This article was downloaded by: [Carnegie Mellon University]On: 09 November 2014, At: 02:17Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales RegisteredNumber: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

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The Action of Cavalryand Horse ArtilleryIllustrated by ModernBattlesMajor E. S. May R.A.Published online: 11 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Major E. S. May R.A. (1894) The Actionof Cavalry and Horse Artillery Illustrated by Modern Battles,Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 38:191, 1-19, DOI:10.1080/03071849409416966

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VOL. XXXVIII. .JAXUAI~Y~ 18 94. No. 191. ~--1-*

(drtfhors alone are responfibte for the eomfenls of their respectice Pa2)ers.j

OCCBSIOXBL l’dPERS,

THE ACTIOX OF CAVALRY hh’n IIORSE AItTILLERT ILLUSTRATED BY XOD U RN UATl’rJE S.

l3y N:ijor li;. S. M i Y , R.A.

I c.issor Iiclp fccling t l in t in giving .Z lecture on tlic subject of Cavalry aud Horse ~lrtillci*y I ham placcci myself nt n slight dis- advnnt:igc in limiting inysclf, as, according to tlic I J~O~IYUII I I IC , I hnvc done, to modern battles for my illustrations. To find t!ic bcst instanccs of cavalrj and liorsc artilleiy acting in co-operation, wc must go back to tlic wars a t tlic commeiiccmeiit of tlic ccritnry, and wc iniglit also find iii 0111- Ilidinri campaigns, \vliicli can hardly bc termed modern warfare, sercrnl brilliant esnmplcs of thcsc two arms mutonlly supporting onc nnothcr. The short time at our disposal will n\;t, homrer, nllox us to esaminc records so far from our own day, when tlic conditions of tlic sitnation as regards armament wcrc so widely different from d i n t tiley arc now, mid d i e r o wc cannot takc :I comprcliensire vicw it will bc bcttcr only to regard what is most likely to be of imniediatc bcncfi) in tlicsc latter days. Wo slinll, thcrcforc, corifinc oursclrcs nlrnost. entircly to tkc war of 1870, tho first occasion since tlic introduction of. brccclilontlers on which two grcnt opponcnts faced one nnotlicr similarly cqnippcd. You may, lioi\-cvcr, fairly ask mc ~‘113; if liorso artillery is in modern times still a ncccssity to cwalry, as I belicro it to be, and if , as I also bclieve, tliero is still a great future bcforo horsemen, still vcrgc and scopc for tho action of sqondrons cvcn on tlic battlcficld itself, you may ask mc, I say, wliy modern warfnrc does not present us with such salient examples for our purposc this evening as do thc p a t struggles of past years. It is n fair question, but, I think, I can givc

1 This essny is tlic substzncc of o lecture gircn in the tiall of the Middlo Tcniplc, on Fcbruav 20, 1603, at tho request of Colonel Cecil Russell, conininnding tlic Iiiiie of Court Riflc Tolunteers.

YOL. I X X Y I I I . B

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2 THE ACTION OF OhVALRS AXD IIOESE XRTILIXRT

yon a complctcrcply to it. nut bcforc I do SO I will ask you to bear \ritIi me a moment wliilc I cspllriii to you 1 1 0 ~ i t was that liorso nrtillcv m ~ s cnllcd into csistcncc a t all. \\'ken you nridcrstand its yaisoir tl’ctrc, JOU will bcttci. npprccintc tlic argumcnt I shall bring f 01 ward.

X o w tlic origin of Iiorsc iirtillcry was briefly this:- When Predcrick thc Great sct liimsclf to pcrfcct his army, nnd turn it

into tlic magnificent fighting machine it ultimatelF became, oiic of tlie first rcforms hc hnil to iiitroducc wns with referciicc to tlic cmploymcnt of his cavnlrj-. Thc vorld was just tlicn, as it is now, hugely iniprcssctl with tlie valuc which new improvcments lind gircn to muskctrF, and tlicrc was a tciidciicy cwn with cavalry to rcly on lcntl rathcr tlinii on stccl. 1Jrcdcricli found his squadrons waiting to rcccirc nn attack in position, and tlicn, 1iavinK poured in a vollcy, cl~arging to tnke ndvnntagc of its cffcct. All tlic dnsli and critcrprisc vliicli slioiild distinguish tlic most iiiobilc arm wcrc thcrcforc gonc, a n d tlic dragoon had bccomc a bad troopcr nnd s worss niusquctccr. Tlic genius of thc King saw that such tactics took away all tLc clinrnctcristics that madc cavalry mluablc, : i d lie set liimsclf to stmil) out thc Iicrcsy cncrgctically. I may hcrc rcniind you that wc see ;in cLzniplc iri our own times of 1iistoi.y rcpcating itsclf, in tlic nianncr in which tlic firc action of cnva1i.y \ins teen :icccntuatcd, csI)ccially in tlic Russian arm3; w1icl.c thcy ham nrmcd tlic dragoons once. i i i~rc with riflc and b:gonct, and this iicw dcpnrturc is rcgmdcd by many with tlic snmc dislikc as it tvns by Frctlcrick. IIis measures to irnprovc ninttcrs \vci*c somcwlint more decisivc tlim \vc arc nsed to now-a-days. 1Ic issucd nn ordcr to his squadrons, I‘ Xinimer zii halten, ninimcr zu stockcii, nber iinmcr stcts zu nttackircn,” that is to s n ~ , tlicy 1s-crc d r a y s to :Ittack, and, furtlioi; Iic dcclnrcd tlint any ofiiccr rho waited in thc old way to receiro the cncluy sliould Lo tried by Court-martial.

His cnvnlrj-, tmincd and splendidly Icd ty two of thc most cnpnblc cavalry lcndcrs that cvcr lircd, Scjdlitz and Zicthcn, ivcrc soon rcnow-ucd for thc prccision mid rapidity of tlicir sx-oop, and linrc probably nc-icr bccn surpasscd.

But liming clc\-clopcd its ‘I shock” powm a t tlic cxpcnsc of its firc cffcct, lie hnct to innkc tlic latter good iu sonic other way.

Cnvnlry is csscntinlly an offcnsivo arm, it canriot dcfciid itsclf cscept by counter-attack, and in certain sitnations it is :kt tlic mcrcy of n fcw wcll-plnccd mnrksmcn. “ Cndry ,” Xapolcon tclls ns, “cnnnot rep11 to firc, and can only figlit Irith tlir: steel." Ilnttcrics of artillcry lightly cquipped, and with tlicir detnclimcnts inounicd lilic troopers, wcrc thcrcforc organized by Frcdcrick to morc and act with cavalry, and supply tlicin with tho powers hc lind shorn tlicm of. And the co-operation of tlic two arms was, and lins since bccn, found to work out in anotlier waj-, to thc bciicfit of both, bccansc, wliilc guus looscncd compact formations for tlic Lorscn~cn, thc caralry forced tlic saittcrcd troopers to draw togcttci; and thus prcscnt mi cnsicr tnrgct to tlic guns.

X:ipolcon, xllo apprcciatcd tho vduc of fire inorc than any mau of

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ILLUSTRAITED BS 3IODEILS CITTLES. 8

llis tinic, and also rcnpcd imniensc rcsults from a skilful usc of c n m l r ~ , rccopiscd tlic raluc of n nioLilc artillcry too, and uiiilcr this 0 orcat csnmplc its iisc becamc gcncral. Knpolcou, too, rnorc than nny otlicr gcncral bcfcrc or since, tnuglit his cavalry to act witli boldness i n rccoiinnissnncc n-ork alicnd of his armies, 2nd it wns by means of tlic information IS to his cncmj’s plans and position which an nbundnnt and cncrgctic cnvalry placcd a t his disposal that rnnny of liis most cclcbrntccl strokcs wcrc rciidcml possiblc. Tlius, during liis admnco to Russia iii 1812, Ilurnt, n-itli tlic advanced cavalry, was oftcn 50 milcs ahcad of his nrmr. So it was tlint not onl~- did cnrnlry in his day comc into collision with tlic criemj- on thc ficld of bnttlc to an crtcd, such as irc sliall ncwi- hco ag&, but caralrj- raids and combnts took placc crc tlic main forccs camc in contact a t all. A powcrful cavalry uicnnt :L vixorons pnrsuit. Otlicr nntious, to incct his Iiorsciiicn, lind to ndopt similar tactics, niid tlins grcat opportunities for tlic actiou of caralry aud its cornplamcnt liorsc artillerr wcrc gircn in tlic long ivnrs that ~iinrkcd tlic cnd of thc last and tho rommciiceniciit of tlic prcsciit ccntury. A i d by no battcrics ~ v e r c opportuiiitics marc wortlii1F turncd to :iccouiit, lct IIIC add, than by our oicn brilliant troops in tlic Pcninsnla, and iii Belgium a fcw ycnrs Inter.

During tlic long pcriocl of pcncc, howcvci; that succccdcd Watcrloo, aliicli rcprcscntcd thc lull after tlic storni, iiiauy of tho lessons of the grcnt battlcficlds iwrc forgotten, and wlicn in 1 S i O the Prussians scnt the ubiquitous Ulilaiis roaming tlirougli Francc, mcu stnrcd in nmnze- nicrit as though :L new cpocli in the ar t of \rar Iind opcncd. Yet thcy wcrc doing but that wliicli Xnpolcon had show11 to I c csscntial to tlic snfcty of nn army i 0 ycnrs bcforc, and did not do i t cithcr ncarly so wcll as lic lind clonc.

But, tlic Frcnch lind not profitcd by tlic study of military history :IS tlicir opponcnts lind, aiid thcir squndrons, brnvc and cngci. ns t h y prorcd tlicmsclycs iiiorc thnn oiico 111 tlic actual figlit, wcrc licltl aiml~ssly in hand, ticd to tlic snnic road on wliicli movcd tho otlicr troops. N o c:~rnliy n-as scnt scoutiiig far away in front or on tlic flanks, mid crcn in rctrcnt tlicy imcly or nercr attainptcd to prcrcnt tlic inqnisitivc inroads of tlic pnrsucrs. It tnkcs two, wc a11 know, to makc a quarrcl, and n cavalry combat is no csccption to tho gcncrnl rule. Thcrc wcro fcir in 16iO bccnnsc tlic Gcrinan troopcrs l i d it, to usc a familiar csprcssioii, “all their o\vn IKLJ.” Con- scqiicntly, thc liorsc artillcry and cavalry l i d no nccd to support, one anotlicr, mid tlicro wcrc in 1670 only n fcw cramplcs of tlicir co- operation in tlic most important rCZc tlicj-can bc called upon to adopt.

Sucli, briefly, is tlic cxplnnation, and it applics also 1ar& to 1866, of tlic fact that IVO find richer ground for resc‘arcl if K C rctrncc o u r stcps to tlic carlicr pcriods. h i d it is \-cry ncccssary that you shonld iindcrstaiid this, bccnusc it is as ccrtain ay anytliiiig in this world can bc tliat, if KC linvc niiotlier great \var 011 tlic Continent in thu ~ icar fiiturc, wc slin11 again scc thc two arms wc arc dcaling with working togcthcr, to an cstcnt and upon a scale which cvcn Xapolcon iicvcr dreamt of. All natioiis h a w studied and profitcd by tlic lessons

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4 TLIE ACTIOS 01.' CBIXLItT A S D IIORSE AIlTILLERT

of 18i0, and on all sides \vc scc s i p s t l int tcll us that n s t swarms of ca\-alrr will shroud. and protcct thc aclrancc of niodcrn armics. Wlien both sides adopt tlicsc same tnctics, tlicir c a ~ a l r j will siircly Conic iiito' collisioii, and IFC shall scc squadrons supportcd ~ J J - 1ioiw artillcry taking part i n contests which will niaterially affect tlic lira- grcss of subscqucnt crcnts.

In 1870, when tho cnralry divisions of tlic Germans wcrc thrust forward alone, liorsc artillery alwnj-s arconipanied tlieni, nltliougli wlicn tlic battlc took plncc wc ficd them c ~ n p l o ~ c d apart from tlic liorscnicn in tlic general linc of Lnttlc ; fo r guiis, bl: thcy liorsc or ficld, must ncrer Lc allorvcd to st:ind by idlc xlicii tlieir fir0 may bc utilized. ' But, besides being essential to one another i n this inost important d l c , cnvnlry and liorsc artillery will find opportunity and necd to work liarnioniously togctlicr in otlicr cnicrgencics.

Horsc ?rtillcry aiid caralry will forin part of tlie iniliicdiate adranccd guard of cvcrj cousidcrablc force, will hzrc to rccoiinoitrc the ciicniy's strcngtli and position, dehy his onset, or check his rctrcat, until tlie main body arrires.

'Iliey will dso, prlinps, find tlicii. most uscful aiid most lionour- a.bIc rGie in corcring n retreat of tlicir own side, and it is to tlicir skill, readiiicss, and, if w e d be. sclf-sacrifice, that tlicir corriradcs look fo r snlvntioii in tlic most trriiig circumstances in wliicli soldiers

Uorse :irtillery and cavalry mnF also Ic cmploycd on tlic ficld of Lattlc itself to mnkc n fliinking movcnicnt, or, by tlicir iiiobilitr, forc- st:ill thc encmg a t sonic iniportant point.

hiid fiunlly, tlicy iiiay act together with advantage in thc pursuit of n bcatcu foc.

But sincc tlic nction of liorsc artillcrr and caralry acting togcthcr l ~ y tlicmselves an'ords' to tlic brilliant lcadcr tLc best ch:incc of distiu- guisliiiig liimsclf, and is thc most clariictcristic, tlic most effcctive, a ~ i d , alas ! thc most difiicult d i e in which thc combined clforts of the two :wins cnn bc ntilized, I will first spcak of it, ndding to tlic ideal and tlicoicticnl description n few instances from recent tvarfarc, by I ~ J - of illnstmtion. And I m q - preface iiiy bricf rcmarks on this point by esphiiiing tlint, according to tlic lntcst regnlntions, n cavalry division ~vould, in our Service, usually be coinposed of 2 brigadcs, or G regiments of cacdry,.witli 4 niachinc-guns, 2 bnttcrics of liorse artillciy, and a battalion of inouiitcd infantry, to wliicli likcwisc 2 macliine-guns would bc attaclicd. 1'7c sliall bc liardly within tlic limits of our discussion this cvening i f wc enter into tlic question of lrow thcsc latter-day adjuncts to tlic cavalry division arc to bc ciii- plojcd. TLc Germans carried iiifatitry in carts on rnorc tlinn one occasion during thc. war of 1870, and our niouritcd infantry niny show themselves uscful in ndvn'ncc of tlic main b o d j under certain circum- stances asiiii ; tlic question, until wc h a n some espcriences of rccciit war to go upon, must, Iiowxcr, be a theoretical, perhaps a contro- v e l h l , oiic, but, sincc tlic question of an escort to guns has cvcr bccir a dificult one, tlic iicm additions will, in tliie rcspcct, piabablr prove a wclcomc assistance and support.

can bc ~llaccd.

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ILLUSTRXTEL) I3T JIODERS BATTLES. 5

For, in tlic cvcnt of n collision bctwccn bodics of cnmlry being inliiiinent, thc guiis will bc called upon to morc inpidly and boldly fo~warcl straigli t to tlicir front., consitlcrnbly alicnd of tlic Iiorscmcn. Jind this for two reasons : to gct into action, if tlicy can, beforc thc Iiostilc artillcry, nnd to gain ns mncli timc'as possiblc in which to produce tlicir cffcct. Tlic cxact clistnncc tlicy sliorild go forward Innst bc lcft Inrgcly to circnmstnnces, but Von ,Schcll, n high authority, says they should adrnnci. one-third thc distnncc which .qxuixtcs the opposing forccs. Anotlicr distinguislicd oficcr l ins rccomtncndcd tlic artillery commniidcr . to watch cnrcfiilly tlic opposing lincs, estiinntc as far as possiblo tho spo). on. wliich t.hc two front lines of squadrons will comc in contact, and stri;c to get into position 300 yards short of, and tlic samc clistnncc on tho flank of, tho point of first coiiflict. \Yo xnaj- iiotc liow much judp- xncnt, how much boldness, how much dccision is tlicrcforc rcquircd on tlic part of him x-lio lcads thc guns, and how imincdiately nszo- cintcd tlicir action, to l o cffcctivc, must bo with that of tlic otlier arm. Sonic onc will, pcrliaps, object that it is dangerous to send guns thus holdly formrd. Wl1y i' If tlic liostilc squadroiis fall upoii thcm tlicy will do tlic vcry thing tlicy should not. For it' tlic c:ivalry and giiris arc really working fogctlicr, ivlicii tlic cncmy turiis on a h t t e r y tlicy will crposc tlicir ow1 tlaiik to assault, and, in any case, tlicycnn, nf tcr all, iiijurc tlio artillcry but to a wry sninll cstcnt. . Wliat may nppcnr tcmcrity is, tlicrcforc, tlic surest bid for S U C C C R S ~

'l'lic gons will usnnlly bc on tlio Bank, iiiid tlicir ontcr flank will iiccrl protection. A squadron would usually bc dctnilcd for that duty, and miglit liarc to dismount sornc of its lilcs in ccrtaiu C ~ S C S to call iii tlic aid of fire.

It is obvionslj- n mistnkc, liowcrcr, thus to wcnkcn tlic camlry, for thcy will nccd crcry sa1n-c iu thc comiiig mSKe, nnd thcrcforc it is not unlikely that a. splicro oE uscfiilncss will bc opcncd up licrc for tlio iiionmtcd infantrev and mnchinc-guns, in which tlicy 1 1 1 ~ ~ - on occnsions display f.licir special characteristics with success. The point to bc spccially noted is tlic rcry short time t1icl.c will bc for tlic guns to producc nn cffcct, and that np ins t n l-nrying tnrgct also. For tho artillcry oficcr will hnrc to cscrcisc quick dccision ns rrgnrds tlic clioicc of his objective. Is lie to firo nt tlic cncmy's guns, or n t thcir aqundrons ? T h e ausircr is tliat tiic arm a t tho momcot thc most dnngcrous must bc attackcd, and circunistnnccs must. iiiflucncc hini 11Cl.C.

It is for tlicse rcasons that estwmc quickncss, or wlint wc call sinnrtncss, has bccn lookcd for, both from oficcrs and mcn who wear tho jacket. It. was not tlirougli mcro bravado, or to plcaso tlic gallery, tlicrcforc, that tlic old troops took pridc in getting off a ronnd quickly, but becansc, since it was nccessarj to gct to a short rtungc in order to harc a chancc agaiust thcir rapidly-moving targct, nonc of thc flectiiig monicnts might be wasted. Evcii in thcsc days of long ranges in combats bctwecn cavalry such as wc' arc dcscribiiig, which will hcrnld tl!? approach of struggles on a largcr scalc, distances and opportunities v;ill still bc short as cvcr, and thc snmc qunlitics, both physical and

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ci TLIE XCTIOS OF C-ITALRY A S D IIORSE ARTILLERT

mental, will bc nccdcd in tlic horsc gnnncr, if Iic is to do his duty propci-lj-. Tlic gunncrs, too, W C ~ C , niid arc, incii sclectcd for their plijsiquc, bec:uiso in order to leap 011 a liriiber or mount a horse with facilitly somctliing morc t lmi tho :rrcrngc staturc of tlic soldier is rcquircd. KO rnoro pitiable objcct is to bc sccn tlian n little man tr;yin,n to get on tlie back of ail impatient chargcr, with onc foot i n tllc stirrup and one on the ground, cspccially if a Gliazi v i t h n loiig Icnifc is coining aftcr him ! 'Ihc labour of runiiirig guns up aftcr tlicir rccoil during r:ipid firing is also immcnsc,*niid rcquircs strcngtli on tllc pwt of tlic detaclimcnt.

Wc mn-y find an illustration of the scverc Iabonr that is somctinics tiiroym on gunncrs i n this rcspcct from thc rccords of tlic Egj-ptian campaign ollSS3.

In tlic vcrj first action of thc war two guns mrc, sciit forward from Ismailin to p i n posscssion of n dam across thc Sycct Wntcr Cmnl at Magfar. !l'licse guns wcrc i n action for scvcral hours in h c a ~ y sand, and tlic dctachmcnts bccan~c SO crh:iustcd by tlic labour iuvolvcd i n workiiig tlic guns that they bccamc completely unnblc, i n s c ~ c r a 1 cnscs, to carrj- out tlicir duties. Tkc drivcrs lind to bc cnllcd iipon to tnke their tnrn a t tlic WI~CCIS, and subscqiicntly thc aid of the iiiarinc nrtillci-rmcn, wlio were iri action closc to, knd to b. iiirokcd.

As to tlic question of wliat projectile thc guns arc to use, ns :I gcucral rule, i t riiny bc assuliicd that shmpncl will probablj IIC fired a t tlic pcrsoniicl of tlic cncmy% guns in the cnrlicr stngcs of tlic action, but, as soon as thc first liiic of his squadrons comes witliin effcctiw rangc, i t \roiild sccm dcsirnblc tlint tlic grcatcr part, a t niiy ratc, of tlic guns should o i~cn on tlicm with slirapncl shcll nnd pcr- cnssion fnzes, 01% cvcn yitli corninon slicll. It will bc impossible, i n tlic short tinic at disposal, to bore tiinc fuzcs, and tlic cffccts .>f coxumou shcll, both moral awl mntcrinl, sLoulrl lo grcat :tnionpt liorscs. If tlic liostilc guns nrc not liarasscd b j n lively Grc, tlicy will h - c free scope to plag upon and dcxnoralizc our o m liorscmcn. .

As soon as tlic two front lincs of liorsomcn linrc mct in conflict, the guns rnnj tiirn tlicir :ittciitioi: to tlic sccond linc and rcscn-cs, and n-arc1 off any flank att:ick.

I n thc crcnt of aucccss or fnilnrc bcing distiiictlg prononnccd, thc rGlc of tlic guns would 1)c obvious aiid nccd not be clwclt on, bu t occnsionnllj i t n i a ~ bc a knotty point for the lcndcr of tlic batteries to clcciclc vlictlici* Iic should remain 'in action or wlictlicr Iic should rctirc t o somc position in rcar. IIc mist lcavc sclfisll considclations out of sight. Bu t which will bc bcst for his friends ? Probably to stay uriliinbcrcd, for it is during a rcpulsc that guns mag bc of niost assistance, and it is oftcri thc last round that tells. Tc t to staF bchind too long imj- causc tlic cavalry losscs in a dcspcratc nttcmpt to rxtricntc tlicni. Tlic artillcry 1c:dcr in this position hns nccd both of pluck and jiidgmerit, and his statc niay Lc likcncd to that of a 1ii;i11

watcliiiig liis fricnd bnttliug with a wild torrcnt, niid uiicertnin whether to leap in a t oucc niid ninkc a Iiopclcss cffort to S ~ Y C him, 01' stay for a moment to lauiicli n boat.

Thc niost dificult position of all, I IOIYCW~' , would occui' \rlicn a

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r ILLUSTRITED DT XOD,l.:RS D.\TlLI5L 1

rninglcd mnss of fiicnds nnd focs conics surgiug back upon tlic guns. It woiild bc a very knot ty point to dccidc whcthcr thc guns should, under such eirciixnsfniiccs, rcinnin iii action or lirnlicr up i n thc hope of ge t t ing n clcnr f ront of firc furtlicr to tho rear, ond thc ezigcn- cics of tlic riiomcnt mist bo nllowcd to sct t lc thc problcm. As n gcncrnl ruIc, h o \ ~ c r c r , it will bo thc bcst t o rcxnniii in position. It is i n oriscs such ns thcsc t h a t t ho support of g u n s maybo sufficient t o turn tlic scnlc, and t o withdraw would, in tlic majority of cnscs, bc n risky proceeding. T o n Sclicll suggcsts tlic Iirroic rcmcdy of firing iudiscriminntcly into tlic confuscd xnnss, t h u s discntnngliug it, nnd forciiig tlic cncmy t o loosen liis grip. Tlicrc arc no instnnccs, (rs

f n r ns I n'rri a\vnrc, of such drastic mctliods Iinriug bccii dclibcratcly :irloptcd, biit i t is scnrccly likcly that,, o w n Iind tlicy liccn, n record woiild 1)c prcscrrcd in t h c Official iiccouut.

Tkcrc was a n occasion during tlic Criincaii \vnr, liowv~vcr, wlicii somctliing of this kind did occur. Dr. W. H. Riisscll, then corrc- spoiidcnt to thc I' Tinics," wrotc as follows conccriiing t h e action of tlic Russian artillcry nftcr our Light Urigndc Iind nindc tlicir cclc- bratcd ch:irgc n t l3nlnclnva: I' A t tlic vcry inonleiit wl ic~i t h y wcrc itbout to rctrcnt, a n cnormous xnnss oE Innccrs \vns Iiurlcd on their flniik. Coloiicl Shcwcll, of tlic 8 t h Hussars, saw tlic dangcr nud rodc his fcw iiien s t ra ight n t tlicip, cu t t ing his way through with fearful loss. Tlic otlicr regiments turiicd arid ciigagcd i n :L dcspcrnto cn- counter. I r i t l i courngc too grca t nlmost far crcdcncc thcy wcrc Irrcnking thcir way tliroiigli tho coliiinns which cnvclopcd thcm, whcn thcrc took place an a c t of atrocity witliout parallcl i n thc lnodcrn wnrfqrc of civilizcd nntious. Thc llussinn gunners, whcn the s torm of c : i ~ i l r y pnsscd, rcturucd to thcir guns. Tlicysaw thcir own cavalry minglcd wit11 tlic troopcrs who lind just ridden ovcr tlicm, nnd, to tlic ctcriinl disgrncc of the llussian namc, tho miscrcants ponred n murdcroiis rollcy of grapc nnrl cnnistcr on t h c mass of s t ruggl ing mcii find l iorxs , mingliug fricnd and foc in 011c common ruiu." It is to bc notcd, liowcver, tlint tlic nctiou oE thc Russinn nrtillcry was unjusti- finblc i n this cnsc, because our cavalry wcrc not bearing down Tic- toi~iuiislj ou thcir cncmy's position at tho moment, biit werc lcaving it. Tlie stntciricnts of cjc-witncsscs, whom I hnrc consultcd, likcwise throw considcrnblc doubt on tlic nccount ns g i r c n bj Dr. Ilnsacll, and i t i s \-cry probnblc tha t tlic Russian gunners nctcd lcss dclibcratclj-, a n d tlint t.licir fricnds suffcrcd lcss n t thcir linnds tlinn wo arc lcd t o bclicrc b ~ - it. Should nn artillcry officcr, Iio\vcrcr, crcr bc plnccd in so t r j i n g and pninfiil a situation tlint, in ordcr to sarc tho bulk of tlic force Iic was act ing wi th from dcstruction, 110 felt bound t o r u n tlic r isk of sacrificing tho l i ~ c s of sonic oE his friciic'.s, his motivo would bc a coiniucndnblc onc, and slioulrl no t cxposc liiiii to ccusurc, far 1css to csccrntion.

JVitli rcfcrcncc to tlic valuc of thc assistance somc riflcmen may be to liorscr artillcry i n ccrtniii situations, nnd t h c Rllusion which has bccu made to t h e cmploj-ment oE inountcd infantry iri this mnniicr, we liavc, ns far as I nni nviarc, no espcricncu i ir war subsequcnt t o t h o Crimcnn crn. D u r i n g tlic affair of t h c Unlganak, ho~crcr , tlic

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s THE ACTIOX OF UAVALRY AXD IIUltSE AIITILLERY

day bcforc the battle of tho Alma v-as fought, tlic necd for a11 escort of infantry was fclt bj- our liorsc artillcry, and tlic want \\-as made good in an impromptu manner, mliicli appcars to forcshadon- what may lo (lone in tlic futuro morc easily and cffectivcly tlirougli our modern organization.

1'110 Russian cnralq- and liorsc artillery viere supported by tlrrec or four battalioiis of ilifanti.1, and, as thcsc advanced, oiir two troops of horsc artillcry (I nnd C), undcr Brigadier-Gcncral Fos Strangyap, gallopcd forward from wlicrc tlicy alrcady ~vcrc in nction a,oflirist tlic Russian carnlry nnd C O S S ~ C ~ S , tlicir fire from their new position bcirig cflcctivc. Tlic IHnck bnttcry of tlic Tliglit Division wns also soon in action. Tlic Russian cavalry, fcoling tlic cITect of thc artillcry firc, quickly rctircd out of raiigc, niid C troop, as Loi*cl Rq$ui did not wish IL gcncral cngagcmcnt brought 011, niovcd back to tlic ground about 300 p r d s in advniicc of wlicrc t h y liad at first, comc into action, and frontcd tlic Russian infantry and guns, both of \vliich had now bccn rcinforccd. Sir Gcorgc Ilrowii liad by this timc got tlic Light Division up, and cstcndcd in line; but j u s t out of sight bchind tlic ridge, and Iic, or Lord Raglan, dcsircd that sonic mcn of thc 2nd battalion ltiflc Brigaindc might bc takcii on tbc guns of C troop to act as sharpshootcrs, i n tho cvciit of axiotlicr acl\-niicc into action. " This battalion liad practiscd with thc Mini6 riflc a t Cantcrbury in 1853. Thc Light Division rcgiiiicnts Iiad all, or iicnrlg all, bccn a t Cliobliam Camp in 1853.

" Tlic rillcmcn wcro accordingly placcd on cncli nxlctrec bos, onc on each trail, and thrco on the limbcr borcs ; thc limber giinncrs tlicni- sclvcs stood on the trail handlcs, and held on by thc limbcr boses. This was douc with tho concurrcncc of Gencral Strangwajs, nud Sir Gcoigc Bipwn was aftcrwnrds plcascd to c:Jl tlie troop his ' Riflo troop' ; howewr, tliero \\-as no furtlici. attempt 011 tlic p u t of tlic liussiano to renew tho fighting, and this ended tlic 'alikii- of tkc

It docs not secm unreasonablc to assnmo that, had Lord Raglan lrad at his disposal tlic rcsonrccs one of our lcadcrs of to-day will possess, lic woiild gladly liavo utilized tlicir scrviccs on this occasion ; and tlic incident is interesting a s a n csamplc of tlic unforcsccn dc- mands which tlic crigcncics of tlic Lattlcfieltl occasionally iinposc upon us.

Sucli aro somc of tlic morc salicnt fcaturcs of tlic action of liorac artillery and cavalry acting indcpcndcntly of tlic otlicr nrms. A s wo havc alrcndy noticed, tlicrcnro but fcw esamplcs of such nction to bc giitlierctl from tho war of 2870, perhaps thc only gcnuiuc onc haying taken phcc during tlic small afhir at Buzaricy, on thc 27th August, during 3lacJlhhon's cclcbratcd flank march to Scdan.

TIio Saron Cavnlrr Di-iision, covoring tlic front of tho XlIth Corps, which was to cross the Xcusc at Dun, lrad asscmblcd i t s 23rd Brigade at Landrcs daring thc forenoon. Thc 24th Brigade was sent forw:iid

Sec the "Iiistorj of C Dnttcry, A Brigodc," I I ~ Coloricl F.I.\Vhiiiyatcs, 1'. 91.

Uulga11ak.' "I

(Plat0 1.)

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ILLUSTRATED BT NODEBS BATTLES. 9

to tllc iiortli to rcconnoitrc, tlic 18th Lancers working torrards tho u11zancr-Stciinj- road, \c.liilc t l c 3rd Camlry with a battery of horsc artillery liad r6:aclicd Rdmo~ivillc, and puslicd forward ail aclvanccd truard, consisting of oric troop of tlic 1st m d two troops of tlic

A t aboiit 11 o’clock this ntl~anced guard reported that tlicrc was R rcgirncnt of French ca\-drr in front of it, and that tlic town was occupicd by tlic cncinj-.

x o w , tlic troops obscrrccl \vcrc tlic cavalry of thc 5th Corps of tho FrCiicIi, wliicli was so disnstroasly dcfc:itecl nt Dcnnniont tliteo days Inter, and which wns iio\v formed up n t Unr, Uralinut’s cnvnlry division bcing pnslicd ahcnd of i t as far as h z n n c y . Two squadrons of tlic 12tli Chasscnrs ivcrc on tlic south of that torrn, tlic issues ofwhich \vcrc ]&l by dismounted troopers, but tlic biill; of tlio cnrnlry were still on tlic north of it. 32canwhilc, on tlic Gcriiiaii- sidc, tlic 18th Lancers Lad concluded tlicir rcconnaissaxicc, and liad morcil to 1:~moiivillc. ‘l’lic leader of tlic 24th l3rig:idc (Gcncrd Scnfft yon Pilsacli), linving 1 1 0 ~ .united liis brigadc again, ordercd it to inore forward through U:tyonrillc. lFc tlicn rodc on to tlic :idmnced guard, and, sccing tlic wcakiiess of the opposit.ioii, ordercd i t to clini-gc thc Cliassciirs. This was done, mid with siicli good cffcct tha t the liostilc squ:idrons wcrc clrircn back to Uiizancy, and, in spitc of tlic c:irbiiie firc with which they wcro Tcccircd, tlic Gcriiians succeeded in pressing into tlic town aftcr tliern. Tlierc a hand-to-liand m X e cnsiicd, :id tlic F~*c~icli, corning on in supcrior nunibcrs, gixtliinlly forced tlicir oppoiiciits froiii tilo houses and p ~ r s u c d thcni foi. soiiic distxicc beyond. U u t tlic captain of the 1st S ~ i I ~ d ~ O I i (\‘on \Voldcrsdorf) Iiad tnkcii up n posi-. tion on tlic cast of tlic 17dmonvillc rond, frorn w!iicIi, in tlic crcnt of tlic ~vcah- ndvnnccd guard bcing forced bnck1v:;rd (wliicli was wlint actiially O C C O I T C ~ ) , It(: niiglit fall on tlic flank of tbc pursiiiiig I+ciicli and takc tlicm in a most ritnl point in tlic inidsL of their carccr of triumph.

It, seems to mc that this sninc Von IVoldei-sdorf (I do not know if hc afterwards roso to distinction or not) \\-as n man imbued by Saiturc with n genius for war. J h n y of us can bc wisc after tlic cvciit, can sliow liow Napoleon ought to linvc won Waterloo, or JColtkc liarc lost Grarclottc. But this inail was wise bcforc tlic cvcnt, and dis- plajcd judgment and dccisioii at :I critical juncture during tlic fleet. ing rnorncnts of a cavalry combat. Kinctj--ninc officcrs in a liiintlrcd moving in support of that advanced gu:ird woiild Iiarc manocurred sotncwhcrc in rear of it, but Iic, with nti instinct wliicli did not lcad liini astray, carried his coinmnnd boldly to n position from ivliicli tlic greatest, results wcrc bound to follow on its swoop. IIc npprcciatcd thc situation, and rccogiiiscd tlic dccisivc point. lu oiic word, Iio actcd like R Lorn soldier.

Tliu event proved tlic corrcctness of his judgmcnt ; his attack on tlic lcft flank of , thc Chasscurs cnablcd thc flying Gcrnians to rally and facc tlicir foes, a ~ i d , tlic Cliasscurs, assailed both in front and flank, were drircii back once morc within tlic slielter of tlic hoiiscs.

The carbine firc from the villngc denied furtlier progrcss to the Saxons, who fell back

3 3tll.squaclron. towards nuzancy.

Bu t now tlio weakncss of cavali-y is cxcmplificd.

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10 TAE ACTIOS OF CAYALRT A S D IIOIlSE ARTILLIIILT

to a disfitncc of sonic liuiidrcds of yards from it , wliilc tlic rcmnindcv of thc brigade niovcd tip to Sivry.

And now tlic ginis snpplciiicntcd thc cfforts of tlic licrscmcn. Tlic battery of horse artillcry was brought into iictioii on some liciglits closc to, a i d dircctcd n wcll-nimcd tirc on tlio CIiasscuc~, who, snpportcd by tho niliskctry firc, wcrc again ndwncing.. Tlie firc of tlicsc grins was so cfi’cct.ivc that., ns tho Oflicinl dcconnt tells us, tlic Fi*cncli “ witlidrcw in siicli liastc that ;? squadron of thc lancers (it lind not yet Lccii cngnged), which was now liken-iso ndmnciug, w a s uiinblc to rcncli thcni.” A t 1 o’clock tlic skirmish Iiad conic to a11 cnd. Tlic two Gcrmnn squadrons who wcrc c n p g c d liad lost 32 rncn nnd 27 liorscs ; both tlic captains \wrc wounded. Twclvc Frcncli Clinsscurs ant1 J,icutcnniit.-Coloncl tlc In Portc, wlio wts \voundcd in sevcrd lilaccs, wcre rn;idc, prisoiicrs. Subscquciitly tlic French fell back frorii Duznricj-, nut2 tlic Siison Camlry Division WIS sciit to rccoiiiioitrc towv:irds Kounrt. lntc in the ;iftcrnooii, tlic c:i\-ii!ry working towirds Kounrt, Darricoiirt, :ind Villiers-dcvaiit-l)icn.

The :iffair is only rcpmdcd ns n little skiriiiish i n thc Gcrninii Onicial Bccoiiiit, but is, ncvcrtliclcss, iiitcrcsting :uid rcmnrkablc as bcing, pcrLaps, tlic niost clinructcristic ltorsc artillcry mid cavalr~ actioii in tlic whole war. It brings oiit :ilso tlic valuc of artillcry ~vcll, :IS tlic Frcncli, altliougli iii supcrior strcngtli ill, and on )lie otlicr sidc of, I3uz:incyy arc stated to liarc dccliiicd the coliibat owing to tlicir 1i:iving no artillcry to support tlicni. . h i d wliat \vns the rcsult of tlic want of ciiterpriso on tlio part of

tlic FrcncL ca-inlry ‘I‘ Uricfiy tliis. Tlircc days latcr, t l io iiien of tlic 5th corps wcrc round tlicir cooking pots :it 13ciiuniont gcttiiig tlicir dinucrs rciidj-, wlicn Gcrmnn, sliclls came turiiblirig into thcir camp. Tlicir cavaliy lind not sccurcd tlicir snfcty, >-on see; t h y did not kiiow of tlic foes that wcrc closing in npon thcm, :tiid the surprisc of Bc:tuinoiit forcshadowcd tlic disnstcr of Scdnri.

I hn\w shown you, too, tlic vnluo of liorso :irtillcry to c a ~ l r y , nnd hov- tlic Frciicli fclt tlic nccd of it hcrc, but I don’t wish nnyonc to iniagiiic tlint I spcak i n any projudiccd or partisan spirit. Far from i t ; cnrnlry wcll Icd xnay ovcrpo\vcr guns too. And i f yon care to scc tho othcr sidc of tlic mcdal, look a t Tobitsclinu.

It XIS nil action fonglit on tlic 15th of July, lSCli, \\-lien tlic Aiistrinns wcrc rctrcnting fiam Olniiitz. On that day Drcdow’s cuirassier rcginicnt (remcmber tliis Drcdo\v, for hc is n good soldier too, anti you will licar of him latcr on), ably lcd so as to takc advan- tagc of thc lic of thc ground, got i n amongst n grciit hustriaii battery in actioii, Itnd tlicir clinrgc was so suddcri and cffcctu:il that tlic rcgitucnt cnpturcd 18 guns, 7 wa~oiis, 1GS liorscs, and 170 prisoiicrs, ‘with :L loss of oiily 8 men and 12 liorscs. , A noblc prizo truly for oiic rcgiuiciit, ant1 au csccllcnt esa~iiplc of t l c power of cavalrj- in tlic liands of an adroit coiumandcr. A s an instaucc of thc cmplojmciit of horsc artilleiy in an advanced

guard action p r tnk ing of tlic nnturc of c rcconnnissnnco in forcc, tlic niost brilliant csaniplc in rccciit tiinca that we can mention is tlic battle of Vionvil;c, becausc t h c cciiscqucnccs of thc bold intcr-

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ILLUSTRATED ET 310DERS DATTLEP. 11

l-cntion of tlicsc two arms on tliat. ocaision ivcrc iminciisc and far- wncliirig, niitl liccnuso tlic audacity with which t h y f:istcncd on tlic iinnicnsc1~- supcrior Frc~icli forccs is uurivnllcd in the niiiinls of

Uazninc mas cndcnvouring to mnkc pood his rctrcnt westwards from Nctz, wliilc tlio Gcrmaiis w r c swccpiiig round his flniik in order to throw l i im hick on that fortrcss. TO hold ihc cncniy fast till rcin- forccmciits might liavc timc to conic up was, thcrrforc, of I-itnl ini- p01*tar1cc.

Tlic 5th Cavalry Division a t 9 O’CIOCI~ 011 tlic lGtli of AuRnst surpriscd tlic bivouacs of Forton’s cnvnlrF a t Vionrille, and at oiicc tlic four Iiorsc artillcry battcrics tlint wcrc with i t lic,n;in shcllilig tlio Frcncli camp from tho Tronvillc Iiciglits.

A Gcrinaii ofiiccr, Gcncral Eltorlf, lias just publislicd n panipl~lcL, :IS :L aupplcincnt to tho wcll-known “ I\Iilitiir-\\‘ocliciibIatt,” dc:iliiig with tlic pcrfomiaiiccs of this 5th Cavalry IXvisioii nt ilic battle wc arc considering. Tliis is liow hc dcscribcs tlic wondcrfiil sccnc that tlic Gcrmnns saw ivhcn t h y first riioiiiitcd thc liciglits cast of Troii- viilc :- “ Jiist ns o u r :tclvaiiccd patrols lind ilifoiwcd us, a 1:ll.g~ l’rcncli

cavalry bivouac is fouiid 011 tlic \wst of Yionvillc. Sonic squadrons arc busy ivatcring tlicir Iiorscs, s m c arc cookiil’g, not n chnrgcr is saddled ! ‘l’riily n pictnrc of tlic most pcaccful, casr-going csistcncc found linply amid tlic turinoil of ww, and this, too, i n the closcst aiid iiiost dnngcrous prosirnity to 4,000 liostilc troopers only waiting im- patic~itly for tlic ordcr to attack !

‘‘ 111 n momcnt Schirnicr’s battery unlinibcri 011 tlic Iicight whicli coinmarids tlic ciicniy’s position, anci suddenly pours do\\-n upon it n pcrfcctlj- unespcctcd :tnd most withcring fire, which falls cspccinlly 011 tlic U r i p l u Jlurat nnd tlic squadrons which arc busy witcriug. JIiijor Koi-bcr’s bnttcry quickly joins tlie onc already in action, nnd tlic h tissar rcginicnts cxtcnd t.hcinsclrcs on citlicr sidc to covcr tlic flanks of tlic guns. Tlic vcry first sliclls whicli fall scrcamiiig and cr:isliing into thc camp throw crcrytliing into :L stntc of tlic wildest panic, and. tlic Frcncli cavalry in a fcw moments fall into n confusion wliicli i s siniplr iiiclescribnblc.”

Tlic Frcncli liacl maclc no usc of thcir cavalry, J-ou scc, to patrol or wconiioitrc townrds tlio cncmy ; tLc Gcrninii sliells startlcd them a t l~rcakfast., as I liavc sliown tlicy disturbed thcir dinncis at neaumont, :ind they wcru absolntcly unprcparcd for this nttnck. This is d i n t tlic Official Account snjs : “ At tlic vcry first round of slicll the liostilc cnvnlr~. fcll iiito wild confusion. A Frcnch squadron, indccd, at- tempted to ndvancc to tho iiortli of the villagc of T‘ionrillc, aiid :L battery to thc north-wcst of it, but both wcro uii&lc to hold tlicir ground against tlic firc of tlic Prussinn guns ; tlier spcodily follorvcd tlic rest of tlic cavalry, whicli nbniidoiied tlic camp in the grcatcst confusion, aud disappcarcd in an castcrlg dircctioii.” Tlicxi thu Gcrniaii liorsc artillcry galloped fiirtlicr alicnd mid bcgan caiinoiindicg tlic iiifniitrj- camp about ltczonrillc, which tlic flyiiig horscnieii n!so t h w iiito grcnt confusion. The liorsc artillcq- of tlic (it5 Cnmlry

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I:! TIIE I C T I O S OF CAYALRT A S D HORSE AItTILLEItT

Division also n o r prcsscd fortvnrcl and cnnic iiito action alongside their coniradcs in front, thcir firc bning also most demoralizing.

;\row Iicrc wc liavc n rcry csccllciit csaniplc of tlic maniicr iii wliicli niobilitF, wliicli is tlic distiiigiiisliing fcntnrc of n cnr:111*~ and horsc nrtillcry force, niny bc tnrnctl t o nccount ; and rcincmbni. tlint tlic cnrnlry, altliougli tlicr might 11nrc stnrtlcd tho Vi*cncli momentarily, coiild liavc effected nothing snbstnnt.ial witlioot the firc with wliicli the guns cndowxl tbcni. A fcw dismountcd troopcrs might L a w clieckcd them till 1110 otlicrs could gct undcr nrms, but tho iiifniitrr would soon liavc ntlvnnccd and drircn tlicm nwny. A s it wns, t h s c lnttcr did rally in n short tinrc and ndrancctl i n superior iiumbcrs against tlic battcrics. Tho position of tlic p i n s was, thcrc- fore, shortly \-cry critical, bu t T'on Alvcnslebcn, who conimnndcd tlic IIIrd Corps, fully apprccintcci the iieccssity for fnstcning his grip irnrnovablr on tho Prcncli fl:iiik, arid battery nftcr bottcry ivns tkcrcforc hurried on to tlic front, niid in coursc of tirnc n loiig liuc of artillcrx was built up wliicli defied nll tlic efforts of tlic Frenclimcn, :ind formed n solid framcnork on wliieli tlio iiif:intry divisions cteplojcd by dcgrccs.

\Vc cnnuot go iiito tlic ilctnils of tlic grrnt figlit, wliicli was n rcry glorious one for tlic :irtillcrr, but i t s opciiiiig pliiiscs arc cspccinlly valiiablc front our point of vicw this cvening, and it inn? bc co~i- fidcntly asscrtcd tlint had tlic Gcrin:in cnrcllry nnd Iiorsc artillery not throwi tlicriisclws with such clccisioii on tlic foc ininicdiiitel~ lie \Y:IR fourid, Jlnzniiic's armj, wliatcvcr Iiiiglit linvc bccn its ultimntc fntc, would ncrcr liarc bccii dcfeatcd at Gmrclottc, or surrcndrrcd iii Jlctz. As regards tlir cmploymclit of Iiorsc artilleiy and cavnlry on the

field of bnttlc oftcr tlic tight lins fully tlcvclopcd, dtliough nt Pion- ville tlic liorsc nrtillcry rcrn:iincd i n nctioii all day, tlicy nctcd.iii tho gcncral liiic of guns, and no pedantic distinctions between horse niitl ficld battcrics were ninde. A11 tlic gutis wcrc nccdcd to lac0 tho tciTiblc firc of tlic Frcncliincii swnrmiiig to thc nttncli with tlic Clinssepct, and thcrcforcl gcns did not co-opcrntc in tlic grcatcst carnliy fight of tlic war, wlrcn Unrbj's brigndo mndc its .cclcl~rntcd clinrgc lntc in t1:u day. Xor do wc find tlicm iii tlic otlicr brilliant clinrges, tlint of tlic Drignilc I~cclcrn, of Urcdow, thc hero of Tobitschnu, tbnt one which tlic Germans call tbc " l'odtcn-ltitt," nor during tlic gallnrit rush mndc by tlic 1st Urngoons of tlic Guard to stem thc FIciicli ndrnncc, and cstricntc tlic guns on tlic cast of XWS- la-Tow. Tho principlc tlie Gcrmnris acted upon is sound, and whcn once batllc is joiiicd cavalry may bc used iridcpcndcntly of guns, bccnusc tlicy :ire tlicxi used i n combination with and supporlcd by tlic otlici- arms, and ncrcr nssnil iiif:irltrj- unlcss the lattcr arc nlrendy dcnioralized by firc, or takcu by surprise.

X'evcrthclcss, tlierc may bc occnsioiis wlrcn cnvalrj- axid Iiorse artillcrr moving rapidly, el-cn during tho pi-grcss of n grcnt battle, inaj anticipate the foc a t soma decisive point, and may make or prc- wilt a telling flank moremeiit.

Tlic action of cavnlry stipportcd Ly artil1crJ- on tlic head of a

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c.olninii, to prcvcnt n turning movcmcnt, was Iicvcr inoi*c brilliantly illustrntetl tlinn :it Rossbach, wlicrc Saj-dlitz mndc his dccisivo ch:irge, and the guns on thq Jniiusberg so cficientlj- co-opcrated with liiiii. This, Iio\vcvcr, is scarcely n modcrii iiistnncc, and lvc must forego cnlargiiig on it. At Grnvclottc, liowcwr, lind tlic mass of tlic Prcncli cnvalr~, in plncc of being licld aimlessly nil4 Iiclplcsslj- in thc rcnr, been placed in front of tlic right of tlic Prcncli position i-iliero tlic ground was fnvoiira1)lc to tlic arm, tlicy might 11:ivc checkcil their enemy’s admncc, and prcvcnted liis rcnchiilg tlicir right wing till tlic C ~ O S C of tlic battle.

It was on this reiy riglit wing tlint tlic dccisirc blow of tlic day ~ n s struck, arid lind tlic Trciicli iiot bccn dcfcntctl tlierc, tlic task of tho Germans would hnm bccn immciiscly inorc diniciilt tlinii i t was, for on t.lic left tlicir sncccss \\-:IS by no mcnns cstnblislicd. Tndccd, by n bold :ind .jndicious cmploymcnt of cavalry and horsc artillcry tlie Frcnch riglit. iniglit linvc taken tlic offciisivc‘, and, mitli tlic Gucrd Corps t l r o w i in to its support, sncli a inovcniciit must l ~ a r c been an cscecdiuglj- dangcrous 0110 to tlicir opponents.

An csccllcnt csnmplc, howovcr, of tlic rapid niovcincnt of Lorso nrtillery :uid cav:ilry to nssail tlic flank of :in cnciiiy’s atlrnncc \\-ill bc fonnd amongst tlic iiiciilcnts of tlic lattlc of Loigiiy-I’ouprj-, ~ I i c n tlic cffort, of tlic Army of Orleaiis to reach I’nris was stillccl by tlic nnvnriniis, on tlic 2nd of December. Tlic dctnils of thc bnttlc nfford ninny instnnccs of tLc inobility of ficld :irtillcry turned to good accoiiiit, arid i t is n bnttlc that cleservcs nttcritivc study froiii ail artillcry Iioiiit of vicw (Platc 1).

The 4th Cavalry Division, formed of 3 brigades of 2 rcgiiiicnts cnch, lind becii told off to co\-ci* thc ri$ of tho 1st hrai*ian Cof~is, uiider tlic cornrriniid of Gciiernl roil dcr Tann, d i i c h \YRS posted at Ln Jlnladerie, facing S.W. Tlic 17th aiiil 2 n d Divisions of tlic Gcrinms were moving to tlic support of tliis corps on Luiiienn and Unigiieus rcspcctivclj-, and, in order to join tbcm, T‘on dcr Tann was ordcrcd to novc into position with his lcft resting on CiiAtcau Gourj. Thc. Frcneli ndraiiccd against liini from Konncvillc, Jrille- pioii, and Tcrminiers, and nssnilcd tlic Gcrmans d i l c tliis movcincnt was in progrcss, and tLc 2nd nnvarinn Division wns clcploycd bctwccn Bcnudlicrs Farm and Goiiry, to resist attack, nboiit 9.30. I t will bo impossible tliis crcning to go into n fiill account of all tlic fighting, but WO mnj- say, in gcncral, that tlic battlc swnjcd to nnd flo with vnrj-bg snccess for thc ncst two hours, tlic Gcrrnnn guns innking n splendid stand ngniiist t l c rcpcated attacks of n numcrous hostile infantry. Tlic action of two Iiorsc artillcrr batteries of tho 17111 Division, which hurricd oii and caiiio into action to tlic south of Cliitenu Gours just as tlic Yrcnch K C ~ C prcssing on iinpctuouslj- ngaiust tlic ircakty licld Gcrrnnri linc tctwecn it and Jknuvillicrs Fnriii, is wry rcmarkablc. Tlic 6rc of tliesc bnttcries liad n pro- nouiiced elfect, and clicckcd at oncc tlic inroad of tlic cncmy. A t Il.W, too, tho 4th Cavalry Division, with its two horsc artillcry bnttcries, supported by tho Bavarian Cuirassicr Biigadc with a liorsc nrFillery bnttcry, also moycd round thc Frcnch left tlank, and the firc

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1-1 TIIE ACTIOS OF CAVALRY AXD HORSE -1RTILLEI1T

of tlio guns cnusccl tl:cm to fall Lack before thc Unvarians, and :ibnndou U cnu v i lli cr.5 Farm .

Tlic application of liorsc ,nrt i l lcr~, supportcd by cn\-alrj-, was iii this cnso most cffcctirc ail(\ instructive, and the mobility t h y tlis- plnrcd in moving ncross coiiiitry ivns ~ c r y rcmnrknlh.

Tlio cavalry :irid lnttcrics rcmniiicd till 2 o’clock n c a ~ Lz Fiilcusc, wllcn tlicir commnndcr jndgcd tliat tlicr might makc an cvcn boldcr turning niorcmcnt. Onc brigade and n rcgirncnt wrrc to adrancc toxtrcts Tcrminicrs to cnt thc linc of rctrcnt of tlic Fwncli, tlic Dnvnrinn Ciiiixssicr Jlrignde wns to s\wcp round rapidly furthcr to tho right, wliilc nnntlicr brigade was to rcmain in rcscrr-c ; the battcrics to acconqinny thc canhj - . nur ing tho inorcmcnt both bripilcs cnnic undcr fir^ from Frcnch bnttcrics, a t tlic north-wcst of Fnrcrollrs niid nt Gonimicrs, :ind sccing 110 opportuiiity for nn effcctivc attack :it prcscnt, thc division was lialtcd at Clinuvcus Farm. Onc liorso :irtillcry bnttcry lialtcd \villi tlic divisioii ; tlic otlicr first of a11 came into action nortli-wcst of Xonncvillc. 1T:rriiig silciiccd tbc liostilc ~ u n s opposed to ttcrn, this bnttcry joincd, two horsc :irtillcry bnttcrics which had also followcd tiic ~novcnicnt of thc cavalry froni La Xnlnderic, and thcsc thrcc battcrics tlicn ciitcrcil into a riyorous combat with tlic Frciicli guns ncnr Pal-crollcs ; one sqiindron nctccl ns nn cscort to tlicsc bnttcries. Tlic FrcncL guns wcrc soon compcllcd to vi t l idnw, and tlicu tlic Gcrmnu bnttcrics went on cnnnoiindiiig tlic vill:igc :ind tho French infantry. At about 3 o’clock scrcral Frciicli camlry regirncnts from tlic west of Guillon- villc mndc a nicnnciiig movcmcnc against tlic Gcrrnnn riglit. Tlic Iiorsc nrtillciy bnttcrr a t Clinuvcus Farm :it oncc gillopcd out to mcct tlicni, niid grcctccl tlicni with soch n hot firc that they tiirnc:I :ind rctrcntcd. Olio of tlic bnttcrics, :Jso from tlio soiitli of Xoniic- YiIIc, also inovcd n p to xvithin 1,200 m. of tlicsc! sqiiail~~ons, and opcucd D hot firc upon thcm. A scconri nttcuipt inndc by tlic Frmicli cnv:ilry to :dvancc from the cast of Guillonvillu was also rcpulscd 19- tlic firc of tlicsc battcrics; and to such purpose that tlic liostilo sqnndrons tiirncd niid flcd from tlic field in confusion. Thc thrco rrginicnts ivliich w x c scnt fonwrd from tlic Cavnliy Division to attack tlicso liodics of cavnlrj- wcrc too far off wlicn tlic Frcncli turncd to bc nlilo to mnkc an cffcctivc puisuit, so dccisivc was tlio action of tho artillcry. .Tlic bnttcrics, linring tlius disposcd of tlicir nntngonists, niowxl to n position sonth of Xonncrillc, from which four bnttcrics cniinonadcd sornc Frcnch bnttcrics tint Iiad again conic into action on tho south of F:mxollcs. Tlic Gcrmnn accounts do not stint tlicir prniscs of tho brilliant mmncr in which tlicsc various horse artillery battcrics wcro liandlcd, and cspccinlly cornmcnd tlicir rvondcrful mobilitj-, both in rnoviiig forivard and changing froni one position to anotlicr. In some cases distanccs as grcat as 5,000 m. (moro tlian 3 miles) wcrc trarcrscd at a rapid pacc ncross countrj-. Tho Frcncli accounts also tcll us how much t h y wcrc linmpcrcd and surpiised by tlic suddcn attack thus mntlc upon tlicir flank, and tho commaudcr of tlicir 1st Division (Admiral Janr&yi4criy) was so complctclj- dcceirerl by tlic bold onset tliat lic imagiiicd n powcrful

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ILLUSTRATED I3T JIODERS DITTLES. 19

fol.cc was thrcntcning his left. Tlic cxamplc is morc nlunblc from an artillcry than from n cavalry point of -&m, for all tlic honours rcstcd lyith tlic formcr arm, but affords us, ncucrtlicless, n vcry striking i]liisti:1tiori of how mobilit;). and fir3 cffcct inny be turned to account (luring tlic progress of R bnttlc.

Hnving tlins considcrcd tho action of Iiorsc artillcrx and cnvnlry prcvious to nnd during n bnttlc, Ict us turn to cxaminc n ~ t l c mhich pcrlinps offcrs grcntcr opportunity tliari nny otlici. for tlic crliibitioii of tlic specid clinmctcristics of tlicsc two nrnis. It is during tlic rctrcat :ifter an army Iias rnct with grarc clisnstcr, as after Kijnig- griitz, o r (luring tlic rctrogrndc . morcmcnt bcforc supcrior forccs wlieii it sccks to cscnpc to sonic sccurcr position in rcni; as after Quatrc Drag, that n forcc lins to rely for its snfcty on tlic cfficicncy of its cavalrr and Iiorsc artillcrx, nud it is on thcsc occasions that tlicir nssistniicc is simply inmlunblc. Tlio Priiicc dc Lignc oiicc said that lic could not conceivc lion* :ui nrriiy C Y C ~ sncccctlcd iri rctrcnting. Tlic csplanntion is tliat i t could ncrcr mnkc anytliiiig liko nii orderly rctrc:it bcforc nti ciitcrprising foc wcrc its movcmciit not corcrcd with skill and wlf-sacrifice by tlic two nrriis 11-c :irc dcnling with to-night. l’crhaps I may bc nllowcd n littlc licence for 8 nionicnt to rcfcr to n splcndid cxnmplc of this sort when I call to your minds tlic rctrcat, on tlic 17th Juiic, 1815, froiii Quatrc nras to tho Watcrloo position. Wellington had to draw OR fais infcrior forces iii tlie fiico of Napoleon liirnsclf nt thc lrcnd of an aimj- fluolicd with thc victory of tlic Imx4ou.s day over tlic Priissinns, axid looking forwnrtl with confidcnt :inticipntion to n coming friurnpli orcr tho English, scpnrntcd as t h y tllouglit thcy ~vcrc from tlicir allies. A scrics of cnvnlry and liorso nrtillorr ciigngcmcrits \vim fought t l int ilny dong tlic Chnrlcroi road, nrid wc rcnd in Sibornc’s intcrestlng lcttcrs st thc cnd of Lord Anglescy’s account, “Tlius cndcd tlic

. prettiest field (lax of cavalry and horsc artillcrj- I cvcr SRW in my Irfc.”

Tliis is n typicnl csaniplc of rcnr guard nctioxis, for in tlicsc tho objcct is rntlicr to dclay tlic cncmy tlinn cntcr into a serions cngngc- mciit with him, and liorsc artillery mliicli can morc rapidly to suc- ccssivo positions iri tlic rcnr, firc n fcm rounds, conipcl tlic cncmy to deploy, then limbcr up n r t d gallop OK njiniii, is spccinIlj- snitccl to such. It should thus form n continunl mcnacc to tlic enemy: most irri- tating, most. impnlpablc, ncwr nllowing him tlic clrniico of n tlircct blow at it, but cl-cr nvoiding his onset and slipping from his grasp.

Occasionnllj-, howcver, wlien it is nccossnrj- to a r w t total ruin, gans must bc sacrificcd, and, forgctting tlicir mobility, stniid rootcd across the path of tlieir foe, blocking his way without tlioiiglit of jiclding. Thc Frcncli in I870 did not mnko use of thcir ca\-nliy and horsc artiliery citlicr to coyer thc adrancc or tlic rctrcnt ; for this reason, a d from tlic noturc of thc Gcrmnn victorics, which wc shall den1 with lntcr on, wc inust go back to tlic ivnr of lSGG to find cavaliy and liorsc artillcry sacrificing tlicrnsclvcs to sccurc thc snfcty of the othcr arms.

In modern war tliere is no better csamplc of sucli devoted

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., ,[I THE ACTIOS OF CA\-ILIIT ASD IIORSE ARTILLERY

coiiduct on thc part of c n ~ a l r ~ nnd artillcry than tlic mniincr in wliicli tlic Austrian cnralry aid artillery stnvcd off complcto ruin from tlicii. cornratlcs nftcr tlic grc‘nt 1)attlc of Kiinniggriitz. It is truc that tlicsc guns which 50 liiglily distiriguislicd tlicinsclvcs wcrc not 311 belonging to liorsc nrlillcry ; but liorsc and ficld nrtillerj nlikc covercd thc rctreat in tlic mnnncr in wliicli w c hope to scc liorsc nrtillery nctiiig, and all nobly seconded tlic efforts of tlic cavnlrr ns thougli they wcrc all linkcd to thcm in tlic ortliotlox way. Espccinlly did eight battcrics of tlic Rcscrrc artillery distinguisli tlicmselrcs wlicn tlicy wcrc brought into action to opposc the ndnnco of tlic 2nd A r n y under ilic Crown Prince, nntl sii1)snqilciitly wlicn tlicy took succcssivc positions to tho w a r to hold back tho triumplinnt flood of T’russiau success. niit for tlic unflinching front shown by thesc guns up to thc last momcrit tlic disaster ~~-0uIt1 l i a v ~ been imincnsur- ably grcntcr. Yct, covcrcd by tlicir firc and tho brave Austrian cavalry, Ucncdck succcedctl in tlrawiiig off his troops, still in forriin- tion, across thc Elbc, and iiotliing like n rout supcrvcncd on tho dcfcnt. Tliesc ciglit battcrics lost 9 officers, 139 mcii, 259 liorus, and 32 guns. h t it, howcvci; not. bc inlagincd that the loss of pl:s was a tlislio~iour to thcni. Tlint iclc:), I liopc, Lns for cvcr bccn cxploclcd, and it rnny form thcir proudcst boast that tlicy sacrificcd tlicir guns to save tlic ormy.

Aiid on this occasion tlic action of tlic Austrian camlrr niasscs was 01.w wortliy of tlic higlicst praisc. Thcy advanced boldly :igainst thc squadrons whicli tho victors scnt out in puisuit of tlicir dis- or,nanizcd infnntrj- : i d it was duo to tlicrii also that tlic sb:ittcred bsttnlions wcrc ablc to cscnpc. I’rincc Krnft, who was an c p witness of tlicir dccds, says that Iiad thc Austri:in cavnlry rnnsces not bccu employed as tlicy wcrc, or liad tlicy bccn abscnt, tlic wholo Austi ian nrmy had Lecn lost, and that Iind tlic Prussinn horscnicn, on tlic othcr hand, not bccn on tlic ficld to opposc tho hostile< squadrons, t l c result of thc day might hnvc bccn cry different, and a victorj- bccii convcrtcd into n defeat.

Ueforc Icaving this part of tlic subject I cannot forbcar to noticc liow, nfter tlic tcrriblc rcvcrso wc cxpcrieiiccd nt Jlaiwnnd, thc Iicavicst blow our prcstigc lins rcceivecl in tho East sincc tlic Afghan W n r of 1842, four guns of our liorsc artillery wcrc mainly instrnrncntal in cnnbliug what ims lcft of our shattcrcd and dc- mornlizcd forco to cscnpc. Tlicir lcndci- was justly rcwnrdcd ; cvcry- oiic spokc of tlic splcndid belinrionr of tlic battery, and somu of the rncn belonging to it werc dccorated Kith tLc Victoria Cross. B u t wliat, gcntlcmcn, was tho rcwnrd of tho galln~it battery itsclf ‘of which wc wcrc all so proud? Likc tho other fino battery I spoko of in Egj-pt, it was brokcn up. And yet men prato of how cspn’t dc corps mny bc fostered, n d tho self-impcct of tlic soldicr iiicrcascd ! Indccd, th is dcstruction of rioblc traditions lins gonc on so iiniformly in tlie artillery that I think it is cnormonsly to tfic credit of tlic rcgirncnt to which I harc the honour to bclong that it still prescrres its fame nntnrnishcd. I oiicc stood with an oficcr who hns now, alas ! lcft us, in tlic old dining lid1 at Woolwicl:. Onc of tlic mottoes 011

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ILLUSTRATED BY JIODERY BITTLES. 17

t11c \vall cmblnzoncd in old English Icttcrs c:uigIit our cycs. Tic rend it. ‘I SU~TI~,” I snid, L L ~ - o u arc Innking n mistnkc, it is ?inRadiitg.” “I havc rcmcmbcred it, a s unlasting a11 niy lifc, :ind it sccxucd such n good lnotto for z gunner, for i t told mc that I must do my bcst, and work )Lard, and tlicn my battery pcrhaps woiild bc disbnndcd.” Hc did not spcak cynically. Tlic grcy-linircd vctcraxi, onc of thc bcst officers J ~ C cvcr ~ O S S C S S C ~ , lind boivcd his licnd all his life to thc iricvitnblc. and had ncrcr slackcncd one atom of liis zcal or disregnrdcd his duty for onc momcnt, although IIC knew-, and probnbly had cx- pericnccd, tlic rcwnrd which too oftcn follows such conduct in our rcgimcnt. But his 1rmai.k fillctl inc with greater admiration for liirn than cvcr, nnd I liopc I may tell you witli confidcnco tliat we have jnnny niorc likc him, -shosc spirit :ind cncrgy rcmains unbrokcu, cvcxi tllougli thcir battcrics tnng souie dny bc brokcn up too.

Tlicrc reinnins for US now to discuss thc dutics which fall to CnJ-alry and horse artillcry duriug tlio pursuit of n beatcn cncxliy. A iiicrc victory will cffcct coixipnrntivcly little, if tlic mnquislicd arc not SO Iiar~sscd and demoralized by thc victors following rapidly upon tlicni tlint tliej sliall linw no timc, ns i t wcrc, to iecovcr brcath. Snpolcon blnrncd his cnynlry, altcr Wagmui, for tlicir want of cntcr- prisc in this rcspcct, ant1 crclaimcd, I‘ Tliis day will hc without results,” sincc ncitlicr gnns nor prisoners fcll iiito his 1i;iii~ls to give tnxigible evidence of liis sncccss. Snlamancn, !,irnil;id~, niiglit h v o bccn 10 tinics morc tclliiig a trinmpli had n pursuit, swift and in- csorablc, bccn launclicd nftcr the Frcnch, or l i d tlic Spaninrcls not IJrukcii tlicir plcrlgcs with regard to tlic Castle of Albn. Yittorin, Jenn, and Watcrloo nrc cmmplcs, on thc otlicr hand, of victories coxi- vcrtcd iiito routs, altliongli at Watcrloo tlio c n d r y might Iinm donc iiiorc than they did. Instanccs of iilcnl pursuits nre in fnct rnrc. 1’110 bcst cxaniples, too, nrc to bc found nmongst tlic annals of tho early vnrs of tlic centurj-. This is ~ar iously to bc accountcd for. Jlnrkncss closing in at thc cud of a Iinrd-fought dny too oftcii prcvciits cffcctirc pursuit, and tho rictors arc oftcn too i v c n r j and sorc for it.

Our forcc of cavnlry \\-as too i\-ca€i to cnnblo us to purme nftm tlic Alma. or rather it was ~iipposcd to bc too wcnk, for it is usclcss to dcny tliaf a glorious opportunitr was thcn tlirown n ~ n y . Thc cir- cumstnnccs wvliicli suriouncl tlic grcatcst victorics of 1870 wcrc L O

rcmnrkablc that they rcndercd pursuit nnncccssary. Tlicrc was, in fact, nothing to pursuc, for tlic cxitirc Frcnch army was in tlicsc snr- roundcd, hcmmcd in, or captured. After Wocrth, hoivcrci; tho ca\-alry on tho Gcrmnn sidc was not suficicntlr boldly Iinndlcd, and touch with ?dncJIahon was lost owing to its not linving bcen thrown fcnrlcssly to tlic front upon his linc of rctrcnt. Sincc wc .arc prc- cludccl this cvening fi-orn going back to \dint can smrcclg bc termed inoclern u-nr for salient csnmplcs, we will content oursclvcs with toucliing on thc principlcs which slionld guidc US in tlic future. Bu t ct it not bc snpposcd from anything that may havc fallen from mo

just now, tlint thrrc will not bc nmplc scope nnd opportunity for tlic inobilo arms in futnrc campaigns to shine in this most essential r62c.

‘ 4 Unlnsting yct unrcstirig work.” ‘ I Is it ? I ’ hc snitl.

YOL. ZSSYIIf. C

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1s TIIE ACTIOS OF CA\-.\T,RT XSD I!OI:SE AIIT1LLEI:Y

Jrngscs of cnvnlry slionld bc conccntratcd 011 tlic liiic of rdrcat, wllCrc tlic Innin body of tlic cneniy is most likclj- to bc inct 11-ith. A s xiianj- bnttcrics of horsc nrtillcir should bc sent 011 with tlic cnrnlry as possible, for othcrwisc a fcw riflcincn or gulls ~iiay hold tbc squad. 1’011s back by their fire, aiid i t will bc ndvantngcoiis for tlicm not to fight 011 foot, for c w r y s n b r ~ will bc nceded in thc work bcforc thcin. A\ Geriiian nuthority,’ Captain Cardinal \-on Widdern, in his ‘‘ Hand- buch fiir Truppciifiilirnng und ~cfclilsnbfnssi~ng,” rccomincnds that Sonic conipanics of iiifnntry, well supplicd with cartridges, should tbercforc bc sent with them, cai-ricd oii carringcs. Thc Gcrmniis arc, 5s you Iinoii-, no bclicrers in nioniitcd infantry as wc orgmizc it, nltltongli t l q cIc:irly rccogiiisc tlic vnlnc of :L mobilc riflciunn ; otlicrwisc, 110 doubt, IVC should h v c sccn mountcd infantry properrcfcrred to. TLc 1)nttnlioii of mountcd infantry with our cnvnlr~ dirisiou will comc in iiiost opportiiidy herc, and, wc trnst, n i q find n splicrc of useful- ness bcforc i t some clay on such nn occasion as n I?ritish victory. Strong patrols, forrncd by rcginients or sqlindroiis, ns circiirnst:iiiccs 1iin~- dictate, \vould sconr tlio otlici. roncls, :incI s~iiallci* cIet:iclinieiits \vould pcnctrntc \vl~crc\-cr t h y coiild ninkc tlicir way. In :ill eases thc’ atlditiou of sonic guns will bc cstrcnicly useful, for t h c nicrc np- pcnrniicc of nrtillcry nlwnys produces a11 immciisc effect 011 :in cneniy in full rctrcnt. Thc pictures that Iiistoriaiis aiicl correspoiidents Lace often pnintcd of tlic disorgnnized crowds of soldicrs jostling o m anotlicr like sliccli iu tlic roadway, t h ~ longs, slo~~-lg-movii~g nn~rni~~iitiori niid supply colnriius blocking up tlic path, all describe :I tcmpting target to tlic pursuing bnttcrics, a1111 n few sliclls may be enongli to cnusc \v113Ic i n i l c~ of vcliiclcs to bc abandoned. TLc dcfcnsivc powci. wliicIi firc Iends to cnvaliy also gives i t grcntcr audacity, mid likcwisc cnablcs it, ?s wc linrc said, to brush nsidc resistancc which might othcrriisc prow serious ; and, firially, tlic ~ o u i i d of tlic guns may nid tlicir sidc, for, iii thc cvciit of tlic encnij- bcing ablc to asscn~blc in sutliciciit nuinbcrs to bring 011 an cngngcniciit, it will call rciuforcc- mciits in tlic dircction d i e r e they arc needetl. Thc manucr in which our cnv:ilry took up tlic pursuit nftcr Tel-el-licbir, although rather i n tIic natiiro of a cnvnlry raid, is n splcnclid csnmplc from tho most iiiodcrn times,. but the iiiiduc ~vciglit of tlicir eqiiipmcnt prcrcnted thc horsc artillcry batteries from acconipnnyigg thc Iiorscmen tlic following dny from Ihlbcis to .Cairo, as Sir Driiry Loivc was most nnxioiis tlicr ~hou ld linvc done, for, in tlic cvciit of nny resistance being mct with in that brilliant and audacious coup, tlicir prcsencc \rould linrc bccn most raluabtc.

Thc rnention of this 1:ittcr feat, for, as wc h r c said, it was morc in tlrc nnturo of a raid tlinii pursuit, 1 ~ ~ 1 ; s us to tIic last i&

wliich liorsc nrtillcrj and cara l r j may assuinc 111 common. I n i ~ n n in tliosc raids wliicli \WTC a fanious fcnturc of tlic Amcricnn War, aiid Iinyc cvcr supplicd a field for ?I IC cncrgy :tiid cnpacit.y of ~ C U U ~ I I C lcndcr of cavalrj-. such rapid eiitcrpriscs m q - bc under- taken for tlic S F ~ C of p i n i n g irdorinntion, cutting an cncniy’s coin- mcnicntione, or capturiug suppi~cs and stores. \Yc find an csccl-

1 Quotcd in Trcncli’s “ Cavnlry in ?Jodcm \Vnr.”

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ILLUSTRATED ET JfODCllS DITTLES. 19

lent cxamplc of such an operation in the rcconnaissancc or raid cffcctcd by Gcncrnl Gourko across tho Balknns in July, 2677, when in eight daj-s lie carried dismay into thc licnrt of Turkcy, dcstroycd parts of the railroad and tclcgriipli on tho principal lines, and gniucd a gwat dcal of information as to tho Turkish morcmcnts. On that occasion hc Lad a miscd forco with him, but thcrc can be littlc doubt that had hc had mountcd infantry at his disposal, as the Icadcl. of ‘onc of oiir caralry dii-isions will in thc futurc ham, hc wonld I l n ~ c nrnilcd liimscl€ of thcir scrviccs. In such iapicl opcrations tlicrc is clcarlj- n widc field for tlic co-operation of horse artillcry and Ca\-Zlrx.

During thc rimcrican War of Secession such raids mcrc frecly undcrtakcn, and tho csploits of S tunrt, Forrest, and 3Iogan arc justly cclcbratcd instauccs. But thew lcadcrs condllcted thclr opera- tions rathcr aftcr thc manner of i r rcp lar than regular warfarc Their principal object wns to cliidc obsci-vation, not to fight, and, thcrcforc, extreme mobility mas dcsimblc. Conscqucntly guns pla-pl only a minor d e , and thcrc was latterly D tcnclency to dis- pcnsc with tlicir scriiccs altogctlicr. A salicnt instancc of .this nature of fighting may bc found in Gcncrnl J. E. Stuart’s raid in front of Richmond in 1862, when with 1,200 mcn and two guns lie nncxpcctcdly burst into thc Fcdcrnl lines, and gained D quantity of iiiformation that I T ~ S of thc greatest d u o in tlic subscqucnt opc1-a- tions. With impudcnt audacity hc swept complctcly round tlic rear of his oppoiicnts, cut thcir communications, bwnt and dcstroycd a vast amount of storcs and property of rnrious description. Hc returned in 48 hours with tho loss of onlr onc man, haying cnptnrcil 1G.5 prisoncrs aud 100 horscs and mulcs. The dashing &rali,y lcadcr will probably again in tho futurc thus turn thc mobility of liis arm to nccount, and tllc vnlnc of force capable both of fire cffcct and rapidity of morcmrnt will again bc cscrnplificd.

With this last rcfcrcncc to a sphcrc in which tho uscfulncss of a combination of cavalry and horsc artillcr,y mill ccrtainly find cmploy- mcnt I must closo my remarks to-night. I hare onls had opportunity to touch very briefly on ths various aspects of thc tactics 11-c ham bccn discussing, bnt I trust I may harc said snongli to stion- you that as niuch will bc cspccted from thc arms of tho Scrricc wc harc dcalt wit11 in thc futurc as in the past, and pcrlinps c w n more, On tlic bsttlc-field itself, vio cau hardly hope to sec caralry, ns in tlic daj-s of Zictlicn and Scydlitz, deciding battles by tlieir action, although wc may noto in passing that tho most modern baltlc, that of Placilla, was won in this may, but bcforo great forces arc locked in IL decisim strugglc, tlicrc must be many opportunitics ‘for the arm still. Frederick snid tliat for every clay of fighting thcrc iwrc tricnty of marching, and that is so now as it was during thc Seven Pears’ TVar. Tlicrcforc c n r a l r ~ and hoiw artillery should be regarded as tho same, for the arm that can mow and strike also can nei-cr bc at a dis- count, ard tlie side well scrred by it will i m p far-reaching benefits and advantages that will seriously influence thc progress of its opera- tions.

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