“Ultimaautemperfectiointellectusesteiusoperatio,nonenimestsicutactiotendensinalterum,quaesitperfectiooperati,sicutaedificatioaedificati;sedmanetinoperanteutperfectioetactuseius,utdiciturinIXMetaphys..”
187
Othertextsmaygivethesameimpressionofunderstandingasanactivity.449The
intellectcanbesaidtobetheactiveprincipleofthesensibilityinametaphysicalsense,
becausewhateverismoreperfectisprincipleoftheimperfect,andtheintellectis
essentiallymoreperfectthanthesenses.Inacognitionalsense,orasreceptiveprinciples,
however,themoreimperfectpotenciesareprinciplesofthehigherones,insofarasthey
provide,asitwere,thematerialfortheactofthelatter:
Butsincetheessenceofthesouliscomparedtothepowersbothasaprincipleactiveandfinal,andasareceptiveprinciple,eitherseparatelybyitself,ortogetherwiththebody;andsincetheagentandtheendaremoreperfect,whilethereceptiveprinciple,assuch,islessperfect;itfollowsthatthosepowersofthesoulwhichprecedetheothers,intheorderofperfectionandnature,aretheprinciplesoftheothers,afterthemanneroftheendandactiveprinciple.Forweseethatthesensesareforthesakeoftheintelligence,andnottheotherwayabout.Thesenses,moreover,areacertainimperfectparticipationoftheintelligence;wherefore,accordingtotheirnaturalorigin,theyproceedfromtheintelligenceastheimperfectfromtheperfect.Butconsideredasreceptiveprinciples,themore[imperfect]powersareprincipleswithregardtotheothers;thusthesoul,accordingasithasthesensitivepower,isconsideredasthesubject,andas[acertain]materialwithregardtotheintelligence.450
IsAquinastalkingaboutthematerial(“materialequoddam”)foraperfecting
activity?Here,St.Thomasisspeakingnotoftheintellectasactiveandevenagentprinciple
ofthesenses(asinthefirstpartofthearticle),butasreceptiveprinciple.Heisalsovery
449Besidesthefollowingtexts,seeAppendix,Note16.45077,7,c.:“Sedquiaessentiaanimaecomparaturadpotentiasetsicutprincipiumactivum
etfinale,etsicutprincipiumsusceptivum,velseorsumpersevelsimulcumcorpore;agensautemetfinisestperfectius,susceptivumautemprincipium,inquantumhuiusmodi,estminusperfectum,consequensestquodpotentiaeanimaequaesuntprioressecundumordinemperfectionisetnaturae,sintprincipiaaliarumpermodumfinisetactiviprincipii.Videmusenimquodsensusestpropterintellectum,etnoneconverso.Sensusetiamestquaedamdeficiensparticipatiointellectus,undesecundumnaturalemoriginemquodammodoestabintellectu,sicutimperfectumaperfecto.Sedsecundumviamsusceptiviprincipii,econversopotentiaeimperfectioresinveniunturprincipiarespectualiarum,sicutanima,secundumquodhabetpotentiamsensitivam,consideratursicutsubiectumetmaterialequoddamrespectuintellectus.”
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carefulinadding“quaedam”,“quoddam”and“quodammodo”throughout,inordernotto
bemisunderstood.Aquinas’goalhereistoshowtheinterdependencebetweenthehuman
potenciesintwoways.First,inametaphysical–staticway,theunityofthesoulrequires
thatthelessperfectoriginatesfromthemoreperfectand,thus,thereisadependencein
therealmofbeingandnaturalperfection.Second,inadynamic–operativeway,theactof
thelowerpotenciesisprior,andbecauseofthat,acertainprincipleoftheactofthehigher
potencies;thus,theactofthesensesisaconditionofpossibilityoftheactofthe
intelligence.Thisisthepoint.Aquinaslaterclarifiesthatthematerialcauseofthesensesis
notenough,andanagencyonthepartoftheintellectisrequired.451However,thisdoesnot
maketheintellectlessreceptiveasaknowingfaculty,aswehaveseenandwillseeagain.
Onearticlejustpriortotheintroductionoftheagentintellect,St.Thomasrefersto
theintellectasapassivepotencywithregardtoeveryuniversalbeing,makingacontrast
betweenthispassivepotencyandotherpotencieswhichareactive:
Theagentisnoblerthanthepatient,iftheactionandthepassionarereferredtothesamething:butnotalways,iftheyrefertodifferentthings.Nowtheintellectisapassivepowerinregardtothewholeuniversalbeing:whilethevegetativepowerisactiveinregardtosomeparticularthing,namely,thebodyasunitedtothesoul.Whereforenothingpreventssuchapassiveforcebeingnoblerthansuchanactiveone.452
ThistexthelpstoshowthattheagentintellectisnotthepotencyofwhichSt.
Thomasisspeakinghere(hewilllatercharacterizebothpotenciesasregardingthesame
451Cf.84,6.45279,2ad3:“Agensestnobiliuspatiente,siadidemactioetpassioreferantur,nonautem
semper,siaddiversa.Intellectusautemestvispassivarespectutotiusentisuniversalis.Vegetativumautemestactivumrespectucuiusdamentisparticularis,scilicetcorporisconiuncti.Undenihilprohibethuiusmodipassivumessenobiliustaliactivo.”
189
butindifferentways,oneactivelyandtheotherpassively);453andthattheintellectis
receptiveofsomethingdifferentfromtheparticular;andthatthepassivityoftheintellect
doesnotmakeitalesserpotencyinthehumansoul.454
Wemaythenconcludethat,forAquinas,knowingisnotaperfectingactivity,butan
activityinwhichtheperfectionofsomethingotherthanthesubjectperfectsthesubject
itself,makingthelatteracquireaperfectionitdidnothave,inawaythatisnotphysicalbut
intentional.Theperfectionoftheobjectisreceived“passively”,insofarasthesubjectgrows
withaperfectionthatdidnotbelongtoit,aperfectionregardingwhichitwasinpotency,
where“potency”meansacapacityofreceivingintentionally.Thefactthatthis“passivity”
cannotmeananabsoluteindifference—adeadopennessintowhichanythingcouldenter—
canbeexplainedbywhatAquinassaysaboutthenaturalappetiteofthepotency,bythe
proportionbetweenpotencyandproperobject,andmainlybythespecificnatureof
knowingasopposedtophysicalprocesses.455
453Cf.88,1,c.454Aquinashascharacterizedknowing(andparticularlyunderstanding)asreceptiveinother
worksaswell.SeeAppendix,Note17.455Cf.p.149ff.andp.177,footnote330.Otherauthorssupportourinterpretationof
knowinginAquinasasreceptive.Gilsonwouldcomplainaboutanidealisticcontaminationofterms.“Invention”inhumanknowingdoesnotmean“creation”,butrathersomethinglikean“encounter”(cf.RM110).Cf.Lambert,85(aftertalkingabouttheinfusedknowledgeofangels):“Thepossibleintellect,ontheotherhand,knowsnothingnaturallyandmustacquireeachoneofitsspeciesseparately”;93:“Thehumanintellectisoriginallyemptyandsomustacquirethespecieswhichactuateit.”
Sellés,instead,saysthatAquinasdoesnotadmitthepreceedinginterpretationsoftheAristotelianagentintellectbecauseallofthemconceivehumanknowingaspassive,whichinthemindofSellésisunacceptablebecauseknowingisanact(cf.Crítica,224;EIA,200,246).Iwouldsuggestthatoneshoulddistinguishbetweenactasperfectionreceivedandactasperfectionbestowed,i.e.,betweentheactofaperfectedpassivepotencyandtheactofaperfectingactivepotency(cf.InIIDeAnima6,123-138);andshouldalsodistinguishbetweenthenaturalpassivityof
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5)TheComparisonbetweenIntelligenceandSensitivity
ThefollowinggroupoftextsregardsthesofrequentcomparisoninAquinasbetween
sensitivityandintelligence.ForKant,theintuitionofthesensesasreceptionofthematerial
ofexperienceisthewaytoensurecontactwithrealityand,thus,theobjectivityofhuman
understanding.ObjectivityforKanthastodowithextramentalreality,whichisonly
particular,andthecontactwiththatrealityisbymeansofsensibleintuition.Nowhuman
scienceisuniversal;universalconceptsdonotcomefromexperience,becauserealityis
particular;butuniversalconceptsareappliedtotheparticular.Therefore,inKant’smind,
humansciencehastobeasubjectivefunction,anactivity,anapplicationofsubjectivea
prioricategoriestotheobjectiverealityofexperience.
Aswehaveseen,St.Thomasdoesnothavethesamepointofdepartureandso,for
him,sensibilityandintelligencearenotunderstoodinthesameway.ForAquinas,both
sensibilityandintelligencearereceptiveoftheobject–content.Andforthisreason,he
doesnothesitatetoconstantlycompareintelligencewithsensibilityregardingthemost
importantcharacteristicsofknowing:alterity,receptivity,species,identitywithregardsto
thespecies,objectivity,etc..Onceagain,thegoalhereistoshowhowdifferentisAquinas’
approachfromanyKantianapproachtoEpistemology,andhowforSt.Thomasknowinghas
nothingtodowithaperfectingactivity.
Thetextsinthissectionshowthat,forAquinas,sensibilityandintelligencerealiseor
fulfilthesamebasicnotionofknowing,inwhichthecontentisaposteriori,thatistosay,
matterandtheintentionalreceptivityoftheknowingfaculties.PassionandactareanalogousconceptsinthemindofAquinas.
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hasitsorigininexperience.Becauseofthis,itseems,intellectualandsensibleknowingare
constantlylikenedtoeachotherinmanyaspects.
In85,2ad2severalsimilaritiesbetweensensesandintelligencecanbeseen.The
firstisthattheobjectofknowingisinrealitybut,insofarasitisknown,possessesanother
modeofbeinginthefaculty:“…thenatureitself[…]isonlyinindividuals;but[itsbeing]
understood[…]isintheintellect.”456and“…thecolorwhichisseenisonlyintheapple:but
thatitbeperceivedapartfromthesmell,thisisowingtothesight.”457Thesecondisthat
knowingisverifiedbymeansofaspecies,animage,thatispresentinthefaculty:“…the
facultyofsightreceivesthelikenessofcolorandnotofsmell.”458and“…in[theintellect]
thereisalikenessofthespecificnature,butnotoftheprinciplesofindividuality.”459The
thirdisthat,inbothcases,knowingiscalled“perception”:“…thatitbeperceivedapart
fromthesmell,thisisowingtothesight…”460and“inasmuchasitis[perceivedby]the
intellect…”461Thetextflowsnicelyinitscompleteform.462
Helpfulinshowinganotherinterestingcomparisonbetweensensibilityand
intelligenceisourothertextusprinceps,79,3.Bothfacultiesarereceptiveandinpotencyof
theirrespectiveobjects;moreover,thesimilaritywithvisiongoesevenfurthersince,for
bothintellectandvision,alightisrequiredfortheobjecttobevisible.Fromthefirst456“Ipsaigiturnatura[…],nonestnisiinsingularibus;sedhocipsumquodestintelligi[…]est
inintellectu.”457“Colorquividetur,nonestnisiinpomo;sedquodsitsineodoreperceptus,hocacciditei
expartevisus.”458“…[I]nvisuestsimilitudocolorisetnonodoris.”459“…[P]ercipiturabintellectu,inquoestsimilitudonaturaespeciei,etnonindividualium
principiorum.”460“…[Q]uodsitsineodoreperceptus,hocacciditeiexpartevisus…”461“…[S]ecundumquodpercipiturabintellectu…”462Cf.85,2ad2,quotedonp.86.
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objectionthecomparisonisexplicit:“Forasthesensesaretothingssensible,soisour
intellecttothingsintelligible.”463Granted,however,asimilaritytosomeextent,anagent
senseisnotrequired:“Sensiblethingsarefoundinactoutsidethesoul;andhencethereis
noneedforanactivesense.”464Infact,althoughinbothcasesthefacultyisinpotency,and
althoughbothfacultiesarereducedtotheirproperactbysomethinginact(thesensibleor
theintelligibleobject),inthecaseofintelligencetheobjectisnotintelligibleinactand,for
thisreason,anagentintellectisrequired:
Nownothingisreducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomethinginact;asthesenses[are]madeactualbywhatisactuallysensible.Wemustthereforeassignonthepartoftheintellectsomepowertomakethingsactuallyintelligible,byabstractionofthespeciesfrommaterialconditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactiveintellect.465
Letusnowconsidertheresponsetothesecondobjection.Ifthefirstopinion
regardingtheroleoflightinvisionisaccepted,thenvisionandintelligencearesimilarin
onemorerespect,thatbeingthenecessityofalightmakingtheirrespectiveobjects
knowableinact.St.Thomassays:“Therearetwoopinionsastotheeffectoflight.Forsome
saythatlightisrequiredforsight,inordertomakecolorsactuallyvisible.Andaccordingto
thistheactiveintellectisrequiredforunderstanding,inlikemannerandforthesame
46379,3,ob.1:“Sicutenimsehabetsensusadsensibilia,itasehabetintellectusnosterad
intelligibilia.”46479,3ad1:“Sensibiliainveniunturactuextraanimam,etideononoportuitponere
sensumagentem.”46579,3,c.:“Nihilautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicut
sensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem.”
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reasonaslightisrequiredforseeing.”466Regardlessofthedoctrineoflight,whichwillbe
examinedinmoredetaillater,itisclearthatthesimilaritybetweentheintentional
receptivityofintelligenceandofvisionisthegreatestpossible.
In78,1,c.,467bothpotenciesaresaidtorefertotheextra-mentalreality,andin
bothcasesthisreferenceisverifiedbymeansofaspecies.
TheAristotelianidentity(which,forSt.Thomas,aswehaveseen,regardsthe
identityofthespecieswiththefaculty)appliestobothintelligenceandsensibility:“The
thingunderstoodisintheintellectbyitsownlikeness;anditisinthissensethatwesaythat
thethingunderstood[inact]istheintellectinact,becausethelikenessofthething
understoodistheformoftheintellect,asthelikenessofasensiblethingistheformofthe
senseinact.”468Theroleofthespeciesis,inbothcases,thesame:“Theintelligiblespecies
istotheintellectwhatthesensibleimageistothesense.Butthesensibleimageisnotwhat
isperceived,butratherthatbywhichsenseperceives.Thereforetheintelligiblespeciesis
notwhatisactuallyunderstood,butthatbywhichtheintellectunderstands.”469Theactof
visionandtheactofunderstandingareconsideredequallyimmanentactions:“Thereisa
twofoldaction(Metaph.ix),onewhichremainsintheagent;forinstance,toseeandto
understand;andanotherwhichpassesintoanexternalobject;forinstance,toheatandto46679,3ad2:“Circaeffectumluminisestduplexopinio.Quidamenimdicuntquodlumen
requirituradvisum,utfaciatcoloresactuvisibiles.Etsecundumhoc,similiterrequiritur,etpropteridem,intellectusagensadintelligendum,propterquodlumenadvidendum.”
467Textquotedandtranslatedp.69.46885,2ad1:“Intellectumestinintelligentepersuamsimilitudinem.Etperhuncmodum
diciturquodintellectuminactuestintellectusinactu,inquantumsimilitudoreiintellectaeestformaintellectus;sicutsimilitudoreisensibilisestformasensusinactu.”Cf.ob.1.
46985,2,sc.:“Speciesintelligibilissehabetadintellectum,sicutspeciessensibilisadsensum.Sedspeciessensibilisnonestilludquodsentitur,sedmagisidquosensussentit.Ergospeciesintelligibilisnonestquodintelligituractu,sedidquointelligitintellectus.”
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cut;andeachoftheseactionsproceedsinvirtueofsomeform.”470St.Thomastakesthe
similarityevenfurtherassertingthat,inbothsensibilityandintelligence,thereisa“double
operation”,onewhichisstrictlyreceptiveandanotherwhichisformativeandmoreactive:
Therearetwooperationsinthesensitivepart.One,inregardofimpressiononly,andthustheoperationofthesensestakesplacebythesensesbeingimpressedbythesensible.Theotherisformation,inasmuchastheimaginationformsforitselfanimageofanabsentthing,orevenofsomethingneverseen.Bothoftheseoperationsarefoundintheintellect.471
Aclarificationisinorder.Althoughthetextjustquotedshowshowsimilararesense
andintellectforAquinas,itseemsthatthistextshouldbeunderstoodnotasreferringto
thereceptivityofthecontentbut,rather,tothereceptivityofthespeciesasagentobject
(speciesimpressa).Inthatcase,definitionisunderstoodastheformationofthespecies
expressabythepossibleintellectinthesimpleapprehension.Thiswouldbeinlinewiththe
considerationofthedefinitionassimple.472Itwouldalsoimplythatthefirstspecies
expressainsensitivityisformednotintheexternalsenses,butintheimagination.Ifwe
wanttosaythatAquinasrefers“formation”onlytojudgment,thenAquinasimpliesinthis
textthatthedefinitionalreadypresupposesacomposition(ofspecificdifferenceand
genus);butthetextseemstoopposeratioandcompositio.Inanycase,theword
“formation”cannotbetakentomean“activity”inthesenseofprovidingcontentbut,
47085,2,c.:“Cumenimsitduplexactio,sicutdiciturIXMetaphys.,unaquaemanetin
agente,utvidereetintelligere,alteraquaetransitinremexteriorem,utcalefacereetsecare;utraquefitsecundumaliquamformam.”
47185,2ad3:“Inpartesensitivainveniturduplexoperatio.Unasecundumsolamimmutationem,etsicperficituroperatiosensusperhocquodimmutaturasensibili.Aliaoperatioestformatio,secundumquodvisimaginativaformatsibialiquodidolumreiabsentis,veletiamnunquamvisae.Etutraquehaecoperatioconiungiturinintellectu.”
472Thisismoreevident,forexample,inInVIIMetaphysicorum,lect.11,n.1528;lect.12,1537,1541,1554-1556.
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rather,theintentionalactualizationofthefacultybymeansoftheagentobject.Onlyinthis
secondmoment(offormation,notimpression)doesthe“reception”(aspossession)ofthe
contenttakeplace.Knowingisthisintentional“activityofreception”andthedifficultyof
Epistemologyistograspthisfactasdifferentfromphysicalactivitiesandreceptions.
Letusexamineothertexts.473Bothkindsoffacultiesareapprehensivebuttheir
respectiveobjectsareformallydifferent:“Indeed,thepassivepoweritselfhasitsvery
naturefromitsrelationtoitsactiveprinciple.Therefore,sincewhatisapprehendedbythe
intellectandwhatisapprehendedbysensearegenericallydifferent;consequently,the
intellectualappetiteisdistinctfromthesensitive.”474
Theclearacknowledgementofthedifferencesbetweenintellectandsensedoesnot
conflictwiththeaforementionedsimilarities.WhatSt.Thomassaysin84,4ad2:“Material
things,astothebeingwhichtheyhaveoutsidethesoul,maybeactuallysensible,butnot
actuallyintelligible.Whereforethereisnocomparisonbetweensenseandintellect.”475is
473ForSt.Thomas,bothfacultiesareequallyinpotencytotheirrespectiveobjects,insucha
waythattheAristotelianquodammodoomniaappliestoboth.Cf.84,2ad2:“Aristotledidnotholdthatthesoulisactuallycomposedofallthings,asdidtheearlierphilosophers;hesaidthatthesoulisallthings,‘afterafashion,’forasmuchasitisinpotentialitytoall—throughthesenses,toallthingssensible—throughtheintellect,toallthingsintelligible.”[…Aristotelesnonposuitanimamesseactucompositamexomnibus,sicutantiquinaturales;seddixitquodammodoanimamesseomnia,inquantumestinpotentiaadomnia;persensumquidemadsensibilia,perintellectumveroadintelligibilia.]Thequodammodoomniareferredtobothfacultieshadalreadyappearedin80,1,wheretheyarealsosimilarintheiralterity,inthereceptionofspeciesoftheirobjectsandinbeingapprehensivefacultiesasopposedtoappetitivefaculties(cf.80,1,c.,ob.2yad2).
47480,2,c.:“Ipsapotentiapassivapropriamrationemhabetexordineadsuumactivum.Quiaigiturestalteriusgenerisapprehensumperintellectumetapprehensumpersensum,consequensestquodappetitusintellectivussitaliapotentiaasensitive.”
47584,4ad2:“Resmateriales,secundumessequodhabentextraanimam,possuntessesensibilesactu;nonautemactuintelligibiles.Undenonestsimiledesensuetintellectu.”
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clearlyunderstoodbywhatwehavealreadyseenin79,3(thenecessityofanagent
intellect)andothertexts,forexample:
Butthereisthisdifference,accordingtotheopinionofAristotle,betweenthesenseandtheintelligence—thatathingisperceivedbythesenseaccordingtothedispositionwhichithasoutsidethesoul—thatis,initsindividuality;whereasthenatureofthethingunderstoodisindeedoutsidethesoul,butthemodeaccordingtowhichitexistsoutsidethesoulisnotthemodeaccordingtowhichitisunderstood.476
Why,then,doesSt.Thomassayin84,4ad2that“thereisnocomparisonbetween
senseandintellect”?Thesecondobjectionisbasedontheallegedparallelbetweensense
andintellectregardingtherelationshipoftheobjecttothepotency.Thisparallel,however,
ismisconstruedinthefollowingway:asthesensibleinact(therealcorporealthing,object
ofknowledge)isthecauseofthesensiblespeciesactualizingthesense(asformaquo),in
thesamewaytheintelligiblespeciesactualizingtheintellectmustbecausedbythe
intelligibleinact(understoodasrealspiritualbeingsexistingoutsidethemind).St.Thomas’
answerputsthingsinorder:theobjectofhumanknowledgeisthecorporealthing,notthe
separatesubstances.Thecorporealthingshaveamodeofbeingoutsidethemindwhich
allowsthemtobesensibleinactand,therefore,thecorporealthingscanactualizethe
sensesasobjects.However,becausethesecorporeal,realthingsarenotintelligibleinact,
theycannotactualizetheintelligenceinthesameway.ForAquinas,thatwhichisdissimilar
isnottherelationshipbetweenobjectandpotency(oncetheobjectisinact,bothpotencies
areactualizedbytheobjectinthesameway),buttheconditionoftheobjectinreality(i.e.
47676,2ad4:“Sedhoctantuminterestintersensumetintellectum,secundumsententiam
Aristotelis,quodressentitursecundumillamdispositionemquamextraanimamhabet,insuaparticularitate,naturaautemreiquaeintelligitur,estquidemextraanimam,sednonhabetillummodumessendiextraanimam,secundumquemintelligitur.”
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itsmodeofbeing).ThatiswhySt.Thomassaysin76,2ad4thatthis(i.e.,themodeof
beingoftheobjectinreality)isthe“only”differencebetweensenseandintelligence.
Thetextsreportedreinforcetheideaofhumanunderstandingasintentionally
receptive,andnotdifferentfromthesenseinthisrespect.Knowing,forAquinas,certainly
hastwospecies(sensibleandintelligible),oreventwolevelsofperfectioninhumanbeing,
butacommongenericcharacteristicwhichisknowingasabeingperfectedbytheformal
perfectionofthereal-otherasother.Inorderforthatformalperfectiontoperfectthe
knower,ithastobeknowableinact.Inthecaseoftheobjectofintelligence,becauseit
doesnotsubsistasknowableinact,therearisestheneedforanagentintellect.477
6)Corollaries:AgentIntellect,PossibleIntellectandWill
Thenotionsofintellectualknowingasanactivityandoftheagentintellectasa
formalaprioritendtoblurthedistinctionsbetweenthepossibleintellect,theagent
intellectandthewillitself.Thereasonsarenotdifficulttounderstand.
Onarathersuperficiallevel,ifunderstandingisactiveasperformative,thepossible
intellect(Thomisticallythefacultyofunderstanding)necessarilyceasestobereceptive;
unlessby“reception”somethinglikean“encounter”withthesensiblematerialismeant,
andtherefore“reception”and“conversiontotheparticular”actuallymeanthesamething.
Thepathfortheidentificationofagentintellectwithpossibleintellectisthusopen.Also,
becausetendingtowardsreality-in-itselfistheThomisticpropertyoftheappetite,and
becausethereisnorealityotherthantheoneencounteredbythespiritinitsopennessto
477ForthecomparisonbetweenintellectandsensesinotherworksofAquinas,see
Appendix,Note18.
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the(material)world,itisnotdifficulttoseehowthis“being-in-the-world”isatthesame
time“understanding”and“tendingtowardsreality,”“conversion”and“decision.”
Onadeeperlevel,thereasonfortheeffacementofthedistinctionbetweenthe
potenciesistheeffacementofthedistinctionbetweenbeingandoperation,orthe
reductionofbeingtoaction.Being(ens)becomesfirstbeingknown:thisisModern
Philosophy’sapproachtobeing,thatis,thereductionofbeingtobeingofconsciousness.
Thisbeingknown,then,turnsouttobetheresultofanactiveperformance(knowingis
performanceoftheobject),andtheonly“being”(esseutactus)lefttothisobjectof
consciousnessisthatperformance(action)itself.Inotherwords,thebeingknown(the
objectofconsciousness)isacompositeofmaterialofsensibilityplusperformanceor
intellectualactivity;478intelligibilityistheactionofintelligenceonthephantasm.Theunity
oftheactofunderstandingistheunityoftheobject.Thebeingofjudgmentisthebeingof
theobject,andsobeing(esseutactusobjecti)isaction(esseutactiosubjecti).479
Onemorestep.Ifbeingismerelybeingaffirmed,whatisthebeingofthesubject,if
notthisaffirmationitself?Thesubjectisnotlikeotherbeings,butisinitselfthis
performance:being-in-the-world.Inthisway,thebeingofthesubjectalsoisreducedtoits
ownaction.Now,thisidentificationofbeingandoperationisforeigntothemindofSt.
Thomas:itispreciselyAquinas’distinctionbetweenessenceandbeing,andtheconsequent
distinctionbetweenesseandoperari,thatisthecharacteristicofcreatedbeing.Inanycase,
478ThethrustofthisdoctrinecanbefoundinKant,KRV,B1-2.479Thisis,inmyview,oneofthereasonswhytheAristotelianidentityisinterpreted
sometimesasidentitysubject-object.
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thishasbeensaidinordertotrytoshowwhy,inModernPhilosophy,thedistinction
betweenintellectualpotenciestendstodisappear.
Theimmediatepurposeofthissectionistohighlighttheexplicitdistinctionin
Aquinasamongagentintellect,possibleintellectandwill,thisdistinctionbeingsimplya
consequenceofwhathasbeensaidsofarregardingthenatureofhumanunderstandingas
intentionallyreceptiveoftheperfectionoftheother.Thereiscertainlyaplaceforactivity
(asopposedto“receptivity”asitisunderstoodinthisChapter)inAquinas,butthisactivity
isnotoriginallythecapacitytounderstand.Thisactivityisprevious,asametaphysical
conditionofpossibilityofunderstanding,inthecaseoftheagentintellect;anditis
posterior,asaninclinationtotheapprehendedform,inthecaseofthewill.
Letusshowfirstsometextsaboutthedistinctionbetweenintellectandwill,and
thenbetweenthepossibleintellectandtheagentintellect.
-Distinctionbetweenintellectandwill.Treatingtheappetitivepotenciesin
general,Aquinasisclearinstatingthattheymustbedistinctfromthecognitivepotencies,
despitethefactthattheobjectsmightbethesameinreality.Whatnecessitatesa
distinctionofpotenciesistheformaldistinctionoftheobjects.In80,1,thesecond
objectionsays:“Powersaredifferentiatedbytheirobjects.Butwhatwedesireisthesame
aswhatweknow.Thereforetheappetitivepowerisnotdistinctfromtheapprehensive
power.”480Theanswer:“Whatisapprehendedandwhatisdesiredarethesameinreality,
butdifferinaspect:forathingisapprehendedassomethingsensibleorintelligible,
48080,1,ob.2:“Potentiaedistinguuntursecundumobiecta.Sedidemestquodcognoscimus
etappetimus.Ergovimappetitivamnonoportetessealiampraetervimapprehensivam.”
200
whereasitisdesiredassuitableorgood.”481Theappetitivepotencyisdistinctalsobecause
itsactismadepossiblebytheactoftheapprehensivefaculty.Inotherwords,the
apprehendedformistheconditionofpossibilityoftheappetitiveinclination;butthis
apprehendedformimpliesthatthecognitiveactisalreadycompletedandperformed;
thereforethecapacityofthisinclinationdependsessentiallyontheperformedactof
cognition,forwhichtherespectivecapacities,thoughessentiallyrelated,mustbe
essentiallydistinct.Anotherwaytoseethisistounderstandtheconcepts:toapprehendis
anactfinishinginthesubject,whereasaninclinationisanactfinishinginthethingoutside
themind;thereasontheknowercantendtowardsthethingisthatthethinghasentered
theknower’shorizonofpossibilities.This“entrance”ofthethingisknowing,andthe
tendencytowardstheknownthingistheappetite.Inthefollowingpassage,forexample,
wecansee1)thedistinctionbetweenthesubstantialformandthecognitiveform(being
andoperation),andtheconsequentdistinctionbetweennaturalappetiteandtheappetite
thatfollowscognition;and2)theactofknowingasconditionofpossibilityoftheactofthe
appetite(“theanimalisabletodesirewhatitapprehends”):
Therefore,asformsexistinthosethingsthathaveknowledgeinahighermannerandabovethemannerofnaturalforms;somusttherebeinthemaninclinationsurpassingthenaturalinclination,whichiscalledthenaturalappetite.Andthissuperiorinclinationbelongstotheappetitivepowerofthesoul,throughwhichtheanimalisabletodesirewhatitapprehends,andnotonlythattowhichitisinclinedbyitsnaturalform.482
48180,1ad2:“Idquodapprehendituretappetitur,estidemsubiecto,seddiffertratione,
apprehenditurenimutestenssensibilevelintelligibile;appetiturveroutestconveniensautbonum.”
48280,1,c.:“Sicutigiturformaealtiorimodoexistuntinhabentibuscognitionemsupramodumformarumnaturalium,itaoportetquodineissitinclinatiosupramoduminclinationis
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ThefactthatbothknowingandappetitearepassivepotenciesforAquinas483does
noterasethedistinctionbetweenapprehendingandtheactoftheappetite.Infact,what
movestheappetiteistheobjectasapprehended.Thisissomuchsothattheconditionof
theobjectas(already)apprehended(intellectuallyorsensibly)qualifiesanddistinguishes
theappetitivepotencies.484ForAquinas,becausethereisaformaldifferencebetweenthat
whichthesubjectapprehendsthroughintelligenceandthatwhichthesubjectapprehends
throughsense,thereisalsoadistinctionbetweentheintellectualappetiteandthesensitive
appetite.
Despitethefactthatbotharepassive,andaspassivecanbesaidtobe“moved”by
theirobjects,thequalificationof“movement”doesnotfitsowelltheactofknowingasit
doestheactoftheappetite.Thereisacleardistinctionbetweentheoperations:
Fortheactoftheapprehensivepowerisnotsoproperlycalledamovementastheactoftheappetite:sincetheoperationoftheapprehensivepoweriscompletedintheveryfactthatthethingapprehendedisintheonethatapprehends:whiletheoperationoftheappetitivepoweriscompletedinthefactthathewhodesiresisbornetowardsthethingdesirable.485
naturalis,quaediciturappetitusnaturalis.Ethaecsuperiorinclinatiopertinetadvimanimaeappetitivam,perquamanimalappeterepotesteaquaeapprehendit,nonsolumeaadquaeinclinaturexformanaturali.”
48380,2,c..484Cf.also80,2,ob.1andad1.48581,1,c.:“Actusenimapprehensivaevirtutisnonitapropriediciturmotus,sicutactio
appetitus,namoperatiovirtutisapprehensivaeperficiturinhoc,quodresapprehensaesuntinapprehendente;operatioautemvirtutisappetitivaeperficiturinhoc,quodappetensinclinaturinremappetibilem.”Cf.82,3,c.:“Foraswehavesaidabove,theactionoftheintellectconsistsinthis—thattheideaofthethingunderstoodisintheonewhounderstands;whiletheactofthewillconsistsinthis—thatthewillisinclinedtothethingitselfasexistinginitself.”[Utenimsupradictumest,actiointellectusconsistitinhocquodratioreiintellectaeestinintelligente;actusverovoluntatisperficiturinhocquodvoluntasinclinaturadipsamremproutinseest.]
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Theexplicitdistinctionbetweenapprehensiveandappetitivefaculties,forAquinas,
isnotafigureofspeech,nortwowaysofspeakingofthesamereality,noreventwoaspects
ofthesamephenomenon.Theactoftheappetitepresupposesandfollowstheactofthe
apprehensivefaculty;theobjectsareformallydifferent,andtheactsthatreachouttothose
objectsarealsoformallydifferent,andevenopposed.ForAquinas,“toapprehend”and“to
tendtowards”arenotthesameand,therefore,thefacultiesthatregardthoseoperations
needtobedistinct.
-Distinctionbetweenagentintellectandpossibleintellect.Thedistinctionbetween
agentintellectandpossibleintellectisalsoexplicitinAquinas:“Neverthelessthereisa
distinctionbetweenthepoweroftheactiveintellectandofthepassiveintellect:becauseas
regardsthesameobject,theactivepowerwhichmakestheobjecttobeinactmustbe
distinctfromthepassivepower,whichismovedbytheobjectexistinginact.”486Itisclear
thattheactionofthepassivepotencycanbeginwhentheactionoftheactivepotency
finishes;oncetheobjectisavailable(bytheactionoftheagentintellect),theotherpotency
canbemovedbyit.
48679,7,c.:“Diversificaturtamenpotentiaintellectusagentis,etintellectuspossibilis,quia
respectueiusdemobiecti,aliudprincipiumoportetessepotentiamactivam,quaefacitobiectumesseinactu;etaliudpotentiampassivam,quaemoveturabobiectoinactuexistente.”Sotheremustbetwopotenciesinthissense,butclearlynottwoapprehensivepotenciesintheintelligence,cf.82,5,c.:“Andthereforeinthewill,whichistheintellectualappetite,thereisnodifferentiationofappetitivepowers,sothattherebeintheintellectualappetiteanirasciblepowerdistinctfromaconcupisciblepower:justasneitheronthepartoftheintellectaretheapprehensivepowersmultiplied,althoughtheyareonthepartofthesenses.”[Etideonondiversificanturinipsa,quaeestappetitusintellectivus,aliquaepotentiaeappetitivae,utsitinappetituintellectivoaliapotentiairascibilis,etaliaconcupiscibilis,sicutetiamexparteintellectusnonmultiplicanturviresapprehensivae,licetmultiplicenturexpartesensus.]
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Letusexploresimilartexts:“Ourpassiveintellectisreducedfrompotentialitytoact
bysomebeinginact,thatis,bytheactiveintellect,whichisapowerofthesoul,aswehave
said;andnotbyaseparateintelligence,asproximatecause,althoughperchanceasremote
cause.”487Itisobviousthatwhatisattributedtotheagentintellectisthecapacityof
actualizingtheintellectwhichispassive,somethingwhich,ifitdoesnotneedtobe
attributedtoanotherseparateintellect,cancertainlynotbeattributedtothesamefaculty
ofunderstanding;St.Thomasintroducestheagentintellectasafacultyofthesoulprecisely
becausewhateverisinpotencycannotbereducedtoactifnotbysomethingthatisactual.
Moreover,theagentintellectdoesnotevendirectlyactualizethepossibleintellect,but
doessothroughthespecies.Theagentintellectistobeconsideredmorepreciselytheact
oftheintelligible(inanefficientsense,producingtheintelligiblemodeofbeing)andthe
species(impressae)themselvesthatwhichactualizethepossibleintellectasagentobject:
[Ourintellect]understandsitselfaccordingasitismadeactualbythespeciesabstractedfromsensiblethings,throughthelightoftheactiveintellect,whichnotonlyactuatestheintelligiblethingsthemselves,butalso,bytheirinstrumentality,actuatesthepassiveintellect.Thereforetheintellectknowsitselfnotbyitsessence,butbyitsact.488
Thepointofthearticleistodenythattheintellectcanunderstanditselfbyitself,
preciselybecauseitisinpotency.Theagentintellect,instead,whichcouldbeconsidered
“act,”isnotitselftheobjectbutrathertheactiveprincipleofthetrulyintelligibleobjects:48784,4ad3:“Dicendumquodintellectusnosterpossibilisreduciturdepotentiaadactum
peraliquodensactu,idestperintellectumagentem,quiestvirtusquaedamanimaenostrae,utdictumest,nonautemperaliquemintellectumseparatum,sicutpercausamproximam;sedfortesicutpercausamremotam.”
48887,1,c.:“…consequensestutsicseipsumintelligatintellectusnoster,secundumquodfitactuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractasperlumenintellectusagentis,quodestactusipsorumintelligibilium,eteismediantibusintellectuspossibilis.Nonergoperessentiamsuam,sedperactumsuumsecognoscitintellectusnoster.”
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Theessenceofanangelisanactinthegenusofintelligiblethings,andthereforeitisbothintellectandthethingunderstood.Henceanangelapprehendshisownessencethroughitself:notsothehumanmind,whichiseitheraltogetherinpotentialitytointelligiblethings—asisthepassiveintellect—oristheactofintelligiblethingsabstractedfromthephantasms—asistheactiveintellect.489
Itisclearthatneitherthepossibleintellectnortheagentintellectare“anactinthe
genusofintelligiblethings”becauseSt.Thomasisopposingthehumanintellect(andhere
heincludesbothfaculties)totheangelicintellectinthatrespect.But,thedistinction
betweenthetwohumanfacultiesisalsoclear:thepossibleintellectisabsolutelyinpotency
regardingtheintelligibleobjects,inpotencyofreceivingthem;andtheagentintellectis
“act”inacertainsense,butnotinsofarasitisitselfintelligible(intelligibiliumispluralhere),
butinsofarasitistheactiveprincipleoftheintelligibleobjects.490
In83,4,ob.3andad3,weseeagaintheword“intellectus”appliedtothe
intellectualfacultiesingeneraland,atthesametime,theirdistinctionas“twopotencies”:
“Thewillistheintellectualappetite.Butintheintellecttherearetwopowers—theactive
andthepassive.”491Theobjectionisnotchallengedinthatregard;thepossibleintellect
needsamovingobjectwhichisnotinactunlesstheagentintellectactualizesit;forthis
reason,therearetwopotenciesintheintellectualpartofthemind.Butregardingthewill,
anotherpotencyisnotrequiredbecausethemovingobjectisalreadyintheintellect:“The
48987,1ad2:“Essentiaangeliestsicutactusingenereintelligibilium,etideosehabetetut
intellectus,etutintellectum.UndeAngelussuamessentiamperseipsumapprehendit.Nonautemintellectushumanus,quivelestomninoinpotentiarespectuintelligibilium,sicutintellectuspossibilis;velestactusintelligibiliumquaeabstrahunturaphantasmatibus,sicutintellectusagens.”
490TheagentintellectasactusintelligibiliumwillbetreatedinmoredetailinChapter4,section1.
49183,4,ob.3:“Voluntasestappetitusintellectivus.Sedexparteintellectussuntduaepotentiae,scilicetagensetpossibilis.”
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intellectiscomparedtothewillasmovingthewill.Andthereforethereisnoneedto
distinguishinthewillanactiveandapassivewill.”492
Inthesameway,thementionof“two”potenciesrecursin85,1,ob.4,theobjection
whichgivesSt.Thomastheopportunitytodistinguishtwo“activities”intheagentintellect
itself(illuminationandabstraction).St.Thomas,inhisanswer,doesnotchallengethe
distinctionoftwopotencies,northedenialoftheattributionofabstractiontothepossible:
headdstotheagentintellectonemoreactivity,otherthantheonealreadyattributedin
theobjection.Theobjectionsays:
ThePhilosophersays(DeAnimaiii,5)therearetwothingsintheintellectualsoul—thepassiveintellectandtheactiveintellect.Butitdoesnotbelongtothepassiveintellecttoabstracttheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm,buttoreceivethemwhenabstracted.Neitherdoesitseemtobethefunctionoftheactiveintellect,whichisrelatedtothephantasm,aslightistocolor;sincelightdoesnotabstractanythingfromcolor,butratherstreamsontoit.Thereforeinnowaydoweunderstandbyabstractionfromphantasms.493
Theanswerbegins:“Notonlydoestheactiveintellectthrowlightonthephantasm:
itdoesmore;byitsownpoweritabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthe
phantasm.”494TherestofthisinterestingpassagewilloccupyusinthenextChapter.What
isimportantisthatSt.Thomasacceptsthechallengeoftheobjection;thatis,thatthereare
onlytwopotencies;now,ifneitherofthemdoesthejob,thereisnoabstraction.The49283,4ad3:“Intellectuscomparaturadvoluntatemutmovens.Etideononoportetin
voluntatedistinguereagensetpossible.”49385,1,ob.4:“UtdiciturinIIIDeAnima,inintellectivaanimasuntduo,scilicetintellectus
possibilis,etagens.Sedabstrahereaphantasmatibusspeciesintelligibilesnonpertinetadintellectumpossibilem,sedreciperespeciesiamabstractas.Sednecetiamvideturpertinereadintellectumagentem,quisehabetadphantasmatasicutlumenadcolores,quodnonabstrahitaliquidacoloribus,sedmagiseisinfluit.Ergonullomodointelligimusabstrahendoaphantasmatibus.”
49485,1ad4:“Phantasmataetilluminanturabintellectuagente;etiterumabeis,pervirtutemintellectusagentis,speciesintelligibilesabstrahuntur.”
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solutionisthatoneofthemdoesit,andallowstheothertobeactualizedwiththefruitof
itsown(theagentintellect’s)work.495
TherealdistinctioninAquinasissustainedbymetaphysicalprinciples,notbya
figureofspeech.496Potenciesaredistinctwhentheirformalobjectsaredistinct.Potencies
aredistinctwhenoneisproductiveofsomethingthattheotheronlyreceives.St.Thomas
speaksabout“duo.”Itistruethatthesouldoesnothavematter,forAquinas,andtherefore
thesetwodistinctpotenciescannotbepicturedasdifferentplacesorinstrumentsina
machine;however,neithercanonesurrendertothetemptationofimaginingthemasjust
onebigcurrenttowardstheworld.Theyaredifferent,accidental,formalperfectionsofthe
onesoul,unitedsubstantiallyinthesoulandhavingbetweenthemacertainorderwhich
preservesinadditionanoperationalunity.Butthereisarealdistinction.Distinctionsin
Aquinasareimportantand,sometimes,real.Forhim,forexample,thedistinctionbetween
essenceand(created)beingisreal,althoughitisimpossibletoseparatetheminreality.The
reasonforarealdistinction,then,isnotthattwothingscannotbeimaginedseparately
fromeachother,butthatoneofthemcannotbetheother;arealdistinctionisgroundedin
theessenceofeachmemberandintheprincipleofnon-contradiction.Forthisreason,if
oneunderstandswhateachofthesepotenciesmeansforAquinas,onerealizesthatthey
cannotbethesamefaculty,althoughtheysubsistinthesameintellectualsoul.
495Thedistinctionbetweenagentintellectandpossibleintellectispresentinotherworksof
Aquinas.SeeAppendix,Note19.496Inadifferentcontext,butperhapsrelevanttothepoint,cf.InIDeAnima6,92-94:“Now
inanyself-movertherearetwothingstobeconsidered,thethingmoving,andthethingmoved;andtheformercannotassuchbethesameasthelatter.”[Inmoventeetiamseipsumduosunt:unummovens,etaliudmotum:etimpossibileestquodilludquodestmovensmoveaturperse.]
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***
InthepresentChapter,theintentionhasbeentoshowthereceptivecharacterof
knowinginthesenseofareceptionofanobject–contentand,therefore,knowingas
perfectiveofthesubjectinitsradicaloriginalimperfection.Theconnectionwithour
previousfindingsisnotdifficulttosee.Theobjectofintelligenceistheintelligiblenatureof
things,whichisaperfectionsubsistingmateriallyinthecorporealthingsthemselves,and
differentfromtheirprincipleofindividuation.Thisintelligibleperfection,evenifitisnot
intelligibleinact,ispresentinthethingsthemselves;thekeytounderstandingthisisthe
distinctionbetweenintelligibleasperfection–content(distinctinturnfromthesensible
content)andintelligibleasmodeofbeingofthecontent.Thisisalsothesenseinwhich
knowingisreceptive:becausetheperfection–contentbelongstothethingitself,nottothe
intellect,thesoulisinpotencyofthiskindofperfectionand,therefore,growswithits
reception.
Allofthisneededtobesaidinordertoshowthat,forAquinas,theagentintellectis
notaformalapriori,whichwouldbeseenintheobjectasitsperfection–content.Hadit
notbeenshownthattheintelligibleisaperfectionbelongingtothethingitselfanddifferent
fromitssensiblecontent,itwouldnothavebeenclearthattheobjectofintelligenceis,at
thesametime,theparticularthingandtheuniversal(becausetheuniversalascontent
subsistsintheparticularthing).HaditnotbeenshownthatintelligibleinAquinasis
understoodintwosenses(thestateofabstractionandthequidditas),itwouldnothave
beenclearinwhatsenseanintelligibleperfectionsubsistsinamaterialthing.Atthesame
time,haditnotbeenshownthatunderstandingisreceptiveoftheintelligibleascontent,it
208
couldhavebeensaidthattheintelligiblecontentispresentinthematerialthingas
belongingtoitbecauseoftheactivityofunderstanding.
Atthesametime,asseemsclear,thesefindingshelpinexplainingtheagentintellect
asametaphysicalaprioriofintellectualknowingasreceptiveofobjectivecontent,thatis,
asproductiveoftheintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheintelligiblecontent.Whatremainsto
besaidwillbeintroducedinthenextChapter.
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ChapterFour:TheThomisticAgentIntellectasaMetaphysicalAPrioriratherthanaFormalAPriori
Thisisthemomenttotakeadvantageofthepreviousclarificationstoaddressmore
directlythemainquestionofthisresearch:istheagentintellecttobeunderstoodasa
formalaprioriofknowingasanactivityofperformanceor,rather,asametaphysicala
prioriofintellectualknowingasreceptiveofobjectivecontent?Thatintellectualknowingin
Aquinasisnotproductivebutintentionallyreceptivehasalreadybeenaddresseddirectly.
Whatmustnowbeaddressedistheprecisecharacterizationoftheagentintellectinthe
textofAquinasasametaphysicalratherthanaformalapriori.
Aformalaprioriinintellectualknowingisbasicallyproductiveoftheuniversal–
intelligiblecontentassuch.Itisasubjectivefunctionwhich“makes”or“creates”the
intellectualobjectofknowingbyacertainorganizationorin-formationofthematerialdata
ofsensibleexperience.Itgives“form”tothe“matter”providedbythesenses,itorganizes
therawmaterialofsensibleexperienceandso,inthissense,makesitintelligible.Thebasic
assumptionisthattheunitythatcharacterizestheobjectofhumanunderstandingcannot
comefromexperience,forthesimplereasonthatexperienceisconsideredaphenomenon
withoutunity,asinKant.Theoriginofthatunityisthereforeapriori,andtheone
responsibleforthatunityisthesubject.Theuniversal,theoneinthemany,istheresultofa
subjectivefunction.ItseemsthatthissubjectivefunctioncouldberelatedtotheThomist
agentintellect.Thequestionbeforeusis:canthisrelationshipbegroundedinthetextofSt.
Thomas?
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ThisChapterisdividedintotwosections.Inthefirst,wewillexaminesometexts
thatmayseemtosupporttheclaimofAquinas’agentintellectasaformalapriori.Inthe
second,wewillexaminesomeofthetextsthatsupporttheviewofthisresearch,thatthe
agentintellectisametaphysicalapriori.
1)TheTextofSt.Thomas:theAgentIntellectasaFormalAPriori?
Wewillpresenttwogroupsoftexts.Thefirstgroupregardsseveral
characterizationsofthehumanintellectthatmayseemtosupporttheclaimofaformala
prioriinhumanunderstanding(ingeneral).Thesecondgroupdealsdirectlywithtextsthat
mayseemtosuggestthatthisformalaprioriisspecificallytheagentintellect.
1.1.InfinityintheHumanIntellect
Theintellectisinfiniteinacertainsense.Isthisinfinitya“virtual”infinity,pre-
containinginitselftheperfection-contentoftheknown?ItdoesnotseemsoinAquinas’
text.
Thehumanintellectcanbesaidtobe“infinite”onlyinpotency,andinpotencyof
receiving:“Thereforeinfinityispotentiallyinourmindthroughitsconsideringsuccessively
onethingafteranother:becauseneverdoesourintellectunderstandsomanythings,thatit
cannotunderstandmore.”497Thereisnothinglikeahabitualknowingoftheinfinite,
becauseitwouldsupposetheactualknowingoftheinfinite,whichforSt.Thomasis
impossible:
49786,2,c.:“Etideoinintellectunostroinveniturinfinituminpotentia,inaccipiendoscilicet
unumpostaliud,quianunquamintellectusnostertotintelligit,quinpossitpluraintelligere.”
211
Forthesamereasonwecannothavehabitualknowledgeoftheinfinite:becauseinushabitualknowledgeresultsfromactualconsideration:sincebyunderstandingweacquireknowledge,asissaidEthic.ii,1.Whereforeitwouldnotbepossibleforustohaveahabitofaninfinityofthingsdistinctlyknown,unlesswehadalreadyconsideredtheentireinfinitythereof,countingthemaccordingtothesuccessionofourknowledge:whichisimpossible.498
InObjectionFour,thefactthattheintellectisaninfinitevirtue(infinite=not
determinedbymatter,subsistentinitself)istakentoimplythatitisaninfinitevirtueina
differentsense,i.e.,asactivelyinfinite,withaninfiniteactivepotentialoninfinitethings.In
theanswer,St.Thomasconcedesthefirstpointoftheobjection,butclarifiesinwhat
precisesensethatinfinity(asnon-determinationbymatter)impliesaninfinityintheobject:
becausetheobjectalsoisnon-determinedbymatter(thequidditasinitsabstraction),itcan
becalled“infinite”,insofarasitcanbeunderstoodorpredicatedofinfiniteindividuals.The
infinityofthisuniversalisnotan“intensive”infinity(includinginitselfalltheperfectionsof
theindividuals)butaninfinityofindetermination(itisnotdeterminedtothisorthat
individual,butitcanrefertoallofthem).ThecompletetextoftheAdquartumsays:
Asourintellectisinfiniteinpower,sodoesitknowtheinfinite.Foritspowerisindeedinfiniteinasmuchasitisnotterminatedbycorporealmatter.Moreoveritcanknowtheuniversal,whichisabstractedfromindividualmatter,andwhichconsequentlyisnotlimitedtooneindividual,but,consideredinitself,extendstoaninfinitenumberofindividuals.499
49886,2,c.:“Eteademrationenonpossumusintelligereinfinitainhabitu.Innobisenim
habitualiscognitiocausaturexactualiconsideratione,intelligendoenimefficimurscientes,utdiciturinIIEthic.Undenonpossemushaberehabituminfinitorumsecundumdistinctamcognitionem,nisiconsideravissemusomniainfinita,numerandoeasecundumcognitionissuccessionem,quodestimpossibile.”
49986,2ad4:“Sicutintellectusnosterestinfinitusvirtute,itainfinitumcognoscit.Estenimvirtuseiusinfinita,secundumquodnonterminaturpermateriamcorporalem.Etestcognoscitivusuniversalis,quodestabstractumamateriaindividuali,etperconsequensnonfinituradaliquodindividuum,sed,quantumestdese,adinfinitaindividuaseextendit.”
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Therefore,infinityinhumanintellectcouldbeunderstoodintwosenses:first,asan
infinitepotencyofreceiving;second,asapotencyofreceivingsomethinginfinite,meaning
nowbyinfinite“undeterminedtothisorthatindividual.”
Itcouldbehelpfultoconsiderthat,forAquinas,theonlypotencythatpre-contains
virtuallyallperfection(asanactiveprinciple,asefficientcause)istheessenceofGod:“The
FirstActistheuniversalprincipleofallacts;becauseItisinfinite,virtually‘precontainingall
things,’asDionysiussays(Div.Nom.v).”500TheessenceofGodis,forSt.Thomas,distinct
fromcreatures,insofarasGodisintensivefullnessofperfection,andthecreatures
participatethatperfection.Thetextjustquotedcontinues:
WhereforethingsparticipateofItnotasapartofthemselves,butbydiffusionofItsprocessions.Nowaspotentialityisreceptiveofact,itmustbeproportionatetoact.ButtheactsreceivedwhichproceedfromtheFirstInfiniteAct,andareparticipationsthereof,arediverse,sothattherecannotbeonepotentialitywhichreceivesallacts,asthereisoneact,fromwhichallparticipatedactsarederived;forthenthereceptivepotentialitywouldequaltheactivepotentialityoftheFirstAct.501
Itisinthissense,asoneintensiveactwhichthemultiplethingsparticipate,thatGod
ispureactandthatthecreaturesareimperfectacts,mixedwiththeirrespective(multiple)
potencies.Thetext,oncethemisconceptionof“(one)purepotency”hasbeendiscarded,
continuesbydistinguishingtheintellectualpotencyfromthemateriaprima,as(both)
receptive(but)ofdifferentkindsofforms:“Nowthereceptivepotentialityinthe
intellectualsoulisotherthanthereceptivepotentialityoffirstmatter,asappearsfromthe50075,5ad1:“Primusactusestuniversaleprincipiumomniumactuum,quiaestinfinitum,
virtualiterinseomniapraehabens,utdicitDionysius.”50175,5ad1:“Undeparticipaturarebus,nonsicutpars,sedsecundumdiffusionem
processionisipsius.Potentiaautem,cumsitreceptivaactus,oportetquodactuiproportionetur.Actusverorecepti,quiproceduntaprimoactuinfinitoetsuntquaedamparticipationeseius,suntdiversi.Undenonpotestessepotentiaunaquaerecipiatomnesactus,sicutestunusactusinfluensomnesactusparticipatos,alioquinpotentiareceptivaadaequaretpotentiamactivamprimiactus.”
213
diversityofthethingsreceivedbyeach.Forprimarymatterreceivesindividualforms;
whereastheintelligencereceivesabsoluteforms.”502Whatisimportantforusisthe
distinctionbetweentheactivepotencyofGod,containingvirtualiterallperfection,andany
othercreatedpotency,characterizedasreceptive(insofarascreatedpotenciesparticipate
thefirstintensiveact);andtheprecisecharacterizationoftheintellectasreceptiveof
absoluteforms,thatistosay,theuniversals.
Thereforetheinfinityofpossibilitiesofthehumanintellectregardsfirstofallthe
possibilityofalwaysreceivingmoreintime:“…throughitsconsideringsuccessivelyone
thingafteranother:becauseneverdoesourintellectunderstandsomanythings,thatit
cannotunderstandmore.”503Then,itimpliestheformalinfinityoftheuniversalreceived,
thatinitselfcanbereferredtoinfiniteindividuals:“Moreoveritcanknowtheuniversal,
whichisabstractedfromindividualmatter,andwhichconsequentlyisnotlimitedtoone
individual…”504Itisinanycaseaninfinitecapacityofreception,andnotanactiveorvirtual
potentiality,pre-containingtheperfectionoftheknown.505Itshouldbeclear,however,that
50275,5ad1:“Estautemaliapotentiareceptivainanimaintellectiva,apotentiareceptiva
materiaeprimae,utpatetexdiversitatereceptorum,nammateriaprimarecipitformasindividuales,intellectusautemrecipitformasabsolutas.”
50386,2,c.:“…inaccipiendoscilicetunumpostaliud,quianunquamintellectusnostertotintelligit,quinpossitpluraintelligere.”
50486,2ad4:“Etestcognoscitivusuniversalis,quodestabstractumamateriaindividuali,etperconsequensnonfinituradaliquodindividuum…”
505WhenIspeakaboutthisobjective“pre-containing”Icertainlyhaveinmindthelanguageofpre-apprehensioninsomeinterpretationsofAquinas,butIamnotaddressingthemdirectly.Inordertoaddressthem,aclarificationofwhatismeantby“pre-apprehension”intheseinterpretationswouldbenecessary,andthatisnotthepurposeofthisdissertation.Itisimportant,forexample,tounderstandinwhatsensetheyspeakofobject,whichcannotbesimplyidentifiedwithcontent:“Nowthispre-apprehensionitselfdoesnotattaintoanyobject[andnote27]Coreth:‘Knowingaboutsomethingelse,aboutanobjectintheoppostitionofsubjectandobjectisaderivative,nottheoriginalsenseofknowing’”(Cullen,77).Wewouldalsoneedtounderstanda
214
St.Thomasisherespeakingofthepossibleintellect.But,becausetheagentintellectis
sometimesnotproperlydistinguishedfromthepossibleintellect,andthetextsthemselves
canbeusedtosupportthecounterclaim,theclarificationseemsuseful.
OtherworksofAquinasmayhelptoconfirmtheproposedinterpretation.Inthe
followingtextoftheContraGentiles,noseparatesubstance(exceptGodHimself)canbea
sufficientprincipleoftheknowledgeofallthings.Theangelsthemselvesneedtoreceive
intelligiblecontentfrominfusedspeciesinordertoknowthingsotherthanthemselves.This
doctrinestronglysuggeststhattheagentintellectdoesnotprecontaininsomesortall
intelligiblecontent.
Wemust,therefore,considerthat,sincenoneofthesesubstancesisbyitsessenceasufficientprincipleoftheknowledgeofallotherthings,theremustaccruetoeachofthem,overandaboveitsownsubstance,certainintelligiblelikenesses,wherebyeachofthemisenabledtoknowanotherinitspropernature.[…]Butsuchalikenessofallbeing,canbenothingotherthananinfinitenature:anaturenotdeterminedtosomespeciesorgenusofbeing,buttheuniversalprincipleofallbeingandthepowerproductiveofallbeing;andthis,aswasshowninBookI,isthedivinenaturealone.Indeed,noothernaturecanbetheuniversallikenessofallbeing,sinceeverynatureexceptGodislimitedtosomegenusandspeciesofbeing.506
St.Thomasdenies,aswehaveseen,anyactualityofthespeciestotheintellectin
itself:“Itfollowsthatthesoulasawholeisnotthe‘place’offorms,butonlythatpartofit
notionofbeingthatisinsomewaysubjective:“Inposingthisquestion,however,Rahneralsoarguesthatmanisalreadywithbeinginitstotality.Ifmanwerenot,hecouldnotaskaboutbeing”(Cullen,74).
506CGII,98,par.8-9:“Considerandumestigiturquod,cumnullahuiusmodisubstantiarumsecundumsuamessentiamsitsufficiensprincipiumcognitionisomniumaliarumrerum,unicuiqueearum,suprapropriamsubstantiam,oportetsuperadderequasdamintelligibilessimilitudines,perquasquaelibetearumaliaminproprianaturacognoscerepossit[…]Talisautemsimilitudototiusentisessenonpotestnisinaturainfinita,quaenondeterminaturadaliquamspeciemvelgenusentis,sedestuniversaleprincipiumetvirtusactivatotiusentis:qualisestsolanaturadivina,utinprimoostensumest.Omnisautemalianatura,cumsitterminataadaliquodgenusetspeciementis,nonpotestesseuniversalissimilitudototiusentis.”
215
whichlacksabodilyorgan,i.e.theintellect;andeventhispartdoesnot,assuch,possess
themactually,butpotentiallyonly.”507ItwouldbePlatonictoaffirmthatthesoulpossesses
allsciencealready,asifitwerehabitually:“Thisisagainst[…]Plato’sopinionthatthe
humansoulisbynatureinpossessionofauniversalknowledgewhichonlyitsunionwith
thebodyhascausedittoforget.(ThistheoryisimplicitinPlato’sreductionoflearningto
remembering.)”508
Thattheagentintellectdoesnotprecontaintheknowncanbetakenfromthe
followingtextalso.Theobjectionprovidesthecontextforthefollowinganswer:
Further,inordertohaveactivity,anagentandapatientalonearenecessary.Therefore,ifthepossibleintellect,whichisthepatientincognition,isapartofoursubstantialprinciple,aswaspreviouslyshown,andtheagentintellectisalsoapartofoursoul,itseemsthatwepossesswithinourselveseverythingnecessaryinorderthatwemaybeabletounderstand.509
Althoughoursoulpossessesanagentandapossibleintellect,neverthelesssomethingextrinsicisrequiredsothatwemaybeabletounderstand.Firstofall,indeed,weneedphantasms,derivedfromsensiblethings,bymeansofwhichthelikenessesofparticular(determinatarum)thingsarepresentedtotheintellect.Fortheagentintellectisnotanactinwhichthedeterminatespeciesofallthings[arepresentinordertoknow],anymorethanlightcan[determinesighttoparticular
507InIIIDeAnima1,233-236:“Nondicendumest,quodtotaanimasitlocusspecierum,sed
solumparsintellectiva,quaeorganumnonhabet.Necitaestlocusspecierum,quodhabeatactuspecies,sedpotentiatantum.”
508InIIIDeAnima3,53-60:“Etperhocexcluditur[…]opinioPlatonis,quiposuitnaturaliteranimamhumanamhabereomnemscientiam,sedesseeamquodammodooblitam,propterunionemadcorpus:dicens,quodaddiscerenihilaliudestquamreminisci.”Wewillexaminelaterthemeaningofthesoulas“quodammodoomnia.”
509Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,ob.6:“Adactionemaliquamnonrequiriturnisiagensetpatiens.Siigiturintellectuspossibilis,quisehabetutpatiensinintelligendoestaliquidsubstantiaenostrae,utpriusmonstratumest,etintellectusagensestaliquidanimaenostrae;videturquodinnobissufficienterhabeamusundeintelligerepossimus.”
216
(determinatas)kindsofcolors,unlessthosesamecoloursdeterminingsightarepresent.]510
Thefollowingtext511isaveryclearindicationthat,forAquinas,theagentintellect
doesnotprecontaintheintelligiblecontent.Thequestioniswhethertheagentintellectis
oneforallhumanbeingsoreachhashisorherownagentintellect.Theobjectionwantsto
relatetheactualityoftheagentintellecttotheactualityoftheintelligiblecontent:either
theagentintellectpossessesthecontentwhichwillbeimpressedonthepossibleintellect
(andsothereisnoneedofabstraction),oritdoesnot;butifitdoesnotpossessthe
content,itcannotproducethecontentbyabstractionbecause,inordertofindwhatoneis
searchingfor,thereneedstobesomepreviousidea(=content)ofit.
Iftheagentintellectisapartofthesoul,itmusteitherbecreatedclothedorfilledwithspecies:andinthatcaseitplacesthosespeciesalsointhepossibleintellect,andwillnotneedtoabstractintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasms;orelseitiscreatednakedandlackinginspecies:andinthatcaseitwillnotbeeffectuallyabletoabstractspeciesfromphantasms,becauseitwillnotrecognizethatspecieswhichitisseeking,afterithasabstractedit,unlessitpreviouslyhadsomenotionofit.512
Aquinas’answerexplicitlyrejectstheideathattheagentintellectberelatedtothe
content.Topossessthecontentornotispropertotheknowingfaculty,whichisnotthe
510Q.D.DeAnima,a.5ad6:“Dicendumquodlicetinanimanostrasitintellectusagenset
possibilis,tamenrequirituraliquidextrinsecumadhocquodintelligerepossimus.Etprimoquidemrequirunturphantasmataasensibilibusaccepta,perquaerepraesententurintellectuirerumdeterminatarumsimilitudines.Namintellectusagensnonesttalisactusinquoomniumrerumspeciesdeterminataeaccipipossintadcognoscendum;sicutneclumendeterminarepotestvisumadspeciesdeterminatascolorum,nisiadsintcoloresdeterminantesvisum.”
511DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ob.15etad15.512DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ob.15:“Siintellectusagensestaliquidanimae,oportetquodvelsit
creatusvestitusseuopulentusspeciebus,etsicillasspeciesponitetiaminintellectumpossibilem,etnonindigebitabstraherespeciesintelligibilesaphantasmatibus;autcreatusestnudusetcarensspeciebus,etsicnoneritefficaxadabstrahendumspeciesaphantasmatibus,quianoncognoscetillamquamquaerit,postquameamabstraxerit,nisipriusaliquamrationemhabuerit.”
217
agentintellectbutthepossibleintellect.ForAquinas,theagentintellectdoesnotinany
wayprecontaintheintelligiblecontent:513
Itisincorrecttosaythattheagentintellectisnakedorclothed,fullofspeciesoremptyofthem.Fortobefilledwithspeciesischaracteristicofthepossibleintellect,buttocausethemischaracteristicoftheagentintellect.Nowitmustnotbesaidthattheagentintellectunderstandsinisolationfromthepossibleintellect,butthatthemanunderstandsbymeansofboth…514
1.2.“Quodammodoomnia”
ThisAristotelianphrasecouldalsobeusedtosupporttheideathattheintellectpre-
containsinsomewaytheknown.Somerecurrencesofthisphrasewillbenoted,with
Aquinas’correspondingexplanations.Themostimportant,perhaps,isthefollowing
becauseitrelatesthischaracteristicofhumanknowingtoGodaspre-containingthe
perfectionofeverything:
Butinthosethingswhichhaveknowledge,eachoneisdeterminedtoitsownnaturalbeingbyitsnaturalform,insuchamannerthatitisneverthelessreceptiveofthespeciesofotherthings:forexample,sensereceivesthespeciesofallthingssensible,andtheintellect,ofallthingsintelligible,sothatthesoulofmanis,inaway,allthingsbysenseandintellect:andthereby,thosethingsthathaveknowledge,inaway,approachtoalikenesstoGod,‘inWhomallthingspre-exist,’asDionysiussays.515
513Thattheoriginofthecontentisinsensibilitywillbemorespecificallytreatedinthis
Chapter,section2.514DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10ad15:“Inconvenienterdiciturintellectusagensnudusvelvestitus
plenusspeciebusvelvacuus.Implerienimspeciebusestintellectuspossibilissedfacereeasestintellectusagentis.Nonestautemdicendumquodintellectusagensseorsumintelligatabintellectupossibili:sedhomointelligitperutrumque…”
51580,1,c.:“Inhabentibusautemcognitionem,sicdeterminaturunumquodqueadpropriumessenaturaleperformamnaturalem,quodtamenestreceptivumspecierumaliarumrerum,sicutsensusrecipitspeciesomniumsensibilium,etintellectusomniumintelligibilium,utsicanimahominissitomniaquodammodosecundumsensumetintellectum,inquoquodammodocognitionemhabentiaadDeisimilitudinemappropinquant,inquoomniapraeexistunt,sicutDionysiusdicit.”
218
Ashasalreadybeensuggested,516itisclearthatquodammodoomniaimplies
specificallythecapacityofreceivingallsensibleandintelligibleperfectionsproportionateto
thesepotencies.Itisalsoclearthat,inthisway,thebeingspossessingknowledgecome
closertotheperfectionofGodinsofarastheyprogressfromthepossessionoftheirown
specificformonlytothepossessionofotherformsaswell.Thesimilarity(quodammodo)
comesfromthefactthatthoseperfections,nowintentionallypresentintheknower,were
alreadyvirtuallycontainedinGod.
Itseemsbettertointerpretthistextastalkingabouttheactualreceptionofthe
knownperfections,ratherthanastalkingaboutmerelythepotencyofreceivingthem.If
thisisthecase,thenthetextmeans“utsicanimahominissitomniaquodammodo,”thatis
tosay,“sic”=byreceivingthespeciesofallsensibleandintelligibleobjects.This
interpretationwouldmakebettersenseofthesimilaritywithGod“inquoomnia
praeexistunt”inact(becausethemerelypotentialsimilaritywouldbealessersimilarity)
andoftheprogressimpliedbytheword“appropinquant”(althoughitcouldalsomeana
static-metaphysicalproximity).
ThisAristotelianphrase,however,isusedbyAquinasinotherinstanceswiththe
precisemeaningofthesoulbeingallthingsinpotency.In84,2,ObjectionTworequiresthat
thesoulknowsthecorporealthingsbyitself.Thereasonisthatthesoulisallthingsand,
therefore,hasalsothenatureofthecorporealthings,andsinceknowingisbythelike,ergo:
“ThePhilosophersays(DeAnimaiii,8)that‘thesoul,afterafashion,iseverything.’Since,
therefore,likeisknownbylike,itseemsthatthesoulknowscorporealthingsthrough
516Cf.Chapter3,sections1,3and5.
219
itself.”517ButAristotle,accordingtoAquinas,doesnotmeantosaythatthesoulisall
thingsasifitwouldhavetheperfectionofallthingsinact:
Aristotledidnotholdthatthesoulisactuallycomposedofallthings,asdidtheearlierphilosophers;518hesaidthatthesoulisallthings,‘afterafashion,’forasmuchasitisinpotentialitytoall—throughthesenses,toallthingssensible—throughtheintellect,toallthingsintelligible.519
ForAquinas,themistakemadebytheNaturalPhilosophersisnotonlythatthe
knownisactualintheknower,butthatthisactualityis“natural,”thatistosay,thatthe
perfectionoftheknownisintheknowerwitharealandnaturalbeing(thefirstmodeof
beingofDeVer.2,2).Still,Aquinas’pointisthatthesoul,inknowing,isallthingsonlyin
potency,andasmuchinpotencyofthesensibleasoftheintelligible.Thatthispotencyis
potencyofreceivingratherthananactivepotencyhasalreadybeenshownintheprevious
text.Inanycase,theAristoteliantextasusedbyAquinasdoesnotsupporttheideaofthe
intellectas“pre-containing”inacertainwaytheperfectionoftheknown:potencyof
receivingcontent(eveneverypossiblecontent)impliespreciselythatthecontentisnotyet
inthepotencyitself.ForAquinas,thepossibleintellectcanalsobe“tabularasa”exactly
becauseitisallthingsonly“quodammodo.”Thattobeinpotencyofsomethingistopre-
51784,2,ob.2:“Philosophusdicit,inIIIDeAnima,quodanimaquodammodoestomnia.
Cumergosimilesimilicognoscatur,videturquodanimaperseipsamcorporaliacognoscat.”518Cf.InIDeAnima12,8-16.51984,2ad2:“Aristotelesnonposuitanimamesseactucompositamexomnibus,sicut
antiquinaturales;seddixitquodammodoanimamesseomnia,inquantumestinpotentiaadomnia;persensumquidemadsensibilia,perintellectumveroadintelligibilia.”
220
containit,inacertainsense,mightalsobesaid,butsuchanexplanationdoesnotseemto
fosterabetterunderstandingofAquinas.520
That,forAquinas,theintellectis“tabularasa”insofarasitdoesnotprecontainany
ofitsobjects,canbetakenfromotherworksaswell.521Itisnotdifficulttofindagreement
withotherauthors.522
1.3.TheProcessofLearning
Isnottheprocessoflearningaproofthatscience(aswhatisknownobjectively)
comes,inacertainsense,fromourselves?Infact,whenwelearn,wedonotreceiveinfused
520Thatthesoulis“quodammodoomnia”inpotencyonlyisclearalsoinInIIIDeAnima7,
28-36;cf.InIIIDeAnima7,54-61(wherethecomparisonwiththesensesinthereceptivityoftheformsofallthingscanalsobeseen);InIIIDeAnima1,170-180(seetextinAppendix,Note23).
521Cf.InIIIDeAnima1,131-139:“Anythingthatisinpotencywithrespecttoanobject,andabletoreceiveitintoitself,is,assuch,withoutthatobject;thusthepupiloftheeye,beingpotentialtocoloursandabletoreceivethem,isitselfcolourless.Butourintellectissorelatedtotheobjectsitunderstandsthatitisinpotencywithrespecttothem,andcapableofbeingaffectedbythem(assenseisrelatedtosensibleobjects).Thereforeitmustitselflackallthosethingswhichofitsnatureitunderstands.”(translator’sparentheses)[Omneenim,quodestinpotentiaadaliquidetreceptivumeius,careteoadquodestinpotentia,etcuiusestreceptivum;sicutpupilla,quaeestinpotentiaadcolores,etestreceptivaipsorum,estcarensomnicolore:sedintellectusnostersicintelligitintelligibilia,quodestinpotentiaadeaetsusceptivuseorum,sicutsensussensibilium:ergocaretomnibusillisrebusquasnatusestintelligere.];InIIIDeAnima3,45-53:“And[thereisalso]thechangewhichimpliesnothingmorethanareceptionofformsfromoutsidethechangedthing.Themind,then,iscalledpassivejustinsofarasitisinpotency,somehow,tointelligibleobjectswhicharenotactualinituntilunderstoodbyit.Itislikeasheetofpaperonwhichnowordisyetwritten,butmanycanbewritten.Suchistheconditionofthe[possible]intellect,solongas[nothingoftheintelligibleobjectsisactualinit,butonlyinpotency].”[Etestaliquodpati,quoddicitursecundumreceptionemtantum.Intellectusigiturdiciturpati,inquantumestquodammodoinpotentiaadintelligibilia,etnihilestactueorumantequamintelligat.Oportetautemhocsicesse,sicutcontingitintabula,inquanihilestactuscriptum,sedplurapossuntineascribi.Ethocetiamacciditintellectuipossibili,quianihilintelligibiliumestineoactu,sedpotentiatantum.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ob.17;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.(thesetwolasttextsinAppendix,Note24).
522Cf.Lambert,85(aftertalkingoftheinfusedknowledgeofangels):“Theposibleintellect,ontheotherhand,knowsnothingnaturallyandmustacquireeachoneofitsspeciesseparately”;93:“Thehumanintellectisoriginallyemptyandsomustacquirethespecieswhichactuateit”;Sellés(cf.EIA,272)placesamongthe“Thomisticnegationsregardingtheagentintellect”theclaimthatit“doesnothaveinitselfanyintelligiblespecies.”
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speciesfromourteacher.Ifthosenewideasdonotcomefromourselves,wheredothey
comefrom?WewillrefertotwotextsofAquinasthatmaybeenlightening.
ThefirstoneisfromthearticlewhereAquinasdeniesthatweunderstandthingsby
innateideas.Thethirdobjectionwillpointoutthat,bymeansofquestionsinanorderly
fashion,apersonwhohadnotpreviouslyacquiredcertainknowledgerespondstruly(as
oneknowing)aboutwhatisbeingquestioned.TheanswerofSt.Thomasisthefollowing:“If
questionsbeputinanorderlyfashiontheyproceedfromuniversalself-evidentprinciplesto
whatisparticular.Nowbysuchaprocessknowledgeisproducedinthemindofthelearner.
Whereforewhenheanswersthetruthtoasubsequentquestion,thisisnotbecausehehad
knowledgepreviously,butbecausehethuslearnsforthefirsttime.”523Thetextseemsto
suggestthatthequestionsprovoketherightphantasmwhichallowsthediscipletolearnex
novowhathedidnotknowbefore.Theothertextappearstopointinthesamedirection:
Secondly,anyonecanexperiencethisofhimself,thatwhenhetriestounderstandsomething,heformscertainphantasmstoservehimbywayofexamples,inwhichasitwereheexamineswhatheisdesirousofunderstanding.Forthisreasonitisthatwhenwewishtohelpsomeonetounderstandsomething,welayexamplesbeforehim,fromwhichheformsphantasmsforthepurposeofunderstanding.524
ForAquinas,itseemsevidentthat,becausethelightoftheagentintellectis
connaturalandcannotfail,yetrequiresasensiblephantasmtoabstract,trueunderstanding
ofthingsispossibleonlyaslongastherightphantasmisformed.Thephenomenonof52384,3ad3:“Ordinatainterrogatioproceditexprincipiiscommunibuspersenotis,ad
propria.Pertalemautemprocessumscientiacausaturinanimaaddiscentis.Undecumverumrespondetdehisdequibussecundointerrogatur,hocnonestquiapriuseanoverit;sedquiatunceadenovoaddiscit.”
52484,7,c.:“Secundo,quiahocquilibetinseipsoexperiripotest,quodquandoaliquisconaturaliquidintelligere,formataliquaphantasmatasibipermodumexemplorum,inquibusquasiinspiciatquodintelligerestudet.Etindeestetiamquodquandoaliumvolumusfacerealiquidintelligere,proponimuseiexempla,exquibussibiphantasmataformarepossitadintelligendum.”
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teachingisnotexplainedbythepresenceofinnateideas,norbytheinfusionofspecies;
rather,teachingistheartofhelpingthelearnertoformtherightphantasm,sothatthe
learner’sowninteriorlight(theagentintellect)abstractstheideawhichwasalreadyinthe
mindoftheteacher,andispresent,bywayofthelatter’sart,inthephantasmproducedfor
thelearner.Inanycase,thereisnoindicationthatAquinasissuggestingapre-
comprehensionorimplicitknowledgeofthingsinthesetexts.525
1.4.TheNaturalDesiretoKnow
OnemightbetemptedtousethenaturaldesiretoknowinAquinas’textasabasis
forsuggestingaformalapriori.Itistruethatwhatisdesiredmustbeknowninacertain
senseand,therefore,anaturaldesiretoknowthingsdoesseemtoimplyacertain
knowledgeofthem.
Aquinasalwaysmakesacleardistinctionbetweenthenaturalappetiteandthe
appetitewhichfollowsanapprehension:
Someinclinationfollowseveryform:forexample,fire,byitsform,isinclinedtorise,andtogenerateitslike.Now,theformisfoundtohaveamoreperfectexistenceinthosethingswhichparticipateknowledgethaninthosewhichlackknowledge.Forinthosewhichlackknowledge,theformisfoundtodetermineeachthingonlytoits
525Cf.alsothetextpreviouslystudied(title:“Infinityinthehumanintellect”),DeSpirit.
Creat.,a.10,ob.15etad15.InCGII,75,par.15wefindsimilarreflections:“Andbyproposingsensibleexamples,fromwhichthephantasmsnecessaryforthedisciple’sunderstanding[maybeformed]inthesoul.Andsincetheoutwardactionoftheteacherwouldhavenoeffectwithouttheinwardprincipleofknowledge,whosepresenceinusweowetoGod…”[Proponendoexemplasensibilia,exquibusinanimadiscipuliformenturphantasmatanecessariaadintelligendum.Etquiaexterioroperatiodocentisnihiloperareturnisiadessetprincipiumintrinsecumscientiae,quodinestnobisdivinitus…]Thelatterprincipiumistheagentintellect,whichisnecessaryonthesideofthesubjectinordertomakethephantasmsintelligible.
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ownbeing—thatis,toitsnature.Thereforethisnaturalformisfollowedbyanaturalinclination,whichiscalledthenaturalappetite.526
Thenaturalappetiteisthatwhichfollowsthenaturalform:itisacertaintendency
towardspreservingthatform’sbeing,andtowardsthethingsthatarenaturaltothatform
(forthefiretogoup,intheexample).Theappetitefollowinganapprehensionisthe
tendencytowardstheapprehendedform,notasknown(inwhichsenseitisalready
possessed)butasreal,astheperfectionoftheotherwhichisfittingtothesubject.
Moreover,thenaturalappetitefollowseverynaturalform,bethatformsubstantialor
accidental.Thatiswhythenaturalappetitebelongsaswelltotheintellectualfaculty:
intelligencedesiresitsownperfectionwithnaturalappetite.Aquinassays:
The‘naturalappetite’isthatinclinationwhicheachthinghas,ofitsownnature,forsomething;whereforebyitsnaturalappetiteeachpowerdesiressomethingsuitabletoitself.Butthe‘animalappetite’resultsfromtheformapprehended;thissortofappetiterequiresaspecialpowerofthesoul—mereapprehensiondoesnotsuffice.Forathingisdesiredasitexistsinitsownnature,whereasintheapprehensivepoweritexistsnotaccordingtoitsownnature,butaccordingtoitslikeness.Whenceitisclearthatsightdesiresnaturallyavisibleobjectforthepurposeofitsactonly—namely,forthepurposeofseeing;buttheanimalbytheappetitivepowerdesiresthethingseen,notmerelyforthepurposeofseeingit,butalsoforotherpurposes.Butifthesouldidnotrequirethingsperceivedbythesenses,exceptonaccountoftheactionsofthesenses,thatis,forthepurposeofsensingthem;therewouldbenoneedforaspecialgenusofappetitivepowers,sincethenaturalappetiteofthepowerswouldsuffice.527
52680,1,c.:“Quamlibetformamsequituraliquainclinatio,sicutignisexsuaformainclinatur
insuperioremlocum,etadhocquodgeneretsibisimile.Formaauteminhisquaecognitionemparticipant,altiorimodoinveniturquaminhisquaecognitionecarent.Inhisenimquaecognitionecarent,inveniturtantummodoformaadunumessepropriumdeterminansunumquodque,quodetiamnaturaleuniuscuiusqueest.Hancigiturformamnaturalemsequiturnaturalisinclinatio,quaeappetitusnaturalisvocatur.”
52778,1ad3:“Adtertiumdicendumquodappetitusnaturalisestinclinatiocuiuslibetreiinaliquid,exnaturasua,undenaturaliappetituquaelibetpotentiadesideratsibiconveniens.Sedappetitusanimalisconsequiturformamapprehensam.Etadhuiusmodiappetitumrequiriturspecialisanimaepotentia,etnonsufficitsolaapprehensio.Resenimappetiturproutestinsua
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Also,inthislattertext,itisclearboththatthenaturalappetitedoesnotimplya
distinctfaculty,andthattheappetitefollowingapprehension,infact,needsadistinct
faculty.Further,thereisnoconfusionbetweenthenaturalappetiteoftheobjectandthe
appetitivefaculty,becausewhatisdesiredineachcaseisformallydifferent:theobjectin
ordertoknow(theperfectionofthecognitivefacultyitself),versustheobjectinitself(the
perfectionoftheobjectasfittingtothesubjectalsoinotherrespects).Significantly,the
appetitivefacultycanalsodesiretoknowsomething,butinthiscaseknowingisdesiredas
aparticulargoodofthesubject,ratherthanforthegoodofthefacultyitself.Similar
reflectionsarefoundinthefollowingtext:
Eachpowerofthesoulisaformornature,andhasanaturalinclinationtosomething.Whereforeeachpowerdesiresbythenaturalappetitethatobjectwhichissuitabletoitself.Abovewhichnaturalappetiteistheanimalappetite,whichfollowstheapprehension,andbywhichsomethingisdesirednotassuitabletothisorthatpower,suchassightforseeing,orsoundforhearing;butsimplyassuitabletotheanimal.528
Whatistheperfectiondesiredbyintelligencewithnaturalappetite?Itisitsnatural
perfectionasfaculty,thatistosay,tounderstand.Theintellectdesirestoknow;thewill,
instead,desireswhatisknown,onceitisknown.Theintellectdesirestoknowasa
subjectiveperfection(naturalappetite);thewilldesirestheknownasanobjective
natura,nonestautemsecundumsuamnaturaminvirtuteapprehensiva,sedsecundumsuamsimilitudinem.Undepatetquodvisusappetitnaturalitervisibilesolumadsuumactum,scilicetadvidendum,animalautemappetitremvisampervimappetitivam,nonsolumadvidendum,sedetiamadaliosusus.Siautemnonindigeretanimarebusperceptisasensu,nisipropteractionessensuum,scilicetuteassentiret;nonoporteretappetitivumponerespecialegenusinterpotentiasanimae,quiasufficeretappetitusnaturalispotentiarum.”
52880,1ad3:“Dicendumquodunaquaequepotentiaanimaeestquaedamformaseunatura,ethabetnaturaleminclinationeminaliquid.Undeunaquaequeappetitobiectumsibiconveniensnaturaliappetitu.Supraquemestappetitusanimalisconsequensapprehensionem,quoappetituraliquidnonearationequaestconveniensadactumhuiusvelilliuspotentiae,utpotevisioadvidendumetauditioadaudiendum;sedquiaestconvenienssimpliciteranimali.”
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perfection(appetitefollowingapprehension).Theintellect’stranscendentalorientationto
knowand,inthatsense,toknowthings,issimplyitsnature,thatwhichmakesit“intellect.”
Thenaturaldesireortendency,then,comesfromthefactthattheintellectisabletoknow,
apotencyofknowing.Thisnaturaltendencydoesnotimplythattheintellectalready
knows;thetendencyistherefromthebeginningwhiletheintellectstilldoesnotknow,and
isstillthereonceithasknown.529
Moreover,thisnaturaldesiretoknowshouldnotbeconfoundedwiththeconscious
desirewhichonemayhavetoalwaysknowmore.530InthemindofAquinas,althoughthis
latterdesirecouldbecalled“natural,”insofarasitisaccordingtohumannature,it
evidentlypresupposesknowledge.Theonlynaturalintellectualdesirepreviousto
knowledgeisthenaturalappetite,andthisnaturalappetite,inthetextofAquinas,doesnot
implyanyformalanticipationoftheobject.Inotherwords,forAquinas,theappetitewhich
impliesknowledgeisnotthenaturalappetiteoftheintellect,butthewill;andthenatural
appetiteoftheintellectisnottheappetiteoftheobjectinitself,buttheappetiteofthe
faculty’sperfection.Thedistinctionbetweencontentandmodeofbeinginthespecieshere
provescrucialinunderstandingthemindofSt.Thomas.529Thisistrueinsofarasthenaturalappetiteappliesalsototheformthatispossessed.530Afurtherdistinctionmaybemadebetweenthedesireofknowingmoreaboutanobject
(say,moreaboutMathematics)orofsimplyknowingmore,being“morelearned.”Inbothcases,thisappetiteimpliesknowledge,andalthoughthisisaccordingtothenaturalappetite,itseemstomethatknowingisdesiredmoreasagoodofthesubjectthanasagoodofthefacultyitself.Inthefirstcase,thedrivetoknowmoreabouttheobjectseemsmorelikeanaturaldesire(asadesireofknowingMathematics);butbecausewhatisdesiredisknowingMathematicsassomethinggood,orbettersaid,thegoodofknowingMathematics(say,forthe“pleasure”itimplies),Ithinkitwouldbemoreaccuratetosaythatitisanelicitdesireofthewill.Itcouldbegranted,still,thatthefacultywhichknowsMathematicswillalso“desire”toknowmoreofitwithnaturalappetite,andwill“repose”inthepossessionofitsknowledge;butitdoesnotseemthatthisdesirecanbeidentifiedwiththeconsciousorelicitdesire.
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1.5.“Naturaliternotavelindita”
Despitetheclearindicationsthat,forAquinas,therearenoinnateideas,his
affirmationofprinciplesnaturallyknownor“included”(indita)inthemindmayraisethe
questionofacertain“objective”presenceofthoseprinciplesintheintellectprevioustoany
actofknowing.Relevanttextstobeexaminednowfollow.
In79,12,c.,itisclearthat,forSt.Thomas,therearesomenaturallyknown
principlesfromwhichreasoningmustbegin:
Man'sactofreasoning,sinceitisakindofmovement,proceedsfromtheunderstandingofcertainthings—namely,thosewhicharenaturallyknownwithoutanyinvestigationonthepartofreason,asfromanimmovableprinciple—andendsalsoattheunderstanding,inasmuchasbymeansofthoseprinciplesnaturallyknown,wejudgeofthosethingswhichwehavediscoveredbyreasoning.[…]Thereforewemusthave,(imprintedin)usbynature,notonlyspeculativeprinciples,butalsopracticalprinciples.531
Now,inthistext,itissaidthatthoseprinciplescomewithoutinvestigation,not
withoutabstraction.Amovement,aspassagefrompotencytoact,requiressomethingin
actinordertohappen.Therefore,thebeginningofreasoningasmovementcannotbe
reasoningitself,butmustbesomethingimmobile,anactualperfection(here,thefirst
principles).Grantedthatthefirstbeginningofamovementcannotbetheresultofa
specificallyequalmovement,itmaywellbetheresultofanotherkindofpassagefrom
53179,12,c.:“Ratiocinatiohominis,cumsitquidammotus,abintellectuprogreditur
aliquorum,scilicetnaturaliternotorumabsqueinvestigationerationis,sicutaquodamprincipioimmobili,etadintellectumetiamterminatur,inquantumiudicamusperprincipiapersenaturaliternota,dehisquaeratiocinandoinvenimus[…]Oportetigiturnaturaliternobisesseindita,sicutprincipiaspeculabilium,itaetprincipiaoperabilium.”
227
potencytoact,suchasabstraction.Thefactthatthosefirstprinciplesareprinciples,ina
certainsense,doesnotmeanthattheyarenotaresultinadifferentsense.532
Moreover,itissaidthatthesefirstprinciplesare“naturallyknown,”notthatthey
areinnate.“Naturallyknown”maysimplymeanknownaccordingtonature,accordingto
thenaturaloperationofthehumanfaculties.
Atthesametime,includedorinditadoesnotnecessarilymean“innate”,butitmay
refertothepresenceofthoseprinciplesinthemind.Ifknowingisreceptive,“naturally
included”and“naturallyknown”meanthesamething;oncesomethingisknown,itis“in”
themindbymeansofthespecies.
ThislineofinterpretationismoreconsistentwithwhatSt.Thomassaysfour
questionslater:
532InthissenseshouldbeunderstoodInIIDeAnima11,224-231:“Whenamanacquires
knowledge[…]therearetwoprinciplesinvolved:anintrinsicone,whichamanuseswhenhefindsthingsoutforhimself;andanextrinsicone,aswhenhelearnsfromothers.Butinbothcasesapotencyisactualisedbysomethingalreadyinact.Thelightoftheagentintellectgivesamanimmediateactualknowledgeofthefirstprincipleswhichweknowbynature…”[Homoenimacquiritscientiam,etaprincipiointrinseco,duminvenit,etaprincipioextrinseco,dumaddiscit.Utrobiqueautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,abeoquodestactu.Homoenimperlumenintellectusagentis,statimcognoscitactuprimaprincipianaturalitercognita…]BesidesthefactthatSt.Thomasissaying“statim”,andthereforedoesnotnecessarilyimplyapre-containingoftheprinciples,hispointhereisthattheactualityoftheprinciplesalreadyknownallowsthe“inveniens”todrawconclusionsfromthem.Whatisprincipleinacertainsense(oftheconclusions),canbearesultinadifferentsense(oftheagentintellect’sactiononthephantasms).Cf.InIIDeAnima12,17-26:“Now,asasubjectmovesfromprimarypotencyintoprimaryactualitywhenitacquiresknowledgethroughteaching,sotooasubject’sprimarypotencytothepossessionofasense-facultyisactualisedbyhisbirth.Butwhereasasense-facultyisnaturaltoeveryanimal,—sothatintheactofbeinggenerateditacquiresasense-facultyalongwithitsownspecificnature—thecaseisnotthesamewithintellectualknowledge;thisisnotnaturallyinborninman;ithastobeacquiredthrough[investigation]anddiscipline.”[Sicutautemdepotentiaprimaaliquidmutaturinprimumactum,dumacquiritscientiamperdoctrinam;itadeprimapotentiaadsensum,aliquidmutaturinactum,utscilicethabeatsensumpergenerationem.Sensusautemnaturaliterinestanimali:undesicutpergenerationemacquiritpropriamnaturam,etspeciem,itaacquiritsensum.Secusautemestdescientia,quaenoninesthominipernaturamsedacquiriturperinventionemetdisciplinam.]
228
Thecognitivesoulisinpotentialitybothtotheimageswhicharetheprinciplesofsensing,andtothosewhicharetheprinciplesofunderstanding.ForthisreasonAristotle(DeAnimaiii,4)heldthattheintellectbywhichthesoulunderstandshasnoinnatespecies,butisatfirstinpotentialitytoallsuchspecies.533
Afterdenyingthepresenceofspecies“naturallyincluded”,however,St.Thomas
doesnothesitatetospeakaboutthingsthatareknownnaturally,preciselythefirst
principles.InshowingtheinconsistencyofPlato’sposition,thatthesoulisnaturally(from
thebeginning)endowedwithspecies,St.Thomassays:“Because,ifthesoulhasanatural
knowledgeofallthings,itseemsimpossibleforthesoulsofartoforgettheexistenceof
suchknowledgeasnottoknowitselftobepossessedthereof:fornomanforgetswhathe
knowsnaturally;that,forinstance,thewholeislargerthanthepart,andsuchlike.”534
St.Thomas,therefore,isaffirmingthepresenceofprinciples“naturaliterindita”and
thendenyingthepresenceofspecies“naturaliterindita.”ItisnotrelevantherethatSt.
Thomasspeaksinitiallyofprinciplesandthenofspeciesbecause,forAquinas,thespecies
arethemeanstounderstandeverything.Theuseofthesamewording,however,shouldnot
confusewhomeverisattentivetotheclearcontextinwhicheachofthestatementsoccurs.
Inthefirsttext,535St.Thomasisnotspeakingabouttheoriginoftheprinciples,butabout
theoriginofreasoning.Reasoningisamovementoftheintellectfromsomethingalready
knowntosomethingunknown,andthereforeitimpliessomethingknownasprinciple.The53384,3,c.:“Oportetdicerequodanimacognoscitivasitinpotentiatamadsimilitudines
quaesuntprincipiasentiendi,quamadsimilitudinesquaesuntprincipiaintelligendi.EtpropterhocAristotelesposuitquodintellectus,quoanimaintelligit,nonhabetaliquasspeciesnaturaliterinditas,sedestinprincipioinpotentiaadhuiusmodispeciesomnes.”
53484,3,c.:“Sihabetanimanaturalemnotitiamomnium,nonvideturessepossibilequodhuiusnaturalisnotitiaetantamoblivionemcapiat,quodnesciatsehuiusmodiscientiamhabere,nullusenimhomoobliviscitureaquaenaturalitercognoscit,sicutquodomnetotumsitmaiussuaparte,etaliahuiusmodi.”
53579,12.
229
knownwhichisprincipleofthismovementcannotbethefruitofreasoning,exactlybecause
itisitsprinciple.Theknownmust,then,betheresultofthefirstnaturalactualizationofthe
intellect,andnotofthemovementoftheintellectasalreadyperfect.ThatiswhySt.
Thomassays:“naturaliternotorumabsqueinvestigationerationis.”Here,naturallymeans
“withoutinvestigation,”becauseSt.Thomasisdealingwiththeprincipleofinvestigationas
movement.Naturallyalsomeansthatitisanactualizationaccordingtonature,insofarasit
depends,notontheperfectionofaparticularsubject,butontheperfectionofnatureitself,
andheretheperfectionoftheintellectualfacultiesinordertoknowreality.Here,principles
naturaliterinditasimplymeansprinciplesthatarepresentinthemind,notasaresultofthe
movementoftheintellectinact,butasaresultofthenaturalfirstactualizationofthe
intellect.
Inthesecondtext,St.Thomasisexpresslydenyingthattheknowledgewehaveof
corporealthingscomesfromspeciesincludednaturally(=exnaturaasfromthefirstorigin)
inthemind.Laterinthequestion,St.Thomasaffirmsthatthisknowledgecomesfrom
speciesthatareabstractedfromthephantasm.Thatistosay,thespeciesthatarethe
meansofhumanknowledgearenotready-madeinthemind,butneedtobeabstracted
fromthephantasmofsensitivity.WhatAquinasaffirmshereisthatthereasonforthelack
ofspecies“naturallyincluded”isthattheintellectisinpotencyofspecieslikethis:ifthey
werenaturallyincluded,theintellectwouldnotbetabularasaorinpotency,butinactorat
leastinhabitofpossessingscience.ForSt.Thomas,thisisclearlynotthecase.Therefore,
whatisdeniedhere(“speciesnaturaliterindita”)isthattheintellectisalreadyinactby
nature(thatistosay,bybeingwhatitis).Thereasontodenythisisthattheintellectisby
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natureinpotencyofspecieslikethis.Whatisaffirmedorsupposedintheprevioustextis
thatthefirstactualizationoftheintellectisaccordingtonature,andnotaresultofthe
reasoningactivityoftheintellectitself,whichisstillnotinact.
Therefore,itshouldbeclearthat,forAquinas,thereisoriginallynothinginthemind
allowingustosaythatthemindisinact,oreveninthehabitofknowinganything.Thefact
thattheactualizationofthemindisnaturalinthefirstplace(firstconceptsandfirst
judgmentsdependingonthoseconcepts)doesnotnegatethefactthattheintellectisin
purepotencyofallthesethings,andpassivepotency,aswehaveseen.
ThesamedoctrinecanbeseeninotherworksofAquinas.Aclearinstanceisthe
followingtext.Here,theexplanationofthe“naturaliter”knownisthatthelightbywhich
thoseprinciplesaremadeintelligibleis“natural”inhumanbeings.Again,theuniversal
principlesknownnaturallycomenaturallyfromexperience:
Inspeculativesciences,everyconsiderationisreferredbacktocertainprimarythings,whichmancertainlydoesnotneedtolearnnorfindout(otherwisehewillneedtogoontoinfinity):manpossessesnaturallythecognitionoftheseprimarythings.Ofthiskindaretheindemonstrableprinciplesofdemonstration[…]andalsothefirstconceptionsoftheintellect,suchasthenotionofbeing,one,andthelike[…].Suchnaturallyknownthingsaremadeknowntomanthroughtheverylightoftheagentintellect,whichisnaturaltoman,bywhichlightsomethingismadeknowntous,onlyinsofarasbytheagentintellectthephantasmsaremadeintelligibleinact.Thisisinfacttheactoftheagentintellect,asissaidinIIIDeAnima.Now,thephantasmscomefromthesenses;fromthis,itfollowsthattheprincipleofcognitionoftheaforementionedprinciplesisinthesensesandthememory,asthePhilosopherdemonstratestowardstheendofPosteriorum.536(mytrans.)
536InBoet.DeTrin.6,4,c.:“Omnisconsideratioscientiarumspeculativarumreduciturin
aliquaprima,quaequidemhomononhabetnecesseaddiscereautinvenire,neoporteatininfinitumprocedere,sedeorumnotitiamnaturaliterhabet.Ethuiusmodisuntprincipiademonstrationumindemonstrabilia[…]etetiamprimaeconceptionesintellectus,utentisetuniusethuiusmodi[…]Huiusmodiautemnaturalitercognitahominimanifestanturexipsolumineintellectusagentis,quod
231
InthetextofInIIIDeAnima4,26-35,St.Thomasisdenyingthattheagentintellect
bethehabitusofthefirstprinciplesinsofarasthiswouldimplythatthesoulalready
understandsinactthetermsoftheseprinciples,andsothatthosetermsarenotacquired
bytheactionoftheagentintellect.ItisevidentthatforAquinasthereisnothingnaturally
precontainedinthesoul,regardingthecontentofunderstanding:
Thislastphrasehasledsometosupposethattheagentintellectisonewiththe‘intellect’whichisahabitualapprehensionoffirstprinciples.Butitisnotso;forthelatter‘intellect’presupposes[somethingsalreadyunderstoodinact,namelythetermsofthoseprinciples],inunderstandingwhichweapprehendthetruthoffirstprinciples.Sotheviewinquestionwouldimplythattheagentintellectwasnot,asAristotleheremaintains,theprimarysource,forus,oftheactualintelligibilityofanything.537
Thatthefirstprinciplesarealsoknownfromexperienceand,therefore,nottobe
confoundedwiththeagentintellect,isexplicitinthefollowingtext.Fromtextslikethisitis
esthomininaturale,quoquidemluminenihilmanifestaturnobis,nisiinquantumperipsumphantasmatafiuntintelligibiliainactu.Hicenimestactusintellectusagentis,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.Phantasmataautemasensuaccipiuntur;undeprincipiumcognitionispraedictorumprincipiorumestexsensuetmemoria,utpatetperphilosophuminfinePosteriorum.”ThesamereferencetothePosterioraisfoundinanothercleartextDeVer10,6,sc2:“Atfirst,allourcognitionconsistsintheknowledgeoffirstundeducibleprinciples.Butthecognitionofthesearisesinusfromsense,asisclearfromthePosteriorAnalytics.Therefore,allourknowledgearisesfromsense.”[Omnisnostracognitiooriginaliterconsistitinnotitiaprimorumprincipiorumindemonstrabilium.Horumautemcognitioinnobisasensuoritur,utpatetinfinePoster.Ergoscientianostraasensuoritur.]Whatisoriginalascontentinhumanunderstandingisnotprecontainedbutacquiredfromexperience.
537InIIIDeAnima4,26-35:“Huiusautemverbioccasione,quidamposueruntintellectumagentemidemessecumintellectuquiesthabitusprincipiorum.Quodessenonpotest:quiaintellectus,quiesthabitusprincipiorum,praesupponitaliquaiamintellectainactu:scilicetterminosprincipiorum,perquorumintelligentiamcognoscimusprincipia:etsicsequeretur,quodintellectusagensnonfaceretomniaintelligibiliainactu,uthicphilosophusdicit.”ThetextcontinuesexplaininginwhatsenseAristotlesaysthattheagentintellectisa“habitus”:“ThereforeIholdthattheterm[‘habit’]isusedhereinthesenseinwhichAristotleoftencallsanyformornaturea[‘habit’],todistinguishitfromaprivationorapotency.Inthiscasetheagentintellectiscalleda[habit]todistinguishitfromtheintellectinpotency.”[Dicendumestergo,quodhabitus,sicaccipitursecundumquodphilosophusfrequenterconsuevitnominareomnemformametnaturamhabitum,prouthabitusdistinguiturcontraprivationemetpotentiam,utsicperhocquodnominateumhabitumdistinguateumabintellectupossibili,quiestpotentia.]
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clearalsothatthefirstprinciplesarenotnaturallypresentintheintellect,inthesenseof
previoustotheagentintellect’sactiononthephantasms:
Indeed,somementhoughtthattheagentintellectdoesnotdifferfromourhabitusofindemonstrableprinciples.Butthiscannotbethecase,becausewecertainlyknowindemonstrableprinciplesbyabstractingthemfromsingulars,asthePhilosopherteachesinthePosteriorAnalytics.538
1.6.TheTextof84,6:materiacausae
ThefactthatAquinasmentionssensibilityasnotthetotalandperfectcauseof
intellectualknowing,butratherasthematterofthe(total)cause(“materiacausae”),may
seemtoimplythattheformofthecause(theuniversalcontent)isprovidedbythe(agent)
intellect.Inthisway,AquinaswouldbesuggestinganEpistemologyinlinewithKant’s,in
whichthesensesprovidethematterandintelligencetheform.Isthisactuallywhatthetext
suggests?Whichothertextscouldshedlightonacorrectinterpretation?
538Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,c.:“Quidamverocredideruntintellectumagentemnonessealiud
quamhabitumprincipiorumindemonstrabiliuminnobis.Sedhocessenonpotest,quiaetiamipsaprincipiaindemonstrabiliacognoscimusabstrahendoasingularibus,utdocetphilosophusinIPoster.”Amongthe“Thomisticnegationsregardingtheagentintellect”,Sellésincludesthatitisnotreceptiveofhabits(innate,acquiredorinfused)anditisnottobeconfoundedwiththehabitofthefirstprinciples(cf.Sellés,EIA,272).Inafootnote,Fabrosaysthefollowing:“‘Praeexistunteniminipsa(naturahumana)naturaliterprincipiademonstrationumpersenota,quaesuntseminaquaedamsapientiae,etprincipiaquaedamiurisnaturalisquaesuntseminaquaedamvirtutummoralium’[Forself-evidentprinciplesofdemonstrations,whichareseedsofthecontemplationofwisdom,naturallypreexistin(thatnature),asdoprinciplesofnaturallaw,whichareseedsofthemoralvirtues](DeVeritate,q.XIV,a.2;cfr.q.XI,a.1ad5um;q.XVIII,a.6).Elsewhereitisexplicitlysaidthatthefirstprinciplesare‘innatiquodammodo’[innate,inasense(mytrans.)].Cfr.InIISent.,Dist.24,q.II,a.3;InIVSent.,Dist.49,q.I,a.3,Sol.III;DeVeritate,q.X,a.6ad6um.Thisterminology,whichwasincommonwiththeAgostinians(v.MATTHAEUSABAQUASPARTA,QQ.DeFideetcognition,AdAquasClaras,1903,q.1,p.53)disappearsintheThomisticworksofmaturity,wheretheoriginofthefirstprinciplesisabsolutelyentrustedtothe[Greek]epagogué,whichtakesthemfromexperience,notonlyregardingthecontentoftheisolatedtermsbutalsoregardingtheirconnection.Onthisquestioncfr.C.Fabro,[Englishintheoriginal]KnowledgeandPerceptioninthearistotelic-thomisticPsychology,in:‘ThenewSholasticism’XII(1938),pp.337-365”(Fabro,NMP,277.AneweditionofthecitedarticleisinourBibliography).Regardlessoftheterminology,IthinkitisclearthatthedoctrineofAquinasontheoriginofthefirstprincipleshasnotchanged.
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Letustakeacloserlookat84,6.Thequestioniswhetherornotthesoulacquiresits
intellectualknowledgefromthesensiblethings,andtheanswerispositive,butwitha
distinction.Throughouttheentirearticleitseemsclearthatknowingisreceptiveandnot
active,sincetheissueofthesourceofknowingisreferredtotheprincipleofa
proportionatecause,bywhichknowledgeisproducedinthefaculty.Inotherwords,the
agentobjectofintellectualknowingmustbedifferentfromtheoneofsensibility,because
theremustbeaproportionbetweeneffect(here,thedifferentknowing)andagent.539In
thethirdobjection,infact,St.Thomasargues:“Aneffectdoesnotsurpassthepowerofits
cause.Butintellectualknowledgeextendsbeyondsensiblethings:forweunderstandsome
thingswhichcannotbeperceivedbythesenses.Thereforeintellectualknowledgeisnot
derivedfromsensiblethings.”540Intheobjection,then,thereasonthatourintellectual
knowledgedoesnotcomefromsensiblethingsisbecausetheyarenot,assensible,
proportionatecauseforourknowledgeofintellectualthings.Senseknowledgehereis
clearlyperception,andintellectualknowledgeisallegedlytoo.AsFabronotes,541St.
539Asimilarapproachtothequestion,thatis,theprincipleofaproportionatecause,maybe
seeninDeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad17:“Aspecieswhichisintheimaginationisofthesamegenusasaspecieswhichisinasense,becausebothareindividualandmaterial.Butaspecieswhichisinanintellectbelongstoanothergenus,becauseitisuniversal.Andconsequentlyanimaginedspeciescannotimprintanintelligiblespeciesasasensitivespeciesimprintsanimaginedspecies;andforthisreasonanactiveintellectualpowerisnecessary,whereasanactivesensepowerisnot.”[…speciesquaeestinimaginatione,esteiusdemgeneriscumspeciequaeestinsensu,quiautraqueestindividualisetmaterialis;sedspeciesquaeestinintellectu,estalteriusgeneris,quiaestuniversalis.Etideospeciesimaginarianonpotestimprimerespeciemintelligibilem,sicutspeciessensibilisimprimitspeciemimaginariam;propterquodnecessariaestvirtusintellectivaactiva,nonautemvirtussensitivaactiva.]
54084,6,ob.3:“Effectusnonseextenditultravirtutemsuaecausae.Sedintellectualiscognitioseextenditultrasensibilia;intelligimusenimquaedamquaesensupercipinonpossunt.Intellectualisergocognitiononderivaturarebussensibilibus.”
541Cf.LS,116,footnote.
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Thomasinrespondingdoesnotrejecttheprinciplesoftheobjection:“Sensitiveknowledge
isnottheentirecauseofintellectualknowledge.Andthereforeitisnotstrangethat
intellectualknowledgeshouldextendfurtherthansensitiveknowledge.”542Thatis,itistrue
thattheeffectdoesnotgobeyondthecause:theremustbeproportion.However,because
whatisperceivedbythesensesisnotthetotalcauseofintellectualknowing,butisthe
causeonlyinacertainsense(materially),wecanstillsaythatintellectualknowingcomes
fromsensiblethings,evenifitisnotreducedtothecontentofsensiblecognition.
Thepointis,then,thattheremustbeaproportionatecausethatproduces
intellectualknowledgeinthepossibleintellect(i.e.,theintelligibleinact),asthesensiblein
actisproportionatecauseofsensibleknowledge.Thecorpusisbetterunderstoodinthis
sense:”AndthereforeinordertocausetheintellectualoperationaccordingtoAristotle,the
impressioncausedbythesensibledoesnotsuffice,butsomethingmorenobleisrequired,
for‘theagentismorenoblethanthepatient,’ashesays.”543Hereagensdoesnotreferto
theagentintellectdirectly,buttotheintelligibleinactproducedbytheagentintellect,as
thefollowingcomparisonwiththePlatonicideaandthereferenceto“intelligibiliainactu”
suggest:
Not,indeed,inthesensethattheintellectualoperationiseffectedinusbythemereimpressionofsomesuperiorbeings,asPlatoheld;butthatthehigherandmorenobleagentwhichhecallstheactiveintellect,ofwhichwehavespokenabove,544
54284,6ad3:“Adtertiumdicendumquodsensitivacognitiononesttotacausaintellectualis
cognitionis.Etideononestmirumsiintellectualiscognitioultrasensitivamseextendit.”54384,6,c.:“Etideoadcausandamintellectualemoperationem,secundumAristotelem,non
sufficitsolaimpressiosensibiliumcorporum,sedrequirituraliquidnobilius,quiaagensesthonorabiliuspatiente,utipsedicit.”
544TheOttawaeditionrefersto79,3and4.
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causesthephantasmsreceivedfromthesensestobeactuallyintelligible,byaprocessofabstraction.545
Inotherwords,intellectualknowledgecannotbecausedbythemereimpressionof
sensiblethings(forlackofproportionatecause),norisitcausedbytheimpressionofa
Platonicidea(forthesourceofknowledgemustbeinthesensiblethings,whicharethetrue
reality),butbytheimpressionoftheintelligibleinact,producedfromthephantasmbythe
agentintellectandimpressedinthepossibleintellect.
Accordingtothisopinion,then,onthepartofthephantasms,intellectualknowledgeiscausedbythesenses.Butsincethephantasmscannotofthemselvesaffectthepassiveintellect,andrequiretobemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect,itcannotbesaidthatsensibleknowledgeisthetotalandperfectcauseofintellectualknowledge,butratherthatitisinawaythe[matterofthe]cause.546
Quodammodomateriacausae,therefore,meansthatthephantasmisthe“matter”
outofwhichtheagentintellectproducestheintelligibleinactbymeansofitsillumination,
andthatsameintelligibleinactwillbetheproportionatecauseofintellectualknowing.
IsthisnotpreciselywhatleadssomereadersofAquinastoreducesensibleknowing
toprovidingthematterforthecompletingactivityofintelligence?Itisimportantto
54584,6,c.:“Nontamenitaquodintellectualisoperatiocauseturinnobisexsola
impressionealiquarumrerumsuperiorum,utPlatoposuit,sedilludsuperiusetnobiliusagensquodvocatintellectumagentem,dequoiamsupradiximus,facitphantasmataasensibusacceptaintelligibiliainactu,permodumabstractioniscuiusdam.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima4,76-77,whereSt.ThomasinterpretstheAristotelianphrase:“theagentismorenoblethanthepatient”(mytrans.)[honorabiliusestagenspaciente]intheDeAnima’stextontheagentintellectasreferredtotheagentintellectitself.IdonotthinkthatthischallengesmyinterpretationoftheSumma,forthereasonsexposedabove,andforwhatwewillsayabouttheagentintellectasactusintelligibilium,i.e.,inwhatsensetheagentintellectcouldbesaidtobethatwhichactualizes“formally”theobjectofunderstanding.
54684,6,c.:“Secundumhocergo,expartephantasmatumintellectualisoperatioasensucausatur.Sedquiaphantasmatanonsufficiuntimmutareintellectumpossibilem,sedoportetquodfiantintelligibiliaactuperintellectumagentem;nonpotestdiciquodsensibiliscognitiosittotalisetperfectacausaintellectualiscognitionis,sedmagisquodammodoestmateriacausae.”
236
rememberthatinquestion84,Aquinasistryingtoexplainhowintelligenceworks(inthis
life),notdirectlywhatitknows,whichisalreadypresupposed.Inotherwords,theproblem
isnotwhetherweunderstandcorporealthings,buthow.Thefirstarticletellsusbywhich
facultyweunderstand(preciselymakingtheimportantdistinctionbetweenresintellecta
andmodusreiintellectae),whereasthefollowingarticlestellusbywhichagentobject.That
iswhy,afterdenyingthatknowledgeofcorporealthingsisverifiedbymeansofintelligible
“ready-made”intermediaries(theintellect’sownessence,innatespecies,infusedspecies,
ortheessenceofGod),Aquinasgoestotheother“extreme”,thesensiblethings,inorderto
showinwhatsensesomethingthatisnotactuallyintelligiblecanbethesourceofthe
intellectualoperation;inthisway,Aquinasfinallyarrivesattheabstractedspeciesasagent
object.Therefore,inthiscontext,thatsensibleknowingisinacertainsensethematterof
intellectualknowingshouldbeunderstoodoftheoperation(how),notofthecontent
(what),i.e.,ofintelligibilityasamodeofbeing,notofwhatisunderstood.St.Thomasisnot
sayingthatthephantasmisthematterofwhatisunderstood,butthatthemodeofbeingof
thephantasmisnotproportionatetobetheagentobjectofintellectualknowing,and
therefore,initsparticularity,thephantasmworksonlyasa“matter”fromwhichtheagent
intellectproducestheagentobject,whichistheintelligibleinact.Inotherwords,heisnot
sayingthatsensiblethingsareamatterthatobtainsintelligibilityascontentwhentheagent
intellectilluminatesthem;heissayingthatthephantasmislikeamatterthatobtains
intelligibilityasamodeofbeingwhenitisilluminatedbytheagentintellect.Aswehave
seen,forAquinas,sensiblethingsarewhatisunderstood,insofarastheuniversalnature
subsistinginthecorporealthingsistheobjectofunderstanding.
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Theagentobjectisnecessarilyanintelligibleinact.Thatiswhythesensiblethings
cannotbetheagentobjectofintellectualknowing.Butbecauseouragentobjectdoescome
fromsensiblethings,theycanbesaidtobeinacertainsensethesourceofourintellectual
knowing.Theagentintellectproducestheintelligibleinactfromthephantasm,andforthis
reason,thephantasmcanbeconsideredacertain“matter”oftheagentobject,inthesense
of“thatoutofwhich”theintelligibleinactcomesinsomeway.
Inwhatway?Aquinasmentionsit:“permodumabstractioniscuiusdam.”Theway
thephantasmismadeintelligibleinactbytheagentintellectis“byacertainabstraction,”
thatis,notbypreservingthephantasm’sparticularity,norbyborrowingacertaincontent,
butbytheintellect’s“takingfrom”thephantasm.Aquinashaspreviouslyexplained
abstractionasa“separation”oftheuniversalobjectfromitsindividualconditionsinthe
matter.547
547Cf.79,3,c.:“Wemustthereforeassignonthepartoftheintellectsomepowertomake
thingsactuallyintelligible,byabstractionofthespeciesfrommaterialconditions.”[Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.];79,4,c.:“…weperceivethatweabstractuniversalformsfromtheirparticularconditions,whichistomakethemactuallyintelligible.”[…percipimusnosabstrahereformasuniversalesaconditionibusparticularibus,quodestfacereactuintelligibilia];andafterwardsin85,1ad3:“Thisisdonebythepoweroftheactiveintellectwhichbyturningtowardsthephantasmproducesinthepassiveintellectacertainlikenesswhichrepresents,astoitsspecificconditionsonly,thethingreflectedinthephantasm.Itisthusthattheintelligiblespeciesissaidtobeabstractedfromthephantasm…”[Sedvirtuteintellectusagentisresultatquaedamsimilitudoinintellectupossibiliexconversioneintellectusagentissupraphantasmata,quaequidemestrepraesentativaeorumquorumsuntphantasmata,solumquantumadnaturamspeciei.Etperhuncmodumdiciturabstrahispeciesintelligibilisaphantasmatibus…]ThatSt.Thomasconsidersabstractionmorea“consideration”thana“separation”(cf.85,1ad1)doesnottakeawaythefactthatheconsidersthespecies“takenfrom”thephantasm(cf.InIDeAnima2,261:“plane-surfaces[…]whichcanbeconsideredbythemindapartfromthematter”[superficies,quaerationepossuntsepararianaturalimateria]).Thecontextshouldberegardedineachcase:whenabstractionrefersmoretotheproductionoftheintelligibleinactasagentobject,itmeanssomethingmorelike“separation”,becausetheintelligiblespeciesisreallyseparatefromthephantasm,astwodifferent
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ThefollowingseemstobethepassagethatwouldmisleadAquinas’readers:“causes
thephantasmsreceivedfromthesensestobeactuallyintelligible,byaprocessof
abstraction.”548Itdoesseemthatwhatisunderstoodisthephantasmitself,modifiedin
somewaybytheagentintellect,andsoperhapsprovidedwithintelligibilityascontent.But
abstraction,whichisexplicitlythewayinwhichthephantasmismadeintelligibleinact,
doesnotsupportthatassumption.Weshouldrathersaythatthephantasmiswhatismade
intelligibleinact,insofarasitisthesubjectmatteroftheactionoftheagentintellect.
Thereisanotherindicationinthetextthatmaysupportareadinginlinewiththe
restoftheproposedinterpretation.Intellectualknowledgeinthelastparagraphisequated
withtheimmutatioofthepossibleintellectbytheagentobject,andnotwiththeagent
intellect’sactivity,whichistheconditionoftheimmutatio.Thetwopotenciesandtheir
respectiveoperationsarenotconfused,aswehaveseen,andknowingisnotportrayedas
anactivityonsensibilitybutasareceptivityconditionedbysuchactivity(agentintellectas
metaphysicalaprioriofintellectualknowingasreceptiveofobjectivecontent).Wehave
agentobjects(cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,c.:“Foroneparticularman,suchasSocratesorPlato,makesthingsintelligibleinactwhenhepleases,thatis,byapprehendingauniversalformfromparticulars,whenheseparatesthatwhichiscommontoallindividualmenfromthosethingswhicharepeculiartoeach.”[Unusenimhomoparticularis,utSocratesvelPlato,facitcumvultintelligibiliainactu,apprehendendoscilicetuniversaleaparticularibus,dumsecernitidquodestcommuneomnibusindividuishominum,abhisquaesuntpropriasingulis.]);butwhenitregardstheuniversalcontentofthespecies,asdistinctfromthesensible,St.Thomaspreferstospeakabout“consideration”,becausethecontent,thoughabsolutelyspeakingdistinct(andthereforeknowablewithouttheother),isnotreallyseparatefromtheparticular(cf.InIIIDeAnima6,274-276:“Thereforetheintellectabstractsthingspresentinthesense-objects,notunderstandingthemtobeseparate,butunderstandingtheminseparationanddistinctly.”[mytrans.][Eaergoquaesuntinsensibilibusabstrahitintellectus,nonquidemintelligenseaesseseparata,sedseparatimetseorsumeaintelligens.])Thisisclearlyrelatedtothedistinctionbetweenabstractionasactoftheagentintellectandasactofthepossibleintellect(cf.Cromp,16ff.;Chapter1,section4;Chapter4,section2).
54884,6,c.:“…facitphantasmataasensibusacceptaintelligibiliainactupermodumabstractioniscuiusdam.”
239
alreadyseenthatthisactivityimpliesthatthecontentisalreadypresentintheparticular,
andthereforereferstothemodeofbeingofthecontent.
Forthereasonsexplained,itdoesnotseemthatanotionofexperiencethat
providesonlytherawmaterialfortheinformativeactivityofintelligencecanbegrounded
onthistext.Iwouldaddthatthe“quodammodo”shouldbetakenmoreseriously,and
thereforelessasaprecisereferencetoa“rawmaterial.”Itmustbeadmittedthatthis
particulartextisnotasclearasothers;inanycase,however,themeaningofmoreobscure
statementsshouldbeclarifiedbypayingattentiontotherestofthetreatise,sinceitisnot
plausiblethatSt.Thomasdeniesherewhatheaffirmselsewhere.Thethreeprevious
chaptersareintendedtoprovidethatcontext.
InotherpassagesSt.Thomasreferstothis“material”roleofsensibilityinother
ways.
In77,7,c.,aswehaveseenpreviously,Aquinassaysthatifweconsiderthesoul
insofarasitisreceptive,thelowerpotenciesactasprinciplesofthehigherones.Thus,the
sensesprovideasitwerethesubjectmatterfortheworkoftheintellect:“Butconsidered
asreceptiveprinciples,themore[imperfect]powersareprincipleswithregardtothe
others;thusthesoul,accordingasithasthesensitivepower,isconsideredasthesubject,
andas[acertain]materialwithregardtotheintelligence.”549Itisimportanttonotethat
thesensesareconsideredasacertain(againquoddam)matterfortheintellect,butinsofar
astheintellectisconsideredacertaincapacityofreception,andnotasanactiveprinciple
54977,7,c.:“Sedsecundumviamsusceptiviprincipii,econversopotentiaeimperfectiores
inveniunturprincipiarespectualiarum,sicutanima,secundumquodhabetpotentiamsensitivam,consideratursicutsubiectumetmaterialequoddamrespectuintellectus.”
240
whatsoever.Thefirstpartofthearticle,instead,dealswiththeintellectasacertainactive
principleofthelowerpotencieswithregardstotheirbeing(“sicutimperfectuma
perfecto”).550However,thisactivityisnotreferredtotheactivityoftheagentintellect.In
thesecondpartofthearticleSt.Thomasisdealingwiththefacultiesintheiroperation,551
andinthatexactcontexttheintellectisconsideredasareceptive–knowingfaculty,whose
subjectmatterisprovidedbythesenses.This,ofcourse,doesnottakeawaythenecessity
ofanagentintellectactingonthephantasmofsensitivity,butitdoesshowhowthefact
thatSt.Thomasconsiderstheproductofsensitivityacertainmatteroftheintellectual
operation,doesnotmeanthatheconsiderstheintellectualoperationasanactivity.Asin
theinterpretationofthephantasmasobject,theimportantpointistounderstandtherole
ofthesensesinhumanknowingasprovidingtherealinits“real”modeofbeing,inits
particularity,andthereforeputtingthesoulincontactwithitsobject.Insofarasthesenses
providewhatistobeknownintellectually,theymaybesaidtoprovidethe“object”of
humanunderstanding;thatis,weunderstandparticularthings.But,insofarastheproper
objectofhumanunderstandingisthequidditasofthecorporealthings,whichisnotactually
intelligibleinthephantasm,thesensesaresaidtoprovidethe“material”ofhuman
understanding,thatistosay,notthe“form”thatisunderstood,butthe“materialfrom
which”thatformwillcome,supposedtheactionoftheagentintellect.Thetranslation
“subjectmatter”seemstoconveyaccuratelywhatAquinasmeansby“materiale
550Wesetasidetheotherwayinwhichthehigherpotenciesareprinciplesofthelower:by
finality.551Asinquestion84,thematerialroleofthesensesisinthecontextoftheoperation.
241
quoddam”552and“quodammodomateriacausae”,553insofarasthematterherecontains
whatistobeunderstood.
Arelatedunderstandingoftheroleofthesenseswithregardstotheintellectual
operationcanbetakenfrom89,5,c.:“Butastheintellectualactresideschieflyand
formallyintheintellectitself,whilstitresidesmateriallyanddispositivelyintheinferior
powers,thesamedistinctionistobeappliedtohabit.”554Theactoftheintellectismainly
andformallyintheintellectitselfinsofarastheintellectistheplaceoftheintelligible
species(“locusspecierum”555);itismateriallyand“inawaythatcreatestheconditions”
(“dispositive”)intheinferiorfaculties,insofarastheintellectturnstotheirphantasmsin
ordertosee(speculari)itsownintelligibleobjects(asexistingintheconcrete)556St.Thomas
isspeakingdirectlyoftheactoftheintellectaftertheabstractionhashappened,and
thereforethe“materiality”ofthesensibleobjectacquireshereadifferentsense.
AbstractionandconversionaredistinctforSt.Thomas.Thesensibleobjectisnotherea
“matterfromwhich”theobjectwillbetaken,ora“subjectmatter”onwhichtheagent
55277,7.55384,6.55489,5,c.:“Sedsicutactusintellectusprincipaliterquidemetformaliterestinipso
intellectu,materialiterautemetdispositiveininferioribusviribus,idemetiamdicendumestdehabitu.”
555Cf.InIIIDeAnima1,226-236:“Wecanseethepointoftheoldsayingthatthesoulisthe‘place’offorms,—meaningthatitreceivestheseintoitself[…]Itfollowsthatthesoulasawholeisnotthe‘place’offorms,butonlythatpartofitwhichlacksabodilyorgan,i.e.theintellect;andeventhispartdoesnot,assuch,possessthemactually,butpotentiallyonly.”[Iampotestverificaridictumillorum,quidixerunt,quodanimaestlocusspecierum:quodpersimilitudinemdicitur,eoquodestspecierumreceptiva(…)Etideonondicendumest,quodtotaanimasitlocusspecierum,sedsolumparsintellectiva,quaeorganumnonhabet.Necitaestlocusspecierum,quodhabeatactuspecies,sedpotentiatantum.]
556Cf.84,7,c.:“…[I]nordertoperceivetheuniversalnatureexistingintheindividual.”[…utspeculeturnaturamuniversaleminparticulariexistentem.]
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intellectwillrealizeitsoperation;itisratherlikea“ground”or“support”fortheintellectual
activity,thatwhichkeepstheintelligiblespeciesboundtoreality.Thesensibleobjectis
whatallowstheintellecttoseetheuniversalnatureasitis,as(existing)intheconcrete.The
actofintelligenceshouldbetrulyunderstoodasan“intus–legere,”areadingtheuniversal
natureintheconcretereality.Thisis,inmyview,whatAquinasmeansbyconversioad
phantasmata.Theabstraction,instead,isstillnota“readinginto”becauseitisthe
“production”ofwhatistoberead(theimage)“outof”thephantasm.Andthepointofthis
dissertationistoshowthatwhattheagentintellectproducesisnotwhatistobereadinits
content,butinitsintelligiblemodeofbeing:theagentintellectproducesthespecies,the
imageofthenaturethatexistsintheconcrete.Justasthelightdoesnotpaintthedifferent
coloursbutmakesthemallvisible,theagentintellectmakesvisiblethedifferentnaturesof
particularthings.Finally,itisimportanttonotethatthematerialroleofthesenses,inthis
text,isnotrelatedtoanactivityofin-formationbytheintelligence,buttothenecessityofa
connexionwiththerealthroughtheconversioadphantasmataoftheintellectinact.The
phantasmisnottheobjectoftheintellect,becauseitissensible;however,thewayinwhich
theintellectcontemplatesitsintelligibleobjectisbyconvertingtothephantasm(the
sensibleobject).And,althoughitwouldbeimpossibletomaintainthattheintellectbeholds
twoobjects,itisnotimpossibletomaintainthat,whileonlyoneofthemactualizesit
formally,theotherqualifiestheoperation.Intheend,theintellectisthecauseofthe
cognitivepowerofthesenses,andtheyareforit,asAquinassays.Theirmetaphysical
interconnectionmayhelpinunderstandingthepossibilityofthiscooperationinthe
operativerealm.
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Thedistinctionbetweentherespectiveformalobjectsofthesensesandintelligence,
andtheinterconnectionbetweenthem,isalsomentionedin78,4ad4:“Althoughthe
operationoftheintellecthasitsorigininthesenses:557yet,inthethingapprehended
throughthesenses,theintellectknowsmanythingswhichthesensescannotperceive.In
likemannerdoestheestimativepower,thoughinalessperfectmanner.”558Althoughthere
isnoexplicitmentionofmateriality,theideaoftheobjectofthesensesasa“matterfrom
which”(“oriaturasensu”)andtheideaoftheintellectknowingitsobjectintheobjectof
thesenses(“inreapprehensapersensum”)arepresent.Atthesametime,thecomparison
betweentheestimativefacultyandtheintellectreassuresusthatSt.Thomasistalking
aboutbothas“perceptive”(receptive)faculties.Theestimativefaculty,indeed,isableto
perceivethingsthattheexternalsensesdonot(thesensibleperaccidens),andinthisitis
similartotheintellect,which“perceives”thequidditasofthecorporealthing.
Aquinas’“materiacausae”in84,6doesnotseemtosupportaKantianreadingofhis
doctrine.St.Thomasissayingthatthesensesprovidetheobjectassubjectmatter,they
presenttherealinitsrealmodeofbeing,theyprovidethenecessarycontactwiththereal
fortheintellectualoperationtohappen.But,forthatoperationtohappen,somethingelse
isrequired.Therealinitsrealmodeofbeingcannotactualizetheintelligence:onlyan
intelligibleinactcandothat.Theagentintellectilluminatesthephantasmandmakesits
quidditasvisibletotheeyeofintelligence.Morepowerfulthantheeyeofthesensesisthe
557Thematerialroleofthesensesisagainrelatedtotheintellectualoperation.55878,4ad4:“Licetintellectusoperatiooriaturasensu,tameninreapprehensapersensum
intellectusmultacognoscitquaesensusperciperenonpotest.Etsimiliteraestimativa,licetinferiorimodo.”Cf.84,6,ob.3andad3.
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eyeoftheintelligence,butintelligencestillneedsalighttoseeitsproperobject(andthisis
theagentintellect)aswellasneedingtherealobjectitself(andthisistheroleofthe
senses).Itisalwaysinthephantasmthattheeyeofintelligencecanseeitsproportionate
object,whichistheuniversalquidditasofthisphantasmasobjectiverepresentationofthe
corporealthing.Thephantasm,therefore,isthematterofthecauseinsofarastheefficient
cause(theagentintellect)producestheagentobject(theintelligiblespecies)fromthe
phantasm,makingthelatter(whichstandsfortheparticularrealthing)intelligibleinactby
meansofabstraction.559
1.7.TheAgentIntellectas“actusintelligibilium”
ThenexttaskistostudythetextsinAquinaswhichseemtospeakmoredirectly
abouttheagentintellectasacertainformoftheobjectofintelligence.
AccordingtoSt.Thomas,wecannotsaythatthereareintelligiblespeciesready-
madeinthemind.However,wecannotdenythattheagentintellectisready-madeinthe
559ThereseCory,approachinginsteadtheadmissionofaformalaprioriinintellectual
knowing,interpretsthistextdifferentlythanIdo.NoticehowsheusesalmostthesamewordsIusetospeakofametaphysicalapriori,butinadifferentsense:“[O]nemightarguethatAPM3[‘ActivePrincipleModel3’,herproposalforaninterpretationoftheactionoftheagentintellectinAquinas]isnotempiricistenough,becausetheintellectuallightaddssomethingtotheintellectthatwasnot‘firstinthesenses,’thatis,theformofintelligibility.Indeed,Aquinasagreesthat‘thesensesarenotthetotalcauseofintellectualcognition.’Nevertheless,thisdoesnotseemtobeofmajorconcern,sinceinAPM3theintellectuallightdoesnotaddanycontent,butonlyanewmodeofexisting,thatofintelligiblebeing.”Andinnotesheclarifies:“Atleast,itdoesnotaddnewcontentrelevantforunderstandingtheessenceoftheextramentalobject.AsIhaveargued,Aquinasholdsthatallactuallyintelligiblebeingisself-intelligible,sobecausetheagentintellectgrantsactuallyintelligiblebeingtothepossibleintellectthroughtheintelligiblespecies,thereisasenseinwhichtheveryintelligibilityoftheintelligiblespeciesisakindofcontentthatallowstheintellecttocognizeitselfwhenitiscognizinganythingelse(AquinasonHumanSelf-Knowledge,ch.6)”(Cory,Rethinking,639,myunderline).Cf.mypreviousremarksonCoryinChapter1.Foraratherstrangeinterpretationofthepassage,seeBerger,38,43.Herefersthemateriacausaetothematerialityoftheexternalsensesevenwithregardtotheinternalsenses.
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subject(i.e.somethingbelongingtothesoul).Now,Aquinassaysthattheagentintellectis
the“actoftheintelligible”objectsinthemind.Mightthismeanthattheagentintellectis
theform(act,perfection)ofeverythingweunderstand,andthereforewhatisunderstoodin
everyactofintelligence?MightthisbeaclearThomisticindicationoftheagentintellectas
aformalaprioriofhumanunderstanding?
Letusbeginwithanexplicitoccurrenceof“actusintelligibilium”:
Butasinthislifeourintellecthasmaterialandsensiblethingsforitspropernaturalobject,asstatedabove,itunderstandsitselfaccordingasitismadeactualbythespeciesabstractedfromsensiblethings,throughthelightoftheactiveintellect,which[…]actuatestheintelligiblethingsthemselves,[and]also,bytheirinstrumentality,actuatesthepassiveintellect.Thereforetheintellectknowsitselfnotbyitsessence,butbyitsact.560
Inwhatsenseistheagentintellecttheactoftheintelligible(objects)?First,letus
examinewhatSt.Thomasistalkingabout,thenwhatthoseintelligiblesare,andfinallythe
meaninghereof“act.”
1)St.Thomasissayingthattheintellectcannotbecomeanobjectofknowledge
unlessitissubjectively(asarealbeing)inact.Thisisbecause,evenifitisabeinginthe
realmoftheintelligible,itisinthatrealmtheleast,insofarasitisonlyinpotency,likethe
materiaprimaintherealmofcorporealthings.Now,whatmakesthepossibleintellect
subjectivelyinactisthespeciesassubjectivemodification.
56087,1,c.:“Sedquiaconnaturaleestintellectuinostro,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,
quodadmaterialiaetsensibiliarespiciat,sicutsupradictumest;consequensestutsicseipsumintelligatintellectusnoster,secundumquodfitactuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractasperlumenintellectusagentis,quodestactusipsorumintelligibilium,eteismediantibus[Ottawaeditionadds:“intelligit”]intellectuspossibilis.Nonergoperessentiamsuam,sedperactumsuumsecognoscitintellectusnoster.”
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2)Therefore,whenSt.Thomassaysthattheagentintellectistheactofthe
intelligible(objects)heisdirectlyreferringtothisaspectoftheintelligiblespecies(itsreality
asformaquo),nottotheintentionalpresenceoftheobject.Inotherwords,theagent
intellectis“actoftheintelligible”initsintelligiblemodeofbeing,notinitscontent.
3)Whatdoesitmeanthattheagentintellectistheactofthespeciesand,through
it,ofthepossibleintellect?Actistheprinciplebywhichsomethingisperfectinsomesense,
belongingintrinsicallytothethingitself.Theagentcauseisnot“actofthething”inthis
sense.But,ifwetakeas“actofthething”thatwhich“perfects”thethingitselfby
participatingsomeperfection,thenitcertainlyincludestheagentcausebutwewould,
then,beusingtheword“actus”inananalogicalandbroadersense.IsthiswhatAquinasis
doing?Letusseewhetherornotthissuggestioncanbegroundedinthetext.
IfthecorrectionoftheLeonineeditionisright,theagentintellectwouldbeboththe
actofthespeciesandtheactofthepossibleintellectthroughthespecies.561Thatmeans
561Cf.CGII,76,par.15:“Now,manisthemostperfectofalllowermovers,andhisproper
andnaturaloperationisunderstanding,whichisnotaccomplishedwithoutacertainpassivity,inthattheintellectispassivetotheintelligible;noragain,withoutaction,inthattheintellectmakesthingsthatarepotentiallyintelligibletobeactuallyso.Therefore,theproperprinciplesofboththeseoperationsmustbeinman’snature,normusteitherofthemhavebeinginseparationfromhissoul.Andtheseprinciplesaretheagentandthepossibleintellects.”[Homoautemestperfectissimusinteromniainferioramoventia.Eiusautempropriaetnaturalisoperatioestintelligere:quaenoncompletursinepassionequadam,inquantumintellectuspatiturabintelligibili;etetiamsineactione,inquantumintellectusfacitintelligibiliainpotentiaesseintelligibiliainactu.Oportetigiturinnaturahominisesseutriusquepropriumprincipiumscilicetintellectumagentemetpossibilem;etneutrumsecundumesseabanimahominisseparatumesse.]AfewparagraphslaterAquinasclarifiesthattheformsactualizingthepossibleintellectaretheintelligiblespeciesthemselves,nottheagentintellect.ThisisthemeaningoftheAristoteliancomparisonoftheagentintellecttoart,forexampleinCGII,76,par.18:“Fortheagentintellectstandsinthesamerelationtotheintelligiblespeciesreceivedintothepossibleintellectasarttotheartificialformswhichitproducesinmatter,astheexampleusedbyAristotleinDeanimaIII[…]makesclear.”[Comparaturenimintellectusagensadspeciesintelligibilesreceptasinintellectupossibili,sicutarsadformas
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thespeciesarethatwhichdirectlyactualizethepossibleintellect.Now,ifwetake“species”
hereasagentobject(asspeciesimpressa),St.Thomaswouldbesuggestingthatthespecies
areactofthepossibleintellectinsofarastheyareitsagentobject.Thiswouldalsobeinline
withwhatAquinashasjustsaid:“[intellectus]fitactuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractas
perlumenintellectusagentis.”Thepreposition“per”isnormallyusedfortheagentcause:
herethespeciesisagentasagentobject(intellectus“fitactuper”)andtheagentintellectis
agentastheoneabstracting(=faciensintelligibilia)thespeciesfromthesenses
(“abstractasper”).Isuggestthatthereisaclearconnectionbetweenthe“fitactuper”and
“eismediantibusintellectuspossibilis,”andbetween“abstractasper”and“actusipsorum
intelligibilium.”Inbothcases,theagentintellectiscauseofsomething(speciesimpressa)
thatinturniscauseoftheactoftheintellect.Theuseoftheword“actus”hastodowith
thefactthatSt.Thomasislookingforasubjectiveactualityintheintellect(itsownactus)
thatwouldallowittobeobjectofknowing;thissubjectiveintelligibility,orintelligibilityas
modeofbeinginthepossibleintellect,istheintelligibilityofthespeciesbecause,ofitself,
theintellectisinpotency(intelligiblespeciesasactusintellectus);thisintelligiblemodeof
beingofthespeciesisinturntheperfectionoftheagentintellectsince,ofitself,thespecies
artificialesquaeperartemponunturinmateria:utpatetexexemploAristotelisinIIIDeAnima.]AlsoforSellés(cf.EIA,254,272)theagentintellecthasafunctionofactontheintelligiblespecies,notdirectlyonthepossibileintellect.AndhequotesAquinas(translationfollows):“Etsiquisrecteconsideret,intellectusagens,secundumeaquaePhilosophusdeipsotraditnonestactivumrespectuintellectuspossibilisdirecte,sedmagisrespectuphantasmatum,quaefacitintelligibiliaactu,perquaeintellectuspossibilisreduciturinactumquandoaspectuseiusinclinaturadinferioraexunionecorporis.”[Andifoneconsidersrightly,hewillseethat,accordingtothePhilosopher’sowntreatmentofthematter,theagentintellectisnotactivedirectlywithrespecttothepossibleintellect,butratherwithrespecttophantasmswhichtheagentintellectmakesactuallyintelligible.Anditisbythephantasmsthusactualizedthatthepossibleintellectisactualizedwhen,asaresultofitsunionwiththebody,itsvisionisturnedtoinferiorthings.](Q.D.DeAnima,a.18,ad11,inSellés,EIA,254)
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(=nature)initsrealmodeofbeingisparticular(agentintellectas“actusipsorum
intelligibilium”).Inbothcases,however,oneisactusoftheotherinsofarasagent,andnot
asintrinsicallyperfectingtheother:butbecausetheperfectionreceiveddoesnotbelong
originallytotherecipient,itmakessensetocallthecause“act”ofit,tounderlinethe
potentialityoftherecipient.Thislatterisexactlythepointofthearticle:becausethe
essenceofthesoulisinpotency,itcannotbeknownbyitself,butbyitsoperation.
Ifthepreviousreflectionsseemcomplicated,itshouldbegrantedthatitisdifficult
tocalltheagentintellect“actoftheintelligible”inanyothersense.Thattheagentintellect
isnotthecauseoftheintelligiblecontenthasalreadybeendiscussed(insofarasthe
intelligiblecontentisnotsomethingthatneedstobemade,butitisready-madeinthe
thingitselfasitsnature).Forthisreason,theagentintellectcannotbetheactofthe
intelligibleasitsformalcontent.Thattheagentintellectcannotbeconfoundedwiththe
intelligiblemodeofbeingofeachspecies,maybeconcludedfromthefactthatanagent
causeisnotidentifiedwithitseffect;iftheagentintellectisresponsibleforthemodeof
beingoftheobjectspecificallyasagentofthismodeofbeing,thenagentintellectand
modeofbeingoftheobjectarenotthesamething.Forthisreason,theagentintellect
cannotbeactoftheintelligibleasitsintelligiblemodeofbeing.Thiscanbetakenfromthe
followingtwotextsaswell.
In79,4ad3,theroleofagentobjectisdeniedtheagentintellect:thelatterisnot
the(agent)object,butthefacultymakingthatobjectinact.Bothsenseandintelligenceare
showntobeactualizedbytheirrespectiveobjectsinact:
Iftherelationoftheactiveintellecttothepassivewerethatoftheactiveobjecttoapower,as,forinstance,ofthevisibleinacttothesight;itwouldfollowthatwe
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couldunderstandallthingsinstantly,sincetheactiveintellectisthatwhichmakesallthings(inact).Butnowtheactiveintellectisnotanobject,ratherisitthatwherebytheobjectsaremadetobeinact…562
Theroleoftheobjectasagent(heremovens)anditsdistinctionfromtheagent
intellectarepresentagainin79,7,c.:“Neverthelessthereisadistinctionbetweenthe
poweroftheactiveintellectandofthepassiveintellect:becauseasregardsthesame
object,theactivepowerwhichmakestheobjecttobeinactmustbedistinctfromthe
passivepower,whichismovedbytheobjectexistinginact.”563
Clearly,theagentintellectisnotactoftheintelligibleasintrinsicperfectionofthe
intelligibleinanysense:neitherasitscontent,norasitsmodeofbeing.
Theinterpretationbeingproposedisthefollowing.Theprinciplebywhich(the
natureof)therealthingisintelligibleinactistheagentintellect.Now,thisdoesnotmean
thattheagentintellectcommunicatesintelligibilityasuniversalcontent,butthatitisthe
principleofintelligibilityasamodeofbeing.Inotherwords,theagentintellectisnotan
objectiveactofthematerialofsensibility,butanagentprincipleoftheintelligibilityofthe
abstractedspecies.Thatiswhy,in87,1,c.,thatwhichactualizesthepossibleintellect
directly,asaformofit,isthe(already)intelligiblespecies,nottheagentintellect.Theagent
intellectasactisnotperfectiveofthepossibleintellectinitself,butoftheabstracted
56279,4ad3:“Dicendumquod,siintellectusagenscomparareturadintellectumpossibilem
utobiectumagensadpotentiam,sicutvisibileinactuadvisum;sequereturquodstatimomniaintelligeremus,cumintellectusagenssitquoestomniafacere.Nuncautemnonsehabetutobiectum,sedutfaciensobiectainactu…”
56379,7,c.:“Diversificaturtamenpotentiaintellectusagentis,etintellectuspossibilis,quiarespectueiusdemobiecti,aliudprincipiumoportetessepotentiamactivam,quaefacitobiectumesseinactu;etaliudpotentiampassivam,quaemoveturabobiectoinactuexistente.”
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speciesand,then,notinsofarasitgivesthemobjectiveintelligibility,butinsofarasitgives
themintelligibilityasamodeofbeing.
Theexpression“actusintelligibilium”recursintheresponsetoObjectionTwo.St.
Thomasishereexplainingwhythehumanintellectisnotinactintherealmofthe
intelligiblethings:“…notsothehumanmind,whichiseitheraltogetherinpotentialityto
intelligiblethings—asisthepassiveintellect—oristheactofintelligiblethingsabstracted
fromthephantasms—asistheactiveintellect.”564Therefore,theagentintellect(though
actusintelligibilium)isnotareasonforthehumanintellecttobeintelligibleinact,because
itisthereasonforthenatureofcorporealthingstobeintelligibleinact.Itisnotalightthat
isseeninthecorporealthings,butratheralightthatallowsthecorporealthingstobeseen.
Itisnotanactintheobjectivesense(intelligible),butinanagentsense(makingintelligible);
thatis,iftheagentintellectwereintelligibleinanobjectivesense,itwouldallowthe
intellecttobeknownbyitself,whichiswhatAquinasisheredenying.Theagentintellect
perfectsthephantasmbymakingitintelligibleinact:inthissenseitisitsact.Itisalsoact
becauseeveryactivepotencyisactiveinsofarasitisabletocommunicateaperfectionand
this,inturn,impliesacertainperfection(nothingcangivewhatitdoesnothave).
Thoughthefollowingtextreferstotheactofthepossibleintellect,itishelpfulto
seewhatSt.Thomasthinksaboutallofthesethings.Theactoftheintellectisnotthe
perfectionthatisunderstood:
56487,1ad2:“Nonautemintellectushumanus,quivelestomninoinpotentiarespectu
intelligibilium,sicutintellectuspossibilis;velestactusintelligibiliumquaeabstrahunturaphantasmatibus,sicutintellectusagens.”
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Theintelligentactofthehumanintellectisnottheactandperfectionofthematerialnatureunderstood,asifthenatureofthematerialthingandintelligentactcouldbeunderstoodbyoneact;justasathinganditsperfectionareunderstoodbyoneact.Hencetheactwherebytheintellectunderstandsastoneisdistinctfromtheactwherebyitunderstandsthatitunderstandsastone;andsoon.565
Grantedthatitisnotthepossibleintellect,itwouldbereallydifficulttosuggestthat
this“actusetperfectionaturaeintellectaematerialis”istheagentintellectbecause,for
Aquinas,itmeans“naturareimaterialis”and“lapidem.”Ashasbeenshownpreviously,the
objectofthepossibleintellectistheuniversalnatureofthecorporealthing.
Inthefollowingsectionof88,1,c.,AquinasisexplainingAverroes’doctrineabout
theunionoftheseparateagentintellectwiththehumanintellect.ForAverroes,theagent
intellectislikeaformofthethingsthatareunderstood:
Forsinceweunderstandbymeansofboththeactiveintellectandintelligibleobjects[…]itisclearthattheactiveintellectmustbecomparedtotheobjectsunderstood,eitherastheprincipalagentistotheinstrument,orasformtomatter.Foranactionisascribedtotwoprinciplesinoneofthesetwoways;toaprincipalagentandtoaninstrument,ascuttingtotheworkmanandthesaw;toaformanditssubject,asheatingtoheatandfire.Inboththesewaystheactiveintellectcanbecomparedtotheintelligibleobjectasperfectionistotheperfectible,andasactistopotentiality.566
Notethesmoothtransitionfromagentandinstrumenttoactandpotency.Aquinas
rejectstheoveralldoctrine,buthedoesnotseemtorejectthisuseoftheterm“act”,aswill
56587,3ad2:“Dicendumquodipsumintelligerehumanumnonestactusetperfectio
naturaeintellectaematerialis,utsicpossitunoactuintelliginaturareimaterialisetipsumintelligere,sicutunoactuintelligiturrescumsuaperfectione.Undealiusestactusquointellectusintelligitlapidem,etaliusestactusquointelligitseintelligerelapidem,etsicdeinde.”Theeditionofwww.corpusthomisticum.orghas“inde.”
56688,1,c.:“Cumenimnosintelligamusperintellectumagentemetperintelligibiliaspeculata[…]necesseestquodintellectusagenscompareturadintellectaspeculatavelsicutagensprincipaleadinstrumenta,velsicutformaadmateriam.Hisenimduobusmodisattribuituractioaliquaduobusprincipiis,principaliquidemagentietinstrumento,sicutsectioartificietserrae;formaeautemetsubiecto,sicutcalefactiocalorietigni.Sedutroquemodointellectusagenscomparabituradintelligibiliaspeculatasicutperfectioadperfectibile,etactusadpotentiam.”
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beseen.Thepartialargumentconcludesthat,supposingknowingtobereceptive,and
becausewhatisreceivedisreceivedwithitsperfection,boththeintellectualobjectandthe
intellectuallightarereceivedinthepossibleintellect,astheperfectthingwithits
perfection.“Nowasubject[receiveswhatisperfectand]itsperfectionatoneandthesame
time,asthereceptionofwhatisactuallyvisiblesynchronizeswiththereceptionoflightin
theeye.Thereforethepassiveintellectreceivestheintelligibleobjectandtheactive
intellecttogether.”567
Thisistheway,forAverroes,inwhichthehumanintellectisabletouniteitselfin
somewaytotheseparateagentintellectandso,throughit,understandtheotherseparate
substances,thusattainingbeatitude.Here,thepointofinterest,however,iswhatAquinas
saysaboutthisunionoftheagentintellectwiththepossibleintellect,i.e.,howhequalifies
it.Istheagentintellectaperfectionoftheobjectinsofarasit(theagentintellect)isseen?Is
itreceivedobjectively?
Itwouldseemthat,evenforAverroes,thisunionoftheseparateagentintellectand
thehumanintellectdoesnotsomuchallowthehumanintellecttoknowtheagentintellect
(asobject),butratherallowsthehumanintellecttoknowwhatisknownbytheagent
intellect(andbecauseofthis,intheend,toknowtheagentintellectitself).Inanycase,itis
clearthatforAquinastheagentintellectisnotwhatisknownbecause,inthislife,boththe
agentintellectandthepossibleintellectarereferredtothematerialthings.Also,inthis
56788,1,c.:“Simulautemrecipiturinaliquoperfectumetperfectio;sicutvisibileinactuet
lumeninpupilla.Simuligiturinintellectupossibilirecipiunturintellectaspeculataetintellectusagens.”
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article,theagentintellectaslightisnottheobject,butaprincipleoftheunderstandingof
theobject.
Secondly,[…]becauseintheaboveexplanation,theactiveintellect,supposingittobeaseparatesubstance,wouldnotbejoinedtousinitssubstance,butonlyinitslight,asparticipatedinthingsunderstood;and[thisbeingconjoined]wouldnotextendtotheotheractsoftheactiveintellectsoastoenableustounderstandimmaterialsubstances;justaswhenweseecolorssetoffbythesun,wearenotunitedtothesubstanceofthesunsoastoactlikethesun,butitslightonlyisunitedtous,thatwemayseethecolors.568
ForAquinas,inthehypothesisofaseparateagentintellect,somethingsimilarto
whathappensinocularvisionwouldbethecase.Thesunisalsoaseparatelight.The
coloursare“illuminatos”asthelightoftheagentintellect“isparticipated”bythe
intellectualobjects(“intellectisspeculativis”).569ButSt.Thomasalsosaysthatthelight,in
bothcases,isunitedtous(“unieturnobis”fortheintellect,“nobisunitur”forocularvision).
So,isthelightactoftheobjectoractofthefaculty?Inbothcases,Aquinasunderstandsthe
lightassomethingunitedtothefacultyinordertoknowotherthings,andparticipatedin
somewayintheobjectsinordertoknowtheobjectsthemselves.So,evenacceptingthat
thelightissomehowactoftheobjects,hedoesnottakeithereasanobjectiveperfection.
56888,1,c.:“Secundoquia,secundummodumpraedictum,intellectusagens,siest
substantiaseparata,nonunietur[www.corpusthomisticum.orghas:“uniretur”]nobissecundumsuamsubstantiam;sedsolumlumeneius,secundumquodparticipaturinintellectisspeculativis;etnonquantumadaliasactionesintellectusagentis,utpossimusperhocintelligeresubstantiasimmateriales.Sicutdumvidemuscoloresilluminatosasole,nonuniturnobissubstantiasolis,utpossimusactionessolisagere;sedsolumnobisuniturlumensolisadvisionemcolorum.”
569Theeditionofwww.corpusthomisticum.orghas“speculatis.”TheOttawaeditionhas“speculativis”whichgivesthepossibilityofreading“speculativeintellects”aswell.Itwouldnotaffectdramaticallythemeaningofthetext,butthisalternativereadingseemslessaccurate,becausethisparticipationseemstobethe“counterbalance”ofthe“illuminatos”referredtothecolours.Inotherwords,Aquinasmeansherethatwhatparticipatesthelightistheobject,nottheintellect,althoughhealsosaysthatthelightisunitedtothefaculty(“nobis”).
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Theagentintellectandthepossibleintellect,asprinciplesofunderstanding,are
referredonlytomaterialthingsbytheirmodeofactioninthislife.Attheendofthecorpus,
Aquinassaysclearlythattheagentintellectisreferredtothematerialthingsasactive,as
makingthemintelligible.
Aswasshownabove,theactiveintellectisnotaseparatesubstance;butafacultyofthesoul,extendingitselfactivelytothesameobjectstowhichthepassiveintellectextendsreceptively;because,asisstated,570thepassiveintellectis‘allthingspotentially,’andtheactiveintellectis‘allthingsinact.’Thereforebothintellects,accordingtothepresentstateoflife,extendtomaterialthingsonly,whicharemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect,andarereceivedinthepassiveintellect.Henceinthepresentstateoflifewecannotunderstandseparateimmaterialsubstancesinthemselves,eitherbythepassiveorbytheactiveintellect.571
Thatwhichismadeintelligibleisalsothatwhichisreceived:“materialiasola.”572St.
Thomasistalkingabouttheresintellecta;wedonotunderstandseparatesubstancesbut
materialthings(=naturascorporum).Inotherwords,hedoesnotmeanthatwhatis
receivedinthehumanintellectisthephantasminitsparticularity(materialiter),butthat
the(real)proportionateobjectofthehumanintellectisnottheseparatesubstancesin
themselves(thisisthepointofthearticle),butthematerialthings(materialia).Whathe
saysisthatwhatismadeintelligiblebytheagentintellectisthematerialthingsthemselves,
andthesesamematerialthings(i.e.,theirnature),inanintelligiblemodeofbeing,arewhat
isreceivedinthepossibleintellect.St.Thomasisreferringheretowhathehassaid570DeAnimaiii,5.57188,1,c.:“Sexto,quiasupraostensumestquodintellectusagensnonestsubstantia
separata,sedvirtusquaedamanimae,adeademactiveseextendens,adquaeseextenditintellectuspossibilisreceptive,quia,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima,intellectuspossibilisestquoestomniafieri,intellectusagensquoestomniafacere.Uterqueergointellectusseextendit,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,admaterialiasola;quaeintellectusagensfacitintelligibiliaactu,etrecipiunturinintellectupossibili.Undesecundumstatumpraesentisvitae,nequeperintellectumpossibilem,nequeperintellectumagentem,possumusintelligeresubstantiasimmaterialessecundumseipsas.”
572Thisisalsothesenseof“omniafacere”and“omniafieri”,atleastinthiscontext.
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previously,573andheisnottalkinganylongerabout“act”butabout“makingintelligible”
thematerialthings.
ItseemsclearthattheagentintellectasactusintelligibiliumdoesnotmeanforSt.
Thomasthattheagentintellectissomethingthatisunderstood,butratherthatitisa
principleofunderstandingotherthings.Canitbesaidtobeaformalprinciple?St.Thomas
saysactus,butactusisananalogousnotion.Aquinaswouldsaythatthelightofthesunis
theactofthecoloursinsofarasitmakesthemvisible.Itisinthecolours,butmakingthem
visible,notmakingitselfvisible.Thereasonweknowthereisnolightisthatwecannotsee
anything:“Turnthelighton,please!”Thelightdoesnotmodifythecolours,butmakes
themvisible;thelightisnotthecolour,itisnotwhatisseen,butthatbywhichwesee.
These,ofcourse,arenotscientificclaims,buttheexampleSt.Thomasusestoenableusto
understandthingswhichdependonprinciples.Thepointisthatthelightisnottheobjectof
vision,astheagentintellectisnottheobjectofunderstanding.Theagentintellectisactas
makingintelligibleinitsmodeofbeingtheuniversalnatureofcorporealthings,andnotas
providingintelligibilityascontent.Thelightdoesnotconstitutetheknowninits
universality,butmakesthisuniversalityvisibletotheeyeofintelligence.574
573Cf.79,4.574Cf.InISentd.3,q.4,a.5,c.:“Accordingtothephilosophers,thereisanotherwayto
understandthatthehumansoulunderstandsalwaysitself,insofaraseverythingthatisunderstoodmustbeilluminatedbytheagentintellectandreceivedinthepossibleintellect.Hence,justasineverycolourisseenthecorporeallight,soineveryintelligibleisseenthelightoftheagentintellect:not,however,asobject,butasameansbywhichknowinghappens.”(mytrans.)[Aliotamenmodo,secundumphilosophos,intelligiturquodanimasemperseintelligit,eoquodomnequodintelligitur,nonintelligiturnisiillustratumlumineintellectusagentis,etreceptuminintellectupossibili.Undesicutinomnicolorevideturlumencorporale,itainomniintelligibilivideturlumenintellectusagentis;nontameninrationeobjectisedinrationemediicognoscendi.];DeVer14,8,ad4:“Insomesenselightistheobjectofsightandinanothersensenot.For,sincelightisseenbyoursight
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Therefore,ifwhatismeantis“act”as“activeprinciple”,insofarastheactive
principleinasenseparticipatesitsownperfection,orwhatismeantis“formalprinciple”in
thesamesense,thentheagentintellectcan—inaThomisticsensealso—becalled“act”and
“formalprinciple”oftheobjectofknowing,insofarasitcontributesintelligibilityasamode
ofbeing.Aquinashimselfusesthisexpression,andheappearstodosointhesense
explained.But,ifbyformalprinciplewhatismeantisthattheintelligiblecontentof
knowingiscontributedtothematerialofsensibilitybytheagentintellect,thenwhatis
beingsaidisnolongeraboutAquinas’notionofagentintellect.575
Twogroupsoftextshavebeenexamined;namely,sometextswhichseemto
suggestaformalaprioriinhumanunderstanding,asisrequiredinaKantianepistemology;
andafewothertextswhichcouldbeinterpretedassayingthattheagentintellectisa
formalaprioriofintellectualknowingasperformative.Thereisnotenoughevidenceinany
ofthemtosupporttheclaimthatAquinasconsiderstheagentintellectaformalapriori,in
thesenseofcontributingintelligibilityascontent.Thefollowingtextsshouldhelptoshow
moreclearlythat,forAquinas,theagentintellectisthatwhichprovidesintelligibilityasa
onlyifthroughreflectionorinsomeotherwayitisunitedtoabodyhavingasurface,itisnotcalledtheessentialobjectofsight.Thisis,rather,color,whichisalwaysinabodyhavingasurface.However,insofarasnothingcanbeseenexceptbyreasonoflight,lightitselfissaidtobethefirstvisiblething…”[Lumenquodammodoestobiectumvisusetquodammodonon.Inquantumenimluxnonvideturnostrisvisibusnisiperhocquodadaliquodcorpusterminatum,perreflexionem,velaliomodoconiungitur,diciturnonessepersevisusobiectum,sedmagiscolor,quisemperestincorporeterminato.Inquantumautemnihilnisiperlucemvideripotest,luxprimumvisibileessedicitur…]
575HereisaninterestingtextfromZagalArreguín,inwhichtheauthorexpressesverywellwhatismeantherebyametaphysicalapriori,andbytheagentintellectasactoftheintelligible:“Whatmakesitthereforeinactwithrespecttointeligibleobjectsisthefactthatitisanactiveimmaterialforceabletoassimilateotherthingstoitself,i.e.,immaterializethem.Inthiswayitrendersactuallyintelligiblesomethingthatwasonlypotentiallyintelligible:likelight,whichwithoutcontaininganyparticularcolor,bringscolorsintoact”(ZagalArreguín,367).
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modeofbeingandis,therefore,ametaphysicalaprioriofintellectualknowingasreceptive
ofobjectivecontent.
2)TheAgentIntellectasaMetaphysicalAPriori
Althoughmuchhasalreadybeenanticipated,andmuchofwhatwillherebesaid
dependsonthepreviousreflections,itistimetoaddressmoredirectlythecharacterization
oftheagentintellectasametaphysical,notaformal,aprioriofintellectualknowing.
Introductoryremarksareofferedtobeginwith,followedbyanexaminationofthetexts.
Theagentintellect,forAquinas,isametaphysicalaprioriofintellectualknowingas
receptiveofobjectivecontent.Bythisismeantthattheagentintellectisresponsiblenotfor
theintelligiblecontent,norfortheuniversalobject,butfortheintelligiblemodeofbeingof
theuniversalcontent.Theobjectofunderstandingissomethingrealoutsidethemind,but
initsrealmodeofbeingisnot“available”toourintellectualfaculty.Tothisobjecttheagent
intellectgivestheintelligiblemodeofbeinginactby“separating”therealnaturefromthe
individualconditionsofmatter.
Thisseparationisnothingotherthanamakingvisibleofthespecificperfectionby
divestingitfromtheparticularrealizationinthisindividual(doctrineofparticipation);it
shouldnotbeunderstoodasaseparationinreality,i.e.,aseparationofthecontentinits
existence.576Theuniversalcontentisabstracted(=madevisible)bytheagentintellectbutit
isunderstood(=seen)inthephantasm,i.e.,itis“read–into”theparticular.577The
576Cf.85,1ad1;InIIIDeAnima6,261-271.577Thisisrelatedagaintotheissueofthedistinctionbetweenabstractionasactofthe
possibleintellectandoftheagentintellect(cf.Cromp,16ff.;Chapter4,section1).
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separationoftheagentintellectisnotaseparationofthecontent,butamakingvisibleof
theuniversalcontentofthephantasm;andalthoughitimpliestheproductionofaseparate
species(theimpressa),itscontentisreadintothephantasm(=conversioadphantasmata
asmodusintelligendi).Theagentintellectseparatesthenatureinitsmodeofbeing,butin
suchawaythatthenatureitselfmaybeseeninthephantasm(bythepossibleintellect).
Thenatureisseeninaseparatemodeofbeing,butnotasseparatefromthephantasm.
Whatisseenisthequidditasofthephantasm.Thecontentisdistinctindeed,notinsofaras
itexistsorcouldexistseparatelyfromthesensiblecontent,butinsofarasitisacommon
perfectionthatisnotidentifiedwithitsparticularrealizationinthematter.Matterisasign
oflimitation,whichimpliesthelimitationofaperfection;aperfectionofitselfdoesnotsay
limitation;thereforetheperfectionthatislimitedisdifferentfromitslimitation,andcanbe
consideredwithoutreferencetoitslimitation(i.e.,initselfor“absolutely”).
Whichtextssupportthisinterpretationoftheagentintellect?Insubsection2.1,
following,isthetextusprinceps578whichwillbere-examinednowmindfulofourprevious
path;then,in2.2,areothertextshelpfulinstressingthattheagentintellectcannotbe
interpretedasaformalapriori,butsolelyasametaphysicalapriori;finally,in2.3,aretexts
helpfulinunderstandingthesenseinwhichAquinasseestheagentintellectasalight,
whichwillbestudiedinconnectionwiththeinterpretationathand.
57879,3,c..
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2.1.Thetextusprinceps
In79,3,theproblemiswhetherornotthereisaneedtopostulateanagentintellect
inthehumansoul.AcomparisonwithPlatoclarifiesthepoint:
AccordingtotheopinionofPlato,thereisnoneedforanactiveintellectinordertomakethingsactuallyintelligible;butperhapsinordertoprovideintellectuallighttotheintellect,aswillbeexplainedfartheron.ForPlatosupposedthattheformsofnaturalthingssubsistedapartfrommatter,andconsequentlythattheyareintelligible:sinceathingisactuallyintelligiblefromtheveryfactthatitisimmaterial.579
Itisevidentthattheroleoftheagentintellectistomake(theobject)intelligiblein
act;itisalsoevidentthat,forAquinas,theobjectofhumanunderstandingforbothPlato
andAristotleistheform(nature,species)ofcorporealthings.St.Thomaswillnothere
(again)showthereasonsforhisdisagreementwithPlato.Theimportantpointisnowthat,
becausePlatoconsiderstheobjectofhumanunderstandingasseparatefrommatterinits
realmodeofbeing,thatobjectis–forPlato–alreadyintelligibleinactand,therefore,no
needofanagentintellectinthesensementionedpreviously(asmakingintelligibleinact)
arisesforhim.Thisisthereasonfortheclarification“sedforteadpraebendum”etc.:the
needofanagentintellectasmakingintelligibleinactmakesnosenseinthesystemof
Plato,becausetheobjectofhumanunderstandinginitsrealbeingisalreadyseparatefrom
matterand,therefore,alreadyintelligibleinact.
Aristotle’spositionisclearlystated:“ButsinceAristotledidnotallowthatformsof
naturalthingsexistapartfrommatter,andasformsexistinginmatterarenotactually
57979,3,c.:“SecundumopinionemPlatonis,nullanecessitaseratponereintellectum
agentemadfaciendumintelligibiliainactu;sedforteadpraebendumlumenintelligibileintelligenti,utinfradicetur.PosuitenimPlatoformasrerumnaturaliumsinemateriasubsistere,etperconsequenseasintelligibilesesse,quiaexhocestaliquidintelligibileactu,quodestimmateriale.”
260
intelligible;itfollowsthatthenaturesofformsofthesensiblethingswhichweunderstand
arenotactuallyintelligible.”580Theobjectofhumanunderstandingforbothphilosophers,
atleasthereforAquinas,isthesame:theformsofthecorporealthings.Theprinciplefor
resolvingthequestionisexactlythesame:somethingisintelligibleinactonlyifitis
separatefrommatter.Thedifferencebetweenthetwophilosopherscannotbemoreclearly
established:therespectivemodesofbeingoftheobjectofhumanunderstandingdiffer
because,whereasforPlatoitisintelligibleinact,forAristotleitisimbeddedinthematter
and,therefore,notintelligibleinact.
Aquinascontinues:“Nownothingisreducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptby
somethinginact;asthesenses[are]madeactualbywhatisactuallysensible.”581Here“ens
actu”istheintelligibleinact,asthecomparisonwiththesensesmakesclear,andalsothe
context:St.Thomashasjustsaidthatthenatureswhicharetheobjectofourunderstanding
arenotintelligibleinact.Whatheissayingnowisthis:weunderstandthenaturesofthings,
buttheyarenotintelligibleinact;now,ifunderstandingistohappen(asthepassageofthe
intellectfrompotencytoact),thosenaturesneedtobeintelligibleinact.Therefore,he
concludesthattheconditionofpossibilityofhumanunderstandingisafacultymaking
intelligibleinacttheproportionateobjectofhumanunderstanding:“Wemusttherefore
assignonthepartoftheintellectsomepowertomakethingsactuallyintelligible,by
58079,3,c.:“SedquiaAristotelesnonposuitformasrerumnaturaliumsubsisteresine
materia;formaeauteminmateriaexistentesnonsuntintelligibilesactu,sequebaturquodnaturaeseuformaererumsensibilium,quasintelligimus,nonessentintelligibilesactu.”
58179,3,c.:“Nihilautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicutsensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.”
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abstractionofthespeciesfrommaterialconditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactive
intellect.”582
Theagentintellect,therefore,isametaphysicalaprioriinsofarasitisanefficiency
previoustoknowingitself,affectingthemodeofbeing(notthecontent)oftheobjectof
humanunderstanding.Itisapriori,notinsofarasitisanarbitraryinventionprevioustothe
analysisofthefactofhumanknowing,butpreciselyinsofarisitexplainstheThomisticfact
ofhumanunderstandingasithappens.Ifwedounderstandthenatureofcorporealthings
butthesenaturesarenot,intheirsubsistence,intelligibleinact,theremustbesomething
whichexplainsthefactthatweunderstandthem.Thisisthenecessityandtheroleofthe
agentintellectforAquinas.
2.2.NotaFormalbutaMetaphysicalAPriori
Othertextscanhelpustoconfirmandtoqualifythisinterpretation:first(2.2.a),
thosesuggestingthattheagentintellectisnotaformalapriori;second(2.2.b),those
referringtheoriginoftheintelligiblecontenttoexperience;finally(2.2.c),textsfromother
worksandauthorsportrayingtheagentintellectasametaphysicalapriori.
2.2.a.NotaFormalAPriori
Inthefollowing,theagentintellectisnotaformalapriori:
Iftherelationoftheactiveintellecttothepassivewerethatoftheactiveobjecttoapower,as,forinstance,ofthevisibleinacttothesight;itwouldfollowthatwecouldunderstandallthingsinstantly,sincetheactiveintellectisthatwhichmakesall
58279,3,c.:“Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceret
intelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem.”
262
things(inact).Butnowtheactiveintellectisnotanobject,ratherisitthatwherebytheobjectsaremadetobeinact…583
Thisisanimportanttext.First,theagentintellectisdeniedaformalobjectivity;that
is,theagentintellectinnowayiswhatisunderstood(itisnottheintelligibleasthatwhich
actualizesthefacultyofunderstanding).However,thereasonforwhichitcannotbethe
intelligibleobjectisevenmoreimportant:theagentintellectisthatbywhicheverythingis
made(intelligible).Ifthiscapacity,orrathervirtuality,ofmakingeverythingintelligiblewere
tobeunderstoodinaformalsense,orobjectively,theformalcontentofeveryactof
understandingwouldbealreadyincludedintheagentintellect,andsowewould
understandeverythingimmediately.Instead,theagentintellectisnottobeunderstoodas
object(thusformallyperfectingthefaculty)but,rather,asmetaphysicallyperfectingthe
object(insofarastheagentintellectmakesitintelligibleinact).ForAquinas,tobethe
objectofunderstandingandtomakethisobjectintelligiblearetwodifferentthings.
Asimilartextis88,3ad1.Hereagaintheagentintellectisnottheobjectof
knowing,butitsprinciple.Thistextcouldberelatedtothepreviousone,inthesensethat
Aquinasdeniesthatthevirtualityoftheagentintellect(hereasaparticipationoftheFirst
58379,4ad3:“Siintellectusagenscomparareturadintellectumpossibilemutobiectum
agensadpotentiam,sicutvisibileinactuadvisum;sequereturquodstatimomniaintelligeremus,cumintellectusagenssitquoestomniafacere.Nuncautemnonsehabetutobiectum,sedutfaciensobiectainactu…”LetmealsogivethepartialtranslationofStump(cf.256-257,hersquarebrackets):“Iftheactiveintellectwererelatedtothepossibleintellectasanactiveobjectisrelatedtoapower...,itwouldfollowthatwewouldimmediatelyunderstandallthings...But,asitis,theactiveintellectisrelatednotasan[active]object,butratheraswhatactualizes[cognitive]objects.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima4,147-162.Thefollowingtextisnotspeakingdirectlyoftheagentintellectbutmaybehelpful,InIIIDeAnima1,170-180:“Theearlyphilosophers’[said]thatintellectmustbecompoundedofallthingsifitcanknowallthings.Butifitknewallthings,ascontainingthemallinitselfalready,itwouldbeanever-actualintellect,andnevermerelyinpotency…”[Dicebantenimeumadhocquodcognosceretomnia,essecompositumexomnibus.Siautemessetcognoscitivusomniumquiahaberetinseomnia,essetsemperintellectusinactuetnunquaminpotential…]
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Truth)issomethingobjective.If,intheprevioustext,itisdeniedthatweknoweverything
(whichwouldbethecaseiftheagentintellectweretheobjectofunderstanding),hereitis
deniedthatGodisthefirstobjectofknowing,whichcouldbethecaseifthelightbywhich
weknoweverythingwereitselfknown.St.Thomaspointsoutalsothat,inhuman
understanding,thelightasprincipleofunderstandingisnotGodHimselfbutaperfection
participatedfromGod.
Weseeandjudgeofallthingsinthelightofthefirsttruth,forasmuchasthelightitselfofourmind,whethernaturalorgratuitous,isnothingelsethan[acertain]impressionofthefirsttruthuponit,asstatedabove.Hence,asthelightitselfofourintellectisnottheobjectitunderstands[butthatbymeansofwhichitunderstands],muchlesscanitbesaidthatGodisthefirstobjectknownbyourintellect.584
Thattheagentintellectisametaphysicalapriori,insofarasitisprevioustoknowing
itself,couldbetakenfromthefollowingpassageaswell:“Neverthelessthereisadistinction
betweenthepoweroftheactiveintellectandofthepassiveintellect:becauseasregards
thesameobject,theactivepowerwhichmakestheobjecttobeinactmustbedistinctfrom
thepassivepower,whichismovedbytheobjectexistinginact.”585
Althoughinthefollowingtextsintellectusstandsforthepossibleintellect,itisstill
relevantforthepresentpurposesthattheperfectionoftheobjectofhumanunderstanding
isnottheintellectualoperationitself,butthenatureofthecorporealthing.Thisisrelated
58488,3ad1:“Inluceprimaeveritatisomniaintelligimusetiudicamus,inquantumipsum
lumenintellectusnostri,sivenaturalesivegratuitum,nihilaliudestquamquaedamimpressioveritatisprimae,utsupradictumest.Undecumipsumlumenintellectusnostrinonsehabeatadintellectumnostrumsicutquodintelligitur,sedsicutquointelligitur;multominusDeusestidquodprimoanostrointellectuintelligitur.”Itseemsclearthatthislumenistheagentintellect.Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.a.10ad1,andS.Th.I,54,4.
58579,7,c.:“Diversificaturtamenpotentiaintellectusagentis,etintellectuspossibilis,quiarespectueiusdemobiecti,aliudprincipiumoportetessepotentiamactivam,quaefacitobiectumesseinactu;etaliudpotentiampassivam,quaemoveturabobiectoinactuexistente.”
264
tothecharacterizationofhumanunderstandingnotasperformativeoftheobjectbutas
receptive:
Theintelligentactofthehumanintellectisnottheactandperfectionofthematerialnatureunderstood,asifthenatureofthematerialthingandintelligentactcouldbeunderstoodbyoneact;justasathinganditsperfectionareunderstoodbyoneact.Hencetheactwherebytheintellectunderstandsastoneisdistinctfromtheactwherebyitunderstandsthatitunderstandsastone;andsoon.586
“Nowtheultimateperfectionoftheintellectconsistsinitsownoperation:forthisisnotanacttendingtosomethingelseinwhichliestheperfectionoftheworkaccomplished,asbuildingistheperfectionofthethingbuilt;butitremainsintheagentasitsperfectionandact,asissaid[in]Metaph.ix.”587
Clearly,forAquinas,itisnottheobjectthathastobe(objectively)perfectedbythe
intellectualoperation,butitistheintellectthatisperfectedbytheobject.Theactionofthe
agentintellect,therefore,mustbeconceivedasperfectingtheobjectinanotherway
(metaphysically,thatistosay,initsmodeofbeing)andthisactivitymustbeplaced
previoustounderstandingitself(withapriorityofnature,notonlytemporal).Thetextof
76,2ad4pointsusinthesamedirection:becausetheobjectofunderstandinghasan
autonomousexistence,theactionoftheagentintellecthasnothingtodowithitscontent
butwithitsmodeofbeing:“…whereasthenatureofthethingunderstoodisindeed
58687,3ad2:“Dicendumquodipsumintelligerehumanumnonestactusetperfectio
naturaeintellectaematerialis,utsicpossitunoactuintelliginaturareimaterialisetipsumintelligere,sicutunoactuintelligiturrescumsuaperfectione.Undealiusestactusquointellectusintelligitlapidem,etaliusestactusquointelligitseintelligerelapidem,etsicinde.”
58787,3,c.:“Ultimaautemperfectiointellectusesteiusoperatio,nonenimestsicutactiotendensinalterum,quaesitperfectiooperati,sicutaedificatioaedificati;sedmanetinoperanteutperfectioetactuseius,utdiciturinIXMetaphys..”
265
outsidethesoul,butthemodeaccordingtowhichitexistsoutsidethesoulisnotthemode
accordingtowhichitisunderstood.”588
Thattheagentintellectisnotaformalapriori,asoriginoftheintelligiblecontent,
relatestoAquinas’rejectingtheidentificationbetweentheagentintellectandthehabitof
firstprinciples.589
2.2.b.TheOriginoftheIntelligibleContent
Thefollowingtext590isimportantbecauseitshowsclearlythedifferencebetween
theagentintellectasametaphysicalapriori(andprincipiumquo)andtheaposteriorityof
thespecies,andso,oftheobjectofhumanunderstanding.Onecanreadbetweenthelines
manyhistoricalissuesrelatedtotheimportanceofSt.Augustineinthescholarlymilieuof
thetime,buttheseneednotdistractfromtheimmediatepurpose.Thequestioniswhether
weknoweverythinginrationibusaeternis.St.Thomasgivesanaffirmativeanswer,butfirst
clarifieswhatitmeansinthiscasetoknow“in”something.Inthiscase,itdoesnotmeanto
knowinrationibusaeternisasinanobjectofvision(aswhoeverlooksatamirrorcanseein
themirrorallthatistherereflected).ThisitcouldmeanforPlato,accordingtowhomwe
participateobjectivelyintheeternalideasinthepresentstateoflife.St.Thomaswantsto
proposeinsteadasubjectiveparticipation:theparticipationofthelightbywhichtheobjects
areseen.“Secondly,onethingissaidtobeknowninanotherasinaprincipleofknowledge:
58876,2ad4:“…[N]aturaautemreiquaeintelligitur,estquidemextraanimam,sednon
habetillummodumessendiextraanimam,secundumquemintelligitur.”589Cf.inthisChapter,section1.5,“Naturaliternotavelindita.”59084,5,c..
266
thuswemightsaythatweseeinthesunwhatweseebythesun.”591Theshiftfrom“in”to
“per”fromthebeginningissignificant;thatis,“in”canembraceseveralmeanings,but“per”
ismorerestricted.“Andthuswemustneedssaythatthehumansoulknowsallthingsinthe
eternaltypes,sincebyparticipationofthesetypesweknowallthings.”592Thissecond
precisioniscrucial.St.Thomashasalreadysaidthattheeternalideasareonewiththe
divineessenceand,therefore,justastheycannotbethedirectobjectofvisioninthislife,
neitheraretheydirectlytheprinciplebywhichwesee.Wepossessaparticipationofthe
uncreatedlight,anditisonlyinthatsensethatweknowbythedivinelight:“Forthe
intellectuallightitselfwhichisinus,isnothingelsethanaparticipatedlikenessofthe
uncreatedlight,inwhicharecontainedtheeternaltypes.”593
Thismentionofthefactthatthedivinelightcontainstheeternalideasmayleadone
tothinkthattheparticipatedlightwouldalsocontain,atleastinsomeway,theideasofall
things.TwothingsactuallypreventusfrommisreadingAquinas.Thefirstistoremember
that,forhim,intellectuallifeisrealizedincreationbydegrees,theleastofwhichisthe
humansoul.Thesoulparticipatesonlya“power”tounderstand,whichisinpotencyofall
oftheintelligibleobjects,anda“light”whichisalsoinpotencyofmakingintelligiblethe
natureofcorporealthings.Weparticipate[from]theintelligenceofGodinsofaraswehave
thecapacitytoknow,butweactuallyknownothing“bynature,”i.e.,fromthebeginning.
59184,5,c.:“Aliomododicituraliquidcognosciinaliquosicutincognitionisprincipio;sicutsi
dicamusquodinsolevidentureaquaevidenturpersolem.”59284,5,c.:“Etsicnecesseestdicerequodanimahumanaomniacognoscatinrationibus
aeternis,perquarumparticipationemomniacognoscimus.”59384,5,c.:“Ipsumenimlumenintellectualequodestinnobis,nihilestaliudquam
quaedamparticipatasimilitudoluminisincreati,inquocontinenturrationesaeternae.”
267
ThesecondthingmakingitmoredifficulttomisreadSt.Thomasissimplytherestofthe
passage,whereheclearlysaysthat,besidesthislightasparticipationoftheeternalideas,
weneedintelligiblespeciescomingfromthethingsthemselves:
Whenceitiswritten[inPsalm4],‘Manysay:Whoshowethusgoodthings?’whichquestionthePsalmistanswers,‘ThelightofThycountenance,OLord,issigneduponus,’asthoughheweretosay:Bytheseal594oftheDivinelightinus,allthingsaremadeknowntous.Butsincebesidestheintellectuallightwhichisinus,intelligiblespecies,whicharederivedfromthings,arerequiredinorderforustohaveknowledgeofmaterialthings;thereforethissameknowledgeisnotduemerelytoaparticipationoftheeternaltypes,asthePlatonistsheld,maintainingthatthemereparticipationofideassufficedforknowledge.595
Itisclear,then,thattheparticipationinthedivineideas,hereandforAquinas,ison
thepartoftheagentintellectandnotonthepartoftheintelligiblespecies.Ofcourse,the
speciesthemselves,insofarastheycomefromthethings,whichareinturnparticipationsof
thedivineideasbycreation,[thespecies]couldalsobeconsidered“participations”ofthe
eternalideas.596Butthisparticipationisnot“direct,”sotospeak,asitisdirectinthecaseof
theagentintellect(atleastinsofaraswereceiveitfromGodincreation).Thatiswhy
Aquinassays“nonpersolamparticipationemrationumaeternarum,”thatistosay,notby
meansoftheagentintellectalone,becauseweneedtheintelligiblespeciesalso.
594Theword“sigillationem”herestandsforparticipation,inthesenseofacreatedeffect
fromGodinthehumansoul(“innobis”).Bythislight,allthingsareshowntous,insofarasthelightmakesvisibletheobjects.
59584,5,c.:“UndeinPsalmoIV,dicitur,multidicunt,quisostenditnobisbona?CuiquaestioniPsalmistarespondet,dicens,signatumestsupernoslumenvultustui,domine.Quasidicat,peripsamsigillationemdiviniluminisinnobis,omniademonstrantur.Quiatamenpraeterlumenintellectualeinnobis,exigunturspeciesintelligibilesarebusacceptae,adscientiamderebusmaterialibushabendam;ideononpersolamparticipationemrationumaeternarumderebusmaterialibusnotitiamhabemus,sicutPlatoniciposueruntquodsolaidearumparticipatiosufficitadscientiamhabendam.”
596Cf.84,4ad1,quotedonthenextpage.
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Finally,itmaynotbeoutofplacetoremarkthatAquinasconsiderstheagent
intellecttobedistinctfromtheintelligiblespecies,theagentintellectcomingfromGodand
theintelligiblespeciescomingfromthethingsthemselves.Itismostsignificantbecause
thatwhichcomesfromthethingsisnotjustthephantasm,asthematerialofsensibilityto
beinformed,buttheintelligiblespecies.Therefore,someintelligibleaspectcomesfromthe
thingsthemselves.Whichaspect?Itistheobjectiveaspectand,therefore,whatherehas
beencalledtheintelligiblecontentasopposedtotheintelligiblemodeofbeing.Thismust
besobecausethepurposeofAquinasinthearticleistoshowthatwedonotparticipate
fromGodtheobjectofunderstanding,butalightthatisprincipleofunderstandingthe
objects.Inordertoknow,then,itisnotenoughtohavelight,butweneedthethingsthat
areseen.Thesethings,ofcourse,implythecompletedactionoftheagentintellect,not
howeverinordertobethemselves,butinordertobeseen.Theintelligibilityofthespecies,
asamodeofbeing,doescomefromtheagentintellect,andnotfromthethings
themselves;butwhatisintelligiblecomesfromthethings,andinthatsense,theintelligible
speciescomefromthethingsthemselves.
Thisinterpretationseemsconfirmedbythefollowingtextfromthepreviousarticle:
“Theintelligiblespecieswhichareparticipatedbyourintellectarereduced,astotheirfirst
cause,toafirstprinciplewhichisbyitsessenceintelligible—namely,God.Buttheyproceed
fromthatprinciplebymeansofthesensibleformsandmaterialthings,fromwhichwe
gatherknowledge,asDionysiussays.”597Aquinasisheretryingtodenythatwereceive
59784,4ad1:“Speciesintelligibilesquasparticipatnosterintellectus,reducuntursicutin
primamcausaminaliquodprincipiumpersuamessentiamintelligibile,scilicetinDeum.Sedabillo
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intelligiblespeciesfromtheseparatesubstances.Again,whatisatstakeisacertain
objectiveparticipationinknowing.But,thistimeAquinas’concernistoshowthat,ifwecan
speakofacertainparticipationfromGodregardingthecontentofknowing,this
participationis“indirect,”throughtheformsofthenaturalthingsfromwhichwereceive
sciencedirectly.Inotherwords,whatweknowisnotwhatispresentedtousbythe
separatesubstances,butthenatureofcorporealthings:ourfacultycannotknownaturally
byinfusedspecieswhichexceeditsintelligiblepower.Ourfacultycanbeperfectedonlyby
theintelligibleperfectionofmaterialthings,bytheirform,whichinitsrealmodeofbeingis
poorinintelligiblecontentandcommontomany.598Thisperfectioniswhatwecansee
thankstothepoorlightoftheagentintellect.Therefore,thepoorintelligibilitybestowedby
thecreativewisdomofGodonmaterialcreaturesisparticipatedbyourpossibleintellect,
thankstoanintellectuallight(theagentintellect)participatedfromtheDivineLight.The
participatedlightcomesfromGod,buttheperfectionoftheobjectasknowncomesnot
directlyfromGod,butfromthematerialthings.BytheimpressionofHislight(ourown
participatedlight),GodallowsustoseetheintelligibilityHebestowedonmaterialcreatures
principioproceduntmediantibusformisrerumsensibiliumetmaterialium,aquibusscientiamcolligimus,utDionysiusdicit.”AnothertextwiththesamereferencetoDionysiusis76,5,c.:“Nowtheintellectualsoul,aswehaveseenabove[…]intheorderofnature,holdsthelowestplaceamongintellectualsubstances;inasmuchasitisnotnaturallygiftedwiththeknowledgeoftruth,astheangelsare;buthastogatherknowledgefromindividualthingsbywayofthesenses,asDionysiussays(Div.Nom.vii).”[Animaautemintellectiva,sicutsuprahabitumest,secundumnaturaeordinem,infimumgraduminsubstantiisintellectualibustenet;intantumquodnonhabetnaturalitersibiinditamnotitiamveritatis,sicutAngeli,sedoportetquodeamcolligatexrebusdivisibilibusperviamsensus,utDionysiusdicit,VIIcap.deDiv.Nom.]
598Aboutthedegreesofcognitivepowerandtheproportionbetweencognitivepowerandobject,cf.85,1,c.;aboutthedegreesinintellectualpower,76,5,c.(seepreviousfootnote)and55,2,c.;aboutthedivisionintheintellectualrealmasaconsequenceofthelowerstatusinthescaleofbeings,cf.89,1,c.;Fabro,NMP,268ff.
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insofarasitisinthem,andnotinsofarasitisinHisdivineideas.Intheend,theintellectual
contentofourknowingcancomefromthematerialthingsbecause,forAquinas,thereis
somethingintelligibleinthematerialthingsinsofaras,intheirnaturalperfections,they
participateofthecreativewisdomofGod.Thisiswhythereisnoneedofaformalapriori
forAquinas.
Afinaltextregardingtheoriginoftheintelligiblecontentis76,2,c.St.Thomasis
tryingtoconfutetheopinionofthosewhopostulateonlyoneseparateintellectforall
humanbeings.Here,heisdealingparticularlywiththeCommentator,whosuggeststhatthe
reasonweascribetodifferentsubjectstheintelligenceofthesamething(astone,inthe
example)isthenumericaldiversityofphantasms.Butthisdiversity,forAquinas,doesnot
implyanumericaldistinctionofintellectualoperations.Thediversityofphantasmsdoesnot
preventourintelligencefromunderstandingwithoneoperation(andthereforewithone
intelligiblespecies)theonenatureofstone,becausethephantasmsare“ofthesame
species.”Whatisinterestingforthepresentpurposesisthis:thereasonthattheintelligible
speciesisoneisthatthephantasmsareofthesamespecies(i.e.,allofthemarephantasms
ofstones,theyallpossessthesamenature)andtherefore,fromallofthem,wecanabstract
onlyoneintelligiblespeciesbywhichweknowtheonenatureofstone.Again,the
intelligiblecontentcomesfromthecorporealthingsthemselvesastheyarerepresentedby
thephantasmofsensibility:
Butthephantasmitselfisnotaformofthepossibleintellect;itistheintelligiblespeciesabstractedfromthephantasmthatisaform.Nowinoneintellect,fromdifferentphantasmsofthesamespecies,onlyoneintelligiblespeciesisabstracted;asappearsinoneman,inwhomtheremaybedifferentphantasmsofastone;yetfromallofthemonlyoneintelligiblespeciesofastoneisabstracted;bywhichthe
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intellectofthatoneman,byoneoperation,understandsthenatureofastone,notwithstandingthediversityofphantasms.599
Thattheoriginoftheintelligiblecontentcomesfromexperienceandisthenature
subsistinginsensiblethingsisadoctrinethatcanbefoundinbothearlierandlaterworksof
Aquinas.Wewillbeginwiththeearliertexts,andquoteinfootnotesomecorresponding
latertexts.
Thefollowingtextalsohelpsustounderstandthattheformsweknowgofromthe
mindofGodtoourmindsthroughthethingsthemselves,insuchawaythattheyimpress
theirformsinus:
ThatstatementofAlgazelistobeunderstoodofourknowledge,whichisacquiredbythe[thingsimpressingtheirlikenesses]uponoursouls.TheoppositeistrueofGod’scognition,foritisfromHisintellectthatformsflowintocreatures.Ourknowledgeistheimpressingofthingsinoursouls;buttheformsofthingsare[acertain]impressingofthedivineknowledgeinthings.600
The“active”roleofthethingsthemselvesinintellectualknowingisclearinthe
followingtextalso.This“activity”regardsthecontentofknowing,insofarasthethings
themselves“provide”intelligencewiththeperfectionoftheirforms.Onlyinthecaseof
artifactsdothethingsthemselves“receive”theirformalperfectionfromintelligence.
59976,2,c.:“Sedipsumphantasmanonestformaintellectuspossibilis,sedspecies
intelligibilisquaeaphantasmatibusabstrahitur.Inunoautemintellectuaphantasmatibusdiversiseiusdemspecieinonabstrahiturnisiunaspeciesintelligibilis.Sicutinunohomineapparet,inquopossuntessediversaphantasmatalapidis,ettamenabomnibuseisabstrahiturunaspeciesintelligibilislapidis,perquamintellectusuniushominisoperationeunaintelligitnaturamlapidis,nonobstantediversitatephantasmatum.”
600DeVer.2,1ad6:“VerbumilludAlgazelisintelligendumestdescientianostra,quaeinnobisacquiriturperhocquodresimprimuntsimilitudinessuasinanimasnostras;sedincognitioneDeiesteconverso,quiaabeiusintellectueffluuntformaeinomnescreaturas;undesicutscientiainnobisestsigillatioreruminanimabusnostris,itaeconversoformaererumnonsuntnisiquaedamsigillatiodivinaescientiaeinrebus.”
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Now,thisform,whichisotherthantheintellect,issometimesthecauseofthethingwhoselikenessitis.Wehaveanevidentexampleofthisinthepracticalintellect,whoseformisthecauseofthethingdone.Butsometimesthisformistheeffectofthething,asisclearlythecasewithourspeculativeintellectwhenitreceivesitsknowledgefromthings.601Therefore,wheneveranintellectknowsathingthroughalikenesswhichisnottheessenceoftheknower,thentheintellectisperfectedbysomethingotherthanitself;butifthatlikenessshouldhappentobethecauseofthething,inthatcasetheintellectwillbeperfectedonlybythelikeness,andnotatallbythethingwhoselikenessitis.Forexample,ahouseisnottheperfectionoftheartisticconception,butratherthecontrary.Ontheotherhand,ifthelikenessiscausedbythething,thentheperfectionoftheintellectwillbe,asitwere,thethinginanactivesense,butitslikenessinaformalsense.602
601Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad15:“Itisnaturaltothehumansoultoapprehendintelligible
truthinamannerinferiortothatpropertosuperiorspiritualsubstances,namely,by[receivingit]fromsensiblethings…”[Istemoduscognoscendiestnaturalisanimae,utpercipiatintelligibilemveritateminframodumquopercipiuntspiritualessubstantiaesuperiores,accipiendosciliceteamexsensibilibus…];SummaI,51,1inLambert,85:“Itbelongstothehumansoultobeunitedtoabody,becauseitisimperfectandexistspotentiallyinthegenusofintellectualsubstances,nothavingthefulnessofknowledgeinitsownnature,butacquiringitfromsensiblethingsthroughthebodilysenses.”[Humanaeanimaecompetituniricorpori,quiaestimperfectaetinpotentiaexistensingenereintellectualiumsubstantiarum,nonhabensinsuanaturaplenitudinemscientiae,sedacquirenseampersensuscorporeosasensibilibusrebus.]
602DeVer.2,3,ad1:“Haecautemforma,quaeestaliudabintellectu,quandoquequidemcomparaturadremcuiusestsimilitudo,utcausaeius:sicutpatetinintellectupractico,cuiusformaestcausareioperatae;quandoqueautemesteffectusrei,sicutpatetinintellectunostrospeculativoaccipientecognitionemarebus.Quandocumqueergointellectuscognoscitremaliquampersimilitudinemquaenonestintelligentisessentia,tuncintellectusperficituraliquoalioase;sedsiillasimilitudositcausarei,perficieturtantumsimilitudine,etnullomodorecuiusestsimilitudo,sicutdomusnonestperfectioartis,sedmagiseconverso.Siautemsiteffectusrei:tuncresetiameritquodammodoperfectiointellectusactivescilicet,similitudoveroeiusformaliter.”Cf.InMet.7,lect.6,1404-1405:“And[Aristotle]doesthisbecausetheformpresentinthematterofthingsmadebyartproceedsfromtheformpresentinthemind.Inthecaseofnaturalthings,however,theoppositeistrue.Nowtheformpresentintheminddiffersfromtheonepresentinmatter;forinmattertheformsofcontrariesaredifferentandopposed,butinthemindcontrarieshaveinasensethesameform.Andthisistruebecauseformspresentinmatterexistforthesakeofthebeingofthethingsinformed,butformspresentinthemindexistaccordingtothemodeofwhatisknowableorintelligible.”[Ethocideo,quiaaformaquaeestinanimanostra,proceditformaquaeestinmateriainartificialibus;innaturalibusautemecontrario.Haecautemformaquaeestinanima,differtaforma,quaeestinmateria.Namcontrariorumformaeinmateriasuntdiversaeetcontrariae,inanimaautemestquodammodounaspeciescontrariorum.Ethocideo,quiaformaeinmateriasuntpropteressererumformatarum:formaeauteminanimasuntsecundummodumcognoscibilemetintelligibilem.]Theforminthethingitselfisthesourceoftheforminthemind,asinthetextofDeVeritate,andherethedifferentmodeofbeingoftheformisalsosuggested.
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St.Thomasparallelssensesandintelligenceregardingtheoriginofthecontent.This
suggestsalsothatthedifferenceinthecontent(sensibleandintelligible)doesnotmeana
differenceinthereceptivityofknowing.Bothfacultiesreceivetheircontentfromthethings
themselves:“Whatisunderstoodorsensedmovesthesenseorintellectonly[insofaras]
thesenseknowledgeorintellectualknowledgeisreceivedfromthings.Divinecognitionis
notofthiskind;hence,theargumentdoesnotfollow.”603Thedifferenceinthemodeof
being(alreadystudied)isthatwhichallowsSt.Thomastospeaksimultaneouslyofthis
receptionofcontentandofitsorigininthesensibleexperience.Thatistosay,whatisinthe
intellectwaspreviouslyinthesenses,notinsofarasthesamephantasmhasadifferent
modeofbeing,butinsofarasthedifferentintelligiblecontentsubsistedinthesensible
thingwithadifferentmodeofbeing:
Thataxiomistobeunderstoodasapplyingonlytoourintellect,whichreceivesitsknowledgefromthings.Forathingisledbygradualstepsfromitsownmaterialconditionstotheimmaterialityoftheintellectthroughthemediationoftheimmaterialityofsense.Consequently,whateverisinourintellectmusthavepreviouslybeeninthesenses.This,however,doesnottakeplaceinthedivineintellect.604
603DeVer.2,3,ad14:“Intelligibileetsensibilenonmoventsensumvelintellectumnisi
secundumquodcognitiosensitivavelintellectivaarebusaccipitur;nonestautemtalisdivinacognitio;etideorationonprocedit.”Cf.ad15.
604DeVer.2,3,ad19:“Verbumilludestintelligendumdeintellectunostro,quiarebusscientiamaccipit;gradatimenimresasuamaterialitateadimmaterialitatemintellectusdeducitur,scilicetmedianteimmaterialitatesensus;etideooportetutquodestinintellectunostro,priusinsensufuerit;quodinintellectudivinolocumnonhabet.”Cf.DeVer8,6,c.inLambert,83:“Similarly,ourpossibleintellectcanunderstandnothingbeforeitisbroughtintoactbyanintelligibleform.Onlythencanitunderstandthatthingtowhichthisformbelongs.Moreover,itcanunderstanditselfonlybymeansofanintelligibleformthatactuallyexistsinitself.”[Itaintellectuspossibilisnosternihilpotestintelligereantequamperficiaturformaintelligibiliinactu:tuncenimintelligitremcuiusestillaforma;necpotestseintelligerenisiperformamintelligibilemactuinseexistentem.]Inthistext“form”standsforthecontentofintellectualknowing:initsintelligiblemodeofbeing(“in
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AnotherpassagefromDeVeritatetellsusclearlythattheintelligiblespeciescomes
fromthethingsthemselvesregardingthecontent,notregardingitsmodeofbeinginthe
mind:“Theformsinourintellects,however,arereceivedfromthings.Hence,theydonot
excelthings,andare,asitwere,equaltothemasfarasrepresentationgoes,eventhough
theymayexceltheminmodeofbeingbecausetheir[being]isimmaterial.”605Asalready
shown,everyintellectualcontentcomesfromexperience,includingthefirstprinciplesand
firstnotions:“…fromwhichitfollowsthattheprincipleofcognitionoftheaforementioned
principlesisinthesensesandthememory,asthePhilosopherdemonstratestowardsthe
endofPosteriorum…”606(mytrans.)
actu”)andinitsrealbeing(“remcuiusestillaforma”).Whatperfectsthepotencyistheformofthesensiblethinginanintelligiblemodeofbeing.
605DeVer.8,10ad3inLambert,98:“Sedformaeintellectusnostriaccipiunturexrebus;undenonsuntsuperexcedentesrebussedquasiadequataequantumadrepraesentationem,licetsintexcedentesquantumadmodumessendiinquantumhabentesseimmateriale.”Regardingthecontent,thesameideaof“adequacy”betweenthethingandthemindcanbeseeninthefollowingpassage,InMet.10,lect.2,1957:“Therefore[scienceandsense]arecalledmeasuresfiguratively,becauseinrealitytheyaremeasuredratherthanmeasure.Foritisnotbecauseweperceiveorknowathingthatitissoinreality;butitisbecauseitissoinrealitythatwehaveatrueknowledgeorperceptionofit,asissaidinBookIX[…]Thusitfollowsthatinperceivingandknowingsomethingwemeasureourknowledgebymeansofthethingswhichexistoutsidethemind.”[Sicigiturperhancsimilitudinemdicunturmensurae,quiasecundumreiveritatemmagismensuranturquammensurent.Nonenimquianosaliquidsentimusautscimus,ideosicestinrerumnatura.Sedquiasicestinrerumnatura,ideoveroaliquidscimus,autsentimus,utdiciturnonoMetaphysicorum.Etsicacciditnobis,quodinsentiendoetsciendomensuramurperresquaeextranossunt.]Thenotionof“measure”alsoimpliesacertainformalidentityandinbothpassagestheroleofpatternisfulfilledbytheformsinthethingsthemselves.
606InBoet.DeTrin.6,4,c.:“…undeprincipiumcognitionispraedictorumprincipiorumestexsensuetmemoria,utpatetperPhilosophuminfinePosteriorum…”Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,c.:“Indeed,somementhoughtthattheagentintellectdoesnotdifferfromourhabitusofindemonstrableprinciples.Butthiscannotbethecase,becausewecertainlyknowindemonstrableprinciplesbyabstractingthemfromsingulars,asthePhilosopherteachesinthePosteriorAnalytics.”[Quidamverocredideruntintellectumagentemnonessealiudquamhabitumprincipiorumindemonstrabiliuminnobis.Sedhocessenonpotest,quiaetiamipsaprincipiaindemonstrabiliacognoscimusabstrahendoasingularibus,utdocetphilosophusinIPoster..]
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2.2.c.AMetaphysicalAPriori
ThefollowingtextsconfirmourinterpretationoftheSummawithsimilarormore
clearstatementsfromotherworksofAquinas.Thefocusnowisonthecharacterizationof
theagentintellectasproductiveofanintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheuniversalcontent.
Buttheactionoftheagentintellectdoesnotmakeintelligiblethosethingswhichareofthemselvesintelligible,suchastheessencesoftheangels,butthingswhichofthemselvesarepotentiallyintelligible,suchastheessenceofmaterialthings,whicharereceivedthroughsenseandimagination…607
IfSt.Thomas’referenceto“essences”istakenasareferencetothecontent,and
theirsubsistenceaseitherintelligibleinactorinpotencyasareferencetotheirmodeof
being,theninthistexttheagentintellectistobeinterpretedasametaphysicalapriori,
insofarasitproducestheintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheessenceofthematerialthing.
Thefollowingpassagemaybeconfusingif“formal”and“material”arenotproperly
understood:“Theintelligiblespecieshasthatwhichisformalinit,throughwhichitis
actuallyintelligible,fromtheagentintellect,whichisahigherpowerthanthepossible
intellect,althoughthatwhichismaterialinitisabstractedfromphantasms.”608“Whatis
material”shouldbeunderstoodastheuniversalcontentoftheintelligiblespecies,sinceitis
607DeVer.18,5,c.inSellés,EIA,247:“Actioneautemintellectusagentisnonfiunt
intelligibiliaeaquaesuntdeseipsisintelligibilia,cuiusmodisuntessentiaeangelorum,sedeaquaesuntdeseipsisinpotentiaintelligibilia,qualiasuntessentiaererummaterialium,quaepersensumetimaginationemcapiuntur…”
608DeVer.18,8,ad3inSellés,EIA,248:“Speciesintelligibilisidquodineaformaleest,perquodestintelligibilisactu,habetabintellectuagente,quiestpotentiasuperiorintellectupossibili;quamvisidquodineamaterialeest,aphantasmatibusabstrahatur.”Thewholeresponserevisitsotherpointsreferredtopreviously,andconfirmsevenmoreourreading.
276
“abstracted”fromthephantasm.Whatisformalinthespeciesisitsimmaterial(andso
“superior”)modeofbeing,andthisiswhatthespeciesreceivesfromtheagentintellect.609
ThefollowingpassagescomefromtheContraGentiles.Theagentintellectisthe
causeoftheimmaterialcondition(=modeofbeing)ofthespecies,whichenablesthe
intelligiblespeciestorepresenttheuniversal(=content):
Theintellect’sunderstandingofthegenericorspecificnatureapartfromtheindividuatingprinciplesisduetotheconditionoftheintelligiblespeciesreceivedintoit,forthespeciesisimmaterializedbytheagentintellectthroughbeingabstractedfrommatterandmaterialconditionswherebyaparticularthingisindividuated.Consequently,thesensitivepowersareunabletoknowuniversals;theycannotreceiveanimmaterialform,sincewhateverisreceivedbythemisalwaysreceivedinacorporealorgan.610
Thefollowingtextisoneofthemostexplicitregardingtheagentintellectasa
metaphysicalapriori:
609Cf.DeVer20,2ad5:“Fortheagentintellectneedsnohabitforitsactivity,becauseit
doesnotreceiveanythingfromintelligiblethings,butgivesitsownformtothembymakingthemactuallyintelligible.Thepossibleintellect,however,hasjusttheoppositerelationtointelligiblethings.”[Quodenimintellectusagenshabitunonindigeatadsuamoperationem,exhoccontingitquodintellectusagensnihilrecipitabintelligibilibus,sedmagisformamsuameistribuit,faciendoeaintelligibiliaactu;intellectusautempossibilisecontrariosehabet.]
610CGII,75,par.8:“Quodautemintelligatintellectusnaturamgenerisvelspecieidenudatamaprincipiisindividuantibus,contingitexconditionespecieiintelligibilisinipsoreceptae,quaeestimmaterialiseffectaperintellectumagentem,utpoteabstractaamateriaetconditionibusmateriae,quibusaliquidindividuatur.Etideopotentiaesensitivaenonpossuntcognoscereuniversalia:quianonpossuntrecipereformamimmaterialem,cumrecipiantsemperinorganocorporali.”Cf.CGII,76,par.3:“Thepurposeforwhichtheagentintellectrendersthespeciesactuallyintelligibleisnotthattheymayserveasmeansofunderstandingonitspart,especiallyasaseparatesubstance,becausetheagentintellectisnotinastateofpotentiality;thispurpose,onthecontrary,isthatthepossibleintellectmayunderstandbythosespecieswhichtheagentintellecthasmadeactuallyintelligible.Thus,thefunctionoftheagentintellectinregardtotheintelligiblespeciesissimplytorenderthemfitvehiclesforthepossibleintellect’sunderstanding.Now,theagentintellectmakesthemtobesuchasitisitself;foreveryagentproducesitslike.”[Intellectusagensnonfacitspeciesintelligibilesactuutipsepereasintelligat,maximesicutsubstantiaseparata,cumnonsitinpotentia:sedutpereasintelligatintellectuspossibilis.Nonigiturfaciteasnisitalesqualescompetuntintellectuipossibiliadintelligendum.Talesautemfaciteasqualisestipse:namomneagensagitsibisimile.]
277
Thatwhichexistsinthesoul,however,differsfromwhatisfoundinnaturalagents.Forinthelatter,onethingisinpotentialitytosomethingaccordingtothesamemannerofbeingasthatofitsactualpresenceinsomethingelse;thematterofairisinpotentialitytotheformofwaterinthesamewayasitisinwater.Thatiswhynaturalbodies,whichhavematterincommon,aremutuallyactiveandpassiveinthesameorder.Ontheotherhand,theintellectivesoulisnotinpotentialitytothe[species]ofthingsinthephantasms,accordingtothemodeoftheirpresencetherein,butaccordingastheyareraisedtoahigherlevelbyabstractionfrommaterialindividuatingconditions,thusbeingmadeactuallyintelligible.Theactionoftheagentintellectonthephantasm,therefore,precedesthereceptionbythepossibleintellect,sothatoperationalprimacyhereisascribednottothephantasms,buttotheagentintellect.AndforthisreasonAristotlesaysthattheagentintellectisrelatedtothepossibleintellectasarttoitsmatter.611
Thepossibleintellectisinpotencyofthese“similitudinesrerumquaesuntin
phantasmatibus”butnotwiththemodeofbeingtheyhaveinthephantasms:
“similitudines”shouldherebetranslatedas“species”ratherthanas“representation”,
because“species”betterindicatesthecontentinsofarasitisrepresented.Inthatway,this
representedcontentbelongstothethingitselfinonemodeofbeing,butitisnotreceived
bythepossibleintellectwiththatsamemodeofbeing.Inanycase,itisclearthattheagent
intellectisresponsiblefortheabstractedmodeofbeingofsomethingthatispresentinthe
phantasmwithadifferentmodeofbeing.Moreover,thefactthatthisactionoftheagent
intellectprecedesthereceptionbythepossibleintellectmakestheagentintellecta
metaphysicalconditionofpossibilityoftheactofunderstanding.611CGII,77,par.3:“Differttamenhocquodinveniturinanima,abeoquodinveniturin
agentibusnaturalibus.Quiaibiunumestinpotentiaadaliquidsecundumeundemmodumquoinalteroactuinvenitur:nammateriaaerisestinpotentiaadformamaquaeeomodoquoestinaqua.Etideocorporanaturalia,quaecommunicantinmateria,eodemordineaguntetpatiunturadinvicem.Animaautemintellectivanonestinpotentiaadsimilitudinesrerumquaesuntinphantasmatibuspermodumillumquosuntibi:sedsecundumquodillaesimilitudineselevanturadaliquidaltius,utscilicetsintabstractaeaconditionibusindividuantibusmaterialibus,exquofiuntintelligibilesactu.Etideoactiointellectusagentisinphantasmatepraeceditreceptionemintellectuspossibilis.Etsicprincipalitasactionisnonattribuiturphantasmatibus,sedintellectuiagenti.PropterquodAristotelesdicitquodsehabetadpossibilemsicutarsadmateriam.”
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ThereisanotherveryexplicittextinthecommentarytotheDeAnima:
Andfromthispointofviewtheagentintellectisnotinact.Foriftheagentintellectassuchincludedthedefiniteformsofallintelligibleobjects,thepotentialintellectwouldnotdependuponphantasms;itwouldbeactualisedsimplyandsolelybytheagentintellect;andthelatter’srelationtointelligibleobjectswouldnotbethatofamakertosomethingmade,asthePhilosopherheresays;foritwouldsimplybeidenticalwiththem.Whatmakesitthereforeinactwithrespecttointelligibleobjectsisthefactthatitisanactiveimmaterialforceabletoassimilateotherthingstoitself,i.e..toimmaterialisethem.Inthiswayitrendersthepotentiallyintelligibleactuallyso(likelightwhich,withoutcontainingparticularcolours,actuallybringscoloursintoact).612
Thetextdeniesthattheagentintellectisactiveregardingthecontent(Aquinassays
previouslythatthepossibleintellectisinpotencypreciselyinthatregard),andaffirms
insteadthatitsactivityisacertainmetaphysicalcausality,a“facienssibisimile”,a
participationofitsownmodeofbeing(immaterial)totheintelligibleinpotency.The
exampleoflightisusedtounderlinethefactthattheagentintellectdoesnotproducethe
content,evenifitproducestheintelligibleinact.Also,theword“intelligible”seemstobe
usedinboththesenseofcontent(“determinationumomniumintelligibilium”isexactly
whattheagentintellectdoesnothave,andthereforewhattheagentintellectcannot
produce)andinthesenseofmodeofbeing(“aliasibisimiliafacere,scilicetimmaterialia[…]
facitintelligibiliaactu”).Thetwosensesaredistinguished,inordertoavoidconfusion:the
agentintellectactivatesintelligibilityinonesense,butnotintheothersense(thecontent612InIIIDeAnima4,147-162:“Quantumautemadhoc,intellectusagensnonestinactu:si
enimintellectusagenshaberetinsedeterminationemomniumintelligibilium,nonindigeretintellectuspossibilisfantasmatibus,sedpersolumintellectumagentemreducereturinactumomniumintelligibilium;etsicnoncomparareturadintelligibiliautfaciensadfactum,utPhilosophushicdicit,sedutexistensipsaintelligibilia.Comparaturigiturutactusrespectuintelligibilium,inquantumestquaedamvirtusimmaterialisactivapotensaliasibisimiliafacere,scilicetimmaterialia,etperhuncmodum,eaquaesuntintelligibiliainpotencia,facitintelligibiliaactu:sicenimetlumenfacitcoloresinactu,nonquodipsumhabeatinsedeterminationemomniumcolorum.”
279
comesfromthephantasms).613Finally,itwouldbeamistakesimplytoconsidertheagent
intellectasanatural-realefficientcauseandnothingelse,evenifthetextmaygivethat
impression.This“makingimmaterial”isnotsimplythenaturalbestowingofapower,nor
thephysicalcommunicationofaperfection,butpreciselytheabstractionofthecontent
fromthephantasm.614
ItisinthissensethatthefollowingtextoftheQ.D.DeAnimaorientsus:“The
intellectgivesuniversalitytotheformsknowninasmuchasitabstractsthemfrommaterial
individuatingconditions.Consequentlyitisnotnecessarythattheintellectbeuniversal,but
thatitbeimmaterial.”615“Togiveuniversality”inthistextmeansthesameas“tomake
intelligible”inothertexts.St.Thomasisrespondingtoanobjectionthatportraysvery
simplytheproblemoftheuniversals:
613Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,c.:“Thereforepotentialitywithrespecttophantasmsmustbe
foundwithinoursoulsofarasthesephantasmsarerepresentativeofdeterminatethings.Thisbelongstothepossibleintellectwhichis,byitsverynature,inpotencytoallintelligibleobjects,butisactuatedby[determinaturad]thisorthatobjectthroughspeciesabstractedfromphantasms.Oursoulmustalsopossesssomeactiveimmaterialpowerwhichabstractsthephantasmsthemselvesfrommaterialindividuatingconditions.Thisbelongstotheagentintellect,sothatitis,asitwere,apowerparticipatedfromthesuperiorsubstance,God.”[Estergoinanimanostrainvenirepotentialitatemrespectuphantasmatum,secundumquodsuntrepraesentativadeterminatarumrerum.Ethocpertinetadintellectumpossibilem,qui,quantumestdese,estinpotentiaadomniaintelligibilia;seddeterminaturadhocvelaliudperspeciesaphantasmatibusabstractas.Estetiaminanimainvenirequamdamvirtutemactivamimmaterialem,quaeipsaphantasmataamaterialibusconditionibusabstrahit;ethocpertinetadintellectumagentem,utintellectusagenssitquasiquaedamvirtusparticipataexaliquasubstantiasuperiori,scilicetDeo.]
614Cf.Q.DeAnima,a.6,ad5inLambert,88:“Inlikemanner,theactionoftheagentintellectisnotofthesamemodeastheactionofnaturalforms,fortheactionoftheagentintellectconsistsinabstractingformsfrommatter,whereastheactionofnaturalagentsconsistsinimpressingformsonmatter.”[Etsimiliteractiointellectusagentis,nonesteiusdemmodicumactioneformarumnaturalium.Namactiointellectusagentisconsistitinabstrahendoamateria,actioveroagentiumnaturaliuminimprimendoformasinmateria.]
615Q.D.DeAnima,a.2ad6:“Intellectusdatformisintellectisuniversalitatem,inquantumabstrahiteasaprincipiismaterialibusindividuantibus;undenonoportetquodintellectussituniversalis,sedquodsitimmaterialis.”
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Auniversalformdoesnotacquireitsuniversalityfromthethingexistingoutsidethesoul,becauseallformsexistinginsuchthingsareindividuated.Thus,iftheformsintheintellectareuniversal,theymustacquirethisuniversalityfromtheintellectivesoul.Consequentlytheintellectivesoulisnotanindividuatedform,andthereforeisnotunitedtothebodysofarasits[being]isconcerned.616
Theobjectorconfusesuniversalitywithintelligibilityasamodeofbeing.St.Thomas
wouldgrantthattheuniversalcannotbeintelligibleinactasitisinthethingsthemselves
andso,ifitisactuallyintelligible,thismustbebytheactionofthesoul.Whathecorrectsis
thesenseinwhichthesoulmakes“universal”orintelligibleinact,thatisbymaking
immaterial,byabstractingfrommatterwhatisinmatterunderindividualconditions.Ashe
saysinotherinstances,whatmakessomethingintelligibleinactisnotthefactthatitis
universal(acontentabstractedfromindividuals),butthefactthatitisimmaterial,whichis
amodeofbeing.617Theagentintellectdoesnotmakethecontent,buttheabstractionof
thecontent;itmakes“immaterial.”Therefore,itdoesnotneedtobeuniversal,but
immaterial.618
616Q.D.DeAnima,a.2ob.6:“Formauniversalisnonhabetquodsitintellectivaarequaeest
extraanimam;quiaomnesformaequaesuntinrebusextraanimam,suntindividuatae.Siigiturformaeintellectussintuniversales,oportetquodhochabeantabanimaintellectiva.Nonergoanimaintellectivaestformaindividuata;etitanonuniturcorporisecundumesse.”
617Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5:“Thehumansoulisanindividuatedformandsoalsoisitspowerwhichiscalledthepossibleintellect,aswellastheintelligibleformswhicharereceivedinthepossibleintellect.Butthisdoesnotpreventtheseformsfrombeingactually[understood],forathingisactually[understood]becauseitisimmaterial,notbecauseitisuniversal.Indeed,theuniversalisintelligiblebecauseitisabstractedfrommaterialindividuatingconditions.”[Animahumanaestquaedamformaindividuata;etsimiliterpotentiaeiusquaediciturintellectuspossibilis,etformaeintelligibilesineoreceptae.Sedhocnonprohibeteasesseintellectasinactu:exhocenimaliquidestintellectuminactuquodestimmateriale,nonautemexhocquodestuniversale;sedmagisuniversalehabetquodsitintelligibileperhocquodestabstractumaprincipiismaterialibusindividuantibus.]
618Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad6:“Itmustbesaidthatthisveryfactthatthelightoftheagentintellectisnotanactofanycorporealorganthroughwhichitactsissufficientforitsbeingabletoseparateintelligiblespeciesfromphantasms;sincetheseparatenessofintelligiblespecies,
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2.3.TheComparisonoftheAgentIntellectwithLight
Theagentintellectislikealight.WhatdoesthismeanforAquinas?Thefirst
importanttexttokeepinmindis79,3ad2.Aquinasisawarethattheroleoflightinthe
sensiblerealmissubjecttodifferingopinions,butheknowsinwhatdefinitesenseheis
usingit(asametaphor)regardingintellectualknowing:
Therearetwoopinionsastotheeffectoflight.Forsomesaythatlightisrequiredforsight,inordertomakecolorsactuallyvisible.Andaccordingtothistheactiveintellectisrequiredforunderstanding,inlikemannerandforthesamereasonaslightisrequiredforseeing.Butintheopinionofothers,lightisrequiredforsight[,]notforthecolorstobecomeactuallyvisible;butinorderthatthemediummaybecomeactuallyluminous,astheCommentatorsaysonDeAnimaii.Andaccordingtothis,Aristotle'scomparisonoftheactiveintellecttolightisverifiedinthis,thatasitisrequiredforunderstanding,soislightrequiredforseeing;butnotforthesamereason.619
Thatistosay,whateveropiniononemayholdabouttheeffectoflightisofno
consequencetoAquinas.Thefactis,theagentintellectisrequiredsothatthenatureof
corporealthingsismadeintelligibleinact.Themetaphorismorehelpfultousifwe
understandsensiblelightinthesameway;thenecessityandtheroleoftheagentintellect,
whicharereceivedinthepossibleintellect,isnotgreaterthantheseparatenessoftheagentintellect.”[Hocipsumquodlumenintellectusagentisnonestactusalicuiusorganicorporeiperquodoperetur,sufficitadhocquodpossitsepararespeciesintelligibilesaphantasmatibus;cumseparatiospecierumintelligibiliumquaerecipiunturinintellectupossibili,nonsitmaiorquamseparatiointellectusagentis.]St.Thomas’pointistoshowthattheeffectisproportionatetothecause,andallhesaysreferstothemodeofbeingofthecontent,nottothecontent.Thecontent,infact,isnotseparatefromthethingsthemselves(cf.85,1ad1),buttheabstractedspeciesis.
61979,3ad2:“Circaeffectumluminisestduplexopinio.Quidamenimdicuntquodlumenrequirituradvisum,utfaciatcoloresactuvisibiles.Etsecundumhoc,similiterrequiritur,etpropteridem,intellectusagensadintelligendum,propterquodlumenadvidendum.Secundumaliosvero,lumenrequirituradvidendum,nonproptercolores,utfiantactuvisibiles;sedutmediumfiatactulucidum,utCommentatordicitinIIDeAnima.Etsecundumhoc,similitudoquaAristotelesassimilatintellectumagentemlumini,attenditurquantumadhoc,quodsicuthocestnecessariumadvidendum,itailludadintelligendum;sednonpropteridem.”Cf.InIIDeAnima14,356ff.;InIIIDeAnima4,43-53;Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,ad4(seeAppendix,Note20).
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however,donotdependonthemetaphor,butontheprinciplesexposedinthecorpus:
becausethepossibleintellectmustbeactualizedbyanintelligibleinact,andtheobjectof
understandingisnotintelligibleinactinitsnaturalmodeofbeing,theremustbeanagent
powerthatmakesitintelligibleinact.620
Amoreobscuretextis85,1ad4.Whatisinterestingaboutthispassageisthat
Aquinasspeaksoftwoactionsoftheagentintellect:onehecalls“illumination”,anactionof
theagentintellectuponthephantasm,anactionofwhichhedoesnotspeakanywhereelse
inthetreatise;andtheotherhecalls“abstraction,”referringtotheusualefficiencyofthe
agentintellectasmakingtheintelligibleinact:
Notonlydoestheactiveintellectthrowlightonthephantasm:itdoesmore;byitsownpoweritabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm.Itthrowslightonthephantasm,because,justasthesensitivepartacquiresagreaterpowerbyitsconjunctionwiththeintellectualpart,sobythepoweroftheactiveintellectthephantasmsaremade[…]fitfortheabstractiontherefromofintelligibleintentions.Furthermore,theactiveintellectabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm,forasmuchasbythepoweroftheactiveintellectweareable[totakeintoourconsiderationthespecificnaturewithouttheconditionsofindividuality,sincetheimageofthatspecificnature]informsthepassiveintellect.621
620Cory(cf.Averroes,11-12)distinguishesbasicallytwotheoriesoflight(L1andL2).
Averroesinterpretstheroleoflightasnotactualizingthevisibleobjectitself(L1),butasmakingthemediumabletoreceivetheinfluenceofthecolour(L2).AverroesattributesthistheorytoAristotle.AboutSt.Thomasshesays:“AlthoughlaterinlifehediscardedtheL1TheoryofphysicallightinfavorofL2,hecontinuedtoinsistthatL1providestheappropriatemodelfortheagentintellect’sabstractivefunction;seeQDDA,4,ad4;ST,I,79,3,ad2”(Cory,Averroes,42).
62185,1ad4:“Phantasmataetilluminanturabintellectuagente;etiterumabeis,pervirtutemintellectusagentis,speciesintelligibilesabstrahuntur.Illuminanturquidem,quia,sicutparssensitivaexconiunctioneadintellectivamefficiturvirtuosior,itaphantasmataexvirtuteintellectusagentisreddunturhabiliautabeisintentionesintelligibilesabstrahantur.Abstrahitautemintellectusagensspeciesintelligibilesaphantasmatibus,inquantumpervirtutemintellectusagentisacciperepossumusinnostraconsiderationenaturasspecierumsineindividualibusconditionibus,secundumquarumsimilitudinesintellectuspossibilisinformatur.”
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NoticeAquinas’freedominhisuseofwordsbut,atthesametime,hisprecisionin
conveyingwhathemeans.Thefactthatheisnowusing“illumination”forsomethingthatis
notabstractiondoesnotmeanthathecannotuse“illumination”or“light”tosignifythe
agentintellectinsofarasitabstracts.622Butherethereisareasonforusingtheword
“illumination,”andthisiswhatisimportant.
ObjectionFourplayswiththe“material”meaningofthetwowordsthatareusually
relatedtotheactionoftheagentintellect:abstractionandlight.Whereaslightseemstobe
somethingactive,inthesenseofacertaininfluenceonwhatisilluminated(weseethe
effectofthelightontheobject),thewordabstraction,thoughactiveaswell,seemsrather
tobeakindof“takingfrom”itsobject.Therefore,iftheagentintellect“illuminates,”itdoes
not“takefrom.”
TheobjectiongivesAquinastheopportunitytoroundoffhisEpistemology.Theissue
isnotasecondaryone:isthephantasmintelligibleinpotency?Itiseasytoadmitthat
somethingmaterialisnotintelligibleinact,butthisisnotthesameassayingthatitis
intelligibleinpotency.Iftheagentintellectmakesthephantasmintelligibleinact,itis
becausethephantasmisalreadyintelligibleinpotency.Now,tobeintelligibleinpotencyis
to“actually”possessapotentialityofbecomingintelligibleinact.Doesthephantasmhave
thispotentiality?
622Thishedoes,forexample,in79,3ad2(quotedabove)and79,4,c.Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,
a.10,ad4:“…butyetitactuallypossessesanimmateriallightwhichhasthepowerofabstractingthosethingswhichareabletobeabstractedinpotency.”[…sedtamenactuhabetlumenimmaterialehabensvirtutemabstrahendiquaesuntabstrahibiliainpotential.]
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Itwouldnotbeoutofplaceinitiallytoclarifyinwhatsensethephantasmissaidto
be“intelligibleinpotency”:itisinpotencyinthesamesensethatitwillbeinact,because
wearetalkingaboutpotencyandactofthesamething.Therefore,iftobeintelligibleinact
means—fortheobjectofunderstanding—acquiringanewmodeofbeing,thisisalsothe
kindofpotentialitywearetalkingabout.Itisapotentialitythatregardsthemodusrei
intellectae,andnottheobjectitselfassuch(resintellecta).Infact,theobjectassuchisin
act,notinpotency:thenatureofthecorporealthingisthespecificperfectionofthe
corporealthing,thatwhichmakesittobewhatitis,aformalperfectionreceivedinthe
matterandactualizingthematter.
Wehavesaidalsothattopossessthepotentialityofbecomingintelligibleinactis
notthesameasnottobeintelligibleinact.Anexamplemayclarifythepoint.Itmaybesaid
that,inacertainsense,atableis“inpotency”ofbecomingaman.Butifatablewillbecome
aman,firstitmustsuffertheactionofmanyagentsbeforefinallybecomingsomethingthat
isinproximatepotencyofbecomingaman.Intherealmofnature,noteverythingcomes
fromeverything,butthereisanorderintheprocessesofthings.Atableisnotaman(in
act),butthisdoesnotsimplyimplythatitisinpotencyofbecomingaman.
Inasimilarway,ifsomethinginintellectualknowingcomesfromtheobject(the
universalcontentinanintelligiblemodeofbeing),theobjectmustbeabletocontributeto
thiseffect,atleastundertheinfluenceofanagentpower.
Nowthephantasm(whichrepresentstheobject)asamaterialthingcannotproduce
morethannaturaleffects(thefirstmodeofbeingofDeVer.2,2).Ifanintentionaleffect
(secondmodeofbeing)istocomefromthephantasm,thatabilitycannotbeproducedby
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itsnaturalprinciplesbecausecauseandeffectmustbeproportionate.ThisiswhyAquinas
introducestheinfluenceofthecelestialbodiesinordertoexplainsensibleknowing.There
mustbeanintentionalinfluenceonthematerialthingsinordertoexplainhowsensible
knowingmaycomefromthem.623
Here,itappearsthatAquinasistryingtoexplainhowtheintelligiblespecies624may
comefromthephantasmundertheabstractiveinfluence(secondaction)oftheagent
intellect.Thephantasmismadeable,byacertainintentionalcausalityoftheagentintellect
calledhere“illumination,”tobesubjecttotheagentintellect’sabstractiveactivity,bywhich
623Anotionofclaritas,asapropertyofthenaturalformwhichfunctionsastheconditionof
possibilityoftheform’sperception(asproposedbyKevinE.O’Reilly,AestheticPerception:AThomisticPerspective[Portland:FourCourtsPress,2007],24ff.)wouldnotreplace,inmyview,theThomistictheoryofthecelestialbodies,althoughifitisunderstoodinacertainsense,itcouldbetakenasacomplementarynotion.O’Reillyunderstandsclaritasasanobjectivepropertythatisactualizedonlybytheactualizationofsubjectivity(“[aesthetic]visioinactuestclaritasinactu”)andherelateshisclaimtotheAristotelianidentity(i.e.,intellectusinactuestintellectuminactu)interpretedasanidentitybetweensubjectandobject(aninterpretationIconsiderforeigntoAquinas,asIhavearguedinChapter3).Now,iftheprincipleofactualizationofacontent-propertyoftheobjectisonthesideofthesubject,O’ReillyisproposingwhatIamrejecting,whichisaformalaprioriinperception,asformallyconstitutiveoftheobjectofknowing.Inotherwords,ifclaritasiswhatisknownbytheaestheticvisio,andreceivesitsactualityfromvisioitself,itmeansthatitisonlypotentiallyintheformitself,andactualinthesubject’sactivity.Understoodinthissense,therefore,thenotionofclaritascannotreplacetheThomistictheoryofcelestialbodiesbecauseitbeginsfromprinciplesforeigntoSt.Thomas(inmyinterpretation).Inotherwords,ifwesaythattheobjectisnotactualindependentlyfromtheactivityofthesubject(cf.25),butwedonotdistinguishtheobjectfromitsmodeofbeing,wearegivingtothesubjectaresponsibilityoverthecontentthatthesubjectdoesnothaveinAquinas.Inmyview,becauseinknowingthereisalwaysadistinctionbetweentheobjectinitselfandinitsknowablemodeofbeing,acauseforthatknowablemodeofbeingisalwaysneeded,bothatthelevelofsensibleandintelligibleknowing.Now,O’Reillymentionsthat“clarityis[…]apropertyofform,forallformparticipatesinthedivineclarity”(24).IfweunderstandthispropertyasaparticipationonGod’sknowability,aparticipationthat,intheThomisticsystem,couldverywellarriveatmaterialthingsthroughthemediationofothercreatures,thenIdonotseeatensionwiththeThomistictheoryofcelestialbodies,butIsee,rather,thecoreofit.Thisknowability,intheintellectualrealm,isrelatedtowhatwehavecalledtheintelligiblemodeofbeingand,inourinterpretation,theactivityoftheagentintellectisrelatedtothismodeofbeing.
624Intelligiblespecies,i.e.,theuniversalcontentinitsintelligiblemodeofbeing.
286
thephantasm’snaturebecomesintelligibleinact.Inotherwords,bythisillumination,the
phantasmismadeintelligibleinpotency;whereas,byabstraction,thephantasmismade
intelligibleinact.And,becausebothactionsoftheagentintellectregardthemodusrei
intellectae,itcannotbesaidthattheintelligiblecontentcomesfromanyoftheseactions.
Rather,theintelligiblecontent(resintellecta)isabletoberenderedintelligible(modusr.i.)
bytheactionoftheagentintellect.
Aquinascouldhaveascribedthistypeofcausalitytoaseparatesubstance,ashe
ascribedtothecelestialbodiestheintentionalcausalityofthematerialthings.Buthedid
notwanttomultiplycauseswithoutnecessity.Thereisalreadyinthehumanbeingan
activeintellectivepowerwhichisaparticipationofthedivinelightandso,forAquinas,this
poweristhecauseofthispotentialityinthephantasm.625
Theactionoflightissometimesrelatedtotheverbresultareasopposedto
transmutatio:“Theemanationofproperaccidentsfromtheirsubjectisnotbywayof
transmutation,butbyacertainnaturalresultance;thusonethingresultsnaturallyfrom
another,ascolorfromlight.”626Theactionoflightdoesnotproducethecolours(asina
transmutatiowhereonethingcausestheother)but,rather,makesthecoloursvisible.In
thefollowingtext,resultareisagainopposedtotransmutatio:“Asthepowerofthesoul
flowsfromtheessence,notbyatransmutation,butbyacertainnaturalresultance,andis
625Cromp(cf.188)doesnotseemtoconsiderthisdistinctionrelevantinthetextofAquinas.62677,6ad3:“Emanatiopropriorumaccidentiumasubiectononestperaliquam
transmutationem;sedperaliquamnaturalemresultationem,sicutexunonaturaliteraliudresultat,utexlucecolor.”
287
simultaneouswiththesoul,soisitthecasewithonepowerasregardsanother.”627
Resultareisawayof“being-originated,”differentfromphysicalalterationandnotimplying
timeofitself.St.Thomasusesresultarefortheagentintellectinthefollowingtext:
Thisisdonebythepoweroftheactiveintellectwhichbyturningtowardsthephantasmproducesinthepassiveintellectacertainlikenesswhichrepresents,astoitsspecificconditionsonly,thethingreflectedinthephantasm.Itisthusthattheintelligiblespeciesissaidtobeabstractedfromthephantasm…628
WemaysaythatthisisoneofthetextsinwhichAquinasseemstospeakof
abstractionasan“illumination.”Butwhatisclearisthat,byusing“resultat,”heis
suggestingthattheactionoftheagentintellectisnotproductiveoftheobject,butletsthe
objectbeseen.Themetaphoroflightandtheuseofresultareseemalsotodiscouragean
understandingoftheagentintellectasaformalapriori.
Themetaphoroflightisusedclearlyfortheagentintellectinsometexts(cf.84,5,
c.;88,3ad1).ButthisdoesnotpreventSt.Thomasfromusingittosignifytheseparate
intellects(especiallythedivineintellect).TheintellectuallightinGodissimple,butthe
moredistantfromitsfirstsource,themoredividedwillwefindthislight:
EveryintellectualsubstancepossessesintellectivepowerbytheinfluenceoftheDivinelight,whichisoneandsimpleinitsfirstprinciple,andthefartheroffintellectualcreaturesarefromthefirstprinciplesomuchthemoreisthelight
62777,7ad1:“Sicutpotentiaanimaeabessentiafluit,nonpertransmutationem,sedper
naturalemquandamresultationem,etestsimulcumanima;itaestetiamdeunapotentiarespectualterius.”
62885,1ad3:“Sedvirtuteintellectusagentisresultatquaedamsimilitudoinintellectupossibiliexconversioneintellectusagentissupraphantasmata,quaequidemestrepraesentativaeorumquorumsuntphantasmata,solumquantumadnaturamspeciei.Etperhuncmodumdiciturabstrahispeciesintelligibilisaphantasmatibus…”
288
dividedanddiversified,asisthecasewithlinesradiatingfromthecentreofacircle.629
Thedivineintelligenceisalsocalled“light”inrelationshiptotheknowledgeofthe
separatesoul,whenthereisnoabstraction:“Butthesoulwhenseparatedunderstands
singularsbyspeciesderivedfromtheDivinelight,whichisindifferenttowhatisnearor
distant.Henceknowledgeintheseparatedsoulisnothinderedbylocaldistance.”630The
divineintelligenceiscalledlightbecauseitmakespossibletheactofunderstanding,not
insofarasitphysicallymovesthefacultytounderstand,butinsofarasitbestowsanagent
object,theintelligibleinact.Itiswhattheagentintellectdoesinthislife,insofarasit
producestheagentobject,theintelligibleinact,bymeansofabstractionfromthe
phantasm.ThedifferenceisthatGoddoesnotmakeintelligiblesomethingthatisnot(i.e.,
initsmodeofbeing),butmakestheintelligibleitself(theintelligiblespecieswithits
content)asaparticipationofitsowntruth.Godcertainlymakestheobjectvisible,not
thoughastheobjectisinitself,butasitisinGodHimself.Thatiswhythecontentofthe
infusedspeciesis“intensive”andnotproportionatetothehumanintellect.
Thereare,asitwere,threeintelligibilities:intelligiblepower,intelligibleobjectand
intelligiblemodeofbeingoftheobject(theseparationfrommatterthatallowsittobe
understood).InGod,thethreethingsareoneandthesame.Intheangel,theproportionate
objectisalreadyinanintelligiblemodeofbeing.Inhumanbeings,thisisnotthecase;here,62989,1,c.:“Inomnibusenimsubstantiisintellectualibusinveniturvirtusintellectivaper
influentiamdiviniluminis.Quodquideminprimoprincipioestunumetsimplex;etquantomagiscreaturaeintellectualesdistantaprimoprincipio,tantomagisdividiturilludlumenetdiversificatur,sicutacciditinlineisacentroegredientibus.”
63089,7,c.:“Intelligitautemanimaseparatasingulariaperinfluxumspecierumexdivinolumine,quodquidemlumenaequalitersehabetadpropinquumetdistans.Undedistantialocalisnullomodoimpeditanimaeseparataecognitionem.”
289
theobjectisnot“light”(intelligibilityasmodeofbeing)butneedstobe“illumined.”Thisis
theneedforandthenatureoftheagentintellect.
***
AtextfromtheContraGentiles631canserveasasummaryofmanyoftheconcepts
thatformthecoreofourargument.ForAquinas,itisnotdifficulttoseehowanagent
intellectandapossibleintellectmaycoexistinonesoul:
Fornothingpreventsonethingfrombeinginonerespectpotentialinrelationtosomeotherthing,andactualinanotherrespect,asweobserveinthingsofnature;airisactuallydampandpotentiallydry,andthereverseistrueofearth.Now,thissameinterrelationshipobtainsbetweentheintellectivesoulandthephantasms.632
Thatistosay,thephantasmisinactofsomethingofwhichthesoulispotency,and
thesoulisinactofsomethingdifferentofwhichthephantasmispotency:“Forthe
intellectivesoulhassomethingactualtowhichthephantasmispotential,andispotentialto
somethingpresentactuallyinthephantasm.”633Whatarethesedifferentthings?Aquinas
beginsbyexaminingtheactualityandthepotentialitywithregardstothesoul:
“[S]incethesubstanceofthehumansoulispossessedofimmateriality,and,asisclearfromwhathasbeensaid,itthereforehasanintellectualnature—everyimmaterialsubstancebeingofthiskind.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatthesoulisnow[determinately]likenedtothisorthatthing,asitmustbeinordertoknowthisorthatthingdeterminately;forallknowledgeisbroughtaboutbythelikenessofthethingknownbeingpresentintheknower.Thus,theintellectualsoulitselfremainspotentialwithrespecttothedeterminatelikenessesofthingsthatcanbeknownby
631II,77,par.2;Cf.79,4ad4.632CGII,77,par.2:“Nihilenimprohibethocrespectuilliusessesecundumquidinpotentia
etsecundumaliudinactu,sicutinrebusnaturalibusvidemus:aerenimestactuhumidusetpotentiasiccus,terraautemeconverso.Haecautemcomparatioinvenituresseinteranimamintellectivametphantasmata.”
633CGII,77,par.2:“Habetenimanimaintellectivaaliquidinactuadquodphantasmaestinpotentia:etadaliquidestinpotentiaquodinphantasmatibusactuinvenitur.”
290
us,namely,thenaturesofsensiblethings.Itisthephantasmswhichpresentthesedeterminatenatures[ofsensiblethings]tous.634
Thesoulisinactofbeingimmaterial(itpossessesimmateriality),butisinpotencyof
determinatespeciesofitsobject.Speciesisherethecontentasrepresented,andnotsimply
thespeciesasameans;thisisbecausethespeciesasameansisactinthesamesenseas
thesoulisact(immateriality),andhereAquinasistryingtoshowthatpotentialityand
actualityarereferredtodifferentthings.Thesoulisinpotencyofsomethingwhichwill
perfectitinawaydifferentfromthewayinwhichthesoulisalreadyperfect.Thesoulisin
potencyofreceivingtheperfectionofthething,notofbeingimmaterial;butthe
determinatespeciesofthething(here,thephantasm),thoughitpossessestheperfectionof
thething,isinpotencyofbeingimmaterial,asAquinassays:
Butthesephantasmshavenotyetacquiredintelligibleactuality,sincetheyarelikenessesofsensiblethingsevenastomaterialconditions,whicharetheindividualproperties,and,moreover,thephantasmsexistinmaterialorgans.Consequently,theyarenotactuallyintelligible.Theyare,however,potentiallyintelligible,sinceintheindividualmanwhoselikenessthephantasmsreflectitispossibleto[conceive]theuniversalnaturestrippedofallindividuatingconditions.Andso,thephantasmshaveintelligibilitypotentially,whilebeingactuallydeterminateaslikenessesofthings.Intheintellectivesoultheoppositewasthecase.635
634CGII,77,par.2:“Habetenimsubstantiaanimaehumanaeimmaterialitatem,et,sicutex
dictispatet,exhochabetnaturamintellectualem:quiaomnissubstantiaimmaterialisesthuiusmodi.Exhocautemnondumhabetquodassimileturhuicvelillireideterminate,quodrequirituradhocquodanimanostrahancvelillamremdeterminatecognoscat:omnisenimcognitiofitsecundumsimilitudinemcognitiincognoscente.Remanetigituripsaanimaintellectivainpotentiaaddeterminatassimilitudinesrerumcognoscibiliumanobis,quaesuntnaturaererumsensibilium.Ethasquidemdeterminatasnaturasrerumsensibiliumpraesentantnobisphantasmata.”Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,ob.6etad6.
635CGII,77,par.2:“Quae[i.e.phantasmata]tamennondumperveneruntadesseintelligibile:cumsintsimilitudinesrerumsensibiliumetiamsecundumconditionesmateriales,quaesuntproprietatesindividuales,etsuntetiaminorganismaterialibus.Nonigitursuntintelligibiliaactu.Ettamen,quiainhochominecuiussimilitudinemrepraesentantphantasmata,estacciperenaturamuniversalemdenudatamabomnibusconditionibusindividuantibus,suntintelligibiliain
291
InwhatbetterwaycouldAquinashavesaidthatthecontentofwhichthesoulisin
potencyisinactinsomesense,andyetisinpotencyinanothersense(whichisexactlythe
pointoftheparagraph)?Theword“determinatio”seemstobeameanstoexpressthis
“potentialactuality”or“actualpotentiality”ofthenatureintheconcretesubstance.
Aquinas’pointcannotbesimplythatthephantasmisinactofrepresentingthethinginits
particularity.Thisisbecausethesoulisnotinpotencyofthatactuality,butinpotencyof
theuniversalnaturewhichisactuallypresentinthethingitself(asismostclearinthe
passagejustquoted),636butnotinthemodeofbeingwhichwillmakeitknowable.Thatis
whytheagentintellectandthepossibleintellectarenotonlydistinctfacultiesinthesame
soul,insofarastheiractivitesregarddifferentpotentialities(asisevidentintheconclusion
oftheparagraph),buttheworkofonerequirestheworkoftheotherasaconditionof
possibility.Aquinasconcludes:“Hence,thereisinthatsoulanactivepowervis-à-visthe
phantasms,makingthemactuallyintelligible;andthispoweriscalledtheagentintellect;
whilethereisalsointhesoulapowerthatisinpotentialitytothedeterminatelikenessesof
sensiblethings;andthispoweristhepossibleintellect.”637These“determinatas
potentia.Sicigiturhabentintelligibilitateminpotentia,determinationemautemsimilitudinisreruminactu.Econtrarioautemeratinanimaintellectiva.”
636Noteinparticularhowthephantasmsaresaidtobe“similitudinesrerumsensibiliumetiamsecundumconditionesmateriales.”Thisimpliesthatthenatureisalsoinsomewayrepresentedinthephantasm.Thisisnotsurprisingifweadmitthat,forAquinas,thenatureispresentintheparticularthing:iftheuniversalnaturecanbepresentintheparticularthing,itcanalsobepresentintherepresentationofthatparticularthing,insomeway.ThatiswhyAquinassaysthat“Whateverisinourintellectmusthavepreviouslybeeninthesenses.”[Oportetutquodestinintellectunostro,priusinsensufuerit.](DeVer2,3,ad19).
637CGII,77,par.2:“Estigiturinanimaintellectivavirtusactivainphantasmata,facienseaintelligibiliaactu:ethaecpotentiaanimaevocaturintellectusagens.Estetiamineavirtusquaeestinpotentiaaddeterminatassimilitudinesrerumsensibilium:ethaecestpotentiaintellectuspossibilis.”
292
similitudinesrerumsensibilium”arenotthephantasms,buttheabstractedspeciesinsofar
astheyrepresentthesensiblethingsintheirnature.And“facienseaintelligibiliaactu”
impliestheimmaterializationoftheuniversalnature,andsothecontributionofamodeof
being(“denudatam”)toit.
***
Withthisendstheexplanationofthetextssupportingtheproposedinterpretation
oftheagentintellectinSt.Thomasasametaphysicalapriori.Ascanbeseen,this
explanationdependsheavilyonthepreviousreflections.Ifwedistinguish,withAquinas,
betweenintelligibleasresintellectaandasmodusreiintellectae(Chapter2)andwethen
understandthepassivityofhumanunderstandingasareceptionoftheintelligibleas
content(Chapter3),itbecomespossibletounderstandtheefficiencyoftheagentintellect
asrelatingtothemodeofbeingofthecontentand,therefore,tounderstandtheagent
intellectasametaphysicalapriori.
293
Conclusion
Weconcludethisdissertationbyofferingabriefsummaryofthetopic,themain
contributions,limitsandfuturelinesofresearch.
1.Summary
FocusingonthetreatiseonhumanbeingintheSummaTheologiae,Ihave
substantiatedmyinterpretationofAquinas’agentintellectasametaphysicalapriori.The
mentionofametaphysicalapriorirefersbycontrasttoaformalapriori,acrucialnotionin
ModernPhilosophy.
InAquinas,themeaningofthings(theirnatureorintelligibility)isnotdeterminedby
theagentintellect,butresidesinthethingsthemselves.Theagentintellectgivesthe
commonnatureanintelligiblemodeofbeing,sothatthespecificperfectionofthingsmay
becomesomehowtheperfectionofourintelligence.Intelligence(i.e.,thepossibleintellect)
receivestheperfection-contentofthings;itisinthissensethatthepossibleintellectisin
potencybeforeknowing.Theperfection-contentreceivesanintelligiblemodeofbeing;itis
inthatsensethattheagentintellectperfectstheobjectofknowing.Theagentintellect
givestothespecificnaturesofsensiblethingstheabilitytoactasagentobjects;theagent
intellectdoesnotprovidetheircontent.Theagentintellectisthus,forAquinas,notaformal
butametaphysicalaprioriofhumanunderstanding.AKantianformalapriori,instead,is
sourceofintelligiblecontentandconstitutiveoftheknown.
BymakingAquinasdialoguewithKant,Ihaveintendedtopointouttheradical
differencebetweenthetwosystems,therebyhighlightingthedifficultiesofunderstanding
294
Aquinas’agentintellectasaformalapriori.Thiswasrequiredformyinterpretationof
Aquinasinordertodistinguishitclearlyfromotherinterpretationsthatmayconsiderthe
agentintellectasfulfillingtheroleofaKantiantranscendental.ThatiswhyIthoughtit
importanttobringforththetensionbetweenAquinasandKant,andtotakethattensionto
itsroot:thedifferingKantianandThomistic“facts,”whichworkastheirrespectivepointsof
departureandrequire,asconditionsofpossibility,theirrespectiveapriorielements.
ThedialoguewithKantwasalsohelpfulinconnectingAquinas’thoughtwith
meaningfulreflectionfortodaysince,despitetheirdifferingapproaches,Isuggestseeing
boththinkers(KantandSt.Thomas)asfacingthesamequestion:thetensionbetween
contentofexperienceanduniversalknowing.Thisismyreasonforhavingplacedthe
doctrineoftheagentintellectinitsnaturalcontext,theproblemoftheuniversals.
Itshouldbeclearthatmypointwasnotsomuchtoofferanoverallinterpretationof
Kant(aboutwhosecontributionsfutureconversationsoughttohappen),asitwastotryto
“catch”Kant’sapproachtotheproblemoftheuniversalsattheverybeginningandtoshow,
thus,thetensionwithSt.Thomas’sapproach.Thisapproach,inmyview,isKant’slegacyto
ModernPhilosophy,anditispreciselyherethattherelevantdistinctionbetweenAquinas
andKantislocated,particularlyinreferencetoAquinas’doctrineoftheagentintellect.
2.Contributions
Mymaincontribution,ratherthanbeingtheparticularcharacterizationoftheagent
intellect(aviewthatcanactuallybefoundinotherauthorsaswell)is,instead,the
argumentproducedtosupportthischaracterization.Thisargumentisrelatedtothe
particularconnectionamongthefirstthreechapters,explainedseveraltimesinthe
295
dissertation.Chapter1establishesthefactwhichrequiresforAquinasanagentintellect,
anditgivesustwoveryimportantprinciples:oneistheobjectofhumanunderstanding(the
universalnature)aspresentinthethingsthemselves,andtheotherthatitisnotinthe
thingsthemselveswithamodeofbeingthatmakesitavailabletotheintellectualeye.
ThesetwoprinciplesleadustothemainpointofChapter2,namelythedistinctionbetween
theintelligibleobjectanditsintelligiblemodeofbeing.Now,becauseknowingisreceptive
oftheintelligibleobject(Chapter3),whichispresentinthethingsthemselves(Chapter1),
theagentintellectisactive,notoftheintelligiblecontent,butofitsabstractedorintelligible
modeofbeing(Chapter4).
Anothercontributionisshowingtheconnectionbetweentheinterpretationofthe
AristotelianidentityinAquinas(cf.Chapter3)andthedistinctionbetweenresintellectaand
modusreiintellectae(Chapter2).ThenotunusualmisunderstandingoftheAristotelian
identityinAquinas(asifitwereanidentitybetweensubjectandobject)isrelatedtothe
lackofdistinctionbetweentheaforementionedtwomeaningsofintelligible.Itisan
importantpoint,inmyview,becausesomeauthorsmaystumbleinthismisunderstanding
oftheAristotelianidentityinAquinasandthenthinkthatforAquinas,asforKant,the
content-perfectionoftheknownistheactoftheknower.WhatIproposeisthatthe
objectiveaspectoftheAristotelianidentity(intellectuminactu)cannotbetakenassimply
thecontent,butthatitactuallyreferstotherepresentationofthecontent,andsotothe
content,yes,butinitscognitivemodeofbeing.
296
3.LimitsandFutureLinesofResearch
Someofthelimitationsofthisdissertationhavetodowithitsmethodology,and
havealreadybeenmentionedintheIntroduction,orinthepreviouspointsofthis
conclusion.
Onanothernote,itisalwayschallengingtoexpressone’sownviewtoscholarswho
comefromdifferentinterpretationsand/orphilosophicalbackgrounds.OneofthewaysI
thoughtimportanttoovercomethisdifficultywastofocusnotsomuchonthedefinitionof
terms,asonthedefinitionoftheproblemsandtheapproaches.
Ontheonehand,thespecificityofatopiccanmakeitdifficulttofindrelevant
scholarlyworkaddressingtheissueasdirectlyasneeded.Ontheotherhand,manymore
generalworksonAquinas’Epistemologyandothermoreparticularstudiestreatmanyof
thepointsIhavemadeindealingwithmyprecisetopic,andtheyhavenotbeenexpressly
referenced.Ihavesoftenedthissilencebyengagingafewmorerelevantauthors,butIlook
forwardtoengagingotherviews,particularlyinTranscendentalThomism.
Inthemain,thisinvestigationhasallowedmetobetterworkoutmyownposition
and,Ihope,hasmadeitunderstandable;furtherengagementinabroaderandconstructive
dialoguecouldcertainlyfosterabetterunderstandingofAquinas.Inparticular,mysilence
regardinginterpretationsofAquinasinTranscendentalThomismisduemainlytothe
impossibilityofadequatelyengagingintheinterpretationofseveralauthorsatthesame
time.MyinterpretationofSt.Thomascouldbetakenaspreparationforestablishingamore
fruitfulengagementwiththisparticularschool.
297
AdetailedstudyoftherestoftheSumma,withregardstotheoutcomesofthis
dissertation,couldproveofthegreatestrelevanceforassessingmyinterpretationon
severalpoints,particularlythetreatiseontheTrinity(forexample,thenotionofverbum),
thereferencestoother“lights”inintellectualknowing(suchasthelumengloriaeandfaith),
otherexplicitreferencestotheagentintellect,thehumanknowledgeofChrist,andalong
etcetera.NottomentionthestudyofthosesametopicsintherestofAquinas’works.
Thesefindingscouldalsohelpustoreadsuchtextsinanewlight.
Forexample,inthetextintheSummaTheologiae,I,q.34,a.1ad3,thedistinction
betweenresintellectaandmodusreiintellectae,andtheconsequentdistinctionbetween
speciesandobject,mayhelpustobetterunderstandthedistinctionbetweenthetwo
aspectsoftheVerbumintheHolyTrinity:oneaspectaccordingtowhichtheVerbumis
absolutelythesameasregardsthewholeTrinity(thewholeTrinityissaidthroughthe
Verbum,thewholeTrinityisunderstoodbytheThreeDivinePersonsintheoneVerbum)
andanotheraspectinwhichtheVerbumisdistinct(onlyoneVerbumissaidbytheone
Father).WhatisunderstoodisnotonlytheSpecies,butthewholeTrinityintheSpecies
because,forSt.Thomas,speciesandobjectaretwodifferentnotions.Inthecaseofthe
Trinity,thereisactuallyanabsolutecompleteidentitybetweenintellectusandintellectum
(=object),butnotbetweenintellectumandVerbum(insofarastheVerbumandalsothe
otherpersonsoftheTrinityandothercreaturesarewhatisunderstood).
TheVerbumintheTrinitywouldbethatwhichwehavecalledspeciesexpressaas
regardshumanunderstanding—thatis,thesubjectivemodificationofthehumanintellect
astheintellect’sreferencetothatwhichisunderstood.ThespeciesimpressaisGod
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Himself,alreadyintelligibleinact,andthecontentofthisspeciesissimplythedivine
essence.Thereisanabsoluteidentitybetweenintellectandthingunderstood,becauseGod
ispureintellectandunderstandsHimselfbyHimself(byHimselfasspeciesimpressa:Godis
intelligiblebyHimself;Hedoesnotneedanagentintellect).ButHeunderstandsHimselfby
meansofaVerbumasspeciesexpressa,whichproceedsfromtheFatherandwhosecontent
isthewholeDivinity.
Nowif,aswehavesuggested,theactofthehumanintellect(asverbum)proceeds
fromtheintellectitself(asfacultyinpotency)bytheagencyofanintelligibleinact(the
speciesimpressa),itismoreclearhowthenotionofverbumismostfittingtospeakof
distinctionintheTrinity:thenotionofverbum,infact,containsprocessionoforigin(which
intheTrinityistheonlywaytodistinctions)andallowsidentityofsubstance(insofarasthe
verbum’scontentcanbetheveryself,inthosewhodonothavematterandarealready
intelligibleinact,andinsofarastheverbumhasnootherbeingthanthebeingofthe
intellectitself).638
Itwouldbeinterestingtostudytherelationshipofthesupernaturallightstothe
agentintellect.Infact,faithdoesnotseemtomakeintelligible(“visible”)itsproperobject:
faithmakesusjudgeaboutthingswhicharenotevident.Themetaphoroflight,then,
acquiresanewsignificance,asthatwhichallowsustojudgewithcertaintyabout
something.Astudyofthefunctionoftheagentintellectinhumanjudgmentandofthe
possibilityofreferringtocertain“objects”ofknowing—suchasthefirstprinciples—as
638ThislatteristhatwhichwehaveconsideredtheThomisticinterpretationofthe
Aristotelianidentity,intellectusinactuestintellectuminactu.
299
“light”becomesnecessary.Moreover,the“light”metaphormayalsosufferadjustmentsin
itsuseforthelumengloriae,sincethislightdoesnotaffectsomuchtheobject(theDivine
Essence)asthehumansubjectitself.Itislight,itseems,asthatwhichallowsustosee,not
thoughasaffectingtheobject(asinintellectualhumanknowing)northemedium(asin
sensiblevision)but,rather,asaffectingthepotencyitself.
RegardingthehumanknowledgeofChrist,ourfindingscanhelpusbetter
understandhow,forSt.Thomas,therecanbeinChristadistinctknowingofeverything
fromHisconceptionand,atthesametime,aprogressioninHisknowing.Thedivine
essenceandtheinfusedspeciesare“intelligibles”inactwhichassuchareagentobjects,
respectively,ofChrist’sscienceofvisionandinfusedscience.Scienceisheretheparticular
referenceofHispossibleintellecttotheobjectsbytheagencyofanintelligibleinactand,
therefore,areferencetotheobjectrepresentedinthespecies,totheobjectthroughthe
species(impressa).TheaforementionedspeciesareinJesussincethemomentofHis
conception,butnotsothespeciesimpressaeresultingfromtheactionoftheagentintellect
onthephantasms.Theselatterspeciesprovokeanewreferenceofthepossibleintellect
(because,evenifaspeciesregardsanobjectthatJesusalreadyknowswithanotherscience,
thespeciesitself,initssubjectivemodeofbeing,isdifferent—asanumericallydifferent
speciesimpressa),andthereforethereisanewscience(acquiredknowledge),whichis
progressiveduetothetemporalsuccessionofexperienceandtheconsequentsuccessionof
newphantasms,speciesimpressaeandexpressae.Itreallyseemsasifthedistinctionof
speciesimpressaandexpressa,thoughnotexplicitinAquinas,isveryhelpfulin
understandingwhathemeanshere.Butthesespeciesshouldbeunderstood,Ibelieve,not
300
astwodifferentimages,butastwodifferentmomentsofthesamecontent,asavailable
initiallyandas“embraced”later.Thespeciesexpressaisthusareferencetotheimpressain
itscontent(or:tothecontentoftheimpressa),areference“produced”bythepresenceof
theimpressatothefaculty.
ThesignificanceofthequestionsofknowingandbeinginTheologycanneverbe
overemphasized,atleastfromaThomisticpointofview.Fromthefirstarticleofthe
Summa,Aquinasdistinguishesbetweenwhatcanbeknownbythelightofreasonandwhat
isbeyonditsreach.Humanbeinghasbeengivenanendwhichsurpassesthelightofreason
and,therefore,adifferentknowledgemustbeaddedtotheoneobtainedbypurelynatural
means.Inotherwords,thedifferentkindofbeingoftheobjectrequiresadifferentkindof
knowing:thisisthereasonforaSacredDoctrine.Finitereasoncanknowfinitebeing,and
canrealizethatthereisaninfinitebeingwhichisthecause.Finitereasoncan“see”that
theremustbeaninfinitebeing,can“see”thatinfinitebeingisnotlikeotherbeings,but
cannotseethisinfinitebeing—andfinitereasonremainsoutsidethecastle—hopingthat
someonewilllowerthedrawbridgetowardshappiness.However,itisalwaysthesame
humanbeingwhoiscalledtoenterthecastleand,therefore,humannaturalpowersarenot
leftoutside,butinvitedin,whereanewlight—thelightofthecastle—willallowhuman
intelligencetoseetheKing.Thisnotionofknowingasencountermayproveveryhelpfulin
understandingAquinas’approachtobothphilosophicalandtheologicalquestions.
Onequestionthatcouldbeaddressedfurtheristhemorepreciseunderstandingof
theactionoftheagentintellect.Infact,mycharacterizationoftheagentintellectasana
prioriwhichismetaphysicalcouldhavegiventheimpressionthattheagentintellect
301
producestheintelligiblemodeofbeingas“bestowing”or“adding”somethingphysicalto
theobject.Although,inAquinas,itdoesseemthattheagentintellectbestowssomething
realonthephantasmitself(the“firstaction”oftheagentintellectin85,1ad4),the
abstractive(second)actionproperlyspeakingseems,rather,tobean“extraction”ofthe
content.Inotherwords,itseemsthattheactionoftheagentintellectshouldbe
understoodmoreasa“dematerialization”(efficientintakingfrom)thanasa
“spiritualization”(efficientinprovidingperfection),althoughbotharecorrectinasense.On
theonehand,Ithinkitismoreadematerializationbecausethespiritualityofthecontentis
nothingotherthanitsbeingseparatedfromitsindividualconditionsinthematter.Onthe
otherhand,itcanstillbesaidtobea“spiritualization”becausethecontentinitsstateof
abstraction“subsists”spiritually,participatinginsomewaythemodeofbeingoftheagent
intellect.
Whatismostimportant,however,istounderstandthemethodologicalproblem;
thatis,althoughwedoneedmaterial“parables”tounderstandourcapacityfor
understanding,wemusttranscendthem;andtheactionoftheagentintellectisoneof
thoseinstancesinwhichtheuseofimagesandevenwordsseemstodisappointusthe
most.This“makingintelligible”seemstobeacertain“letting[acontent]beseen”bythe
separationofthecontentfromitsindividualconditionsinthematter.Now,thisseparation
isnotphysical,becausecontentandindividualconditionsarenotphysicallyseparatedin
thesensiblething.Theseparationcomesaboutbyanelevationofthatcontenttoa
differentmodeofbeing.Thatdifferentmodeofbeingmustbepresentinthepotentialityof
302
thephantasm,andthisiswhySt.Thomasmakesadistinctionbetweenthetwoactionsof
theagentintellect.
Myfocusonthesimpleapprehensionallowedmetosayverylittleaboutjudgment.
AnexplicitconsiderationofjudgmentinAquinasinconnectionwithmyreflectionsonthe
roleoftheagentintellectcouldproveveryfruitfulinordertorefineourfindingsandoffera
morecompleteviewofhumanunderstanding.
Becauseminewasaneffortofinterpretation,thequestionsofjudgmentneedstillto
beaddressed.AretheepistemologicalprinciplesreferredheretoAquinasstillrelevant
today?WouldtheymakeanysenseinamodernEpistemology?Ithinkaveryfruitfullineof
investigationcouldbethestudyofthenotionofalterityasabasicoriginalconditionofthe
objectinhumanknowing.Thenotionsofencounter,remedy,subjectiveoriginal
imperfection,etc.,shouldbeconjoinedtoaseriousphenomenologicalanalysisofhuman
knowing.Myemphasisonalterityisrelatedtotheviewthatthecontributionofsubjectivity
is(essentiallyandoriginally)notrelatedtothecontent,buttoitsmodeofbeing.Our
subjectivestorageofexperienceorpersonalhistorywillcertainlyandgreatlyinfluencelater
perceptions,andthiscanbetakenasacognitivefact.Butisthisfactoriginal?Isitnotbased
preciselyonmoreoriginalfacts?Andwhataretheconditionsofpossibilityofthoseoriginal
facts,andoftheverydevelopmentofexperience?TheworkofCornelioFabro,deeply
imbuedinboththePhenomenologyofPerceptionandtheMetaphysicsofKnowledge,can
beahelpfultoolforresearchinthisdirection.
303
Epilogue:KnowingafterKantWearemeanttoknow;wearesobynature.Theperfectionoftheknown,however,isnotexpectedasafriendwealreadyknow,butasthefoodwedonothave.
Wedoneedfood,andthisisthetranscendentalorientationofapotencytoitsparticularobject.Thisneed,however,doesnotperfectitselfinanyway,butrathercallsfortheperfectionofanother.Foodperfectsthehungrystomach,buthungerwillnottransformastoneintobread.Theimageoffood,however,cannotbetakenmuchfurther,becauseitisjustanimage,andknowingisdifferentfromthat,morethanthat.Thehungrystomachwillactuallytransformthefoodintosomethingbelongingtothebody.Theknower,instead,willnoteathisorhervisitors,butwillwelcomethemastheyare.Theknownstayshomeasavisitor,alwaysdifferent,alwaysinteresting,alwaysother.ForAquinas,asIreadhim,thereismeaninginthethingsthemselvesandheis,inthissense,differentfromKant.IfSt.Thomasisright,thereisaneedtofaceagainthemoreoriginalquestionsofEpistemology,namelytheproblemoftheuniversalsandtheverycharacterizationofknowing.Thereisaneedtogetawayfromskepticalbiasesandunfruitfuldialectics.ThealternativetoKantisnotagoingbacktothethingsthemselveswhichleavesthesubject,sotospeak,staringspeechlessataworldofobjects.AnEpistemologysensitivetothepsychologicaldevelopmentofthehumansubject,the(Thomistic)factofknowinginitsmetaphysicalessence,andtheconditionsofpossibilityforbothis,inmyview,thewayforwardtoamorehelpfulphilosophicalaccountofhumanknowing.
Otherwise,bydissolvingthemeaningofthingsinourdealingswiththem,werisklosingalsothemeaningofourownexistence.Theexistentialvoidistheemptinessofasoulwhodidnotwelcomethingsastheyare—withtheirowncapricesandbeauty—asoulwhothusremainedaloneintheself-madeprisonofhisorherownworldofideasandvalues.Then,whenthedoortotheworldisclosed,thepathtoHeavencannotbefound.Godishiddenbehindthetrees,behindthebeautiesHemade.ItisonlybyencounteringothersthatwecanhearaboutGod.639Itisgoodforneithermannorwomantobealone.Lethumanity,then,beopentotheadventureofknowing.
639A“philosophicaltranslation”ofthisparagraphcanbefoundintheAppendix,Note21.
304
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Knasas,JohnF.X.“WhyforLonerganKnowingCannotConsistin'TakingaLook'.“ACPQ78,no.1(2004):131–150.Lambert,RichardT.“ATextualStudyofAquinas’ComparisonoftheIntellecttoPrimeMatter.”NewScholasticism56(1982):80-99.Lindbeck,George.“AGreatScotistStudy.”TheReviewofMetaphysics7,no.3(1954):422-435.MartínezMillán,Hernán.“SunandLight,orontheAgentIntellect.”RevistaEspañolaDeFilosofíaMedieval20(2013):49-56.Maurer,ArmandA.BeingandKnowing:StudiesinThomasAquinasandLaterMedievalPhilosophers.Toronto:PontificalInstituteofMediaevalStudies,1990.Therelevantessaysare:“St.ThomasandEternalTruths”(pp.43ff)andSt.ThomasandHistoricity”(pp.95ff).O’Reilly,KevinE.AestheticPerception:AThomisticPerspective.Portland:FourCourtsPress,2007.Owens,Joseph.Cognition:AnEpistemologicalInquiry.Houston:CenterforThomisticStudies,1992.SchmidtAndrade,CiroE.“SantoTomásyelDeAnima:ComentarioalosCaps.4y5delLibroIIIdelDeAnimadeAristóteles.”AnalogíaFilosófica:RevistaDeFilosofía8,no.1(1994):123-136.Sellés,JuanFernando.“LaCríticaTomistaalaInterpretaciónÁrabeyJudíadelIntelectoAgente.”Espíritu:CuadernosDelInstitutoFilosóficoDeBalmesiana52,no.128(2003):207-26.Sellés,JuanFernando.Elintelectoagenteylosfilósofos:Venturasydesventurasdelsupremohallazgoaristotélicosobreelhombre.[Vol.]I(SiglosIVa.C.-XV).Pamplona:EUNSA,2012.Serequeberhan,Tsenay.“AquinasandKant:aComparativeStudy.”Dialogue:JournalofPhiSigmaTau26(1984):40-48.Stump,Eleonore.Aquinas.NewYork:Routledge,2003.Therelevantessaysare:“FoundationsofKnowledge”(pp.217ff)and“TheMechanismsofCognition”(pp.244ff).ZagalArreguín,Héctor.“TheSeparateSubstancesandAquinas'IntellectusAgens.”RevistaPortuguesaDeFilosofia64,no.1(2008):359-377.
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Appendix:OtherAuthors,Excursus,LatinTextsandTranslations
Note1:OtherRelevantAuthors(Introduction)
AccordingtoJohnHaldane,640St.ThomasusestheAristoteliantexttoexplainhis(Aquinas’)
theory.Aristotle’sconcernismoremetaphysicalinthattheagentintellectexplains,forhim,
theintellectualfaculty’spassagefrompotencytoact.Aquinas’concernismore
gnoseologicalinthatAquinasistryingtoexplainthefactthatweknowbymeansof
universalconcepts.Inotherwords,forHaldane,St.Thomasismakingsenseoftheproblem
oftheuniversals,whereasAristotleisconcernedwiththefactthatweknowafternot
havingknown.
Again,accordingtoHaldane,thewaySt.ThomasusestheAristotelianagentintellecttofit
hispurposesisbymakingitaformalapriori.IntheAvicennianPlatonism,theuniversal
formswouldseemtocomefromacertainilluminationfromabove.ButAquinasreacts
againstthisEpistemology:
[Aquinas]maintainsthattheactualityoftheagentintellectconsistsintheuniversalcontentofitsacts,anditisthiswhichconfersgeneralityuponthethoughts(speciesexpressa)ofthepassivemind.Withouttheworkoftheformernoconceptswouldbeavailable;andwithoutthesecognitioncouldnottakeplace,forthesensuouspresentationoftheenvironmentcouldnotbeordered.641
Haldane’ssuggestionisthat,forAquinas,theagentintellectisactiveregardingthe
universalityascontentand,inthisway,Aquinassubscribestoatheoryofaformalapriori.
ForHaldane,theThomisticalternativetoPlatonism(formscomingfromabove)istheforms
comingfrominside,becausetheycannotcomefromexperience.
Finally,Iwouldliketosuggestthattheepistemologicalandmetaphysicalconcerns,as
Haldaneconceivesthem,neednotbeseenasopposingeachotherinAristotleandAquinas.
Rather,itisinordertoexplainboththefactoftheuniversalactualityofthecontentandthe640Cf.JohnHaldane,“AquinasandtheActiveIntellect,”Philosophy(UK)67(1992):199-210.641205.
309
possibleintellect’sconsequentpassagefrompotencytoactthattheagentintellectiscalled
tothescene.Inotherwords,thepossibleintellectwouldnotpassfrompotencytoactif
therewerenotanintelligibleinact,andthenatureofthesensiblethingwouldnotbe
intelligibleinactiftherewerenotanagentintellect.Thepointofdepartureisthatweknow
thosenaturesafternothavingknownthem.
WayneHankey’s642pointistoestablishthecontinuitybetweennaturalandsupernatural
knowledgebymeansofadoctrineoftheagentintellectasaformalapriori.Becausethe
agentintellectisalreadyacertainparticipationinthecontentofthedivinelight(implicit
knowledgeofthetranscendentalnotions),itisnotsodifficulttounderstandhowgracecan
elevatethispotencytoaknowingofGodthatisexplicit.Thiswouldalsobethereasonfora
more“positive”knowledgeofGodbyfaith(asopposedtoanemphasisonthevianegativa).
InhisunderstandingoftheagentintellectinAquinasasaformalapriori,i.e.,asproviding
intelligiblecontenttosenseexperience,HankeyrefersextensivelytoSmit,643withwhomhe
agrees,644andconfirmshisowninterpretationwithsomeofSt.Thomas’textswhichare
discussedinthebodyofthethesis.
R.E.Houser,645inhisstudyonthemetaphoroflightamongtheGreeks,ascribestothe
agentintellectinSt.Thomasnotjustitsdistinctionfromthepossibleintellectbutits
separationfromthesubject.InhisunderstandingofAquinas,Houserseemsalsoto
confoundthelightoftheagentintellectwiththelightofgrace.646Finally,Housersuggests
thattheefficientcausalityoftheagentintellectisnotaformalcauseanddoesnotadd
content,becauselightmustbetransparent.647However,Houserdoesnotindicateinwhat
642Cf.WayneJ.Hankey,“ParticipatioDiviniLuminis,Aquinas'DoctrineoftheAgentIntellect:
OurCapacityforContemplation,”Dionysius22(2004):149-178.643Cf.163,162andpassim.644Cf.173.645Cf.R.E.Houser,“PhilosophicalDevelopmentthroughMetaphor:Lightamongthe
Greeks,”ProceedingsoftheAmericanCatholicPhilosophicalAssociation64(1990):75-85.646Cf.83-85.647Cf.81.
310
way,then,lightproducesintelligibilityinthingsthatareonlypotentiallyintelligibleand
cannotexistasuniversal,unchangingandnecessary.648Inotherwords,despitethefactthat
hewouldarguablyrejecttheconsiderationoftheagentintellectasaformalapriori,Houser
doesnotdistinguishbetweenintelligibilityascontentandasmodeofbeing.
Note2:OnCory’sInterpretation(Footnote205)
ThisseemstobeCory’sinterpretation.AbstractionforAquinaswouldbe“theobject’s
[read:“thephantasm’s”]causingitsintelligiblelikenessintheintellectbythepowerofthe
agentintellect”;649“Quasiformedbythisimmaterializingpower,imagesareintelligible
merelyinthesensethattheycanperformtheproperactofactuallyintelligibleentities,
withoutbeingintelligibleentities.”650Forher,theagentobjectisthesensibleimageunder
theinfluenceoftheagentintellect,notthoughasinstrumentalbutassecondarycause;she
proposesthattherelationshipbetweenagentintellectandphantasmissimilartothe
relationshipbetweenuniversalandparticularcause.Basically,forCory,theagentintellect
causestheintelligiblemodeofbeingofthephantasm,notanintelligiblespeciesdifferent
fromit,northeintelligiblemodeofbeingofanintelligiblecontent(thelatter,asIpropose).
Note3:TheMediationofthePhantasm(Footnote238)
Itisnotpossibletotreatthoroughlythemediationofthephantasminintellectualknowing,
butcertainprinciplesmayorientthereadertounderstandmyposition.WhatIproposeis,
basically,thatthecontentofthephantasmisoutthere,butnotinthesamemodeofbeing
asitisinthephantasm.Relatedtothis,Iproposealsothatthephantasmisforintelligence
theparticularitself,insofarasitscontentisreal(wedonotknowthephantasm,butthe
thingitselfthroughitsphantasm).Iacknowledgethefactthatthephantasmiscomposedof
elementsfrommemoryandimagination;thisfact,however,givesthephantasmmore
objectivity,andnotless,becausethis“subjective”compositionrepresentswhatisoutthere
64883-84.649Cory,Averroes,40.650Ibid.51,cf.23,47.
311
moreaccuratelythanarepresentationofonlythepresentfeaturesofaparticularthing.The
subjectiveactivityofcompositionisnatural,andhereappliestheprinciplethatnaturedoes
notfailinwhatisproper.Thatthissubjectiveactivity,thoughnatural,isnotarbitrarybut
basedonthedataofexperiencethemselves,aswellasmanyotherproblemsconnected
withperception,cannotbetreatedhere,butcf.Fabro,PercezioneePensiero.Thatwhichis
mostimportant,inmyview,istodistinguishthecontentofthephantasmfromthemodeof
beinginwhichthisrealcontentispresentinthefaculty.Inthiscognitivemodeofbeingthe
contentisnotoutthere,butwhatisknownisthecontentitself,andabstractionhappens
withregardtothecontent.
Note4:TheStabilityinMaterialThings(Footnote248)
Cf.InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,ob.6etad6:
Noteveryobjectofnaturalphilosophyissubjecttomovement[…]Thesoulandtheothernaturalforms,eveniftheydonotmoveinthemselves,theydomovewithregardstosomethingelse,andbesidesthis,theyareperfectionsofmobilethings:itisinthissensethattheyfallundertheconsiderationofnaturalphilosophy.651
Thattheformsaremovedperaccidensimplythattheyareinwhatismoved(cf.corpus).
Democritushadalsodeniedstabilitytomaterialthings:
Hetookintellecttobe,notthefacultyforknowingtruthandunderstandingintelligibleobjects,butameresense-faculty.Onlythesensible,hethought,couldbeknown,sinceonlythesensibleexisted.Andbecausethelatteriscontinuallychangingtherecouldbeno[determinate]truthaboutanything.652
Seeinthesamecontext:“Aristotle,however,proceededalonganotherway.Forfirsthe
showedinmanywaysthatthereissomethingstableinsensiblethings.”653
651InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,ob.6etad6:“Nonomnia,dequibusestphysica,suntinmotu[…]
animaetaliaeformaenaturales,quamvisnonmoveanturperse,moventurtamenperaccidens,etinsupersuntperfectionesrerummobilium,etsecundumhoccaduntinconsiderationenaturalis.”
652InIDeAnima3,198-205:“[Ipse]nonutebaturintellectuquiestcircaveritatem,idestvirtuteintellectivaquaanimaintelligitintelligibilia,sedsolumvisensitiva,etquodnichilcognoscereturnisisensibile,cumnichilponeretinrerumnaturanisisensibile;undecumsensibiliasintincontinuomotuetfluxu,opinatusestnullamveritatemdeterminatamesseinrebus.”
653DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad8:“Aristotelesautemperaliamviamprocessit.Primoenim,multipliciterostenditinsensibilibusessealiquidstabile.”Cf.InMet.11,lect.6,2232.
312
Note5:TheReasonforCallingtheSpeciesorFormratio(Footnote267)
Thereasonforcallingthespeciesorformratio654canbetakenfromthefollowingtext:
Andform,whichisalsotermedtheintelligiblestructurebecausetheintelligiblestructureofthespeciesisderivedfromit,iscalledsubstance[…]inasmuchasitissomethingactual,and[…]inasmuchasitisseparablefrommatterinthoughtbutnotinreality[…]Andalthoughthecompositeisseparableinanabsolutesense,yetsomeoftheotherthingswhicharecalledsubstancesareseparableinthoughtandsomearenot.Foraformisseparableinthoughtbecauseitcanbeunderstoodwithoutunderstandingindividuatingsensiblematter;butmattercannotbeunderstoodwithoutunderstandingform,sinceitisapprehendedonlyinasmuchasitisinpotentialitytoform.655
Note6:TheErroroftheNaturalPhilosophers(Footnote293)
In84,2c.,thesameerrorisattributedtotheNaturalPhilosophers.Seealso:
Like,theysaid,mustbeknownbylike.Ifthenthesoulistoknowallthingsitmustcontainalikenessofallthingsaccordingtotheirnaturalmodeofbeing.Theycouldnotdistinguishbetweenthemodeofexistencethatathinghasinthemindortheeyeortheimaginationfromthatwhichithasinitself.656
“Theyexpressedthisbysayingthatthereasonwhythesoulknewallthingswasthatallthingsenteredintoitscomposition,andthatthesoulpossessedthelikenessofallthingsaccordingtothemodeofexistence,i.e.acorporealone,whichthingshaveinthemselvesoutsideit.”657
Note7:TextofQ.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad8(Footnote298)
654Cf.alsoInMet.12,lect.10,2595.655InMet.8,lect.1,1687:“Formavero,quaeetrationominatur,quiaexipsasumiturratio
speciei,dicitursubstantiaquasiensaliquidactu,etquasiensseparabilesecundumrationemamateria,licetnonsecundumrem[…]Etlicetcompositumsitseparabilesimpliciter,tamensecundumrationem,aliorumquaedicuntursubstantiae,quaedamsuntseparabilia,etquaedamnon.Formaenimestseparabilisratione,quiapotestintelligisinemateriasensibiliindividuante;materiaverononpotestintelligisineintellectuformae,cumnonapprehendaturnisiutensinpotentiaadformam.”
656InIDeAnima4,19-36:“Dicebantenimquodoportebatsimilesimilicognosci;undesianimacognoscatomnia,oportet,quodhabeatsimilitudinemomniuminsesecundumessenaturale,sicutipsiponebant.Nescieruntenimdistinguereillummodum,quoresestinintellectu,seuinoculo,velimaginatione,etquoresestinseipsa.”
657InIDeAnima12,10-15:“Dicebantanimam,adhocquodomniacognosceret,essecompositamexomnibus;etquodsimilitudorerumomniumessetinanimasecundumpropriummodumessendi,scilicetcorporalem.”
313
AccordingtothePlatoniststhereasonwhysomethingisunderstoodasaone-in-many[i.e.,universally],isnottobeattributedtotheintellect,buttothething.Theyarguethat,becauseourintellectknowsathingasaone-in-many,itwouldapparentlybeemptyofanyrealcontentunlesstherewereonereal(thing)sharedbymanyindividuals.Forinthatcasetheintellectwouldhaveinitselfnothingcorrespondingto(…)reality.HencethePlatonistsfeltobligedtopositIdeas,byparticipationinwhichbothnaturalthingsaregiventheirspecificnature,andourintellectsmadecognizantofuniversals.ButaccordingtoAristotle,thefactthattheintellectunderstandsaone-in-manyinabstractionfromindividuatingprinciples,istobeattributedtotheintellectitself.Andthoughnothingabstractexistsinreality,theintellectisnotvoidofanyrealcontent,norisitmisrepresentativeofthingsastheyare;because,ofthosethingswhichnecessarilyexisttogether,onecanbetrulyunderstoodornamedwithoutanotherbeingunderstoodornamed.Butitcannotbetrulyunderstoodorsaidofthingsexistingtogether,thatoneexistswithouttheother.Thuswhateverexistsinanindividualwhichpertainstothenatureofitsspecies,andinrespectofwhichitislikeotherthings,canbeknownandspokenoftrulywithouttakingintoconsiderationitsindividuatingprinciples,whichdistinguishitfromallotherindividuals[ofthesamespecies].658(Parenthesismine,squarebracketstranslator’s.Latinfollowshere)
SecundumPlatonicoscausahuiusquodintelligiturunuminmultis,nonestexparteintellectus,sedexparterei.Cumenimintellectusnosterintelligataliquidunuminmultis;nisialiquaresessetunaparticipataamultis,videreturquodintellectusessetvanus,nonhabensaliquidrespondenssibiinre.Undecoactisuntponereideas,perquarumparticipationemetresnaturalesspeciemsortiuntur,etintellectusnostrifiuntuniversaliaintelligentes.SedsecundumsententiamAristotelishocestabintellectu,scilicetquodintelligatunuminmultisperabstractionemaprincipiisindividuantibus.Nectamenintellectusestvanusautfalsus,licetnonsitaliquidabstractuminrerumnatura.Quiaeorumquaesuntsimul,unumpotestvereintelligiautnominari,absquehocquodintelligaturvelnomineturalterum;licetnonpossitvereintelligiveldici,quodeorumquaesuntsimul,unumsitsinealtero.Sicigiturverepotestconsiderarietdiciidquodestinaliquoindividuo,denaturaspeciei,inquosimileestcumaliis,absqueeoquodconsiderenturineoprincipiaindividuantia,secundumquaedistinguiturabomnibusaliis.
Note8:TextofQ.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5(Footnote324)
Thehumansoulisanindividuatedformandsoalsoisitspowerwhichiscalledthepossibleintellect,aswellastheintelligibleformswhicharereceivedinthepossibleintellect.Butthisdoesnotpreventtheseformsfrombeingactually(understood),forathingisactually(understood)becauseitisimmaterial,notbecauseitisuniversal.
658Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad8.
314
Indeed,theuniversalisintelligiblebecauseitisabstractedfrommaterialindividuatingconditions.659
Note9:TheFigureof“Food”(Footnote348)
Animagesomewhatsimilartothatof“remedy”isthefigureof“food”:
Weought,therefore,toreachconclusionsaboutobjectsbeforeactivitiesforthesamereasonasleadsustodefineactivitiesbeforepotencies.The‘objects’inquestionare[likefoodtothevegetativefaculty,boththesensibleobjectwithrespecttothesense,andtheintelligibleobjectwithrespecttotheintellect.]660
Clearalsoisthesimilaritybetweensenseandintellectinthatregard.661Thereferenceto
foodinthetextabove,however,couldalsobeinterpretedassimplyacomparisonbetween
therelationshipsofeachobject(food,thesensibleandtheintelligible)toitscorrespondent
faculty.
Note10:TheSameInterpretationoftheAristotelianIdentityinotherTexts(Footnote
375)
ThesameinterpretationcanbeseenclearlyinothertextsandworksofAquinas,for
exampleinCGII,98,par.14-19;Ibid.,99,par.5-7,especially:
Butsincetheintellectinperfectactisthethingunderstoodinact,someonemaythinkthataseparatesubstancedoesnotunderstandmaterialthings;foritwouldseemincongruousthatamaterialthingshouldbetheperfectionofaseparatesubstance.Rightlyconsidered,however,itisaccordingtoitslikenesspresentintheintellectthatthethingunderstoodistheperfectionoftheonewhounderstandsit;foritisnotthestoneexistingoutsidethesoulthatisaperfectionofourpossibleintellect.Now,thelikenessofthematerialthingisintheintellectofaseparate
659Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5:“Animahumanaestquaedamformaindividuata;etsimiliter
potentiaeiusquaediciturintellectuspossibilis,etformaeintelligibilesineoreceptae.Sedhocnonprohibeteasesseintellectasinactu:exhocenimaliquidestintellectuminactuquodestimmateriale,nonautemexhocquodestuniversale;sedmagisuniversalehabetquodsitintelligibileperhocquodestabstractumaprincipiismaterialibusindividuantibus.”
660InIIDeAnima6,156-161:“Undeetpriusoportebitdeterminaredeobiectisquamdeactibus,proptereamdemcausam,propterquametdeactibuspriusdeterminaturquamdepotentiis.Obiectaautemsuntsicutalimentumrespectuvegetativi,etsensibilerespectusensus,etintelligibilerespectuintellectus.”
661Cf.Chapter3,section5.
315
substanceimmaterially,accordingtothelatter’smode,notaccordingtothatofamaterialsubstance.Hence,thereisnoincongruityinsayingthatthislikenessisaperfectionoftheseparatesubstance’sintellect,asitsproperform.662(Latinfollowshere).
Cumautemintellectusinactuperfectositintellectuminactu,potestalicuivideriquodsubstantiaseparatanonintelligatresmateriales:inconveniensenimvideturquodresmaterialissitperfectiosubstantiaeseparatae.Sedsirecteconsideretur,resintellectaestperfectiointelligentissecundumsuamsimilitudinemquamhabetinintellectu:nonenimlapisquiestextraanimam,estperfectiointellectuspossibilisnostri.Similitudoautemreimaterialisinintellectusubstantiaeseparataeestimmaterialiter,secundummodumsubstantiaeseparatae,nonsecundummodumsubstantiaematerialis.Undenonestinconvenienssihaecsimilitudodicaturesseperfectiointellectussubstantiaeseparatae,sicutpropriaformaeius.
Cf.alsoInIIIDeanima7,37-48:
Hesaysthatifthesoulisindeedallthings,itmustbeeithersimplyidenticalwithallthingsoraformallikenessofallthings.TheformerviewwasthatofEmpedocleswhomadeoutthatwe,beingearth,knowearth,andbeingwaterweknowwater,andsoon.Butobviouslythesoulisnotsimplyidenticalwiththethingsitknows;fornotstoneitself,butitsformallikenessexistsinthesoul.Andthisenablesustoseehowintellectinactiswhatitunderstands(inact);theformoftheobjectistheformofthemindinact.663
Finally,cf.SummaI,14,2.
Note11:OtherStudiedTextsinSupportofourInterpretationoftheAristotelianIdentity,
fromInMetaphysicorum(Footnote381)
InInMet.12,lect.11,2617,theobjectiontothedoctrinethatGodknowshisown
intelligenceisawrongtranspositionofwhathappensinhumanunderstandingtothe
divine:toknowtheotherseemstobefirst,andtoknowoneselfisderivative.Therefore,if
theobjectofGod’sunderstandingwereGodhimself,hisknowingwouldnotbetheutmost.
662CGII,99,par.6-7.663InIIIDeanima7,37-48:“Etdicit,quodsianimaestomnia,necesseestquodsit,velipsae
resscibilesetsensibiles,sicutEmpedoclesposuitquodterraterramcognoscimus,etaquaaquam,etsicdealiis;autsitspeciesipsorum.Nonautemanimaestipsares,sicutilliposuerunt,quialapisnonestinanima,sedspecieslapidis.Etperhuncmodumdiciturintellectusinactuesseipsumintellectuminactu,inquantumspeciesintellectiestspeciesintellectusinactu.”
316
Theanswerissimplythatintheseparatesubstancestheintellectinactandwhatis
understoodarenotdifferent,andthereforeinGodtheyarethesame.664Whatisrelevant
forourpurposesisthattheAristotelianidentity,whichforAquinasappliestoevery
intellect,impliesidentitywiththeobjectinitselfinsomecases,butisalwaysanidentity
withtheobjectinitsintelligiblemodeofbeing.665
Thefollowingtextcanhelpustoseethat,inunderstanding,thereisidentityinonesense
andalterityinanothersense.“Inthecaseofthespeculativesciencesitisevidentthatthe
concept,whichdefinesthethingitself,isthethingunderstoodandthescienceor
knowledgeofthatthing.Foranintellecthasknowledgebyreasonofthefactthatit
possessestheconceptofathing.”666Thisiswhatwehavecalledthealternativeexpression
oftheAristotelianidentity:theintellectisonewiththethinginitsabstractedmodeofbeing
(theactoftheintellectistherationemrei,notthethingitselfinitsnaturalbeing).Thetext
continues:
Therefore,sinceinthecaseofallthosethingswhichdonothavemattertheintellectwhenactuallyunderstandingdoesnotdifferfromthethingunderstood,theninthecaseofthefirstsubstance,whichisseparatefrommatterinthehighestdegree,theactofunderstandingandthethingunderstoodareevidentlythesameinthehighestdegree.Hencethereisjustoneactofunderstandingpertainingtothething
664Cf.InMet.12,lect.11,2620.665Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,ad1:“ForafterAristotlehaddeterminedtheroleofthepossible
andagentintellect,hehadtodeterminetheroleoftheintellect-in-act.Hefirstdistinguishesitinrelationtothepossibleintellect,becausethepossibleintellectandthethingknownarenotoneandthesame.However,theintellectorscience-in-actisthesameasthethingactuallyknown.Aristotlehadsaidthesamethingaboutsense,namely,thatsenseandwhatispotentiallysensibledifferfromeachother,butthatsenseandwhatisactuallysensedareoneandthesame.”[NampostquamAristotelesdeterminavitdeintellectupossibilietagente,necessariumfuitutdeterminaretdeintellectuinactu,cuiusprimodifferentiamostenditadintellectumpossibilem.Namintellectuspossibilisetresquaeintelligitur,nonsuntidem;sedintellectussivescientiainactuestidemreiscitaeinactu,sicutetdesensuidemdixerat,quodsensusetsensibileinpotentiadifferunt,sedsensusetsensibileinactusuntunumetidem.];DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad3:“Theintellectinpotencyisnotthethingthatisunderstoodinpotency,buttheintellectinact,orknowledgeinact,isthethingthatisunderstoodorknowninact.”[…intellectusinpotentianonestintellectuminpotentia;sedintellectusinactu,sivescientiainactu,estresintellectavelscitainactu.]
666InMet.12,lect.11,2620:“Inspeculativisveroscientiismanifestumest,quodipsaratiodefinitivareiestresscita,etestipsascientiasiveintelligentia.Perhocenimestsciensintellectus,perquodhabetrationemrei.”
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understood;thatis,theactofunderstandingthethingunderstoodisnotdistinctfromthatofunderstandingtheactofunderstanding.667
Theclarification“inhisquaecumquemateriamnonhabent”comesbecausetheobjection
pointsouttheoriginalalterityoftheobjectinhumanunderstanding.St.Thomasdoesnot
challengetheobjectioninthatsense,butclarifiesthatitdoesnotapplytothedivine.The
textatleastsuggeststhattherecanbealterityregardingtheobject,althoughthereis
alwaysidentityinadifferentsense.
Note12:TheDistinctionbetweenSpeciesandObject(Footnote383)
Othertextsshowthisdistinctionbetweenspeciesandobject:668
Averroes’secondargumentfailsbecauseitdoesnotdistinguishbetweenthatbywhichoneunderstandsandthatwhichisunderstood.Thespeciesreceivedintothepossibleintellectisnotthatwhichisunderstood;for,sinceallartsandscienceshavetodowiththingsunderstood,itwouldfollowthatallsciencesareaboutspeciesexistinginthepossibleintellect.Andthisispatentlyfalse.669
Butinorderthattherebeonethingunderstood,theremustbealikenessofoneandthesamething;andthisispossibleiftheintelligiblespeciesarenumericallydistinct.Forthereisnoreasonwhythereshouldnotbeseveraldifferentimagesofonething;itisthusthatonemanisseenbyseveral.670
Consequentlywemustunderstandthat,althoughtheintelligiblespeciesreceivedinthepossibleintellectareindividuatedinasmuchastheyexistinthepossibleintellect,stilltheuniversal,whichisconceivedbyabstractionfromindividuating
667InMet.12,lect.11,2620:“Cumigiturintellectusinactuetintellectumnonsitalterum,in
hisquaecumquemateriamnonhabent,manifestumestquodinsubstantiaprima,quaemaximeremotaestamateria,maximeidemestintelligereetintellectum.Etsicunaestintelligentiaintellectitantum,etnonestaliudintelligentiaintellecti,etaliudintelligentiaintelligentiae.”
668Cf.forexampleDeVer2,3,ad2(differenceindivineknowingbetweenwhatheknowsandthemeansbywhichheknows),ad3andad10.
669CGII,75,par.7:“Secundaveroratioipsiusdeficit,exhocquodnondistinguitinteridquointelligitur,etidquodintelligitur.Speciesenimreceptainintellectupossibilinonhabetseutquodintelligitur.Cumenimdehisquaeintelliguntursintomnesartesetscientiae,sequereturquodomnesscientiaeessentdespeciebusexistentibusinintellectupossibili.Quodpatetessefalsum.”
670CGII,75,par.9:“Sedoportet,adhocquodsitunumintellectum,quodsituniuseteiusdemsimilitudo.Ethocestpossibilesispeciesintelligibilessintnumerodiversae:nihilenimprohibetuniusreifieripluresimaginesdifferentes;etexhoccontingitquodunushomoapluribusvidetur.”
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principles,isknowninthesespeciesinasmuchastheyareimmaterial.Foruniversalswithwhichthesciencesareconcerned,arewhatareknown(throughintelligiblespecies)andnottheintelligiblespeciesthemselves.671(Translator’sparentheses)
Theintelligiblespeciesthroughwhichtheintellectunderstandsformally,ispresentinthepossibleintellectofthisandofthatparticularman,andforthisreasonitfollowsthattherearemanypossibleintellects.Neverthelessthequiddity(quod)knownthroughsuchaspeciesisone,ifweconsiderthisquiddityinrelationtothethingknown;becausetheuniversalwhichisunderstoodbybothofthesemenisthesameinallthethings(ofwhichitistheuniversalrepresentation).672(Translator’sparentheses)
Wemustsaythatthethingwhichisunderstoodisnotrelatedtothepossibleintellectasanintelligiblespecieswherebythepossibleintellectisactuated,butthatspeciesisasaformalprinciplewherebytheintellectunderstands[…]Andhencethespecieswhichmakesseeingpossibleisnotasathingwhichisseen,butasthatwherebytheobjectisseen.Andthesameistrueofthepossibleintellect[…]Accordingly,athingthatisunderstoodbytwointellectsisinawayoneandthesamething,andinawayitismanythings:becauseonthepartoftheobjectwhichisknownitisoneandthesamething;butonthepartoftheknowledgeitselfitistwodifferentthings.673
Note13:The“DoubleBeing”oftheSpecies(Footnote389)
This“doublebeing”ofthespecies,i.e.,itsrealbeingassubjectivemodificationandits
“representative”being,canbeseeninothertexts:
671Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5:“Quamvisspeciesreceptaeinintellectupossibilisint
individuataeexillapartequainhaerentintellectuipossibili;tamenineis,inquantumsuntimmateriales,cognoscituruniversalequodconcipiturperabstractionemaprincipiisindividuantibus.Universaliaenim,dequibussuntscientiae,suntquaecognoscunturperspeciesintelligibiles,nonipsaespeciesintelligibiles.”
672Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad7:“Licetspeciesintelligibilisquaintellectusformaliterintelligit,sitinintellectupossibiliistiusetilliushominis,exquointellectuspossibilessuntplures;idtamenquodintelligiturperhuiusmodispeciesestunum,siconsideremushabitorespectuadremintellectam;quiauniversalequodintelligiturabutroque,estideminomnibus.”
673DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6:“Oportetdicerequodresintellectanonsehabetadintellectumpossibilemutspeciesintelligibilis,quaintellectuspossibilissitactu;sedillaspeciessehabetutprincipiumformalequointellectusintelligit[…]Undespeciesvisibilisnonsehabetutquodvidetur,sedutquovidetur.Etsimileestdeintellectupossibili[…]Resigiturintellectaaduobusintellectibusestquodammodounaeteadem,etquodammodomultae:quiaexpartereiquaecognosciturestunaeteadem,exparteveroipsiuscognitionisestaliaetalia.”Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad12.
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Therearetwowaysofconsideringthemutuallikenessbetweentwothings.First,wecanconsidertheminasmuchastheyagreeinacommonnature.Suchalikenessbetweentheknowerandtheknownisnotrequired;indeed,wesometimesseethatthesmallerthelikeness,thesharperthecognition.Forexample,thereislessresemblancebetweentheintellectuallikenessofastoneandthestonethanthereisbetweenthesenselikenessandthestone,fortheintellectuallikenessisfartherremovedfrommatter;yettheintellectknowsmoreprofoundlythansense.Secondly,thelikenessbetweentwothingscanbeconsideredfromthepointofviewofrepresentation.Suchalikenessoftheknowertothethingknownisnecessary.674(Latinfollowshere)
Similitudoaliquorumduorumadinvicempotestdupliciterattendi.Unomodosecundumconvenientiaminnatura;ettalissimilitudononrequiriturintercognoscensetcognitum;immovidemusquandoquequod,quantotalissimilitudoestminor,tantocognitioestperspicacior;sicutminorestsimilitudosimilitudinisquaeestinintellectuadlapidem,quamilliusquaeestinsensu,cumsitmagisamateriaremota;ettamenintellectusperspicaciuscognoscitquamsensus.Aliomodoquantumadrepraesentationem;ethaecsimilitudorequiriturcognoscentisadcognitum.
Therefore,thesenotionsthusabstractedcanbeconsideredintwoways.Thefirstoneistoconsidertheminthemselves.Inthisway,theyareconsideredwithoutmovementanddesignatedmatter:thisisfoundintheaforementionednotionsonlywithregardtothebeingthattheyhaveintheintellect.Theotherwayistoconsiderthemwithregardtothethingsofwhichtheyarenotions,thingsthatcertainlysubsistinmatterandmovement.Andinthiswaythesenotionsareprinciplesofknowledgeofthosethings,becauseeverythingisknownbymeansofitsform.Thus,bymeansofthesenotions,immobileandconsideredwithoutparticularmatter,wehaveknowledge(innaturalscience)ofmobileandmaterialthingswhichexistoutsidethesoul.675
674DeVer2,3,ad9.675InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,c.:“Possuntergohuiusmodirationessicabstractaeconsiderari
dupliciter.Unomodosecundumse,etsicconsiderantursinemotuetmateriasignata,ethocnoninveniturineisnisisecundumessequodhabentinintellectu.Aliomodosecundumquodcomparanturadres,quarumsuntrationes;quaequidemressuntinmateriaetmotu.Etsicsuntprincipiacognoscendiilla,quiaomnisrescognosciturpersuamformam.Etitaperhuiusmodirationesimmobilesetsinemateriaparticulariconsideratashabeturcognitioinscientianaturaliderebusmobilibusetmaterialibusextraanimamexsistentibus.”
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“However,itmightbesaidthatinasmuchasintelligibleformsinhereinthesoultheyare
individuated;butasthelikenessesofthingstheyareuniversalsrepresentingthings
accordingtotheircommonnatureandnotaccordingtotheirindividuatingprinciples.”676
Note14:IntentionalIdentitywithoutquodammodo(Footnote407)
ForaninterestingtextinwhichSt.Thomasspeaksaboutthisintentionalidentitywithout
quodammodo,seethefollowing:
Andthemindinactisitsobject;forprecisely[as]theobjectisorisnotmaterial,[inthesamewayitis]perceivedbythemind.AndjustbecausePlatooverlookedthisprocessofabstractionhewasforcedtoconceiveofmathematicalobjectsandspecificnaturesasexistinginseparationfrommatter;whereasAristotlewasabletoexplainthatprocessbytheagentintellect.677
TheitalicsoftheLeonineeditionindicatethetermsofAristotlethatAquinasquotes.The
contextmakesclearthatthisisnotanexplanationofthe“Aristotelianidentity,”butofthe
objectivityofknowing,insofaraswhatweconceivecorrespondstothethingsthemselves.
Lambertsays:“Humanabstractedconceptsareidenticalincontenttothingsinthereal
physicalorderandinthatrespectarenevermorethantheequalofthings;theirsuperiority
liesexclusivelyintheirfunctionas‘re-presentation’ofthosethingsinanimmaterial
mode.”678
Note15:Apprehensionin83,4,c.(Footnote420)
In83,4,c.,theoriginalapprehensivequalityoftheintellectisopposedtothetensive(as
“tendingtowards”)aspectofthewill.Wequoteonlythebeginningofthecorpus:
676Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ob.7:“Seddicebatquodformaeintelligibilesexillapartequa
inhaerentanimae,suntindividuatae;sedexillapartequasuntrerumsimilitudines,suntuniversales,repraesentantesressecundumnaturamcommunem,etnonsecundumprincipiaindividuantia.”
677InIIIDeAnima6,297-305:“Etomninointellectusinactuestresintellectae,quiasicutresinsuirationehabentmateriamvelnonhabent,sicabintellectupercipiuntur.EtquiahuncmodumabstractionisPlatononconsideravit,coactusfuitponeremathematicaetspeciesseparatas,lococuiusadpraedictamabstractionemfaciendamAristotelesposuitintellectumagentem.”
678Lambert,98.
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Theappetitivepowersmustbeproportionatetotheapprehensivepowers,aswehavesaidabove.Now,asonthepartoftheintellectualapprehensionwehaveintellectandreason,soonthepartoftheintellectualappetitewehavewill,andfree-willwhichisnothingelsebutthepowerofchoice.Andthisisclearfromtheirrelationstotheirrespectiveobjectsandacts.Fortheactof‘understanding’impliesthesimpleacceptationofsomething;whencewesaythatweunderstandfirstprinciples,whichareknownofthemselveswithoutanycomparison.Butto‘reason,’properlyspeaking,istocomefromonethingtotheknowledgeofanother:wherefore,properlyspeaking,wereasonaboutconclusions,whichareknownfromtheprinciples.679
Notehow“potentiasappetitivas”aredistinguishedfrom“potentiisapprehensivis,”andthe
descriptionofintelligere(herethefirstoperationoftheintelligence)isdescribedas
“simplicemacceptionemalicuiusrei.”Significantly,eventhemovementofratiofromthe
principlestotheconclusionsisascribedtothe“intellectualapprehension”:“exparte
apprehensionisintellectivaesehabentintellectusetratio.”
Note16:UnderstandingasanActivity(Footnote449)
Thereisatendencyofeverypotencytoitsproperobject,asortof“transcendental
orientation,”towhichAquinasrefersas“naturalappetite.”Thisisnomorethanthe
metaphysicaltendencythat,aseveryform,thefacultiesofthesoulhavetotheirown
perfections.Itiscomparabletothetendencyofeverybeingtobewhatitis,anditisnot
enoughtomakethesefaculties“active”or“tendential”potencies.ForAquinasthe
appetitivepotenciesarenecessaryinthehumansoul680andarenottobeconfoundedwith
thenaturalappetite:
Eachpowerofthesoulisaformornature,andhasanaturalinclinationtosomething.Whereforeeachpowerdesiresbythenaturalappetitethatobjectwhich
67983,4,c.:“Respondeodicendumquodpotentiasappetitivasoportetesseproportionatas
potentiisapprehensivis,utsupradictumest.Sicutautemexparteapprehensionisintellectivaesehabentintellectusetratio,itaexparteappetitusintellectivisehabentvoluntasetliberumarbitrium,quodnihilaliudestquamviselectiva.Ethocpatetexhabitudineobiectorumetactuum.Namintelligereimportatsimplicemacceptionemalicuiusrei,undeintelligidicunturproprieprincipia,quaesinecollationeperseipsacognoscuntur.Ratiocinariautemproprieestdevenireexunoincognitionemalterius,undepropriedeconclusionibusratiocinamur,quaeexprincipiisinnotescunt.”
680Cf.80,1.
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issuitabletoitself.Abovewhichnaturalappetiteistheanimalappetite,whichfollowstheapprehension,andbywhichsomethingisdesirednotassuitabletothisorthatpower,suchassightforseeing,orsoundforhearing;butsimplyassuitabletotheanimal.681
Note17:KnowingasReceptive(Footnote454)
Aquinashascharacterizedknowing(andparticularlyunderstanding)asreceptiveinother
worksaswell:“Ourpossibleintellectcanunderstandnothingbeforeitisbroughtintoactby
a[…]form[intelligibleinact.]”682;“…[T]heintellectispassivetotheintelligible…”683;“Our
possibleintellectismerelyinpotencyintherealmoftheintelligible;itisactualisedthrough
anideadrawnfromsensibleimages.”684(mytrans.);thespecies“isimpressed”685onthe
possibleintellect.Knowingis“apprehensive”686,“receptive”687;“perceptive”688;
“accipere.”689
Note18:TheComparisonbetweenIntellectandSenses(Footnote477)
68180,1ad3:“Dicendumquodunaquaequepotentiaanimaeestquaedamformaseu
natura,ethabetnaturaleminclinationeminaliquid.Undeunaquaequeappetitobiectumsibiconveniensnaturaliappetitu.Supraquemestappetitusanimalisconsequensapprehensionem,quoappetituraliquidnonearationequaestconveniensadactumhuiusvelilliuspotentiae,utpotevisioadvidendumetauditioadaudiendum;sedquiaestconvenienssimpliciteranimali.”
682Cf.DeVer8,6inLambert,83:“Intellectuspossibilisnosternihilpotestintelligereantequamperficiaturformaintelligibiliinactu.”
683CGII,76,par.15:“…[I]ntellectuspatiturabintelligibili…”684InIIDeAnima6,173-190:“Intellectusnosterpossibilisestinpotentiatantuminordine
intelligibilium:fitautemactuperformamaphantasmatibusabstractam.”685DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad17.Cf.InMet.9,lect.8,1864-1865.686Cf.InBoet.DeTrin.6,2,c..687Cf.InISentd.3,q.4,a.5,c.;InIIIDeAnima1,131-139;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.;Q.D.De
Anima,a.4,ad8:“Theactivityofthepossibleintellectconsistsinreceivingintelligibles,whereasthatoftheagentintellectconsistsinabstractingthem.”[Actusintellectuspossibilisestrecipereintelligibilia;actioautemintellectusagentisestabstrahereintelligibilia.]andad9;a.5,c.;a.13,c..
688Cf.InIIIDeAnima4,100-104:“Moreover,justasthepotentialintellect’sfunctionofreceivingintelligibleobjectsisattributedtotheindividualmanasitssubject,soalsoistheworkoftheagentintellect,theabstractingofsuchobjectsfrommatter.”[Videmusetiam,quodsicutoperatiointellectuspossibilis,quaeestpercipereintelligibile,attribuiturhomini,itaetoperatiointellectusagentis,quaeestabstrahereintelligibilia.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad15.
689Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad15;DeVer8,10ad3inLambert,98;Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,c..
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ThecomparisonbetweenintellectandsensescanbeseeninotherworksofAquinas.InIn
Boet.DeTrin.6,2,c.,forexample,bothimplyanapprehensivemoment.IntheContra
Gentiles:
Consequently,intheactofunderstanding,theintelligiblespeciesreceivedintothepossibleintellectfunctionsasthethingbywhichoneunderstands,andnotasthatwhichisunderstood,evenasthespeciesofcolorintheeyeisnotthatwhichisseen,butthatbywhichwesee.Andthatwhichisunderstoodistheveryintelligibleessenceofthingsexistingoutsidethesoul,justasthingsoutsidethesoulareseenbycorporealsight.690
InInIIIDeAnima1,56ff.,botharepassiveandreceptive,preciselyinthecontextofthe
distinctionofthefaculties;InIIIDeAnima2,264-279issimilartothetextquotedofContra
Gentiles;inInIIIDeAnima10,20-27bothimplyacertain“apparition”andknowinginthe
absenceofthethingsknown,forwhichsomeofthenamespropertoeachfacultymay
sometimesbeusedinterchangeably;inInIIIDeAnima5,233-238intellectandsightarenot
deceivedintheirproperobjects,quodquidestandcolour.“Foritisevidentthattheactof
intellectionhasitsorigininthepossibleintellectasthefirstprinciplewherebywe
understand,justastheoperationofsensinghasitsorigininasentientpower.”691Notehow
inthislasttexttheactofunderstandingischaracterizedasacertain“comingout,”andso
allegedlyasactive,butonlyinthesamewaythattheactofthesensescouldbe
characterizedasactive.St.Thomasissimplytalkingaboutthespontaneityofknowing,in
thesensethat“weknow”:knowingisanactofthesubject.InInMet.11,lect.7,2253both
areoperationsthatremainintheagent.“Nowasthesenseisdirectlyinformedbythe
likenessofitsproperobject,soistheintellectbythelikenessoftheessenceofathing.
Hencetheintellectisnotdeceivedabouttheessenceofathing,asneitherthesenseabout
690CGII,75,par.7:“Habetseigiturspeciesintelligibilisreceptainintellectupossibiliin
intelligendosicutidquointelligitur,nonsicutidquodintelligitur:sicutetspeciescolorisinoculononestidquodvidetur,sedidquovidemus.Idveroquodintelligitur,estipsaratiorerumexistentiumextraanimam:sicutetresextraanimamexistentesvisucorporalividentur.”
691Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,c.:“Manifestumestenimquodhaecoperatio,quaeestintelligere,egrediturabintellectupossibilisicutaprimoprincipio,perquodintelligimus;sicuthaecoperatiosentireegrediturapotentiasensitiva.”
324
itsproperobject.”692Stumpcomparesthemintheroleofthespecies(“Likesensiblespecies
andphantasms,theintelligiblespeciesareimmaterialformsthataremeansofcognition
andsimilitudesofthingsoutsidethemind”)693andonpage263sheprovidesothertextsof
Aquinasinwhichthesimilaritiesbetweenintellectandsensecanbeseen.
Note19:Thedistinctionbetweenagentintellectandpossibleintellect(Footnote495)
Thedistinctionbetweenagentintellectandpossibleintellectispresentinotherworksof
Aquinas.“NeitherdoIsaythatthesetwopotencies,namelytheagentintellectandthe
possibleintellect,areactuallyoneandthesamepotencydifferentlynamedaccordingto
differentoperations;infact,wheneverdifferentactionsarereducedtocontraryprinciples,
itisimpossibletoreducethoseactionstothesamepotency.”694(mytrans.)“Now,the
possibleintellectiscomparedtotheagentintellectasitsproperpatientorrecipient,
becausetheagentintellectisrelatedtoitasarttoitsmatter.”695
Note,inthislasttext,thatthepossibleintellect“receives”theagentintellectasactive
cause,notasitsownactorform:otherwisethecomparisonwouldbenotwiththeart,but
withtheformoftheartefact.ThisiswhatSt.ThomasinterpretedintheAristoteliantext.
“Fortheagentintellectstandsinthesamerelationtotheintelligiblespeciesreceivedinto
thepossibleintellectasarttotheartificialformswhichitproducesinmatter,asthe
692SummaI,17,3(inStump,233note90):“Sicutautemsensusinformaturdirecte
similitudinepropriorumsensibilium,itaintellectusinformatursimilitudinequidditatisrei.Undecircaquodquidestintellectusnondecipitur:sicutnequesensuscircasensibiliapropria.”
693Stump,262.694InIISentd.17,q.2,a.1,c.:“Neciterumdico,haecduo,scilicetintellectumagentemet
possibilem,esseunampotentiamdiversimodenominatamsecundumdiversasoperationes;quiaquaecumqueactionesreducunturincontrariaprincipia,impossibileesteasreducereineamdempotentiam.”
695CGII,76,par.2:“Intellectusautempossibiliscomparaturadagentemutpropriumpassivumsivesusceptivumipsius:habetenimseadeumagenssicutarsadmateriam,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.”
325
exampleusedbyAristotleinDeanimaIII[…]makesclear.”696Coryquotesaninteresting
textofAverroesfromhisLongCommentarytoDeAnima,wheretheCommentator
prospectsthelimitsoftheanalogyofart,pointingoutthattheagentintellectisnotthe
absoluteoriginofthecontent,becauseinthatcasethephantasmswouldnotbe
required.697
MoreAquinas’textsforthedistinctioncouldbequoted.698Sellés699statesthatforAquinas
theactionoftheagentintellectprecedesthereceptionofthepossibleintellect,quotingCG
II,77,n.3.Stumpspeaksofadistinctionofpartsintheintellect:“Aquinasthinksofthe
intellectasdividedintoanactivepartandapassivepart.Theactivepart,generallycalled
‘theagentintellect’,abstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasmsanddeposits
theminthepassivepartoftheintellect,whichisgenerallycalled‘thepotentialintellect’or
‘thepossibleintellect.’”700
Note20:OnthetwoOpinionsastotheEffectofLight(Footnote619)
“Therearetwoopinionsastotheeffectoflight…”701
Hence,following[Aristotle’s]opinion,Isaythatlightisnecessaryforseeing,notbecauseofcolour,inthatitactualisescolours(whichsomesayareinonlypotencysolongastheyareindarkness),butbecauseofthetransparentmediumwhichlightrendersactual,asthetextstates.702
696CGII,76,par.18:“Comparaturenimintellectusagensadspeciesintelligibilesreceptasin
intellectupossibili,sicutarsadformasartificialesquaeperartemponunturinmateria:utpatetexexemploAristotelisinIIIDeAnima[cap.V,1;430a].”
697Cf.Averroes,LCDA,III,18inCory,Averroes,25.698Cf.CGII,76,par.15;Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,ad8etad9;a.5,c.:“Thereforetheremustexist
withinusaformalprinciplethroughwhichwereceiveintelligiblespecies,andonewherebyweabstractthem.Theseprinciplesarecalledthepossibleandtheagentintellectrespectively.”[Oportetigituresseinnobisaliquodprincipiumformalequorecipiamusintelligibilia,etaliudquoabstrahamusea.Ethuiusmodiprincipianominanturintellectuspossibilisetagens.];InIIIDeAnima4,1-7;100-104;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,c..
699Cf.Sellés,EIA,251.700Cf.Stump,264.70179,3ad2.702InIIDeAnima14,356ff.:“UndesecundumsententiamAristotelisdicendumest,quod
lumennecessariumestadvidendum,nonexpartecoloriseoquodfaciatcoloresesseactu,quos
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InInIIIDeAnima4,43-53thelightdoesnotmakeinactastheagentintellectmakesinact.
Cf.alsothefollowing:
Forthisreasonothersofferadifferentandmoreacceptableexplanation,namely,thatlightisnecessaryforsightinasmuchasitperfectsthemedium[…]Consequentlythecomparisonbetweenlightandtheagentintellectdoesnotholdinallrespects,becausetheagentintellectisnecessaryforthisreason,thatitmaymakethepotentiallyintelligibletobeactuallyintelligible.AristotlepointedthisoutintheDeanima,(BookIII)whenhesaidthattheagentintellectislikelightinsomerespects.703
Note21:“PhilosophicalTranslation”oftheSecondLastParagraphoftheEpilogue
Otherwise,bydissolvingthemeaningofthingsinourdealingswiththem,werisklosingalsothemeaningofourownexistence.Theexistentialvoidistheemptinessofasoulwhodidnotwelcomethingsastheyare—withtheirowncapricesandbeauty—asoulwhothusremainedaloneintheself-madeprisonofhisorherownworldofideasandvalues.Then,whenthedoortotheworldisclosed,thepathtoHeavencannotbefound.Godishiddenbehindthetrees,behindthebeautiesHemade.ItisonlybyencounteringothersthatwecanhearaboutGod.
This“philosophicaltranslation”doesnotintendtoconveythesamemeaningasthe
previousimages,butdoesintendtohelpintheunderstandingofsomeoftheprincipleson
whichthoseimagesdepend.Animagemaysometimesconveymorethanoneidea,andcan
sometimeshelpintheunderstandingofdeeperideasthancanmerephilosophical
expression.Theuseofimagesservesalsoasascholarlydevice,insofarasitcanhelpthe
readertoformtherightphantasminordertounderstand.Atthesametime,thelimitation
ofanimagemaycomefromtheimpossibilityofitsadaptingperfectlytothemeaningittries
toconvey,and/orfromalackofartintheonewhocreatestheimage.
Atthebeginningofthisparagraph,IimplythataKantianformalaprioritendsto“dissolve
themeaningofthingsinourdealingswiththem,”insofarasthemeaningpassesfrombeing
quidam,tantumdicuntesseinpotentia,cumsuntintenebris;sedexpartediaphani,inquantumfacitipsumesseinactu,utinliteradicitur.”
703Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,ad4:“Etideoaliialiterdicunt,etmelius,quodlumennecessariumestadvidenduminquantumperficitdiaphanum[…]Comparatioergoluminisadintellectumagentemnonestquantumadomnia;cumintellectusagensadhocsitnecessariusutfaciatintelligibiliainpotentiaesseintelligibiliaactu.EthocsignificavitAristotelesinIIIDeAnima,cumdixit,quodintellectusagensestquasilumenquoquomodo.”
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somethinginthethingsthemselves(Thomisticprospective)tobeingsomethingbestowed
onthingsbythesubject’sactivity(Kantianprospective).
By“existentialvoid”Imeanthelackofmeaninginhumanexistence,insofarasthesubject
findsnoreason,nopurpose,noanswerinlifeand,thus,facesdespair.Thesubjectrealizes
that,ifeverythingdependsonhimorher,theneverythingparticipatesthesubject’s
contingency,imperfectionandfinitude,andthusfallsintonothing.Thereisnohopeof
perfection(=happiness),becausetheonewhoacknowledgesone’sownneedanddesire
forperfection,findsoneselfasbeingtheperfectionofeverythingelse.
Thisexistentialvoidisproduced,inmyview,bytheattitudeofrejectingthingsashavinga
meaninginthemselves(“notwelcomingthingsastheyare”).Itissimilartowhathappens
whenone,insteadoflisteningtotheotherperson,isalwaystryingtohearonlywhatone
wantstohear.Whenthesubjectdoesnotacceptthelimitthatathingbringswithitself,
whenthesubjectdoesnotwelcomesomethingas“other,”buttriestoseehisorherown
utilityinthatthing,thesubjectremainsalone,havingthingstodealwithbutnothingto
receive.
Theattitudeof“humility”or“welcoming,”instead,isthatwhichopensthedoortoa
meaningfulworld.Butoncethisdoorisopen,thelimitsofthingsandtheirbeing-there-
before-usinspiresthesearchforacause.Participatedbeingisbynecessityacausedbeing.
Ameaningful,independentworldpresentsitselfasamystery,asabigquestion.Thisiswhy
itissaidthat“whenthedoortotheworldisclosed,thepathtoHeavencannotbefound.”
“Heaven”canherebeunderstoodasultimatemeaning,happinessorGodHimself.When
thedoortotheworldisopen,wemayfindthepathtowardsGod,becausethehumanway
toarriveattheknowledgeofGodisascendingtowardsHimbymeansoftheknowledgeof
creatures.
ThatiswhyIsay“Godishiddenbehindthetrees.”Theimage“behindthetrees”canmean
severalthings.Firstofall,Godisnot“within”thetreesbut“behind”them,insofarasGodis
not“part”ofcreation,nordoesGodbelongtocreationasitsintimateenergyorform;God
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is,rather,tobeconsidered“beyond”creation.ThedistinctionbetweenGodandcreatures,
however,isnotspatial(“hereistheworldandthereisGod”);Godiseverywhere.Instead,
thedistinctionbetweenGodandcreaturesismetaphysical.Godisactualfullnessof
perfection,apureactincludingintensivelyandsimply(withoutdifferentiation)allofthe
perfectionofbeing,whereaseachcreatureislimited,possessingaspecificperfectionanda
limitedcorrespondingactofbeing.Godiseverywhere,therefore,insofarasGodcauses
eachgramofbeingintheuniverse.Inthisway,“behindthetrees”pointstothedistinction
betweenGodandcreatures,theessential“otherness”ofGod.704
“Behindthetrees”isalsoafigureofakindofplaybetweenGodandhumanbeings.The
purposeofGodincreationistobefoundbyhumanbeingswhorejoiceinfindingGodas
thosewhowinagame.HumanbeingsaresupposedtolookforGod.Godishiddenbecause
GodwantshumanbeingstolookforHim,notbecauseGoddoesnotwanttobefound.God
wantstobefound,andGodwantstobefoundinsuchawaythatthosewhofindHimmay
behappywiththeirown“cleverness.”God,however,canbefoundonlybythosewhoget
outofthemselves,andrecognizetheirneeds.Inasense,itisonlybyacceptingthe
limitationimposedonusbythethingsthemselves(“welcomingthingsastheyare”),andby
acceptingourownlimitationandneed(“goingouttoplaythegame”),thatweopen
ourselvestotheunlimitedhappinessoffindingGod.
“ItisonlybyencounteringothersthatwecanhearaboutGod.”Thislastlinemeanswhat
hasalreadybeensaidregardingthenecessityofascendingtoGodbymeansofcreatures.
ThereasonIsay“hear”isbecausebymeansofcreatureswecannot“see”God,butwecan
certainly“hear”GodinHiscreatedeffects;theeffectsmakeusrealizethatthereisacause,
inthesamewayasthesoundofthebellmakesusrealizethatsomeoneisatthedoor.
704ThispositionisdifferentfromconsideringGodanaprioriofhumanunderstanding,for
tworeasons:first,becausewefindGodnotbyreflectingonourselvesandourmodeofknowing,butbyreflectingonthelimitsofcreatures;andsecond,becausewecannotknowourselvesbeforeknowingcreaturesinthemselves.WedonotdenythattheknowledgeofourselvesbecrucialorevenneededinordertoknowGod.
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ThislinecanalsomeanthatonlybyencounteringthosewhopreachtheGospelcanwe
hearaboutGod,insofaras“NoonehaseverseenGod;theonlySon,whoisinthebosomof
theFather,hehasmadehimknown.”705Thatis,thenaturalknowledgeofGodisobtained
byencounteringcreaturesandreasoningfromthem;thesupernaturalknowledgeofGodis
obtainedbyencounteringthedivinemessengersandwelcomingtheirmessage.
Note22:TheCompleteTextofFabroinNMP272-273
CertainlyGod,whoisthe‘ipsumintelligeresubsistens’,istheintelligiblesunofthespiritsandthefirstcauseofeverytruth;but,asinthesensiblerealmitisnotnecessarythattheeyeseesitsobjectsturningdirectlytothesun,butitisenoughthattheybeseeninsofarastheyarerenderedevidentbythelightderivedfromthesun–likewise,inthecreatedintelligiblerealm,itisenough,andevenfitting,thatthecreatureseesitsobjectsinsofarastheyarerenderedevidentbyalightparticipatedfromthedivinesun.706Thislightisformantheagentintellect,whichAristotlehassaidtobeinnoi[Greek]‘likethelight’707andwhichSt.Thomasdescribesalwaysasthehighestparticipationandtheinmostseal(inthenaturalorder)ofthedivinityinus.Theagentintellectisprincipleproductive[fattivo]oftheintelligibleandthisintelligiblethat708comestousnotbydirectparticipationfromGod,butthroughacomplexprocessofabstractionaccomplishedbytheparticipatedlight,theagentintellect,intherealmoftheconcreteanddiffuseparticipationsofthesensibleworld:‘Theintelligiblespecieswhichareparticipatedbyourintellectarereduced,astotheirfirstcause,toafirstprinciplewhichisbyitsessenceintelligible—namely,God.Buttheyproceedfromthatprinciplebymeansofthesensibleformsandmaterialthings,fromwhichwegatherknowledge,asDionysiussays.’”709
Note23:TextofInIIIDeAnima1,170-180(Footnote520)
Theearlyphilosophers’principle[was]thatintellectmustbecompoundedofallthingsifitcanknowallthings.Butifitknewallthings,ascontainingthemallinitselfalready,itwouldbeanever-actualintellect,andnevermerelyinpotency.Inthe
705John1:18.706DeVeritate,q.XVIII,a.1.707DeAnima,Gamma,5,430,a.15.708Thiswordshouldprobablybeomittedintheoriginal.709Fabro,Cornelio,LaNozioneMetafisicadiPartecipazionesecondoSanTommasod’Aquino,
inCornelioFabro:OpereComplete,vol.3(Segni:EDIVI,2005),272-273.ThetextwhichFabroquotesfromAquinasis84,4ad1:“Speciesintelligibilesquasparticipatnosterintellectus,reducuntur,sicutinprimamcausam,inaliquodprincipiumpersuamessentiamintelligibile,scilicetinDeum.Sedabilloprincipioproceduntmediantibusformisrerumsensibiliumetmaterialiumaquibusscientiamcolligimus,utDionysiusdicit.”(LatintextusedbyFabro)
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samewayhehasremarkedalreadyofthesenses,thatiftheywereintrinsicallymadeupoftheobjectstheyperceive,theirperceptionswouldnotpresupposeanyexteriorsensibleobjects.710
Note24:TheIntellectas“tabularasa”inOtherWorks(Footnote521)
“Theintellectisinpotencytoallintelligibleformshavingnoneactually,justasprimematter
isinpotencytoallsensibleformshavingnoneactually.”711Theobjectionisnotchallenged
inthatregard.Seealsothefollowing:
Itwouldfollowthatthepossibleintellectwouldnotreceiveanyspeciesthatareabstractedfromourphantasms,ifoneintellectbelongstoallthosewhoareandwhohavebeen.Because,nowthatmanymenwhoknewmanythingshavealreadygonebeforeus,itwouldfollowthatwithrespecttoallthosethingswhichtheyknewthepossibleintellectwouldbeinactandnotinpotencytoreceivethem,becausenothingreceiveswhatitalreadyhas.712
710InIIIDeAnima1,170-180:“Dicebant[antiqui]enimeum[i.e.intellectusanimae]adhoc
quodcognosceretomnia,essecompositumexomnibus.Siautemessetcognoscitivusomniumquiahaberetinseomnia,essetsemperintellectusinactuetnunquaminpotentia:sicutsupradixitdesensu,quodsiessetcompositusexsensibilibus,nonindigeretsensibilibusexterioribusadsentiendum.”
711Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ob.17:“Intellectusestinpotentiaadomnesformasintelligibiles,nullamearumhabensinactu;sicutmateriaprimaestinpotentiaadomnesformassensibiles,etnullamearumhabetinactu.”
712DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.:“Sequereturquodintellectuspossibilisnonreciperetaliquasspeciesaphantasmatibusnostrisabstractas,sisitunusintellectuspossibilisomniumquisuntetquifuerunt.Quiaiamcummultihominespraecesserintmultaintelligentes,sequereturquodrespectuomniumillorumquaeillisciverunt,sitinactuetnonsitinpotentiaadrecipiendum;quianihilrecipitquodiamhabet.”