the act of choice

volume6,no.4� december2006

The VirTue of

Law-abidance

William A. Edmundson

Department of Philosophy & College of LawGeorgia State University

© 2006 WilliamA.Edmundson<www.philosophersimprint.org/006004/>

Thelasthalfcenturyhasseenasteadyerosionofconfidenceinthedefensibilityofadutytoobeythelaw—evenaqualified,pro tanto duty to obey the laws of a just or nearly just state

(Wasserstrom 1961; Simmons 1979).Over roughly the same period,there has been increasing interest in virtue ethics as an alternativeto the dominant consequentialist and deontological approaches tonormativeethics(Anscombe1958;McDowell1979).Curiously,thesetwo tendencies have so far only just barely linked up.� There hasbeen discussion of the questionwhether patriotism should be con-sideredavirtue,avice,oranambiguousorneutraltrait(MacIntyre1984; Nussbaum 2002); but being patriotic and being subject to adutytoobeythelawarequitedifferentthings.Therehasalsobeensomeabstractdiscussionabout thevirtuousperson’s relation toau-thority and justice in general (Swanton 2001, 2003). But, followingLeslieGreen’s(1988,261–63)dismissalofavirtueofobedience,therehasbeenlittlevirtue-orienteddiscussionhavingspecificreferencetothekindsofdifficultiesthathavemotivatedtheascendantskepticismaboutpoliticalobligation.�Thissilencehaspersisteddespiterepeat-edcallsforrenewedworkon“virtuepolitics”(CrispandSlote1997;Hursthouse1999).

Inthisarticle,Iproposeanddefendaroughaccountoflaw-abid-anceasavirtue.IfirstoutlinewhatImeanbythevirtueoflaw-abid-anceandthenexamineagroupofexamples—someofthemnotoriousintheliteratureonpoliticalobligation.IndiscussingtheseexamplesItrytodeveloptwopoints:first,therelationbetweenlaw-abidanceandothercandidatevirtuesand,second,theadvantagesofavirtue-ethical

1. Onethemecommontoboththerevivalofvirtueethicsandtotheascendanceofphilosophicalanarchismisaparticularisticsuspicionofrules.Anotherisaconcerntoplacetheagentatcenter-stage—butherethevirtueethicistsandphilosophical anarchists begin to part company. Philosophical anarchiststendtowardaLockeanconcernfortheagentquasovereignindividual,whilevirtueethiciststendtowardaneo-Aristotelianconcernfortheagentquapo-liticalanimal.

2. OneexceptionisRichardDagger(1997,61–80,197),whoidentifiesfairplayasacivicvirtueandderivesadutytoobeythelawfromthat.Thecurrentstateofthefair-playjustificationofadutytoobeyisdescribedinEdmundson2004.

ImprintPhilosophers’

williama.edmundson The�Virtue�of�Law-Abidance

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.6,no.4(december2006)

overatraditional,straightforwardlydeontologicalanalysis.Icontinuebyanticipatingobjectionsanyvirtue-ethicalaccountmust face,andbysuggestingpossiblerejoinders.Inconcluding,Isuggestthatavir-tue-theoreticaccountofourrelationtothelawoffersadvantagesthatarenotcontingentupontheindependenceorpriorityofthevirtueswithrespect toconsequentialistanddeontologicalcomponentsofacompletemoraltheory.Chiefamongtheseadvantagesisthepromiseofanalternativetothedeadlockedpositionstakenbyapologistsforthedutytoobeythelawandtheirphilosophical-anarchistcritics—po-sitionswhich,betweenthemselves,havebeentacitlyassumedtooc-cupyallthespacesontheboard.

I. Abidance versus Obedience

The virtue of law-abidance is a complex character traitwhose coreconsistsintheactor’sacceptanceofadutytocomplywithwhatIwillcharacterize as “retail” operationsof the legal system, a dispositionsotocomply,andadispositiontoregardthebareunlawfulnessofanactionasanontrivialandnormallyadequatethoughnotnecessarilyconclusivereasonagainstperformingit.Thevirtuedoesnot,however,compriseadispositiontoobeythelawqualaw,regardlessofitsmoralmerits;althoughitdoesincludeadispositiontoconformtothenot-patently-unjustconventionalmoralnormsoftheactor’ssociety—es-peciallywherethosenormsconstitutecustomarylaw.

The distinction between wholesale and retail operations of thelaw—adistinction thatwillbe sharpened later—is crucial tounder-standinghowabidanceandobediencediffer.Wholesaleoperationsarecentrallyamatterofprescribinggeneralrules,typicallybylegisla-tiveenactment,administrativerulemaking,oradjudicatoryprecedent.Theyaregeneralwithrespectbothtothekindofbehaviortheycon-cernandthepersonstheyareintendedtoaffect.Retailoperations,incontrast,arespecificinterferenceswiththeongoingstreamofconductbyspecificmeasures focusedon individuals—suchas issuingasub-poenaorasummons,revokingalicense,makingatrafficstoporanarrestorajudicialsale.AsHart(1994)pointedout,oneofthedistinc-

tivefeaturesofa“modernmunicipallegalsystem”isanofficialclassempowered to promulgatewholesale rules that enjoy legal validitydespitehavingnobasis incommunitycustom.Theclaimthat thereisadutytoobeysuchwholesalelegalrules,regardlessbothoftheircontentandoftheirrootednessincommunitypracticesandhabits,isunderstandablyproblematic(Hayek1978;Postema1998).

Inadditiontotheabove-listedelementsoflaw-abidancethereareotherswhich,thoughnotentailedbythecentralcore,reinforceitandgiveitgreaterconcreteness.Forexample,thelaw-abidingneednotbecompulsivestudentsofthelaw,buttheyaresteepedinthecustomsoftheircommunities.Lawandcustommaydivergeinvariousways:wheretheydo,thelaw-abidingwillbesensitivetothereason-givingforceof lawandbepoisedtocomplywith lawas itbecomes(orsolongasitremains)asalientalternativetoconflictingcustomarynorms.Whenthelaw-abidingfaceadirectordertosubmittotheadministra-tionofwhattheyviewasamorallyflawedlaw,theywilleithercomplyoropenlyandpeacefullypursuewhateverchannelstheremaybeforredress.Thelaw-abidingarenotquicktousealaw’sfaultstoexcusetheirownnoncompliance,butneitheraretheyquicktodepartfromcustomarynorms. Iwill try toclarify theseelementsandtheir inter-relatedness inwhat follows—often by contrast to other recent con-ceptions,suchasLeslieGreen’saccountof thevirtueofcivilityandJosephRaz’sofrespectforthelaw.Iwillnotattempttostatenecessaryorsufficientconditionsthatatraitmustpossesstocountasavirtue.Irelyonalooserunderstandingoftheconcept;butIwillarguethatlaw-abidanceisatraitpossessionofwhichisbeneficialandadmirable,andlackofwhichconstitutesadefect.

WhatIofferisadefenseofthevirtueoflaw-abidance,notofobedi-ence.�Myaccountofthedistinctionbetweenthetwoisatleastpartlystipulative:Ibelievebutwillnotinsistthatmuchofitislatentinordi-naryusage.Thesignificanceofthedifferencebetweenobedienceand

3. WilliamGalston(1988,1283–87)usestheterm“virtueoflaw-abidance”butdoesnotdistinguishabidanceandobedience(cf.Galston1989,93).OthernearpassesaredescribedinBrownlee2004.



abidancehastodowiththerelationofeachtotheconceptofpoliticalorlegalauthority.Alegalorpoliticalauthoritycharacteristicallyclaimsthatitssubjectshaveadutytoobeywhateverislaiddownaslaw.Apoliticalauthority,then,typicallyclaimsthatitssubjectslaborunderageneraldutyofobedience,whichisparticularizedbytheever-shiftingcontentofitscorpus�juris.Ordersbyofficialsdonotnormallyspecifythejustificationbackingthisclaim—whenajustificationisforthcom-ing,itmayinvokedemocracy,orfairness,orconsent.Whateverthejustificatory“backstory”maybe,thetaskofgettingjusticedoneisonethestateinsistsitisgenerallybetteratthanitscitizensactingsever-ally.Thestateintendsitslawstopreemptitscitizens’actingontheirown—possiblysuperior—notionsofwhatjusticerequires.

Theauthorityofthestatehastraditionallybeenunderstoodtoen-compassthepowertomakelawandarighttocommandobediencetothelawsomade.Law-abidance,however,isaconceptthathasat-tracted less attention from philosophers. Etymologically, ‘abidance’has tiesboth to the ideaofcontinuouslydwelling inaplaceandtoacquiescenceifnotcooperativeengagement.Itisreadilyunderstoodasatermofpraise:tosaythatsomeoneisa“law-abidingcitizen”isnormallysoofferedandtaken.Law-abidancequalifiesasacandidatevirtueonanumberofgrounds.Itreferstoasettleddispositiontoactandtofeel:butitisnotitselfafeelingorafaculty.Itisneithernaturalnorcontrarytohumannature;anditisanearlyuniversalcomponentofmoraleducation.Ittypicallybenefitsthosewhopossessit,andtheyare typically thoughtbetterof forhaving it.Finally, it isacharactertraitthatharmonizeswellwithotherstandardvirtues,suchashonestyandfairness.�

4. ManyofthepointsImakeinthispaperreflectabroadlyAristotelianunder-standingofthevirtuesandtheirplaceinanaccountofmorality.Nonetheless,myaccountisintendedtobeaccessiblefromeithersideofthedivisionthatis said to separate a “pure” virtue ethics from a virtue theory that is an ap-pendagetoafundamentallyconsequentialistordeontologicalmoraltheory(cf.Hursthouse 1999).Myaccount is alsodesigned tobeneutralbetween“agent-based”and“agent-focused”approachestovirtueethics(cf.Slote2001).ItmaybethatwhatIsayherefavorsorisfavoredbyoneoranotherofthesevariousstances,butIwillnotattempttosortthroughthepossibilitieshere.

Asettleddispositiontoobeythelaw, incontrast, is less likelytowithstandscrutinyasacandidatevirtue.Onewhoobeysalegalcom-mandtoφmustφand,havingφ-ed,willhaveoriginatedatokenofφ-ingpartakinginallthemoralqualitiesofthatφ-ing.Yettheactor’sφ-ingisexpectedbythelawregardlessoftheactor’sownassessmentof themoral andprudential qualitiesofφ-inggenerallyorofφ-inginthecircumstancesinwhichtheactorfindshimself.Suchacharac-tertraitisneitherclearlyadmirablenorclearlybeneficialtotheactor.Law-abidance,asIhavedefinedit,isdifferent:onewhoislaw-abidingmaywellfailtocomplywithalegalrequirementtoφ:theactormaybeignorantoftherequirement,ortheactormaychoosetochallengetherequirement—readyofcoursetoobeyanyeventualspecificordertocomply.�Thelaw-abidingactorwillnotdisregardlegalrules,butshemaynotknowofall thatapply toher,and indeedmaybe inca-pableofknowing,withoutexpertcounsel,what the lawrequiresofher(Postema1998).Incomingtoknow,shemaychoosetochallengethelawinitsgeneralityorasappliedtoher.Shemayindeeddecidetodepartfromwhatlawrequires,wherethebalanceofallreasonsavail-able toher sufficiently favorsdoingso.But the law-abidingarenotoutlawsevenwhentheyknowinglydisobey:fortheydocomplywithdirectorders,except in thoserarecases inwhichnoncompliance istheonlywaytoinitiatereviewofthejusticeofalaworofficialpolicy.Thelaw-abidingregardthelawasinvariablyareasonforaction,buttheyarenotgenerallydisposedtoobeyregardlessoftheirownassess-mentsofthemoralandrationalmerits.�

5. Law-abidance falls within a class that RaymondGeuss calls “the coopera-tivevirtues,”whichmustbeunderstoodassubjecttoastandingcaveat:“anexcessivefocusonthevirtuesofcooperationcanhaveveryunwelcomecon-sequences…. It is of some importance to know towhat degree any givensocietydeservesour cooperation,withwhichparticularpeopleweshouldcooperateandinwhatway”(2005,95).IfvirtueisunderstoodalongthelinesJudithThomson(1997,282)proposes—asatraitthatitisbetterthatothershavewhateverothertraitstheyhave—thenthestatusoflaw-abidingnessasavirtueisquestionable—butIdoubtthatThomson’stestcanberight.

6. G.H. von Wright (1963, 141–48) notes that there is no informatively de-scribedact-categorycorrespondingtoavirtue;fortheoccasionscallingfor,



Obedienceseemsavirtueonlyintheattenuatedsensethatbeingdisposed generally to discharge one’s duties is a virtue.Obediencemight get one past one’s resistance to discharging certain of one’sduties—andthisthoughtisafamiliarelementinaccountsoftheroleoflaw.But,soconceived,thevirtueofobediencetothelawisbenefi-ciallyeffectiveonlywherethereissomedutytoobey.Iftherewerenodutytoobeyagivenlaw,andtheperformanceitrequiredwerevalu-ableonnoothergrounds,manywouldbedisinclinedtopraisesuper-erogatorycomplianceasanexhibitionofanyvirtue,andmightinfactcriticizeitasofficiousandevensycophantic.Anyvirtueofobediencewouldbekeyedtothedutytoobey—andensnaredinthecontrover-siesattendingthislatternotion.Incontrast,thevirtueoflaw-abidancedoesnotpresupposetheexistenceofanydutytoobeythelawqualaw.Rather,it iskeyedtothefittingnessorsuitabilityofrespectinglegalinstitutionsandofficials;andbeingreadytocomplywiththem,whentheyinsist,oralternativelytosubmitone’sobjectionstothelegallyap-propriate dispute-resolution forum.� The law-abiding thus acknowl-edgetheperemptoryforceoflegaldirectivesthatchannelandresolvedisputes.Socratesexemplifiesthelaw-abidingcitizen:hesubmittedto theorderof theassemblythatcondemnedhimtodeath;but theorderwasenteredagainsthimonthechargethathehadcorruptedthepietyoftheyouthofAthens.Insofarasitwascontrarytothelawof

say,courage,arefartoovarioustocompriseakind.Moreover,theexerciseofcouragedoesnotnecessarilyissueinacourageousaction:fortherightthingfor thecourageous todowillonoccasionbe towithdrawtofightanotherday.Similarremarksapplyhere.Law-abidingness(unlikeobedience)isnotlinkedtoanact-category,nortoanycollectionofactscompliantwiththelaw.Moreover,thelaw-abidingmayonoccasiondepartfromthelawjustasthecourageousmayturnawayfromdanger.

7. As to the generalmatter of individuating candidate virtues, JohnGardnerhaswritten,“Eachmoralvirtueisdifferentiatedfromothermoralvirtuesbythedistinctiverationalhorizonsofthosewhoexhibitit.BythisImeanthatpeopleand institutionswithdifferentmoralvirtuesareanimatedbydiffer-entrationallysignificantfeaturesofactions”(2000,4).Iwouldonlyaddthatdistinctcandidatevirtuesmayhaveoverlappingrationalhorizonsbutdifferinthemannerinwhichtheyrespondtofeatureswithinit.Thisishowobedi-enceandabidance—andabidanceandjustice—differ.

Athenstocorruptthepietyoftheyouth,Socrateswasdisobedient.Buthiswillingnesstoaccepthissentenceshowedhimtobelaw-abiding.

Obedience, as I have indicated, is anunpromising candidate forthecanonofvirtues.Socrates,intheCrito,tiesobediencetogratitude.Butgrantingthatgratitudeisavirtue,itisverydoubtfulthatitencom-passesobediencetothelaw(Wellman2003).Evenwithrespecttoourparents, anobedientdisposition seems lessand lessappropriateaswemature,yieldingitsplacetodispositionsofgratitudeandrespect.Soevenifpoliticalandfilialobligationswereanalogous,theanalogywouldfailtosupportavirtueofobedienceasanadulttrait.ItsclosestcousininAristotle’saccountseemstobejustice,for“evidentlyboththelaw-abidingandthefairmanwillbejust”(NE1129a33).Justiceisthechiefvirtue,forhim,anditencompasseslegaljustice;butassoonasnaturalandlegaljusticearedistinguished(NE�1134b8–14),theroleofobediencebecomesproblematic.Aristotlegoesontoidentifyequi-tyasacorrectivetolegaljustice,andassuchsuperiortoit(NE1137a31–b12)—whichsuggeststhatafullydetailedAristotelianaccountcouldgiveonlyaqualifiedendorsementtotheideathatobedienceisavir-tue(excepttotheextentthatsubordinatepersons—women,children,andslaves—couldbesaidtobecapableofvirtuesappropriatetotheirnatures).Whatever law-abidance is, it is not obsequiousnessbut isrelatedtowhathedescribedaspoliticalfriendship.

In the Politics, Aristotle acknowledges that ancient laws can be-comeabsurdlyobsoleteand,moreover,thatthelaw’sgeneralityandwhat justice demands in particular cases can diverge. Nonetheless,justasitisharmfultothestatetoofrequentlytoamendthelaws,itisharmfultothecitizentocorrectwhatthelawgiverhasthoughtwiseto letstand; for,otherwise, thecitizen“will loseby thehabitofdis-obedience”(Pol.1269a15–20).Suchcorrectionscanenfeeblethelaw,forit“hasnopowertocommandobedienceexceptthatofhabit”(Pol.1269a20–21).But tosayall this isnotquite tosay that “thehabitofobedienceisagood”(paceChristie1990,1314n.10)orthatobedienceisavirtue.Itmayverywellbetruethatawidespreadhabitofobedi-encestrengthensthestateandthatahabitofdisobedienceharmsthe



individual,withoutitsbeingthecasethatobedienceisavirtueorthatitbenefitstheindividual(cf.Green1988,257–59).Itmaybethatnei-therhabitualobediencenorhabitualindependencegetsmattersrightforthefullcitizen;�andthatthemoredistancedattitudeIhavecalledlaw-abidanceisthebettercandidatevirtue.Butthis isnottheplacetoexploretheinterpretationoftheGreeks’viewswiththecaretheyrequire.Itwillhavetosufficeheretosaythatbothobedienceandabi-danceonthepartofacitizenofthepolistaketheircastandcomplex-ionfromtherelativeintimacyofthepolis.AsConstant(1988)notedcenturiesago,transposingGreekvirtuestomoderncircumstancesisadubiousundertaking:somuchmoresonow.�

II. Law-Abidance and Puzzle Cases

The rough sketch I have given canbe sharpened.The recent litera-tureonpoliticalobligationhastendedtorevolvearoundthequestionhow to treat certain puzzling examples: e.�g., Robert Nozick’s “clas-sicalmusic” scheme (1974, 93–94); JohnSimmons’sMontana-based“Institute for the Advancement of Philosophers” (1979, 148); andM.B.E.Smith’sstopsigninthedesert(1973).Itwillbehelpfultofilloutsomeofthedetailsofthevirtueoflaw-abidancebywayofrevisit-ingSmith’sexample,aswellassomeothersdrawnfrombeyondthepolitical-obligationliterature.

harmlesslawbreaking.Recentdisputesabouttheexistenceofaprotantodutytoobeythelawhaveoftenrevolvedaroundexamplesofharmless lawbreaking—such as running a stop sign in the desert(Smith1973).Casessuchas“stopsign”arespecifiedinsuchawaythat

8. RichardKraut’s carefulanddetaileddiscussionsuggests that to “obeywell”mightbethebestwaytocharacterizethevirtueofacitizenwhois�nomimos,or“lawful”(2002,105–11,379–84).InanAristotelianvein,TimothyEndicottargues that sometimes the possessor of practicalwisdom “conscientiouslyobeystheunjustlaw,anddeliberatelydisobeysthejustlaw”(2005,245).

9. The problem of political obligation as currently understood is one thatAristotle,forexample,didnothavecognizanceof,accordingtoKraut.ThisconclusioniscontestedinRosler2005.

theimaginedinstanceoflawbreakingcausesnoharmandnosignifi-cantriskofharm.Spellingallofthisoutinvolvesstipulatingthattherearenowitnesseswhomightbecorruptedandthatthelawbreakerher-selfdoesnotbecomecorruptedbythesingleexercisein(asitwere)experimentallawbreaking.Thestipulationmayevenbebuttressedbythesuppositionthattheactortakesadrugimmediatelyafterrunningthe stop sign, to induce amnesia and thusminimize the possibilityofrepeatedlawbreaking.Thesemovesarepartofawiderdialecticalpattern that isprominent indiscussionsofmoralparticularism, theview that there are no interesting and intelligiblemoral generaliza-tions(Dancy2000).What isnotable for thepresentpurpose is thatstop-sign-typeexamplesworkbestfortheparticularist—andfortheskepticaboutpoliticalobligation—whenofferedwiththeassurancethat the actor’s characterwill not be affectedby the isolated act oflawbreaking.Thestraightforwardwaytounderstandthisseriousnessisasamanifestationoftheimportanceweintuitivelyassigntoculti-vatingalaw-abidingcharacter.

This straightforward interpretation is not blockedby the sugges-tion thatallwe really careabout is the trainof further consequenc-esflowingfromtheone-offactoflawbreaking.Toseethis,imaginesomedifferentpersonaltrait:notavice,perhaps,butsomethingnotdesirable,likeclumsiness.Itispossiblethataclumsyperson—aschle-miel—mightblunderthroughlifedoingnoharm.Theschlemielmightleavehisfeetoutintheaisleofthebusbuthappennevertoencounteraschlemazltotripoverthem.AsinaHaroldLloydcomedy,afigura-tivegirderserendipitouslyappearswhenever theschlemiel isabouttostepoutontothinair.Luckyfellow—butnotasadmirableafellowasonewhowasluckyroughlytothesamedegreebutwithoutbeingclumsy.Thepersonwhomthefallingpianonarrowlymissesisluckybutnotclumsy;buttheluckyschlemielisclumsy.(Theluckyschlemazl,bydefinition,doesnotexist[Rosten1968].)Mypointisthatourdesirenottobetheschlemielisnotwhollytheproductofourdesirenottobeinvolvedinharmandembarrassment.Soalso,ourreluctancetoac-cepttheskeptics’verdictonthestop-signcase,withoutfirstreceiving



whatwecouldcallthe“characterologicalassurance,”isnotwhollytheproductofourconcernwithconsequences(cf.Adams1976,474–75;Kagan2000).Takingthelawlightlywouldbearegrettablehabittoformevenif,somehow,noharmhappenedevertocomeofit.�0

abidingbynearly-justlawsofunjustregimes.Theoriesofpoliticalobligationnormallyconcedethatthereisnodutytoobeythelawsofunjustregimes.Positiveaccountsthustypicallydefendtheviewthatthereisaprotantoduty�� toobeythelawsofsufficientlyjuststates,whileallowingthatothermoralprincipleswillbeneededtosupportparticular duties to complywith just laws promulgated or adminis-teredbyunjuststates.Themoralcredentialsofthestate—whicharedistinctfrombutsurelysomehowrelatedtothoseofthecurrentandrecentgovernmentsdirectingthestate—arethustheorganizingprin-ciple.Asufficientlyjuststateisthefocalpointofpoliticalobligation.An insufficiently just state cannot focus the collection of particularcompliance duties thatmay and typically will exist for its subjects.Anydutytocomplywiththeadministrativeprerogativesofaninsuf-ficientlyjuststatemustariseeitherfromthestate’sfunctions’satisfy-inga“second-best”qualificationgenerally,orfromparticularfactsandcircumstances(cf.Hart1994,268–72).

Avirtue-ethicalaccountneednotplacesuchstresson themoralcredentialsofthestate;andthisisanadvantage.Itisdifficulttomus-teragreementuponcriteriaoftheideallyjuststate,andperhapsevenmoredifficult tospecifywhatmaypassas “goodenough” justiceofthe state.To theextent that anagent’smoral relation to the law isdeterminedbyaglobalevaluationofthejusticeofthestate,thatrela-tionwillremainproblematic.Becauseavirtue-ethicalaccountbuilds,

10.Ananonymousreviewerhaspointedout tome thataconsequentialistvir-tue-theoristwilllikelyrefusetocreditthedemandforwhatIcallacharacter-ologicalassurance,insofarassuchademandpresupposesthatvirtueshaveintrinsicvalue.Aconsequentialistvirtue-theorycan,ofcourse,recognizelaw-abidanceasavirtueforitspurelyinstrumentalmerits.

11. IadoptShellyKagan’sproposaltoreplacetheterm“primafacieduty”withthelessmisleadingexpression“protantoduty”(Kagan1989).

asitwere,notfromtheoutsideinbutfromtheinsideout,themoralcredentialsof the stateneednotbeof suchparamount importance.Thosecredentialsarenottobeignored,ofcourse;but,asRawlsheld,weshouldnottakethestate’sfaultsasatoo-readyexcuseforignor-ingitslaws.AlthoughRawlscharacterizedthisconstraintasa“dutyofcivility,”��hispointcouldbetterbeputintermsofavirtueofcivil-ity(Green1988,265–67).Thevirtueofcivility,asGreenhasoutlinedit,neednot involveany“surrenderof judgment” totheauthorityofthestate. It is “aweaker formofcommitment: theconservativeoneofself-restraint.”It isavirtuenotsomuchforfosteringstabilitybutbecauseit“express[es]akindofsocialsolidarityandapublicconcep-tionofjustice.”Evenso,“itisnotobligatorytobecivil,”andthus,forGreen,thereisnodutyofcivility.Nonetheless,“civilitywillincertaincircumstancesgenerateobligations,particularlyifothersareinducedtorelyonourself-restraint.”Civility,insum,isapoliticalvirtue“lyingbetweenthevicesofrigorismontheonehandandcomplacencyontheother.”

Green’s brief account of the virtue of civility is elusive on thesubject of the relation between virtue and right action; and it is si-lentonthequestionswhetherandhowcivilitybenefitsitspossessor.Nonetheless,itisahelpfulstartingpoint.Ofparticularvalue,Ithink,is the idea that theremay be a political virtue that is not rigoristicaboutjustice.Alaw-abidingcitizendoesnotkeeparunningaccountof thestate’smoralperformanceaspartofherreasoningwith legalprecepts.Justicemattersforthelaw-abiding,ofcourse.Iwilldiscusstherelationbetweenthevirtuesoflaw-abidingnessandofjusticeinthesectiononcivildisobedience,below.

ignoranceofthelawandoflegallymaterialfact.Thelaw-abid-ingcitizendoesnotscanthestatutebookstodiscover loopholesorstandardsmorelenientthanthoseembodiedincustomarynorms.Thevenerablemaxim�ignorantia�legis�neminem�excusat�restsnotsomuchon

12. Theterm“dutyofcivility”isputtoadifferentuseinRawls(1993).



administrative convenience as on the supposition that positive en-actmentsmerelymakemore determinate the customary andmoralnormsobservedgenerally throughoutsociety. Ignoranceormistakeoflawoughtthereforetobeanexcuseonlyforthevirtuous,asDanKahanhasargued(1997).Going to thestatutebookought tobeanextraordinaryoccasion for the law-abiding. (Unlike the situationofthosewhoaredisposedtoobeyratherthantoabidebythelawandwhowould, onewould imagine, devote substantial time to discov-eringobscureprescriptions.)Thosewhogotothestatutebookinalaw-abidingspiritaretobeforgiveniftheymakehonestandreason-ablemistakes.Thosewhogotothestatutebookhopingtofindalegaldispensation fordeparting fromcommunitynormsoughtnot tobeforgiven,howeverreasonabletheirmistakenreadingsmightbe.

When the law-abiding lapse and knowingly violate communitynorms,theyacceptthattheriskfallsuponthemthatthelawhaspro-hibitedwhatsocietyalreadydisapproves.Moreover,theyaccepttheriskthatfacts,circumstances,andoutcomesoftheirwrongdoingmaybeworsethantheysuppose.Thelaw-abidingdonotexpecttobeex-cused on technical grounds—as, for example, that they reasonablybelieved that a femalewasof age though still young enough tobecalledagirl—exceptwheretheirconductismorallyinnocentthough��malum�prohibitum.��

civildisobedience.Thisfadedsubjectmayseemnowtobelonginacuriocabinetoftopicsdestinedneveragaintobetopical.Theappear-anceofJohnSimmons’sMoral�Principles�and�Political�Obligations,in1979,madeitimpossibletodiscusswiththesameearnestnessthequestion“How,ifatall,mayonegoaboutdisobeyingthelaw?”Althoughtherewereearlierstraws in thewind(e.�g.,Wasserstrom1961;Wolff1970;Smith1973),therigorandthoroughnessofSimmons’streatmentsuc-ceededinbringingaboutadecisivereversalofthepresumptivestart-ingpoint.Thequestion “Howought Idisobey, if Imayatall?”was

13. Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr.Cas.Res. 154 (1875); Ratzlaf v. U.S., 510 U.S.135(1994).

bumpedasidebythephilosophicalanarchists’increasinglyconfidentchallenge,“TellmewhyIshouldobeyatall.”Interestingly,though,theformerquestionwastakenseriouslybynolessaluminarythanJohnRawls(1969),whoinsistedthatcivildisobedienceisjustifiableonlyasaformofaddress.Rawlstookseriously,forexample,theproblemofindirectcivildisobedience,bywhichoneviolatesajustlawL1—suchasacriminaltrespassordinance—inordertoprotesttheinjusticeoflawL2—suchasasegregationstatuteorapolicyofwagingaggressivewar.ForRawlsandothers,thecivildisobedientactsnotonlypermis-siblybutrightlyif,butonlyif,heractionsarepublic,nonviolent,andareintendedasanappealtoofficialsandfellowcitizenstoreconsid-erandrectifywhat is infactaseriousinjustice.Sabotage,terrorism,and furtive noncompliance, however, are not justifiable responsestolegalinjusticewithinreasonablyjustlegalsystems,onthistypeofview—whichIrefertoasthe“petitionview.”

Ithinkthepetitionviewmakesbettersenseiflaw-abidanceisanadmittedvirtue(Edmundson1998,57–58).More importantly, the is-sueaddressedbythepetitionviewprovidesatleastonecriterionbywhich to distinguish law-abidance from law-obedience. Obviously,ifonehastakenthepositionthatobeyingthelawisavirtue,oneisgoingtohavedifficultyexplaininghowdisobeyingthelawmightbenotonlypermissiblebutvirtuous.For ifobeying issometimesrightanddisobeying is sometimes right, itwould appear thatwhat is re-allyatwork is somevirtue tobecharacterizedgenerallyenough tocoverboththerightfulobeyingsandtherightfuldisobeyings.Butif,asIpropose,therelevantvirtueisoneoflaw-abidance,theproblematicnatureofobedienceis,ifnotavoided,thenatleastnotbuiltrightintothedefinitionofavirtuethatonewillbeatpainstomakeplausible.Letmeexplain.

The law-abiding are among those who want to get along withothersonjust terms.Thelaw-abidingvaluejusticebutdonotpositperfectjusticeasanoverridinggoalorsinequanonofgettingalong.Justicemayappear to the law-abidingas, in JohnGardner’sphrase,“a remedialvirtue…avirtue fordispute-resolvers—whose job is to



mopupwhen thingshavealreadygonewrong—anddispute-antici-pators” (2000,29).�� In theabsenceof law, there isofcoursenooc-casiontoacquireorexercisethevirtueoflaw-abidance,unlessinthesensethatthereisalwaysanoccasiontotakepartinthecreationoflegalinstitutions.Creatinglegalinstitutionsagainstabackgroundofmerelycustomaryprimarynormsis,asHart(1994)explained,amat-terofbringingitaboutthatacertain(notnecessarilyproper)subclassofpersons—officials—comestoberecognizedandacertainsecond-orderrule—a“ruleofrecognition”—comestobeinternalizedamongthatofficialclass.Law-abidingness is rooted inadisposition tocon-formtoprimarynormsbecausetheyaretheprimarynormsofone’ssociety;but,aslegalinstitutionsemerge,law-abidingnessfurtherin-volvesadispositiontoaccepttheeffortsofofficialstomanageprimarynorms—which,associal lifebecomesincreasinglycomplex,tendtobecomeantiquated, inefficient,uncertain inapplication,and incon-flictonewithanother.

Officialswill,however,havetouseblunttoolstore-engineerandmanage primary norms. Officials will, roughly, have to deal bothwholesaleandretail.Asexplainedabove,by“wholesale” Imeanbyprescribing rules, whether by constitution-making, ordinary legisla-tion,executiveedict,orjudicialdoctrine;andby“retail”Imeaninter-feringwiththeongoingstreamofconductwithspecificdirectivestoindividuals—issuingasubpoenaorasummonsorrevokingalicense,makingatrafficstoporanarrestorajudicialsale.Suchretailopera-tionstypicallyservetoforestallparticulardisputes(say,bydirectingvehiculartrafficatanaccidentsite)ortochannelparticulardisputesintolegalorlegallyauthorizedprocessesfororderlyresolution.

RetailoperationsincludewhatHart(1994,21)called“officialindi-viduatedface-to-facedirections.”��IncriticizingAustin,Hartadmittedthatsuchoperationsareakinto“orders”inavernacularsense,butheinsistedthatthey“arenot,andcannotbethestandardwayinwhich

14. IhavetakenthelibertyofreorderingGardner’sphrasingforemphasis.

15. I formerlyreferredtosuchretailoperationsbytheuglytermadministrative�prerogatives�(Edmundson1998).

lawfunctions.”They“areeitherexceptionalorareancillaryaccompa-nimentsorreinforcementsofgeneral formsofdirections”(1994,21)that hewent on to explicate as rules. Yet he also spoke of generaldirectionsassomethingthat“onemustaddtothesimplemodel”ofdirectorders“ifitistoreproduceforusthecharacteristicsoflaw.”Ifit isaquestionofwhat isprimaryratherthanancillary,orstandardratherthanexceptional,IdoubtthatHartevergaveconclusivereasontofavortheadded,generalformratherthantheprimordial,particu-lar formofcontrol.Whyis it imperativetoassignaprimaryandanancillary role at all? Ifweneed todo sobetter tounderstand legalobligation,itmayturnoutthatobligationattachesmorereadilytotheparticularthantothegeneralformsofdirection.ThatisindeedwhatIwillargue.

The law-abiding willingly defer to officials as they conduct thestate’sretailoperations.��Thelaw-abidingalsowillinglycomplywiththenot-outrageously-unjustinformalnormsthatmakesociallifetol-erable.Butthe law-abidingneednothaveawell-settleddispositiontowardstatutoryorjudge-madelawinbulk.Foronething,notallofitisdirectedtothem(Hart1994;Dan-Cohen1984);andevenwhereitis,thelawmakermayhaveintended“desirablenonconformity”rath-erthanconformity—asmaybethecasewith,forexample,a65mphspeed-limitintendedtoproduceanyreasonablespeedwithinawiderange (cf.Kagan 2000, 140). For another thing, the law is not onlyoverbroad,asnotedalready,butoftenunenforced—aswhereastat-utehasfallenintodesuetude,orcomplianceisnotseriouslyexpected(e.�g., statutescriminalizingadultery).Foryetanother thing, the law-abidingareignorantofthebulkoflaw(despitetheofficialpresump-tiontothecontrary).Thelaw-abidingarestronglydisposedtoavoidandcondemnmalum�in�se,but(asWolff,Simmons,Feinberg,Green,

16. Thelaw-abiding,andothers,willnormallybeentitledtoassumethatofficialswithwhomtheydealactingoodfaithwhenevertheyactunderthecolorofoffice.Patentbadfaith,likeotherdefeatingconditions,mayrelievethelaw-abidingoftheir(defeasible)dutyofcompliance.Whereofficialcorruptionissoendemicthatconnivance is thecustomarysocialnorm,the law-abidingmaybedisposedto“goalongtogetalong.”



andothershavepointedout)not somuchbecause the lawprohib-itsitasbecausemoralitydoes.Thelaw-abidingavoidandcondemnthosemala�prohibita�ofwhichtheyareaware,notnecessarilyasaresultof assigninganoverwhelmingmoralweight to legal enactmentperse,norbytreatinglegalenactmentsasRazianexclusionary(or,moreprecisely,“protected”)reasons.Rather,thelaw-abidingintuitivelyap-preciatethepowerofthepositivelawtocoordinatewhatmightoth-erwisebean inefficientor evendisastrous cacophonyof individualstrategiesandhabits.Thelaw-abidingacknowledgethattheexistenceofalegalruledirectingonetoφisalwaysanontrivialreasontoφ.Butthat isas faras theyneedgo.Anattitudeof “waitingwatchfulness,”inSimmons’s(1987)phrase,isnotnecessarilyinconsistentwithlaw-abidingness.Whatisdisallowedistheideathattheexistenceofalegalnormis“neitherherenorthere”forpurposesofpracticalreasoning,orthatthelawmaylightlybedisobeyed.��

Nowcontrastthemuchmorestringentconstraintunderwhichthelaw-abidinglaborwithrespecttoretailoperations.Thefactthatanof-ficialhasspecially,andperhapsevenpersonally,directedoneto“pullover,”to“beincourt,”to“paytheplaintiff$X,”orevento“stepintothiscell,”operatesforthelaw-abidingnotmerelyasareasonamongothers.Complianceinsuchcasesisoftenhabitual,andthehabitneednothavebeendeliberatelyacquired.Rationalizing suchhabitsmaytakeanyoftheseveralformsexploredintheliteratureonauthority(Shapiro2002).Tothedegreethattheoreticaldifficultiesattendanygeneralaccountoftherationalityofhabit,thevirtueoflaw-abidancewillbeinvolvedintheoreticaldifficulties.Butinmyviewthesediffi-cultiesaremorelikelytobeworthseeingthroughonbehalfofaplau-sibleandtightlyconceivedvirtuethanonbehalfofabreathtakingly

17. Ananonymousrefereehassuggestedtomethat,havingrelaxedtherequire-mentsofpoliticalobligationasfarasIhave,Ioughtinfairnesstoconsiderwhether,forexample,amotive-utilitarianorothersophisticatedconsequen-tialist accountmight reconstruct law-abidancewithout drawing upon anydistinctively virtue-ethical tenets. Space limitations make that impossiblehere—but(asnotedabove)Ihavenotmeanttobehostiletovirtuetheoriespursuedwithinlargerconsequentialistordeontologicalpositions.

open-ended(aswellasputatively“content-independent”)duty,suchastheembattleddutytoobeythelaw.��

Civildisobedienceonthepetitionviewisaformofaddress.Itis,asJoelFeinbergputit,“aviolationofthelawwithoutlossofrespectforthelaw”(Feinberg1979,153).ItdiffersfromwhatRawlscalls“consci-entiousrefusal,”whichis“noncompliancewithamoreorlessdirectlegal injunctionoradministrativeorder,”butnoncompliancenot in-tendedasaformofpublicaddress—ratherasasimpledoingoftherightthing,perhapsmotivatedsolelybyawishnottodirtyone’shands(Feinberg1979,155).Conscientiousrefusalisnormallymanifesttoanofficial,butnotnecessarilyso.“One’sactionisassumedtobeknowntotheauthorities,”Feinbergsays,“howevermuchonemightwish,insomecases,toconcealit.”Inmyview,thelaw-abidingwillnotexploittheopportunitytoconcealtheirnoncompliancewithretailoperations,evenwhentheymightdosobymorallyinnocentmeans.Butthelaw-abidingmayindeedengageincivildisobedienceinthe“proper”and“narrow”sensedefinedbythepetitionview.Alaw-abidingpersonmay,inmyview,enjoy“soft”drugsrecreationallyandmayservemodestamountsofalcoholtominorsonfamilyoccasions.Butshewillnotslipawayfromamassarrest,evenifshemightdososafely.Alaw-abiding

18. Americancriminal-lawdoctrinepresentsaseemingdifficultytotheideathatthelaw-abidingcitizenisonewhoisdisposedtocomplywithretailopera-tions rather thanwith the law in itsmore abstract and sweeping formula-tions. If therelevantvirtue in thisfield looks towardcommunitynormsofcivilbehaviorandtoofficials’retailoperations,thenonewouldexpectthatthecriminallaw,atleast,wouldbewillingtoexcusethosewhofollowedanofficial’s good-faith advice rather thana conflicting, abstractly stated legalnorm.CasessuchasHopkins�v.�State,69A.2d456[Md.1950]areanunder-standableresponsetoagenuineworryaboutofficialcorruption:ifadefenseof“reasonablerelianceonbadlegaladvice”wererecognized,then“suchad-vicewouldbeparamounttothelaw.”TheU.S.SupremeCourtandthein-fluentialModelPenalCode,however,havenotletthatworrycontrol.UnlikeHopkins,theirdoctrinesareconsistentwiththeideathatthelaw-abidingciti-zen,actingingoodfaith,oughttolooktotheon-the-spotofficialforguidanceandoughttobeabletodosowithouthavingtoanswerto“thelaw”moreab-stractlyconceived,eveniftheofficialhadbeenmistaken.Cox�v.�Louisiana,379U.S.536(1965);ModelPenalCode§2.04(3)(b)(iv) (Philadelphia:AmericanLawInstitute,1962).



personmayharborfugitiveslaves.Butshewilleithercomplywithoropenlydefyanofficialseekingpersonallytoenforceajudicialordertosurrenderafugitiveslave.Shemightfurtivelydisobeyastatutefor-biddingmalum�prohibitum,ifdisobedienceiswidespreadorcustomary,butshewillnotcovertlydefyanadministrativeprerogative.Herdefi-anceexhibitslaw-abidanceonlyifittakestheformofapetition.

Law-abidingnessisnotrigoristicaboutjustice;butitisnotcompla-centaboutit,either.Alegalregimemaybesothoroughlyunjustthatlaw-abidingnessceasestobeavirtue.Toacknowledgethisfactmayseemtobetoabandonthevirtue-ethicalprojectofworkingfromtheinsideout.Whetherthisisreallysowilldependuponhowtheaccountofjusticegoes—inparticular,uponthesuccessofavirtue-ethicalac-countofjustice.Itcouldturnout—asasimpleunderstandingofthe“unityofthevirtue”thesishasit—thatlaw-abidingness,likecourage,isavirtueonlyasexhibitedbythejustperson.Alternatively,itcouldturnoutthatjusticeandlaw-abidingnessarealwaysatleastpotential-lyatodds—evenifitturnsout,asRosalindHursthousehassuggested,thatnoteveryrightactexemplifiesjusticeratherthansomevirtueorotherofnarrowerscope(Hursthouse1999,5–6),orperhapsnoneforwhichwehaveaspecificname.Butthebigquestionemerginghereis:Whatactsarerightiflaw-abidingnessisavirtue(cf.,e.�g.,Annas2004;Johnson2003)?TothatInowturn.

III. How Is the Virtue Related to Right Action?

ThegeneralrelationbetweendoingtherightthingandbeingvirtuousissovastandimportantatopicthatIcandolittlemoreherethantoacknowledgethatthethesisIoutlinemayseemonlytoshoveaprob-lemunderarug—anexpensiverugatthat,whichitselfrequirescostlycare.ThedifficultyhasbeencalledWilliams’s�Thesis:roughly,thattherightispriortothevirtuousandthereforetheeffortto“virtue-center”ethicsisafutility(Williams1980;Solum2003).��Virtueethics,intryingtoworkfromtheinsideout,infactmanagesonlytoputthecartbefore

19. IntheDoctrine�of�Virtue,Kantmakesasimilarpointagainstwhathecallseu-daemonism(1996,142).

thehorse.Inthepresentcase,Williams’sThesispredictsthatwewillfindthatsomesortofdutyoflaw-abidanceispriortothevirtue,withthesuggestionthatthespecificationanddefenseofthatduty—ratherthanofthevirtue—willturnouttobewheretherealactionis.

Myresponseis,first,toconfessthatWilliams’sThesismaynotbeworth resisting—and certainly not here, where I need to persuadethosewhogo alongwithhim.�0 I, too,find little satisfaction in thethought that we should simply stop talking about duty and obliga-tion—as though theydeserved tobepopped into thenearestoubli-ette.Similarly,Ifindlittlenourishmentinthesuggestionthatthedu-ties thathavetobediscussed—andperhapsadmittedasprior—aremerely“imperfect”dutiesinsomesenseofthatproteanterm.So,thesecondpartofmyresponseistoconfessthatdefendinglaw-abidanceasavirtuerequiresashowingthatthereisa(perfect,thoughprotan-to)dutyoflaw-abidance,whichisdistinctfromanydutyofobedienceorofjusticeandwhichis,moreover,interestinglyconnectedtootherconceptsofpoliticalphilosophy,likelegitimacy.

Thethirdandfinalpartofmyresponseistoavoidtheconclusionthatan“aretaicturn”inpoliticalphilosophyisnothingmorethananunpaidvacationfromseriousworkonthetheoryofright.IhopeIhavealreadysaidenoughtoavoidthatconclusion,atleastasitpertainstothesubjectoflaw-abidance.Theprotantodutytocomplywithretailoperations,anacceptanceofthatdutyandadispositionsotocomply,combinedwithadispositiontoregardthebareunlawfulnessofanac-tionasareasoninvariablyvalencedagainstit,iswhatthereistothevirtueoflaw-abidance,asIhaveunpackedit.Adispositiontoconformtothenot-outrageously-unjustconventionalmoralnormsofone’sso-cietyalsobelongshere(cf.Kraut2002).Thedispositionsconcernedherearenotbloodlesstendenciesbutrather—asisthecasewiththevirtues generally—are tendencies thickened by affect (Hursthouse1999,108–20).Astateislegitimate,inmyview,justincasethemoral

20.AndrewJ.Cohenhassuggestedtomethatvirtueanddutyare“equi-primor-dial,”sothatneitherisprior;rather,eachrepresentsadistinctiveperspectiveonmoralphenomena.CfLouden1984;Kagan2000;Geuss2005.



dutypartofthispackageisbornebyallwithintherelevantterritory,andthedispositionsaresufficientlywidelyifnotuniversallyingrained.Thearetaicpartofthispackagehasfortoolongbeendisparagedasamerely“defacto,”descriptive,sociologicalcondition.Butcontrarytowhatseemstobetheprevailingphilosophicalview,theexistenceofawidespreaddispositionamongpeopletodothelawfulthingbecauseitisthelawfulthingtodoisnotacircumstancewhosevalueisutterlyderivative fromorconditionaluponthe justnessof thestatewhoselawisinvolved.

Here isaveryserious,relatedobjection:Adutyof law-abidanceisopentothesamelinesofcriticismthatbroughtdownitspredeces-sor,thedutyofobedience.Therefore,theonlypositionsopenontheboardarephilosophicalanarchism,à�laSimmonsandGreen,andde-fensesofthedutyofobedience,à�laKlosko,Wellman,et�al.Irespondindetail lateronbutwillstatetwopointshere.Thefirst isthatthisobjectiondoesnotchallengethecogencyofdistinguishingobedienceand abidance. Theobjection is, rather, that a duty of law-abidanceisasvulnerabletoSimmons-stylecriticismasthedutyof law-obedi-ence (cf.Lefkowitz2004).Thesecondpoint is that thedutyof law-abidanceiswhatweseewhenwelookatthevirtueoflaw-abidancefromadeontologicalstandpoint.Butthereismoretothevirtuethantheduty—andthismakesadifference.��Contrast thedutyofobedi-ence.Nophilosopher sinceAquinas, so far as I amaware,hashadverymuchtosayinfavoroftheideathatadispositiontoobeythelawbecauseitisthelaw,ortoobeythelaw“asitrequirestobeobeyed,”isavirtue.Qualify theduty toobeyasmuchasyou like, therestillseemstobelittletosayaboutitasanexcellenceorconditionofhu-man flourishing—little, that is, beyond the unnourishing bromidethatitisavirtuetobedisposedtodischargeourduties,whatevertheymaybe.Thevirtueoflaw-abidance,ontheotherhand,seemstome

21. EmpiricalstudiesinsocialpsychologyhaveinspiredJohnDoris(1998)andGilbert Harman (1999) to voice skepticism about the existence of charac-ter traitsof thekinddemandedbyvirtueethics. Ibelieve their skepticismhasbeensufficientlyansweredbyNafiskaAthanassoulis(2000)andGopalSreenivasan(2002).

tooffersomethingmorethanyetanothercandidateduty.Thereasonisthatitmakesconnectionwiththeideathatsociability��isahelpfulandhealthytrait—andthatsociabilityisamatterofputtingupwithothersandgettingalongwiththem.Itiseven,sometimes,amatterofdoingwhattheysaytodojustbecausetheysayso.ToparaphrasearemarkofPhillipaFoot’s,because“cooperationissomethingonwhichgoodhangsinthelifeofthewolf,”thenon-law-abidingwolf“isnotbehavingas itshould”(Foot2001,35). Inotherwords,absentsomeextraordinarysetofcircumstances,thereissomethingwrongwithapersonwhoisnotlaw-abiding,justasthereissomethingwrongwithapersonwhoisincapableofempathy.��

Theconnectionbetweenlaw-abidanceandsociabilityhelpsexplainhowbeingdisposedtoabidebythelawbenefitstheactor.Aristotle’sdiscussionofthedifferencebetweenenkrasia(“continence”)andfullvirtueisespeciallyonpoint(NE1145b8–16;1151a29–1152a3).Theactorwho,outwardly,actsasthelaw-abidingdo,butwhodoessoenkrati-cally,failstoact“withtherightaim,andintherightway”(NE1109a28).Theenkraticactormay,forexample,respondtoasummonsorcomplywithajudicialordersimplyoutofacalculatingaversionto(further)legalpenalties.Theenkraticactor’scomplianceisgrudgingandrep-resentsthefrustrationofhercontraryimpulsestoproceedasthoughherownpreferred,extralegalcourseofactiontookprecedenceoverlegal or social requirements. The (reasonably) just and overwhelm-inglybeneficialdemandsofsocialexistencethuspresentthemselvestotheenkraticactoraschallengestothesovereigntyofherownpre-dilectionsandappetites.Thishardlyseemsahealthywaytobe.The

22.TheStoicsconsideredsociabilitytobeakindofpassion,ajoyful“well-rea-sonedswelling”withregardtoothers(LongandSedley1987,412).Myview,whichIcannotdevelopfurtherhere, is that inaStoicalschemesociabilitywouldmoreproperlyappearasanaspectofjustice,alongsidehonestyandfairdealing—justiceitselfbeing�phronesis�orpracticalwisdom“inmattersre-quiringdistribution”(LongandSedley1987,377,380).

23.PaulChurchland (1998)argues thatvirtueethicshasacomparativeadvan-tage over its rivals in that its emphasis on habituation is congruent withwhat isknownabout theneurophysiologyof thebrain.Butcf.KnobeandLeiter2006.



fullyvirtuouslaw-abidingactor,incontrast,willinglysubmitstothedirect orders of legal officials, welcoming the fact that—howeverburdensome—hiscooperationmanifestsandreinforcesawholesomesolidaritywiththem.Butthesubmissionofthelaw-abidingis innowaypusillanimous—itmayinfactbethepreludetoavigorouschal-lengetothatveryorder.

Thisisnottodenythatsociabilityisoftenitselfasourceofconflictandsuffering.Apoignantexampleistheparentconfrontedwithanorderthatshesurrenderherchildtolegalcustody.Thepotentialforsuchconflicts is inherent in the fact thatour sociabilityaffiliatesusnotwithothersenbloc,orwithfellowcitizensonly,butwithfamily,friends,andsundryothers.AsE.M.Forster(1951)remarked,

Ihatetheideaofcauses,andifIhadtochoosebetweenbetrayingmycountryandbetrayingmy friend Ihope Ishouldhave theguts tobetraymycountry….Probablyonewillnotbeaskedtomakesuchanagonizingchoice.Still,thereliesatthebackofeverycreedsomethingter-ribleandhardforwhichtheworshippermayonedayberequiredtosuffer,andthereisevenaterrorandahard-nessinthiscreedofpersonalrelationships,urbaneandmildthoughitsounds.

The “cause” and “creed”of virtueperhaps escapes Forster’s critiqueonly ifamastervirtue—perhapsphronesis,practicalwisdom—coulddissolveeverydilemma.Iwillnotclaimthatitcan.

Thosewhoactasthelaw-abidingdo,butonlyenkratically,couldbecomparedtothosewhoconformtoeverydaysocialnormswhilein-wardlyrebelling.Occasionallythisisthestuffofcomedy:anactor(intheliteralsense)wonderswhyheshouldnottake“Howareyou?”asaliteralinquiryintohiscurrentstateofmind,andproceedstostartleotherswithdisclosures thatdetailhowvery far from“Fine!”hehap-pensreallytofeel.Butsupposehesuppressestheurgetoignoretheconventional significanceof thequestion “Howare you?” andgoesalong,mouthingtheritual“Fine,andyou?”solelybecauseheisaverse

tothemodestsocialpenaltiesheknowshewillpayshouldhelethisliteralismshow.If thiskindofmerelyenkraticcompliancepersistedpastadolescence,itwouldnotconstituteadevastatinghandicapbutatthesametimeitwouldnotbeasignofemotionalwell-being.Soalso, Iargue,withamerelyenkraticdisposition tocomplywith theprocedurallyregular,bonafidedemandsoflegalofficials.Thematureadultwho,outsidehisstudy,isdisposedtowonder“WhyshouldI?”and“Whowillmakeme?”whenencounteringanofficialdirectiveisnotinagoodway.

IV. Taking the Worry out of Being Close

Anotherobjectionmightbeputintheformofaworry.IfWilliams’sThesis isconfessedto, isn’t thevirtueof law-abidanceawfullycloseto the (discredited) prima facie duty to obey the law? Put in syllo-gistic form, theworry is that the view I am defending licenses thefollowinginference:

P1 Itisvirtuoustobelievethatifφ-ingislegallyrequired,thereisareasontoφ.(mythesis)

P� Itisrighttobelievethatifφ-ingislegallyrequired,thereisareasontoφ.(fromP�,byWilliams’sThesis)

P� Thereisadutytobelievethat ifφ-ingis legallyrequired,thereisareasontoφ.(fromP�,bysubstituting“thereisaduty”for“itisright”initsobjectivesense)

P� Thereisadutytobelievethat ifφ-ingis legallyrequired,thereisanatleastprotantodutytoφ.(substituting“thereisaprotantoduty”for“thereisareason”)

C Thereisanatleastprotantodutytoφ, ifφ-ingislegallyrequired.(fromP�,byan“EliminationofDutiestoBelieve”Principle,tobeexplainedbelow)

IfthepassagefromP�toCissound,thentheputativevirtueoflaw-abidanceseemstoliesoclosetothedutytoobeythelawthatitcouldbeitsshadow.What,then,canhavebeengainedbythe“aretaicturn”?



Weseemtobebackwherewestartedwhen,intheearly1970s,R.P.Wolff andM.B.E. Smithwere firing the first shots across the latterduty’sbow.

ThereisonemoveofavoidancethatIwillrepudiaterightaway.Itwon’tdotosimplycullouttheoffendingP�anddownsizethepack-ageIhaveofferedsothatitcontainsnothingbutwhatrelatestoretailoperations.Thatwouldreducethevirtuetooneofabidingbycertaindirectionsof legalofficials rather than the law. It iseasyenough toconceiveofanagentwho though indifferent to the law isdisposedtodoaslegalofficialsdirect,andeventodosobecausetheagentbe-lievesherselfduty-boundtodoso.Butwhatsuchanagentisdisposedtoabidebydoesnotquite reach the law itself.Lawcannotachieveitsdistinctiveadvanceovercustomaryrulesifthelaw-abidingattendonlytocustomandspecificallydirectedofficialgoading.Indeed,thestatehasasoundmotiveforclaimingauthoritybeyondwhatitright-fullypossesses inorder topersuadecitizens to look to the lawasasourceofreasons(cf.Edmundson2002).

The“EliminationofDutiestoBelieve”Principle,whichlicensesthestep fromP� toC, looks likeagoodplace toattack the imputationthatmyvirtue-ethicalaccountharborsthefugitivedutytoobey.Butthe Principle seems right tome. If there is a duty to believe some-thing—taking‘duty’inanobjectivesense—whatcouldpossiblybeitsgroundotherthanthetruthofwhatoneistobelieve?Eliminativismas to “there is aduty tobelieve thatp” seemsaswellmotivated aseliminativismtoward“itistruethatp.”Neitherlocutionaddsmuchtothebareassertionthatp.Maybedutiestobelievehavetobegroundedinmorethantruth;butsurelythetruthofpisanecessaryconditionoftherebeinganobjectivedutytobelievethatp.Counterexamplesofthepredictable“BelievethatporI’lllaywastetoyourvillage”varietyareinvitationstoanexcursionintothepossibilityofcompellingbelief(‘ought’ implying ‘can’, andall that).But rather than take thebait IwillassumethatthepassagefromP�toCiswarranted—ifnotbytheEliminationPrinciplethenbysomethingelse.

Ipreferadifferentmaneuver toavoid thecharge thatmyvirtue-

theoreticaccountpresumesthatthereisadutytoobeyandsocannotavoidthedifficultiesthathavebroughtthatdutyintodisrepute.Idenythat“thereisaprotantoduty”maybefreelysubstitutedfor“thereisareason.”Inshort,thereisagapbetweentherebeingareason—evena“moral”reason—infavorofacourseofactionandtherebeingadu-ty—evenamerelyprotantoduty—topursuethatcourse.Whatareof-tencitedas“imperfect”dutiesarebetterunderstoodascasesinwhichreasonsdon’tquiteadduptoduty.Hereisanexample:SupposeIseeSusan’snewbookontheshelfinthebookstore.Iknowthatshewor-riesthatheryearsoflaborhaveyieldednomorethan“anotherbrickinthewall,”andsheisanxiousabouthowitisselling.Thereisarea-sonformetobuythebook:doingsowillmakeSusanfeelbetter.ButIhavenodutytobuythebook—evenifIcaneasilyaffordit.Idonothaveevenaprotantoduty:thelanguageofmoralrequirementismis-placedhere.Evenifthereisnoreasonwhateveragainstmybuyingthebook,mydoingsoremainsoptional.Reasonsdon’talwaysamounttorequirements,evenwhennothingopposesthembutinertia(Broome2003;Dancy2000;Simmons1987;Raz1979).Reasonsamounttore-quirements—duties, oughts, etc.—only when they are significantlyweightyorincludea“booster”reason,likeasolemnpromise.Therearethustwostationsonthewayfrombeingamerereasontobeinganall-things-consideredrequirement,orduty.Thefirstistheplateauareasonmustattaintobecomeaprotantorequirementorduty.Onceonthisplateau,areasonautomaticallygoestothenext,andbecomesarequirementall-things-considered,unlessitisdefeated(outweighed,orperhapsexcludedà�la�Raz).Ifthereiscompetitiononthefirstpla-teau,onlytheweightiest(ifany:incomparabilitiesmayexistbetweenreasons)willgoontothesecond.

Thisdoesn’tmeanthat“mere”reasonsaresafetoneglect.Areasonisaconsiderationthatisalwaysworthtakingintoaccountifrelevant,whetherornotitamountstoaprotantoduty.Moreover,onemustbecarefulnottotakeanyreasontoolightly.Thevicethatphilosophicalanarchismpromotes(wittinglyornot)istheviceoftakingthelawtoolightly.Philosophicalanarchistsdiffer in theirviewsof the lawasa



sourceofreasons:Wolffcomesclosesttoviewinglawasasourceof,atbest,merereasons;Simmons,Green,andRazallowthatinspecialcir-cumstances lawmay—butneedn’tnecessarily—conveygoodratherthanmerereasonsforaction.Butlawsaren’tnecessarilymerereasons,evenintheabsenceofgeneralconsentorspecialcircumstances.Norisa lawameredummyfor reasons thatmight justify it.Cessante�ra-tione�legis,�cessat�ipsa�lexisamaximfortheguidanceofthosewhohavealready acknowledged law’s status as a source of reasons.A neces-sarypartofthevirtueoflaw-abidanceisbeingmindfulofthefactthatlawscanstandforreasonsthatoftenarenotobvious.Acknowledgingthecommandof lawasareasontoobey isavirtuethat isasmuchintellectualasmoral. It is related to the intellectualvirtuesofopen-mindedness, fairness, andhumility (Zagzebski 1996). These virtues,individuallyandincombination,areexhibitedinareadinesstocon-siderthetestimonyanddeliberativeconclusionsofothers—lawmak-ersincluded.

ItmaybehelpfulheretodrawacontrastwithJosephRaz’saccountoftheattitudeofrespectforlaw(Raz1979,250–61).Razdeniesthatthere is a general obligation, prima facie or otherwise, to obey thelawsofajustornearlyjuststateofwhichoneisacitizen.Hefurtherdeniesthatthereisageneralreasontoobeythelaw,anddeniesthatlawsgenerallyprovide reasons toobey.Nonetheless,anattitudeofrespecttowardthelawofajustornearlyjuststateismorallypermis-sible,perhapsasanexpressionofone’s(morallyoptional)loyaltytothestate.Respect,forRaz,hastwoaspects:onecognitive,theotherpractical.Cognitiverespectconsistsinthinkingwellofthelaw;prac-ticalrespectconsists“largelyofadispositiontoobeythelaw(i.�e.,todothatwhichitrequiresbecauseitsorequires,becauseitisrightasamoralprinciple toobey it)…” (1979,251).The twoaspectsare in-dependent:onemighthavealowopinionofthelawandyetbelieveoneselfduty-boundtoobeyit,orahighopinionof(e.�g.)foreignlawbutnodispositiontosubmittoit.

Aretherespectfulthenself-deceived,onRaz’saccount, inbeliev-ingthemselvesduty-boundtoobey,wheninfacttheyarenot?Hede-

niesthatthisisso.Byadoptinganattitudeofrespect,onRaz’saccount,theadopterbecomesmorallyobligatedtoobey.Razdefendshisac-countbyanalogizingrespecttofriendship:althoughnooneismorallyobligatedtoformfriendships,obligationsflowfromthemoncetheyhavebeen formed.Similarly, thosewhoadopt themorallyoptionalattitudeofrespectforlawbecomesubjecttoobligationsofobediencewhichtheywouldbefreeofhadtheynotadoptedarespectfulattitude.Obligationflowsfromrespect,forRaz,andnotthereverse.

Razdoesnotcharacterizetheattitudeofrespectforlawasavirtue.Razianrespectismorallyoptionalandmaybenomoreorlessadmi-rablethanadoptinganygeneralattitudetowardthelawofthegoodstate—pro or con. Virtues are different: there is something wrongwiththosewholackthem.Razianrespectalsodiffersfromthevirtueoflaw-abidanceinsubtlerways.Razianrespectdoesnotdistinguishbetweenretailoperationsandthegeneralrulesthatconstitutealegalsystem’swholesaleoperations.Razianrespectdoes,however,allowtheagenttopickandchooseamonglawsandtypesoflaw—thereare,inotherwords, “possibilitiesofqualifiedrespect” thatexclude legaldoctrinestheagentdislikes(1979,259).Suchexcludedlawsnotonlyfailtoobligate;theydonotevenprovidetheagentareasonforaction.Incontrast, thosewhopossesthevirtueof law-abidancehave,withregardtoeverylawthatappliestothem,areasonfavoringobedience.But,unliketheRazianlyrespectful, thelaw-abidingneednotregardthemselvesasobligatedtoobeythelawwholesale.Theyarenotcor-ruptedbycomingtoknowthatthelawmayinclude“manyfussyregu-lationswhosebreach itwouldbepedantic tocall immoral” (Devlin1965,27).Thevirtueoflaw-abidanceemphasizespracticalratherthancognitive respect: the law-abiding have, and accept that they have,reasontoobeylawstheythinksillyandevenunjust.

Why,though,isthereinvariablyareasontodoasthejustornearlyjuststatesays?Iwouldexplainitthisway:thelawtradeswholesalebecausethelawmakercannotanticipatethedirectionofhistoryinde-tail.The law is calledupon to forestallwhatmaybevaletudinarianworries.Itiscalledupontosolvecoordinationproblemsthatmayor



maynotrequireretailstatesupervision. It iscalledupontoexpressthesenseof themajority,orsome influential segment,of thepopu-laceaboutcontroversialissuesinadynamiccontext.Thisperceptionisofcoursefallible.Thatisonereasonwhytheexecutivedepartmentis understood to retain wide discretion in matters of enforcement.Somethinglikeanationalhighwayspeedlimit,forexample,mayseemtobea reasonable response tooneproblem (petroleumshortages),butmayturnouttohaveamelioratedanother(trafficaccidents)evenafter theprecipitating crisishaspassed (thus instancing “preadapta-tion,”asanevolutionarybiologistmightsay).A law-abidingcitizenacknowledgesthatthefactthatthelegislaturehaschosentoaddresscertainmattersbyguidingbehavior incertainways isa reason—ofuncertainstrength—toactaccordingly,whateverone’sown“take”onthematter.Moreover,thelaw-abidingcitizenatleastimplicitlyunder-standsthatlegislationcarvesoutarangeofdiscretionaryprerogativetowhich,whenitisexercisedinawayfocuseduponher,sheisduty-boundtoaccede.

Onemattertobearinmindistheweaknessof“mere”reasons.Inasense,thereisareasontodowhateveroneisaskedtodo,insofarasdoingsowouldplease(oroughttoplease)theasker.Butthereasontodoasthelawrequiresisseldomasweakasthis,forthelawofajustornearlyjuststateisrarelyamerewhimofthelawmaker.Justandnearlyjuststatesaredemocraciesinwhichtheprocessoflegislationisadeliberatelyencumberedone:nowholesale,mandatorylawislikelyto survive the passage to enactment unless it reflects some signifi-cantpublicperceptionofaproblemandapossiblyeffectivewayout.Assuming theprocess is functioningwell,no lawwillbewithoutatleasttherationalforcethatonewouldaccordtothedirectivesofarep-resentative,deliberativebodyseekingtopromotethepublicgood.��Thelawmakertypicallyaspirestoofferreasons,ratherthanmerelyto

24.Admittedly,theprocessoflegislationaswefinditwilloftenfallshortofthedeliberativeideal.Butitiscorrupted,typically,notbyitsuseofblunt,gen-eral,mandatory rulesbutbyoverspecificity in its appropriations from thegeneralfisc.

posereasonsinthesenseofattachingconsequences,asachangeintheweathermightposeareasontobundleup(cf.Postema1998).

Atthispoint,onemightaskwhyanyoneshouldthinkthatthereisinvariablyagood�reasontodoasthelawsays.Agoodreasonmightfallshortofconstitutingaprotantodutyyetstillbemorethana“mere”reason.��Onecircumstancethatmightpreventamerereason’sbeingcountedasagood reason is its source.Awhimsicaldemandmightgeneratea(mere)reasontocomply—butthereisanunderstandablehesitation tocount suchademandasagood reason;and thathesi-tationdoesnothanguponasensitivitytothedistinctionbetweenareasonandaprotantoduty.Moretothepoint,anillegitimatedemandmightfailtoprovideagoodreasontocomply—evenifitweregrudg-inglygrantedtoprovidea(mere)reason.Philosophicalanarchistsin-sistnotonlythatthereisnoprotantodutytoobeythelaw;theyfur-therclaimthatstatesaretypicallyillegitimateandthatthedemandsexpressedintheirlawsarethereforeillegitimate(though,wheretheycoincidewith independentmoral requirements, the law’s demandsareperhapsmerelypresumptuous,orimpertinent:thehighwaymanwhoenjoinsme,atgunpoint, toobserve theGoldenRulegivesmenogoodreasontoobservetheGoldenRule).Onsimilargrounds,adeterminedphilosophicalanarchistmightdenythatthemerereasonsthatexisttodoasthelawdemandsamounttogoodreasons,fortheyissuefromanillegitimatesource.

Thecorrectanswertothephilosophicalanarchistherebeginswithadecouplingoftheconceptofthelegitimacyofthestatefromthebe-leagueredprotantodutytoobeythelaw.Althoughitissurelytoosoontosaythatthetraditionaldutytoobeycannotbedefended,nothingherehangsuponthatpossibility.NorwouldIdenythatthestatechar-acteristicallyclaimstoimposesuchadutywhenitlegislates.Whathasbeenconvincinglydenied, I think, is thatthe legitimacyof thestate

25.MattKramerhaspersuadedmethat,despitetheirweakness,merereasonsaredefeasible,inthesensethatcircumstancesmaybesuchthatwhatwouldotherwisebeareasonfails,orceases,tobeareason.Bythesametoken,thegoodnessofareasonmaybeadefeasiblepropertyofareason.Spacedoesnotallowmetoexploreallthepossibilitieshere.



hangsuponthetruthofitsclaimtoimposesuchaduty(Edmundson1998). If this denial is correct, then the philosophical anarchist’s at-tackonthedutytoobeyfailstoobtainthefurtherobjectiveofexpos-ing the illegitimacyof thestate.Therefore, if the(moral) legitimacyofthestateisuntouchedbythephilosophicalanarchist’scritiqueofthedutytoobey,thereasonsforactionthatthelawsuppliesarenotdisqualifiedfromcountingasgoodreasons.Thatdoesn’tmakethemgoodreasons—thejusticeornear-justiceoflegalinstitutionsmustdothat��—butitremovesanobstacletocountinglawasagoodreasontodoasthelawsays.

Nowtoansweranevenharderquestion:Whythinkthereisadutyto complywith the retailoperationsof a just-enough state?Letmesketchoutanargumentfirst;thenIwillprogressivelytightenit.Thereisadutyofjustice,towhichweareallindividuallysubject(cf.Cohen1997;Murphy1998).Butjusticedoesnotfillallofmoralspace;andnotallof itsdemandsareunmediated. Justice inoureverydaydealingspresupposesaconsiderabledegreeofbackgroundjustice,whichhasanessentiallyinstitutionalcharacter.Whatismineandwhatisthineare sometimesnatural factsbut aremoreusually institutionalones.Evenwherethereisacorrect,pre-institutionalanswertoaquestionofjustice,therearefurtherquestionsabouthowtoresolvedisagree-mentsbetweenindividuals,andaboutpermissiblecorrectives.Thesefurtherquestionsarealways,andinevitably,institutional.Institutionsofjusticemakepossibleadivisionofmorallaborbetweenbackgroundjustice—by which I mean the justice of basic social arrangements,norms,and institutions—and“foreground” justice, that is, justice intheindividualcase,whichalwayspotentiallyraises“background”dis-

26.Anot-even-nearlyjustlegalregimemaybesuchthatthereisgoodreasontoobeyitslaws.Butinsuchcases,thegoodnessofthereasonwillhavetoderivefromsomethingotherthanjusticeornear-justice:possiblyfromtheunsocia-bilityofdisobedience,wherereformisunfeasible,orfromthelikelihoodofbadconsequencesfortheactororothersifthelawisdefied.Obviously,thereisdiversityofcases.Thetopicisintricate,butIhopeitwillsufficeheretosaythattheexistenceofalegalregime—evenafar-from-justone—canrepresentanimprovementoveritsprelegalorextralegalalternatives.But,asMatthewKramer(1998)hasargued,itisnotinvariablytruethatitdoes.

putes.Theindividual’svirtueofjusticewouldoverwhelmusifitwereofaswideascopeasjustice,thevirtueofinstitutions.Individualscan-not,bytheirownefforts,assurebackgroundjustice;althoughtheycan,because they ought to, act justly in their foregrounddealings. Thisdivisionoflabormustberespectedifapluralityofvaluesistothrivewithinthecontextofsociallife(Rawls1993;Scheffler2005).

Unlessitisthestate’sprerogativetodeterminewhenandwhethertobring foregrounddisputesbefore tribunalsof justice—subjectingthemtooperationsatretail—theadvantagesofthisdivisionarelost.Intuition registers the importanceof thisprerogative: there is anal-mostpalpabledifferencebetweenignoringatrafficlawortrafficsign,on theonehand, and ignoring a traffic ticket or traffic cop, on theother.Whatiscalledinquestioninthelatterinstancesis,notwhatitwassafetodointhecircumstances,buttheverylegitimacyofasys-temassigningaspecialmoralroletoofficials.

Similarly, the division ofmoral labor is confounded if the judg-ments of dispute-resolving tribunals are not at least presumptivelyobligatory.Thedifferencebetweenignoringacreditor’sdemandforpayment,ontheonehand,andignoringacourtorderawardingthecreditorthesumdemanded,ontheother,issimilarlypalpable.Inig-noring summonses, judgments, and similar retail operations of thelaw,citizensmight,serendipitously,donoforegroundinjustice.Butbackground justice is undermined. Background justice is not fixedbut—especially in a pluralistic context—is amatter of dynamicallybalancingavarietyof interestsandvaluesand fairlyallocatingben-efitsandburdens.Ajusticesystem’sabilitytocorrectitselfdependsuponitshaving(andbeingseentohave)presumptivecommandofthe channels by which retail disputes about justice are resolved.��Moreover,thebareexistenceofalegalsystemofjusticedepends,asHart(1994)outlined,uponitsbeingrecognizedashavingauthoritytodecideretaildisputes—whetherornotitclaimsorpossessesauthorityinthewholesalesense.InthenextsectionIwillfillinthissketchby

27. Thispresumptivecommandisonethestatemaysuspendbychoosing—whole-saleorretail—toleavecertaintopicstoprivateorderingortoself-help.



showinghowargumentsfromnecessityandfromfairplaythatfailasapropforthedutytoobeythelawwholesale(seeEdmundson1998)seemtobesturdyenough,inpropercombination,tocarrythedayforadutytocomplywiththelawinitsretaildeployment.

V. Necessity and Fair-Play Arguments for the Pro Tanto Duty

There is an extensive literature on the question of the existence ofaprotantodutytoobeythelaw(Edmundson2004).Onelineofar-gument favoring the recognitionof suchaduty takes the followinggeneralform:

P� Whateveristypicallyanecessarymeanstoamorallycom-pellingendisatleastaprima-facieduty.

P� Obeyingthelawistypicallyanecessarymeanstoamorallycompellingend

C Obeyingthelawisaduty.

JohnFinnis(1984)defendsanatural-lawaccountofthisgeneralform.Onepointofcontentioninvitedbysuchtheoriesisthespecificationofmorallycompellingends.Finnis,acknowledgingthepluralityofendssoughtbycitizens,emphasizeslaw’suniqueabilitytosecurethecom-mongood,viz.“thegoodof individuals livingtogetheranddepend-ingupononeanother inways that tendto favour thewell-beingofeach”(1989,103).Similarly,Mason(1997)invokestheintrinsicvalueof citizenship.These are valueswhichothers, of amore individual-isticpersuasion,wouldcontestordeflate.Thisdifficultymightbefi-nessedbyobservingthatthenormalwaytojustifylegalcoercionisbyestablishingthatcitizensbettercomplywiththereasonsthatapplytothem(whatevertheymaybe)byobeyingthanbydeterminingforthemselveswhatreasonrequires(Raz1996).ButRazhimselfisskepti-calthatstatespossessthecompetencetoestablishacomprehensivelyapplicableanduniversallybornedutyofobedience(Raz1984).

Amendingandmakingmorespecific thiskindofargument fromnecessity,Iproposethefollowing:

P� There isadutyof justice,comprisingaduty toact justlyandadutytohonorbackgroundjustice.

P� Ifthereisadutytoφ,andψ-ingisapermissibleandneces-sary requirementofφ-ing, then there isapro tantodutytoψ.

P� Honoringbackground justicenecessarily requires comply-ingwiththejust-enoughstate’sgood-faithretailoperations.

P� Complying with the just-enough state’s good-faith retailoperationsismorallypermissible.

C Thereisaprotantodutytocomplywiththeretailopera-tionsofajust-enoughstate.

Therewill of course be controversy about the notion of “honoring”backgroundjustice,asdeployedinP�andP�.Mostseriously,thereisananalogueofwhatIhaveelsewheretermedthe“harmlessdisobedi-ence”difficultythattheargumentfromnecessityforthedutytoobeythe lawhasencountered.Thatdifficulty isoftenputwith referenceto“stopsigninthedesert”examples,whicharedevisedtoshowthatthereisnothingevenprotantowrongwithdisobeyingthelawwhenthereisavanishinglylowchanceofharmandapalpablebenefittobegained(Smith1973).Appliedtothepresentargument,thisisachal-lengetoP�.Whathasbecomethestandardfall-backresponsetosuchchallengesistheinvocationofafair-playduty,whichcondemnsevenharmless noncompliance as unfair to (or disrespectful of the equalworthof)thosewhodocomplywithsociallybeneficialrules—acon-siderationthatmightnotobviouslybeencompassedalreadyby thenotionofhonoringbackgroundjustice.

Debateabouttheproperformulationofaprincipleoffairplay,anditsavailabilitytosupportadutytoobeythelaw,hasbeendominatedbytwoissues.Thefirstiswhethermerereceiptofbenefitsofacoop-erative scheme is sufficient to trigger the principle, orwhether vol-untaryacceptanceisalsonecessary.Aplausiblecasehasbeenmade



thatcertaingoodsarepresumptivelybeneficialeventhoughbytheirnature(aspublicgoods,intheeconomist’ssense)theyarenotsubjecttoacceptanceorrefusal(Klosko1987).Butevenifthefirstdifficultyismet,anotherimmediatelyarises,forthevarietyoflawsenactedbytypicalmodern legislatureswill includemany thatareofnobenefitatall,presumptiveorotherwise.Yetthestateclaimsthatitscitizenshaveadutytoobeythatiscomprehensivelyapplicablewithrespecttoallofitsvalidlaws.Thisseconddifficultyhasnotbeenovercome.WhatIsuggestisthatthisdifficultyisavoidedifwhatisproposedisnotadutytoobeythelawqualawbutamorenarrowlycalibrateddutytosubmit to theretailoperationsof the juststate; for the followingargumentisvalid:

P1 Given sufficiently wide compliance, those who submitto rulesnecessary toconveyapresumptivebenefit toallmembersofagroupareentitledtosimilarsubmissionbyallgroupmemberswhoreceivethatbenefitandanetbenefit.

P� Retail dispute-resolving operations, conducted in goodfaith,conveytoallwithintheirgeneralscopeapresump-tivebenefit.

P� Rules endowing officials with prerogative authority tochanneland resolvedisputesarenecessary to thestate’sretaildispute-resolvingoperations.

P� Thereisasufficientlywidecompliancewiththerulesmen-tionedinP�.

C Thereisaprotantodutytocomplywiththeretailopera-tionsofajust-enoughstate.

Ifthisargumentisalsosound,itdoesestablishadutytoobeycertainlaws,qualaw—namelythosethatrequirecompliancewiththeretailorgansofthestate.But,asIhavesuggested,itismoreplausiblethatsuch laws are exceptional in beingboth clearly needed and clearlybeneficial—aswellasconstitutiveoftheexistenceofalegalsystem.

VI. ConclusionTheproblemofpoliticalobligationthatRobertPaulWolffraisedmostpointedly,andthatJohnSimmonshaspressedwithcareanddetermi-nation,presenteduswithatangleofconceptualandnormativeissues.I think substantial progress has beenmade toward untangling theconceptualfromthenormative.Forexample,Ithinkitisnowwidelyappreciatedthatthelegitimacyofthestateisconnectedtoadutyofobediencemuch less stronglyanddirectly thanhadoncebeensup-posed(e.�g.,Greenawalt1987;Edmundson1998).Oncethenormativeissueshavebeenisolatedandidentified,theycanbetreatedassuch,ifnotresolved.Thatlaw-abidanceisadistinctnotionissomethingIthinkIhaveshown.Thatitisinfactavirtuemay,however,bedoubt-eddespite thecase Ihavemadehere.At theendof theday,astutephilosophersmaysimplysay,astheyhaveaboutthedutytoobey,“Idon’tseeit,”asJoelFeinbergputasimilarpoint(1979).Inotherwords,whetheronerecognizesthevirtueoflaw-abidanceornotmayintheendbeamatterofhowonewasreared.Butthisepistemologicalsitua-tionisexactlywhatonewouldexpect,fromthestandpointofanethicsofvirtue.AsAristotleobserved,weshouldnotexpectthevirtuestobeappreciatedbythosewhohavenotacquiredthem.ButIamhappytoarguewithanyonewhodoubtsthereisanythingwrongwithslip-pingawayfromamassarrest—paceAnscombe,hismindmightnotbehopelesslycorrupt.��

28.ThanksareduetoBrianBix,KimberleyBrownlee,AndrewI.Cohen,AndrewJ.Cohen,LesGreen,RosalindHursthouse,MattKramer,DavidLefkowitz,Jim Nickel, Tim O’Keefe, Henry Richardson, Irit Samet-Porat, and ClaireValier,andtopatientaudiencesatGeorgiaState,Cambridge,SanDiego,andOxford.IoweaspecialdebtofgratitudetoKitWellman.



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