the 1992 world administrative radio ... - ota archive

The 1992 World Administrative RadioConference: Technology and Policy

Implications

May 1993

OTA-TCT-549NTIS order #PB93-203727

Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The 1992 WorldAdministrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications, OTA-TCT-549 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1993).

For Sale by the U.S. government Printing OfficeSuperintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP Washington, DC20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-041 766-X

Foreword

A s the 20th century draws to a close, new radio technologies and servicesare poised to change the ways we communicate. Radio waves alreadymake possible a wide range of services considered commonplace—AM and FM radio broadcasting, television, cellular telephones, remote

garage-door openers, and baby monitors. Advances in radio technology are givingbirth to even more new products and services, including pocket-sized telephonesthat may allow people to make and receive calls anywhere in the world, high-defini-tion televisions (HDTV) with superior quality pictures and sound, and static-freedigital radios.

The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-92) authorizedfrequencies for many of these new radiocommunication services, and granted addi-tional frequencies for many existing services, including international broadcasting,satellite-based mobile communications, and communications in space. The effects ofthese changes will be felt well into the 21st century as countries around the worlddevelop and deploy new communications systems to serve the needs of consumers,businesses, and governments. For the United States, the decisions made at the con-ference will critically affect how we develop new radio technologies and applica-tions, how competitive this country will be in radiocommunications equipment andservices, and how effectively the United States can exercise its role as a leader inworld radiocommunication policymaking.

This study of the outcomes and implications of WARC-92 was requestedby the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Senate Committee onCommerce, Science, and Transportation. OTA was asked to evaluate the success ofU.S. proposals at the conference, discuss the implications of the decisions made forU.S. technology and policy development, and identify options for improving U.S.participation in future world radiocommunication conferences. This report comple-ments OTA’s assessment of the preparations process for WARC-92, The 1992 WorldAdministrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. International Spectrum Policy.

OTA acknowledges the contributions of the members of the U.S. delegationto WARC-92, who helped clarify and focus the issues. OTA also appreciates theassistance of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, theFederal Communications Commission, and the State Department, as well as thenumerous individuals in the private sector who reviewed or contributed to this docu-ment. The contents of this report, however, are the sole responsibility of OTA.

Roger Herdman, Director. . .Ill

Project Staff

DAVID P. WYEProject Director

Gregg FestaResearch Assistantl

Karolyn St. ClairGraphics Specialist

ADMINISTRATIVE

Liz EmanuelOffice Administrator

Barbara BradleySecretary

CONTRACTORS

Richard G. GouldGeorge HagnTelecommunications Systems

John AndelinAssistant Director, OTAScience, Information, andNatural Resources Division

James W. CurlinProgram ManagerTelecommunication andComputingTechnologies Program

1 July-September 1992

iv

Reviewers and Contributors

João Carlos Fagundes AlbernazDirector-AdjuntoMinistério Da Infra-EstruturaDepartamento Nacional de

Administração de Freqüências

Dexter A. AndersonTelecommunications ManagerVoice of America

Jan Witold BaranAttorney at LawWiley, Rein & Fielding

Jeffrey BinckesCOMSAT Mobile CommunicationsCommunications Satellite Corp.

William M. BermanVice President and DirectorGlobal Spectrum ManagementMotorola Inc.

Robert BriskmanPresidentSatellite CD Radio

David CastielPresidentEllipsat Corp.

Lawrence F. ChestoDirectorTelecommunications SystemsAeronautical Radio, Inc.

Vary CoatesSenior Associate (Project Director)Office of Technology Assessment

David J. CohenStaff MemberNational Telecommunications and

Information Administration

William CookDirectorElectromagnetic Spectrum

ManagementU.S. Department of Navy

Raymond CrowellDirectorIndustry Government PlanningCOMSAT

Steve CrowleyConsulting Engineer

Frederick J. Day, Jr.Attorney at LawKeller and Heckman

Daniel S. Ehrman, Jr.Vice President, Finance & Business

AffairsGannett Broadcasting

Ben C. FisherAttorney at LawFisher, Wayland, Cooper& Leader

Michael FitchSenior AdvisorInternational Communications and

Information PolicyU.S. Department of State

Steven H. FlajserVice-President, Space SystemsLoral

Victor E. FooseManager, Frequency Engineering

BranchFederal Aviation Adminis tration

William GambleDeputy Associate AdministratorNational Telecommunications and


Tomas E. GergelyElectromagnetic Spectrum ManagerNational Science Foundation

John T. GilsenanDeputy Director, Spectrum PolicyBureau of Communications and

Information PolicyU.S. Department of State

Richard G. GouldPresidentTelecommunications Systems

Bruce A. GracieHeadWARC/CCI AffairsInternational Relations BranchCommunications Canada

George H. HagnSenior Staff AdvisorInformation & Telecommunications

Science CenterSRI International

William HatchDepartment of CommerceNational Telecommunications and


v

Gerald B. HelmanConsultantEllipsat Corp.

Olof LundbergDirector GeneralInmarsat

Geoff W. PerryTelecommunications ConsultantSociete International deTelecommunications Aeronautiques

(SITA)Neal D. HuikowerAssociate Department Head

Bill LutherInternational AdvisorFederal Communications Commission Leonard R. Raish

Attorney at LawFletcher, Heald & HildrethKris Hutchison

Director of Frequency ManagementARINC, Inc.

Robert McIntyreChief, International StaffPrivate Radio BureauFederal Communications Commission

Michael C. RauSenior Vice-PresidentScience and TechnologyNational Association of Broadcasters

Waiter E. IrelandDirectorRegulatory Affairs OfficeU.S. Information Agency

H. Donald MesserEngineerVoice of America Edward E. Reinhart

ConsultantKaryl A. IrionSenior Project StaffAtlantic Research Corp.

John E. MillerconsultantStanford Telecommunications

Alan B. RenshawProgram ManagerStarsys Global Positioning

Ed JacobsDeputy ChiefLand Mobile and Microwave DivisionFederal Communications Commission

Gary K. NoreenChairman and CEORadio Satellite Corporation

Warren RichardsChairman of ITU-CCIRU.S. Department of State

Janice ObuchowskiPresidentFreedom Technologies, Inc.

George JacobsConsultant

Paul RinaldoConsultant

Bruce KraselskyVice-ChairmanConstellation Communications, Inc.

Randall T. OdenealGeneral PartnerSconnix Broadcasting Co.

Raui R. RodriguezAttorney at LawLeventhal, Senter & Lerman

Walter La FleurDirectorEngineering & Technical OperationsVoice of America

Larry OlsonChief, International BranchFederal Communications Commission

Walda RosemanDirectorOffice of International

CommunicationsFederal Communications CommissionLawrence Palmer

Program ManagerNational Telecommunications and


Todd LaPorteAnalystOffice of Technology Assessment

Charles RushChief ScientistNational Telecommunications and

Information AdministrationAlex LatkerEngineerFederal Communications Commission

Alan L. ParkerPresidentOrbital Communications Corp. Norbert Schroeder

Private Sector CoordinatorNational Telecommunications and

Information AdministrationLon C. LevinVice-President and Regulatory CounselAmerican Mobile Satellite Corporation

Richard ParlowAssociate AdministratorNational Telecommunications and


Joseph F. SedlakDirector of Government RelationsVolunteers in Technical Assistance

Jeffrey L. SheldonGeneral CounselUtilities Telecommunications Council

Herschel ShosteckHerschel Shosteck Associates, Ltd.

Jean SmithContractorOffice of Technology Assessment

Walter SonnenfeldtExecutive DirectorWalter Sonnenfeldt & Associates

Thomas P. StanleyChief EngineerFederal Communications Commission

Ron StrotherPresidentStrother Communications

Leslie A. TaylorPresidentLeslie Taylor Associates

Robert TaylorOffice of Space OperationsNational Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Thomas S. TyczDeputy ChiefDomestic Facilities DivisionFederal Communications Commission

Jim VorhiesNational Telecommunications and


Thomas WalshInternational EngineerFederal Communications Commission

Francis WilliamsChief, Treaty BranchOffice of Engineering and TechnologyFederal Communications Commission

Kurt A. WimmerAttorney at LawCovington & Burling

Joan WinstonSenior AnalystOffice of Technology Assessment

vii

1 Summary and Findings, 1Request for the Study, 2Introduction, 3Summary of Findings, 3WARC-92: The Conference, 9Themes and Trends From WARC-92 15Implications for U.S. Policy and Technology

Development, 30Options for Improving U.S. Policymaking, 39

2 Outcomes and Implications forU.S. Radio Technology, 51Factors Complicating Assessment of WARC-92

Outcomes, 51U.S. Objectives for WARC-92, 54High-Frequency Broadcasting, 55Broadcasting Satellite Service-Sound, 64Terrestrial Mobile Services, 77Satellite Mobile Services, 86Other U.S. Allocation Proposals to WARC-92, 128

3 Next Steps and Lessons for the Future, 143International Issues in WARC-92 Implementation, 144

Domestic Context for WARC-92 Implementation, 149WARC-92: Lessons for the Future, 157Conference Management, 166

APPENDIXESA Structure and Proceedings of WARC-92, 173B International Observers at WARC-92, 176

C Selected WARC-92 Resolutions andRecommendations, 177

D Acronyms and Glossary of Terms, 180E Negotiated Rulemaking: An Alternative to Traditional

Rulemaking, 184

INDEX, 187

contents

ix

andFindings 1

F or 50 years, radio technologies and services have playedan important role in the daily lives of people all over theworld. Radio waves carried messages of hope to millionsof people caught behind the Iron Curtain. They allowed

Americans to see and hear Neil Armstrong’s first steps on theMoon. In more recent years, satellite communications haveallowed us to witness events from around the globe as theyhappened—the fall of the Berlin Wall and a lone Chinese studentfacing an advancing tank in Tiananmen Square. Radio wavesalso make possible services and technologies considered com-monplace today—radio and television programs, cellular tele-phones, and even microwave ovens, remote garage-door openers,and baby monitors, Advances in radio technology are givingbirth to a wide range of new products and services, includingpocket-sized telephones that may allow people to make andreceive calls anywhere in the world, high-definition television(HDTV) that will provide superior quality pictures and sound,and digital radios that will provide static-free listening.

The process of coordinating the radio frequencies used bydifferent wireless services and systems, and harmonizing radio-communication policies worldwide is an extremely complextask. Procedures must be developed that allow radio services toshare sections of the radio frequency spectrum, and internationalagreements must be negotiated so that systems and equipment indifferent countries can interconnect and not interfere with eachother. The job of harmonizing and regulating telecommunicationand radio services on a worldwide basis falls to the InternationalTelecommunication Union (ITU), a specialized agency of theUnited Nations. In order to allocate radio frequencies for specificradiocommunication services and to negotiate the rules andregulations that govern the use of those services internationally,

1

2 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

For 4 weeks in February 1992, delegates from aroundthe world met in the Palacio de Congresos inMalaga-Torremolinos, Spain for the 1992 WorldAdministrative Radio Conference.

ITU-member countries periodically gather inWorld Administrative Radio Conference (WARCs).The latest conference, the 1992 World Adminis-trative Radio Conference (WARC-92), took placein Torremolinos, Spain over the month of Febru-ary 1992. Among other issues, WARC-92 ad-dressed frequency allocations for a wide range ofexisting and emerging radio services and soughtto define the regulations that will govern them.

Despite the growing role wireless servicesplay, the world of international radiocommunica-tion policymaking is largely removed from publicview. The institutions and procedures that guidethe development and coordination of wirelessservices worldwide have long been the provinceof engineers-not politicians or diplomats. Today,however, as the frequencies used for radiocom-munication become increasingly congested, theproblems of regulating international uses of theradio spectrum are becoming progressively morecomplex. And as the connections between radio-communications, international trade and compet-itiveness, and national security have become

clearer, these problems have begun to draw morehigh-level attention from American and foreignpolicymakers.

REQUEST FOR THE STUDYIn November 1991 the Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA) released a background paper,The 1992 World Administrative Radio Confer-ence: Issues for U.S. International SpectrumPolicy. 1 That paper examined the technologiesand issues to be considered at WARC-92, dis-cussed the international and domestic context forWARC-92 preparations, and analyzed the U.S.process of conference preparation.

To complete the analysis of WARC-92 begunin that paper, the House Committee on Energyand Commerce and the Senate Committee onCommerce, Science, and Transportation requestedthat OTA prepare a follow-on study that wouldexamine the outcomes of WARC-92 and theirimplications for U.S. radiocommunications pol-icy. Noting the importance of international radiofrequency allocations to emerging and estab-lished radiocommunication services and domesticindustries, the Committees requested that OTAassess the relative success of the U.S. proposals toWARC-92 and analyze the potential impacts thatthe conference’s decisions might have on domes-tic radiocommunication services and policymak-ing, the international competitiveness of theUnited States in new radio services, and theability of the United States to achieve its diplo-matic and foreign policy goals.

To answer these questions, OTA focused itsanalysis in three areas:

1. What decisions were reached at WMC-92?What implications will these decisions haveon the development of new radio-basedtechnologies and services in this country?How will the decisions of WARC-92 affect

1 U.S. Congress, Office of lkchnology Assessmen4 The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. InternationalSpectrum Polic~ackground Paper, OTA-BP-TCT-76 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, November 1991). Hereafter“O’IX, WmC-92,”

Chapter 1--Summary and Findings I 3

2.

3.

U.S. international competitiveness in radio-communication applications and servicesinternationally?How successful were U.S. proposals toWARC-92? What were the barriers togreater success? What lessons can be drawnfrom the WARC-92 experience?How does the current structure of radiocom-munication policymaking in the UnitedStates contribute to and/or detract from theability of the country to influence intern-ational radiocommunication policymaking?What types of organizational or proceduralchanges might be needed for the UnitedStates to adapt to changes in the intern-ational procedures for setting internationalradiocommunication policy?

This report is divided into three parts. Chapter1 presents an overview of WARC-92, includingan analysis of the themes of the conference and adiscussion of the factors that will affect imple-mentation of the final decisions. The chapter alsopresents options for restructuring the U.S. WARCpreparation and radiocommunication policymak-ing processes to better respond to the challengesof the 21st century. Chapter 2 presents a detaileddiscussion of the allocation and technology issuesthat were most important at WARC-92, discussesthe issues involved in domestic and internationalimplementation of WARC-92 allocations, andconsiders the implications for existing and emerg-ing U.S. radio technologies and services. Chapter3 discusses—in the context of WARC-92 out-comes-the preparation for WARC-92, the manage-ment of preparations and conference negotiations,and changes that may be needed in the domesticstructures and processes for preparing for andimplementing decisions made at future worldradiocommunication conferences.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGSThe following section summarizes the conclu-

sions OTA reached as a result of its research. The

underlying bases for these findings are discussedin more detail throughout the report.

Overall, United States proposals enjoyedmixed results at WARC-92. U.S. negotiatorsachieved some notable successes, but also suf-fered some defeats. On many of the most impor-tant and controversial issues considered by theconference, the broad objectives of the UnitedStates were achieved. For example, the UnitedStates was successful in preventing changes inspectrum allocations that could have harmedimportant domestic radiocommunication systemsand services. The United States was also success-ful in persuading the conference to adopt alloca-tions for many important new and existingservices, including low-Earth orbiting satellite(LEOS) systems, space research and communica-tions systems, and high-frequency broadcasting(see box l-A).However, thesesuccesses wereoften tempered united Statesby constraints on I proposalshow, when, or I achievedwhere the newly-

mixed resultsallocated fre-quencies could at WARC-92.be used, It is un-clear how serious (and permanent) these limita-tions will be, and it may not be possible to assesstheir impact on new radio services until systemsbegin operation. Thus, the ultimate effects ofsome WARC-92 decisions are still uncertain, andevaluations of the implications of these decisionsmust remain tentative.

Any evaluation of the outcomes and implica-tions of an international conference will becolored by the perspective one takes. WARC-92is no exception. Depending on how the goals andobjectives of the conference are defined, theresults are more or less successful. Taking anarrow perspective, and merely comparing U.S.proposals with the results of the conference maylead to an overly negative assessment of theoutcomes of WARC-92. Many analysts prefer a


broader analysis that recognizes the difficulty of new radio services. The limited successes ofinternational negotiations and accepts that not allU.S. proposals will be adopted at any givenconference. These analysts believe that results aremore accurately judged in the context of longer-term negotiating across several conferences andmany years. From this perspective, the mixedresults of the U.S. proposals at WARC-92 areseen as only the frost step in achieving U.S.objectives, and analysts who take this view seeWARC-92 as a success for ‘opening the door’ to

WARC-92 will serve as the foundation for futureproposals as U.S. representatives pursue fre-quency allocations and regulations favorable toU.S. radiocommunication interests.

Some analysts, however, prefer an assessmentthat views WARCs and their outcomes in isola-tion from the larger radiocommunication policyprocess. From this perspective, to the extent thatU.S. proposals were adopted by WARC-92, theconference was a ‘‘success’ ‘—whatever occurs


after the conference should be considered sepa- results of WARC-92 and may also obscure therately. OTA believes this perspective is toorestrictive and takes the decisions made at WARC-92 out of context—the goals and objectives forU.S. participation in a WARC should advance thelarger radiocommunication goals of the UnitedStates. Such a narrow perspective may alsoobscure flaws that might exist in the policydevelopment and/or preparation process.

Concentrating on the “success” or “fail-ure” of U.S. proposals may oversimplify the

nuances of implementing the frequency alloca-tion decisions made at the conference. Severalfactors will affect how WARC-92 decisions areimplemented and what the implications ofthose decisions will be. First, WARC-92 does notmark the end of international spectrum negotia-tions, nor does it represent the fma1 resolution ofthe issues it addressed. It was only one, albeitimportant, step in the continuous process ofallocating and regulating frequencies internation-


ally. Similarly, the agreements reached at WARC-92 are not cast in stone-future negotiations andworld radiocommunication conferences maymodify or even reverse some of them. This factworks both for and against those who take a‘ ‘longview. ” When decisions are subject to review, it iseasier to downplay negative outcomes as only atemporary or minor setback that will eventually

A greements

reached at WARC-92

are not cast in stone----

future conferences

may modify or even

reverse some of

them.

be overcomethrough futurenegotiations. Onthe other hand,the successesachieved by U.S.negotiators arealso subject toreview and/or modification.Winnin g favora-ble power limits

at WARC-92, for example, does not mean thatsuch limits will not be changed (in ways unfavor-able to U.S. interests) based on further studies oroperational experiences.2

Second, many of the details involved in implem-enting the new allocations and services are yetto be worked out. The decisions reached in Spainmust now be adopted by each ITU-membercountry, and any conflicts in implementing WMC-92 allocations and the systems that will use themwill have to be resolved in negotiations betweencountries. In those bands of frequencies wherespectrum must be shared, users will have to workout sharing arrangements to prevent harmfulinterference. In addition, many of the technicaldetails that will affect the future of these servicesand technologies are still undecided. WARC-92called on the International Radio ConsultativeCommittee (CCIR) to conduct studies on thetechnical aspects of many of the allocationsadopted.

Third, WARC-92 assigned long transition timesto many services before new allocations can beused, making the implications of WARC-92difficult to foresee. Some WARC-92 allocationscannot come into effect for 10 or 15 years in orderto give existing users of the bands adequate timeto move to other frequencies. The full force ofsome of the decisions made at WARC-79, forexample, are just beginning to be felt. Likewise,some WARC-92 allocations are not scheduled tocome into effect until 2007, and so it will be manyyears before their effects will be evident. In themeantime, radio technology will continue toadvance, and international and domestic regula-tions will continue to evolve. Because of this,evaluating the outcomes of WARC-92 is, in onesense, premature. Rather, the outcomes of WARC-92 must be examined as one step in a longerprocess that stretches out for many years beforeand after.

Finally, the fact that WARC-92 allocated radiofrequencies for new and existing radio servicesdoes not guarantee that those services-and theindividual systems implemented to provide them-will be technically viable or economically suc-cessful. In a broad sense, the final assessment ofWARC-92 will depend on how successful U.S.systems will be in domestic and world markets.Consumers and foreign regulators will ultimatelydetermine the outcomes of WARC-92.

The preparation and negotiation of propos-als for WARC-92 and the outcomes andimplications of the conference cannot be di-vorced from the broader U.S. radiocommuni-cation policy process. From this perspective,lack of integrated, long-term radiocommuni-cation planning by U.S. spectrum managersand policy makers hurt U.S. preparations forWARC-92 and now threatens to undermine

2 Commenters have pointed out that this outcome makes WARC-92 a‘ ‘success. ’ However, since the limits agreed to at the conference maybe changed, this victory may ultimately prove hollow.

Chapter l-Summary and FindingsI 7

the successes achieved at the conference.3

Driven primarily by advances in technology anda commitment to improving competitiveness, theperspective of both government and industry hasbeen too narrowly focused on merely gainingaccess to new radio frequencies. As a result of therush to prepare positions for WARC-92—andnow to license services—larger policy issueshave been overlooked or neglected, and insuffi-cient consideration is being given to the long-term consequences of implementing new technol-ogies and services. The result has been an oftenreactive and short-sighted approach to spectrumpolicy--once frequencies are allocated, otherissues can be addressed later. This problem isexacerbated because radiocommunications pol-icy development and spectrum management inthe United States is divided between the FederalCommunications Commission (FCC) and theNational Telecommunications and InformationAdministration (NTIA), with input from theDepartment of State on international issues. Nocommon vision or policy goals currently unitethese agencies, and although new leadership maybring more foresight to the process, institutionalinertia and personal ambivalence about the pros-pects of radiocommunication planning amongspectrum managers may frustrate the develop-ment of new policy directions. Preparations andnegotiations for future world radiocommunica-tion conferences will be impaired if radiocommu -nication policymaking continues to be frag-mented and unfocused.

Past approaches to international radiocom-munication policy development and negotia-tions may no longer produce the most success-ful outcomes for the United States at futureconferences. While U.S. technologies and mar-kets still lead the world in many wireless services,

new international competitors will challenge theUnited States to develop more cooperative strate-gies that rely less on U.S. market power and moreon developing consensus and agreement with new(and old) allies around the world. Several trendsevident during the preparations for and negotia-tions at WARC-92 are challenging traditionalU.S. approaches to international policymaking.

The rapid development of new radio technolo-gies and applications, the explosion of de-mand for wireless communication services,and the consequent increase in congestion ofthe radio frequency spectrum have put greatpressures on the structures and processes formanaging radio-based communications bothdomestically and internationally. Findingspace on the airwaves for new technologiesand services is becoming increasingly diffi-cult, and many counties, including theUnited States, have become more protectiveof their existing uses of the spectrum. Bala-ncing the needs of existing and emerginguses of the radio frequency spectrum willbecome one of the most critical technologi-cal and political problems facing U.S. tele-communications policymakers.Economics and politics have begun to play agreater role in the way spectrum is allocatedboth internationally and domestically asradio services have assumed a greater role inworld communications and commerce. Theeconomic stakes involved in the decisions ofWARCs are huge, and as a result, decisionsand proposals regarding spectrum use areoften no longer based primarily on technicalcriteria. In trying to develop domestic radio-communication policy and prepare for WARCs,U.S. spectrum managers must often contendwith politically powerful users, large invest-

3 The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineer~United States Activities (IEEE-USA) recently noted the over-concentration onshort-term domestic issues to the detriment of long-tam pkmnin g and accommodation of international concerns. See Comments of the Instituteof Electrical and Electronics Engineers before the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Notice of Inquiry in thematter of Current and Future Requirements for the Use of Radio Frequencies in the United States, Docket No. 920532-2132, released June1, 1992.


ments in equipment, and users with longhistories of successful operation and publicservice. Internationally, maintaining and pro-moting the competitiveness of U.S. productsand services in world radiocommunicationmarkets and protecting vital national (secu-rity) communication systems are increas-ingly important goals of U.S. internationalspectrum policy.In this newly economically-driven context,government and private sector representa-tives are especially concerned about the riseof regional blocks of countries that areuniting to protect and advance their eco-nomic interests in international meetingssuch as WARC-92. These coalitions canwield significant power in forums such as theITU, with its one-nation, one-vote process,and could effectively work against U.S.interests at future world radiocommunicationconferences. These regional groups alsooften have enormous technological, manu-facturing, and/or market power that couldpose a serious threat to U.S. competitiveinterests in global markets. On the otherhand, these new alignments may present theUnited States with an important opportunityto cultivate support for U.S. positions.As telecommunications industries have beenderegulated and privatized and as marketshave been liberalized around the world, theprivate sector and radiocommunication usergroups have begun to play an increasinglyimportant role in the development of interna-tional spectrum policy. This rise may por-tend important changes in the role of the ITUin international spectrum regulation. Negotia-tions that previously involved only gover-nments will in the future more directly includea variety of spectrum “special interestgroups” —private sector and extra-gover-nmental organizations that represent impor-tant international users of radiocommunica-tions—the world aviation community, forexample. These international groups were

evident at WARC-92 and worked hard be-hind the scenes to have their concernsaddressed.

The rise of such groups and the increasinginvolvement of the private sector in interna-tional regulatory affairs pose a substantialchallenge for U.S. policymakers. The prob-lem is that the interests and goals of transna-tional companies and organizations will notalways match those of the United States.Even those companies based in the UnitedStates may have trouble supporting U.S.positions if those positions conflict withtheir own international interests or with theinterests of their industry. In the future,government spectrum managers must bewatchful that U.S. companies participatingin international conferences support U.S.positions and do not promote their ownspecial interests to the detriment of specificU.S. objectives. A strong policy focus mustbe maintained if the United States is to besuccessful in influencing international radio-communication policymaking.Finally, the ITU recently restructured itselfand its processes to better meet the chall-enges presented by these changes. In thisnew environment, the United States is beingforced to reexamine traditional assumptionsabout how the spectrum is allocated and howradiocommunication policy should be set.Reliance on purely market-based approachesto spectrum policy are likely to be inade-quate to protecting and promoting U.S.technological competitiveness and policyleadership in future international policy de-cisions.

In order to maximize the success of U.S.proposals at future world radiocommunica-tion conferences, the current structure andprocesses of radiocommunication policymak-ing in the United States will have to change.Institutional organization, responsibilities, and

Chapter l-Summary and Findings I 9

procedures for future world radiocommunicationconferences must be reexamined. Current levelsof funding for WARC preparation and negotia-tion may be inadequate with future conferencesnow slated to occur every 2 years. Planning,preparation, and negotiation for these biennialmeetings will become continuous activities, re-placing the more sporadic efforts for past confer-ences. Centralizing WARC preparation couldstreamline decisionmaking and eliminate thefunding disparities between agencies that charac-terized WARC-92. Options for improving WARCpreparations-and radiocommunication policy ingeneral—are discussed at the end of this chapter.

A critical long-term concern for U.S. spectrummanagers and policymakers is balancing impor-tant national economic and security interestsagainst the broader goals of international cooper-ation, integration, and regulatory accord. In somecases, legitimate U.S. radiocommunication re-quirements may not match global needs. How-ever, U.S. policy makers must be wary of advocat-ing positions that too often conflict with worldneeds or that run the risk of isolating the UnitedStates from the world radiocommunication com-munity. Many analysts believe that an isolationistapproach could decrease U.S. effectiveness ininternational radiocommunication policymakingin the long term. Thorough evaluations must bemade of the foreign policy implications of U.S.positions, and international considerations mustbe weighed carefully in developing U.S. domesticand international spectrum policies. U.S. spec-trum managers must also develop better guide-lines to balance the needs of new and existingspectrum users, More open and effective proce-dures are needed to compare and evaluate propos-als from competing government agencies andbetween the government and the private sector.

Cooperation between U.S. Government andprivate sector interests is generally good dur-ing WARC preparations and negotiations.Although each group vigorously pursues itsown interests, and conflicts are hard-fought,both sides work together to develop U . S .positions and policies. In large part, this spirit ofcooperation is the result of the extensive networkof personal relationships that have been built overmany years, and the prior experience many in theprivate sector gained while working for thegovernment. The downside of this cooperativeprocess is that

s o m e t i m e s i t i s unclear who isin charge of for- S ometimes it ismulating U.S. in- unclear who is international spec- charge of formulating. trum policy—the Federal Gov- U.S. ‘international

ernment or the spectrum policy—the

private sector and Government orits consultants. private sector.Despite suchproblems, however, this network of individualscould form a foundation for the future develop-ment of aggressive and forward-thinkin g U s .

radiocommunication policy, if guided by clearand creative guidelines and a focused policydevelopment process.

WARC-92: THE CONFERENCEWARC-92 began on February 3 and ended

March 3, 1992. More than 1,400 delegatesattended the conference representing 127 of theITU’s 166 member countries. 4 The conferencewas also attended by observers from 31 interna-tional and regional organizations (see appendixB). Fifty-three official delegates from the UnitedStates participated in the deliberations in Spain,

4 The number of countries has fluctuated rapidly in recent years as countries have consolidated (East/West G~y and North/$outhYemen) and as the member states of the former Soviet Union-the Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus, for example-have sought to enterthe ITU as independent members. Delegates from 124 countries attended WARC-92, with 3 (Belize, Latvia, and Liechtenstein) representedby proxy.


More than 1,400 delegates representing 127 countriesparticipated in the deliberations of WARC-92.

representing a wide range of interests from theFederal Government and the private sector (seetable l-l). Jan Witold Baran, a lawyer fromWashington, DC, served as head of the U.S.delegation, a position that confers temporaryambassadorial status. A support staff of 18additional representatives provided technical andadministrative assistance to the delegation at theconference, and approximately 30 more U.S.citizens attended all or part of the conference asobservers and informal advisers. 5 During theconference, a “home team” of approximately 40government and private sector representativesremained in the United States and providedadditional technical and policy guidance to thedelegation in Spain.

The work of WARC-92 was functionallydivided among a variety of committees (seeappendix A for a description of the formalseven-committee structure of WARC-92). Themost important work, and the majority of formalnegotiations, at WARC-92 was conducted in the

meetings of Committee 4 (the Allocations Com-mittee), and Committee 5 (the Regulatory Com-mittee). These committees distributed their workto ad hoc and drafting groups in which smallgroups of delegates forged agreements on specifictopics and developed regulations for implement-ing changes. The supreme body of WARC-92 wasthe plenary, which was chaired by the HonorableJose Barrionuevo Peña of Spain.6 It was at theplenary sessions that decisions were formally andfinally agreed to-most of the Plenary sessionstook place in the last several days of the confer-ence.

The decisions made at WARC-92 resultedfrom a complex mixture of formal committeemeetings and extensive informal discussionsoutside of the formal meeting structure. Theseinformal discussions, during which much of thereal work of the conference--negotiation andpersuasion—took place, were held during coffeebreaks between sessions, at lunches around town,and at after-hours meetings anywhere there wasspace. The agreements reached at the conference

Table 1-1—WARC-92 Delegates’

Department of Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Department of Defenseb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Federal Communications Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Other Government

National Aeronautics and Space Administration . . . 2National Science Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Coast Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1U.S. Information Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Federal Aviation Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

a Includes support staff.b Includes Army, Navy, and Air Force.NOTE: Some private sector delegates worked as contractors support-ing various government agencies.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on U.S.Delegation Report.

5 The United States was the only delegation to send a separate ‘‘support staff. ” In practice these individuals performed duties that closelyresembled those of the formal delegates, although they were not considered delegates by ITU and did not have direct access to workingdocuments, except through fellow delegates.

6 For conferences held outside Geneva (home base for ITU), the chairman of a WARC is traditionally provided by the country hosting theconference. Five vie-chairs, including Ambassador Jan Baran, the head of the U.S. delegation were selected by the delegates to assist the chair.Delegates from the Russian Federation Cote d’Ivoire, China, and Norway served as the other vice-chairs.


were based on consensus and compromise, al-though informal polls were sometimes taken togauge support and/or opposition to a specificproposal. Although formal voting on issues isprovided for in the rules of the ITU, it is usuallyonly used as a last resort, and no formal voteswere taken at WARC-92. This was considered aminor victory by some members of the U.S.delegation, since the United States was isolatedon some issues and had only tentative support onothers. Formal voting on these issues could havebeen embarrassing for the United States.

As a result of the month-long negotiations,WARC-92 allocated frequencies to a number ofemerging radiocommunication services and sys-tems, including low-Earth orbiting satellite (LEOS)systems, 7 broadcasting-satellite services for audiobroadcasting (BSS-Sound), and HDTV. See box1-A for brief descriptions of these services. Theconference also expanded the frequency alloca-tions for the Mobile-Satellite Service (MSS),high-frequency (HF) broadcasting, and a varietyof space research and operations services. Box1-B summarizes the allocations made at WARC-92 and figure 1-1 shows a sample page from theFinal Acts of WARC-92. Chapter 2 discusses theallocations in greater detail.

WARC-92 differed from past WARCs inseveral respects. It was the first WARC in morethan 12 years to attempt a broad revision of theinternational Table of Frequency Allocations. Asopposed to the WARCs of the 1980s, whichgenerally concentrated on one service-mobile,high-frequency broadcasting, or space communi-cation services--WARC-92 addressed a widerange of allocation issues covering many seg-ments of the radio spectrum. Compounding thebreadth of the conference, the time allotted toWARC-92 was short, both for preparations-lessthan 2 years-and for the conference itself.

New radiocommunication services will permit peopleto communicate to and from almost anywhere in theworld.

WARC-92 was limited to only 4 weeks; however,for previous WARCs, the ITU had allottedsubstantially longer time.

Most analysts believe that WARC-92 wasprobably the last broad reallocation conferencethat will be held. At a special plenipotentiary heldin December 1992, the ITU adopted a newtimetable for future radiocommunication confer-ences. 8 According to that schedule, WARCs,renamed ‘‘world radiocommunication confer-ences,’ would be held every 2 years. Mostobservers expect these conferences to be narrowerin focus than WARC-92-concentrating on oneservice or area of the spectrum, more like theWARCs of the 1980s. The format and workingprocedures of future conferences were alsochanged in order to streamline decisionmakingand reflect the increasing role of the private sectorin international telecommunications policymak-ing. The full impact of these changes will not befelt for several years, however, since some of theagreed-to changes have not yet been imple-

7 No types of LEOS systems were considered by WARC-92. “Little” LEOS systems plan to provide data and position-location servicesand will operate in the VHF/UHF frequencies. ‘‘Big” LEOS will provide telephone services in addition to dat% and will operate in frequenciesabove 1 GHz.

8 See OTA, M!4RC-92, op. cit., footnote 1 for further discussion of the organization and functioning of the ITU.


Box 1-B-5ummary of WARC-92 Allocations

WARC-92 allocated frequencies for a number of new and existing radiocommunication services. The allocations, however, do not tell the whole story of the decisions made at WARC-92. All of the allocations summarized below are subject to limitations and constraints that are described in footnotes to the allocations and in various resolutions and recommendations the conference adopted for each service. These footnotes, resolutions and recommendations are examined in more detail In chapter 2.

High-Frequency (HF) Broadcasting A total of 790 kHz was allocated to HF broadcasting with 200 kHz located in frequencies below 10 MHz (the

most congested portion of the HF bands), and 590 between 11 and 19 MHz. All the newly allocated bands are allocated on a worldwide basis, an are subject to piannlng, and all must use single sideband (SSB) modulation for transmission.

5900-5950 kHz 7300-7350 kHz 9400-9500 kHz 11600-11650 kHz 12050-12100 kHz

Broadcastlng·Satellite Service-Sound (BSS-Sound) 1452-1492 MHz 2310-2360 MHz

3800-13870 kHz 3570-13600 kHz

5600-15800 kHz 7480-17550 kHz

B900-19020 kHz

WOrldwide, except the United States Only In the United States and India

2535-2655 MHz Various countries in Europe and Asia

All BSS-Sound operations are required to use digital audio broadcasting (DAB) technology.

Broadcasting·Satellite Service-High-Definition Television 17.3-17.8 GHz ITU Region 2 only

21.4-22.0 GHz ITU Regions 1 and 3

Terrestrial Mobile Service 1700-2690 MHz 1885-2025 MHz &

2110-2200 MHz

Moblle-8atellite Service

Upgraded to primary status worldwide

Intended for Future Public Land Mobile TelecomrTlJnlca-lions Systems (FPLMTS) worict,.ide. Fi6qu6i.aes fUi a satellite component of FPLMTS were also identified.

MSS allocations are made in pairs-one set of frequencies for transmission from the Earth to sateiiites [uplinks) and one set for transmissions from satellites to Earth (downlinks).

1492-1525 MHz (downlink) Region 2 only, not allocated In the United States 1675-1710 MHz (uplink) 1525-1559 MHz (downlink)

Region 2 only Portions remain allocated specifically to land, maritime, and aeronauticai services, butthe United States has allocated almost the entire band to generic MSS.1

1 With the exception of 1545-1555 MHz, which remains allocated to the aeronautical mobile satellite service.


1626.6-1660.5 MHz (uptink)

1930-1970 MHz (uplink) 2120-2160 MHz (downiink) 1980-2010 MHz (uplink)

2170-2200 MHz (downlink)

?l;nn_?I;?n UJ-I7 Irtnwnlinlc\ _vv ..... _"' __ ,.11._ ,_ ..... ".'11' .. '1

2670-2690 MHz (uplink)

Low-Earth Orbiting Satellites Using frequencies above 1 GHz (big LEOS): 1610-1626.5 MHz (uplink) 2483.5-2500 MHz (downlink) 1613.8~ 1626.5 MHz

Using Frequencies Beiow ; GHz (iittie LEOS): 137-138 MHz (downlink) 148-149.9 MHz (uptink) 400.15-401 MHz (downlink)

Space Services

As above, portions remain allocated to specific ~and, maritime, and aeronautical) services, but the United States has allocated the majority of the band to generic MSS.2 On a secondary basis for Region 2 only. On a secondary basis for Region 2 oniy. With an additional 10 MHz allocated at 1970-1980 MHz for Region 2 only. With an additional 10 MHz allocated at 2160-2170 MHz in Region 2 only.

Upgraded to primary

Allocated (secondary status) for downlinks in order to permit bidirectional use of the band.

Portions of which are secondary Secondary in more than 70 countries

A number of allocations were made to various space services, including space research, space operations, and Earth exploration satellite services. Frequencies were allocated in the 400-420 MHz bands for space communications and research, in the 2 GHz bands for space research, operations, and Earth-exploration satellite service, and in the bands above 20 GHz for inter· satellite links, Earth-exploration satellite, and (deep) space research services.

Aeronauiicai PubHc Correspondence 1670-1675 MHz was allocated worldwide for ground-to-aircraft communications, to be paired with 1800-1805

MHz for aircraft-to-ground transmissions. The United States will maintain its existing system at 849-851 MHz and 894-896 MHz.

Flxed"Satellite Service A worldwide allocation was made at 13.75-14.0 GHz.

2 With the except/on of 1646.5-1656.5 MHz, which remains allocated exclusively to aeronautical mobile satellite service. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. 1993.


MOD

Figure l-l-Sample Page From Final Acts of WARC-92

MHz1613.8 -1626.5r———

L— —— —Allocation to Serwces

1 Region 1

11

Frequencies — 1613.8 -1626.6

AERONAUTICALRADIONAVIGATION

MOBILE-SATELLITE(Earth-to-space)

Region 2

1613.8 -1626.5


RADiODETERMINATION-SATELLITE

(~a~h-to-space)Mobk-Satellde

J

‘‘C>733A(space-to-Earth)


New & existingfootnotes —

Mobde-Satelllte

L(“ -)

(space-to-Earth)

722727730731 731X731 Y 732733 733A 722 731X 731 Y 732733

\733B 733E 733F 733C 733D 733E

r SUP 731A

Footnotesthat have

{

S U P 731B

beenremoved. S U P 731C

L S U P 731D

Region 3

1613.8 -1626.5



Radiodeterminatlon-Satelhte(Earth-to-space)733A

Moblle+atelhte(space-to-Earth)

722727730731 X 731 Y732733 733B 733E

Indicates anew footnotethat hasbeen addedto the table.

L> 0A D D 731Y

The use of the band 1613.8 -1626.5 MHz by the mobile-satelllteservice (space-to-Earth) is subject to the application of the coordi-nation and notification procedures set forth in Resolution COM5/8.

+- ITURegions

Allocations

1

1 Primaryserwces arelisted In allcapital letters

1I

/

Secondaryservices areIrsted m Initialcapdal letters.

Final Acfs of fhe thfd


mented. In order to evaluate the implications ofthese changes for the United States, the Depart-ment of State has convened a task force under theauspices of the U.S. national CCIR/InternationalTelegraph and Telephone Consultative Committ-ee (CCITT) committee structure. That group willalso study possible improvements in U.S. struc-tures and procedures that could allow the UnitedStates to participate more effectively in the newITU.

THEMES AND TRENDS FROM WARC-92A number of broad trends complicated the

negotiations leading up to and at WARC-92, andseveral important themes were evident at theconference that will influence the course of futureITU proceedings and meetings. U.S. spectrumpolicymakers and managers must take account ofthese trends in order to ensure the success of U.S.negotiating efforts for future world radiocommu-nication conferences.

E Spectrum Negotiations Are BecomingIncreasingly Difficult

The overarching message to come out ofWARC-92 is how difficult it has become toachieve international consensus on spectrummatters. WARC-92 has been described as one ofthe most difficult international radio conferencesin memory. The issues were technically complexand interrelated. New geopolitical realities hadredefined who the important players were, andeconomic concerns drove countries to protecttheir existing radio services and users with atenacity rarely seen before.

WARC-92 came very near to failing entirely.9

Twenty-four hours before the scheduled end ofthe conference, several major allocation issuesremained unresolved-future public land mobile

telecommunications systems (FPLMTS), MSS,and BSS-Sound—and delegates talked openlyabout calling a formal halt to the proceedings. Ifthat had occurred, it is possible that no decisionswould have been accepted, no new allocationswould have been made, and more than 2 years ofpreparation would have been left unfulfilled.

Several factors made WARC-92 difficult. First,the agenda for the conference changed (andexpanded) substantially over time. originally,WARC-92 was conceived as a limited conferencethat would resolve issues left over from previousWARCs and address a small number of newallocations for space and mobile services. Afterthe initial scope of WARC-92 was set by the 1989ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, however, it wasexpanded considerably at the 1990 ITUAdministra-tive Council meeting. At that meeting, the UnitedStates added many new items to the agenda,including frequency allocations for ‘little’ LEOS,terrestrial supplements to BSS-Sound, and somenew space services. Even after the agenda wasfinalized in 1990, however, the range of topics tobe addressed continued to grow. Companies inthe United States unveiled plans in late 1990 for“big” LEOS systems that would provide tele-phone service in addition to data communica-tions, and that would require a frequency alloca-tion all their own. Because these systems are atype of Mobile-Satellite Service, they were con-sidered at WARC-92 as part of the MSS negotia-tions. The result of this expansion was that issuesbecame more complex and interrelated, moreviewpoints had to be accommodated, and gover-nment and private sector resources were stretchedvery thin. Nonetheless, the broader agenda didforce WARC-92 to consider many (new) topics inwhich the United States had important interests.

g Ln ITU parlance, ‘‘fail’ seems to have a specific mcaning, although there is disagreement over exactly what it is. Some delegates believethat if a conference fails, it is adjourned without any final agreements being signed+ven on those issues where decisions had been reached.Others believe that the conference could sign a partial agreement on items that had been agreed to. No WARC has ever ended this way, butthe threat of “failure’ was used at WARC-92 to push delegates to compmmise.


9 Technology Issues: Existing Servicesor New Uses?

The clearest theme governing the negotiationsat WARC-92 was the battle between existing andnew technologies-how to find room in thespectrum for new technologies and services whileaccommodating the existing users of the spec-trum. The spectrum is already completely allo-cated from 9 kHz up to 275 GHz (300 GHz in theUnited States), and many of these frequencies,especially in the bands below 6 GHz are heavilyused (see box 1-C for a brief description of radio

waves and theradiospectrum). 10

DAnd while policy-

elegates makers and engi-struggled to find need-s in the United

spectrum for new States continue to

technologies while I propose ways tomake more effi-

accommodating cient use of theexisting users of spectrum andthe spectrum. accommodate

more users, con-gestion continues to increase. ll Thus, new systemsand services trying to gain access to radio frequen-cies often must contend with entrenched users withlong histories of serving public (and private) needsand who have large investments in equipment.

In the U.S. preparation process, the battle overthe 1435-1525 MHz band of frequencies illus-trates this tension. Proponents of satellite-delivered audio broadcasting wanted to use aportion of this band to deliver BSS-Sound serv-

ices. The band, however, is already used by theFederal Government and aerospace companies toprovide aeronautical telemetry (tracking, datarelay, etc.) services in support of aircraft testingand missile development.12 Debate over the U.S.proposal(s) for these frequencies was intense.

At WARC-92, the battle between old and newwas clearly evident. On most issues, countriessought to protect their existing services, in whichthey have often invested millions or billions ofdollars, while simultaneously promoting newtechnologies and services with the potential toprovide new or better services where none existedbefore or that could advance their competitiveinterests. This battle often separated the devel-oped and developing countries. Developing coun-tries, because of sunk investments and a lack ofresources to modernize, often resisted new allocat-ions that could make their existing systemsobsolete. Developed countries, on the other hand,which are generally better able to implement newtechnologies more rapidly, were the major forcepushing allocations for new types of radio serv-ices. Although resource problems face both de-veloping and developed countries, large-scalechanges in systems may be more keenly felt indeveloping countries, many of which lack thefunds and personnel to make such changes. Suchcountries are likely to need financial and technicalhelp to implement new systems. Recognizingthese problems, WARC-92 adopted Resolution22, which calls on the ITU’s TelecommunicationsDevelopment Bureau (BDT) to provide assist-ance to countries in need.13

10 o’I.A, wmc-$v, op. cit., footnote 1.11 Congms, for e=ple, has ~n considering legislation for sevaal years that would take spectrum from the government ~d me it

available to the private sector. The FCC has put great emphasis on sharing spectrum and competition in its recent proceedings, and has attemptedto encourage innovation and Spectrum-efficient applications in its Pioneer’s Preference ruling. NTrA has initiated a study looking at thelong-range spectrum needs of the counrry. Scholars, policymakers, and industry analysts alike are debating the value of auctions for assigningspec(rum rights. See OTA, WMC-92, op. cit., footnote 1 for further discussion of the technical developments affecting spectrumcongestion.

12 MS ~mpnents ~W w~ted t. me the band for mobile services. For more information on the history of this debate, see O’M, WMC-92,

op. cit., footnote 1.

13 ~temtio~ ~lecomrnunication (hioq Fina/Ac(s of the WorkiAdministrative Radio Conference (WWC-92), Resolution 22. Hereafter,‘‘ITU, Final Acts.”

As the spectrum becomes more crowded andcongested, convincing existing users in the UnitedStates and abroad to share or give up theirspectrum will become increasingly difficult. Amer-ican strategists and policymakers must recognizethat convincing incumbents to share spectrum ormove will require sustained efforts in political,economic, and technical persuasion. As part ofthese efforts, the United States may wish to targetprograms and funding that would help developingcountries modernize their (radio) communicationservices and infrastructures. Such funding, incombination with direct private sector aid to thesecountries, would make U.S. systems and servicesmore affordable and accessible internationally,and could promote demand for U.S. technologyand equipment overseas. Such a strategy may alsohelp counter efforts on the part of other countries,notably Japan and several European countries, tobuild international marketsnications equipment.

M The Rise of RegionalAnother important trend

for their telecommu-

Blocksevident at WARC-92

was the linking of countries in groups in order tomore forcefully present their positions. WARC-92 was the first WARC held under the banner ofthe ‘new world order.’ The USSR had dissolved,and its control over a strong block of EasternEuropean countries had almost vanished.14 Thehistoric North-South divisions that separated thedeveloping and developed countries for manyyears had lessened, replaced on many issues (butnot all) by divisions between blocks of countries,each united by common regional and economicconcerns. Among these, a unified block of


<

,4. .<.\,

New satellite technologies will enable people inremote parts of the world to access many kinds ofinformation and receive technical assistance tailoredto their specific needs--all at low cost.

European countries, represented by the Confer-ence of European Postal and Telecommunica-tions administrations (CEPT), was the strongestat WARC-92. The developing countries, as agroup, exhibited little of the unity and cohesive-ness they have shown in the past. However,toward the end of the conference, under theguidance of Mr. Abderrazak Berrada of Morocco,many of the developing countries, especiallyfrom Africa and the Middle East, were able toexercise considerable control over debate onmany important issues.

15 While other regional

blocks did not show the cohesiveness and deter-mination of CEPT, some countries of the AsianPacific and Latin America were able to cooperateon specific issues—indicating their potentialemergence as a force to be reckoned with at futureconferences.

14 me Russia Federation did send a delegation to WARC-92, as did the Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus. The delegates for lheSe newcountries were, by and large, the same individuals that had represented the USSR in the pas~ and they usually acted together in their proposalsand negotiations. By most assessments they were an effective, although limited, force at WARC-92.

15 At past co~ermms, developing ~untries often would setup (or threaten) votes on specfIc issues they knew they had a maJorhY for. hthis way, they could more directly control the outcomes of the conferences. At WARC-92 their impact was much more beni~ if important-no votes were takeq but the number of potential votes commanded by Mr. Berrada was an important force in making the developing countriesvoices heard and forcing concessions out of the developed countries.


CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN POSTAL ANDTELECOMMUNICATIONS ADMINISTRATIONS

to present a more unified front at internationalmeetings. In forums such as WARC-92, where

The most powerful bloc at WARC-92 was each country has one vote, such a unified groupCEPT, representing 32 European countries.l6 can potentially command a substantial number ofCEPT members are the telecommunications regu- votes, and this power gives an enormous amountlatory authorities from each participating country. of leverage in conference negotiations. At WARC-For the past several years, CEPT has been gaining 92, CEPT was closely coordinated, presentingthe attention of U.S. international spectrum ex- common positions on most of the items theperts as it has become more coordinated and able conference considered. The tight cohesiveness

16 Atilou@ ~~ is dfIIOSt unanimously regarded as the most powerful single force at WARC-92, curiously, little mention has been madeas to how effective the European bloc was at the conference. While such an evaluation is outside the scope of this report, future studies of theCEPT organimtion and processes might provide valuable lessons for the United States as it plans for future conferences.

Chapter l-Summary and FindingsI 19

Table l-C-l—Radio Frequency Bands and Uses

NAME Frequency range Examples of services

Very low frequency (VLF)

Low frequency (LF)

Medium frequency (MF)

High frequency (HF)

Very high frequency (VHF)

Ultrahigh frequency (UHF)

Superhigh frequency (SHF)

Extremely high frequency (EHF)

3 to 30 kHz

30 to 300 kHz

300 to 3,000 kHz

3 to 30 MHz

30 to 300 MHz

300 to 3,000 MHz

3 to 30 GHz

Above 30 GHz

Marine navigation

Marine and aeronautical navigation equipment

AM radio broadoast, LORAN maritime navigation, long-distance aeronautical and maritime navigation

Shortwave broadcast, amateur radio, CB radio

Private radio land mobile services such as police, fire, andtaxi dispatch; TV channels (2 through 13); FM broadcasting;cordless phones; baby monitors

UHFTV channels; cellular phones; common carrier point-to-point microwave transmission used by Iong-distance phonecompanies; satellite mobile services

Radar, point-to-point micowave, and satellite communication

Satellite communioations and space research

SOURCE: Harry Mileaf (cd.), Electronics One, revised 2n Ed. (Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden Book Co., Inc., 1976), p. 1014; and JohnJ. Keller, “No Vacancies,” The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 9,1990, p. R14.

Individual radiocommunication services use specific bands of frequencies, which are allocated to them atworld administrative radio conferences (WARCs). FM radio broadcasting, for example, uses the 88-108 MHz band(see figure 1-C-2). In many cases, however, bands of frequencies are shared by different services. In the lowerpart of the radio spectrum, for example, frequency bands are often shared by fixed (point-to-point) and mobileradiocommunication services.

Figure l-C-2—Radio Frequency Spectrum and Selected Services

AM radio(535-1 705 kHz)

r-” I

VHF TV,chs. 2-6 Ku-Band

(54-72 MHz VHF TV, (10.7-12.2 GHzand chs. 7-13 Cellular and

76-88 MHz) (1 74-216 MHz) (825-894 MHz)

L“7”J “ ? 2 5 ~ ? ? $ 1 5 G H z )(88-108 MHz) (512-806 MHz)

< [ —...–. ..+ . ....–...~ ~ I ..-+..-1

300 kHz 3000 kHz 30 MHz 300 MHz 3000 MHz(3 MHz) (3 GHz)

L——-J >

30 GHz

NOTE: This figure uses a logarithmic scale with dashed lines representing breaks in the scale. Shaded areas in different segmentsof the scale are not proportional. For example, AM radio occupies 1,170 kHz of spectrum, while cellular (which appears smallervisually) actually occupies 69,000 kHz of spectrum.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.


and determined approach of the CEPT countriesmade CEPT a strong, almost immovable force onmany issues.17

In analyzing the performance of CEPT atWARC-92, some observers and delegates tend tosee CEPT as a monolithic group that would notcompromise on any issue. In large part, this viewstems from CEPT’s unwillingness to compromiseon the high visibility MSS (including big LEOS)issues that were priorities for the United States.Individual European countries were often unwill-ing to change their positions so as not to breakdown the unity of the CEPI’positions.18 However,while it is true that CEPT’s lack of flexibilitymade it difficult to negotiate with on severalimportant issues, on other matters CEPT wasreportedly more willing to compromise. In thedebate over BSS-Sound, for example, internaldivisions in CEPT forced a change in its position.

The perceived inflexibility of the CEPT bloc(and the United States’ own determination) ap-pears to have had at least one positive outcome.Delegates from both sides agree that such rigidityundermined the ability of Europe and the UnitedStates to negotiate before and at WARC-92, andthat more flexibility in negotiations might pro-duce better outcomes at future conferences. Thisrealization may lead to more productive discus-sions and negotiations between the United Statesand Europe prior to the next world radiocommu-nication conference.

The role of CEPT in future internationalspectrum negotiations is somewhat unclear due tocontinuing reorganization of its structure andfunctions. Prior to 1987, CEPT was composed oftelecommunications regulators, systems opera-tors, and telecommunications services providers.In that year, the role of CEPT was redefined and

the scope of its power diminished by transferringstandards development activities to the EuropeanTelecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).In September 1992, CEPT reorganized again, andnow consists solely of telecommunications regu-lators, with system operators and services provid-ers forming a separate group.19 Within CEPT, thefocal point of radiocommunication policymakingis the European Radiocommunications Office(ERO), which evaluates spectrum use and devel-opment, manages spectrum interests, and devel-ops long-term spectrum policy.

As a result of these restructurings, CEPTactivities have become increasingly focused onregional and international radiocommunicationspolicymaking-with the goal of promoting greaterharmonization of European policies. This concen-tration, and the slowly increasing political andeconomic unification of Europe, may eventuallystrengthen CEPT as an organization and bring itto the forefront of European radiocommunicationpolicy development. However, at the end of 1992,the various European organizations (includingCEPT, ETSI, and the European Community (EC))had not settled all the jurisdictional and proce-dural battles over radiocommunication policy. Itis still too early to tell if restructuring will makethe European process more or less effective, andwhat impact these efforts will have on Europeanperformance at future world radiocomrmmicationconferences.

Aside from its new focus on radiocommunica-tions policy, regional changes could bolsterEurope’s and CEPT’s position. Driven by eco-nomic concerns, for example, the nations ofEurope are becoming increasingly united on tradeand competitiveness issues—a trend that may

17 me ~~vior of CEPT at W~C-92 has been likened to a battleship-large and powdtd, but slow to ~uver.

18 ~ addition t. the CEPT ~oup, the Europ~ community had its own representatives at W~C-92. Some U.S. delegates to W~C-92believe that this group was present to enforce the solidarity of the European countries at the conference. Several observers, however, note thatsuch pressures were resisted by CEPT members, especially those not belonging to the EC, and that the relationship between the EC and CEPTrepresentatives was strained at best.

19 ~~= Evagow ‘‘cEn: Ri3di0 hterference, “ Communications Week International, July 20, 1992, p. 4,


foreshadow greater cooperation on radiocommu-nication policy development in order to supportcommon economic goals. With the dissolution ofthe USSR, the newly independent countries ofEastern Europe have been seeking alliances withWestern Europe, including joining CEPT or theEC (see figure 1-2). CEPT’s numbers (and hencethe number of potential votes CEPT wouldrepresent) will likely swell in the next severalyears. A larger CEPT representing more countriesat future conferences could pose a substantialchallenge to U.S. negotiators and policymakers.

INTER-AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONSCONFERENCE (CITEL)

The countries of the Western Hemisphere havetheir own forum for coordinating telecommunica-tions policies, CITEL.20 However, in the past,CITEL has served little more than a discussionfunction for its members; it has not been aneffective force for coordinating regional radio- ortelecommunication policies. In preparation forWARC-92, many of the countries in the WesternHemisphere, including the United States, made aconcerted effort to build regional cooperation-atleast in part in response to the perceived power ofthe CEPT alliance-in order to present a stronger,more united front at the conference. Two formalmeetings were held in an attempt to work outcommon positions, and working groups were setup to develop common views that could be usedby all CITEL members to form the basis for theirown national proposals.21 Despite recognition ofthe importance of such activities and extensivediscussions between countries, no formal com-mon proposals/positions were adopted.

During the conference, CITEL had little moresuccess in building a stronger presence and

promoting regional views. A schedule of meet-ings had not been set up in advance of WARC-92and formal discussions were held only in the last2 weeks of the conference. Ambassador Baranhosted a luncheon for CITEL members, but onlya few countries attended. The CEPT countries, onthe other hand, met daily to update members onlate-breaking news and to develop negotiationstrategies and responses. In the end, the CITELeffort was ineffective because members could notagree on common views.

The ineffectiveness of CITEL at WARC-92 isthe result of several factors. There is littlehistorical tradition of cooperation between thecountries in the Western Hemisphere on telecom-munication matters. CITEL has been under-funded by the Organization of American States,its parent organization, for many years. Perhapsmost importantly, the countries that participate inCITEL are a more heterogeneous group-politically, economically, and culturally-thanthe countries that belong to CEPT. There arefewer natural and historical linkages that can beused to promote cooperation.

However, the failure of CITEL’S efforts atWARC-92 should not be considered a systemicfailure of CITEL as a coordination mechanism.Rather, its ineffectiveness illustrates the need forbetter regional cooperation, both in conferencepreparation and at the conferences, and indicatesthat further work must be done if CITEL is tomore forcefully represent the interests of itsmembers. Most analysts do not believe, however,that the goal of efforts to improve CITEL shouldbe to mirror the kind of organization representedby CEPT--namely, development and strict ad-herence to common regional proposals by allmembers. “Common proposals” carry with them

m CITEL is an ongoing conference convened under the auspices of the @g anization of American States. See OTA, WIRC-92, op. cit.,footnote 1 for a more in-depth discussion of CITEL, its historical developmen~ and its WMC-92 preparations.

z] ~s approach differs from that of CE~, which actually submitted ‘‘European Common Proposals for the Work Of the Cotierence. ’ ~contrast, the idea behind CITEL WARC-92 preparations was not for the CITEL countries to actually submit “common proposals’ to whicheach country would adhere, but to develop common positions from which each country would develop and submit its own formal, individualproposals for WMC-92. See International Tklecormmmication Unio~ “European Common Proposals for the Work of the Conference, PartsI and II, ” Document 20-E, Oct. 7, 1991.


Figure 1-2--Current and Projected European Community Membership

— —

ijz/z ”/Finland Russia

v

&v Estonia (2000)

Latvia (2000)y!

1’ Lithuania (2000)

cSzech Republic (2000Liechtenstein (1996)?iwitzerland (1996)Yovenia (2000),

*W”

<~

w Mlual Ila

G

Greece ‘

Q

‘---”T

– Bosnia-Herzegovina

— Montenegro

,.,

D European Community ~ European Free Trade Association m EC Associate Countries

(1996), (2000) –Indicate projected dates countries may join the European Community



the potential loss of national sovereignty andcould lead to the type of inflexibility manyobservers attributed to CEPT. Maintaining na-tional flexibility in a framework of regionalcooperation seems to be the consensus goal ofthose involved.

Continued improvement in CITEL’s effective-ness will require the cooperative efforts of theU.S. private sector and the Federal Government,as well as the other member countries of CITEL.Representatives from all these groups recognizethe need for better coordination, and individualsfrom several CITEL countries approached U.S.delegation members and observers to talk aboutways to improve future efforts. A long-termcommitment must be made to the CITEL processif the region is to effectively work together atfuture world radiocommunication conferences.

OTHER REGIONAL BLOCKSIn addition to CEPT and CITEL, some dele-

gates reported that the French- and English-speaking countries of Africa were more unitedthan they had been at past conferences. They alsoshowed a willingness to follow the leadership ofMorocco on several issues, making Africa apowerful force in later stages of the conference.As further evidence of the increasing unity of theAfrican continent, observers point to the develop-ment of a regional satellite system-RASCOM.Some analysts believe that the unifying force ofa common satellite communications system maylead to a more coherent approach to meeting thecommunications needs of the continent, andcould form the basis for future cooperative effortsamong the countries of Africa in telecommunica-tions development and policymaking.

This coalescence could present the UnitedStates with an opportunity to improve relationswith African nations and strengthen its negotiat-ing positions internationally. Africa is part of thesame ITU region (Region 1, see figure 1-3) as

Europe. Improved ties and cooperation withAfrica could provide leverage for U.S.-supportedproposals. Other observers point out, however,that the African nations are still disorganized—they have nothing approaching the CEPT or evenCITEL organizations, and are not yet a majormarket for telecommunications products or serv-ices.

The countries of the Asian Pacific representanother region of the world that is becomingincreasingly important. While the region does nothave an organization comparable to CEPT, the sixcountries of the Association of South East AsianNations (ASEAN) have cooperated on tradeissues in the past and have announced theformation of a free trade area that would include320 million People.** And while not a member ofASEAN, Australia has been an active force at pastconferences, including WARC-92. Japan hasbeen quiet at past conferences, but has economicpower that could come into play in the future.Although uniting all these countries in a singletrading block is unlikely in the short term, theyrepresent a huge market for U.S. goods andservices, and could become powerful representa-tives of regional interests in ITU activities.

Because of these political/economic realign-ments and differences in the ways countries usespectrum, the United States has lost many impor-tant allies and some of the historical influence ithas wielded in international radiocommunicationpolicymaking. At past conferences, the UnitedStates had usually been able to count on theindustrialized world and even, to a certain extent,on the USSR for support. By 1992, however,many of these historical ties had dissolved, andnew ones were still being developed. As a result,at different points in the conference, the UnitedStates found itself isolated on several importantissues. The Europeans, for example, opposed theUnited States on many items, including some ofthe most important issues of the conference-

22 ASEAN mem~s include: Brunei Darussalam, Lndonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The ASE~ Fr= Trtie ha(AIWA) is expected to begin Jan. 1, 1993. Paul Blustei~ “Southeas[ Asia Joins the Bloc Party,’ The Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1992, p. B1.

330-071 0 - 93 - 2 QL 3

24 I The 1992 World A

dministrative R

adio Conference: Technology and Policy Im

plications

/’”b.

.___.!!l!!yy-Ji

l

Figure 1-3-lnternational Telecommunication Union Regions of the World

d

Region 2 Region 1

~;{1 tJl

(} ~

w Region 3

d"V

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Tables of Frequency Allocations and Other Extracts From: Manual of Regulations and PrOC8dur9S for Federal ,Radio Frequency Management, September 1989 ad., p. 4--30.

future terrestrial mobile services, MSS, andBSS-Sound. The United States was also not ableto develop significant worldwide support for itsproposals on aeronautical public correspondence(APC) and HDTV.23 The United States can nolonger rely solely on its market power andtechnological preeminence to influence the out-comes of international radiocommunications con-ferences.

The rise of regional blocks of countries actingin concert at ITU forums presents the UnitedStates with both threats and opportunities. Thethreats stem from the possibility that U.S. propos-als and positions could be overpowered in futureWARCs. Conversely, the fluid state of alliancespresents the United States with an importantopportunity to encourage the formation of otherblocks of countries, either on a regional basis orperhaps based on a particular special interest, thatcould support U.S. positions. The United Stateswould not necessarily have to be an officialmember of such alternative alliances for them toprove useful. The development of alternate,competing power centers could be used to balanceeach other at future conferences. At the sametime, the United States should cultivate alliances,both with members of the Western Hemisphereand with individual countries or other regional orinternational organizations that share U.S. con-cerns, in order to promote U.S. interests.

1 The Economics and Politics of WARC-92Economics and, as a consequence, politics are

playing increasingly pivotal roles in the allocat-ion of spectrum both internationally and domes-tically. In the past, international spectrum alloca-tion was largely the province of governmentengineers, spectrum managers, and representa-tives from a few large (U. S.) telecommunicationscompanies. Today, as the world’s telecommuni-cations industries and service providers are in-


creasingly turned over to private ownership andas markets are opened to competition around theworld, the economic stakes associated with spec-trum policy are growing. Decisions that wereonce based primarily on technical considerationsare now decided on the basis of economics(investments, revenues, and competitiveness) andpolitics as well as technology. As countries (orblocks of countries) have sought to advance theireconomic interests in radiocommunications, spec-trum allocations have become a weapon in thebattle for global economic supremacy, and WARCs,which decide how frequencies are to be dividedbetween services, have become anew focus in theintense globalstruggle for com-petitive advantagein radiocommu-nication technol-ogies and serv-ices. Countriesseek to protectthe interests andinvestments oftheir existing do-mestic users, and

E conomics and

politics are playing

increasingly pivotal

roles in spectrum

allocation—

internationally and

domestically.

try to gain an advantage for their manufacturersand service providers in order to promote compet-itiveness.

Evidence of the increasingly political aspect ofthe process is abundant. In the United States,companies or government agencies fighting forspectrum often raise the battles to the politicallevel—pitting Congress against the FCC, and theDefense Department against the private sector.Congress, for example, got involved in the FCC’sspectrum reserve proceeding in order to protectthe interests of the incumbent users of frequenciesthe FCC proposed to reallocate. FCC commis-sioners have noted the political pressures andrumors surrounding the pioneer’s preference pro-

Z3 III tic Cme of APC, the united St,ites held to its or@ud positio~ protecting the systerm already being used in the United Statti, cm~da,and Mexico. However, in the case of HDTV, the IJtil~d States went along with a compromise supported by other members of Region 2, theWestern Hemisphere.


ceedings for LEOS services.24 Motorola wrotethen Vice-President Dan Quayle, seeking help inpreventing the International Maritime SatelliteOrganization (Inmarsat) from entering the bigLEOS arena (see chapter 2).

The consequences of this focus on economicsand the consequential politicalization of WARCShave a number of effects clearly seen at W~C-92. First, despite the general belief that globalallocations are the most advantageous-in termsof market size, consequential lower equipmentcosts, and reduction of interference-allocationswere often made on a regional or even country-specific basis. Many countries, the United Statesincluded, inserted footnotes into the internationalTable of Frequency Allocations that prohibitservices from operating in their country or allo-cate services that will operate only in theircountry. 25 Although such footnotes are some-

times necessary to protect important nationalservices, fictionalization of the allocation tablein this way makes it harder to share spectrum andcoordinate services, and may lead to an increasein interference between different services operat-ing in the same band in different countries.Divided allocations may also reduce the potentialmarket for new services, increase equipmentcosts, and may even make some services (techni-cally and/or economically) infeasible. The nega-tive impacts of regionalization should not beoverestimated, however. The large size of someregional markets may mean that a worldwidesystem or service would not convey any furthersignificant economies of scale or size.

Second, in order to protect existing services,technical limitations were put on many of the new

allocations. These include sharing requirements,power limitations, and stringent coordinationprocedures. Such limitations could severely limitthe ability of a new service to operate and couldpreclude it altogether in some circumstances. Atbest, such limitations make the process of devel-oping and introducing a new international radio-communication service more difficult and subjectto failure if countries cannot agree.

Third, long transition times were attached tosome new services. In many cases, these servicescannot come into operation for 10 or 15 years.These long transitions are designed to protectinvestments in equipment—allowing time forcompanies and countries to recover their invest-ments before the systems are replaced. However,in an era of rapid technological change, whengenerations of technology are measured not inyears, but in months, such a practice can also beused to allow lagging countries to ‘‘catch up’ totheir competitors in the development of newtechnologies. In this role, long transition times aresometimes perceived as protectionist mecha-nisms of foreign trade policy.

For the future, the role of politics and economicsmust be clearly recognized and explicitly includedin preparations and negotiation strategies. As thetraditional role and power of foreign postal,telegraph, and telephone administrations (PTTs)erode, the locus of power will likely shift to privatecompanies and government telecommunicationministries. The experience of WARC-92 showedthe effectiveness of making direct contacts withhigh government officials in other countries. It isat these higher levels that political and economicpressures will be understood and acted on. Closer

N Comments of Co@ssioner Ervin S. Duggaq “FCC Tentatively Chooses Non-profit Organization ~Oposing LEO Siitellk sCXVlCf3 toAid Developing Country Volunteer Programs to Receive First Pioneer’s Licensing Preference, ’ Telecommwican”ons Reports, Jan. 20, 1992.Comments of Commissioner James Quello at the August 5, 1992 meeting of the Federal Communications Commission.

25 Footnotes to the inte~tio~’rableof Frequency Allocations, just like the footnote you are r=ding, tierdesctibeor limit tie allocationsListed in the table. They are designated by number and letter-731X (see figure 1-1, which shows a sample page horn the international lhbleof Frequency Allocations, including how footnotes are presented). Footnotes are used for a variety of purposes, including to specify powerlevels, reference relevant resolutions, and allocate additional services. As noted, footnotes are also used by a country (or countries) to preservesome measure of national sovereignty when they disagree with the allocations that were made internationally. These country footnotes can makealternative or additional allocations or can limit operations within those countries.

Chapter I-Summary and Findings 127

cooperation with high-ranking foreign governmentofficials may enhance the ability to achievecompromises acceptable to all sides.

9 The Rise of the Private SectorINTERNATIONAL AND WARC ISSUES

As the forces of privatization and liberalizationsweep through the world’s telecommunicationand radiocommunication industries, the numberand influence of private sector interests and usergroups are growing. This rise has the potential toalter the ways in which radiocommunicationpolicies are determined internationally by bring-ing telecommunications system operators, manu-facturers, and users more directly into the process.However, the increasing role of the private sectorin international telecommunications regulationand negotiations may pose a threat to interna-tional structures and institutions such as the ITU.Historically, the ITU has been primarily anintergovernmental organization, bringing togetherthe nations of the world in order to harmonizetelecommunication and radiocommunication pol-icies and coordinate international usage. With therise of transnational telecommunication fins,however, and the demise of the government-controlled PTTs, control of the world’s tele- andradiocommunications networks and policies isincreasingly being influenced by the privatesector.

As a result, the focus of world telecommunica-tion and radiocommunication policymaking couldshift. The structures and processes that were setup to accommodate intergovernmental negotia-tions may prove inadequate for private sectorneeds. Recognizing this, the ITU is attempting toopen its activities more to the private sector. If itsefforts succeed, it may survive as a new, moreindustry-oriented ITU. However, if its processesand structures begin to be seen by the private

sector as too slow, or too political, or evenirrelevant, some or all of the ITUs functionscould increasingly be bypassed.

The rise of the translational corporation poseschallenges to both domestic and internationalWARC preparations and negotiations, althoughthe extent to which this is a serious problem is stillunclear. Often such companies have branches orsubsidiaries in many countries. In the prepara-tions for world radiocommunication conferences,it is possible that representatives of these compa-nies will pursue proposals that favor their homecountry or their company over best interests of thecountry in whichthey work. In theUnited States,with its open(FCC) prepara-tion process, thisis a serious con-cern. Foreign-based or foreign-owned companiesdoing business inthe United Statesmay seek to in-

The private

sector’s rising

influence is creating

new threats and

opportunities for

United States

spectrum

policymakers.

fluence U.S. spectrum policy through their U.S.subsidiaries or partners in ways that favor them ortheir countries.26

The multinational character of these companiesis felt at the WARCs as well. In recent years, asthe international trend to privatization and liberal-ization has advanced, more and more members ofprivate companies have been serving on othernations’ WARC delegations. This trend contin-ued at WARC-92, and promises to accelerate inthe future as ITU activities are increasinglyopened to private sector participation. Somecompanies, in fact, may actually have representa-tives on several different delegations27—raising

26 b WARC.92 prepmatiom, questions of foreign ownership and the influence that it might have on U.S. policymaking were I-tied iIIcomection with two LEOS firms-Starsys, Inc., which has ties to the French Governmen~ and I-oral, which is 49 percent owned by foreigncompanies (see chapter 2).

z? Motorola, for example, had representatives on several delegations, including the U-nited States, Canad% France, md Australia.


the possibility at least that in international forasuch as ITU conferences and meetings, thesecompanies may (surreptitiously) choose to pursuestrategies that protect or promote the company’sbest interests, but do not support and may actuallyundercut the efforts of the governments on whosedelegations they serve.

DOMESTIC ISSUESThe ramifications of this rise internationally

are far-reaching, but the United States, with itsactive private sector and more democratic policyprocesses, could be affected more than othercountries. 28 The role of the U.S. private sector ininternational telecommunication matters is uniquein a foreign policy setting. Due to the historicaldevelopment of the telecommunication industryin this country (private, not government-owned),and the high degree of expertise private sectorrepresentatives have developed in internationalradiocommunication matters, they play a muchmore active and involved role in foreign (telecom-munication) policy than companies in otherindustries .29

During the preparations for WARC-92 and atthe conference, for example, private sector repre-sentatives were very active in the development ofU.S. proposals and in lobbying for U.S. positionsat the conference. Generally, government andindustry delegates believe these efforts wereimportant in achieving positive outcomes for theUnited States. In the case of big and little LEOS,several delegates credited much of the success ofthe U.S. proposals to the work of the LEOSprivate sector proponents supported by the gov-ernment. Ambassador Baran encouraged the wide

participation of the U.S. private sector in order todemonstrate to foreign delegates that the UnitedStates was serious about its various proposals andthat the proposals enjoyed broad industry back-ing.

The private sector will also be intimatelyinvolved in implementing the decisions of WARC-92. U.S. companies planning to operate in foreigncountries, for example, will have to develop aknowledge base of the various stakeholders andregulations in those countries in order to negotiatefor foreign licenses. The knowledge gained in thisprocess could form an important foundation forplanning and strategy as the United States pre-pares for future conferences.

The extensive involvement of the U.S. privatesector in international radiocommunication poli-cymaking has benefits and disadvantages. Theprimary benefits flow from the expertise industryrepresentatives have developed. In many casesthis experience was gained from previous servicein the Federal Government. This relation fostersa closer sense of collegiality among Governmentand nongovernment representatives that pro-motes greater cooperation and better decision-making. In this way, the private sector supple-ments the government’s own expertise, enablingthe best and brightest of American radiocommu-nication experts to contribute to developingpolicies and positions.

The downside of this involvement is thatprivate sector individuals represent the interestsof their company, and in some cases, theseinterests may conflict with the greater interests ofthe United States.30 On an individual level it is

Z8 Reco@fig the fipor~ce of this mStruCturingfOrArnaican companies, the State Department organized a private sector ITU Task Force

to develop recommendations on how the United States should approach the special plenipotentiary. The fuml recommendations of this groupwere submitted to the State Department in December 1992.

29 h E~ow espwially, he tel~communications service providers have historically been public institutions-P’ITs. In effeCt there were noprivate sector service providers, although manufacturers of equipment have been privately owned.

30 ~s i5 one remorl co~ict of interest disclosures were required fiorn W U.S. delegates.

.


often difficult to balance the two. For officialWARC delegates, this tension can be especiallytrying because delegates formally represent theUnited States, and they may have to support U.S.positions that they and their companies do notendorse and actively argued against in the past.Several delegates to WARC-92 reported feelingtorn on various issues. In cases such as these, adanger exists that an individual may work morefor his/her own interests and not support (oractually undermine) official U.S. positions. Iso-lated instances have occurred in past conferences,and infighting between the big LEOS proponentswas evident at WARC-92, but, by and large,government representatives and delegation lead-ers report that the private sector delegates wererelatively well-behaved at WARC-92.

More problematic is unofficial private sectorinvolvement at the conferences. Past practice hasallowed governments to let individuals from boththe government and industry participate in thework of the conferences as ‘‘observers’ or‘‘support staff. At WARC-92, such designationswere granted to a large number of people from theU.S. private sector. Again this practice has bothgood and bad effects. The primary advantage isthat more people increases lobbying strength tosupport U.S. positions, gauge foreign delegatesreactions, and simply get work done. WARCobservers from both the government and theprivate sector credit a strong industry presencewith helping U.S. positions get adopted. How-ever, some delegates to WARC-92 (both U.S. andforeign) and others who attended WARC-92 havecharged that lobbying was sometimes too aggres-sive or heavy-handed. Motorola, for example, hada contingent of representatives in Torremolinosestimated at over 30 people (all but one of whomwas not part of the official delegation). Too large

a group of “observers’ can easily becomeoverbearing and make foreign delegates feeldominated. In some cases, these industry repre-

sentatives, who are not formal delegates and areless subject to formal control by the delegationleadership, can be overzealous-becoming, asone observer put it, “their own worst enemy. ”Perhaps more than in the past, setting rules ofconduct early in the process and maintaining tightcontrol over the number and (to the extentpossible) the actions of unofficial delegates willbe important.

Participation by private sector companies alsoleads to questions of equity. Large corporationscan afford to send sizable groups of their employ-ees to international meetings such as a WARC.Smaller companies, however, have no such op-tion. In many cases, they hire an outside consultant/lawyer to represent them in the preparation workand at the conference. Disproportionate represen-tation such as this may give an unfair advantageto those companies well-heeled enough to partici-pate,

Finally, the direct and critical involvement ofthe private sector in sensitive international nego-tiations raises a number of important questions forU.S. policymakers. Fundamentally, who’s incharge? At what point does the U.S. Governmentlose control of foreign policy? How much latitudeshould private sector delegates have at confer-ences? Should private companies take such anaggressive role? In such an environment, com-panies may feel free to cut “deals” with foreigncountries in order to advance their own interests.In some cases, such arrangements may helpfurther the policy objectives of the United States,but should such actions be condoned? In an era oftranslational corporations that owe less and lessallegiance to any national government, there is noguarantee that private interests will always matchU.S. public policy or foreign policy objectives.Aside from questions of legality, such actionscould undercut the sovereign power of the U.S.Government to negotiate international agree-ments.


IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY ANDTECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

The lessons of WARC-92 and the implementa-tion of its outcomes cannot be analyzed inisolation from the larger context of U.S. radio-communication policymaking. That context ischaracterized by a divided government structure,a strong and involved private sector, and aphilosophical commitment to market-driven pol-icy development. The proposals that the United

The lessons ofWARC-92 cannot be

analyzed in isolationfrom the larger

context of U. S.

radiocommunication

policymaking.

States adopted forWARC-92, andthe manner inwhich the deci-sions made at theconference willbe implementeddomestically, area product of theseforces.

OTA has pre-viously analyzed

the divided structure of U.S. radiocommunicationpolicymaking and the problems that it causes inthe WARC preparation process.31 That analysisled to the conclusion that the fragmentation ofU.S. radiocommunication policymaking, lackingclear long-term policy guidelines or vision, led toradiocommunication policies that were oftenreactive and lacking focus. And while this struc-ture may have worked adequately for isolatedissues or specifically-defmed topics such asWARC-92, it works less well for developinglong-term and/or broader radiocommunicationpolicy initiatives.

Looking beyond WARC-92, although seniorpolicymakers increasingly recognize the impor-tance of the international dimensions to radio-communication policy and more effective plan-

ning, it is possible that philosophical, structural,procedural, and institutional inertia may inhibitcreative policy development and prevent theUnited States from aggressively moving ahead inradio technology policy development. Even witha change in Administrations, which may bringmore focused direction and leadership to U.S.radiocommunication policy development, struc-tural and procedural problems will continue toexist, and ideological changes at the top levels ofthe government may take some time to falter downto career spectrum managers. Established institu-tional cultures and beliefs, and uncertainty overhow much the spectrum can and should beplanned, could make the implementation of anynew vision difficult.

B Refining the Market Approach toSpectrum Policy

In place of focused forward-looking policyleadership by the Federal Government, the UnitedStates has relied almost solely on market forces toguide the development of radiocomrnunicationservices and technologies in this country .32 Andwhile market mechanisms do have advantages intechnology development, there are dangers inrelying too heavily on such an approach. Over-reliance on market mechanisms, combined withthe divided nature of U.S. radio spectrum man-agement and a lack of forward-looking action onthe part of Federal policymakers, has led to a driftin international radiocommunication policy thatcould consign the United States to being asecond-rate radiocommunication power.

Historically, the United States has based itsapproach to telecommunication development ona philosophical/ideological model that identifies“the market” as the best driver of technological

31 o’K& WMC.W, op. cit., footnote 1.

3Z NTIA, op. cit., footnote 3.


Radio astronomers use large dish-shaped antennas, such as this one in Puerto Rico, to help them explore theUniverse. These antennas must often be several hundred feet in diameter in order to pull in the faintest radio wavesfrom distant galaxies.

progress.33 34 According to this approach, market

mechanisms provide maximum flexibility to in-dustry to develop and sell products and servicesthat meet consumer/user demands. Similarly,government spectrum managers believe that apriori planning of radiocommunication serviceswould lead to inefficient use of the spectrum bycommitting frequencies to technologies and serv-ices that may not succeed in the long-run.Proponents of a market approach point to U.S.leadership in many areas of radiocommunicationtechnology and the highly developed state of U.S.radiocommunication systems (compared with othercountries) as proof that the market-based ap-

proach should be the preferred model for technol-ogy development.

PROCESSES OF MARKET-BASEDPOLICYMAKING

In practice, the market model affects thedevelopment of radiocommunication policy on atleast two levels. At the broadest level, the marketis called on to determine what technologies andservices should be developed, how much spec-trum should be allocated to them, and in whatbands. This approach to policymaking and spec-trum allocation suffers from several flaws. First,the market can only sort effectively and effi-

SJ For one view of tie difference between market-driven and technology-driven approaches to telecommunications, see Barbara J. F~~and D. Mike Maxwell, ‘‘Market-Based Public Policy, ’ Telephony, June 15, 1992 p. 80.

34 Not wi~~d~g ~ffo~ bY he FCC in he e~lY 1970s to create spec~ reserves for l~d mobd~ te&mlO@eS. For a brief hktOry Of

these actions, see Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use ofNew Telecommunications Technologies, 7 FCC Rcd No. 4, Feb. 7, 1992.


ciently between competing commercial uses, oruses that can be reduced to dollar figures. Itcannot adequately judge between a commercialsystem, for example, and a radiocommunicationservice that serves larger social goods or goals,such as public diplomacy or radio astronomy—where few or no direct monetary benefits mayaccrue. In cases such as these, public policy muststep in to fill the void left by a market approach.Policymakers must decide how to strike thebalance between the important social functionsfilled by radiocommunications-public safety,defense, diplomacy, and scientific research-and(new) commercial systems that could potentiallyimprove U.S. competitiveness in radiocommuni-cations, create jobs, and improve our balance oftrade.

Determining g the “public good’ in this new eraof wireless communication will be increasinglydifficult. Many different players in the govern-ment and industry need the radio spectrum tocarry out their missions and provide services tothe public. Domestic policy battles over spectrumuse will intensify as the Nation’s airwavesbecome increasingly congested—pitting the pri-vate sector against the government, differentdomestic radio industries against each other, andvarious Federal Government users against eachother. For example, the use of radio frequencies toprovide safety and navigation services to mari-time and aeronautical users is a vital publicinterest use of the spectrum, but it is not particu-larly glamorous. The importance of such uses cansometimes get lost in the enthusiasm for newconsumer technologies. In these battles, thelegitimate interests of the existing users of thespectrum must be balanced against the potentialbenefits to consumers and advantages to intern-ational competitiveness that new technologies

could bring. Too often, as policy is determinednow, such evaluations-based on a comprehen-sive assessment of the benefits and disadvantagesof each competing user—are not made.

Second, what is “the market’ and who definesit? Presumably the market is perceived userdemand for a product or service. Unfortunately,this demand is usually measured and reported onby the very companies that wish to serve it—theyhave an obvious motive in making the proposedservice seem as popular and desirable as possible.As a result, the marketing projections made bythese potential providers may be overestimated.The widely varying estimates of the market forsatellite-delivered phone services indicate thesubjective nature of this approach. Allowing theprivate sector to dictate radiocommunicationpolicy through its definition of market demandmay skew the policy development process inways that benefit companies at the expense ofconsumers or the long-term development of acoherent radiocommunication policy designed toserve public needs.35

Because of the difficulties in identifying “suc-cessful” technologies, opponents of greater Fed-eral Government involvement in technology de-velopment (industrial policy) believe that thegovernment should not be put in the position ofpicking specific technology winners” and ‘los-e r s . Rather, they argue that the governmentshould support any and all radio-based technolo-gies that contribute to an agreed-upon frameworkof policy goals for radiocommunications devel-opment. Such policy goals and objectives, how-ever, like the concept of universal service intelephony, cannot be set or achieved by marketforces alone.

Furthermore, some analysts, in fact, argue thatthe U.S. approach to telecommunication technol-

35 some @ysts~emorebl~t: “Thepubfichbeexlk gely shutout of the communications pOliCYprOOXS. Although the CommunicationsAct of 1934 mandates that all actions implementing it be based on determina tions that they are in ‘the public interest’ the FCC has viewedthe public as nothing more than customers. It has let those who sell services to the public decide what is best for them.” Nolan Bowie, AngetaJ. Campbelt, and Andrew Jay Schwartzmaq ‘‘Telecommunications, ‘‘ in Mark Gree~ (cd.), Changing America: Blueprints for the NewAdministration (New Ycrk: Newmarket Press, 1993), pp. 604-615.

Chapter l--Summary and Findings I 33

ogy development is often not market-, but technology-driven. “If you build it they will come” stillseems to be the dominant theme in U.S. telecom-munications technology development.

Although the current [industry] language sug-gests a market model, the actions continue tofocus on a technological one. This confusion hasbrought the industry to its present impasse. Morethan anything else, this impasse is characterizedby effort after effort to develop ‘‘market-driven”products, only to have the products repeatedly failin market trials.

Why is this happening? The industry hascarefully identified products customers coulduse. . . The answer lies in understanding howparadigms affect actions. . . if their [companies’]vision is limited by a focus on technology, if theirinsight is bounded by a commitment to specificproducts, they may see only what technology cando for customers rather than learning whatcustomers need technology to do for them.36

The reason for this continued reliance on technol-ogy has been attributed to the fact that “all toooften, the people who invent and design newtechnologies are not the ones who debate andthink through their social, economic, and policyimplications. 37 In other words, technology isoften developed by engineers who concentrate onsolving technical problems, but give less thoughtto how (or even if) the technology systems theyhave developed will really be used. Given thishistorical focus, letting the market decide, whenthe market is defined by the companies trying toserve it, is not necessarily a sound basis fordetermining public policy or the public good.More specifically, in the development of WARCproposals, the dictates of an as-yet-unspecifiedmarket demand should not be uncritically ac-cepted or given undue weight in the preparationprocess. Noncommercial systems that serve im-

portant public (safety) communication needsmust be fairly considered and equally stronglyadvocated. Government regulators and analystsmust play this role.

Some analysts have likened the change thatneeds to occur in telecommunications policy withthe change in paradigm from an industrial econ-omy to an information economy—with a changein focus from industry to public interest needs.Congress has an important role to play in movingU.S. telecommunication policymaking into the21st century. Today, legislation is often

. , . designed from art industrial age perspective toprotect industrial age players. They representsellouts to special interest groups rather than theresponsible leadership needed in these econom-ically turbulent times.38

More forward-looking leader-ship from the The dominantCongress couldpush U.S. spec- theme in U.S.

trum managers to telecommunicationsconsider more technologycarefully the development stilllong-range im-pacts of their de- seems to be

cisions on all of “if you build it theyAmerican soci- will come. ”ety, and take abroader, more comprehensive approach to evalu-ating the public good.

The second means by which the market con-trols radiocommunication policy is just as impor-tant. Once a market decision has been maderegarding which services are most needed, themarket is then called on to sort out competingsystems, standards, and companies. Unfortu-nately, the market is fickle, and acts according to

36 B~bara J. Fti and D. M&e wwe]l, “Re-g the TeIecom Field of Dreams,” Telephony, MM. 9, 1992, p. 50.

37 D. L~& &xia, remar~ &fore tie AXMNMI Conference of the Public Radio Program Directors ASSOCMO% Philadelphia% PA, Sept. 17,1992.

38 Btibm J. F- and D. M.&e Maxwell, op. cit., footnote 36.


economics-it does not necessarily take intoaccount important social or political goals.

Finally, the market does not always work. Inthe standards-setting arena, there are many exam-ples when market forces have failed, includingAM stereo and digital cellular telephone.39 Inthese cases, the failure of the market to quicklyconverge on a standard held up the developmentand deployment of the most advanced technolo-gies. In an era of rapid technology developments,

waiting for the

~ ‘arket ‘0 ‘ e t

Rstandards and sort

elying solely out winners andon the market losers could leave

undermines

effective strategic

the United Statesbehind its inter-national compe-

planning. 1 titers in advancedI wireless applica-

tions.40 Duringthe preparations for WARC-92, for example,private sector stakeholders often complainedabout the lack of government leadership andguidance in developing positions.

EFFECTS OF A MARKET-BASED APPROACHFrom a policymaking perspective, U.S. reli-

ance on market forces at both levels has severalundesirable effects. First, there is a philosophicalcommitment in this country to the democraticideal where proponents and opponents cometogether in a neutral forum to debate the merits ofan idea and arrive at a reasoned conclusion ordecision. This is a forum where information flows

freely, and the technical merits of a technologyshould decide its fate-win or lose. However, inreality, the picture is more complicated. In caseswhere the economic stakes reach into the billionsof dollars, companies will look for any means todiscredit their competitors and politics oftenenters the equation (witness the political over-tones to almost every major decision the FCCmakes). If the market were a level playing field,all rivals could compete evenly. However, in thisdebate, all parties are not equal. Larger compa-nies, with more resources and better politicalconnections and clout, can often gain an ‘unfair’advantage. As a result, the market is not allowedto function normally. It becomes hostage to thevarious political and legal machinations indus-tries use to either protect themselves (as in thecase of personal communication services) or topromote themselves (as in the case of LEOS). Themarket sometimes has less to do with decidingoutcomes than the political considerations thathave come to the fore with the rise of the(economic stakes of these) new technologies.

Relying solely on market forces to determinespectrum policy also undermines effective strate-gic planning and could decrease the long-termcompetitiveness of the United States in newradiocommunication services. Indicative of thelack of strategic focus in radiocommunicationpolicymaking, no effective governmentwide mech-anism exists for comparing and evaluating radiotechnologies and services as a basis for publicpolicy decisions. The FCC, through its publiccomment processes, does try to make these kindsof analyses, but it only controls the private sector

w ~eFCC ~s now ken m~&ted t. set a s~tid form stereo. Telecommunications Authorization Act of 1992, fiblic ~w 102-538,

Oct. 27, 1992.a A ~g~g qumhon from ~e WMC.92 p~p~atio~ process, and one that tiers debate in the stidwds-set@ ~em for new

technologies, is at what point should positions (and standards) be set. By waiting for the market to decide (determine a standard) the UnitedStates could lose any competitive advantage it might have. Waiting also makes it very dfilcuh to push U.S. proposals and policies abroad, whenthey have not been set. Such disputes were highly evident in the preparation for the ‘l%e Inter-American ‘Mecomrnunications Conference(cITEL) WARC-92 preparation meeting held in Washington DC. Would the United States be better served by adopting a decision early andgetting a potentiat jump on the competition? On the other hand, locking in a position too early could jeopardize effective negotiation-if U.S.representatives did not have the flexibility to modify their stances-just as setting a standard too early can lock in technology that is not theoptimum. For a more complete discussion of the policy issues surrounding standards setting, see U.S. Congress, OffIce of TechnologyAssessment, G106u1 Stanahrds: Building lllocks~or theFucure,TCT-512 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offtce, March 1992).


use of the spectrum. There is no open, effectiveway to compare government and nongovernmentspectrum use. WARC-92 was, in large part, astruggle for spectrum between emerging wirelesstechnologies and services and established radiofrequency users. For several reasons—lack ofobjective sources, lack of FCC staff resources,pressures imposed by the shortness of WARC-92preparation time, secrecy of government data,lack of experience and data on new services—open evaluations of the public interest benefitsand/or disadvantages of competing radio serviceswere never made.

The foremost example of this lack of processwas the competition for the coveted frequenciesin the L-band. The Federal Government andmajor aircraft manufacturers use the lower por-tion of this band (1435-1525 MHz) for aircraftand weapons testing. Because these activities areclassified, however, the FCC claims it was unableto determine exactly how the government and itscontractors use the band-i. e., what frequencies,what times of day, what geographic locations.The government was never forced to fully explainits use of the band.41 The private sector, becauseof the favorable transmission characteristics ofthe band, wanted to use this spectrum for mobilesatellite services or digital audio broadcastingsatellite services. While a comparison was appar-ently made between the existing uses of the bandand the potential revenues, technological gains,and competitive benefits that could be realized byreallocating the band for BSS-Sound, it is un-known what factors were used in the comparisonor how they were valued.

Finally, the reliance on private industry toidentify future spectrum needs obscures thesecond-order effects of new systems and services.Assuming frequencies are granted, what realbenefits will the United States realize? Many ofthe new systems and services tout their benefits toAmerican competitiveness. Such claims need to

be examined closely. Will the equipment neededfor these new services be produced in the UnitedStates? Indications are that some will not be.Little LEOS service providers, for example,report being disappointed with the response ofU.S. manufacturers to this potentially lucrativenew area. More importantly, for a system tosucceed globally, it will need to attract support(and funding) from a variety of foreign sources,both government and private sector—global sys-tems will require global partners to succeed.Launches may not be on American rockets, andmuch of the other equipment for the systems maynot be produced in American factories. The realbenefits to American competitiveness may comeonly in enhancing the U.S. reputation as theworld’s premier provider of satellite services, andlaying the foundation for future advances inglobal satellite markets.

Overall, relying on the power of the U.S.radiocommunication market alone would be amistake. The emerging markets of Europe andAsia will challenge U.S. claims to being theworld’s preeminent technology developer andconsumer. Crea-tive and aggres- /sive policymak-ing, taking ad-vantage of mar-ket forces, isneeded to en-sure the com-petitiveness andleadership of theUnited States inworld radiocom-

Creative and

aggressive

policymaking is

needed to ensure

United States

competitiveness

in world

radiocommunicationmunication mar-kets. Without

I markets.

such leadership, the United States will continue torely on its private sector to set the direction forU.S. radiocommunication policy. Industry, how-ever, needs the guidance and partnership of

41 Gove~ent SPc~ m~gem dispute this view. They contend that they made all necessary information available to the FCC for review.

However, what information was actually provided, its accuracy and completeness, is unclear.


government planners to make the United States astrong, coherent presence in international radio-communication policymaking and markets. Amore aggressive policy process is needed to bringleadership, direction, and coherence to U.S. inter-national radiocommunication policymaking.

9 Improvements in Long-Range PlanningAs a result of the historical reliance on market

forces and the lack of Federal Governmentleadership in spectrum policy development, long-term planning for future uses of the radio fre-quency spectrum and coordination of spectrumpolicy (including priority-setting) are inadequate.For example, although U.S. proposals for WARC-92 were developed in a timely fashion, it is lessclear how well, if at all, these proposals (and the

policy directions

~ theY imPIY) fit

L ong-term radio

frequency spectrum

planning andcoordination of

spectrum policies

are inadequate.

into long-rangepolicy goals oreven if such long-range goals havebeen considered.Preparing WARCproposals andpositions is notequivalent to de-

veloping long-term policy (even if WARC nego-tiating strategies are carried out over long periodsof time), and it is unclear if such an essentially adhoc approach can meet long-term needs. A moreregular ITU schedule for future conferences willincrease pressures to develop more coherent U.S.policymaking initiatives, and force both thegovernment and the private sector to consider

long-term goals in a more clearly defined andfocused way.42

OTA has argued in the past that a reliance onmarket forces and a lack of government andprivate sector foresight in planning for futureradiocommunication services will hurt the U.S.ability to compete internationally .43 OTA contin-ues to believe that between a purely market-basedapproach to spectrum management and an overlycentralized approach to planning, there is amiddle ground of creative, aggressive planningand policymaking that will enable the UnitedStates to compete more effectively in the newtechnologies and services that are being devel-oped. 44

However, developing a practical approach tospectrum planning will be challenging. A numberof analysts in both the government and the privatesector have noted the difficulties in planningspectrum. First, planning for needs and technolo-gies that do not yet exist is nearly impossible, andwould not necessarily lead to efficient use of” thespectrum. The tradeoffs between encouragingefficiency and promoting the development of newtechnologies must be carefully weighed as a partof determining future radiocommunication pol-icy. It may be possible to craft policies andregulatory efforts that encourage both, but it willbe necessary to carefully balance the needs forefficiency with the demand for new technologiesand services. Second, even if spectrum is moreconcretely planned, this does not guarantee that amarket for the planned service will actuallydevelop or that the services/systems planned willbecome economically viable. The 12-GHz bandof frequencies, for example, has been planned forseveral years to provide direct broadcast televi-

4Z NTIA m men steps in this dh~tion with its proc- on future spectrum requirements, as has the State Department with its task forceon U.S. reactions to changes in ITU. See U.S. Department of Commerce, National lklecommunications and Information A&mm“ “Stratiom‘‘Current and Future Requirements for the Use of Radio Frequencies in the United States,” Notice of Inquiry, Docket 920532-2132, June 1,1992.

43 O’IA, WARC.!M, op. cit., footnote 1.

44 A s- concept has been called a “progressive” approach to telecommunications regulation. See Steven R. Rivkin and Jeremy D.Rosner, “Shortcut to the Information Superhighway: A Progressive Plan to Speed the lklecommunications Revolution” Future Choices,August 1992.

sion services from satellites. Despite the fact thatsuch services were frost proposed in the early1980s, they are only now beginning to beimplemented, and their eventual success is farfrom certain.

One of the fundamental reasons for the lack ofa clearly defined vision/framework to guide U.S.radiocommunication policy development is thedivided responsibility for policymaking in theUnited States. The FCC and NTIA have notworked cooperatively to build such a view orframework. Recognizing these problems and theimportance of radiocommunications, in recentyears U.S. policymakers at higher levels havebegun to pay greater attention to spectrum poli-cymaking.

The executive branch has taken the lead inrevitalizing spectrum planning. NTIA recentlyissued a Notice of Inquiry requesting commentsand information on ‘‘Current and Future Require-ments for the Use of Radio Frequencies in theUnited States, ”45 In the Notice, NTIA notesclearly the importance of improved planning ofthe spectrum resource:

. . . planning helps ensure that adequate spectrumwill continue to be available for public safetyneeds, other non-commercial uses such asamateur radio and scientific research, and local,state, and federal government uses, Moreover,improved planning is essential for the U.S.government to represent effectively the interestsof all U.S. spectrum users in international spec-trum negotiations. Such planning is especiallyimportant to permit the presentation of consistentpolicies in such forums as the new series ofbiennial World Administrative Radio Confer-ences recommended by the High Level Commit-


tee of the International Telecommunication Union( m ) .

In its comments on NTIA’s proceeding, Motorolanotes further that ‘‘this explosive growth of newmobile communications services, driven by tech-nological advances and consumer demand, willlead to a serious shortage of spectrum absentsound spectrum planning. ”46

Unfortunately, these efforts have not yet beenmatched by the FCC. Critics accuse the Commis-sion of doing little more than reacting to technol-ogy developments. It responds to applications andpetitions, but has shown a notable lack ofaggressiveness or foresight in helping to advancethe development of radio technologies. Numer-ous observers have commented that the FCC willnot act until someone forces it to by filing apetition for change. Despite a historical lack ofplanning at the FCC, however, there are signs thatthings could be different. The FCC has taken anaggressive (ironically, some say too aggressive)approach to developing standards and an imple-mentation schedule for HDTV. The FCC’s Officeof Plans and Policies has written studies on thefuture of fiber optics and the broadcasting indus-try. 47 In early 1992, the FCC proposed thecreation of a ‘‘spectrum reserve in order topromote the development of new radiocommuni-cation technologies and services.48 Aside fromthe political problems encountered by the plan,the FCC’s efforts at least represent an effort tospur future development.

In terms of international spectrum planning andpolicymaking, the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA) and the internationalSpace Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG)

45 ~, op. cit., fOOmOte g.

46 comen~ of Motoro~, ~c., ~ me ~tter of “c~~t ad fifie Req&m~~ for tie IJw of Radio Frequencies k the United Stitt X,”

op. cit., footnote 34, p. 4.47 Ro&fl M. pepper, Through the~oking GIa$S: IntegratedBroad& ndNe~orks, Regulato~ Po[icy affdz~ti~tionalc~nge (W&jhhl@On

DC: Federat Communications Comrnis sio% November 1988); Florence Setzer and Jonathan Levy, Broadcast Television in a A@tichannelMarke@ace (Washingto~ DC: Federal Communications Commission, April 1991).

48 F~er~ com~titiom co~ssioq ‘‘R~~elopment of spec~ to ~co~age bovation in &e use of New ~]~omm~catiom

Technologies, ” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket 92-9, 7 FCC Rcd No. 4, Feb. 7, 1992.


may provide a model of plannin g for futurespectrum needs. The SFCG (see chapter 2) iscomposed of space agencies from all over theworld. This group identifies the future needs ofspace operations and research, and developsconsensus among member countries, on a contin-ual basis, on how best to meet those needs.Because of the long lead times to get large-scalespace operations and missions into space, this

Despite the

increasing

importance of

telecommunications

in world and

domestic economies,

no action has been

taken to unify

United States

telecommunications

policy.

group has to thinkof their spectrumrequirements inthe long term andthen develop in-ternational agree-ments to get whatthey need. In theUnited States, forexample, NASAwas a strongdriver pushingthe United Statesto become moreinvolved with andto support whatturned out to be

WARC-92. As a result of the extensive pre-negotiation done in the SFCG prior to WARC-92,new allocations for space services were relativelyeasy to agree to at the conference.

1 The Future: Protecting US.Technological and Policy Leadership

As the United States moves into the 21stcentury and wireless technologies and servicesbecome an increasingly important part of theoverall telecommunications infrastructure of this

country, the timely development of appropriateradiocommunication policies, both domestic andinternational, becomes imperative. Many analystshave identified the general problems and short-comings of the presently divided structure of U.S.telecommunications policymaking.49 As a subsetof overall telecommunications policy, spectrumplanning and management suffers from the sameproblems. It is important to note, however, thatdespite the increasing importance of telecommun-ications in world and domestic economies andthe strategic and competitive benefits a strongtelecommunications policy represents, no actionhas been taken to unify U.S. telecommunicationspolicy, although some efforts have been made toimprove long-term spectrum management.

The large number of radiocommunication tech-nologies and services now being developed, andthe corresponding increase in the number andinfluence of private sector interests, will placeincreased emphasis on government and privatesector cooperation to prepare for future worldradiocommunication conferences, to carry outcooperatively developed strategies at the confer-ences, and to implement new domestic radiocom-munication rules and regulations. There is asignificant amount of expertise in both thegovernment and the private sector that must betapped in creative ways to bring the benefits ofnew technologies and services to American con-sumers and to promote the competitive interestsof U.S. radiocommunication firms overseas.

Unfortunately, the United States has had novision or policy framework that could guidespectrum development and that would ensure thatthe spectrum resource is utilized in the publicinterest and for the benefit of the Nation. Overall,

49 For a dixussion of such issues, see Hew Geller, The Federal Structure for Telecommunications policy (WaShhgtOQ m: The Benton

Foundation 1989); U.S. Congress, Office of Twhnology Assessmen4 Critical Connections: Communicatiomfor the Future, OTA-CIT407(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990); U.S. Congress, Office of ‘lkchnology Assessment The 1992 WorIdAdministrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. International Spectrum Policy, OTA-BP-TCT-76 (Washingto~ DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting OffIce, November 1991); Michael F. Starr and David J. At.kiQ “The Department of Communications: A Plan and Policy fc]r theAbolition of the Federal Communications Commission, ” Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 12, No. 2, titer1989; and U.S. Department of Commerce, National lklecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Spectrum Management Policy:Agenda for the Future, NTIA Special Publication 91-23 (lVashington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1991).


the process of developing coordinated domesticand international radiocommunication policy inthe United States is seriously lacking. Decisionsand policies are often reactive and not based onlong-term considerations. This situation is com-pounded by the fact that there has not been onedecisionmaking authority that effectively arbi-trated policy disputes between Federal agenciesin a timely manner; that made policy-leveldecisions among competing agency missions andrequirements.50 The recent change in Administra-tions may bring more focus and vision to U.S.spectrum policy, but in any case, it is too soon togauge the impact anew perspective could have onimproving U.S. radiocommunication policymak-ing, or the effectiveness of such an approach in theface of stubborn institutional and structural barri-ers.

The trends examined above and the issues andimplications outlined in chapter 2 demonstratethe need for a comprehensive approach to spec-trum management in this country, and the poten-tial consequences to services and competitivenessif such a policy framework is not adopted. Unlessinstitutional and structural changes are made, thislack of policy guidance and planning will, in thelong term, reduce the U.S. leadership role ininternational radiocommunication policymakingand could erode the U.S. competitive position inradio-based technologies and services.

OPTIONS FOR IMPROVINGU.S. POLICYMAKING

The choices for improving domestic and inter-national U.S. radiocommunications policymak-ing cover a broad range of approaches andoptions. Many of the options discussed includereorganizing the institutions and processes bywhich international spectrum policy is made. Anysuccessful reorganization, however, must be basedon specific public policy goals that the reorgani-zation is designed to achieve.51 A careful analysismust also be made of the tradeoffs of reorganiza-tion, includingthose between ef-ficiency, equity,and political andpublic accounta-bility. 52 Reorgan-izations based onwell-meaning,but elusive con-cepts—such asimproved econ-omy, efficiency,or public respon-

N0 single

decisionmaking

authority has

effectively arbitrated

policy disputes

between Federal

agencies in a timely

manner.

siveness—are not likely to be successful in theabsence of clearly defined goals.

At the broadest level of policy development,presidential leadership may be effective for set-

m me director of tie office of Management and Budget (OMB) is authorized to resolve appeals &tW&n agencies OVm Specifk Fed~alGovernment frequency assignments, but this authority does not appear to extend to policy decisions or give OMB the right to decide mattersof policy such as which agency mission(s) should take precedence over others in matters of frequency allocation.

51 ~ a 1977 repo~ t. the Congess, the Congressional Research Semice noted that: ‘‘Reorganization itself cannot be a ‘value. ’ It receivesits normative content by absorption. A reorganization is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending upon the purposes the reorganization is designed to achieve.Presumably, in the hierarchy of purposes, a reorganimtion should be justified on the grounds that it is facilitating the achievement of a ‘higherPwse’ thaII that which is the purpose of the current org anizational stzucture. It is the task of President Carter, as it was of his predecessorsand wiLl be of his successors, to develop a hierarchy of values so that the process of reorg anizationwithbe neither random nor counterproductive,but will sexve a purpose which is both consistent and visible. Ronald C. Moe, Executive Branch Reorganization: An Overview, prepared bythe Congressional Research Semice for the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, committee print, March 1978, p. CRS-72. Therelationship of goals to institutional organiza tion is also discussed in U.S. Congrvss, Oftlce of Technology Assessment, Critical Connections;Contmunicationfor the Furure, OTA-CIT-437 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990).

52 Craig Thomas, “Reorganizing Public Organiz.a tions: Alternatives, Objectives, and Evidence, ’ paper prepared for the Secretary of EnergyAdvisory Board, U.S. Department of Energy, August 1992. This paper also notes the necessity of choosing between goals (“values”) “whendeciding whether and how to reorganize a public organization,’ and notes the ‘‘profoundly political” mture of such decisions, p. 51.


ting the general goals and policy framework thatwill guide future radiocommunication policy.Likewise, Administration initiatives may also beable to improve specific aspects of the U.S.radiocommunication policy process—through ex-ecutive orders, for example. However, forcefulcongressional action may also be needed to helpfocus attention on the broad problems facing U.S.spectrum managers and to develop priorities forresolving those problems. The approaches andoptions presented below give Congress a numberof ways to work with the Admini stration in orderto bring about desired improvements or to exer-cise more prominent leadership if the Administrat-ion fails to act quickly and decisively in improv-ing U.S. radiocommunication policy structuresand processes.

Depending on congressional interest and in-volvement, three basic approaches are availableto reform the international radiocommunicationpolicy process, within which specific options arepresented. The three approaches represent aprogression from least to most complicated—from short term solutions that could be implem-ented in less than a year, through solutions thatcould be developed over a 1 to 2 year span, andfinally to more long-term, systemic solutions,which could take many years to enact. Eachapproach has its own benefits and disadvantagesas outlined below. The options presented are notmeant to be exhaustive or exclusive, and manydifferent combinations of options are possible.Figure 1-4 summarizes these approaches andoptions, and figure 1-5 puts them in the context ofCongressional decisionmaking.

I Approach 1Improvements in the U.S. policymaking proc-

ess must be made immediately to allow theUnited States to most effectively respond and

adapt to rapid changes in radio technology and therecent restructuring of the ITU. Over the course ofthe next year, Congress could take several steps toimprove the U.S. radiocommunication policyprocess in general and the WARC preparationprocess specifically. Congressional action, bytargeting funding and focusing attention on keyaspects of the U.S. spectrum policymaking proc-ess, would demonstrate commitment to andleadership of U.S. radiocommunication policy,and could encourage the development of morefocused policies by the agencies involved. Suchefforts could be made in concert with executivebranch efforts or in place of them if insufficientinterest or attention is forthcoming from theWhite House. Implementation of these optionsmay also serve as a stimulus for further presiden-tial action.

The first general approach would leave theexisting three-part radiocommunication pol-icy structure and procedures intact, and allowthe FCC, NTIA, and State Department, as wellas the individual Federal agencies, to build onimprovements they have already instituted.The FCC, for example, established the Office ofInternational Communications (OIC) in January1990 to coordinate international policies. Drivenby the increasing importance of internationalconcerns in the FCC’s daily work, and supportedby former Chairman Alfred Sikes, OIC hasevolved into an important center of policy coordi-nation in the FCC. Most of the experiencedinternational staff, however, still remain scatteredamong the FCC’s various bureaus. As notedabove, the State Department has convened a taskforce to examine changes in ITU structure andpossible U.S. responses. NTIA is engaged in along-term effort to improve its spectrum manage-ment procedures vis-a-vis the private sector,53

53 me blucpfit for ~ese activities was first outlined by NTIA in early 1991, and many of the changes they identified hve been put intoplace. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration% U.S. Spectrum Management Policy: AnAgendafor the Future, NT’lA Special Publication 91-23 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Off@ February 1991).


and has begun a broad assessment of the long-term spectrum needs of the United States.54

OPTION 1. Take no action, but closely monitorthe efforts noted above and the overall directionand development of U.S. international radiocommu-nication policy.

OPTION 2. Increase funding for existing agenciesand programs and tie it to improvements in theradiocommunication policymaking process and/or WARC preparation activities.

Targeted financial support for WARC prepa-ration and spectrum policy planning activitiescould encourage more forward-looking policiesand enable more thorough policy planning andtechnical preparation for future radiocommunica-tion conferences.

OPTION 3. Mandate the formulation of a long-range spectrum plan.

If Congress believes that the executive branchis not making sufficient progress toward develop-ing a more comprehensive and focused approachto international spectrum management, it couldalso require long-range and strategic planning onthe part of all Federal agencies. This would forcethe executive branch to develop priorities forradiocommunication policy, and would also con-tribute to the development of a broader spectrumpolicy framework that would guide future poli-cymaking efforts.

As the focal point of this effort, the FCC andNTIA could be required to cooperate on develop-ing a long-range plan that would address theNation’s spectrum needs, with revisions to theplan submitted at regular intervals. In 1978,Executive Order 12,046 required that such a planbe developed, and although NTIA has produceda series of long-range plans beginning in 1986,

these plans have largely been developed withoutthe cooperation of the FCC (as required) and evenat times without the participation of the Interde-partment Radio Advisory Committee(IRAC).5556In the recent legislation statutorily authorizingNTIA, such a plan was listed as a function ofNTIA, but was not mandated.57 Making thedevelopment of such a plan a required responsi-bility of NTIA, subject to congressional review,could hasten the development of more focusedpolicy.

This option would build on NTIA’s currentefforts to identify long-range spectrum needs, andexpand this activity to serve as the basis for thedevelopment of a future integrated national spec-trum plan. In order to bring the FCC more directlyinto the process (and meeting the original lan-guage of Executive Order 12,046), legislativelanguage could be inserted in FCC appropriationsto mandate formal FCC cooperation with theNTIA effort. The effort could also be furtherexpanded to include all Federal Governmentagencies with radio operations. In some cases,such efforts may require the commitment ofadditional resources, but such increases could beminimal.

In order to accommodate the concerns of theprivate sector, another possible vehicle for im-proving the development of radiocommunicationpolicy and new radiocommunication technolo-gies and services is to fund (jointly with industry,perhaps) a radiocommunication equivalent ofSematech. In that case, the Federal Governmentfunds a consortium of computer chipmakers topromote research and development of chips andpromote U.S. competitiveness in the chip indus-try. A similar arrangement for radiocommunica-tion could have a variety of missions. It couldserve as a focal point for the development of radio

54 ~, op. cit., fOOmOte 3.

55 Exe~tive order No. 12,046, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code con~essiomd C% ~‘ “strative News, 9685-9692.S6 ~, op. cit., footnote 53, P. 176.

57 ~bfic ~w 102-538, Oct. 27, 1992$


I

I

Figure 1-4—Approaches and Options for Improving U.S. Radiocommunications Policy—

Option 1 IMonitor exlstlng efforts and the Ioverall dlrectlon and develop- 1ment of U.S. international radlo-

, - - - -

communlcatfon policy.APPROACH 1

Short-Term

J ILeave the existing three-part radmcommunicatlon

‘--–:==::;.,

policy structure intact, and allow the FCC, NTIA,and State Department, as well as the Indwidual—— —

Option 3Federal agencies to build on Improvements they

Mandate the formulation of ahave already instituted.

———. —..———— —long-range spectrum plan.

r -

. . — i - . -—.—–—

Option 5 TI

1Establish an advisory commsslon

1

to evaluate the mternatlonalspectrum pol!cymaklng process.

I I

1—.——–.—– A~— 1

—Option 2

Increase funding for exstlngagencies and programs and tled to Improvements In the radlo-communlcatlon policymakingprocess and/or WARC prepara-tion actlwhes.

—— .—- ‘r-:: - - -

Option 4Mandate improvements In govern-ment (NTIA) and FCC collectionof frequency use data, and ensurethat such data, where not vital tonahonal security, IS made easilyaccessible to the publlc,

—

APPROACH 2Medium-Term

Would retain the current diwsion of responsibilityfor domesttc radncommunication policymaking,but create mechanisms that would facilitate thecoordination of international poltcy.

1

_.~_:z..‘ — - - - – – 3 ’ = - “--––.~---–-—.—, ~ –——— ——— ——— 7— -—Option 1

Establish a senior Interagency groupto resolve pollcy-level disputes betweenagencies and between the FederalGovernment and the prwate sector.

Option 2Create a small Interagency group thatwould coordinate and/or developmternatlonal radlocommunlcatlon policy.

Option 3Formally establlsh a separate agencyfor developing and coordinating inter-national radlocommunlcatlon policy.

[::::’,1The third and most radical approach to ImprowngU.S. radiocommumcatlon pohcymaklngrevolves restructuring or reorganizing all or partof the existing domestic policy structure.

F;;;pii:;”cy E?;rn[g$i$cs$

KEY: CIP = Bureau of International Communications and Information Policy; FCC = Federal Communications Commission; NTIA - NationalTelecommunications and Information Administration.



Figure 1-5-Decisions to Improve U.S. Spectrum Policymaking

1 ..— —– J

- . . — J . . 1

I Approach 1, OptIon 1-~

r — — Jv +

What can be done Immediately? 1 and/or[

What long-term solutlons are available? I

~....— k- --1APPROACH 1 I—— — J

I -----Any comblnat]on of OptIons 2-5.— J

Later: Have these changes been effectwe?

I,. — . .— _ ~———– .[-YES: END ~ [ NOi————k“

f

~-” APPROACH 2_ & <IF;

Is structural reorganization‘ - - necessary?~... —. ——

I

I

[ -1---:,YES “ [NO+ i-.—....__-=] ~------_ –.— L. ._–_._. ,

1 OptIon 3 ~ I OptIons 1, and/or 2Aor2B ~.—— — —. J

[

,— —-. . —— J

II Later: Have these changes been effective?

[- --- ‘1

—1

YES: END- J

— L ——

1 NO }L– ——

APPROACH 3

Since this approach WIIItake many years to

accomplish, should intenmImprovements be made?

Q L.‘L-. — . - YES

L

. - !O - -—. —>

~– ‘ . .—

v — 7v--—.“~ ~–— I.1. .-?Options 1,2, or 3 or

1.OptIon 4.— .._



technologies, focus private sector input into theradiocommunication policy process, and providea forum for cooperative industry/governmentpolicy development. Such an organization couldalso serve as a clearinghouse for future worldradiocommunication conference preparations.

OPTION 4. Mandate improvements in governmentand FCC collection of frequency use data, andensure that such data, where not vital to nationalsecurity, are made easily accessible to the public.58

Additionally, such data should be required tobe shared with relevant policymaking authoritiesin order to reach informed decisions about futureWARC proposals and spectrum requirements. Inseveral cases during the preparation for WARC-92, private sector and even some governmentinterests complained that they could not assesssome uses of particular spectrum bands becausethe data either did not exist or were withheld.

OPTION 5. Establish an advisory commission toevaluate the international spectrum policymakingprocess.

Such a commission could be mandated toidentify any problems with the current U.S. policystructure, recognizing the current state of flux inthe world’s telecommunications community, andto recommend specific improvements (if needed)in the structure and/or processes of U.S. interna-tional spectrum policymaking. Such a commiss-ion could be established in a number of differentways. Congress, for example, could pass legisla-tion to establish such a committee, with member-ship to include individuals chosen by the Presi-dent and assuring adequate representation for

Congress.59 The principle advantage of such acommission would be to focus more high-levelattention on the processes of radiocommunicationpolicymaking and encourage greater congres-sional and Administration (oversight of and)involvement in goal-setting for U.S. internationalspectrum policy. Another recent suggestion callson the president to establish a commission toreview overall U.S. communications policy andmake recommendations for updating it.60

The advantages and disadvantages of essen-tially preserving the status quo mean continuedreliance on market mechanisms to make broadpolicy decisions. This approach maintains anideological commitment to market-based deci-sionmaking and ensures that the private sector hasmaximum flexibility to quickly respond to bothnew consumer demands and advances in technol-ogy. However, as noted previously, too muchreliance on market forces reduces the amount andquality of strategic planning that can be accom-plished. In the face of increasingly fierce competi-tion in global radiocommunications systems andservices from both Europe and Japan, such apolicy may inhibit U.S. ability to compete effec-tively in world markets.

9 Approach 2Although the options presented above could

contribute to the short-term improvement of thedevelopment of U.S. international spectrum pol-icy, more substantial changes may be required toensure that U.S. policies adequately reflect thetechnological, economic, and political changesnow taking place in global radiocommunicationspolicymaking. Over the next year or two, Con-

58 ~A discuss= OptiOIIS to improve access to frequency data in NTIA, U.S. Spectrum ~a?KIgettM?nt policy, op. cit., foo~ote 53.

59 b 1966, for example, Congress passed the “Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act” which directed the President toestablish a Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources. ‘II@ commission had 15 members, limited to 5 from the FederalGov ernmen~ and with Four members of Congress seining as advisors. ‘I%e legislation specifkd the duties of the commission and provided forfunding of its efforts. ‘The committee was part of a broader legislative approach to develop a “comprehensive, long-range, and coordinatedprogram in marine science. . . .“ Public Law 89-454, June 17, 1966.

@ “Br~~ Awtittig R~ction to Suggestion of Presidential commission On communications,” Telecommunications Reports, Dec. 14,1992.


gress may want to consider additional proceduraland/or structural improvements that could im-prove U.S. WARC preparations and the overallpolicy development process. These medium-termoptions represent the next step in a broaderevaluation of the efficacy of current U.S. methodsfor determining international spectrum policy.

The context and timing of these changes iscrucially important. With world radiocommuni-cation conferences scheduled to take place bien-nially, the distinctions between general policydevelopment and WARC preparation will be-come increasingly blurred and will, in fact, beginto converge. A single focal point for integratingthese trends would help the United States todevelop and maintain a clear policy directionthroughout all its international radio negotiationsand meetings. NTIA, for example, proposed aJoint Strategic Planning Council, which wouldbring together the FCC and NTIA to coordinatedomestic spectrum management policies,61 Animportant factor in forming such a group is to gethigh-level support for its activities, and to ensurethe active and effective participation of privatesector interests.

The second approach to improving radio-communication policy development would re-tain the current division of responsibility fordomestic radiocommunication policymaking,but create mechanisms that would facilitatethe coordination and/or development of inter-national policy. Under this general approach,several options for improving the coordinationand quality of radiocommunication policy exist.

OPTION 1. Establish a senior interagency groupthat could resolve policy-level disputes betweenagencies and between the Federal Governmentand the private sector.

A possible model is the Senior InteragencyGroup for telecommunications that was dis-

banded for budgetary reasons in the mid-1980s.62

This group would have the power to review thespectrum uses of the various Federal agencies andprioritize the agencies’ missions and future spec-trum requirements. The group would also settledisputes between industry and the Federal Gov-ernment regarding conflicting proposals for spec-trum use. In order to fairly represent all interests,private sector membership in this group, asobservers at least, maybe required. Efforts wouldhave to be made to ensure the widest possibleparticipation from industry-not just the largestor most well-established players.

OPTION 2. Create a small interagency group thatwould coordinate WARC and/or internationalradiocommunication policy.

This group could effectively complement theSenior Interagency Group noted in Option 1, andcould probably be put together with a minimumof additional funds, although this would requirefurther study. This solution was suggested by anumber of delegates and observers, and tookseveral different forms.

Option 2A. In its least complicated form sucha group would coordinate, but not subsume, theactivities of the FCC, NTIA, and the StateDepartment in preparation for world radiocom-munication conferences. This group would focusonly on WARC preparation.

Option 2B. In order to ensure that WARCproposals effectively reflect broader U.S. intern-ational spectrum goals, the mandate of the groupdiscussed in Option 2A could be broadened toinclude coordination not only of WARC positionsand proposals, but also the coordination of all ofinternational radiocommunication policy and in-tegrating WARC preparations within an overallpolicy framework.

Legislation, for example, could create (rees-tablish) the Joint Long-Range Planning commit-


tee, composed of representatives of both the FCCand NTIA, that would meet on a regular basis, andproduce a report to Congress every year or twoyears. This legislation would force the UnitedStates to specifically develop goals and plans fordeveloping the radio spectrum resource andradiocommunication systems, and could providea vehicle for Congress to participate in thegoal-setting for radiocommunications and to closelymonitor progress toward those goals.

OPTlON 3. Formally establish a separate agencyfor developing and coordinating internationalradiocommunication policy.

Essentially, the international radiocommunicationfunctions and staff of the FCC, NTIA and Bureauof International Communications and Informa-tion Policy (CIP) would be merged in oneagency.63 Domestic functions could be left intact.Such an agency would combine technical andpolicy expertise and, proponents believe, wouldeffectively unify U.S. international radiocommunica-tions policymaking and streamline both the de-velopment of policy and the WARC preparationprocess. Such a singular focal point for intern-ational radio policy could also improve the con-duct of radiocommunications negotiations inter-nationally. For example, foreign spectrum man-agers would no longer be confused by thethree-part division of responsibility in this coun-try and could no longer take advantage of thissplit to further their own positions. However, sucha centralized approach faces opposition by many

analysts and would be difficult to institute bothinstitutionally and politically.64

The most difficult question regarding theestablishment of such an agency is whereto locateit in the structure of the U.S. Government. Carewould have to be taken to establish it at a highenough level to give it the authority to setpriorities and policies, while at the same timeavoiding the ability of one group or groups todominate the agency’s work. Clear lines ofresponsibility and coordination between this agencyand the FCC, NTIA, and State Department wouldhave to be established.

Along these lines, some have suggested thecreation of an office similar to the U.S. TradeRepresentative (USTR) for international telecom-munications (or just radiocommunications) pol-icy. In 1962, Congress created a position in theWhite House for a special representative for tradenegotiations, changed as the chief representativeof the United States in all trade agreementsnegotiations, and chair of an interagency organi-zation, established by the President, to assist withthe implementation of trade and tariff agree-ments.65 Paralleling the language describing themission of NTIA, the USTR is designated as thePresident’s “principal advisor” on internationaltrade policy. The USTR also coordinates inter-agency preparation for and participation in multi-lateral trade talks, and supervises a network ofprivate sector advisory groups.

The advantage of this option is that it wouldraise the level of international telecommunica-

SJ For ~~ple, tie agency wo~d combine the FCC’S Office of International Communications, -’s ~lce of International Afffi5, andthe State Department’s CIP.

M me idm of cenh~ing telecomrnunicatiom and radiocommunications policy in the United States has been discussed exten.wvelyelsewhere. For a brief review of the arguments for and against such an approach, see OZ4, W%RC-92.

65 me OffIce SupW@ he USTR WaS crat~ by exwutive order in 1%3. For a fuller discussion of the USTR, see Stephen D. Cohen. TheMaking of United States International Economic Policy, 3rd Ed. (New York: Praeger, 1988). Cohen reports that the creation of the ofllce wasprecipitated by Congressional doubts about ‘the State Department’s ability to drive a hard bargain and bring home the most advantageous tradeagreement. . .“ (p. 66). Similar concerns have been raised about the ability and will of the State Department to negotiate internationaltelecommunication agreements-some believe that they are more concerned with keeping foreign governments happy than anything else. The1974 Trade Act elevated the position to cabinet-level status. In 1980, under Reorganization Plan No. 3, the offke was renamed the Office ofthe USTR and received a broader mandate that effectively made the offke “the lead agency in all aspects of policy formulation in the tradeand investment sectors. Reorganization Plan No. 3 (as submitted to Congress by the President) says that the USTR ‘shall have primaryresponsibility’ for ‘developing and for coordinating the implementation of U.S. international trade policy.’” Ibid, p. 67.


tions to the political level, enabling/forcing pol-icy decisions to be made about goals, priorities,and strategies. The status of such an agencywould offer high prestige and political leverage toformulate policy, and could offer a place forpolicymakers to coherently think about intern-ational telecommunications policy, rather thanresponding to the wishes and whims of privatesector and Federal agency interests.

The main disadvantage to such an agency is thevery real threat that the office could become toopolitical-a charge often leveled at the USTR.Rather than aggressively formulating policy andpursuing long-term negotiation strategies, thisnew agency could be “captured’ by U.S. indus-try or the administration in power. It would beextremely important to build in openness andpublic accountability into the procedures of suchan agency.

9 Approach 3In the long term, the changes needed in the U.S.

radiocommunication policy development processmay be realized only as part of a more sweepingreordering of the Nation’s entire telecommunica-tion policymaking structure, Sustained congres-sional efforts would be required to make thesechanges. As noted in chapter 3, each of theagencies involved in the management (and/orregulation) of spectrum resources has its ownproblems and limitations that constrain its effec-tive participation in the policymaking process.The FCC is critically short of funds to do its job,and this has caused it to take a primarily reactiveapproach to policymaking. NTIA is hampered byits sometimes conflicting roles as presidentialtelecommunications advisor and Federal Gover-nment spectrum manager. And the role of the StateDepartment needs clarification and perhaps redef-inition. See chapter 3 for further elaboration ofthese issues and options.

The third and most radical approach toimproving U.S. radiocommunication policymak-ing involves restructuring or reorganizing allor part of the existing domestic policy struc-ture. This approach would take many years todebate, build support for, and enact.

Some analysts believe that as long as thecurrent structures (FCC, NTIA, and State Depart-ment) and divisions in authority (Federal Gover-nment vs. private sector and State/local gover-nment) continue to exist, there is little chance thata coherent international radiocommunication pol-icy can be articulated and maintained in the longterm. These analysts believe that policy develop-ment for both government and nongovernmentspectrum use must be combined in order toachieve a focused approach to both policy andinternational negotiation.

From this perspective, many observers viewthe disbanding of the Office of Telecommunica-tions Policy (OTP) in 1978 as a mistake.66 Theybelieve that a high-level (White House) focus isneeded once again for U.S. telecommunicationspolicy. Still others believe that a cabinet-levelposition is needed—a Department of Communi-cations. Disagreements over the form of thisrestructuring reflect the lack of consensus overthe importance of telecommunications policy andwhat the best format for developing that policy is.

While presidential leadership, or at least sup-port, would be necessary for any of these optionsto come into being, Congress has an importantrole to play in considering the implementationand implications of these proposals. Long-termcongressional leadership in the development andarticulation of U.S. radiocommunication policycould be the vehicle through which such changesare enacted, and the creation of such an agency ordepartment may help to solidify the congressionalrole in the future development of U.S. radio- andtelecommunications policies. Efforts to restruc-ture the process would also demonstrate the

M oTp funcliowj were transferred tO NTIA.


importance Congress places on the issues oftelecommunication policy in this country.

OPTION 1. Reestablish the Office of Telecom-munications Policy in the White House.

This office would be responsible for devel-oping all domestic and international telecommu-nications (including radio) policy for the execu-tive branch. Similar to the establishment of aUSTR-type position noted above, such an agencywould confer needed high-level attention to theproblems of telecommunications and would offera mechanism for more effectively coordinatinglong-term policy development and resolving pol-icy level disputes between agencies. The creationof such an office would entail moving responsi-bilities for radio- and telecommunications asoutlined in the options below. Changes could beaccomplished through executive order.

OPTION 2. Transfer responsibility for internationaltelecommunications out of CIP or out of the StateDepartment entirely.

If Congress decided that CIP was no longernecessary in a restructured international telecom-munication procedure, CIP’s functions could betransferred to another bureau of the State Depart-ment.67 This action would likely require Congres-sional action since CIP was established byCongressional mandate.68 This could result ineither effectively burying CIP, and presumablyeffectiveness, or conversely, if CIP’s functionswere taken over by a strong division of the StateDepartment, or if CIP continued to exist within astrong division of State, the effectiveness of theoffice could be enhanced. Alternatively, CIP’sfunctions, and the responsibility of the StateDepartment for international telecommunicationsrepresentation, could be transferred to NTIA, a

newly created international radiocommunicationsagency, or a new OTP.

OPTION 3. Decouple NTIA’s dual roles as presi-dential advisor on telecommunications mattersand manager of the Federal Government’s spec-trum use.

As argued in chapter 3, the two roles canconflict and give the appearance of being incom-patible in many instances-WARC preparations,for example. Two choices are possible. First,transfer IRAC duties and support out of NTIA.IRAC existed before NTIA, and could be madeinto a separate organization with a separatebudget. This would sever the now direct policydevelopment lines from IRAC to NTIA and giveNTIA more autonomy to make policy decisions inthe public interest and with less influence fromIRAC. Under this option, the question of whetherto leave NTIA as the manager of Federal Gover-nment spectrum is problematic. Some could arguethat separating IRAC from NTIA would suffi-ciently protect the public’s interest by decreasingthe power of IRAC over NTIA policymaking.However, the ties between the two agencies couldcontinue to be too close to permit truly independ-ent policy development. IRAC might have toassume a broader role as the Federal Governmentspectrum manager, an option that would seriouslyreduce the role and staff of NTIA.

An alternative choice is to leave IRAC inNTIA, but separate out the role of presidentialtelecommunications advisor from NTIA and putit in the White House. One possible place to vestthis authority is the Office of Science andTechnology Policy or a new OTP. Anotherpossibility would be to transfer it to a specialtelecommunications representative, like USTR,noted above. This action would leave NTIA free

ST me State Dep~ent recenfly resmcmred its operations, revoking CIP’S bureau status and placing it ~der the Bureau of Wonomic andBusiness Affairs. This could affect both CIP’s stature and its ability to carry out its statutory responsibilities.

68 ~ Cmly 1990, for example, Representative 13dward Markey considered proposing legislation tbat would have removed autiotity forinternational HDTV negotiations from the State Department and placed it in the Department of Commerce.


to concentrate on its responsibilities as FederalGovernment spectrum manager.

OPTION 4. Create a separate cabinet-level agency,a Department of Communications that wouldinclude an international radiocommunicationsjunction.

This option would abolish the FCC, NTIA andCIP, and transfer their functions to one integrateddepartment that would have overall responsibilityfor developing and implementing national tele-communications policy, and negotiating at inter-national meetings.

The advantages and disadvantages are similarto those for Approach 2 above: internationaltelecommunications policy would gain a moresolid political base from which to settle disputesand set goals and priorities. However, the depart-ment could become another pawn in political

battles, or be captured by industry. There is little

discernible support for this idea among membersof Congress.

The most far-reaching changes would be ac-

complished through the establishment of a centraltelecommunications agency combined with amajor commitment to an industrial policy for thetelecommunications industries. Such a commitm-ent would require the most active and long-termcongressional involvement. This approach couldbe accomplished through existing structures orthrough a centralized telecommunications agency.The benefits of such an approach would be toraise the level of policymaking to a higher level,and to focus greater attention, and hopefullyresources, on telecommunications policy issues.The disadvantages include the effects of poorplanning and decisionmaking and a danger ofeven greater politicalization of the issues.

—

Outcomesand Implications

I

for U.S. RadioTechnology 2

ARC-92 considered a host of issues that weretechnically complex, interrelated, and contentious.Many of these issues were left over from previousWARCs, but the conference also considered fre-

quency allocations for a number of new services and technolo-gies. As a result of the month-long deliberations, conferencedelegates reached agreement on a broad range of allocation andregulatory issues. This chapter examines the outcomes ofWARC-92, the factors that contributed to the success and/orfailure of U.S. proposals, and the implications WARC-92decisions will have for the development of radio technology in theUnited States and the making of future radiocommunication policy.

FACTORS COMPLICATING ASSESSMENT OFWARC-92 OUTCOMES

Although the United States achieved many of its objectives forWARC-92, U.S. proposals were generally less successful thanpopularly reported, How much less is open to debate. Membersof the delegation leadership point cut that the United States wasvery successful in ‘‘opening the door’ to several important newservices, and on many issues of lesser importance, U.S. proposalswere accepted by WARC-92. These officials take a long view ofthe process of international spectrum management, and note thatadditional gains will be pursued at future conferences. They donot see the fact that the United States did not get everythingexactly as proposed as a failure, but rather as an expectedoutcome and as part of a longer-term U.S. strategy in intern-ational spectrum policymaking.

Many factors complicate an evaluation and analysis of thedecisions reached at the conference. Some of these factors aretechnical, some procedural, and some interpretive. In addition, as

51


economic, technical, and political needs change,policies regarding radiocommunication servicesand the effects of those policies can be expectedto change as well. As a result, assessing the futureof specific services is difficult and somewhatspeculative. The discussion below presents themost likely developments in these technologiesand services based on current knowledge oftechnical details, negotiations, and political prior-ities.

9 Differences in InterpretationEvaluation of the outcomes of WARC-92, or

any other international conference, is compli-cated by differences in perspective and interpreta-tion. Different people, depending on their job oraffiliation, have different perspectives, and as aresult, interpretations and evaluations of eventsand decisions can vary significantly. DefenseDepartment evaluations may differ from FederalCommunication Commission (FCC) assessments,which could be wholly different from an analysisby someone in the private sector. Even among themembers of the U.S. delegation—who suppos-edly all have U.S. interests at heart-this diver-gence of opinions exists.

In describing and analyzing the implications ofany international conference, there is a tendencyfor those involved to simplify the issues and putthe best possible light on the outcomes achieved.Since the close of WARC-92, government andprivate sector representatives have endeavored toaccentuate the positive results of the conferencewhile downplaying negative outcomes. In somecases, this ‘‘positive spin’ makes issues easier tounderstand. In other cases, however, ‘ ‘spin’ ‘ cancloud the issues, covering possible strategic orpolicy errors and making assessments of U.S.

performance more challenging. In the case ofWARC-92, the effects of ‘ ‘ spin‘‘ have beencompounded by the complexity of the decisionsmade and the secrecy surrounding several of theissues—it is difficult to evaluate results whenthey are not necessarily final or well-defined.

In addition, it is important to remember thatWARCs are negotiations, and as is the case foralmost any international negotiations, it is unrea-sonable to expect that one side will get all itdesires. Such was the case for WARC-92. In orderto fairly evaluate the outcomes of the conference,it is important to understand how specific goalsfor the negotiations were developed and whatstrategies were used to pursue them. In somecases, for example, negotiating positions (basedon amounts of spectrum requested) were estab-lished that might have been more extreme thanwas actually needed. These proposals might nothave been expected to succeed entirely, but wereput forth as bargaining chips in order to providenegotiating room. In such cases, a narrow analysisthat simply compares proposals with results maylead to an overly negative judgment about theoutcomes of WARC-92 for the United States.

I Procedural IssuesThe problem of assessing WARC-92 outcomes

is exacerbated by the way decisions are reached atWARCs and the way the international Table ofFrequency Allocations is written. In WARCnegotiations, frequencies are allocated to specificradio services and become part of the intern-ational Table of Frequency Allocations (see figure1-1). However, footnotes are often added to theseallocations that further define or constrain how,when, or where individual services can be usedand by which countries. 1

1 Footno[cs to the international T-~blc of Frequency Allocations, just like the footnotes in this report, further describe or limit the allocatmnslisted in the table. They are designated by number and letter-731X (see figure 1-1 in chaptcrl, which shows a sample page from the internationalTable of Frequency Allocations, including how footnotes are presented). Footnotes are used for a variety of purposes, including to specify powerlevels, reference relevant resolutions, and allocate additional semices. Footnotes are also used by a country (or countries) to prcscrvc somerncasure of national sovereignty v.’hcn they disagree with the allocations thal were made internationally. These countiy footnotes can makeahmative or additional allocations or can limit operations within those countries.

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 53

Often, adding footnotes to the allocations tableis the only way to reach agreement. A country (orcountries), for example, may decide that it cannotagree with an allocation that has been agreed tointernationally because of its existing uses. Thedissenting country will attempt to have a footnoteplaced in the allocation table noting its use of thefrequencies or making an alternative allocationthat applies only to it. At WARC-92, for example,the members of the International Telecommunic-ation Union (ITU) decided to allocate the1452-1492 MHz band to the Broadcasting-Satellite Service-Sound (BSS-Sound) on a copri-mary basis. The United States, however, in orderto protect domestic aeronautical telemetry uses—aircraft testing and weapons development—placed a footnote (in the form of an alternativeallocation) that prohibits those frequencies frombeing used in the United States for BSS-Sound. Inaddition to footnotes, WARCs also adopt resolu-tions and recommendations that set conditions onthe use of some frequencies that will affect howallocations can be implemented. Resolutions andrecommendations also identify areas requiringfurther technical study by the International RadioConsultative Committee (CCIR) (see appendix Cfor a select list of WARC-92 resolutions andrecommendations).

WARC-92 made many important changes tothe international Table of Frequency Allocations,but also inserted many footnotes that will con-strain the use of those new allocations.2 In fact,delegates at the conference had a joke about thenumber and complexity of the footnotes they hadagreed to: ‘‘what the allocations giveth, thefootnotes taketh away. ” At the close of theconference, a representative of Canada remarkedthat he was glad the conference was over so hecould go home and determine just what he hadagreed to. Olof Lundberg, Director-General ofInmarsat, echoed this sentiment after the confer-

ence ended: “I think all of us who want to beplayers in new areas have a challenging timeahead to find out to what degree this spectrum isu s a b l e . Thus, concentrating only on the allocat-ions that were adopted could lead one to con-clude that the results of WARC-92 were morefavorable for the United States than they actuallyare. A thorough analysis of the decisions of theconference requires careful consideration notonly of the allocations, but also of the sometimestechnically complex, sometimes deliberately vaguefootnotes that accompany the allocations.

1 Technical IssuesFinally, in analyzing the outcomes and implic-

ations of WARC-92, several important technicalcaveats must be noted that will affect how andwhen WARC-92 decisions will be implemented,First, many of the technical details that will affectthe future of these services and technologies arestill undecided, and will be negotiated amongstthe stakeholders over the next several years. Inaddition, WARC-92 called for the CCIR, whichstudies technical matters relating to radio technol-ogy, to conduct studies on many of the systemsand services addressed at the conference. Thesestudies will guide future revisions of the decisionsmade at WARC-92.

Second, the decisions and allocations made atWARC-92 are not cast in stone. Although WARC-92 has been described as the last of its kind, it willnot be the last world radiocommunication confer-ence, and future conferences will very likelychange, reverse, or otherwise modify the deci-sions and allocations made at WARC-92. Accord-ing to the recent restructuring of the ITU (seechapter 3), future world radio conferences willtake place every 2 years-each dealing with asingle topic or very limited range of topics. It islikely (and required in some cases) that theseconferences will modify the allocations and foot-

2 For mobile services, e.g., more than 30 new footnotes were added that define power ICVCIS and sharing criteria, limit usc to certaincountries, and specify dates for implementation.

3 Quoted in Bob Chapin+ “Inrnarsat: MSS Evolution or Revolution?” Satellite Communications, August 1992, p. 36.


notes made at WARC-92 based on CCIR studiesand as a result of new technological developments.

In addition, the decisions made at WARC-92will be subject to continuing interpretation (andreinterpretation to fit changing national priorities)over the next two decades. Since many of theservices (and systems) discussed at WARC-92are still being developed, their operational char-acteristics are still unknown, Consequently, theprocedures and regulations that govern their usewill likely change over time as experience sharp-ens understanding.

The implications of WARC-92 are also diffi-cult in some cases to foresee because of the longtransition times involved. The ITU often makesallocations effective 10 or 15 years in the futurein order to give existing users of the bandsadequate time to move to other frequencies. So,for example, the full force of some of thedecisions of WARC-79 are just now beginning tobe felt. Likewise, some WARC-92 allocations arenot scheduled to come into effect until 2007—15years from now. It may take almost that long towork through the nuances of the WARC-92footnotes, and in that time, technology will havecontinued to advance rapidly. Radio services willhave gone through several generations of im-provements, and new applications will have beendeveloped. Policies, rules and regulations willcontinue to evolve in response to technologydevelopments. For these reasons, evaluating theoutcomes of WARC-92 is, in one sense, prema-ture. Rather, the outcomes of WARC-92 must beexamined as one piece in a longer process thatstretches out for many years before and after.

U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR WARC-92The general goals for the United States at

WARC-92 were to enhance the competitiveposition of the United States in radiocommunica-

tion technologies and services, and allow newradio services and technology systems to bedeveloped as quickly and flexibly as possible. Inpursuit of these goals, the U.S. delegation hadseveral objectives for WARC-92:

Support allocations for new services, such aslow-Earth orbiting satellites (LEOS), BSS-Sound, and general satellite service (GSS),as well as the expansion of allocations forexisting services, such as the Mobile-SatelliteService (MSS) and high-frequency broad-casting (HF).Protect important domestic radio operationsby preventing new services from operating inthe same bands and interfering with theincumbent services. This was an importantconcern for allocations in the L-band (approxi-mately 1.4-1.6 GHz), the 14.5 -14.8 GHzband, and the frequencies just above 21.4GHz, among others.Assure that new and existing allocations aremore flexible and less constrained by regula-tion-allowing U.S. companies to exploit theirtechnical strengths in international markets.Promote development of new radiocommuni-cation technologies, an area in which the

United States is a world leader.

In some cases these objectives conflicted witheach other. During the domestic preparations forWARC-92, for example, U.S. policymakers wereforced to choose between protecting the impor-tant civilian and military uses of the L-band foraircraft and weapons testing and promoting newdigital broadcasting technologies that had beenproposed by the private sector. In such cases,intense policy disputes erupted, the undercurrentsof which carried over into the conference.

The sections below discuss the most importantallocation issues debated at WARC-92.4 Each

4 Other matters besides new allocations for radio services were discussed at W~C-92. However, the main focus of the conference wason allocations, and allocation issues consequently are the focus of this report. For a full discussion of the U.S. positions for WMC-92,negotiating issues, and fiil results, see U.S. Department of State, United States Delegafi”on Report: World Administrative Radio Conference,International Telecommunication Union, Malaga-Torremolinos, Spain, 1992, publication 9988, released July 1992.

— —


section provides a brief background on the service by amateur radio operators, international govern-and technology, discusses the U.S. proposals andhow well they fared at WARC-92, and examinesthe implications for the service now that agree-ments have been reached.5

HIGH-FREQUENCY BROADCASTING

9 BackgroundThe frequencies from 3 to 30 MHz are referred

to as the high-frequency band or, more comm-only, the shortwave band. Because radio wavesin these frequencies can travel long distances(beyond the horizon), they are extensively used

ment (Voice of America, British BroadcastingCorporation, and Radio Moscow) and private(religious) broadcasters, and for national andinternational aviation, maritime, and emergencycommunications. 6 Many developing countriesuse these bands primarily to provide domesticpoint-to-point communications.

International broadcasters typically transmitnews and information services and religiousprogramming as well as music. Many countries,including the United States, use shortwave broad-casting to champion their political, cultural, andeconomic beliefs around the world. In this role,HF broadcasting is viewed by many nations as an

5 All information onU.S. proposals comes from U.S. Department of State, UnitedStates Proposalsfor the 1992 WorldAdministrative RadioConference for Dealing with Frequency Allocations in Certain Parts of the Spectrum, Department of State publication 9903, July 1991.

6 Although more than 1O(3 countries currently use HF frequencies to broadcast information progr amming internationally, large-scaleinternational broadcasting is limited to perhaps a dozen (mostly industrial) countries, including Australia, Cana&, Chin% Cuba, France,Ge rmany, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For a brief discussion of the history of international HFbroadcasting, see James Wood, “Growth Explosion in International I-IF Information Broadcasting,” Telecommunications Policy, vol. 15,February 1991, pp. 22-28.

330–071 0 – 93 - 3 QL 3


&* ,

The United States uses high-frequency broadcasting towers like these in the Phillipines to transmit radioprograms around the world.

important tool of foreign policy. In the past, forexample, HF broadcasting was instrumental indelivering propaganda programming during timesof war. This function was important during theCold War, but today, the overt propagandacontent of the broadcasts has been toned downand more emphasis is put on communicatingAmerican values and viewpoints. The UnitedStates currently broadcasts more hours ofinternational programming than any other coun-

try.For many years, the amount of spectrum

allocated to HF broadcasting has been recognizedby most countries as critically inadequate, espe-cially in the most valuable (and congested) bands

below approximately 10 MHz.7 Part of the reasonfor this congestion is simple numbers-there aremore broadcasters than available frequencies.Planning exercises conducted for the 1987 HighFrequency Broadcasting WARC (HFBC-87), forexample, indicated that more than 50 percent ofall HF broadcasting needs submitted by membercountries could not be adequately met, andbetween 25 and 35 percent of these needs couldnot be met at all.8 In 1990 the National Telecom-munications and Information Administration(NTIA), concluded that 2 to 4 times morespectrum (depending on specific frequency bandsand modulation techniques) was needed to meet

7 The bands below 10 MHz are especially coveted by broadcasters and other HF users because they are much more reliable than thefrequencies above 10 MHz. Frequencies above 10 MHz that are used for long distance communication are often affected by sunspot activity,which varies by the time of day and by season. When this happens, the broadcasters in the upper bands reset their transmitters to the lowerfrequencies, causing even more interference and congestion.

8 WMC-92 Lndustry Advisory Committee, “Final Report of Informal Working Group Number l,” report submitted to the FederalCommunications Commission Apr. 24, 1991.


current HF broadcasting requirements. The Inter-national Frequency Registration Board (IFRB)reached similar conclusions in its report toWARC-92.9

One reason behind the great demand for HFfrequencies is that multiple frequencies are oftenneeded to deliver programming to a given geo-graphic area over the course of a day. Differentfrequencies have distinct transmission character-istics that make them suitable for long-rangetransmission during specific hours-different fre-quencies, for example, are used at night andduring the day. Thus, in order to provide continu-ous coverage to a specific region or city, frequen-cies must be changed as the day progresses. Forexample, Voice of America (VOA) uses sevenfrequencies to deliver programmingg to Beijing,China. The problems in providing adequatecoverage to an area as large as China or Africa areenormous and achieving adequate quality andcoverage may require many different frequen-cies.

The international regulatory system also con-tributes to the congestion of the HF broadcastingchannels. HF broadcasting is not regulated, forexample, as AM/FM radio is in the UnitedStates—where one station is assigned to onechannel in a specified geographic area. Thisassignment process substantially reduces interfer-ence between stations. International HF broad-casting, on the other hand, has much less stringentlimits. Although the use of specific frequencies issupposed to be coordinated internationally, andthe FCC regulates U.S. broadcasters, in othercountries broadcasters often transmit anytime,

anywhere they want-as long as the band isallocated to HF and they follow the internationalRadio Regulations (and sometimes even this isnot adhered to).l0 Some of the most sought-afterfrequencies can have as many as 10 stationsoperating on them.

9 U.S. ProposalsThe United States made several proposals

relating to HF allocations and regulations. First,based on the need for additional frequencies forHF broadcasting, and in order to balance theamount of spectrum available in the ITU’s 3regions (see figure 1-2), the United States pro-posed to allocate an additional 1325 kHz in ITURegion 2, and an additional 1125 kHz in Regions1 and 3. The following additional HF broadcast-ing allocations were proposed for Region 2:

5900-5950 kHz 13800-13900 kHZ7200-7525 kHZ* 15600-15700 kHZ9350-9500 kHz 17450-17550 kHz11550-11650 kHz 18900-19300 kHZ

*The United States proposed to add only 125 kHzin this band for ITU Regions 1 and 3 in order toalign the HF broadcasting bands worldwide(existing HF broadcasting allocations in theseregions exceeded those in Region 2). This ac-counts for the difference in total proposed alloca-tions.

All these allocations except the 18900-19300 kHzwould be contiguous with existing HF broadcast-ing bands.

In addition, the United States proposed that allnew allocations be required to use a transmission

9 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Spectrum Required for HF Broadcasting,NTIA Report 90-268, October 1990. Internation.al Telecommunication UnioU Document 4 of WUC-92, Malaga-Torremolinos, SpairLFebruary 1992.

10 The Irltematioti Frequency Registration Board does have to be notified that such operations me hginning, but the ~ ~sno red powerto prevent stations from operating on any frequencies they want.

58 ! The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Figure 2-l—Single Sideband Modulation

In order to transmit information using radio waves, thereformation to be sent (music or voice) IS impressedonto a carrier wave. As a result of this process, side-bands are created that actually contain the musicor voice Information of the signal. Radio receiversextract the music or voice reformation from the carrierand its sidebands.

‘m

When both upper and lower sidebands are transmitted,the method IS called double sideband modulation.

b,—— ●

&.

In smgle-sideband modulation, either one of thesidebands IS removed from the modulated carrier.Only the carrier and one sideband are transmitted.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, adapted fromHarry Mileaf, cd., Electronics One (Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden BookCompany, Inc., 1976),

technique called reduced carrier single-sideband(SSB) modulation (see figure 2-1).11 SSB reducesthe amount of spectrum each radio signal/stationneeds, thereby allowing more users to share theband. 12 In order to encourage the early use ofSSB, the United States also proposed advancingthe date (agreed to at HFBC-87) when allbroadcasting must be converted to SSB from theyear 2015 to 2007.

Finally, the United States proposed to align thediffering regional HF broadcasting and amateurradio service allocations around 7 MHz—creating a worldwide allocation for HF broadcast-ing at 7200-7525 kHz. A procedure for reaccom-modating existing services displaced by thesechanges was also proposed.

1 ResultsUnited States HF proposals achieved mixed

results at WARC-92. The conference allocatedonly 790 kHz of additional spectrum to HFbroadcasting, of which 200 kHz is located infrequencies below 10 MHz (the most congestedportion of the HF bands). The remaining 590 kHzwas allocated between 11 and 19 MHz. All thenewly allocated bands are allocated on a world-wide basis (see table 2-l).

Two significant limitations were put on the useof these new frequencies. First, they cannot comeinto operation until April 1, 2007. At that time,broadcasting will become the exclusive primaryservice operating in the bands. Point-to-point andmobile services, however, will be able to use thebands after this date, but only within the bounda-ries of a country and only on a low-power,noninterference basis. WARC-92 Resolution 21defines the conditions for the phase-in of thebroadcasting service in these newly allocatedbands.

1 ] Cwendy, most ~temtio~ shortwave broadcmting uses a transmission technique c~led double sidebmd.12 Conbq t. int~tion, the kcre~e k spec~ ava.ilabili~ would not be 2:1. NTIA estimates gains of about 1.8:1, while the ITU/~

estimates that the efficiency gain would be approximately 1.5:1, meaning that 2 existing double-sideband channels could be converted into 3new SSB channels.


Table 2-1—WARC-92 High-Frequency Broadcasting Allocations

Frequency Amount Frequency Amount

5900-5950 KHz 50 KHz 11600-11650 KHz 50 KHz7300-7350 KHz 50 kHz 12050-12100 KHz 50 KHz9400-9500 KHz 100 KHz 13570-13600 KHz 30 KHz

13800-13870 KHz 70 Khz15600-15800 kHz 200 KHz17480-17550 KHz 70 KHz

18900-19020 KHz 120 KHz

200 KHz 590 KHz


Second, WARC-92 prohibited use of theseadditional bands until a process for planning theHF broadcasting spectrum has been completed.This restriction is defined in Resolution 523,which also calls for a WARC to establishplanning procedures. However, United States HFbroadcasters believe that planning will be mean-ingless until more spectrum is allocated, TheUnited States entered a formal reservation in theFinal Acts of WARC-92 to protest the smallamount of spectrum allocated to HF broadcastingand other limitations put on use of the bands.13

On its other HF proposals, the United Stateswas more successful. WARC-92 did agree that allnew bands should be required to use SSBtransmission, but did not accept the U.S. proposalto advance the date for conversion of all HFbroadcasting to SSB from 2015 to 2007. Theconference did, however, adopt Recommendation519, which recommends that the next WARCagain consider advancing the date for replacingcurrent double-sideband transmissions with morespectrum-efficient SSB techniques. WARC-92did not accept the U.S. proposal for aligning theworld’s HF broadcasting bands around 7 MHz,but Recommendation 718, proposed by Mexicoand supported by the United States, was adoptedthat calls for a future conference to address the

issue. Finally, WARC-92 accepted U.S. propos-als for reaccommodation procedures and second-ary status for freed and mobile users in the HFbands. WARC-92 also adopted Recommendation520 that member governments take steps to shutdown HF broadcasters who are using frequenciesoutside the designated HF broadcasting bands.

H Discussion

DOMESTIC ISSUESIn the domestic preparation process for HF

broadcasting, the primary issue was how muchadditional spectrum the United States shouldpropose to be reallocated for HF broadcastinguses. This debate pitted private broadcasters andseveral agencies of the Federal Government (U.S.Information Agency (USIA)/VOA and RadioFree Europe/Radio Liberty) against other U.S.Government users, including the Departments ofTreasury (Coast Guard) and Justice (FederalBureau of Investigation).

During the preparations process, the FCC’sIndustry Advisory Committee (IAC) recommendedthat 2455 kHz of additional spectrum be allocatedfor HF broadcasting. Defense and other gover-nment HF users proposed far smaller amounts, anda compromise of 1325 kHz was tentatively

13$ {In he “Iew of he u~ted states of ~e-ica, ~i~ co~erenw f~]~ to tie ad~uate provision for tie ~ needs of the broadcasting

service, particularly below 10 MHz, despite an earnest effort to do so. The IFRB’s Report to the Conference shows that broadcasters’requirements far outnumber the channels available in the bands between 6 and 11 MHz (where spectrum is urgently needed) and that planningwill not work effectively without additionzd and adequate HF spectrum. Therefore, the United States of America reserves the right to take thenecessary steps to meet the HF needs of its broadcasting service. ’ hternational ‘IMecommunication UnioL *’Declarations,” WmC-92Document 389-E, Malaga-Torremolinos, Spa@ Mar. 3, 1992, p. 29.


reached. What happened next is disputed, butfinal proposals included only 1325 kHz. USIAand VOA, joined by private broadcasting inter-ests, complained to NTIA that this amount wasinadequate, and proposed an additional 60 kHz.Other government agencies, including the CoastGuard and Federal Bureau of Investigation, op-posed this addition, citing the use of the specifiedband for drug interdiction activities. NTIA agreedwith these agencies, and rejected VOA appeal—the final proposal to WARC-92 was for 1325 kHz.In an attempt to force official U.S. proposals toinclude more spectrum for HF broadcasting,VOA, representing government and industrybroadcasters, took its case to the National Secu-rity Council (NSC) in early January 1992.14 NSCdid not act on VOA’s request until after WARC-92 had ended, effectively nullifying VOA’sappeal.

The clash over allocations for HF broadcastinghas become controversial. Different players in thedebate hold conflicting views of what happenedand when: What information was shared? Whenwere decisions made and who made them? Howcarefully were the factors surrounding the issueconsidered? Because the debate involved existinggovernment use of the HF bands, much of thepreparations and debate regarding HF broadcast-ing allocations were conducted in the Interdepart-ment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), thedeliberations of which are largely restricted frompublic view.

15 The issues surrounding the battleover additional HF spectrum and its implicationsfor long-term U.S. radiocommunication policydevelopment are discussed in chapter 1.

Ultimately, the domestic battles over HF broad-casting proposals most likely had no effect on theWARC-92 outcome. Even if the United Stateshad proposed more spectrum, as did the Europe-ans, it is unlikely that the developing countrieswould have agreed to any further allocations. Afew analysts disagree. They believe that if theUnited States had been able to develop a proposalwith even more additional spectrum for HFbroadcasting in a timely manner, and had joinedothers (the Europeans) in promoting such newallocations prior to WARC-92, that additionalspectrum could have been obtained. Whether itwas the result of conscious strategy or not, goinginto the conference with more modest proposalsnow makes the outcome look better than it wouldhave if the United States had proposed the largeramount of spectrum VOA and the private broad-casters wanted.

An additional area of domestic disagreementinvolves the implementation of SSB technology.This conflict again involves VOA and privatebroadcasters, on the one hand, and other gover-nment agencies on the other. Although VOAsupports the conversion to SSB in principal, andis, in fact, installing SSB-compatible transmitters,it is concerned about how and when the transitionto SSB can be accomplished. VOA’s position isthat the cost of SSB radio receivers currentlyprevents their rapid adoption by VOA’s listeners,and until adequate numbers of SSB radios are inuse, they will resist ceasing their double-sideband

14 NSC is ~ laq ~e~o~ for resolv~g issues mat could not ~ resolved iD tie re~m WARC preparation processes. It has no specific expertise

in radiocomrnunication matters and no individual who specializes in telecommunication issues.15 me ~terdepmmt MO Advisory Cohttee @AQ was fo~ed ~ 1922 to coor@te tie Fede~ Government’s use of the spectrum.

It is now located in the Commerce Department and consists of approximately 20 to 25 representatives from those Federal agencies who arethe most active users of radio technologies. IRAC serves in an advisory capacity to NTIA in matters of radiocornmunication policy and spectrummanagement. For more information on IIL4C and its role in the WARC-92 preparation process, see U.S. Congress, Office of T@nologyAssessment, The 1992 WorldAdministrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. International Spectrum Policy, OTA-TCT-BP-76 (WashingtonDC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1991).


(DSB) transmissions.l6 Typical shortwave (HF)radio receivers are relatively inexpensive, butSSB receivers, which are being manufacturedtoday (although not in mass market quantities),cost $175 and up, far beyond the means of mostVOA listeners around the world.17 VOA’s posi-tion also may be related to a desire to moveeventually into satellite (BSS-Sound) delivery ofits programming. Rather than forcing its listenersto endure two format changes in the coming years,VOA may prefer to move directly into BSS-Sound delivery of its services, leapfrogging atechnology (SSB) they see as only an interim (andvery expensive) step.l8

These disagreements indicate a larger policyand institutional battle that is being foughtbetween private/government broadcasters andother Federal Government spectrum users in thearena of international frequency allocation. De-fense interests are especially reluctant to real-locate spectrum for HF broadcasting (public andprivate) because they control much of the HFspectrum allocated for government use, and theydo not want to give up any more frequencies thannecessary. As a result, the HF broadcastingcommunity reports being consistently overwhelmedin government decisionmaking processes such asthe IRAC preparations for WARC-92. The issueappears to be one of agency mission. Defense-andsecurity-related communications appear to haveassumed a higher priority than internationalbroadcasting, despite a National Security Direc-tive (NSD-51) that affirms the important role ofinternational broadcasting in foreign policy and

supports its continued mission. Battles of thistype can be expected to continue until guidelinesare developed that allow government policymakersto weigh competing spectrum claims based onclearly-defined policy goals.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUESUnlike many other allocation issues, the debate

at WARC-92 over new HF broadcasting alloca-tions echoed past ITU differences between thedeveloped and developing countries. For morethan a decade, the United States and many otherindustrialized countries have been advocatingincreasing HF broadcasting allocations in order tomeet the growing needs of international HFbroadcasters. These past efforts achieved onlylimited success.

Historically, developing countries, who use theHF bands for fixed (point-to-point) domestictelecommunication services, have opposed ex-panding the allocations for HF broadcasting.They fear that such uses would interfere with orlimit their point-to-point HF systems, and thatincreased use of these frequencies for broadcast-ing could make their existing equipment unusable-jeopardizing their investments in that equipment.They want to continue to use HF for domesticcommunications and they want to protect theirinvestments. Many countries are also concernedabout increased foreign broadcasting into theirterritories.

At WARC-92, these historic divisions per-sisted as a large and determined block of develop-

16 * ~USIA ~oc~ not ~ppo~e ~onvcr~ion t. SSB, ~~ch it sees as offering sp~~ efficiency and possibly generator-fuel savings, provided

its listeners have SSB-compatible receivers. . . USIA has consistently insisted that two related problems, the introduction of SSB-compatibletransmitters and the introduction of SSB-compatible receivers, must be resolved prior to the fha.1 abandonment of DSB in favor of SSB. . .Thehigh cost of SSB-compatible receivers, especially in the Third World, maybe a significant factor in delaying the conversion from DSB. Untiland unless adequate numbers of SSB-compatible receivers are in the hands of audiences, broadcasters, and more importantly the governmentsthat in most cases pay their bills, will be unwilling to cease DBS operations. ” Review comments of Walter La Fleur, Director, Office ofEngineering and Technical Operatiom, Voice of America, Iettcr to David P. Wyc, OTA, Nov. 18, 1992, p. A-2.

17 some ~yst5 ~lntaln t~t me Price of SSB rKelvers Wou]d ~omc down substanti~y when fiey were manufactured in tfuc mass market

quantities. Others believe that the price of the reccivcrs would still be prohibitively high.

18 It should be noted that ncw BSS-Sound receivers will also be very expensive when they are first inmoduced.


ing countries staunchly opposed allocating anymore frequencies to the HF broadcasting service.The industrialized countries, including the UnitedStates and Europe as well as the Russian Federa-tion and Japan, supported increasing the alloca-tions. The Europeans, in fact, submitted a com-mon proposal for new HF spectrum that exceededeven the amount proposed by the United States.Discussions over the allocation proposals at theconference were intense, and negotiations quicklybecame focused on the most valuable and con-gested frequencies below 10 MHz. After a numb-er of formal and informal meetings and muchdiscussion “of f-line,” a compromise packagewas worked out that included the allocationsnoted above.

Although the allocations by WARC-92 fellshort of U.S. objectives, the United States sup-ported the compromise package. U.S. delegatesparticipating in the HF negotiations felt thatfurther discussion would be useless, citing exten-sive opposition to any further allocations. Devel-oping country opposition also blocked other U.S.proposals. The U.S. proposal for advancing theconversion date for SSB, for example, met stiffresistance from the developing countries, andsome developed countries, who were concernedthat they could not afford to refit or replace theirequipment any faster than the original date of2015.

This case points out the difficulty of balancingdomestic and international factors in developingproposals. Domestic users need more spectrum,which led the United States to propose largeadditional allocations. Many (primarily develop-ing) countries, however, oppose expansion, mean-ing that a smaller proposal might have had betterchances for success internationally. U.S. propos-als represented an attempt to strike a balancebetween these two conflicting forces.

H Issues and Implications

FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AREINADEQUATE

STILL

From the U.S. perspective, despite the alloca-tions made at WARC-92, the amount of spectrumallocated for HF broadcasting is still inadequate.This means that the HF broadcasting bands willcontinue to be congested and subject to highlevels of interference among stations around theworld. Furthermore, the limitations placed on theimplementation of the new HF broadcastingfrequencies mean that these bands will not beavailable for HF broadcasting for at least 15 years.Given the shortage of spectrum that currentlyexists, the decisions made at WARC-92 will notsolve broadcasters’ immediate needs.

Several long-term questions regarding HFbroadcasting remain. How can the United Statesbest meet its HF broadcasting requirements giventhe limitations and restrictions of the WARC-92allocations? What constraints, if any, will theinadequacy of allocations put on future U.S. HFbroadcasting activities? Will future internationalbroadcasting services require more high fre-quency spectrum or can other technologies beused to alleviate the shortage?

The options available to the United States arelimited. According to the U.S. reservation in theFinal Acts of WARC-92, the United States willtake all steps to meet the needs of its broadcasters.In practice, this may mean that U.S. broadcasterswill use the frequencies allocated at WARC;-92immediately, in spite of the implementation dateof 2007. Despite ITU agreements and resolutionsthat prohibit broadcasting in frequencies out ofthe specified bands, many countries, including theUnited States, have been forced to use bands otherthan those allocated to HF broadcasting to meettheir domestic HF broadcasting needs.l9 In thefuture the United States may be forced to expand

19 ~~ber 342 of the Radio Re@latio~ permits such operations provided they do not cause interference to the allocated SCmlceS.International lklecomrnunication Unioq Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1982).


its use of prohibited frequency bands in order tomeet its broadcasting requirements.

PLANNINGPlanning the HF broadcasting spectrum is

closely linked to the amount of spectrum that hasbeen allocated for HF broadcasting. From theU.S. perspective, any attempt at planning beforeadequate spectrum is allocated would be difficultand most likely unsuccessful. The United Stateswill fight attempts to plan the spectrum until itbelieves that allocations are adequate and/or untilan adequate planning system is developed.20

Aside from arguments that insufficient spec-trum exists for planning, the United States hashistorically opposed a priori planning of thespectrum. Government officials believe that suchplanning reduces the flexibility to meet as yetundefined future needs and leads to inefficientutilization of spectrum resources, U.S. spectrumpolicymakers may also fear that because spec-trum is in such limited supply, and because theUnited States is the world’s largest user of the HFspectrum, that ITU planning could force U.S. HFbroadcasters to give up frequencies in order tomake room for other countries. Thus, it is unclearin any case if the United States would eversupport the formal planning of the HF broadcast-ing bands. From the perspective of developingcountries, like the past battle over geosynchro-nous orbital slots for satellites, this is a questionof equity and fairness they have been pursuing forsome time, and which continues to be importantto them. The issue of HF planning will continueto be contentious for many years.

SINGLE-SIDEBAND TRANSMISSIONSingle-sideband transmission is not a new

technology. Amateur radio operators, the milit-

ary, and some marine and aeronautical users havebeen using it for many years. Converting thesetypes of (point-to-point) radiocommunication sys-tems to SSB is easier than for mass marketbroadcasting operations because commercial serv-ices and the military have greater financialresources and the ability to more completelycontrol the transition process—allowing them toimplement transmitters and receivers simultaneo-usly. Broadcasters, on the other hand, directlycontrol only the transmission of the signal; theycannot force listeners to buy new radios.21

Although SSB radios are available, they are nota truly ‘‘mass market” product. Currently, SSBreceivers are available commercially for $175 andup in the United States. These prices will slow thewidespread introduction of these radios in thedeveloping nations of the world. If and when massmarket economies are realized, the price of SSBradios will fall, Whether such radios will beproduced cheaply enough to sell worldwide, andwhen, however, are open questions. Developinga market for such products will be difficult untilmore broadcasters (are forced to) start using SSBtransmissions for their programming. The conver-sion to SSB in the United States will continue tobe a difficult issue. Because of this, broadcasterswill probably continue to insist that sufficientnumbers of SSB-compatible receivers be in thehands of their listeners before abandoning DSB infavor of SSB systems.

BSS-SOUNDThe congestion in HF broadcasting bands and

the relatively low reliability and quality of someof the frequencies is pushing international broad-casters to look for alternative means to deliverprogramming. An important future possibility ininternational broadcasting is the deployment of

20 Despite ~=fom t. &te, he devel~p~ent of ~ computcnz~ p~ing model ~ not been successti. Systems that have been developed

so far have suffered from various technicat flaws that made them unacceptable to ITU members. It is unclear how vigorously furtherdevelopment efforts are being pursued.

21 Broa&.~terS we faced ~~ a c~cken.egg smfio. Consmers do not &ve SSB radios and do not want to buy them ~td there 1S Sufficient

progr amrning to listen to. Broadcasters will resist broadcasting to listeners who cannot hear them-unless they are forced to. One possiblesolution is to develop inexpensive dual-mode radios capable of receiving both SSB and DSB transmissions.


broadcasting systems that use satellite technol-ogy. Such systems would cover larger areas thanterrestrial transmitters, and if such systems arelicensed and operated regionally and/or globally,they could replace traditional HF broadcasting asthe medium of choice for international broadcast-ers.22 The deployment of only a small number ofsatellites could beam hundreds of channels ofprogramming around the world, thereby relievingsome, if not all, of the current congestion of theHF broadcasting bands. Many HF broadcasters,including VOA, see the future of internationalbroadcasting in satellites. Direct broadcastingfrom satellites could provide worldwide coveragefor U.S. broadcasters that is more complete,reliable, and of higher quality than that availablewith HF technology.

One important issue that will have to beaddressed at future ITU meetings before BSS-Sound international broadcasting can go forwardis the legitimacy of cross-border satellite trans-missions. Currently, HF broadcasting across na-tional boundaries is internationally recognized asa legitimate activity, although some countries doattempt to jam foreign transmissions enteringtheir territories. There is currently no similarbroad acceptance of international satellite broad-casting activities, and the impossibility of con-forming satellite coverage areas strictly to na-tional boundaries could cause serious difficulty inimplementing such systems on a regional orworldwide basis.23 Some countries, who want toexercise tight control on the flow of informationinto their countries, will seek to impose restric-tions. U.S. broadcasters would prefer that futuresatellite-based international broadcasting be con-sidered in the same way that HF broadcasting is

today. This would allow them maximum flexibil-ity in reaching listeners around the world.

BROADCASTING SATELLITESERVICE-SOUND

I BackgroundBSS-Sound refers

programming (music,to the delivery of audionews, sports) from satel-

lites directly to consumer radios. While noBSS-Sound services are operating yet, the sys-tems now being developed would use digitaltechnology to broadcast CD--or near CD-qualityprogramming to listeners using radio receiversthat would be portable/mobile and low-cost.24 Akey feature of satellite broadcasting is that itallows programmers to broadcast their signal overa wide area-the entire United States, for example-as opposed to the limited range of today’sconventional terrestrial transmitters. Some devel-opers of BSS-Sound systems plan to augment thesatellites with terrestrial transmitters that wouldimprove reception in urban areas (between build-ings, in tunnels, etc.). Because these systems willsend their signals in a digital format, the termdigital audio broadcasting (DAB) has come intowidespread use (especially in the United States)to describe this next generation of radio broad-casting, and, in fact, DAB is now commonly usedto describe both satellite and terrestrial digitalbroadcasting systems.

Proponents of BSS-Sound see many marketsfor the new digital services. They are planning avariety of programming targeted to groups ofusers with different musical tastes, ethnic andcultural backgrounds, and special interests—groups that may not be able to support a local

zz pJ~ made MS ~~ent & opposing further allocations for w broadc~ting.23 ~ fac~ No, ‘2674 of tie ~dio Re@ations stip~tes tit “~1 tm~c~ me~s av~able SW be used to reduce, to the maximum eXtent

practicable, the radiation over the territory of other countries urdess an agreement has been previously reached with such countries.’ ITU, RadioRegulations, op. cit., footnote 19, p. RR30-2. Whether or not this regulation requires prior consent of countries before satellite broadcastingcan be beamed into them is a topic of debate in U.S. radiocommunication policy circles.

z~ Because existing AMIFM radios use analog technology, they will not be able to receive the new digital BSS-Sound signals. Consumerswill have to buy new (digital) radios in order to listen to the new services.


radio station, but when aggregated across thecountry, make a national service possible. Thisconcept is analogous to the programming philoso-phy of cable television.

In addition to audio programmingg, the trans-mission of data services directly to users is alsobeing explored. Proponents envision broadcast-ing data services to support educational needs,paging operations, and navigation and trafficmanagement systems for the Nation’s cars andhighways. In addition to purely domestic serv-ices, international broadcasters see BSS-Soundtechnology as an important new way to transmitradio programming around the world—a servicethat would allow them to reach listeners withhigher quality than the HF broadcasting they usetoday.

BSS-Sound applications have been studiedinternationally for at least 25 years. The membersof the ITU first considered allocating frequenciesfor BSS-Sound services at the 1979 WARC. Thatconference and subsequent WARCs, however,were not able to agree on specific allocations, andas a result, the matter was deferred for considera-tion by WARC-92.

U.S. ProposalBecause of the contentious nature of the debatethis country over allocations for BSS-Sound,

the U.S. proposal for this service was submittedto the ITU after the formal package of U.S.proposals was submitted in July 1991. The UnitedStates proposed that the 2310-2360 MHz band beallocated for BSS-Sound and complementaryterrestrial broadcasting services on a worldwidebasis.

9 ResultsThe U.S. proposal was not adopted as a

worldwide allocation. Instead, WARC-92 adoptedthree different allocations for BSS-Sound (seefigure 2-2 and table 2-2), making the development

b

-5

-.

Satellite dishes such as these will beam digital qualityradio programming up to satellites that will thenretransmit it across the country.

of a common worldwide BSS-Sound system/standard unlikely.25 First, WARC-92 allocated 40MHz of spectrum for BSS-Sound and comple-mentary terrestrial systems at 1452-1492 MHz ona coprimary worldwide basis. However, 30 coun-tries, including many countries represented by theConference of European Postal and Telecommu-nications Administrations (CEPT), indicatedthrough a footnote (722AAA) that BSS-Soundservices will have to operate on a secondary basisuntil April 1, 2007. This will likely preclude theintroduction of these services in those countriesuntil that date. In addition, the United States,holding to its original proposal, added a footnote(722B) that allocates the 1452-1525 MHz bandonly to the fixed and mobile services-no BSS-Sound or terrestrial DAB services will be permitt-ed in that band in this country. The United Stateswas the only country that made such a stipulation,which was to protect existing aeronautical te-lemetry users. Second, a number of countries,including Japan, China, and the Russian Federa-tion, allocated (through footnote 757A) the 2535-2655 MHz band for BSS-Sound on a coprimarybasis. Finally, the United States, joined only byIndia, inserted another footnote (750B) allocating

25 WUC-92 did agree that all BSS-Sound systems would be required to use digital transmission technology.


Figure 2-2—WARC-92 Allocations for Broadcast Satellite Service-Sound

Q

,/’-+

L_ India accepts all threeallocations.

NOTE: Only Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine are included from the former Soviet Union.


the 2310-2360 MHz band for BSS-Sound, Thus,there are three BSS-Sound allocations that couldeventually be used.

WARC-92 also adopted two resolutions per-taining to BSS-Sound. Resolution 528 called foranother conference, preferably before 1998, toplan BSS-Sound services, develop procedures tocoordinate BSS-Sound with complementary ter-restrial (DAB) services, and review criteria forsharing the spectrum with other services. In theinterim, new BSS-Sound applications may beimplemented, but only in the upper 25 MHz of theallocations, and only according to existing coor-dination requirements. Terrestrial DAB services

Table 2-2—Population Distribution of WARC-92BSS-Sound Allocations

Allocations Population (milllions)

1452-1492 MHz 3,135No restrictions 2,584Not until 2007 551

2310-2360 MHz 1,0872535-2655 MHz 2,719

NOTE: Because India accepted all three allocations, the actual num-bers of listeners for each allocation will vary depending on whichallocation(s) India uses.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on dataprovided by Voice of America.

Chapter 2--Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 67

may also be introduced, but only after coordinat-ing with countries whose existing services mightbe affected. This 25 MHz limit should allow someservices to use the spectrum, but the number ofsystems that could share the frequencies may belimited.

Resolution 522 notes that BSS-Sound servicescould be provided by either geosynchronous ornon-geosynchronous orbit satellites, and requeststhat the CCIR study the sharing criteria forBSS-Sound systems using different orbits andbetween BSS-Sound and other services in order to

develop coordination procedures and avoid harm-ful interference between systems and services.26

The resolution also requests that the ITU’sAdministrative Council place this matter on theagenda of a future WARC. This resolutionresponds to the development of low-Earth orbit-ing satellite (LEOS) systems and the manyunknowns regarding systems using this newtechnology.

WARC-92 also adopted Resolution 527, whichcalls for a future WARC to consider the develop-ment of terrestrial DAB in the VHF broadcastingbands (existing FM radio bands) for Region 1 andinterested countries of Region 3. This is inresponse to the plans of several European coun-tries to begin digital sound broadcasting on aninterim basis in those bands. The resolution alsorequests the CCIR to begin the relevant technicalstudies (including system characteristics, propa-

gation, and sharing criteria) associated with theintroduction of such services.27

9 DiscussionThe idea of broadcasting radio programming

directly from satellites is not new, dating back atleast 45 years.28 The introduction of digitaltechnology, however, and the promise of static-free radio programming gave new impetus toBSS-Sound and DAB development efforts in the1980s. The European Commission took the leadin developing digital radio technology with itsEureka 147 DAB project, which was first demon-strated at the 1988 WARC. U.S. efforts to developDAB and BSS-Sound technology have laggedbehind European efforts, and U.S.-developedsystems are only now being demonstrated.

DOMESTIC BACKGROUNDThe development of DAB systems has taken

two forms in the United States. Originally, a smallnumber of companies proposed satellite-based(BSS-Sound) systems that would use frequenciesin the L-band (roughly 1.4-1.6 GHz) to transmit

their programming. Because these types of sys-tems, like Eureka 147, would use frequenciesother than the traditional AM/FM broadcastingbands, they are often referred to as ‘out-of-band’systems. The first U.S. company to formallyannounce such a system in the United States wasSatellite CD Radio.29 As currently planned, theSatellite CD system, which was proposed in 1989,

26 ~ tis -e, non-g~syrlchronous orbits refer p rirnarily to elliptical, and not low-Earth orbits. Because LEOS only remain in range of areceiver for a period of minutes, some analysts doubt whether audio services could be provided by LEOS.

27 ~tematio~ TelWo-@~~tion u~~~ )7i~l ~ts of the world ~~”nis~ative R~io Conference (WmC-92), provisiomd vel_siO~

Malaga-Torrernolinos, Spain+ March 1992, p. 116. Hereafter, ITU, Final Acts.

28 me concept of using satellites tO @~tit pro jpmrning was presented by Arthur C. Clarke in 1945 (Arthur C. Clarke, “Extra-’I5rrestriatRelays, ” Wireless World, October 1945). The more modem concept of BSS-Sound was considered at previous WARCS in 1979, 1985, and1988. See OTA, WfiC’-92, op. cit., footnote 15.

29 At abut he sme be, fidio sate~te Coloration (RadioSat) desi~ed a system tit wo~(j bve used the MSAT system p~ed fOr

operation by American Mobile Satellite Corp. (AMSC) and the Department of Defense global positioning system. The system planned toprovide entertainrnent, communications, and navigation semices primarily to car radios on a nationwide basis. Services to be deliveredincluded: interactive digital audio entertainen~ data broadcasts, including traftlc and weather advisories; navigation inforrnatiorL andtwo-way voice and data communications. Because of what RadioSat terms “unlawful’ behavior on the part of AMSC, RSC was never ableto negotiate for frequencies with AMSC and has terminated development of the RadioSat system. RSC has filed suit against AMSC chargingviolations of the Communications Act of 1934 and the Sherman Antitrust Act.


would use two satellites to broadcast up to 30channels of CD-quality music to subscribers whowould pay a $5 to $10 monthly fee. The system,which will serve only the United States, isscheduled to begin operation in 1997. In Decem-ber 1992, five other companies submitted appli-cations to the FCC to offer satellite radio services—American Mobile Radio Corp. (a subsidiary of theAmerican Mobile Satellite Corp.), PrimosphereL. P., Loral Aerospace Holdings, Inc., Sky-Highway Radio Corp., and Digital Satellite Broad-casting Corp.30

Because out-of-band DAB solutions wouldcreate a completely new set of radio broadcastingfrequencies, many broadcasters have stronglyopposed the development of such systems, claim-ing that they would destroy the American tradi-tion of local broadcasting. Primarily, these broad-casters fear the competition that a national radioservice might pose to their local operations. Newnational radio programs could conceivably takeaway listeners and advertising revenues thatwould otherwise go to support local broad-casters.

In addition, broadcasters believe that the morerapid development of out-of-band DAB might putthem at a technical disadvantage in using digitaltechnology. To counter these perceived threats,broadcasters have demanded guaranteed access toany new spectrum that would be opened forterrestrial (out-of-band) DAB use.31 Although nofrequencies have been allocated specifically forterrestrial DAB, the FCC did allocate frequenciesfor BSS-Sound (satellite use only) at 2310-2360

MHz. However, the problem of allowing existingusers access to new frequencies will recur if theUnited States considers additional allocations forterrestrial systems (see below).

Largely in response to local broadcasters’concerns, several companies began developingDAB technology that would work “in-band”—using the same frequencies now used by existingAM/FM radio stations. Such systems wouldallow terrestrial broadcasters to upgrade theirfacilities to digital quality at less cost thanout-of-band solutions and with minimal disrup-tion to the industry. Today, almost all U.S.terrestrial DAB development remains focused onin-band solutions.32

Gannett, CBS, and Group W Broadcasting, forexample, formed a partnership (USA DigitalRadio) to develop an in-band, DAB systemdubbed Project Acorn. This system would sendthe digital audio signal over the same channel asthe existing AM/FM analog signal, but at areduced power level that would not interfere withthe simultaneously transmitted analog signal (seefigure 2-3). Demonstrations of the system werescheduled for the end of 1992, with an experiment-al system planned for mid-1993.33 Another DABsolution has been proposed by Strother Commu-nications and Lincom Corporation. The Strother/LinCom solution is also in-band, but broadcaststhe digital signal in “guard bands’’-fiequencieson either side of existing FM channel that are leftunused in order to guard against interference fromstations on adjacent channels. The system alsosends a digital signal that is much weaker than the

so ~ese applimtiom were tenwtively accepted by the FCC in March 1993, ‘‘FCC Accepts Satellite DARS Application, ” Telcom Highlightslnfernafiomd, vol. 15, No. 10, Mar. 10, 1993. Later in MarclL I-oral Aerospace withdrew its application as part of an agreement to enter intoa partnership with Satellite CD Radio.

31 On@ly, ~fore~.bmd DAB system were ~~g develop~, L.b~d frequencies w~e considered for both satellite ad teIKW@ DAB.

Broadcasters wanted their access to these frequencies guaranteed so that they could compete in digitat services with any newcompetitors-otherwise they feared they would be effectively shut out of and unable to compete with the new technologies and services. Thissituation is analogous to the current demands of cellular carriers to be allowed to provide personal communications services.

32 Edmund L. Andrews, “Digitat Radio: Static Is Only Between Owners,” New York Times, May 6, 1992, p. D8.

33 D~el E-, Vice Resident, Finmce and Business Affairs, Gaunet Broadcasting, personal communication, June 2, 1992.

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology I 69

Figure 2-3—Proposed In-band Digital Audio Broadcasting Systems

I1 Single AM or FM channel

1

TraditionalAMIFM signal

FreauencvA

DAB signal sent at reduced power

In-band, on channel


analog signals in order to avoid interference.Other companies developing terrestrial DABsystems include Mercury Digital, AT&T, theMassachusetts Institute of Technology and Gen-eral Instrument.

WARC PREPARATIONSThe development of a proposal for BSS-Sound

was the most difficult in the domestic WARC-92preparation process.

34 Many interest groups inboth the private sector and the Federal Gover-nment took strong positions on the issue, Themajority of the private sector, as indicated by theFCC in its Report on WARC-92, favored anallocation for BSS-Sound in the L-band (between1430 and 1525 MHz), as did many foreigncountries. 35 The U.S. aerospace industry, the

Department of Defense and its aerospace contrac-tors and many local terrestrial broadcasters re-sisted this proposed allocation. Aerospace indus-try representatives, both civilian and military,vehemently oppose any new use of the L-band,due to its importance for aircraft and weaponssystems testing and the unknowns associated with

Exlstlng FM channels

A ‘rDAB signals sent In exlstlng “guard bands.”

In-band, adjacent channel

developing a new radiocommunicationsystem.

service/

During WARC-92 preparations, the U.S. broad-casting industry was tom by bitter internal

disagreements over the future development ofDAB and the U.S. BSS-Sound proposal. Propo-nents of satellite-delivered DAB favored fre-quency allocations in the L-band. Initially, theNational Association of Broadcasters (NAB),which represents local broadcasters, supportedthis approach. However, a significant number oflocal broadcasters strenuously opposed the alloc-ation of radio frequencies for a new satelliteaudio broadcasting service, arguing that manylocal broadcasters were already experiencingfinancia1 difficulties and that the establishment ofa competing, national service would underminethe ability of local broadcasters to attract advertis-ing revenues. In January 1992, the NAB droppedits support for L-band proposals. Eventually, theopponents of an L-band allocation prevailed, anda compromise allocation was proposed at 2310-2360 MHz.

~ See OT’, wMC-92, op. cit., fOOtnOte 15.

35 TMS band is cwendy allmat~ in the United States to mobile (sbared by both Federal Government and nongovernment users, but limitedto aeronautical telemetering and telecoremand of aircraft and missiles), radiolocation (for military use only), and freed semices (allocated ona secondary basis for government use only). The S-band is not as extensively used for aeronautical telemetry as is the L-band.


WARC NEGOTIATIONSAt WARC-92, the U.S. proposal has been

described as ‘dead on arrival. ’ There was almostno international support for this allocation goinginto the conference, and despite the best efforts ofU.S. negotiators, only India supported the U.S.position in the Final Acts of WARC-92. Opposi-tion to the U.S. proposal came from all parts of theworld. Canada, for example, has been developingterrestrial DAB systems that would use L-bandfrequencies, and Mexico has indicated that it willdevelop similar systems in the next several years.The CEPT countries also opposed the U.S.proposal, initially proposing allocations in the2570-2620 MHz band, and later supporting alloc-ations in the L-band.36 Other countries, includ-ing China, Japan, and the Russian Federationfavored an allocation around 2500 MHz, in orderto protect their existing uses of the L-band.

At the conference, the primary debate was overwhere the BSS-Sound allocation should be located-in the L-band (1.5- 1.6 GHz) or the S-band(2.0-2.5 GHz). The debate was difficult becauseeach band has specific advantages and disadvan-tages.37 Discussion focused on questions of tech-nology (propagation), economics (cost of receiv-ers), but more practically on the politics ofspectrum management—the tension between pro-tecting existing services on the one hand andpromoting new technologies and services on theother. L-band allocations were opposed by manycountries, including the United States, Japan, andsome European countries, because the bands arealready heavily used for other radio services. InJapan, the bands are allocated to important mobileservices. In the United States, the band is used foraircraft and weapons testing. Moving these exist-

ing users to other frequencies would cost millionsof dollars.

POST-WARC ACTIVITYSince WARC-92 ended, BSS-Sound and DAB

regulatory and development efforts in this coun-try have been moving slowly, largely due to the‘‘wait-and-see’ strategy the FCC and NABpursued immediately following the conference.However, the FCC has taken several actions in theDAB/BSS-Sound debate. In October 1992, theFCC proposed to allocate the 2310-2360 MHzband for BSS-Sound (but only for satellite use) inthis country, a decision that was later formalized.This action boosted the prospects of Satellite CDRadio, and, as noted above, prompted othercompanies to enter the race for BSS-Sound. TheFCC’s allocation, however, has not dampened thedevelopment of in-band, terrestrial DAB systems.

Ironically, the allocations made by WARC-92,and the obstinate U.S. position on L-band, havefocused more attention on in-band DAB systemsin the United States. Initially, most of the privatesector favored an allocation in the L-band.38

When that band was not allocated in this country,attention shifted to in-band solutions, which hadbecome better defined as the WARC preparationsprocess went along. Several companies are nowdeveloping in-band DAB systems, includingthose noted above.

Regarding satellite DAB, NAB opposed aSatellite CD Radio request for an expedited FCCrulemaking to allocate the 2310-2360 MHz bandfor BSS-Sound, stating that the world course fordigital radio, satellite and terrestrial, remainsunclear.39 At the same time, NAB encouraged thedevelopment of an in-band system for DAB that

36A tot~ of 18 CEFT coma-k jointly submitted the CEPT proposal.37 Most BSS.S~und proponents and radio engineers &lieve that me fr~uencies aromd 1.5 (Mz w twhnictdly b e t t e r s u i t e d f O r

satellite-delivered DAB than higher frequencies. Propagation characteristics are better at L-band-at the higher S-band frequencies, signalsam more likely to be scattered or blockal by buildings, trees, etc. Because of this, some analysts believe that S-band may only be suitable forsatellite transmission.

38 See especi~ly Annex B of hdustry Advisory Comdt@, “Final Report: W~C’92,” submitted to the FCC, Apr. 30, 1991.

39 ‘‘NAB Opposes Satellite CD wdio Request for Expedited BSS-Sound Allocation Rulernaking, ’ Telecommunications Reports, June 8,1992, P. 30.

.


would improve the quality of both AM and FMstations. If that effort was to fail, NAB apparentlybelieves that L-band is more attractive for BSS-Sound than the S-band allocation the U.S. indi-cated at WARC-92.

The Electronic Industries Association (EIA)established a task group in August 1991 todevelop a standard for DAB in this country. Thestandard agreed to by EIA will be submitted to theFCC as a proposed U.S. standard. The group iscomposed of specific system proponents, broad-cast representatives, and manufacturers. In late1992, the group solicited proposals for systems tobe tested as part of the recommendation process,and actual testing of proposed systems is sched-uled to begin sometime in 1993.40

Internationally, the United States continues tobe active in the work of the CCIR’S study groupon BSS-Sound issues. In preparation for futureCCIR meetings on BSS-Sound, industry andprivate sector representatives formed a workinggroup in August 1992 to develop U.S. positions.The main focus of the group will be on futuretopics the CCIR should study in preparation forthe future radio conference on DAB called for inResolution 528.

A few companies have been authorized toprovide BSS-Sound services in other parts of theworld. The first, WorldSpace Corp. (Afrispace,Inc.), was granted an experimental license by theFCC in 1991 to provide radio services in Africa.After regulatory delays resulting from WARC-92, Afrispace now plans to launch its AfriStar-1satellite in 1995, and has signed up 3 broadcastingcompanies that will use 5 of its 36 channels.41

CaribSpace Ltd., a subsidiary of WorldSpace, hasbeen granted a license from the government ofTrinidad and Tobago to provide similar servicesin the Caribbean.42

~ Issues and ImplicationsThe questions involved in assessing the future

of BSS-Sound and DAB far exceed the alloca-tions issues debated at WARC-92. The alloca-tions made at the conference set the stage for thefuture development of new digital radio services,but the allocations are only one part of a muchlarger constellation of policy problems related tothe future development of radio technology andthe evolution of the radio broadcasting industry inthis country. The decisions to be made about howto implement WARC-92 allocations implicitlyshape future, broader policy decisions, and cannotbe considered separately from them.

The case of BSS-Sound/DAB represents amissed opportunity for the United States. Basedon the reported needs and requirements of theDefense Department and its (politically) powerfulallies in the aeronautical telemetry industry, andpressure from the Secretary of Defense, theUnited States was forced to take a positioncounter to the majority of the world. The problemis not that the Department of Defense won, ’ butrather that the (policy) process for determiningneeds and evaluating competing needs was largelyhidden from view. What should have happenedwas an objective and thorough review of theexisting use of the band compared with thepotential benefits to American industry, leader-ship, and consumers of participating in a newworldwide broadcasting system.

The extent to which this was done is unclear.NTIA officials maintain that proper policy proce-dures were followed and that L-band allocationsfor BSS-Sound were not pursued because supportfor the concept and those particular allocationswas weak. However, it is difficult to discern inthis case if there was a formal policymakingprocess, and if it was followed. Because of thesensitive nature of the bands involved and the

40 Steven ~row]ey, Comu]tig en~eer, prsonal Commticatiou J~Y G, 1992.41 Daniel Marcus, “AfriSpace Satellite Plan Runs Into 2-Year Delay,” Space News, vol. 4, No. 2, Jan. 11-17, 1993.

42 Teleco~unications Reports, ‘‘CaribSpace Gets License for Satellite Radio System From Trinidad and Tobago Government’ vol. 58,No. 36, Sept. 7, 1992.


closed nature of the IRAC process, it is impossib-le to determine how thorough and objective theevaluation of the competing uses of the band was.Questions remain about who did the comparing,what factors they used (and how each wasvalued), and what inputs were considered fromboth sides.

The stakes in the BSS-Sound debate are tooimportant to let things develop without furtherpolicy analysis and debate. Mexico, and espe-cially Canada, are planning to move ahead with(terrestrial) DAB plans in the next several years.Meanwhile, the United States risks falling behindin this potentially lucrative opportunity for U.S.manufacturers and service providers and thispotentially important method for disseminatingU.S. programming and information overseas. Theconsequences are clear:

If DAB is established internationally yearsprior to introduction in the United States, ourinternational competitiveness would be put at riskwhile the public would be denied access to animportant new service.43

DOMESTIC ISSUESAfter a less-than-satisfactory outcome at WARC-

92, domestic efforts to develop BSS-Sound andDAB continue. The United States, because of itsexisting use of the L-band spectrum and its strongtradition of local broadcasting, has been forcedinto a dual approach to DAB development. Thisdual approach is shaped in part by history and inpart by technology, which has become an impor-tant driver of the DAB/BSS-Sound debate. Somecompanies are concentrating on developing in-band systems for terrestrial use while others arefocusing on satellite-delivered out-of-band sys-tems. No system currently being developed effec-tively integrates existing broadcasting infrastruc-ture with new satellite technology.

This divided approach reflects the two perspec-tives that drive the BSS-Sound/DAB debate. On

the one hand, many people raised in the tradi-tional broadcasting industry tend to see the issueas one of new satellite services versus traditionallocal broadcasters. This group is most concernedwith developing terrestrially-based DAB solu-tions that will preserve the existing radio servicesand industry structure while bringing technicalinnovation to the industry. On the other hand, theproponents of satellite-delivered DAB have aslightly different set of concerns than the broad-casters. They are most concerned with bringingnew services to the public and making a range ofbroadcasting services available to previouslyunderserved areas.

The allocations made by WARC-92 and U.S.response(s) to them confined this duality. Thisde facto approach was not the result of anycarefully thought out policy initiative to improveU.S. radio quality or diversity, but rather anattempt to avoid hard choices by letting market-place forces decide a technology “winner.”Unfortunately, this tactic has slowed the develop-ment of DAB technology, and may prevent theUnited States from entering this new field earlyon—allowing other countries to develop theexpertise, hardware, and software that will makethem the leaders in this new technology/servicearea, not the United States. This unofficialstrategy has important long-term consequencesfor the future of the broadcasting industry in theUnited States, and it is unclear whether U.S.policymakers recognize, and are willing to con-front, the many factors at work. To date, the largerissues of how these new digital technologies willimpact the future (and structure) of the radiobroadcasting industry in this country have beenignored by policymakers.

Short-term Issues--The most immediate ques-tion facing U.S. policymakers and regulators ishow future digital radio services will be offered.The FCC has taken the first step toward definingthe future of radio broadcasting in this country by

—43 Te~~~~y of JO~ R. HO~es, ~ Hags ~fore tie su~o~~ee on ~]eco~~cations md FiKEUNX of the COfittee on her=

and Commerce, House of Representatives, 102d Congress, Nov. 61991, p. 8.

—

Chapter 2--Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology I 73

adopting the allocations the United States pur-sued at WARC-92. Other issues that remain to beresolved include how many competing BSS-Sound systems could the U.S. population sup-port? Will these competing systems share listen-ers, or will subscribers be locked in to oneprovider? Should other ways of providing BSS-Sound services, such as advertiser-supported,nonprofit, or public broadcasting, be encouraged,and how can this be done? Should future terres-trial DAB services use the same band as satellite,or should they use the existing AM/FM band?

For example, the development of in-bandsystems poses several issues for policy makers.One concern is the distinction between AM andFM broadcasters. Because of the differences inspectrum currently allocated to AM and FMstations (10 kHz vs. 200 kHz, respectively),developing in-band digital solutions for FM radiohas been much easier than for AM. Because ofthis, many industry analysts expect that AM DABwill not be able to achieve the same quality as FMD A B .44 Due to such predictions, some AMstation owners have promised to block anystandard that disadvantages them relative to FM.On the other hand, FM station owners will resistany technology that brings AM radio broadcast-ing up to the quality of FM and hence into moredirect competition.

45 Some observers believe that

such feuding among broadcasters could poten-tially slow the development of terrestrial DABtechnology, and cause the United States to fall(further) behind in the development of suchtechnologies and systems—reducing or removingany chance the United States may have to be a

world leader in the production of DAB equipmentand the operation of DAB services.

Alternatively, if future terrestrial DAB serv-ices are allocated (additional or alternative) spec-trum outside the traditional AM/FM bands, futurelicensing of such systems would pose the FCCwith a challenge similar to the decision facing itin the personal communication service (PCS)licensing proceeding.

46 Should existing broad-

casters be allowed into new spectrum to offerDAB, or should this new spectrum be openedonly to new service providers? This is more thana technical or economic question, which willrequire the FCC, with the input of the Congress,consumers, and industry to decide.

Long-term Issues-Such issues indicate anumber of longer-term questions for regulatorsand policymakers. Should all broadcasters havean equal shot at DAB technology? How can newforms of competition in radio services be pro-moted while acknowledging (but not necessarilyprotecting) the role and investments of localbroadcasters? How can the traditional strength ofthe U.S. local broadcasting industry be comple-mented by the new technologies of satellitedelivery? What should the future structure of theU.S. broadcasting industry look like?

The most difficult long-term issue facingpolicymakers is how BSS-Sound and DAB willaffect the (local, terrestrial) broadcast industry.Satellite broadcasting directly to listeners has thepotential to dramatically reshape the broadcastindustry in this country. Depending on a numberof technical, economic, and political choices thatwill be made in the next several years, BSS-Sound services could complement local program-

W Edmund L. AIKIKWS, op. cit., footnote 32.

45 me issue is ~oney. over tie ~eMs, ~ r~io &5 g~ed populfity over ~ &aUse of its higher qtity. AS a result, more people listen

to FM stations, and licenses for FM stations are more valuable. Digital technology, with its immunity to noise and high quality, would wipeout the differences in quality between AM and FM stations: Bringing all stations into quality parity and bringing down the value of FM licenseswill at the same time raising the value of AM licenses. Broadcasters who have invested hundreds of thousands (or even tens of millions) ofdollars in an FM station will oppose anything that would jeopardize that investment.

46 ~ tit ~a~e, me FCC must decide wheth~ t. ~low ~ellul~ operators to provide KS, -g advantage of their techuicd and marketing

experience, or bar the cellular operators from entering the PCS market in order to foster more competition in the mobile servicesindustries.


ming, be limited to serving niche markets, oremerge as a substantial competitor to localbroadcasters.

In some countries and in some systems, terres-trial and satellite DAB may develop as comple-mentary parts of one broadcasting system. In theUnited States, however, it now seems likely thatthe two industries will remain separate--theestablished broadcast industry controlling terres-trial DAB, and the new startups controllingsatellite services. It is likely that these technolo-gies will continue to develop on separate tracks,although the relative timelines for the develop-ment of each is far from certain. This dividedapproach may prevent the United States frompursuing a comprehensive approach to improvingradio broadcasting quality and diversity, while atthe same time extending its reach and flexibility.Countries adhering to one (in this case most likelyL-band) allocation for both terrestrial and satelliteprogramming may have an advantage in buildinga more flexible broadcasting system.

As both BSS-Sound and terrestrial DAB sys-tems come into operation, the challenge for theFCC will be to fashion a radio broadcastingindustry that takes advantage of both satellite andterrestrial DAB technologies. The question is:Are the services inherently competitors, or couldthey be (structured to be) complementary? NABand the local broadcasters tend to see satellitedelivery of audio services as a potential competi-tive threat.47 However, it may be possible to setthe rules for BSS-Sound such that the services arecomplementary, rather than competitive. A possi-ble analogy may be the dual nature of cabletelevision—local television stations and cablechannels exist alongside “superstations” andnationwide cable channels that cater to specificinterests. Nationwide services may be able to

supplement existing local services or cater tonationwide niche audiences that are too small tosupport local broadcasting, but when aggregatedcan support a broadcasting service. Ethnic orreligious groups may provide audiences for suchprogramming. Nationwide coverage would alsofill in gaps in coverage of various programmingformats-not every person in America can get thekinds of radio station he or she wants, and notevery market has 10, 15,20 or more stations witha variety of formats available. For the moreremote listener who would like to hear classicalmusic, a satellite-delivered service may be theonly real option.

Industry fears that nationwide satellite audioprogramming will destroy the broadcasting in-dustry must be taken seriously. However, a largerpolicy question remains: if the radio industry isdoing so poorly—stations closing, revenuesdropping-why save it? The industry should beprepared to present a good case for preserving itsprivileges based not on past history-there can belittle doubt of the historical importance of localradio stations, but on the prospects for futureperformance. Society in the 1990s and beyond ischanging rapidly, and the Nation’s radio listenersare entitled to a radio system that best meets theirneeds. The public interest may need to beredefined to include not only local, but alsonational and international programmingg and serv-ices.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUESThe international issues surrounding the imple-

mentation of BSS-Sound and DAB services arecomplex, and at present there are more questionsthan answers about the future of digital radiobroadcasting services. As a result, the future ofDAB/BSS-Sound and the impacts of the threeBSS-Sound allocations is uncertain. Perhaps

47 ~ey ~ote tit if qj~~v satellite sm~ces we au~ofied and made available before local broadcasters cm implement terrestri~

digital broadcasting systems, this would represent unfair competition. John Abel, for example, stated that some local and satellite services couldexist side-by-side, and local broadcasters could compete “if we have the same opportunity as the satellite broadcaster in providing DAB. ”lkstimony of John Abel, in Hearings before the Subcommittee on lklecornmunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy andCommerce, House of Representatives, 102d Congress, Nov. 6, 1991, p. 14.


most importantly, until a future conference can beheld to plan BSS-Sound, only the top 25 MHz ofthe allocations can be used to provide BSS-Soundservices .48 This effectively means that the numberof potential service providers in the band will bevery limited, at least until the requested WARC isheld. 49 In addition, the entire world, with theexception of about a dozen countries, agreed tothe L-band allocation, although in some coun-tries, including most of Europe, the services maynot be able to be offered until 2007.50 Althoughthe United States is not wholly responsible forthese outcomes, U.S. actions contributed to anallocation structure that is less than ideal from aglobal service perspective. The division of theworld into three different BSS-Sound allocationscould have a number of detrimental effects on thefuture of the BSS-Sound industry.

Manufacturing—From a manufacturing stand-point, multiple allocations mean that makers ofportable radios and radios for cars will be forcedto build three different types of receivers. Al-though the different radios may share somecommon parts, the radio receiving equipment willhave to be different. And if different formats andstandards are used for the transmission of DAB,manufacturing difficulties will become even moresevere. The division of allocations and possiblystandards will lead to production that is not asefficient since manufacturing efforts will have tobe divided.

For the United States, the impacts of thisdivision on manufacturing will be limited since‘‘there is almost no production of VCRs, camcor-ders, tape players and recorders, radios, phono-graphs, or CD players in the United States.”51

The impacts on the makers of radios for U.S. cars,GM-Delco, for example, is also likely to be slight.It remains to be seen if domestic manufacturerswill produce alternative radios for installation invehicles destined for export. Development of astrong domestic BSS-Sound industry, however,could enhance and expand this country’s reputa-tion as a leader in the development and operationof satellite communications systems. The actualbenefits of this new technology for the UnitedStates, however, are less clear, since the technicaldetails of U.S.-designed and built systems wouldhave to be modified to work in other parts of theworld.

International Broadcasting—The impacts ofmultiple allocations on international broadcastingare likely to be more severe. Because up to threesets of frequencies could be used for BSS-Soundaround the world, the development of a globalsatellite radio broadcasting service will be diffi-cult. Instead, regional BSS-Sound systems arelikely to become the focus of development efforts,and coordination between countries using differ-ent allocations could be difficult.52 The UnitedStates, for example, is expected to have a hardtime coordinating its aeronautical telemetry servi-

4B S= Resolution COM4/W, ITU, FiM/kts, op. cit., footnote 27. In the fti numbering of Resolutions and Recommendations, COM4/Wbecame Resolution 528.

49 me Sa!e]lite ~ ~dio (SCDR) system, for emp]e, uses 21 ~ of s~~, but cm o~y ske with one other o~mtiorlal system.

The plan proposed by SCDR would accommodate up to eight satellites (appro ximately 4 competing providers), but would use the whole 50MHz of the U.S. 2310-2360 MHz allocation. Cutting the available spectrum in half would presumably limit the number of competing providemto two.

50 N~&rs of ~ou~es ~r ~watiou however, is o~y one ~dication of tie potenti~ impacts of ~we ~locations. When judged (roughly)

by population served by each allocation+ the disparity between allocations lessens signiilcantly (see table 2-2). L-band allocations could serveup to 3,2 bilLion listeners, the U.S./India allocation up to 1.1 billio% and the other S-band allocation up to 2.7 billion. These numbers arechangeable because India, with over 800 million people, accepted all three allocations. Figures are based on numbers provided to OTA by theVoice of America.

51 U.S. Dep~ent of Comeme, ~tentio~ Trade ~minis~atio~ us, ~n~~~(~”a~ Ou/[ook ’92 (washingto@ DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, January 1992).52 However, from a ~dwMe/system pasp~tive, tie impacts of ~s division will ~ limit~ s~ce sate~ite systems are tieady rOUtiely

designed to serve regional areas.


ces—testing for (military) aircraft and weaponssystems—with Canada and Mexico. These count-ries plan to use the worldwide allocation toprovide DAB services, although initially onlythrough terrestrial transmission systems. Thismeans that Canadian and Mexican L-band sys-tems will have to be coordinated with U.S.aeronautical telemetry users, and any U.S. systemthat is deployed using the S-band allocation willhave to be coordinated with Mexico and Canada.It is possible that this will put pressure on thegovernment to simply drop the U.S. position onL-band and adopt the world allocation.53

In addition, an important issue in the imple-mentation of BSS-Sound systems, especially inthe area of new entertainment and informationservices, is the question of cross-border informa-tion flows. Because of the nature of satellitetransmission, it is very difficult to limit a satel-lite’s signal (its footprint) to conform to nationalboundaries. Some countries may resist (or jam)unwanted transmissions from outside their bor-ders. WARC-92 did not address this question,since the primary focus of the meeting was toagree on allocations for the service. However, itis expected that a future conference will take upthe issue.54

For U.S. international broadcasters who seeBSS-Sound as a way to extend their coverage andgive their listeners higher quality, the impacts ofdifferent allocations are unclear. Any intern-ational broadcaster that decides to put up its ownsatellite system to achieve worldwide coveragewill have to adapt its satellites and its system

design to conform with the varying allocations. Itis also possible that international broadcasterscould lease transponders on regional systems—this would relieve them of having to engineertheir own system, but would also relinquish theirdirect control of their transmissions.

Listeners--Finally, the impacts of differentBSS-Sound allocations on listeners are likely tobe minimal, except for international travelers.Common allocations and equipment have bene-fited consumers in the past because they can usetheir radios anywhere in the world-currentbroadcasting frequencies are global, and AM andFM are standard modulations schemes. WhenBSS-Sound systems come into operation, listen-ers will have to buy new DAB-compatible radios,which will be slightly different depending onwhere they live.

The cost for DAB/BSS-Sound receivers isexpected to follow the example set by otherconsumer electronic technologies-it will likelystart out very high initially, but fall quickly asdemand improves and mass market economiesare achieved. Most analysts expect the cost ofsuch receivers to be no more than high-endAM/FM cassette players available today. Thecost for a radio station to upgrade its facilities inorder to offer DAB programming is less clear.The cost in this case will depend on howadvanced/up-to-date the station’s existing tech-nology is—is there a lot of equipment that mustbe changed out, or does the station already havesome of the digital equipment necessary to

53 me fit~ tmes~~ focus of the Canadian and Mexic~ systems may be a blessing for the United States. ‘lkrrestrial systems till bC easier

to coordinate than satellite systems since their limited range means they will affect U.S. telemetry operations only near the borders. EventuaUy,however, these systems may also be delivered via satellite, at which time coordination and interference problems will become much morediff3cult. Some observers note that the introduction of satellite DAB semices in Canada and Mexico would seriously degrade aeronauticaltelemetry services, perhaps making them unworkable. The long transition time to sateUite-delivered DAB services, however, should provideadequate time for U.S. telemetry operations to move to higher bands. Another serious concern in the implementation of these systems is theireffect on U.S. radioastronomy activities, which use very sensitive receivers in the frequencies just below those now allocated for BSS-Sound.

54 Resolution 527 ties note of tie problem by noting No. 2674 of tie ~io Re@tions, which states: “k devising the cbaCtel_ktiCS Of

a space station in the broadcasting-satellite service, all technical means available shall be used to reduce, to the maximum extent practicable.the radiation over the territory of other countries unless an agreement has been previously reach with such countries. ’ ITU, Radio Regulations,p. 30-2, op. cit., footnote 19.


support DAB operations? Estimates range from$50,000 to $150,000.55

One important policy consideration, in thiscountry and internationally, is to lay out a realistictransition plan that will allow a smooth andorderly phase-in of terrestrial and satellite DABservice in whatever band(s) are used. Followingpast practice, for example, new DAB radios maybe required to be able to receive regular AM/FMtransmissions.

TERRESTRIAL MOBILE SERVICESThe mobile telecommunications service indus-

try is still in its formative stages—mobile andmobile-satellite technologies continue to evolveand new systems are proposed regularly.56 Be-cause of this volatility, it is difficult to predictwhat the industry will look like in 5, 10 or 15years. Different proponents have different per-spectives on the future of mobile services, and noone really knows yet how the pieces will fittogether. The final structure of the mobile serv-ices industry will depend largely on marketforces. Consumers will decide which services—satellite, PCS, cellular, mobile data—will besuccessful and which will not.

One of the fastest-growing segments of themobile telecommunications industry is terrestrially-based radio systems serving mobile users (in cars,trucks, ships, aircraft, and on foot). Since itsintroduction in 1983, for example, cellular tele-phone service has amassed more than 9 million

subscribers in the United States, and recentstatistics released by the Cellular Telecommuni-cations Industry Association show an annualgrowth rate approaching 40 percent.57 Some esti-mates of the potential revenues from mobileservices run into the tens of billions of dollarsannually. 58

The boom in demand for mobile telecommuni-cations services has given rise to a confusingarray of new technologies and systems. Countriesand businesses around the world have proposednew mobile applications that will deliver a widevariety of new (and old) services, includingpaging and messaging, telephone, facsimile, datacommunications, and even imaging and video. Inthe United States, for example, hundreds ofcompanies have applied at the FCC for radiofrequencies to deliver future PCS.59 In Europe andJapan, government authorities have given mobileservices high priority in domestic spectrum allo-cations. As a result of the growing demand forservices and spectrum, WARC-92 was chargedwith allocating additional spectrum for new andemerging mobile services.

1 Future Public Land MobileTelecommunications Systems

BACKGROUNDThe focus of WARC-92’S attention to mobile

services was on Future Public Land MobileTelecommunications Systems (FPLMTS).

5S ~s~ony of John R. Holmes, op. cit., footnote 43, P. 9.

56 In ITT-J parlance, “mobile’ refers only to terrestrially-based mobile systems. ‘‘Mobile-satellite service’ (MSS) refers to mobile servicesprovided via satellite. MSS is discussed in the next three sections.

57 Breed on s~tistics compil~ in the frost 6 mOnlhS Of 1992. “CITA’s Biannual Sumey Shows Record Industry Growth in First Half of1992,” Telecommunications Reports, vol. 58, No. 36, Sept. 7, 1992.

58 Smdies est~t~g me potenti~ v~ue of th~e new markets must be viewed with caution as data and its interpretation k highly subjective.A study conducted by Market Intelligence predicts that worldwide sales of cellular phones, pagers, and accessories witl reach $6.2 billion by1998. “Study Says World Markets for CeIlular Phones, Pagers Will Reach $6.2 Billion by 1998, ” Telecommunications Reports, VOL 58, No.37, Sept. 14, 1992. Another study conducted by AIexander Resources, Inc., for example, puts potential revenues at over $10 billion in 1999for wireless local exchange services alone. Te[ephony, June 29, 1992, (untitled box), p. 11. A study by Datacomm Research Co. projectspotential revenues for cellular data services will reach $1 billion by 2001. “Datacomm Study” Telecommunications Reports, vol. 58, No. 36,Sept. 7, 1992.

59A pti~ list of tie comp~es tit ~ve app]ied at the FCC to offer such services can be found in OTA, WARC-92, aPPend-ix C, oP. cit.,

footnote 15.


FPLMTS refers to a concept being developed inthe CCIR primarily by European radiocommuni-cation interests for delivering mobile telecommu-nications services in the 21st century. Althoughclear service definitions and specifications havenot yet been developed, FPLMTS is currentlyconceived as a terrestrially-based system (per-haps supplemented with satellite technology)using large towers located throughout a region toprovide an array of voice, data, and video servicesto mobile users. The Europeans view FPLMTS asthe successor to the Global System for Mobilecommunications (GSM—formerly Groupe Spe-ciale Mobile)---a pan-European digital cellularsystem that is currently being deployed acrossEurope.

60 In order to ensure that future mobile

systems would have adequate spectrum, theEuropeans pursued allocations for FPLMTS atthe 1987 Mobile WARC (MOB-87), but the issuewas carried over to WARC-92.

U.S. PROPOSALThe United States made no specific allocation

proposals for FPLMTS, citing the extensiveexisting allocations available for mobile services,uncertainty over just what FPLMTS is, and thepossibility of making FPLMTS-like servicesavailable through standard-setting and common(global) interoperability requirements rather thanthrough a new frequency allocation. In its state-ment on FPLMTS in the official U.S. WARC-92proposals, the United States noted the work beingdone to develop FPLMTS internationally, butopposed the allocation of new frequencies for thesystem(s).

RESULTSWARC-92 did not formally allocate any fre-

quencies for FPLMTS, but it did identify 230MHz that is ‘intended” to be used for FPLMTS—

1885-2025 MHz and 2110-2200 MHz. This“identification” was made in footnote 746A—FPLMTS does not appear in the actual allocationstable. Debate over whether frequencies would be“allocated,” “identified,” or “intended” forFPLMTS use was intense (see discussion below).Related to the work on FPLMTS, WARC-92 alsoupgraded the mobile service to coprimary status(in Region 1) in the 1700-2290 MHz band. Thiscreated a primary worldwide allocation for mo-bile services from 1700 to 2690 MHz.

WARC-92 also adopted Resolution 212, whichnotes the ongoing study of FPLMTS characteris-tics and calls on the CCIR to continue its work inorder to develop “suitable and acceptable techni-cal characteristics for FPLMTS that will facilitateworldwide use and roaming, and ensure thatFPLMTS can also meet the telecommunicationneeds of the developing countries and ruralareas.” 6l The resolution does not specify datesfor implementation nor any relevant operatingparameters. It does, however, identify the fre-quencies 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz asthe bands where a satellite component ofFPLMTS is expected to be necessary by the year2010.

DISCUSSIONDomestic Issues-The debate over the future

of mobile telecommunications services in thiscountry has been as intense as the negotiations inSpain over FPLMTS. In the United States, thereare many different visions of the future ofterrestrially-based mobile services. Cellular, cable,and telephone companies are all looking towardthe next generation of mobile telecommunica-tions, and there is a confusing array of ideas abouthow these new services will be provided and whatapplications they will offer. Proponents and

@ Al~~u@ GCJM& ken @~~ ~~ d~~y~ re~~g to s~~dfition of eq~pmen[, 17 co~ties pki.11 to begin offelir.lg services ill ] 992

and have 4 million users in 1994. The completed network is expected to be operational by the late 1990s and have 20 million subscribers bythe year 2000. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, .JPRSReport, Feb. 20, 1992, p. 17; Apr. 3, 1992, p. 20; and Apr. 28, 1992, p. 11.

61 ~tematio~ Q1eco=~cation u~o~ A&fendum and Corn”gendm to fhe Final kts of the Workj Administrative Radio Confert!nce

(WfiC-92), provisional versiom Malaga-Tbrmmolinos, 1992, p. 17.


analysts talk about micro-cellular systems, CT-2(2nd generation cordless telephones), and PCS. Inaddition to these land-based systems, varioussatellite systems are being planned to offer anarray of data and voice services (see the sectionson MSS below).

Much of the debate and development of newmobile communications services in this countryhas focused on PCS, which many consider theU.S. equivalent of FPLMTS. PCS has emerged asan umbrella term that encompasses a wide varietyof systems and services, but basically, PCS is awireless phone and data service that will allowusers to send and receive phone calls and/ormessages using small lightweight (and eventuallyinexpensive) handsets similar to today’s cellularphones. Current concepts of PCS systems are asvaried as the companies proposing them. Someanalysts foresee PCS installations in limitedgeographic areas such as shopping malls, airports,college campuses, and downtown commercialcenters--essentially complementing current cel-lular systems. Others predict wider uses, includ-ing vehicle as well as pedestrian communication.These systems would compete with cellularsystems, and have even been considered as analternative to traditional wired telephone service.The FCC has chosen a broad definition forPCS—referring to it as a “family” of newcommunication services-in order to not pre-judge the outcomes of the various developmentefforts. 62

The FCC has two separate proceedings thatwill affect the future of PCS. These proceedingsare now being considered simultaneously. Thefrost, a Notice of Inquiry on PCS released in June1990, has been the subject of many comments and

an en bane hearing in December 1991.63 In July1992, the FCC adopted a notice of proposedrulemaking (NPRM) in this proceeding affirmingthe need for PCS, proposing allocations for dataand voice services, and asking for additionalcomments on licensing, competition, and spec-trum requirements. The FCC deferred action onthe frequencies to be allocated to PCS, wanting togather further comments in the emerging technol-ogies proceeding (see next paragraph).

The second proceeding focuses on an FCCproposal to reallocate frequencies in the 2 GHzband in order to create a “spectrum reserve’ foremerging technologies. 64 This proceeding wasformally begun in January 1992 and in October1992 the FCC adopted a Report and Order andThird NPRM in the proceeding finally proposingthe frequencies to be made available to emergingtechnologies and outlining transfer plans forincumbent users. PCS is expected to be one of themajor users of these bands. All but the lower 35MHz of this reserve overlaps with the FPLMTS/mobile allocations made at WARC-92, meaningthat the FCC could implement FPLMTS/PCS inup to 185 MHz (see figure 2-4). Thus, if aworldwide FPLMTS-like service does develop,the United States will be able to use the samefrequencies as the rest of the world. A worldwideprimary allocation is desirable because it wouldmake it easier to interconnect various nationalsystems and to develop a worldwide mobilecommunication system that would allow individ-uals to use their portable telephones anywhere inthe world. Instead of countries using differentfrequencies for their mobile services, all countriescould use the same broad band of frequencies—allowing manufacturers to produce handsets that

@ Cements of TIIOmaS StanIey, FCC Chief Engineer, Feb. 23, 1993.

63 Feder~ Comtimtiom co~~siou ‘ ‘~en~ent of the Cofission’s Rules to Estabfish New Personal Communications SeIViWS, ”

Notice of Inquiry, Gen. Docket No. 90314, released June 28, 1990.64 Feder~ com~mtiom co~sslou ‘‘R~evelopmentof tie Spec- to Enco~age hovationin the Use of New Telecommunications

Technologies, ’ Notice ofProposedRule Muking, ET Docket 92-9, released Feb. 7, 1992. The FCC proposed to reallocate 220 MHz of spectrumin the 18501990 MHz, 2110-2150 MHz, and 2160-2200 MHz bands. It is important to note the timing of this action-just after the start ofWARC-92.


Existingallocations

WARC-92allocations

Existingallocations

WARC-92allocations

FCCproposedallocations

WARC-92allocations

Figure 2-4—WARC-92 Frequency Allocations From 1400-2700 MHz

1400 1500 1600 1700 1800

Various mobile satellite -Meterological satellites

33 MHz 34 MHz 16.5 Mtiz 34 Mtiz 35 Mt-iz

1800 1900 2000 2100 2200

( 1 I I ITI I Private microwave 1 I I I I

Gov’t fixed & mobde Electronic news gathering Private microwavef Deep Space Research

140 MHz Space R & OIEES.

~,;,:MssP; M~S ‘ r40 MHz 40 MHz 40 MHz 40 Mt-iz

F– ‘— + }+ E+Emerging technologies Emerging technologies

2200 2300 2400 2500 2600 2700

Space R & O/EES +-+ [’Kq+

16.5 Mtiz 20 Mtiz 20 MHz

I MSS Mobile-Satelllte Service MMDS Multichannel, multipoint? Earth-to-space

EES Earth-Exploration Satellite distribution service

I FPLMTS Future Public Land Mobile Cl Interior MSS shadings indl-+ Space-to-Earth

Telecommunication System cated paired bands

1 Space R & O Space research andoperations

a Not an allocationb Secondary allocationc Not allocated in U.S.

L—.._— 1

NOTE: This chart is not complete. Not all International Telecommunication Union services are shown, and some have been edited for presentation.Many footnotes will affect the allocations presented. The WARC-92 allocations shown are the allocations as interpreted by the United States, andare not necessarily applicable to other countries.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on a figuresupplied by Motorola.

will work worldwide. Issues regarding standards, technologies has become highly controversial.protocols, and interoperability between different On one side are the incumbent users of the bandsnational systems will have to be negotiated in who want to protect their existing point-to-pointorder to achieve a truly worldwide service. operations and who would prefer not to move to

The FCC’s proposal to reallocate frequencies other frequencies. These users include: the rail-in the 2 GHz band in order to accommodate new road companies and public utilities--operators of

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology 181

oil and gas pipelines and electric power transmis-sion lines-which use these frequencies to moni-tor and control their operations and providetrouble reports during emergencies; public safetyagencies-police, fire, and ambulance-whichuse these frequencies as part of their everydaymissions;b5 and common carrier microwave oper-ators who use the frequencies to relay point-to-point communications traffic, often as a backup tolong-distance fiber optic lines or to interconnectcellular telephone cells. On the other side are thepotential new users of the spectrum, most notablythe hundreds of companies that have applied tothe FCC to provide new personal communicationservices. Because of the favorable transmissioncharacteristics of these frequencies, they areideally suited to delivering these types of newmobile services.

The debate over the FCC’s spectrum reserveand its reallocation of the 2 GHz band illustratesthe findings and lessons presented in chapter 1.Fundamentally, the debate is one of old versusnew—how to balance the legitimate requirementsof the existing users against the desire to promotethe development of innovative technology sys-tems and services. Each side is able to musterconvincing arguments to support its case. Theutilities and railroads point to their extensive useof the bands and the important functions thatthese systems control, especially in times ofemergency when reliable and instantaneous com-munications are vital to control potentially dan-gerous situations such as power surges, gas leaks,and train derailments. Their systems are oftenextensive, and have provided reliable communic-ations for many years. Moving to other frequen-cies, they claim, would create problems becausethe other frequencies to which they could moveare often already crowded, the equipment usingthose new frequencies is less reliable, and replac-

ing so much equipment would be prohibitivelyexpensive. 66 Changing to other Communication

media, such as fiber optics or satellite, often is notpossible from an engineering or reliability stand-point, and would cost many millions of dollars.

The proponents of PCS, on the other hand,promise an array of new communication servicesthat would serve millions of users, producebillions of dollars in revenue, and promote thecompetitiveness of U.S. companies in interna-tional radiocommunication markets. They claimthat the frequencies allocated to the existingservices are not heavily used in all parts of thecountry and that they can design and engineertheir systems to share spectrum where necessary.

Because of the huge financial stakes involvedand the potential revenues (and jobs) new servicescould generate, the FCC’s proposal quicklybecame political. The utilities, feeling that theFCC had not taken adequate account of theirviews, took their case to members of Congresssympathetic to the concerns of the industry andthe public safety agencies. The issue movedbeyond technical concerns, and the controversyturned into a political test of wills as much as adebate over technology.

Throughout the dispute, most of the stakehold-ers indicated that they would be willing tocompromise. Utilities and others said they wouldbe willing to share the bands under the rightconditions, or they would change frequencies if asuitable transition plan was developed. Theirprimary concerns were the reliability of the newsystems and the cost of moving to other bands.The proponents of PCS indicated a willingness toshare the bands and to develop systems thatwould not interfere with the existing users. Theyagreed, in principle, to finance the cost of movingthe existing users to other bands. Finally, inOctober 1992, the FCC adopted a decision that

65 It is fipo~t t. note tit ~ub~c s~e~ uses would not be forced to leave tie b~d as wo~d tie u~ities and private/common carrier

microwave users.

66 Estimates vw from $125,000 to $200,000 per Ctiel. See, e.g., “FCC to Delay Proceeding on Highly Controversial SpectrumReallocation Plan,” Washington Telecom Week, vol. 1, No. 1, Apr. 3, 1992.


outlined a plan, originally proposed by utilitycompany representatives, for accommodating bothinterests.67 The FCC is still collecting and review-ing comments on this issue—no final decision hasbeen reached.

International and WARC-92 Issues-In thepast decade, the development of terrestrial mobilecommunications systems has become a key focusof European telecommunications policy. Thegeography of Europe-the relatively small size ofthe countries-lends itself to terrestrial mobilesolutions. Satellite systems, on the other hand,cover areas that many Europeans believe are toolarge for Europe.68 Issues such as cross-bordercommunications and control of such a networkmake satellite solutions politically difficult. De-spite the drive toward a unified Europe, nationsstill want to keep some control over their domes-tic radiocommunication policies, and individualdomestic terrestrial mobile systems, even thoughconnected through the umbrella of GSM, fit theseneeds. As a result, FPLMTS was a key issue forthe Europeans at WARC-92. CEPT proposedFPLMTS allocations at 1900-2025 MHz and2110-2200 MHz.

The FPLMTS debate at WARC-92 presentedthe United States with a dilemma. It wanted tosupport the future development of mobile serv-ices, and ensure that U.S. PCS services couldflourish in the future, but it also wanted to ensurethat the spectrum could be used as flexibly aspossible, and not be tied to one concept, espe-

cially a European concept like FPLMTS. TheU.S. position managed to combine the two. Justbefore WARC-92, the FCC adopted a NPRMproposing frequencies that could be used foremerging telecommunications services such asPCS.69 The frequencies identified in that NPRMoverlapped with the frequencies to be consideredfor FPLMTS at WARC-92. This action gave theUnited States an important source of leverageinternationally-showing U.S. support for the(international) development of mobile services inthe 2 GHz band, but also allowing it to maintainits opposition to explicit allocations for a systemthat had yet to be defined.

U.S. opposition to formal FPLMTS allocationswas based on several factors. First, a large amountof spectrum is already allocated to (terrestrial)mobile services.70 U.S. spectrum managers be-lieve that such allocations are sufficient to meetfuture mobile communication needs. Further-more, U.S. delegates took the position thatFPLMTS services could be provided under theexisting mobile allocations without setting asidea specific band of frequencies for FPLMTS.71 Inaddition, in contrast to the terrestrial focus of theEuropeans, U.S. Government and much privatesector interest in new mobile services is largelyconcentrated on satellite-based systems. Satel-lites are seen as a more efficient way to reachconsumers in sparsely populated areas outside therange of terrestrial cellular systems and as a wayto allow mobile users to easily ‘‘roam” beyond

ST Feder~ communications Comrnissioq ‘ ‘Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New ~lwommunications

Technologies,” First Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 92-437, Oct. 16, 1992,

68 A satellite km of o~y 500 kilometers, approximately what is being described for some LEOS applications, could Potentitiy reach into

several countries in Europe.

@ Feder~ Communications Cornmissio~ Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Op. cit., fOOtUOte w.

70 me ~tematio~ Table of Fr~uen~y ~Watiom con~ a pm mob~e ~location in Region 2 iII the bands 1668.4-1690 MHz ad

17002690 MHz.71 me fom~ propos~ for FPL~S s~tes ~ pm tit ‘‘tec~~ s~~ds such as modulation p arameters, protocols, and channelization

schemes will be just as important as an altocated band in facilitating any requirements for global roamin g. These standards and protocols mayobviate the need for a common worldwide band for international roaming. We believe that it is premature to desigmte a frequency band untilthe CCIR has progressed further in its work. ” U.S. Proposals, op. cit., footnote 5.

72 ~e5cnfly, a ce1]~wcu5tomer who &ave]s ou&ide of his~er loc~ system must often make previous arrangements with the cellular camiersinvolved and/or dial complex access codes in order to use the systems.

..


their home system.72 Finally, the United Statesopposed specific allocations for FPLMTS be-cause of the lack of a clear definition for exactlywhat FPLMTS will be. This position is consistentwith the general U.S. commitment to keep radioservice allocations as flexible as possible so as notto preclude development of innovative new sys-tems and technologies, Allocating spectrum to aservice that is currently so poorly defined, andwhose spectrum needs are still vague, U.S.spectrum managers believe, would not be anefficient use of the spectrum, and could conceiva-bly lock the world into this inefficient use formany years.

One unacknowledged, although likely, reasonfor U.S. opposition to FPLMTS is related to tradeand competitiveness. The European countries,with GSM, are ahead of the United States in thedeployment of advanced digital cellular technolo-gies. American opposition to FPLMTS mayrepresent an attempt by the government andindustry to slow down European developmentefforts in order to allow the United States to“catch up. ” Although U.S. technology is secondto none, regulatory requirements and the lack ofaggressive policy designed to promote U.S.mobile applications has held back the develop-ment of a nationwide mobile communicationsservice.

At the beginning of WARC-92, the UnitedStates did not support FPLMTS, but did notactively oppose it. U.S. negotiators report theywere willing to compromise on FPLMTS inreturn for concessions by the Europeans on themobile-satellite service (MSS) allocations theUnited States wanted for big LEOS and otherMSS services. However, as the conference pro-gressed, neither side was willing to compromisemuch, and negotiating stances hardened. It be-came clear that U.S. opposition to FPLMTS andEuropean opposition to MSS/LEOS would haveto be resolved together. Each side used itsopposition to the other’s proposal as leverage in

the negotiations. Unfortunately, the obstinacy ofboth sides prevented such a deal from beingstruck easily.

The final wording of the footnote authorizingFPLMTS caused much debate. FPLMTS propo-nents urged the conference to ‘‘designate’ or“identify” the bands for FPLMTS, but oppo-nents, including the United States, opposed thiswording, believing that it was too strong and tooclosely approached an actual allocation of fre-quencies for FPLMTS. As adopted, the footnotereads that these bands are ‘‘intended for use. . .byFPLMTS.’’73

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONSThe difficulty of predicting the future of mobile

services is illustrated by the simple difficulty ofeven defining what the terms and acronyms mean.The United States, for example, would notsupport allocations for FPLMTS at WARC-92because no delegate from Europe could reallyexplain what FPLMTS is. It is a concept, one thathas only vague meaning now and will continue toevolve as time passes and needs, technologies,and institutional relationships become clearer.

Although the United States opposed FPLMTSallocations at WARC-92, the outcome of theFPLMTS debate for the United States may, in thelong term, turn out to be a “success.” Thefrequencies identified for use by FPLMTS inter-nationally largely match those that have beenproposed by the FCC for similar services in thiscountry. Using these frequencies will enable theUnited States to more easily fit into an interna-tional FPLMTS service, thereby opening animportant long-term opportunity for the growingU.S. mobile communications industry.

International Issues-The development ofterrestrial mobile services in the 21st century isunclear on many fronts. The new technologiesand systems for mobile communications are justnow being designed and implemented. The Euro-pean countries have been aggressive in develop-

7J 1~, Addendum and Corrigendum, op. cit., footnote 61, p. 17.


ing and implementing policies that promote thedevelopment of new mobile services. As a result,the rollout of GSM, after a slow start, is pickingup speed. The European Commission has alsoissued a directive requiring member countries toallocate spectrum for Digital European CordlessTelephone (DECT) service.74

Regulatory Barriers: From a regulatory per-spective, several issues will confront FPLMTSproponents as they develop systems. First, theITU has traditionally allocated spectrum only tocategories of radiocommunication services, not tospecific types of systems such as FPLMTS.Upgrading FPLMTS to a service could be diffi-cult, especially given U.S. opposition. Becausethe concept of FPLMTS is not well-defined, it isunclear what rights and obligations FPLMTSsystem operators will have and be subject to. Suchlegalistic distinctions, however, are not likely tostand in the way of FPLMTS development if nocountry objects.

Furthermore, the footnote authorizingFPLMTS states that “[s]uch use [for FPLMTS]does not preclude the use of these bands by otherservices to which these bands are allocated. ”How this limitation will be interpreted, and whateffect it may have on other services and negotia-tions among countries remains to be worked out.Unlike other footnotes designed to protect exist-ing services, it does not explicitly protect existingservices from interference or indicate thatFPLMTS systems will have to accept interferencewithout recourse (a secondary status). This essen-tially creates a vague new category of operation(neither primary nor secondary) applicable onlyto FPLMTS.

Finally, the technical details of FPLMTS arejust starting to evolve. Many observers expect

that if and when a unified concept of FPLMTSdoes emerge, it will come slowly and initially beterrestrially-based. Any satellite component ofFPLMTS cannot come into operation until 2010,and then will be subject to stringent coordinationrequirements that were laid out for new mobilesatellite systems in Resolution 46.

The result is that the implementation ofFPLMTS is essentially uncharted territory. Ar-rangements will have to be worked out asindividual systems come into operation, or, morelikely, further regulations and operating parame-ters may have to developed at a future worldradiocommunication conference. For example, asnoted in Resolution 211, the CCIR has deter-mined that FPLMTS will not be able to sharespectrum with the Space Services (see sectionbelow). Thus, the potential impact of FPLMTS onspace communications will be very carefullywatched by the world’s space agencies. In addi-tion, some of the frequencies identified forFPLMTS are also allocated to MSS. Sharingconcerns could seriously constrain or limit thefuture development of FPLMTS.

Marketing Uncertainties: The future ofFPLMTS is cloudy from a market perspective aswell. While predictions about the potential ofpersonal wireless communications systems arenot in short supply, demand may be. There arealready several different types of mobile systemsoperating and under development in Europe,including GSM, CT-2/Telepoint, and personalcommunication networks (PCN).75 It remains tobe seen if all these mobile services will be viable.In the United Kingdom, for example, Telepointservices-in which users carry portable phonesthat can only make calls, not receive them-failedto attract many subscribers and the industry is

74 me bad de~iwted for DECT~S is 1.880_19~ ~q w~ch overlaps the wmc.gz &@@~ mLMTs bands. Each EC country

has implemented the allocation as required. See Kurt Wimmer, “Global Development of Pemonal Communications Services, ”Communications Luwyer, summer 1992.

75 Job Willimoq “U.K. PCN Rubber Hits tie Road, “ Telephony, vol. 222, No. 14, Apr. 6, 1992, p. 7.

76 ~em is ~~y one ~m~g ~lepo~t Oprator (Hutc~son) ~ me Utited Kingdom. It now has 9,000 base StiitiOIIS h operation ~d

expects to build 3,(MI0 more. Kurt Wimmer, personal communication% Nov. 20, 1992.


struggling to stay alive.76 PCN trials have alsobeen beset by difficulties, but at least two systemsare expected to begin operations over the nextyear. However, the slow start of PCN in theUnited Kingdom does not seemed to have causedother countries to abandon PCN--Germany andFrance are both moving ahead with their PCNplans,

The total size of the market for mobile servicesmay not support many competing technologiesand systems. GSM operators, for example, oftenview PCN as a threat since it represents ‘‘anotherpurchasing option. ’77 The wide variety of mobilesystems-GSM, PCN, CT-2, microcellular, vari-ous satellite systems that are being planned-maycause consumer confusion similar to that beingexperienced in the evolution of technologies forplaying prerecorded music. In that case, a numberof competing formats (cassettes, Digital AudioTape, Digital Compact Cassettes, Compact Discs,Sony’s Minidisc, etc.) maybe causing consumersto resist merely buying the latest technology. Asimilar trend toward confusing and competingmobile telephone systems may cause consumersto resist buying until the market shakes out andone system becomes dominant. The battle be-tween GSM and PCN in Europe could previewsimilar conflicts between cellular and PCS in theUnited States.

Domestic Issues—In the United States, thedevelopment of future terrestrial mobile servicesis similarly unclear. The cellular industry, whichhas been a world leader since its inception in1983, and continues to add subscribers at a rapid

pace, is now struggling to improve and expand itssystems. In contrast to the GSM plans of Europe,there is no settled plan in this country to provideone unified cellular system, and technical andbilling problems still exist when cellular users“roam’ outside their home systems,78 In addi-tion, the cellular industry is in the middle of aheated battle over the choice of a standard for theindustry that would cover the next generationdigital cellular systems now being designed.79

Such difficulties threaten to slow the develop-ment of future mobile services in this country, andhave led some analysts to conclude that theUnited States now trails Europe in the deploy-ment of advanced mobile technologies.

Like FPLMTS internationally, the FCC faces asimilar problem defining the future of mobilecommunications for the United States. Is theAmerican conception of PCS similar to theUnited Kingdom’s PCN? Or is it more general?Does it compete with cellular or complement it?At different points in time, and depending on whowas asked, the answer to any of these questionscould be ‘‘Yes, ’ ‘‘ No,’ or ‘Maybe.’ Recogniz-ing the inherent uncertainty and danger in pigeon-holing a new technology/service, the FCC has sofar adopted the widest possible definition forPCS—it is all things to all people.

One of the more difficult questions facing U.S.regulators and policymakers is the relationship ofU.S. PCS systems to FPLMTS. Should the UnitedStates support FPLMTS? If PCS is developedbefore FPLMTS begin operating, shouldFPLMTS be made compatible with PCS? How?

77 GSM and PCNS arc quite similar technically, GSM operates in the 900 MHz band, and PCNS (in Europe) “essentially we GSM at 1.8GHz instead of 900 MHz. ” John Williamson, “GSM Bids for Global Recognition in a Crowded Cellular World,” Telephony, vol. 222, No.14, Apr. 6, 1992, p. 37.

75 Mccaw CCHulm communications, hc. and southwestern Bell Corp. did announce plans to make cellular service available nationwideby negotiating with local franchises across the country to ensure common service standards that would altow seamtess transitions betweendifferent service areas. GTE Corp., Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, and Ameritech have also announced a mtionwide cellular plan that would challengeMcCaw’s system. Mary Lu Camevale, ‘‘GTE, Baby Bells Issue Challenge to Cellular One, ” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1992, p. B 1.

79 me battle is between The Division Multiple ACCCSS (TDMA), which waS ‘ ‘Officially’ chosen by the Cellular TWcommunicationsIndustry Association (CTL4), and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), which, although ICSS developed than TDMA, has caught theattention of some large cellular providers due to its promised l,argcr capacity gains over TDMA. CTIA is now evaluating both technologies.For a discussion of the TDMA vs. CDMA debate, sce Global Tclecom Report, ‘‘TDMA Has Been Selected as Standard, but CDMA Is GainingVisibility and proponents, ” vol. 8, No., 2, July 27, 1992.


Should the United States continue to opposeFPLMTS if it appears that it will not be compati-ble with PCS? What are the implications of theU.S. building a system (with all necessary stand-ards and protocols) not supported by other nationsof the world? As other countries outside ofEurope adopt GSM as the standard for next-generation mobile communications, some ana-lysts fear that the United States may becomesurrounded and outnumbered by GSM users. Itmay also be possible that-looking beyond GSM—FPLMTS will “encircle” PCS as well. The risksand advantages of such an outcome, and thepolicies leading to it, should be carefully weighedwhile policy can still be adapted to fit theinternational context.

The case of mobile communications points outa serious tension in American telecommunica-tions policy. It must somehow balance the needfor aggressive policy with a philosophical com-mitment to marketplace solutions. Aggressivepolicymaking that sets clear direction couldprovide focus to U.S. development efforts andallow U.S. companies to compete more effec-tively abroad. Many members of the privatesector called for such leadership during WARC-92 preparations, a call that went largely unan-swered. The disadvantage to this approach is thatchoosing the “wrong” policy direction maycommit U.S. interests to a technology path thatdoes not endure.

Unfortunately, unlike the Europeans, the UnitedStates has no coherent policy to guide thedevelopment of mobile services, nor even anygeneral direction that could guide policymaking.The United States is committed to a policy thatlets the market decide. So far, some would argue,the development of cellular technology has beenremarkably successful-judging by increasingnumbers of users and revenues. Such success,however, when judged in an evolving intern-ational context, may be short-lived. Many technol-ogies, including PCS, MSS, cellular, and LEOS,are now fighting for spectrum (see figure 2-4) and

customers, and time may be working against U.S.interests.

The United States can no longer afford to let themarket decide-the potential for these new serv-ices is too important in terms of benefits to theAmerican consumer, the revenues that could begenerated, and the boost to American competi-tiveness that a focused approach to mobilecommunications could provide. U.S. spectrummanagers and policymakers must make strategicdecisions and hard choices to avoid the kinds ofself-destructive technology battles that have heldback other communications services-AM ste-reo, and now digital cellular standards. Moreaggressive oversight and guidance (leading tounified action) is needed if the United States is toeffectively move forward in pursuit of worldmobile communication markets. Otherwise, do-mestic battles may destroy America’s ability towage the war abroad.

SATELLITE MOBILE SERVICESIn addition to terrestrially-based mobile com-

munication services, companies around the worldhave proposed to use satellites to deliver mobileservices. For communications providers, satellite-based systems offer ubiquitous coverage of large(hundreds or thousands of miles across) areas, theremotest of which may be uneconomical forterrestrial systems to reach. Satellite-based com-munication systems have also become increas-ingly attractive to users because advances intechnology have produced smaller, lighter, andless expensive user equipment and a wider rangeof applications, including telephony, remote datacollection, data communication, position deter-mination, etc. At WARC-92, ITU members con-sidered allocations for three types of MS S-eachoffering overlapping services, but using differentsystem configurations and user equipment. Thefollowing three sections discuss: geosynchronousMSS, LEOS systems planning to offer dataservices, and LEOS systems plannin g to offertelephone services.

.—


I Mobile-Satellite Services80

BACKGROUNDSince the mid-1980s, consumer demand for

MSS has grown rapidly. Comsat’s mobile serv-ices revenue, for example, rose from 14 percent oftotal revenues in 1988 to 20 percent in 1990.81

Proponents of MSS see satellites as an economi-cal and efficient way to deliver telecommunica-tion services to users across wide areas. Theypoint alternatively to the congestion of manycellular systems as evidence of the demand forsuch services and to the lack of nationwide mobileservices as an advantage of satellite delivery. Asa result, the demand for additional spectrum forMSS has grown dramatically both domesticallyand internationally.

The development of MSS in this country datesback to the early 1980s. In 1985, the FCC releaseda NPRM to allocate frequencies and developregulatory and technical policies that would fosterthe development of MSS.82 As a result of that2-year proceeding, the FCC reached two impor-tant conclusions: 1) given the limited amount ofspectrum then available, MSS services, includingaeronautical, land, and maritime applications,could only be efficiently and economically pro-vided by one licensee, and 2) the sole licenseeshould be a consortium of the applicants who hadpreviously applied to provide MSS. As a result ofthis decision, the American Mobile SatelliteCorporation (AMSC) was formed and granted thesole license in the United States to provide MSS

Satellites in geosynchronous orbit 22,300 miles aboveEarth are being used to provide a variety of mobilecommunication services to aircraft, ships, andvehicles.

in the 1545-1559 MHz and 1646.5 -1660.5 MHzbands.83 As currently conceived, AMSC’s MSATsystem will cover all of North America, and willoffer a range of services, including nationwidemobile telephone service, paging, data communi-cation, and position location services to land,maritime, and aeronautical users (trucking orshipping companies, for example). AMSC alsoplans to provide communications for civil avia-tion, including air traffic control and flightmanagement communications to support safetyservices and airline passenger telephone calls. In1992, AMSC began offering data messagingservices using leased satellite capacity fromComsat. Customers using this service will even-

80 Al~ou@ MSS tecfic~y ~cfcr~ t. ~1 ~es of mobile satellite systems, including LEOS, in tis section MSS will refer only to

geosynchronous satellite systems. LEOS systems are discussed separately below.

81 Andrew Lawler, ‘ ‘Political, Economic Changes Draw New Markets, ” Space News, vol. 3, No. 3, Jan. 27-Feb. 2, 1992.82 For a discussion of~e ~stow of domestic ad inte~tio~ MSS issues, see John Davidson Thomas, ‘ ‘~te~tio~ AsWc@ ‘f ‘e ‘Obile

Satellite Services,” Federal Communications Luw Journal, vol. 43, December 1990.

83 Cuenfly, tie major stockholders of AMSC are Hughes CofQmuficatiO~, kc., McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., and MobileTelecommunications Technologies Corp., which together control approximately 90 percent of AMSC shares. The FCC’s actions in thisproceeding, including the validity of the consortium approach have been challenged repeatedly on legal grounds. Although the court did reverseand rcmand the order establishing AMSC, the FCC subsequently reasserted the legitimacy of the consortium approach and the awarding ofthe sole MSS license to AMSC. Members of the aeronautical community appealed these decisions, but the case was dismissed on proceduralgrounds. The court, however, did note its concern over the FCC’s authority to mandate licensee consortiums. “FCC, AMSC Get Victory byDefault. . .,” Telecommunications Reports, vol. 59, No. 5, Feb. 1, 1993.

330-071 0 - 93 - 4 QL 3


tually be switched over to AMSC’S satellite, United States, who hold investment shares in thewhich is expected to launch in late 1994. organization. Comsat is the official U.S. signa-

The major global player in MSS is the Interna- tory to Inmarsat and the only authorized seller oftiona1 Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmar- Inmarsat services.

84 Although it was originally

sat). Inmarsat is an international cooperative established in 1979 to serve the communicationowned by more than 60 countries, including the needs of ships-at-sea, Inmarsat has gradually

ad -sat i~elfis not prmitted to provide land or aeronautical mobile serviees in the United States, It does offer some maritime sen’iCeS.

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology 189

expanded the scope of its activities to includeinternational aeronautical communication serv-ices (begun in 1989), and land mobile communi-cation services. Today, land mobile users makeup 25 percent of Inmarsat’s customers.85

U.S. PROPOSALSWinning support for MSS proposals was among

the highest U.S. priorities at WARC-92. Underthe umbrella of MSS, the United States had anumber of interests to protect and promote, andthese gave rise to several different proposals. Thepriorities (listed in no particular order) for theUnited States in MSS were to:

1.

2.3.

Convert the specific mobile satellite serv-ices (aeronautical, land, and maritime) into“generic” MSS, while providing adequateprotection and priority for aeronautical andmaritime safety communications;Obtain new spectrum for MSS; andPrevent reallocation of the 1435-1525 MHzband now used for aeronautical telemetry toMSS or BSS-Sound (see section on BSS-Sound for discussion).

Generic MSS—In the past, the ITU hadsubdivided the various mobile satellite servicesinto three separate categories-aeronautical, land,and maritime-each with its own allocations. TheUnited States first proposed that these separateallocations be merged into a single “generic”allocation at the 1987 WARC on mobile services(MOB-87), That proposal was not accepted byMOB-87, and the issue was carried over toWARC-92.

The WARC-92 U.S. proposal for generic MSSwas premised on the belief that ‘‘the currentservice specific allocations in the 1.5/1.6 GHz

bands are too restrictive to permit flexible usageto adapt to dynamic changes in communicationneeds. We recognize, however, that special provi-sions are necessary so that safety services will beprotected from interference, and that these serv-ices will be ensured priority access over othercommunications in these bands. ’ ’86 The currentdivision of MSS, U.S. spectrum managers be-lieve, leads to inefficient use of the spectrumbecause radio frequencies cannot be transferredquickly enough for use by the most-demandedservices-leaving some services with too muchspectrum, while others face spectrum shortagesand congestion. In order to eliminate this form ofstructural inefficiency, the United States pro-posed to merge the specific MSS (aeronautical,land, and maritime) into generic MSS, whileproviding special protections and preemptiveaccess to the safety services. Government spec-trum managers believe that such safeguardswould be adequate to protect safety needs of theaeronautical and maritime communities.

U.S. proposals targeted a total of 61 MHz forconversion to generic MSS. The United Statesproposed to reallocate the Land Mobile-Satellite(LMSS) and Maritime Mobile-Satellite Service(MMSS) bands at 1530-1544 MHz (downlink)and at 1626.5 -1645.5 MHz (uplink) to MSS.87

And in the bands 1545 -1559 MHz (downlink) and1646.5 -1660.5 MHz (uplink), the United Statesproposed to reallocate the Aeronautical Mobile-Satellite (Route) Service (AMS(R)S) and LMSSto MSS.88

Additional MSS allocations--In addition tothese changes, the United States sought additionalallocations for MSS. As noted above, the UnitedStates proposed to make 19 MHz of spectrum at

85 Ellen Messmer, “Inmarsat Ready to Challenge Iridiurnj” Network World, Mar. 16, 1992.

86 us. propos~s, op. cit., fOOtnOte 5, P. 4.

87 horder t. b~~~e~owt of sp~~av~able forupl~s ~ddoms, tie United States *CI props~ to allocate the b~d 1525-1530

MHz to the mobile-satellite service (space-to-Earth). See below. This proposal includes priority access for maritime safety communicationsas indicated in the proposed footnotes that accompany the frequency proposal.

M ~s props~ provides pfion~ ~cess ~~ re~-~e preemptive capability for the Aeromutical Mobile-Satellite (Route) Semim. ~s

access was proposed in a footnote accompanying the allocation proposat.


1626.5 -1645.5 MHz (uplinks) generic. The com-panion (paired) generic MSS downlink band forthese frequencies at 1530-1544 totaled only 14MHz.89 Consequently, the United States pro-posed to add 5 MHz (1525-1530 MHz) to thenewly generic MSS downlink band at 1530-1544MHz, thus balancing the amount of spectrumavailable for both uplinks and downlinks.

The United States also proposed new world-wide allocations of 80 MHz (40 MHz each foruplinks and downlinks) for MSS. The proposedallocations were 2110-2130 MHz and 2160-2180MHz (downlinks), and 2390-2430 MHz(uplinks). For ITU Regions 1 and 3, the UnitedStates also proposed to allocate (through foot-notes) the bands 2500-2535 MHz (downlink) and2655-2690 MHz (uplink) to MSS. Finally, theUnited States proposed an allocation footnote toadd MSS to the 1850-1990 MHz band. Thisaddition was intended to provide future spectrumfor MSS operations, including LEOS systems.90

RESULTSUnited States MSS proposals enjoyed mixed

results at WARC-92. The U.S. proposal toconvert existing aeronautical, maritime, and landmobile satellite service allocations into a genericMSS allocation worldwide was generally notsuccessful—WARC-92 let stand the existingdivisions between the specific services (see figure2-5). This outcome was not surprising given pastopposition. International support for maintaininga separate band of frequencies for satellite serv-ices serving airline routes was especially strong.

The United States achieved part of its goal,however, by inserting two footnotes in the crucial

bands indicating that MSS would be allocated ona primary basis in this country and severalothers. 91 Footnote 726C allocates 1530-1544MHz and 1626.5 -1645.5 MHz on a primary basis,but only in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,Malaysia, Mexico, and the United States, andmaritime distress and safety services have prior-ity. The effect of this footnote is to make MSSprimary in all of North America. Footnote 730Callocates the 1555-1559 MHz and 1656.5 -1660.5MHz bands to MSS, but only in the United Statesand Argentina, and provides priority access toAMS(R)S.

Regarding new MSS allocations, some of theU.S. proposals were accepted, some were not.New spectrum was allocated to MSS in a numberof bands (see box 2-C and figure 2-4), but the newallocations are modified, and in some casesseverely constrained, by a complex array offootnotes that specify power levels, coordinationrequirements, and implementation dates. Becauseof these limitations, the United States entered tworeservations in the Final Acts of WARC-92complaining g about the “unduly restricted alloca-tions” for MSS and the delay in making some ofthe new allocations available. Through thesereservations the United States maintains its rightsto use the bands as it deems necessary in order tomeet the needs of mobile satellite systems in thiscountry.92

DISCUSSIONDomestic Issues-U.S. proposals were driven

by the increased demand for mobile services inthis country (and the perceived latent demandworldwide), the large geographic areas involved,

89 Satelli[e Semices we often ~ocat~ in ptid buds. This means tit all communications signals going to the satellite in one bmd will

be transmitted back to Earth in the companion band.90 me Ufited Sta[es ~so ~~ted t. use ~eseb~ds for fi[~e perso~ comm~ca[ions semice~ development and w~td to reserve the b~d

for possible satellite augmentation of terrestrial PCS systems.91 Footnote 726C Wwa[es tie b~ds 153(3-1544 ~ (do~nk) ad 1626.5 .1645.5 ~ (uplink) to ~S on a primary basis h ArgenthM,

Australia, Brazil, Canad% the United States, Malaysia, and Mexico. Foomote 730C allocates the bands 1555-1559 MHz and 1656.5- 1660.5MHz to MSS, but only in the United States and Argentina. Provisions are made to protect and provide emergency access for maritime (andother) safety communications.

w Intematio~ Telecommunication Union, WARC-92, Document 389-E, Mm. 3, 1992, P. 29.


Figure 2-5-WARC-92 L-Band Mobile-Satellite

Downllnk allocations

1545

1525 1530 1533 15441

Service Allocations

1555 1559

—. —

MSS

L .———

AMS(R)S MSS

Upllnk allocations

1646.51626.51631 .51634.5 1645.5 ‘ 1656.5 1660.5~ –d–d-.

1 —~+---—-~ MMSS~ I (

; t.-..-.– -– — ~ – . — – 1 ,

@ r“c

–T—–0 7—zv MSS I AMS(R)S

1

I0 MSS%u)’5

I!- .— _J_._J

a Secondaryb In Region 1 onlyc In Regions 2 & 3 only

KEY: AMS(R)S=Aeronautical Mobile-satellite (Route) Serwce“ ,LMSS=lJmdMobile-Satellite Service, MMSS-Maritime Mobile-Satellite Service,MSS=Mobile-Satellite Service.

SOURCE: Office of Teehnoloyg Assessment, 1993.

and the rapid development of satellite technolo- satellite systems—was an important considera-gies. AMSC’s stated need for more spectrum--so t ion.93 In addition, the desire to foster thethat it could compete with other international development of this newly emerging, and poten-

9S The Limited amount of spectrum allocated to MSS worldwide prior to WARC-92, combined with the number of counties/companiesplanning to [aunch MSS systems made sharing the spcetrum essential. As a result of preliminary negotiations with some other countries, AMand the Federal Government believed that there simply was not sufficient spectrum to support all the competing systems, including AMSC.Without adequate spectrum, AMSC would have had serious difficulties offering the number and quality of services it had planned.


tially important and profitable industry, and tokeep America at the forefront of satellite technol-ogy and services, quickly made MSS proposalsone of the most important priorities for the UnitedStates and a major focus of U.S. WARC-92preparations and negotiations.

Although many in the Federal Government,including NTIA, support the concept of genericMSS allocations, U.S. proposals for convertingthe individual mobile satellite services (aeronau-tical, maritime, and land) into a generic allocationfor MSS were generally opposed by the individ-ual user communities, both domestically in theU.S. preparation process and at the WARC itself(see below).

International and WARC-92 Issues-TheUnited States has been fighting the battle ofgeneric MSS since the mid-1980s. Inmarsat hasopposed the idea, and the international aeronauti-cal community, which wants to maintain aseparate band for aeronautical safety communica-tions or at least ensure that safety communica-tions are protected from interference and continueto have priority access to satellite communicationchannels in the event of an emergency, has beenespecially critical of the generic concept. Theybelieve that the rise of commercial MSS willeventually reduce the amount of spectrum avail-able for aeronautical safety communications andsubject such communications to increasing inter-


ference. While U.S. spectrum managers maintain equipment) will be compromised if civil aviationthat adequate safeguards can be built into technol- users are forced to share spectrum with commer-ogy and accomplished through rule changes, cial MSS providers .94 The maritime community isrepresentatives of the aeronautical community in similarly concerned that future development ofboth the United States and in international avia- MSS services in the bands could degrade thetion organizations, such as the International Civil future worldwide Global Maritime Distress andAviation Organization (ICAO), are skeptical that Safety System (GMDSS). To date, the argumentssuch protection can be provided through either against generic MSS have been more persuasivetechnical or procedural means. They are con- internationally.cerned that air safety (and existing investments in

94 D~~~~ti~ally, tie battle betw~n AMSC and tie aeronautical comm~~ continues. -c, kc., md other gIOllPs hUVe fild SUitS

challenging AMSC’S license, and they continue to doubt the ability of AMSC to ensure the reliability and preemptive access of aeronauticalsatellite communications required by the FCC and international rules. The FCC recently declined to adopt standards for such operations, leavingit instead to AMSC to design the system itself. Telecommunications Reports, ‘‘FCC Adopts Technical Standards, Licensing Requirements forAircraft Earth Stations, ” vol. 58, No. 37, Sept. 14, 1992.


The negotiations over additional allocationsfor MSS were some of the most contentious ofWARC-92. The greatest difficulty in negotiatingnew MSS allocations was in overcoming theresistance of other countries who were trying toprotect their existing services. Many countriesbelieve that (U. S.) satellite systems will causeinterference to the existing services in the bands—just as the maritime and aeronautical communi-ties believe that such systems will cause interfer-ence to their systems.

This difficulty was compounded by the opposi-tion of the European bloc to any new U.S. MSSallocations. Even before WARC-92 began, battlelines had been drawn between the United States,for whom MSS was a high priority, and Europe/CEPT, which generally opposed U.S. MSS allo-cation proposals. At the conference, both sidesrefused to compromise, and despite some promisi-ng rumors, negotiations remained deadlocked for3 weeks. Only 3 days before the end of WARC-92, no agreement had been reached, and the headsof delegations for the principal countries involvedtried to negotiate a solution. Finally, in the lasthours of the conference (between 2 AM and 7AM), a deal was struck in which Europeanopposition to MSS was dropped in return for U.S.concessions on FPLMTS.

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONSAllocation Issues-WARC-92 outcomes rep-

resent a step forward for the U.S. MSS industry,but successes were limited, and several issues willlikely be revisited. Most significantly, some newspectrum was allocated for MSS use. However,while the additional spectrum allocated to MSS isimportant, the proponents of these new systems,both in the United States and abroad, believe thatthe frequencies allocated to MSS are still inade-quate. Around the world, a number of countriesare developing MSS systems (both regional andglobal in scope), each with its own spectrum

needs. These needs, however, greatly exceed theamount of spectrum currently allocated to MSS.In addition, some of the new bands allocated toMSS by WARC-92 cannot be used before 2005-too late to accommodate all the systems nowbeing developed.95 The limited amount of addi-tional spectrum that was allocated to MSS atWARC-92 and the limitations placed on the newallocations mean that this issue will almostcertainly be revisited at a future world radiocom-munication conference. MSS proponents believethat restrictions could be reduced as the systemscome into operation, and more spectrum may beallocated as demand for the service increases.

As a result of the difficulty in coming toagreement on MSS issues, many footnotes wereinserted into the allocations covering MSS. Thesefootnotes modify the allocations in many ways—setting specific dates, varying the allocations indifferent countries, specifying coordination re-quirements, etc.—all of which serve to protectexisting services, but which also constrain theintroduction and/or operation of mobile satellitesystems and services. Moreover, because of thetechnical detail in the MSS footnotes and thesometimes vague way in which they were written,these footnotes are subject to continuing interpre-tation.

Serious economic concerns underlie the MSSfootnotes-concerns that are not amenable totechnical frees and that will only be solvedthrough intense negotiation. Years will be neededto develop, interpret, and negotiate the practicalmeaning of some of them. To what extent this willslow the development of mobile satellite servicesis uncertain. The U.S. Government and AMSChave already begun the process of coordinatingU.S. MSS services worldwide.

The general failure of the U.S. generic propos-als could constrain the development of futureglobal MSS systems in the L-band. The fact thatMSS exists in a generic sense only in North

95 w &te is noted in foo(note 746X. The United States, feeling this date was too far in the fiture, succeeded in hlserting a.IIOther fOOblOtein the table of allocations (746U) that moves up the date at which MSS services can begin in the United States to Jan. 1, 1996.


America (in 1525-1544 MHz and 1626.5 -1645.5MHz—footnote 726C) or only in the UnitedStates (in 1555-1559 MHz and 1656.5 -1660.5MHz—footnote 730C) means that any globalMSS system the United States might put into orbitmust conform to the international allocationswhen operating in other countries. It remains to beseen how serious this restriction will be. AMSC,for example, plans to serve only North America,and is constructing its system accordingly-itwill not be affected directly by the regionalallocations in Regions 1 and 3. The United Stateswill undoubtedly press for generic allocations inthese bands at future conferences in order to allowmore flexible uses of these frequencies by avariety of satellite services. This position willlikely continue to be opposed by the aeronauticaland maritime communities until such time as thetechnical viability of providing them priorityaccess to MSS frequencies can be proven.

Competition with Terrestrial Services—Theimpacts of MSS services on terrestrial mobileservices is unclear. Both of these delivery systemswill provide essentially the same services—telephone, paging, and data communications. Themost important question facing mobile serviceproponents is: is the overall market for mobilecommunication services large enough to supportmany different technologies and companies? Themarket will ultimately decide if MSS becomes amass market consumer service or a servicetargeted to niches such as trucking companies,fleet management services, and/or national pag-ing services.

Some analysts have commented on the abilityof future satellite services to provide competitionto cellular telephone operators—and the benefi-cial effects this competition would have on pricesand service. While such competition could havebeneficial effects, it is not yet clear if MSS

systems will compete directly against cellularsystems or if MSS could provide effective compe-tition to the cellular providers in more than a fewmarkets or niche applications. The strategy ofsome MSS providers (including big LEOS), atleast publicly, is to provide services that “com-plement” the existing cellular systems by target-ing areas not served by cellular systems and/orindividuals who frequently roam between differ-ent cellular systems. If these services provesuccessful, however, it is likely that the satellitecompanies will begin to compete with the cellulartelephone companies for the same customers.

Future of the U.S. MSS Industry---Given theadditional spectrum allocated to MSS at WARC-92 and the likelihood that additional spectrum forMSS will be made available at future WARCs,the domestic structure of the U.S. MSS industryand the policies governing it should be immedi-ately reviewed. The questions involved in deter-mining the future of MSS in this country arecomplex and will require high-level policy deci-sions that take account of many important techni-cal, economic, and political factors. This issuegraphically demonstrates the importance of hav-ing a framework in place through which todevelop consistent and aggressive policies thatwould support the development of mobile (in-cluding terrestrial and satellite) services in thiscountry.

Several domestic MSS issues remain unre-solved. Fundamentally, the decision facing theFCC and the Congress is how much competitionto allow in the MSS industry. AMSC has beenlicensed for several years as the sole provider ofMSS (in the bands 1545—1559 MHz and 1646.5-1660.5 MHz) in the United States, but its role andvery existence continue to be challenged incourt. 96 Furthermore, the additional spectrum allo-cated to MSS at WARC-92 calls into question the

96 A~C, ad he ~atio~e for ~~~bfis~g a co~ofii~ approach for MSS, ~s be~ c~enged in COurt and survived SO f~. ~ the FCC

and AMSC lose, the U.S. MSS industry (which essentially is AMSC) could be seriously set back. AMSC has been the focal point of U.S.coordination discussions internationally, and satellites arc already being constructed. If AMSC is invalidated, or if MSS services are openedfor (additional) applications, deployment of MSS in this country could be delayed.


FCC’s original rationale for granting only oneMSS license-namely that there was only enoughspectrum to support one licensee.

Since its creation, the FCC has carefullyprotected and supported AMSC. Some observershypothesize that since the FCC created AMSC, itfeels responsible to defend it against all threats—domestic and foreign. However, although theFCC’s desire to protect AMSC and promote thedevelopment of a costly and risky new service isa laudable goal, the conditions that led to thatdecision have changed and will continue toevolve. The rapid development of alternativeMSS technologies (LEOS), for example, and theFCC’s support of them undermines AMSC’s andthe FCC’s arguments that AMSC must be initiallyprotected from competition in order to survive.LEOS systems will provide similar services andpresumably compete head-to-head with AMSC inmany markets and service segments.

Such developments call into question the beliefthat the protection of AMSC as a regulatedmonopoly is in the best interests of the citizens ofthe United States. On one hand, government andAMSC officials believe that the regulation andprotection of AMSC are necessary to ensure thatthe system/company can survive and begin offer-ing services. If AMSC was not protected andultimately failed, there would be no mobilesatellite service in this country, and the UnitedStates would suffer a serious setback in theinternational negotiations now going on to workout spectrum sharing arrangements among theproposed MSS systems. In addition, if AMSCwere to fail, and no company or system couldquickly take its place, Inmarsat could step in toprovide services--on a monopoly basis withmonopoly prices.

On the other hand, entry of Inmarsat into U.S.markets could be beneficial to American consum-ers if a “level playing field” for competitioncould be created and maintained. As noted above,Inmarsat has been aggressively expanding its roleand customer base for the last several years, andhas targeted land mobile telecommunications as

an area for future growth. International pagingusing Inmarsat satellites is expected to begin in1994, and the organization has announced plansto provide telephone and other services in compe-tition with the U.S. LEOS providers (see below).When the FCC allocates additional spectrum toMSS in conformance with WARC-92 decisions,Inmarsat could potentially provide services incompetition with AMSC—if it were allowed intoU.S. markets. However, if a worldwide systemsuch as Inmarsat was permitted to operate in theUnited States, it would reduce the amount ofspectrum available for U.S. domestic systems—perhaps making their services difficult or impos-sible to deliver.

A true commitment to competition and itspresumed benefits-lower prices and better qua-lity-require that the possibility of opening theU.S. market to other MSS providers—both do-mestic and foreign—be examined. If AMSC is tocontinue to operate under protected monopolystatus, the reasons for such an important policydecision must be carefully and openly examinedin the light of evolving domestic and internationalconsiderations. It may be possible, given theavailability of new spectrum, to open up MSS inthe United States to even greater competition.With the procompetitive atmosphere that nowexists at the FCC, in Congress, and in theexecutive branch, such a monopoly approachseems out of place. This debate points out theintricate and complex interconnections between(developing goals for) radiocommunication pol-icy, WARCS, and trade policy.

I Little LEOS

BACKGROUNDOne of the greatest booms in the use of wireless

technologies has come in the demand for datacommunication and simple messaging applica-tions. The growth in paging services and the morerecent explosive growth in portable data commu-nications-for service technicians in the field, forexample-indicates a large, and as yet, unex-


ploited market for wireless data communicationservices.97 In order to meet this perceived de-mand, several U.S. companies have proposed touse networks of low-Earth orbiting satellites todeliver two-way data, messaging, and positiondetermination services worldwide. Because thesesystems will operate in frequencies below 1 GHz(in the VHF/UHF bands), and because they willuse very small satellites, they are often referred toas “little LEOS,” in order to distinguish themfrom similar networks of LEOS that plan tooperate in frequencies above 1 GHz and delivervoice services as well as data (see section on ‘‘bigLEOS” below).

Current designs for the little LEOS systemsenvision networks of up to 24 satellites flying inorbits only several hundred miles above theEarth.98 Depending on complexity, these satel-lites are expected to cost from $6 to $10 millioneach. On the ground, satellite dishes callednetwork gateways located throughout the worldwill relay messages and data to the satellites thatwill then retransmit the information down toindividual users who will receive it on smallhandheld terminals (see figure 2-6). Users will beable to send short messages back through thesatellites to the gateways for delivery to othermobile users or through the public telephonenetwork to family and friends or their company.Trucking companies, for example, could use thesystems to locate cargoes or trucks, and tocommunicate with employees.

Little LEOS systems plan to offer a variety ofcommunications services. The most basic serviceinitially might be domestic one-way paging. Themost advanced applications will allow users tosend and receive messages on small, portablehand-held units that resemble large calculators

Iis

Small satellites such as this one, which is less than 4feet tall, will bring data communications services topeople around the world.

with an antenna attached. These handsets will beable to receive and transmit messages of up to 200characters, determine the users’ location to within

97 see, for exmp]e, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and reformation ~“ “strationj Telecom 2000.”Charting the Cour.refer u New Century, NTIA Special Publication 88-21 (Washirtgtoq DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1988).A number of radio-based data communication networks are already operating in this country, including ARDIS (Motorola/I13M) and RamMobile Data (Ram/BellSouth), and the FCC has proposed allocating 20 MHz of spectrum for wireless data communication as part of itsproceeding on PCS, op cit., footnote 63. Severat companies bave also announced plans to market data services that would use existing cellulartelephone systems.

98 Geosynchronous-orbiting satellites, by contmst, are located 22,300 miles above tie Efi.


Figure 2-6-Generic Little LEOS System

.,.

... .... .,, ,’<—_----=-

4 “.’


100 meters or less, and are expected to berelatively inexpensive (depending on features,current estimates range from $50 to $400). Userterminals could also be installed in cars, trucks,and boats or even be integrated with a vehicle’sradio system. An advantage offered by the littleLEOS systems over terrestrially-based data serv-ices is their ability to supply location informationto users and for other service providers. Losthikers or boaters and stranded motorists, forexample, could use the systems to send distresssignals giving their exact location. Police coulduse such systems to find stolen cars. Finally, suchsystems can provide environmental or industrialmonitoring by allowing stationary units to trans-mit weather or leak detection data to a centrallocation.99 The kinds of features a user wants willdetermine the type and cost of equipment needed.

U.S. PROPOSALSAs a result of discussion in the FCC’s Industry

Advisory Committee and between industry andgovernment interests, the United States proposedallocations for MSS to be used by little LEOSsystems in three bands. The bands proposed were:137-138 MHz (downlink), 148-149.9 MHz(Uplirlk), and 400.15-401 MHz (downlink).

RESULTSBy most accounts, the United States did well

with its little LEOS proposals. The frequenciesthe United States wanted were allocated, butsome only on a secondary basis. Additionalfrequencies the United States did not proposewere adopted for LEOS use, and interim coordi-nation procedures for little LEOS operations wereagreed to.

w Such ~~e~ could ~so be ~~way: tie sensors mtdd be polled for an immediate read%. ~ ~- ‘‘FCC Stms pager ~ces”

Washington Technology, vol. 7, No. 1, Apr. 9, 1992, p. 30.

——


WARC-92 allocated 137-138 MHz for littleLEOS downlinks. However, in order to protectexisting services, the band was broken up intosubbands, some of which are primary while othersare secondary (see figure 2-7). This spectrum willbe shared on a coprimary basis with spaceoperations and research services and meteorolog-ical satellite operations, and with fixed andmobile services (both secondary).

The 400.15-401 MHz band was also allocatedfor LEOS downlinks. This band will be sharedwith the meteorological aids and satellite servicesand space research services on a coprimary basisand space operations on a secondary basis. LEOSservices may operate freely in these two bands aslong as they stay below a certain level of power(so as not to interfere with existing services).However, if the signal from the satellite exceedsthat “trigger” level (it is too powerful when itreaches the ground), the little LEOS serviceprovider must coordinate the system with existingusers (see discussion of Resolution 46 below).

The band 148-149.9 MHz was allocated forLEOS uplinks on a coprimary basis with fixedand mobile services. However, in order to protectexisting services, WARC-92 put limitations onLEO operations in this band that are stricter thanfor the downlinks. First, conference delegatesagreed that ‘‘the mobile-satellite service [includ-ing LEOS services] shall not constrain the devel-opment and use of fixed, mobile and spaceoperation services in the band 148- 149.9 MHz."100

Second, the power levels of the mobile userterminals cannot exceed a specified level (incountries which have not allowed the service),which is very low—lower than limits on the otherbands. And unlike the power levels specified inthe 137-138 and 400.15-401 MHz bands, thelimits in this band are absolute. If a country hasnot permitted the system to operate within itsborders, the power 1evels in the offended countrymay not exceed these limits under any circums-tance.

Hand-held terminals will enable consumers andbusiness users to send and receive short messagesaround the world and determine their locationanywhere on Earth to within 100 meters.

More importantly, many countries (includingmost of Europe, many African nations, Canada,Russia, and others, but not including the UnitedStates) have effectively made these LEO uplinkfrequencies secondary (see box 2-A for a discus-sion of the differences between primary andsecondary status for radio services) in theircountries by inserting a footnote into the interna-tional Table of Allocations stating that:

[s]tations of the mobile-satellite service in theband 148-149.9 MHz shall not cause harmfulinterference to, or claim protection from stations

lm 1~, A&e~um ati Corrigendum, op. cit., footnote 61, p. 1.


Figure 2-7—WARC-92 Little LEOS Frequency Allocations

137 MHz 138 MHz 400.15 MHz 401 MHz

$

Coprimary

Secondary Coprimary Secondary Coprimary. 1 - 1. -. -. 1- I : 1

137.025 137.175 137.825

Down link frequencies

148 MHz

CoprimarybI

Uplink frequencies

a Downlinks are Subjwt to coordination according to Resolution 46 if they eXCeed Certain pOWer levels.b s~onda~ in more than 70 countries. See footnote 6082.c user terminals have pwer limits to avoid interference across national boundaries.d Use of the 149.9-150.05 MHz band is limited to land systems, and remains secmndary until January 1, 1997.

NOTE: The coordination procedures outlined in Resolution 46 apply to LEOS systems operating in any of these bands.

150.05 MHz

149.9 MHzdl


of the fixed or mobile services in the followingcountries [more than 70 out of the ITU’s 166countries are listed]. . . .l0l

Coordination between LEOS uplinks and the do-mestic services in these countries will be required.

In addition to the proposals made by the UnitedStates, WARC-92 allocated additional frequen-cies for little LEOS operations. The band 149.9-150.5 MHz, which is limited to land mobile use,will be shared on a co-primary basis withradionavigation-satellite services. Any LEOS serv-ice in this band may not constrain the radionavi-gation services, and will be on a secondary basisuntil Jan. 1, 1997. In response to proposals madeby the Russian Federation, a secondary allocationwas adopted for MSS in the bands 312-315 MHz(uplink) and 387-390 MHz (downlink), which canbe used for non-geostationary systems. Any littleLEOS system will have to share these bands with

freed and mobile services, and cannot causeinterference to existing services.

Finally, WARC-92 adopted Resolution 46,which outlines interim procedures for introducingand coordinating LEOS systems with existingservices. Each of the bands allocated for use bylittle LEOS is subject to the procedures andlimitations contained in Resolution 46, whichwill remain in effect until permanent proceduresand regulations are adopted at a future world radioconference. As noted above, in the 137-138 MHzand 400.15-401 MHz bands, coordination isrequired only in cases where the signal power ofa satellite received at the Earth exceeds a certainlevel. 102

DISCUSSIONDomestic Background—Prior to WARC-92,

four companies applied to the FCC to build little

10I I’I’U, Addend~ ad Corn”gendum, footnote 608Z, op. cit., footnote 61, p. 1.

]02 me tit is. 125 ~Wo ~~ lfiitmy ~c~gedby a fu~eco~erence ifitproveseither too restrictive for LE@ or does notofferenough

protection to existing services. Since none of the LEOS systems are operational yet, determiningg exact power requirements and sharing criteriais extremely diftlcult. As systems are implemented, and levels of interference can be measured and analyzed, these requirements and criteriamay change. Special note is also taken to protect radio astronomy services in nearby bands.

— — .

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio ‘Technology I 101

LEOS systems: Leosat, Inc.; Orbcomm, a subsid- (Collecte et Localisation par Satellite); and Vol-iary of Orbital Sciences Corp.; Starsys, jointly unteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), Inc. (seeowned by ST Systems and North American CLS box 2-D).103 These companies were active in

103 ~OSat~S ~ppllmtion Wm dismissed by me Fcc on procedural grounds. Leosat appealed the dismissal, but wm denied in J~~ 1993.


promoting U.S. proposals for little LEOS bothbefore and at WARC-92.

The rivalry between these companies beforethe conference was intense, particularly betweenStarsys and Orbcomm and between Leosat andthe others. Each challenged the other’s technicalplans and system configuration. Orbcomm alsoraised serious questions about possible foreign(government) ownership of Starsys, a factor thatwould make Starsys ineligible for a U.S. licenseunder section 310 of the Communications Act of1934.104 Starsys, while acknowledging Frenchinterests in the company, maintains that U.S.concerns control the board of directors, thusmaking the company eligible for a license. TheFCC has so far declined to rule on Orbcomm’saccusations, and is proceeding with its actions.105

Although the issue has not been resolved, theFCC has already awarded Starsys an experimen-tal license. This may be in violation of theCommunications Act, which makes no distinc-tion between experimental and operational li-censes. Observers point out that by awarding theexperimental license, the FCC may have createda precedent that will be hard to reverse.

WARC Negotiations—WARC delegates creditmuch of the success of the little LEOS proposalsto the work done prior to the conference by U.S.representatives traveling to other counties toexplain the LEOS concept, how it works, andwhat the benefits could be. In many cases, thiswork was undertaken by individual representa-tives of the little LEOS proponents on behalf oftheir own or their clients’ systems. Little LEOSproponents worked hard to educate individualcountries on the specifics of little LEOS systems,seeking to allay those countries’ concerns thatthese services would interfere with their existinguses of the band. At least some of this preconfer-

ence work was done outside the framework of theofficial bilateral or multilateral talks the U.S.Government held with many countries.

Some observers have noted that U.S. Gover-nment representatives initially did not discuss littleLEOS in meetings with foreign countries. Severalpossible reasons for this relative lack of intereston the part of the government have been noted.First, little LEOS were not one of the highestpriority items for the United States. A secondrationale that has been advanced is that somegovernment interests were not happy with thebands that had been chosen for little LEOS andwould have been happier if the bands were notallocated at all. An additional explanation is thatthe government representatives who participatedin these initial preconference meetings did nothave the expertise to discuss little LEOS topics indetail. These theories are reinforced by the factthat few industry people were involved in earlynegotiations. l06

Just before WARC-92 convened, AmbassadorJan Baran brought together the little LEOSproponents to address the heated rivalry amongthe proponents during the preparation process inthe United States. These meetings laid the ground-work for successful cooperation among the littleLEOS applicants at WARC-92. At the confer-ence, private sector representatives played animportant role in building support for U.S.proposals and relaying status reports to govern-ment spokesmen and delegation leaders. Commu-nication between these two groups was reportedlyvery good, and paid substantial benefits in rebuff-ing attempts by the Russian Federation andFrench delegations, among others, to limit littleLEOS allocations.

At WARC-92 some, especially European, coun-tries, were extremely protective of existing serv-

10447 uS-CA., ~wti~n 310.

Ios Fede~ Communions Co&sSioq Tentative Decision in the Matter of Request for Pioneer’s Preference in Proceeding to Allocate

Spectrum for Ftiedand Mobile Satellite Services for L.ow-Earth Orbit Satellites, FCC 92-21, released Feb. 11, 1992, p, 5.

1~ It should & noted that li~le LEC)S applicants did participate in many of the multilateral meetings thiit were held ptior to WARC-92,including various CCIR meetings and the CITEL W~C-92 preparation meetings.


Table 2-3—Chronology of Little LEOS Actions

September 1988. . . . . . . . . . . . Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) files application for experimental LEOSsystem.

February-October 1990. . . . . . Orbcomm, Starsys, VITA, and Leosat file applications to construct LEOS systems.

October 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FCC releases Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on establishment of little LEOS serviceand allocation of frequencies.

January 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . FCC awards pioneer’s preference to VITA.March 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WARC 92 adopts allocations for little LEOS systems.

April 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FCC issues experimental licenses to Orbcomm and Starsys.1

FCC asks for comments on establishing an advisory committee for Iittle LEOS.

Leosat application dismissed.May 18, 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Orbcomm, Starsys, and VITA file joint comments proposing new little LEOS rules.July 23, 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . FCC establishes an advisory committee for little LEOS (official title: “Below 1 GHz

Negotiated Rulemaking Committee”).August 10, 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . First meeting of little LEOS advisory committee.September 16, 1992. . . . . . . . Last meeting of little LEOS advisory committee.January 1993. ., . . . . . . . . . . . FCC allocates frequencies to little LEOS, and proposes technical rules to govern little

LEOS systems.1 VITA has held an experimental license since 1989.


ices, and wanted to constrain little LEOS opera-tions as much as possible. This opposition ac-counts for the adoption of footnote 608Z, whichlimits little LEOS to secondary status in manycountries in the 148- 149.9 MHz band. Althoughnot ideal, this allocation was apparently accepta-ble to the three U.S. proponents. U.S. representa-tives were successful in reaching out to manydeveloping countries and convincing them tosupport the U.S. proposals.

Post- WARC Activity—Domestic Actions: Onceallocations were made by WARC-92, efforts tolaunch little LEOS systems moved back to theUnited States and into high gear. The FCC tookan aggressive approach toward implementing thelittle LEOS systems (see table 2-3); issuingexperimental licenses to Orbcomm and Starsys,granting a pioneer’s preference to VITA, andestablishing an advisory committee to help itestablish the rules and regulations that willgovern little LEOS systems (see appendix E). TheFCC’s proceeding on the frequencies to be usedby little LEOS concluded in January 1993, whenthe FCC adopted the allocations proposed atWARC-92 as the domestic allocations for little

LEOS services, At the same time, the FCCproposed rules, based on the results of itsnegotiated rulemaking process, to govern littleLEOS services.

After WARC-92 ended, the little LEOS com-panies, partners at WARC-92, once again becamerivals. As before, some of the most contentiousissues surrounding the implementation of littleLEOS services are those that involve technicalchallenges and protests the companies haveleveled against each other. It should be noted,however, that the companies (Orbcomm, Starsys,and VITA) were able to put aside their differenceslong enough to work out proposed service rulesand sharing arrangements to submit to the FCC.

International Interest: On the internationalfront, interest in little LEOS has been strongestamong the developing countries, who see satellitecommunication as an important way to reachareas with inadequate or no communicationservices. As of early 1993, at least three othercountries were actively developing little LEOsystems, France’s Centre National d’Etudes Spa-tiales (CNES-the French equivalent of NASA)has already launched the frost satellite in a


proposed little LEOS system called Taos. Al-though currently not funded, the concept for thefull system calls for six satellites to be operationalin 5 years serving up to 1.5 million usersworldwide. 107 In Mexico, LeoSat Panamericanahas begun experiments and plans to begin offer-ing services in 1995.108 Smolsat—a consortiumof space companies based in the RussianFederation—has already launched the first sixLEOS (two of which are for commercial use) ofa proposed 36-satellite system known as “Gon-ets. "109Beginning in 1995, the system plans toprovide high-speed data services including elec-tronic mail and fax transmission serving transpor-tation and other industries. The Gonets systemplans to add intersatellite links in 1997, enablingvoice services to be provided globally, at a totalcost of $300 million. Although this system willnot compete with U.S. little LEOS providers forthe same spectrum, it could compete with U.S.system (s) to provide the same types of servicesaround the world.ll0

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONSWARC-92 significantly boosted the prospects

for little LEOS technologies and services. How-ever, several obstacles remain, and difficult issuesmust be resolved before little LEOS servicesbecome available throughout the world. Servicesare expected to be implemented frost in the UnitedStates and then spread to other countries. Current

plans call for U.S. services to begin sometime in1994.

Sharing Concerns--The most important issuefacing little LEOS proponents involves interfer-ence and sharing. Sharing concerns have severaldimensions. First, the new little LEOS systemsmust share with the existing users of the frequen-cies, both domestically and internationally. Thisis likely to be the largest problem standing in theway of the implementation of little LEOS serv-ices. The frequencies in which the little LEOSwill operate are already used by some countries,including the United States, for space operationsand research and meteorological services (in137-138 MHz and 400.15-401 MHz), and variouspoint-to-point and mobile applications (in 148-149.9). 111 In order to protect existing services,WARC-92 limited little LEOS to secondarystatus in parts of the 137-138 MHz band (seefigure 2-7), limited power levels, and, as notedabove, more than 70 countries downgraded littleLEOS to secondary status in their countries in the148- 149.9 MHz (uplink) band. The latter declara-tion could cause serious difficulties for potentiallittle LEOS service providers if foreign govern-ments are unwilling or unable to coordinate theLEOS uplinks with their own uses.

Domestically, U.S. Government agencies wantto protect their existing services from harmfulinterference by little LEOS. The National Oce-anic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),for example, operates weather satellites in the

107$ ‘French Hope to ~~ch Glob~ Data-ordy Mobile Commllrlkatiom System, ” Space Commerce Week, vol. 9, No. 40, Oct. 19, 1992.

Im Plans for LeoSat Panarnericana’s system call for 24 satellites serving Latin America. It will offer the same types of data messaging andpaging services as the U.S. LEOS companies. Manuel Villalvazo, “UoSat Panarnericana: Latin American Communications on the Move, ”Satellite Communications, November 1992.

IW t ‘Russi~ Firms Launch Initial Satellites of LEO System, ” Satellite News, July 27, 1992, p. 5.

110 me Russia system will Use 312-315 MHZ for its downhnks and 387-390 MHz for uplinks. Both bands are allocated to MSS on asecondary basis, and must share with existing fixed and mobile services. Because these bands are used for Defense Departmentcommunications, the system will not be allowed to operate in the United States.

111 Radio ~~onomy ~teru~ are ~so p~c~~ly concerned about possible ~terference from li~le MOS tito their space observhg

instruments. Although these instruments operate in slightly higher frequencies (150.05-153 MHz and 406.1-410 MHz), use of radio fkquenciesis not precise and often can spill over into adjacent channels. Radio astronomers fear that little LEOS operations will spill over into theirfrequencies and disrupt their receiving equipment, which is very sensitive. This prompted W~C-92 to adopt language in footnote 599A thatinstructs countries to “take all practicable steps to protect the radio astronomy service in the 150.05-153 MHz [and 406.1-410 MHz] band fromharmful interference. . . .“


137-138 band. Discussions have already begun tocoordinate the use of these frequencies. The148-149.9 MHz band is currently allocated do-mestically only for government (military) use.The Air Force, for example, plans to extend itsmeteorological satellite system in the 400 MHzband.

International sharing may also be difficult dueto the existing uses of the bands and the degree ofopposition to the U.S. proposals, especially in the137-138 MHz and 148-149.9 MHz bands. Can-ada, for example, although it supported other U.S.little LEOS proposals, joined footnote 608 Z---making little LEOS secondary in Canada. Thisaction was taken in order to protect its extensivepaging operations in the 148-149.9 MHz band.Because these systems have to penetrate build-ings to ensure complete coverage, they are alsovery high power, and since they are oftenconcentrated near the U.S. border, coordinationbetween Canada and the United States will benecessary. These uses must be taken into accountby little LEOS proponents as they design theirsystems and by the FCC as it implements rulesgoverning little LEOS services.

The secondary status of LEOS operations insome bands is an important concern for potentiallittle LEOS providers, both at home and abroad,While the effects of these limitations are notknown, since the services are not yet operational,they are potentially serious. Secondary statusmakes sharing with existing users more compli-cated, and coordination issues become moredifficult, although probably not insurmountable.

Little LEOS providers maintain that they canoperate within these limitations, but the realpossibility exists that the primary services in thebands, especially the fixed and mobile services inthe 148-149.9 MHz band could overwhelm them.As long as this secondary status exists, littleLEOS services will remain threatened, poten-

tially dampening investment in these systems andretarding development. Despite such difficulties,each company is moving ahead with its negotia-tions for foreign licenses.112

The second major sharing concern facing thecompeting little LEOS providers is that they mustshare the newly allocated spectrum among them-selves. Although the spectrum allocated to littleLEOS is limited, the FCC has stated its intentionto allow as many providers as possible to use thebands, and is committed to having at least threecompeting providers. Indications are that thissharing can be accomplished among the existingapplicants, However, it is less clear how potentialfuture providers will be accommodated in thebands. It is possible that future applicants-bothdomestic and foreign—may have a difficult timeusing spectrum that has already been divided upbetween the three U.S. companies. This is animportant concern in foreign countries consider-ing launching their own systems. The EC’sCommunications Directorate has requested talkswith the United States to discuss its concerns thatthe U.S. systems not become de facto standards/monopolies in the little LEOS bands (see sectionon big LEOS below). The FCC’s negotiatedrulemaking proceeding did not resolve thesequestions, but they are expected to be addressedby the FCC in its upcoming NPRM on the littleLEOS service rules and licensing procedures. Afinal resolution of this issue may have to waituntil systems are operating and real usage andinterference levels can be measured.

International Licensing—The question ofinternational licensing of little LEOS systems iscrucial. Little LEOS providers will have to gainapproval from every country in which they plan tooperate. 113The problem is that satellite footprints

(the areas within which transmissions can bereceived) do not respect national boundaries—transmissions spill over borders, and systems

112 or~omm, for ~xmple, ~epo~S t~t it hm ageements wifi 11 cow~ies and is in negotiation wi~ 11 more to establish its service.

113 Bo~ ~pll~ facilities (gateways) ~d user tem~~s ~] ~ve to ~ lice~edc me way his licenshg is accomplished will depend on ~ch

country’s regulations (and politics), and will have to be negotiated on a country-by-country basis.


cannot just be turned off at the border. In the worstcase, if a country opposes the system, and refusesto license a LEOS system, the little LEOSservices would technically be prohibited fromoperating in that country. For a concept that ispremised on worldwide coverage, a patchwork of‘‘safe’ nations in which the system can operatewould be complex to engineer, and could under-mine the economic viability of the system.Operating a LEOS system in an area such asEurope, for example, which has a number of verysmall countries, may make provision of service tosome countries, but not others, (technically) verydifficult. 114 Only one dissent from a country in astrategic geographic location could effectivelypreclude service for a number of countries.

Foreign countries will have several concernsover the licensing of little LEOS systems, andnegotiations will be complex. Political, technical,and economic issues will all be in play, and theability of the little LEOS providers to convinceforeign countries to license such services willdepend on several factors. First, all countries willwant to protect their existing systems and applica-tions that will be sharing the band with the newlittle LEOS systems. The little LEOS providersmust convince these countries that their proposedsystems either will not cause interference toexisting services or can be engineered to share thespectrum with them.

Secondly, the contractual obligations of thelicensing country and the service provider willhave to be delineated. European nations espe-cially are concerned that little LEOS systems maysiphon use (and hence revenues) away from thepublic telephone network—an important sourceof revenues they want to protect. Many issues willbe considered: Who will build and pay for anyrequired infrastructure in the country, such as a

satellite gateway facility? How will revenuesgenerated by these new services be distributedbetween the companies and the countries in whichthey operate? If a system is offering services in acountry, that country could demand a portion ofthe revenues generated in return for licensing thesystem. If a country maintains a gateway to thesystem, revenue sharing would be easier tomonitor than if a country is served by a gatewayin a neighboring country. Such negotiations willhave to be conducted on a country-by-countrybasis, a process that will be time-consuming andlegally complex.

Finally, on a purely political level, the mannerin which the FCC rules governing such servicesare written (and enforced), the ways the systemsactually operate, and the dictates of the Commu-nications Act of 1934 may have an impact onwhich countries support and license them. If othercountries that may intend on launching their ownlittle LEOS systems perceive that FCC rules arewritten and the initial U.S. little LEOS applicantswill operate in such a way that inhibits other(foreign) systems from sharing the spectrum withthem, those countries may refuse to license theU.S. systems. A potentially more significantproblem has to do with section 310 of theCommunications Act of 1934.115 Under that act,licensing of companies owned or controlled byforeign nationals or governments is severelyrestricted. Other governments may be reluctant togrant U.S. companies licenses to operate in theircountry when foreign companies are not allowedto obtain licenses in the United States. ll6

Markets--The potential market for little LEOS-type services is large. However, several long-termquestions remain that could limit the marketingappeal (and the revenue-producing ability) oflittle LEOS services. First, because of the limita-

114 fiOvld@~~Wtesi@ leve~ fionemm~while sti~respcfig thepowerlfitations in those neighboring countries who have chosen

not to license the service may require painstaking engineering design and coordination.11S 47 u.S.C,A, section 310.

116 ~sprovisionapplies o~y t. theprovisionofcommoncarrier, broadcasting, and some aeronautical services. ~partto avoid ~sproblem,

Starsys has indicated that it will apply to the FCC to be licensed on a non-common carrier basis.


tions on little LEOS operations due to footnote608Z, little LEOS services are not likely tobecome available in those 70+ countries in thenear future. The effect of this footnote mayeliminate Europe as a potential market. Thequestion then becomes: can little LEOS surviveon the markets that are left? The U.S. little LEOSapplicants believe that they can. The size of theremaining markets, however, will determine thatsuccess or failure and as yet, the real demand forLEOS-type services is not well-known.

From a U.S. competitiveness perspective, foot-note 608Z may actually be positive. Because thefootnote made LEOS a secondary service inEurope it also effectively excludes Europeancompanies from launching competitive systems.With only a secondary allocation, it is extremelyunlikely that any European companies wouldbuild (or find support to build) such a system.Even if a system were built, it would likely takemany years of negotiations, and some countriesmight have to renounce footnote 608Z. By thetime this occurred, one or more U.S. systemswould already be operating and would have asubstantial jump on the market and an installedbase of customers and equipment.

The most serious marketing problem for thelittle LEOS will likely be competition from othermobile data service providers. In the UnitedStates, terrestrially-based data communicationsystems, such as Ram Mobile Data, Ardis, andCoveragePlus, as well as private systems, arealready providing mobile data services in mostlarge urban markets. In addition, Qualcomm’sOmniTracs system is already serving the Nation’strucking companies with nationwide positionlocation and data messaging services.117 Theinstalled base of customers and equipment couldmake it difficult for little LEOS to attract suffi-cient customers to be profitable.

In addition to these established companies,little LEOS systems may also face competition

from the proposed big LEOS systems, which planto offer data services in addition to their primaryvoice service. While little LEOS services couldbe less expensive than similar services providedby big LEOS, it is possible that big LEOS will beable to match service prices since the cost ofproviding data services (in addition to their corevoice service) will likely be nominal. Manyconsumers may want (and be willing to pay for)voice services instead of data-only services. Onthe other hand, little LEOS services may under-mine the big LEOS (data and messaging) serv-ices, due to their lower costs and earlier imple-mentation.

The current rush to put little LEOS servicesinto operation represents a desire on the part of theapplicants to get such systems into operation assoon as possible in order to capture the unmetneeds of today’s consumers and businesses. If alarge enough market can be captured initially,before big LEOS come into operation, littleLEOS systems could become and remain profita-ble. However, if their services do not achieveadequate levels of market penetration quickly,and if their costs are too high, little LEOSsurvivability in the face of competition from bigLEOS maybe questionable.

As a result of such pressures, little LEOSsystems may be reduced to serving primarily ruralareas or niche markets with special communicat-ion needs. Services, for example, could eventu-ally be limited to business applications, such asvehicle location and traffic management services,fleet management services for freight companies,and data communication services for servicepersonnel or emergency relief agencies.

Technology and Cost Considerations-Aswith all low-Earth systems, little LEOS satelliteswill have to be constantly replaced as oldersatellites reach the end of their lifetimes (approxi-mately 5 to 7 years).

118 This means that for as long

as the system operates, new satellites will have to

117 “wi~ LEO ~~ation (@m Door to Mobile Data, AVL Competition?” LundMobile Radio News, vol. 47, No. 4, Jan. 22, 1993.

118 NASA hm ~~o ~~~~ tie possibili~ tit exist~g space debris may pose a threat to LEOS syst~.


Figure 2-8-Low-Earth Orbit Satellite System receive poor coverage and the time whencould actually contact a satellite would

This generic low-Earth orbiting satellite system demonstrateshow such systems can achieve near-worldwide coverage. Theactual systems have orbits that differ in altitude, number ofsatellites in orbit, number of orbital planes, and shape of theorbit.SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

be designed, built, and launched on a continuingbasis. Some have likened this to an assembly linefor satellites. As a result of this long-termcommitment, several issues need to be recog-nized. First, the cost of constructing and launch-ing the initial network of satellites is only part ofthe total cost of the system. Because satellites willhave to be constantly replaced, revenues mustalso cover the ongoing costs of design, construc-tion, and launching. These costs must be borne aslong as the system is in operation. Given themarketing questions raised above, this could be achallenge. Second, although little LEOS systemsdo not necessarily need a full network of satellitesto operate, access to services using less than theoptimum number of satellites would be degraded.The system could operate, but some areas might

a userbe re-

duced. If a string of launch failures occurs, anyLEOS system will be in jeopardy.

1 Big LEOS119

BACKGROUNDIn addition to the data and positioning services

being developed by the little LEOS companies,another class of LEOS systems has been proposedthat would provide telephone service almostanywhere in the world. These LEOS systems,which will operate in frequencies above 1 GHz,have been dubbed “big LEOS.” Like the littleLEOS, big LEOS systems will use a network ofmany satellites-from 12 to 66 depending on thetype of orbit—to provide service around the globe(see figure 2-8). These satellites will be larger andmore complex than little LEOS satellites, and, asa result of their added capabilities, will also bemore expensive ($10 to $20 million). On theground, control centers will administer the systemand manage the satellites, and a number ofgateway stations located in different countrieswill be connected to the public telephone network—allowing users to receive calls from and makecalls to anyone with a (regular wired) telephone(see figure 2-9). One advantage of big LEOS overconventional geosynchronous satellite systemsfor phone service is that, because the low-Earthsatellites are much closer to the Earth (generallyless than 1,000 miles compared with more than22,300 miles), they avoid the annoying delay inconversations caused by the long trip the signalshave to make between the Earth and the geosyn-chronous satellite and back.

Big LEOS systems promise to provide voiceand data communications where none exist now(in remote mountains, for example), or in coun-

119 khnicmy, the systems discussed in this section are not all /ow-Earth orbiting systems. TRW’s Odyssey system, fOr e-pie, pl~s touse medium-Earth orbits, and Ellipsat plans elliptical orbits. As a result official government termi.nologyuses the term “non-geosynchronous’when referring to these systems. Because these systems have been colloquially referred to as ‘‘big LEOS” for several yam, OTA will continueto use the term in this section to refer to all proponents for these types of systems.

.

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology 1109

Figure 2-9-Generic Big LEOS System

——1

NOTE: Intersatellite links will be used only by Motorola’s Iridiumsystem.


tries in which the communications infrastructureis not well-developed. These satellite systemswould allow such countries to connect theircitizens with each other and to the outside world,while avoiding the high (often prohibitive) cost ofbuilding a wireline communications infrastruc-ture. Other potential markets for big LEOSservices include international tourists and busi-ness travelers, emergency relief organizations,government agencies, and various internationalassociations,

U.S. PROPOSALSThe big LEOS concept was first formally

proposed after the topics for WARC-92 werefinalized (see table 2-4). As a result, big LEOSwere not specifically included in the WARC-92agenda. However, prior to the conference, U.S.representatives were able to convince other ITUmembers that LEOS systems are only a differentway of providing MSS, and should be consideredas part of the MSS negotiations.

In anticipation of their inclusion in the WARC-92 debate, allocations for big LEOs were consid-

Dual-mode portable telephones, such as this prototypefrom Iridium, will first attempt to connect to a localcellular system. If no system can be accessed, thetelephone will then use the satellite system to completethe call.

ered in the various U.S. domestic preparationsprocesses, and in its final Report on WARC-92proposals, the FCC! identified bands that itrecommended for LEOS use. The FCC proposed:

Upgrading MSS to primary status in 1610-1626.5 MHz (Uplink) and 2483.5-2500 MHz(downlink);Allocating through a footnote the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz band to MSS downlinks on a


Table 2-4-Chronology of Big LEOS Actions

November 1990. . . . . . . . . . . .

December 1990. . . . . . . . . . . .

May 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

June 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

July 1991-February 1992.. . .

February 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . .August 1992. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

January-March 1993. . . . . . . .Summer 1993... . . . . . . . . . . .

Ellipsat Corp. files application to contruct Ellipso I.

Motorola inc. files application to construct Iridium.

TRW, inc. files application to construct Odyessy.

. Constellation Communications, Inc. files application to contruct Aries.● Loral Qualcomm Satellite Services., Inc. files application to construct Globalstar.. Ellipsat Corp. files application to construct Ellipso Il.

Applicants file for Pioneer’s Preference.

WARC-92 adopts allocations for MSS (big LEOS).. FCC declines to grant Pioneer’s Preference to any particular applicant.. FCC grants experimental licenses to Motorola, Inc., Constellation Communica-

tions, Inc., and Ellipsat Corp.. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes allocations for big LEOS services.. FCC releases public notice on negotiated rulemaking for big LEOS.

Big LEOS Advisory Committee deliberations.Planned launch of experimental systems.

■


secondary basis in order to permit bidirec-tional use of the band; 120 andAllocating through a footnote the 1850-1990MHz band to MSS on a primary basis.121

In the initial U.S. proposals to the ITU, theserecommendations were included as part of theMSS proposals, and although LEOS are notspecifically mentioned, the proposals did note theuse of MSS allocations for LEOS services, andU.S. intentions to use the bands for LEOSoperations were made clear to foreign delegatesprior to the conference.

RESULTSU.S. allocation proposals were relatively suc-

cessful, but a number of footnotes limit the powerthe systems can use and prohibit big LEOSsystems from causing interference to (some) otherusers of the band-effectively reducing big LEOSoperations to secondary status in relation to thoseother users. Stringent coordination requirementswere also adopted. These conditions were accept-

able to U.S. big LEOS proponents, but they maybe revisited in the future if they prove toorestrictive. In summary, WARC-92 decided to:

Upgrade MSS (including, but not limited toLEOS) to coprimary status at 1610-1626.5MHz (uplink) and 2483.5-2500 MHz(downlink), subject to the coordination pro-cedures specified in Resolution 46 (seebelow). 122 In order to protect the servicescurrently using the band, WARC-92 setlimits (according to footnote 731X) on thepower the mobile telephones can use. Thisfootnote also prohibits MSS operations frominterfering with aeronautical navigation andfreed services, including the Russian GLO-NASS satellite navigation system (see box2-E). Users of big LEOS mobile telephonescannot interfere with or claim protectionfrom these existing services. This provisioneffectively makes MSS/big LEOS servicessecondary to these other services, even

IXI ~~ ~ropo~~ responds ~w~y to the pl~ Of Iridium to use the hd fOr two-way comm~~tion.

121 In order to prewme flexibility, no direction (I@IIIC or downlink) WM spdkd for h tid.

122 user~d~e~ ~~~g up t. a sateflite c~ot exc~d sp~~lc power levels tit vw &cording to whether Or not the fr~uencies Wfil

be shared with the Russian satellite mvigation system, GLONASS. For signals being transmitted down from LEO satellites, WARC-92 seta ‘‘trigger” level— if the power of the signal exceeds that level, LEOS systems would have to coordinate with existing users. If the signal’spower remains under the limit however, no coordination is required.


—

(Continued on nexf page)

though MSS services technically have a band to be used for bidirectional communi-primary allocation. cation between the users and the satellites.

■ Adopt a secondary allocation for MSS H Elevate the Radio Astronomy Service todownlinks at 1613 .8-1626.5 MHz, subject to primary status in the 1610.6-1613.8 MHzthe conditions of Resolution 46.123 This band.124 In addition to this upgraded status,allocation allows the 1613.8 -1626.5 MHz WARC-92 also modified footnote 733E to

123 poW~~ lfil~~ ~PPIY tO ~~ I (j 138.1626.5 ~ s~ond~ ~location, but LEO systems WI tive (O coordfi[e regardless of power level.

124 In ~ls b~d, aero~utl~al radionavigatio~ radiodetermination-satellite, MSS, ~d radioas~onomy W Ske p- stahlS.


prevent harmful interference to radio astron- WARC-92 also adopted Resolution 46 toomy services from MSS and radiodeter- establish interim procedures for announcing andmination-satellite services. coordinating new non-geostationary satellite sys-

The U.S. proposal for the 1850-1990 MHz terns. Because these systems are still being

band was not accepted. However other additional developed, their technical parameters are not

spectrum was allocated to MSS which could be final, and the methods for sharing spectrum

used for LEOS services (see section on the between new LEOS services and existing (terres-

Mobile-Satellite Service, above). trial and space) services have not yet been


developed. These interim procedures were adoptedto allow the ITU adequate time to study theproblems and develop appropriate sharing cri-teria. In the meantime, LEOS systems can bedeployed, allowing engineers to gain practicalexperience and knowledge about what servicerules and interference criteria will be required toenable systems to share the spectrum. Permanentregulations governing sharing will be adopted bya future conference called for in the resolution.

DISCUSSIONDomestic Background—Ellipsat Corp. and

Motorola, Inc. first formally proposed LEOSsystems providing voice communications in late1990--too late to be included in the formalagenda of WARC-92 (see table 2-4). Shortlythereafter, three additional applicants--Loral Cel-lular Systems Corp., Constellation Communica-tions, Inc., and TRW, Inc.— applied to the FCCto construct other big LEOS systems (see box 2-Ffor a description of the big LEOS applicants andtable 2-5 for a comparison of their systems).125

Despite their lack of formal standing on theWARC-92 agenda, big LEOS quickly becameone of the focal points of U.S. proposals andpreconference negotiations. U.S. companies havehistorically been very strong competitors insatellite communications, and the emergence ofthe big LEOS concept before the conferencepresented the United States with an importantopportunity to extend its lead in satellite technol-ogy and services and shore up its role in mobiletechnology, which many observers believe isslipping given European progress in implement-ing GSM.

Two basic concepts were originally proposedfor big LEOS systems (see figure 2-10). In the

simpler of the two, proposed by all the firmsexcept Motorola, the LEOS would functionprimarily as relays in the sky. A user would placea call through the LEO satellite, which would thentransmit it to the nearest Earth gateway station forconnection through the long distance and locallines of the public telephone system. No switch-ing between satellites would be required.

Motorola’s Iridium system, by contrast, ismuch more complex. It was first designed as asatellite-only system in which a caller would sendhis/her call to the satellite, which would then passit from satellite to satellite until it reached thesatellite closest to the intended recipient of thecall. That satellite would then transmit the call tothe intended person’s portable phone, or relay thecall through the public telephone network via anetwork gateway station.126 Because of the inter-satellite linking and switching that Iridium re-quires, the system requires sophisticated satellitesand software to control it.

In response to concerns by U.S. telephone andcellular providers and criticism from foreigntelephone companies that satellite-only phoneswould bypass foreign telephone systems anddeprive them of valuable telephone revenues, allthe big LEOS proponents began developing“dual-mode” handsets-mobile telephones thatwill be capable of using either cellular or satellitesystems.

127 The phone will frost attempt to con-

nect to a local cellular system. If the user is not inan area with cellular service, or is out of range ofthe nearest system (or if the terrestrial system isbusy), the phone will then connect to the satellitenetwork. Dual-mode handsets will resemble today’sportable cellular telephones, and are expected tocost from $500 to $3,000.

IM AMSC aISO applied to theFcc forperrnission to construct a system using the same bands, and isparticipatingin the negotiated tiemtigregarding big LEOS systems.

124 s~ce its ong~ in~oductio~ Motorola h~ refined ~s concept in response to criticism that such a system would bypass eXiSting

telephone systems, an unacceptable outcome to many foreign (and U. S.) governments and telephone companies. See the discussion of“dual-mode” phones below.

127 Foreig telephone comp~es ~ve some leverage over U.S. comp~es ~ause hey me often own~ by or closely ~iCd With their

governments-who control frequency allocations the U.S. companies need to operate.

114 The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications

Box 2-F-LEOS Systems Using Frequencies Above 1 GHz

The development of a new generation of wireless communications services has been sparked by recent advance in the technology of low-Earth orbiting satellites. In 1990 and 1991, five U.S. firms applied at the FCC to construct LEOS systems. At WARC-92, the internationai telecommunication comrrunity allocated certain sections of the frequency spectrum to be used by LEOS systems worldwide.

These systems plan to offer telephony, data, and poSition determination to a target market that includes cellular telephone users, nations with underdeveloped telecommunication systems, and international travelers, business people, and organizations. Systems will use an integrated combination of LEOS, terrestrial gateway stations, dual-mode handsets and existing cellular systems and the public telephone system to deliver services.1

Although the services they plan to offer are Similar, each of the proposed big LEOS systems are technically different The five U.S. systems currently under development are:

1. Iridium, Iridium Inc.-Originally, Iridium proposed a constellation of n satellites. However, after receiving an FCC experimental license in August 1992 the system has been modified to include only 66 satellites placed in a circular orbit at an altitude of 421.5 nautical miles in 6 polar orbits (11 satellites in each orbital plane). Transmission will be provided through a time division multiple access modulation scheme, and will use the L-band frequencies allocated at WARC-92 for both up- and downlinks. Users will be able to communicate through portable, dual-mode handsets that will either connect to existing cellular service, if available, or through Its unique satellite linking system. The estimated cost for the handset Is $3,000 and $3.00/minute for service use. Company officials expect that Iridium will be fully operational by 1998 at a cost of $3.37 billion, the highest of the five proposed systems.

2. Aries, Constellation Communications, Inc.-Aries plans a worldwide LEOS system that is projected to reach 2.9 million subscribers by the year 1996. It will use a constellation of 48 satellites orbiting at 550 nautical miles, transmitting through a handset that will cost approximately $1,500. Aries has proposed a COMA modulation scheme and will use the L-band frequencies for uplinks and S-band frequencies for downlinks. In August 1992 the FCC awarded Aries an experimental license, and the expected launch date of the first satellite is summer 1993. The total projected operational cost of the Aries system is $292 million.

3. Globalstar, Loral/Qualcomm Satellite Services, Inc.-Globalstar will initially operate with a smaller constellation of 24 satellites for continental U.S. coverage. As international market demands and authority is granted, an additional 24 satellites will be deployed to expand Giobaistar coverage worldwide. Satellites in this system will orbit the Earth at 750 nautical miles. Globalstar has also proposed a COMA modulation scheme and will use the L-band frequencies for uplinks and S-band frequencies for downlinks. Transmission is achieved through the use of two types of relatively inexpensive handsets-single mode or dual mode. Price of the units is expected to be $700 when produced in mass market quantities. Globalstar expects to be fully operational by 1998 at a total cost of $829 million.

4. Ellipso, Ellipsat Corp.-Unlike other big LEOS systems, Ellipso requires a constellation of 24 satellites orbiting in an elliptical pattern, only offering service to the U.S., including Hawaii, Alaska and other U.S. territories. Ellipsat has also proposed a Code Division Multiple Access (COMA) modulation scheme and will use the L-band frequencies for uplinks and S-band frequencies for downlinks. It expects to be partially operational by mid-1994 and fully operational by 1997 at a total cost of approximately $410 million. The Ellipso handset is expected to cost $1,000 for a new unit or $300 for an add-on to an current cellular handset. The estimated service subscription for Ellipso is $.50 per minute.

5. Odyssey, TRW, Inc.-The Odyssey system plans to offer service to North America alone, utilizing a constellation of 12 satellites operating in the L-,S-, and Ka-bands. The satellites will orbit at an altitude of 5,600 nautical miles, substantially higher than the other systems. Some have labeled this a medium-Earth orbiting satellite system (MEOS). User handsets will be dual-mode, and are expected to cost approximately $1,000 once economies of production are reaJized. TRW, Inc. expects Odyssey to be fully operational by mid-1996, at a cost of more than $1.3 billion.

1 Iridium also uses intersatelllte links for transmitting long-distance phone calls. NOTE: In addition to subscriber costs, consumers will pay an additional existing terrestrial service charge when transmitting through those lines. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on information supplied In applications to the Federal Communications

Commission.

Table 2-5—Big LEOS (Low-Earth Orbiting Satellite Systems)

System Holding company Technology partners costOdyssey TRW, Inc. N/A $1.3 billion

Iridium Iridium. Inc., subsidiary of Motorola McDonnell Douglas (launch vehicle); $3.37 billionSatellite Communications. Inc., General Electric Co. (ground stations):subsidiary of Motorola. Inc. Motorola, Inc. (electronics)

Raytheon (antennas)Lockheed (satellites)

Ellipso Ellipsat Corporation, subsidiary of Fairchild Space & Defense Corp. (satellites and $410 millionMobile Communications Holdings. Inc. ground stations)

Israel Aircraft Industries

Aries Constellation Communications. Inc. Defense Systems. Inc. (satellites): $294 millionMicroSat Launch Systems, Inc. (launch vehicle):Pacific Communications Sciences, Inc. (system &

software)

Globalstar Loral Qualcomm Satellite Services, Inc., Loral Aerospace Corp. (space segment): $748 millionsubsidiary of Loral Aerospace Corp. & Qualcomm, Inc. (ground segment)Qualcomm, Inc. (joint venture)

Technology and Service Characteristics of Big LEOS

System No. of Geographic Modulation Handset cost Service Market Operationalsatellites coverage cost estimates date

Odyssey 12 North America CDMA $1,000 N/A N/A Mid-1 996

Iridium 66 Global TDMA/FDMA $2,000-3,000 $3.00 p/rein 6 million 1998

Ellipso 24 U.S. & Territories CDMA $300 (add-on)a $0.60 p/rein 18 million Mid-1994$1,000 (new unit)

Aries 48 Global TDMA/CDMA/FDMA $1,500 N/A 2.9 million 1996

Global star 24 (first generation) U.S. (first generation) CDMA $700 (dual-mode) $0.30 p/rein 3,4 million 199748 (second Global (second $600 (single-mode)

generation) generation)aAdd-on to existing cellular handset.

KEY: CDMA= code division multiple access, FDMA=frequency division multiple access, TDMA=time division multiple access

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on information provided in system applications to the FCC,


Figure 2-10-Satellite-Linked Mobile Phones:Two Approaches

Motorola’s Original Iridium Plan

A fleet of sophisticated satellites in low-Earth orbit pick upmobile phone calls from anywhere on Earth and could relaythem from satellite to satellite, bypassing Iong-distancecompanies. Motorola has had difficulty developing asatellite with all the technical capabilities needed that couldbe launched at a practical cost.

s

Competing Satellite Plans

The satellites’ only role is to link mobile phones to regionalground stations. Calls are switched and routed betweenground stations over Iong-distance phone lines. Far fewersatellites are needed, especially if unpopulated areasand oceans are not covered, and the satellites can be muchsimpler in design.

&2,,,,!.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, based on Motor-ola, Loral, from The New York Times, Aug. 26, 1992, p. D5.

In addition to the differences in basic concept,the Iridium system, which has been the focus-—fairly or unfairly-of most of the press attentionto LEOS, differs in several respects from the otherbig LEOS systems. First, it plans to use manymore satellites. The original Iridium conceptcalled for 77 satellites, but in August 1992, that

number was reduced to 66 as a result of improvem-ents in satellite design. Second, Iridium plans touse time division multiple access (TDMA), atransmission technique that Motorola began de-veloping for future digital cellular telephonesystems, while the other four applicants plan touse code division multiple access (CDMA).Third, the original concept for Iridium envisioneda system that would not use the local telephonesystem or existing cellular networks. Rather, itwould have bypassed terrestrial systems com-pletely unless the number being called was aregular wired telephone (see figure 2-10). Asnoted, Motorola retreated from this bypass-oriented design in the face of harsh criticism fromforeign governments and telephone companies,and is now developing a dual-mode mobiletelephone. Finally, Iridium requires extremelysophisticated satellites that can route calls muchlike the switching centers used for public tele-phone service-making them substantially largerand costlier than the satellites of the otherapplicants. Because of the complexity and cost ofthe system, Iridium’s usage charges are expectedto be much higher per minute than its competitors($3.00/minute as opposed to approximately $0.50,minute). Motorola points out, however, that usersof the other big LEOS systems will have to paylong distance telephone rates in addition to thecharge for using the satellite service, making thetotal cost of a phone call comparable.

In addition to the companies profiled in box2-F, several other firms are planning or would liketo use the big LEOS spectrum. AMSC, forexample, has applied at the FCC to use thefrequencies to support its geostationary system.Inmarsat has announced plans for Project 21, aglobal satellite telecommunications service thatwould provide mobile services to users at sea, inthe air, and on land. Project21 has not been givenfinal approval, but Inmarsat is conducting techni-cal and marketing studies, and has already begunworking with equipment manufacturers to de-


velop specifications for its handheld phones.128

Inmarsat predicts the market for satellite phoneswill reach 2 million by the end of the century, butalso believes that in order to be successful, these(types of) services must serve domestic users—international travelers are not a large enoughmarket to justify the systems. A final decision ofwhether to proceed is expected in July 1993, andtentative plans call for the system to beginoffering services by 1998. In anticipation ofmoving ahead with the project, Inmarsat has filedto use the frequencies allocated at WARC-92 forMSS.129

Finally, Celsat, Inc. proposed to build andoperate a ‘‘Hybrid Personal CommunicationsNetwork” called Celstar that would operate ineither L- or S-band.130 Celstar would combineterrestrial and space technologies into a “super’cellular system that would use two geostationarysatellites and many ground stations to supplyvoice, data, compressed video, and positiondetermination services to as many as 750,000users at a cost of $0.25/minute (for telephoneservice). Costs for satellite construction andlaunch are estimated at $660 million, whilelightweight user handsets will cost $500.131 Planscall for the terrestrial portion of the system tobegin operating by 1993, with the satellitescoming into operation in 1996. Celsat’s petitionto use the L-band frequencies for its system wasdenied by the FCC in August 1992.

In order to speed the development of servicerules and technical parameters for big LEOS

The U.S. Global Positioning System uses a network ofsatellites that allows users (in aircraft, on ships, or invehicles) to determine their location almost anywhereon Earth.

systems and services, the FCC in August 1992asked for comments regarding the formation of anadvisory committee to develop draft proposals forFCC consideration.132 This process was first usedto help the FCC develop the rules arid specifica-tions guiding the development and operation oflittle LEOS systems (see appendix E). The bigLEOS committee began its work in January 1993,and finished in April 1993. The final report of thecommittee will be submitted to the FCC forconsideration as it writes a formal NPRM, whichis expected to be released in May 1993. After the

]2s Llkc tie phones proposed by the U.S. big LEOS applicants, -sat’s ‘dSets ~ nmarsat-P terminals) wiIl be duaI-mode. They areexpected to cost around $1500.

1x) me ~pec~ic ~quencles Me: 1616- 1626.5 M H Z, 2483.5 -25(N MWZ} and 198@20~0 MHz, ~ of which could be ‘Seal by ‘ti

geosynchronous and LEO satellite systems. See also, Ellen Messmer, “INMARSAT Ready to Challenge Iridium+” Network World, Mar. 16,1992, p. 21; “INMARSAT Files for Frequencies Following W-C, Telcom Highlights International, March 25, 1992, p. 17.

IW Celsat ~s filed ~ ~ppllcation at tie FCC for reallocation of ~ese fr~uencies, but no apphcation for atltiofi~ to c0t3StlUct tie SyStem

has yet been filed. See Celsat, Inc., In the Matter of Amendment of Part 25 of the Commission’s Rules for an Allocation of Frequencies undOther Rules for a New Nationwide Hybrid SpacelGround Cellular Network for Person allMobile Communications Services: Petition forRulemaking, before the Federal Communications Cornmissio% RM No. 7927.

131 Renee Saunders, ‘‘Celsat Joins Mobile Satellite Contenders, ” Space News, Feb. 17-23, 1992, p. 4.

132 Federal Communications Commission, “FCC Asks for Comments Regarding the Establishment of an Advisory Committee to NegotiateProposed Regulations, ’ CC Docket No. 92-166, released Aug. 7, 1992.


NPRM process is completed, the FCC hopes thatthe process of licensing providers of big LEOSservice can be completed quickly.

As of April 1993, the big LEOS companieswere in the process of completing design plans,building strategic and manufacturing partner-ships, trying to convince foreign governments ofthe value of big LEOS, and searching outpotential technology partners.

WARC-92 Negotiations-Big LEOS was oneof the most difficult and complex issues debatedat WARC-92. In broad terms, the debate pitted theUnited States and its allies against the Europeansand their supporters. U.S. support for the bigLEOS concept was very strong and obtainingfrequency allocations for these new systems wasthe highest U.S. priority at WARC-92. Manycountries supported the U.S. position, especiallydeveloping countries who had become convincedof the potential benefits such systems couldprovide.

Before WARC-92 opened, U.S. and CEPTpositions on MSS and big LEOS hardened, andpreconference negotiations were unproductive.At the conference, negotiations continued to bedifficult. 133 Both sides tried to find ways totradeoff support for each others’ systems, butsuch compromise was hard to achieve. A deal wasstruck only in the last hours of the conference.

Complicating the U.S. negotiating position onbig LEOS was the support the United States hadgiven to the Global Navigation Satellite System(GNSS) concept. GNSS is an international satel-

lite system concept now being developed toprovide global navigation services to aircraft, andthat is designed to replace a confusing patchworkof different terrestrially-based systems around theworld. The United States, along with ICAO andthe former USSR, has been actively involved inthe development of this concept since the rnid-1980s. Proponents expect that GNSS will use two

satellite systems, the U.S. Global PositioningSystem (GPS) and the Russian GLONASS sys-tem (see box 2-E) to provide precise positiondetermination and other navigation informationto aircraft flying anywhere in the world.l34 Thesystem is expected to increase safety, e.g., pre-venting disasters such as the downing of a Koreanairliner over Russian airspace in 1983, andefficiency, by allowing planes to be spaced closertogether on routes and allowing them to fly themost fuel/time efficient routes.

U.S. support for GNSS/GLONASS dates backto 1987. At the 1987 Mobile Services WARC, theU.S. opposed an L-band allocation for Aeronauti-cal Public Correspondence (APC—see below)because it thought such use would interfere withthe U.S. GPS and thereby threaten the operationof GNSS. At WARC-92, however, the UnitedStates not only supported, but proposed, fre-quency allocations for big LEOS that would usesome of the same frequencies as GLONASS. Thispolicy switch seriously underrnined U.S. supportof the GNSS system in international eyes, and ledmany frustrated domestic and international avia-tion officials to question why the United States

133 Ec ~&=~~.S, fO~ ~~ple, ~fieV~g tit tie CEPT co~~es ~d given up too much on little LEos, pushed @ to hk a bd positionon big LEOS allocations.

134 ~50 ~~ di5cussed i5 a potenti~ EU~p~ sateflite aeromutic~ Mvigation syst~. Emope~ offIciids have reportedly show some

reluctance to use either the U.S. DoD-controlled GPS system or the Russian (Ministry of Defense’s) GLONASS system. “International AirTraffic Control May Go From Radar to GPS,’ Telcom Highlights International, vol. 14, No. 23, June 3, 1992. p. 17.


was willing to jeopardize years of work onGNSS. 135 Big LEOS proponents, on the otherhand, believe that it is possible for both servicesto share the band, and that the U.S. positions werenot mutually exclusive.

Some analysts and delegates believe that U.S.support for commercial big LEOS systems overGLONASS/GNSS at WARC-92 not only dam-aged U.S. integrity internationally-making itharder to “sell’ U.S. positions at future conferences-but may also have set a bad precedent for futureconferences. ITU members may try to reallocatefrequencies used by the U.S. GPS system.

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

LEOS promise universal communications any-where in the world, Brochures touting theseservices and the popular press extol the benefitsto the world community and the technical marvelsthey represent. Such systems are also expected togenerate huge revenues for services providers andequipment makers-estimates easily reach intothe billions of dollars per year. At present, U.S.companies lead the world in the development ofLEOS technology. However, a number of hurdlesremain to be overcome before these services canbe made available to the citizens of the UnitedStates and the world.

International Allocations and Licensing—Inter-nationally, the biggest potential problemfacing the providers of big LEOS services is that

they must obtain licenses in every country inwhich they plan to operate. Although interna-tional allocations for MSS/big LEOS were agreedto at WARC-92, those allocations must now beadopted by individual ITU member countriesbefore the new systems can begin operations.Furthermore, there is no guarantee--even if theinternational allocations are adopted—that for-eign countries will license all or even any of theU.S. companies that have proposed big LEOSservices.

The possible implications of U.S. big LEOSproposals began to draw the attention of foreigntelecommunications regulators and policymakerseven before the end of WARC-92. EuropeanCommunity officials fear that the U.S. licensingprocess “ultimately will become a worldwidemandate, ’ 136 and that U.S.-operated systems willdominate this emerging market-precluding theintroduction of (non-U. S.) competing systems.137

At the conference, the EC Commission delivereda letter to Ambassador Baran, head of the U.S.delegation, requesting talks on the subject afterWARC-92 ended. Informal talks were held in latesummer of 1992, but no formal agreements werereached and no actions were taken as a result ofthe meeting. Among the issues discussed: licens-ing procedures in the United States and Europe,shared use of spectrum by existing and futuresystems, and domestic procedures for intercon-necting satellite networks with the domestic

135 b the domestic p~paration process, U.S. aviation interests opposed MSS/big LEOS allocations that they believed would tieaten

GLONASS/GNSS. They were not successful in having their views accepted, but they received assurances about protecting GLONASS in theFCC’s final Report. The Report stated: “the Commission has been unable to determine the extent of IGLONASS] operations above 1610 MHz.Therefore, we have not been able to assess the potential for interference to GLONASS in the 1610-1626.5 MHz range. However, if it isdetermined that GLONASS is operating extensively above 1610 MHz, the U.S. Delegation will have the flexibility to modify the U.S. proposalto protect GLONASS. ”

The real meaning of those assurances in practice, however, became clouded at WARC-92. It became clear that GLONASS will operate above1610 MHz, and the delegation did negotiate some protections for the system relating to allowable power levels, However, such protection wasinadequate in the view of the domestic aviation community, who continue to feel that the United States was not truly committed to protectingGLONASS at the expense of the commercial big LEOS systems. See Federal Communications Commission “An Lnquiry Relating toPreparation for the International Telecommunication Union World Administrative Radio Conference for DeaIing With Frequency Allocationsin Certain Parts of the Spectrum,” Report, Gen Docket 89-554,6 FCC Rcd 3900 (1991), p. 15.

1~ Daniel Marcus, “EC Fears Prompt Satellite Talks,” Space News, vol. 3, No. 20, May 25-31, 1992, p. 1.

137 me llcemlng of big LEOS is ~que in tie ~s(oq of ~tematioM1 tel~omm~catio~ b~ause, although licenses will be granted by the

FCC (a U.S. regulatory agency), the services these systems will offer will be global in scope-seemingly putting the FCC in the position ofgranting de~acro international licenses.


telephone system in each country. Despite thesetalks, the Europeans generally remain cool toAmerican big LEOS systems. 138 Consequently,

the big LEOS providers are engaged in extensiveefforts to persuade foreign spectrum managersthat their systems pose no threat to establishedservices. Ultimately, the survival of big LEOSsystems will depend on how successfully they canlobby foreign governments.

If some countries decide not to allocate thespectrum agreed to at WARC-92, or not to licensebig LEOS systems—in order to protect existingsystems, for example--it could seriously jeopard-ize the viability of the systems. Big LEOScompanies could be faced with a patchworkservice in which some countries would haveservice and others would not. The customer baseand coverage of the system would be reduced, andthe operator of the system would have to findsome way to actually turn the system off overoffended countries. While it is technically feasi-ble to do this, software solutions will be ex-tremely complex and expensive. In addition,differing amounts of spectrum are allocated indifferent countries, and adequate frequenciesmight not exist in some cases for multiplesystems. Such scenarios may make operating atrue global system technically unrealistic.

Frequency Coordination and Sharing—Spectrum sharing and coordination in the bigLEOS frequencies is expected to be even moredifficult than the problems faced by little LEOS.Because of the limited amount of spectrumallocated to LEOS at WARC-92 and the band-width requirements of the systems themselves,only a limited number of such systems can beaccommodated worldwide, a fact recognized bythe delegates to WARC-92 in Resolution 70.139

This recognition also led the conference to adoptResolution 46, which defines interim coordina-

tion procedures for LEOS and calls for futurestudy by the CCIR.

Domestic Coordination: Frequency sharingand coordination problems faced by big LEOSservices split along two dimensions. First, the fivebig LEOS proponents must find ways to share theallocated spectrum amongst themselves. Giventhe relatively small amount of spectrum allocated,and the relatively large (compared with littleLEOS) bandwidth requirements of voice services,this could prove to be a substantial challenge.Complicating this problem, the big LEOS compa-nies have proposed different transmission modu-lation schemes. Iridium, as noted above, plans touse TDMA, which Motorola is also developingfor digital terrestrial cellular services. The otherfour applicants have proposed to use CDMA toprovide their services. Because these two forms ofmodulation are different, they cannot use thesame frequencies. The negotiated rulemakingproceeding at the FCC attempted to work out acompromise on this issue, but discussions werenot successful. Ultimately, the FCC will have todecide how best to accommodate the needs of allthe applicants. Unless one side or the otherrelents, it must find some way to allow bothCDMA and TDMA transmissions to be used.

A number of commenters have pointed out thatthe ability of the four CDMA systems to shareamongst themselves may also be limited. Limita-tions on power and hence capacity, according toone commenter, are ‘‘certain only to increase theeffective cost per circuit for each system, increasethe ultimate price to the end user, and possiblyjeopardize the viability of one or more of thecompeting applicants. ’ ’140 Perhaps for this rea-son, some analysts have suggested that a consor-tium, like AMSC, may be one alternative toproviding big LEOS services.

In addition, any future big LEOS system willhave to share the bands with the services already

138 “Satel Conseil Examin es WARC Results, Especially LEOS, ’ Mobile Satellite Reports, vol. 6, No. 21, Oct. 12, 1992.139 ITT-J, Fi~/ Acrs, op cit. foomote 27, p. 117.

]40 Cel=t, op. cit., fOOt.nOte 130, P. ‘

Chapter 2--Outcomes and Implications for US. Radio Technology I 121

using the frequencies. Observers have pointed outthat sharing with existing services may be possi-ble or more easy to negotiate if the other servicesare willing to compromise and work with the U.S.big LEOS providers. If such cooperation is notforthcoming, and if their consent to share thebands is not obtained, many believe that, ascurrently designed, big LEOS will not be able toshare spectrum in the short term.141 Over the nextseveral years, as technology is developed to workaround such constraints, big LEOS could comeinto operation, but they would be years late andequipment would likely be much more expensivethan originally planned. Either one of thesepossibilities could conceivably derail these sys-tems.

For example, the bidirectional use of the1613.8 -1626.5 MHz frequency band by Iridiummay cause serious sharing problems. As notedabove, the downlinks that Motorola plans to usefor Iridium were granted only secondary allocat-ions at WARC-92. The CCIR has tentativelyrecommended that systems using these frequen-cies should not cause interference to systemsoperating on a primary basis. ‘‘The recommenda-tion would prevent Iridium-which will have asecondary downlink at 1613.8-1626.5—from in-terfering with other primary and secondary usersin the band. 142 This fact, combined with the highpower levels characterizing Iridium’s TDMAsystem, ‘‘virtually precludes the possibility ofIridium sharing spectrum with any other satellitesystem—U.S, or foreign. ’’143 The CCLR calledfor additional studies to examine the problems.

GLONASS: The most difficult internationalfrequency coordination problem will be with theRussian GLONASS system.

144 Although bothtypes of proposed big LEOS systems may inter-fere with GLONASS, Iridium appears to presentmore severe and difficult sharing problems be-cause of the concentrated signal power of Irid-ium’s TDMA modulation scheme. Motorola hassaid that it cannot share with GLONASS and willseek to operate in frequencies not used by thesystem. ‘‘MSS industry observers saw the limitsimposed on the big LEO allocations as favoringthe four applicants who proposed to operate inseparate uplink and downlink bands, while rais-ing potential problems for the Iridium sys-tem. 1 4 5 The four CDMA companies believe thatthey can share with GLONASS, but there isconcern that with all four systems functioning,interference might become a problem. Theoreti-cally, the CDMA systems could use the entire1610-1626.5 MHz band, while Iridium, whichplans to use TDMA bidirectionally can only usethat portion of the band not used by GLO-NASS. l46

One specific potential problem is the operationof the user terminals in the uplink allocation at1610- 1626.5 MHz. Interference from these porta-ble telephones could be just as serious as interfer-ence from the satellites, and could make coordina-tion of big LEOS systems difficult since theprimary status of the existing services gives themadvantages in negotiations. GLONASS receivers,for example, which are to be mounted on the topof the aircraft, are very sensitive. Although the

141 me baSiS of MS &fief iS we ~x~emely res~ctive ~wer levels (power flUX de~ity (pm) limits) that have b e e n pla~d on LEOS

operations. While current proponents claim that they can share the spectnmL other analysts believe that more sophisticated and expensiveequipment-now just being designed-wdl be necessary.

142 L $CCIR Sees ~oblems Wi& Bi-&ectiO~ @~tiOn of Mdiq” Sate//ite News, VO1. 16, No. 5, Feb. 1, 1993, p. 4.

143 ~ld.

144 BWause tie U.S. GpS system ~~es frequencies ~ a lower fr~uency b~d (1565.1585 ~), it till not h affected by the big LEOS

systems.

145 ( ‘u.S. ‘Big, LitUe LEOS” Get Allocations at W~C. . .,” Te[ecorrununications Reports, Mar. 9, 1992, p. 14.Iti ~t frequencies GLONASS Ml ~c~y & ~s@ when f~ly operatio~ is still not cl-. Shofly &fore WlmC-92, the RussiarIs filed

plans at the ITU to use frequencies up to 1620 MHz, thus leaving Motorola with only 6.5 MHz in which to operate. It is unclear iflridium couldoperate (witb adequate quality and capacity) with this limited amount of spectrum.


receivers would be partially shielded from inter-ference from mobile telephones by the body of theplane, when the aircraft is turning and banking(especially during landing and takeoff), the GLO-NASS receiver could be exposed to interferencefrom nearby user terminals.147 In order to limitinterference from the handsets and protect theexisting services in the band, WARC-92 (foot-note 731X) put restrictions on the transmissionpower from user terminals. Design and imple-mentation of big LEOS systems under theseconstraints will be technically challenging, butshould be possible.

Implementation of big LEOS systems will facetwo critical issues vis-a-vis GLONASS. First,some arrangement must be worked out withGLONASS officials to insure that U.S. big LEOSwill be able to operate effectively across the entirefrequency band allocated at WARC-92. Motorolaofficials have said that they cannot share withGLONASS or GLONASS-M (an expanded ver-sion of GLONASS). This prompted the UnitedStates to oppose attempts to implement GLONASS-M. Alternatively, the frequency allocations andassignments made by the FCC will have to workaround the GLONASS system, Second, the UnitedStates would have to oppose more stringentpower limits than those defined in footnote 73 1X.Because no LEOS systems are operating, it isdifficult to judge the real effects of any potentialinterference they may cause to existing systems.In practice, it is possible that the limits on bigLEOS power set out by WARC-92 are not strictenough—the U.S. delegation was successful innegotiating limits that were at least workable inthe interim. In that case, the members of the ITUmay decide to make the limits more stringent.However, if the power limits are made muchstricter, big LEOS proponents believe that theirsystems may not be able to operate.

Continued U.S. Government support of the bigLEOS concept puts it in a difficult positionregarding the use of the L-band frequencies, TheUnited States now supports two systems/userscompeting for the same frequencies: GLONASS,which is viewed by the Federal Aviation Admini-stration (FAA) as an integral part of the futureglobal navigation system, and big LEOS. At leasttwo related consequences of the U.S. actions atWARC-92 must be considered. First, what, if any,backlash could be taken against the U.S. GPSsystem at future international meetings? Second,from a broader perspective, what effect will bigLEOS systems really have on GLONASS, andwas promoting big LEOS a sufficient reason torisk the future of the GNSS system?

This issue highlights the policymaking gap thatexists in U.S. international radiocommunicationspolicymaking. In this case, powerful commercialinterests with little more than a conceptual planand initial technical designs were able to under-mine an established, U.S. Government (FAA)-sanctioned, civil aviation initiative that is alreadypartially finalized globally and is already operat-ing. No public proceeding assessing the advan-tages of one versus the other was held, and noaccountability for the policy shift has beenassigned. The mechanism by which this decision/shift was made is invisible, and the reasons so farundocumented. 148

Radio Astronomy: Another potentially difficultsharing problem will have to be worked outbetween the big LEOS providers and the world’sradio astronomers. Radio astronomy is nowallocated on a primary basis in the 1610.6- 1613.8MHz band, and is protected from interference bytwo newly modified footnotes (733E and 734).Footnote 733E specifically protects radio astron-omy operations from interference from MSS(including LEOS) systems. Since radio astronomy

147 k ~tewmfig &ta on ~tetierence and sharing, therefore. it is important that these problems be taken irMO account ~d that COmputtimodels do not assume an aircraft flying level.

14S Wtioughsuch ~oficQ policydecisio~ ~eno~y work~ out fi discussio~ wi~ tit? hlteldepaItmeIltm&) AdViSOWCOInmittM

and between NTIA and the FCC, it is not clear to what extent NTIA was aware of the implications of FAA’s support of the GLONASS system.

Chapter 2--0utcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 123

uses extremely sensitive receivers and requiresprecise measurements, almost any interferencecaused to radio astronomy services could beserious. Big LEOS proponents believe that theposition determination capabilities of their sys-tems will be sufficient to protect radio astronomyapplications.

149 The radio astronomy community

generally does not share that confidence.The real issue in this case, however, maybe the

political support enjoyed by each side. Radioastronomers do not have the economic clout ofprivate sector industries, and hence their politicalleverage is limited. In cases where interference isa problem, it is possible that the complaints ofradio astronomers will be accorded less impor-tance than the concerns of commercial ventures.

Market Considerations-Aside from the tech-nical and regulatory questions plaguing the devel-opment of big LEOS, a more fundamental prob-lem has not been adequately addressed. What isthe market for these types of services? Will bigLEOS services be profitable in the long term? Anumber of assumptions underlie predictions aboutbig LEOS services that have not been adequatelyanalyzed. These assumptions need to be exam-ined in order to assess the market potential for bigLEOS services and the viability of such servicesin the long term.

The question of potential market size forsatellite telephony must be put into context—users do not care how their service iS delivered,whether by satellite (LEOS or geosynchronous),cellular, or emerging personal communicationservices. Thus, the critical questions are: What isthe market for mobile services? What othertechnologies will compete? What portion of theoverall market can LEOS services realistically

expect to capture? Inmarsat, for one, estimates theworldwide market for satellite mobile phones willreach 2 million by the year 2000.150 Ear lyestimates put the dollar value of mobile satelliteservices (including both large and small LEOS) at$1 billion by 1995 rising to $9 billion by 2000.151

However, cutting through the hype of promo-tional brochures and presentations on big LEOSservices to realistically assess expectations isdifficult. And while initial projections made bythe companies in their original applications wouldlead one to believe big LEOS will be servingmillions of users in a few years, a number ofdoubts remain, and most analysts question themarket analyses done so far. An examin ation ofthe marketing projections filed with the compa-nies’ initial applications reveal a wide range ofmarket estimates for essentially the same service.

In an ironic twist, the big LEOS proponentsthemselves may have limited their potentialrevenues by promoting a dual-mode approach. Insystems with dual-mode designs, the user’s porta-ble phone will first search the airwaves for a localcellular service, and if no such service is found,the system would then automatically switch to thesatellite system. The problem is that if the phonefinds the local system, as it will most of the timein the United States, Europe, and many otherdeveloped (and some developing) nations, thesatellite system will not be used, and no revenueswill be generated.

A dual-mode approach (using U.S. handsets)could also draw the ire of foreign cellular carrierswho may operate on different frequencies than theUnited States. When the dual-mode phone at-tempts to connect to a cellular system in a foreigncountry, it may not be capable of operating on the

l@ Stice mdio astronomy facilities are usually loeatai in remote parts of the world, fiteIf~enCefiOm usert~ s is expected to be minimal.Some proponents have suggested that since radio astronomy receivers are located at well-known positions, the big LEOS systems could usethe position determination capability built into their systems to actually turn off user terminals that get too close to such facilities. Signals fromthe satellites, however, represent a much more serious problem as they cannot avoid a particular area.

150 ~fI nmarsat Satellite Telephone Venture Launched, ” Telcom Highlights International, vol. 14, No. 43, Oct. 28, 1992.

151 Dam here was reported in ‘‘Mobile Satellite Communications Market to Pass $1 Billion in 1995, ’ Telcom Highlights Infernationu/, Feb.6, 1991. Study was conducted by International Resource Development, Inc., and based on the expectation that services would start in 1994 orearlier,


local frequencies, and would switch to the satel-lite system, bypassing the local cellular carrier.Many types of dual-mode phones may have to beproduced to work in various countries-defeatingone of the purposes of ubiquitous worldwidecoverage.

A similar problem that may decrease thepotential markets for the dual-mode satelliteservices is the potentially divided nature of thefuture installed base of cellular users. Dependingon which service consumers use, they may beserved by either a CDMA or TDMA cellularsystem. This prior use may constrain whichsatellite system a user can subscribe to--TDMAusers would have to use Iridium (and onlyIridium) while CDMA users could choose be-tween the other four (if they all survive), but couldnot use Iridium. In order to promote maximumflexibility, users might have to use a tri-modephone, which is not (yet) being developed.

Thus, the big LEOS service providers could belimited to marketing essentially to areas withoutcellular service. Current populations may not beable to support deployment and continuing opera-tion of a $1 to $4 billion LEOS system. Basingexpensive systems on speculative projectionsseems optimistic at best, and an invitation tofinancial disaster at worst. Compounding theproblem is that there is not one, but potentially sixcompanies vying to offer these services. Clearlynot all are viable or will survive.

International Markets; A significant part of thejustification for big LEOS services is their abilityto serve the communication needs of countrieswith underdeveloped terrestrial communicationssystems. This marketing pitch was used to great

advantage at WARC-92 to build support amongthe developing countries. However, some observ-ers question whether such benefits will actuallyflow to those countries.152 These countries (andtheir citizens) do not have substantial financialresources and the big LEOS equipment andservices are expected to be very expensiveinitially. Motorola’s Iridium phone, for example,is expected to cost $3,000 when introduced,falling to about $1,500 when mass produced. Inthe United States, the average consumer isrelatively affluent, with an average per capitaincome (1988 dollars) of $16,444.153 For much ofthe rest of the world, however, consumers are notso well off. The per capita income in the CentralAfrican Republic, for example, is approximately$376, meaning that the average consumer wouldhave to work 4 years to buy a phone. Even ifnational governments buy the phones, who willpay for the services? At $3.00/minute it wouldtake 17 hours of labor just to make a 1 minutephone call! 154 In any case, these numbers are notwell quantified, and require more analysis beforeforeign market potential can be realisticallyestimated. 155

Basing projected subscribership and/or reve-nues on international travelers is also risky. Suchtravelers are likely to stay in major cities wherethey will have access to local wired infrastructureas well as local cellular providers (assuming theyhave a dual-mode phone capable of working inthe country in which they are traveling)-furthershrinking the potential market for satellite serv-ices. If they cannot use the local cellular provider,they would use the satellite system. However,local or national cellular providers in foreign

~~z Some more c@cal analysE befieve that in fact, the big LEOS providers have little interest in serving developing counties because tieyrealize that profits will be slim at best. Instead, these analysts believe, the applicants will concentrate their development and marketing activitiesin the most industrialized countries. If anything, they believe, users in developed countries will end up subsidizing users in developing countries.From this perspective, advertising the benefits for developing countries is little more than good public relations and a way to win internationalsupport.

153 per ~apl~ &o~e fiWes provided by: ~k S, Hoffman (~.), The Wor/dA/~~c a~Book OfFucfS: 1992 (hiew York: phms Books,

1991).j~ Assumin g that the average consumer in the Central African Republic works 40 hours a week 52 weeks a year.155 Some obsewe~ pr~lct tit rwoveMg any significant revenues fmm tie developing countries may take M long as 10 yMLS.


z r—‘- -:.1 ‘ .- :- ‘- - ‘ - - - ‘ - - - — ‘“-’ ‘ — ” ‘–—~ I ~- -

Analog Earthce I I u la r satel Ii te

Di~ita IPcs

—

—

JJ- ..LL ——~——.. .—countries will strongly object to this form ofbypass, unless a revenue sharing plan is in place.

Finally, counting Europe and Japan as potentialmarkets is risky for two reasons. First, both arealready deploying terrestrial systems that woulddirectly compete with big LEOS services. Sec-ond, licensing big LEOS services in Europe couldbe extremely difficult, as demonstrated by CEPTopposition to U.S. proposals at WARC-92, Euro-pean countries have serious doubts about allow-ing mobile satellite services to share with theirexisting terrestrial (mobile) services, and willlikely take steps to protect and promote theirsystems at the expense of, especially U. S.,competing satellite-based systems.

Envisioning such global systems without Euro-pean connections is even more difficult. Suchsystems may not be able to survive without accessto European markets. Motorola, for example, hassaid that ‘‘we do not see Iridium without Euro-

pean participation,” and, consequently, is busytrying to convince European governments thatIridium poses no threat to their existing orplanned systems, including FPLMTS.156 Thus,talks between EC and U.S. radiocommunicationofficials are crucial to the success of U.S. bigLEOS systems.

Domestic Markets: Leaving aside internationalmarkets, even marketing big LEOS services in theUnited States could be difficult. As noted above,mobile phone users will not care how their serviceis provided—by satellite, cellular, or PCS—andthe mobile phone market may not be big enoughto support many competing technologies andcompanies. Cellular telephony, for example, hasa big head start in coverage and in signing upcustomers. Cellular telephone service is availableto over 80 percent of the U.S. population, andcovers approximately 60 percent of the country(excluding Alaska).157 If big LEOS companiesplan to draw customers away from cellularcompanies they may have a difficult time unlessthey can show that their service is of betterquality, cheaper, or different than cellular. In themeantime, the cellular industry will move aheadwith its own improvements. Coverage will im-prove as more rural cellular systems are built,roaming between cellular areas will becomeeasier, and capacity and quality will improve asdigital cellular systems are implemented.158

Inmarsat: The prospect of Inmarsat enteringthe market for mobile satellite services presentsits own set of problems for U.S. regulators andpolicymakers. Originally, Iridium announced thatit would like to sell satellite capacity to, partnerwith, or complement Inmarsat. Inmarsat, how-ever, seems clearly focused on providing its own

156 Comenw of Mike Pellon, quoted in Andrea.s Evagora, ‘‘CEPT: Radio Interference,’ Communications WeekInternational, July 20,1992,p. 4.

157 miot Hamilton, &onomiSt, &onomic Management Consultants, Inc., personal communication, July N, 1992.

158 M~-aw Cellulti, for exmple, is in tie process of building a nation~de cell~ network ~ough agreements with ]OGd Celhlh OperatOrS

throughout the country.


system in competition with Iridium.159 This poses.

a Policy dilemma for the U.S. Government:should it support Motorola and its $3+ billionsystem, or should it side with Inmarsat, in whichthe United States holds a major interest throughits signatory, Comsat?

This increasingly bitter battle has reached thehighest levels of the U.S. Government, Motorolapoints out, and others agree, that Inmarsat, whichis a consortium primarily funded by government-owned and/or controlled ‘signatories, ’ could useits influence and current position as a supplier ofmobile services worldwide, to politically blockout new, private sector competitors.160 Othersbelieve that the potential entry of Inmarsat intothe MSS business has stifled, and will continue todepress, investment in private satellite systems,as investors wait to see what Inmarsat will do.Even if U.S. systems do begin offering servicesbefore Inmarsat, they believe, Inmarsat may beable to arrange incentives such as tax breaks thatwould give it an unfair global advantage. Thiscould ultimately result in a (worldwide) monop-oly for Inmarsat and high prices and poor qualityfor consumers.l6l This is one reason some observ-ers believe it is important to support AMSC—toprovide competition to Inmarsat.

Currently, the FCC is pushing ahead with bigLEOS licensing in order to help U.S. systemsbecome operational quickly, an important consid-eration from a marketing perspective. Timely

licensing of U.S. systems could provide themwith an important competitive advantage to offsetthe global (political) support that Inmarsat couldmuster. This approach could also allow theUnited States to avoid having to support one sideover the other. U.S. systems could come intooperation first, and then the United States couldsupport the entry of Inmarsat into the business asan enhancement to competition.

Technology Issues-In addition to the ques-tions raised over frequency coordination andsharing, questions have been raised over some ofthe technical details of the individual systems. l62

This section will not analyze the technical feasi-bility of each system in detail since each propo-nent continues to refine their technical plans andmake improvements in their original systemdesign. Instead, it identities broad concerns aboutthe technical details of the systems-issues thatmust be addressed by all proponents to develop aviable system.

One of the most serious concerns facing bigLEOS operators is the limits WARC-92 placed onthe power these systems can use. Because the sys-tems are not yet operational, questions have beenraised about the power requirements and whetherthe satellites will be able to deliver the power need-ed to effectively provide the proposed services.

Related to the question of power, one of themore difficult technical problems involves theability of the systems to penetrate buildings.l63

159 pa~&Mcr)ou@ I nmarsat director of strategic planning, said that ‘they will be fighting for the same customers.’ Quoted in ‘SpecialReport— Satellite Competition Heating up in Europe, Asia, ’ Satellite News, vol. 15, No, 11, MN. 16, 1992, p. 7.

la See, for example, a report prepared for Iridiw Inc. by Nathan Assmiates, kc., “Inmarsat’s Project 21 and U.S. Policy,” June 5, 1992.

161 Ibid.

162 Mime Coqoratiou for e~ple, completed an initial analysis of the technical feasibility of the various LEOS systems based on tickoriginal applications at the FCC. The report notes numerous instances in which proponents’ claims-about satellite coverage areas, weigh~ andsystem communications capabilities cannot be verilled. However, the report also concludes that none of these technical issues seemed“insurmountable.” Mitre does not expect any of the big LEOS systems to be operating before 2000. W.J. Ciesl@ L.M. Gaffney, and N.D.Hulkower, et al, ‘‘An Evacuation of Selected Mobile Sateltite Communications Systems and Their Environment, ’ The Mitre Corp., Bedford,MA, Aprd 1992.

163 ~~ou@ en~eers ~edivid~ on ~s problem, an~~rof is~es ~t rq~e ~erresearchremain to be resolved. One issue involved

is where the testing should actually be conducted. Circular orbital paths converge as they approach the North and South Poles. This means thatthe satellites in those orbits will be closer together, meaning that a satellite is more likely to be closer to the user and more able to give a goodsignal. If testing is conducted in these areas, as opposed to around the equator, results will likely be too positive. Relying on tests conductedonly in the United States or Europe will lead to false assumptions about service availability and quality in other parts of the world.


Unlike cellular telephony, which is terrestrially-based and has radio waves that travel along theground, satellites, which will be flying high abovethe ground, may not have suitable angles forpenetration into buildings. Because of the fre-quencies involved, a clear line-of-sight may beneeded to the satellite, requiring users to either gooutside or stand at a window. The problem iscompounded by the nature of LEOS themselves;they are not stationary with respect to theEarth-the line-of-sight will change as the satel-lite passes through its orbit. Furthermore, as thesatellites travel in their orbits toward the equator,they will spread out; i.e., some areas will befurther from the satellite than those directlybeneath its orbital path.l64 See figure 2-8, forexample. In those far away cases, direct line-of-sight to the satellite may be a necessity for anycommunication. More testing is needed.

Yet another issue, although not strictly techni-cal, is that of replacement satellites. The 5-yearlifespan of the LEO satellites is relatively shortcompared with the 15-year lifespan of mostgeosynchronous satellites, That means that re-placement satellites will have to be built andlaunched continuously as long as the systemoperates. The often-overlooked ongoing nature ofthese enterprises raises two major concerns. First,the costs of the systems as addressed in theirapplications are merely the initial costs of bring-ing the system into operation. The companiesoperating these systems will also incur substantialrecurring costs of maintaining the system—building and launching new satellites.

Second, the ability of the system to operatecontinuously will depend on a continuing supplyof new satellites. If, for any reason, the satellitescannot be built, cannot be launched, or fail inorbit, the system’s reliability and integrity will bejeopardized. Some analysts have suggested that to

meet such launch requirements, a very highlaunch reliability will be necessary, a level that ispresently above current averages. Given thenature of some of the (emergency) servicesexpected to be provided by these systems, such alevel of risk will require careful monitoring bygovernment agencies to ensure continued systemreliability and quality.

Iridium, because of its complexity, posesseveral unique technical questions. Some analystscite a number of technical factors that lead themto believe that Iridium probably will not be viablein the near term. For example, Iridium’s plans callfor satellites to communicate not only with usersand gateways on the ground, but to transfer callsbetween satellites. This additional feature in-creases the complexity and weight of the system,and introduces unique technical challenges forMotorola that do not concern the other propo-nents. First, the satellites are much more complexand difficult (and costly) to build-they will beessentially switching centers in the sky.l65 Sec-ond, the software to control the complex switch-ing (intersatellite links) envisioned in Iridium isa major development challenge.

All the applicants for big LEOS systems will beretuning and improving their system and satellitedesigns until formal rules are adopted and li-censes granted by the FCC. With the recentchanges in its system design, Motorola officialshope to refocus attention on the promise of thesystem rather than its past troubles. Changes inthe system do not necessarily indicate fundamen-tal weaknesses in the technology as much ascontinual improvements in the system design.

As a result of the above concerns, investmentfinancing for big LEOS companies has been veryhard to generate.

166 The worldwide economic

downturn, combined with the regulatory, techni-cal, and market uncertainties associated with the

164 BWau~e of its ~lllptical orbit, Ellipsat has a dfiferent set of conce~ about tie positioning Of itS SatelhteS.

165 me Sate111te5 of ~e o~er system fiction essenti~ly ~ a “~nt Pipe’ ‘--merely ~laying si@s tiat are sent from tie ~o~d. They wdl

encompass few, if any, switching functions.

166< ‘On he Trail of hves[ors: LEOS Face Financial World’s Skeptics, Satellite News, vol. 15, No. 37, Sept. 14, 1992.


systems has reportedly made them a ‘‘hard sell”to the world’s financial community. Time willeventually bring an economic recovery, and timecould be used to improve the systems andservices, but time is also the enemy of emergingsystems. Existing (cellular) systems are expand-ing their coverage and improving their services ata rapid rate, and other new mobile technologiesare also waiting in the regulatory wings.

OTHER U.S. ALLOCATION PROPOSALSTO WARC-92

I Broadcasting-Satellite Service-HDTV

BACKGROUNDHigh-definition television refers to the next

generation of television service that will havehigh resolution (nearly twice that of conventionaltelevision), better color, a wider screen, andcompact disc-quality digital sound. It has beenunder intensive development in the United States,Japan, and Europe for several years.

167 O r i g i

nally, HDTV developers planned to use an analogtransmission format similar to that used bytoday’s television sets. However, the superiorpicture and sound quality of HDTV would requiremuch more bandwidth (and spectrum) to transmitthe HDTV signal. Because these analog HDTVsignals were expected to occupy so much spec-trum, they would not fit into the channels that hadpreviously been defined and planned for satellite

television broadcasting in the 11.7-12.75 GHzband. As a result, new international allocationsfor satellite-delivered HDTV were believed to benecessary. The 1988 WARC on the Use of theGeostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning ofSpace Services Utilizing It (ORB-88) attemptedto allocate frequencies for these new wide-bandtelevision services, but no agreement was reachedand the debate was carried over to WARC-92.

A desire to promote the development of oneworldwide HDTV standard was one of theoriginal forces pushing a worldwide allocation forBSS-HDTV. As countries developed differentsystems, however, and made choices about howHDTV would be delivered, standards began todiverge. Thus, at WARC-92 the rationale for aworldwide allocation, while still powerful, hadlost some of its urgency.

U.S. PROPOSALThe U.S. proposal for BSS-HDTV had two

main components. First, the United States pro-posed that the existing allocations and associatedplans for satellite television broadcasting around12 GHz could serve as the basis for worldwideHDTV allocations.l68 This proposal was based onthe expectation, discussed below, that develop-ments in digital compression would allow HDTVsignals to fit into the existing allocation plans.However, in order to accommodate future growthof the service and specific HDTV station assign-ments that could not be made according to those

16? HDTV WaS ori@nally Conceivedmore than 20 Years ago, but only recently have advances inrnicroelectronics ~d digital Si@prOCeSshgbrought the technology close to commercial applications, For discussion of the historical, technical, and economic implications of HDTV, seeU.S. Congress, Office of lkchnology Assessment, The Big Picture: HDTV and High-Resolution Systems, O’IA-BP-CIT-64 (Washingto~ DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1990).

16s ~ tie ewly 1980S, a sepmate (from HDTV) trend was developing that would directly affect the U.S. WmC-92 proposal. Witi adv~cesin satellite technology and the shrinking of consum er electronics, entrepreneurs began to develop satellite systems they hoped would bring manychannels of television progr amrning directly into consumers homes via small (18 inches) receiving dishes. These services were dubbedDBS-direct broadcast satellite. In order to accommodate these new satellite services, the countries in Region 2 (essentially the WesternHemisphere) agreed in 1983 to allocate frequencies (12.2 -12.7 GHz) and developed a plan to implement DBS services. These allocations W=formally adopted by the ITU at the 1985 WARC on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services UtilizingIt (ORB-85), Genev% 1985. This conference also allocated spectrum to satellite broadcasting services in 11,7 -12.5 GHz in Region 1 md12.2-12.5 GHz in Region 3. Thus, no common worldwide allocation was achieved. Although no DBS systems are yet operating in this country(Europe hm operating DBS systems), several companies continue to pursue the idea of delivering television programming by satellite (seebelow).

Chapter 2-Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology

plans, the United States also proposed to allocatethe 24.65-25.25 GHz band for use by HDTVsatellite broadcasting.

RESULTSThe U.S. proposals did not generate adequate

support, and the United States eventually changedits position in order to support a common Region2 allocation. In fact, WARC-92 delegates wereunable to agree to a single worldwide allocation.Instead, the conference adopted two separateallocations, one (17.3 -17.8 GHz) for Region 2,including the United States, and another (21.4-22.0 GHz) for the rest of the world. Theseallocations cannot come into effect until April 1,2007. In addition to the allocations for BSS-HDTV, allocations were made for frequencies tosupport BSS-HDTV systems. 169 WARC-92 alsoadopted Resolution 524, which calls for a futureconference to consider modernizing the existingsatellite broadcasting plans (originally set out in1977) for Regions 1 and 3 in order to betteraccommodate digital HDTV technology.

DISCUSSIONHDTV was not one of the highest-priority

concerns for the United States at WARC-92. Infact, the U.S. proposal for using the 12 GHz bandsfor HDTV was less a proposal than a position—itrequired no new allocations or regulatory changes.’ 70

Several factors underlie the U.S. position. First,there is little tradition of satellite delivery oftelevision programming in the United States.Despite the 3 million backyard satellite dishesowned by American consumers, direct broadcast-

129

ing by satellite (DBS) has not yet taken hold inthis country. There are currently no DBS servicesin the United States, and the first is not expectedto be operational until late 1993. Europe andJapan, by contrast, have operated DBS services intheir countries for several years, and see HDTV asa natural extension to those systems. Japan, inaddition, has been operating a satellite HDTVchannel on a limited basis for several years. In theUnited States, by contrast, the primary focus forHDTV delivery has been on terrestrial broadcast-ing solutions—in large part a response to thehistorical importance and power of Americanbroadcasters.171 In addition, the U.S. position wasbased on the belief in this country that advancesin digital signal processing would allow HDTVsignals to be transmitted in the narrow channelsthat had previously been defined in the 12 GHzplans, thereby eliminating the need for extensivenew allocations. This belief, in turn, was based onthe continuing development of digital HDTVsystems in the United States.172 U.S. engineersexpect these systems, which take advantage ofadvanced compression techniques, to be able totransmit full HDTV-quality programming in the24 MHz television channels that are now used forconventional television broadcasting.

Engineers in other countries and the CCIRreport on the technical bases for WARC-92 wereless optimistic about the prospects of digitalcompression and of fitting all HDTV channelsinto existing plans, and the United States had adifficult time convincing other countries that suchtechnologies could actually produce the highlevel of quality they believe HDTV viewers will

169 ~ese f ‘f~der N’ Operatiom were allocated frequencies at 18.1 -18.4 GHz (footnote 870A), 24.75-25.25 GHz (the orig~ U.S.proposal for BSS-HDTV, footnote 882Z), and 27.5-30.0 GHz (footnote 882 W).

170 Tacit rew~tion ~d accep~ce were @ven t. use of tie exisfig p~ in Resolution 524, h which JVARC-92 delegates cded for a

reworking of existing plans in Regions 1 and 3 to better utilize modern HDTV technology.171 ~s is ~oversfipMiUtion. ~edelivewof DTV si@s t. thehomecom~erhas &enanintense s~ggle&Weenlocal broadcasters,

cable companies, and DBS service proponents. Each is actively testing HDTV transmission systems, and the FCC is expected to define astandard for HDTV sometime in 1994.

172 ~g~lly, M of the propos~s for U.S. system were analog. The Conversion to digital kg~ with the ~o~~ment bY ‘en=d

Instruments that they would develop an alldigitat HDTV system. All the other remaining proponents quickly followed suit, with the exceptionof Japan’s Muse systerni which eventually withdrew its system from consideration.


demand. 173 As a result, the primary focus of theHDTV debate at WARC-92 centered on where toput the additional bands that countries perceivedwould be needed for HDTV service.

There were initially three proposals for newHDTV frequencies. The United States, supportedinitially by Japan, proposed to allocate the24,65-25.25 GHz band to BSS-HDTV. Many ofthe countries in Region 2 supported an allocationat 17.3 -17.8 GHz, and CEPT, supported byAustralia and the Russian Federation, proposedan allocation at 21.4 -22.0 GHz.

Each of the various proposals had specificadvantages and drawbacks. The U.S. proposalwas unsuccessful largely because other countriesbelieved that the extremely high frequenciesproposed by the United States would take morepower to deliver and consequently systems wouldcost more to build and operate.

174 Despite U.S.

technical papers showing that the costs of thesesystems would not be substantially higher thanthose that would operate in the other proposedbands, by the third week of the conference, theU.S. position had garnered little support intern-ationally, and U.S. delegation leaders decided topursue an alliance with other Region 2 countries,who advocated BSS-HDTV allocations in the17.3 -17.8 GHz band. The 17.3 -17.8 GHz pro-posal suffered primarily from its impacts onexisting services and on plans to use the band insupport of other services in Regions 1 and 3. The21.4-22.0 GHz proposal, by contrast, enjoyedsubstantial international support-CEPT was ableto line up as many as 55 countries to support itsproposal-but was unacceptable to the UnitedStates because those frequencies are used in thiscountry for microwave telephone links. U.S. andother delegates from Region 2 were successful in

preventing the 21.4-22.0 GHz band from beingallocated to BSS-HDTV in the region. If that hadhappened, many U.S. microwave communicationusers would have been forced to relocate to otherbands, costing the industry a great deal of moneyand causing disruptions in domestic point-to-point communications.

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

WARC-92 established relatively long leadtimes (the year 2007) before BSS-HDTV could beimplemented in order to allow existing users ofthe band adequate time to shift their operations toother bands, but perhaps more importantly toallow the technology to more fully develop. Along lead time will allow standards to be devel-oped for HDTV transmission around the world,and will allow engineers and spectrum managersto become more familiar with the operationalcharacteristics of satellite HDTV systems onlynow being designed. Long lead times are notexpected to constrain new HDTV services, sinceexisting BSS bands will likely be used at frost, andit will be some time before demand for HDTVwill require the additional spectrum.

Satellite-delivered HDTV services in the UnitedStates are expected, at least initially, to beprovided using the frequencies outlined in theexisting 12 GHz plans for DBS. As a result, thefuture of satellite HDTV is closely tied to therelative success or failure of current DBS efforts.If the systems now being planned to deliver(standard analog) television programmin g di-rectly to home consumers from satellites do notcome to fruition, or if the services fail to attract asufficient number of subscribers, future plans todeliver HDTV programming by satellite may bereevaluated.

173 ~temtio~ ~l~m~cation Ufion, ~te~tio~ ~dio co~~~tive Committee, CCIR Report: Technical and Operational Bases

for the World Administrative Radio Conference 1992 (W~C-92), March 1991, p. 7-1.174 ~tereS@ly, Some of the E~ope~ ~~tries reporte~y ~d ori@y w~ted to propse these .$~e frequencies, However, @Us~ Of

a compromise agreed to in the CEP’L they decided to support allocations in the 21.4-22.0 GHz band instead. So, despite sympathy for the U.S.positiom CEPT unity prevailed on this issue.


On the other hand, if DBS services “take off,”the delivery of HDTV by satellite becomes muchmore likely. Hughes Communications’ DBS sys-tem, DirecTv, for example, is moving ahead withits plans to deliver television direct to homes.175

The system is expected to begin delivery by early1994, and will use two satellites to carry up to 150channels of programming on 32 transponders.176

Its first satellite is scheduled to launch in Decem-ber 1993, and co-owner United States SatelliteBroadcasting (Hubbard Broadcasting) has al-ready purchased 5 of the satellite’s 16 transpon-ders, with 5 more dedicated to cable programmingfor rural areas. The remaining 6 transponders willbe used by Hughes for DirecTv entertainmentprogramming. 177 Depending on the success of

these services, other providers may decide toenter the DBS/HDTV arena.178 If DBS and initialHDTV services are successful, it is likely that theadditional frequencies allocated by WARC-92 forBSS-HDTV will be used to accommodate (new)providers that cannot be accommodated in thelower bands.179

However, even if DBS does not succeed anddirect-to-home HDTV satellite services nevercome into operation, viewers may still have theopportunity to get such services. Satellites willcontinue to carry video traffic for the majorbroadcast and cable networks, and consumerswho wish to purchase their own ‘‘backyarddishes” (and any descramblers needed) will beable to receive HDTV services just as they receivetelevision service today.

It is too soon to tell how successful DBS andany future HDTV services will be. Some analystsare still skeptical that DBS services (HDTV ornot) will be able to compete against the existingcable television industry. The DBS industry hasbeen trying to get off the ground (figuratively andliterally) for more than a decade now, and DBSefforts in the early and mid- 1980s ended infailure. The success of DBS and, in the longerterm, satellite-delivered HDTV, will depend inpart on the strength of competition from othervideo delivery systems in this country--cable,local broadcasters, multichannel multipoint dis-tribution service (often known as “wirelesscable”), and perhaps new fiber-to-the-home sys-tems supplied by the telephone companies. Withso many choices available to consumers, DBSand HDTV systems may have difficulty gainingenough customers to be viable.

In some cases, these technologies/systems arealready gearing up to provide HDTV services.Cable systems, for example, have been aggres-sively laying fiber optic cables in order to increasetheir capacities—an increase that could be used tocarry HDTV programming. Satellites will, how-ever, have some advantages in the transition fromregular television to HDTV. Compared with localbroadcasters, there will be far fewer equipmentchanges in one or two satellites compared withhundreds of local broadcasting stations.

The regional, as opposed to global, allocationsagreed to by WARC-92 are not expected toconvey any relative advantages or disadvantages

175 Hughes recently signed a $250 million-d~ with the National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative (NRTC), fo~ed in 1986 by ~altelephone and electric companies, who will retait the DireeTv progr amming and sell/lease the receiving equipment. The target market is the12 million households served by NRTC members.

176 ‘‘IS DkecTv Coming Alive at Last?’ Te[com Highlights International, May 6, 1992.

’77 Debra Polsky, ‘‘Hughes DirecTv Deal to Bring Satellite Service to Rural Areas, Space News, vol. 3, No. 16, April 27-May 3, 1992, p,4.

178 ~cre Me n. 1icem~g Iestfictiom mat would prevent DBS provide~ from offering HDTV programming.

179 It could tie Until 2007 for ~ls size de-d to bc built, so tie lead tie a~eed to at WARC-92 may not be w that limiting.


in terms of global competitiveness.l80 In fact, theregional allocations of WARC-92 may serve toconfirm and reinforce the trend toward divergentHDTV standards already being developed aroundthe world. Originally, international spectrummanagers hoped that the establishment of a singleworldwide spectrum allocation for HDTV wouldfacilitate the global deployment of HDTV andpromote the development of one internationalstandard for the production and transmission ofHDTV programming. The establishment of asingle standard, in turn, would have reduced thepotential for interference between systems, andwould mean that only one type of HDTV equip-ment would have to be manufactured, and nocomplicated conversion would be needed to showHDTV programming in different parts of theworld.181 However, technological developmentsin various countries and different choices on howto deliver HDTV programming to consumershave made it almost a certainty that standards willagain be divided, making the establishment of asingle BSS-HDTV frequency band less impor-tant.

1 Terrestrial Aeronautical PublicCorrespondence

BACKGROUNDAeronautical public correspondence (APC)

services allow airline passengers to place tele-phone calls while in flight (phone calls cannot yetbe received by passengers). The systems usetransmitters in aircraft to communicate withreceiving stations at various locations on theground. These ground stations then relay thetelephone calls through the public telephonenetwork to their final destination.

APC services were frost proposed on a globalbasis at the 1987 Mobile WARC (MOB-87). ThatWARC allocated frequencies in the 1.5-1.6 GHzband for APC experiments. However, in theUnited States and many other countries, thesefrequencies are heavily used for other servicesand could not be used for APC. As a result, theUnited States decided to operate APC services inthe 849-851 MHz and 894-896 MHz bands. Anumber of companies in the United States cur-rently provide such services, and several othercountries, including Canada and Mexico, usethese frequencies as well. The North Americansystem is fully operational, and hundreds ofaircraft have been equipped with equipment usingthese frequencies.

U.S. PROPOSAL

The United States proposed that the 849-851MHz (ground-to-air) and 894-896 (air-to-ground)MHz bands be allocated for APC use on aworldwide basis. This proposal was based on theextensive use of these frequencies for APC inNorth America.

RESULTS

The U.S. proposal was not adopted, but theUnited States was successful in protecting itsexisting APC system. A primary worldwideallocation was made to APC at 1670-1675 MHzfor transmissions from ground stations and in1800-1805 MHz for transmissions from aircraft tothe ground. The United States, along with Canadaand Mexico, inserted footnote 700A specifyingthat they would continue to provide APC in the849-851 MHz and 894-896 MHz bands.

180 L&ewl~e, ~yc~~petitive ~dv~~~~ hat wo~d normally convey to he comp~y orco~~ tit develops a smdard f~s~ haS tdSO &n

lost. The world has already been effectively divided into three standards areas by policy decisions in the United States, Japan, and Europe, thateach would have their own standard. Thus, the markets have already been predefine to a targe extent, and the competitive race now has shiftedto individual companies within regions, or in the case of the United States, a country.

181 Television progr arnming is currently produced and transmitted in one of three incompatible formats: NationaI lklevision StandardsCommittee (NTSC), Phase Alternation Line (PAL), and Systeme Electronique Couleur avec Memoire (SECAM), each of which are used bydifferent groups of countries. The U.S. standard is NTSC.

Chapter 2--Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Radio Technology I 133

DISCUSSIONThe APC debate again pitted the United States

against the CEPT countries, which proposed thatthe 1670-1675 MHz and 1800-1805 MHz bandsbe allocated for APC service worldwide. Thechoices facing WARC-92 delegates on this issuewere clear-support either the United States orEurope. No other bands were seriously consid-ered. Although there was important support forthe U.S. position in Region 2—the WesternHemisphere--other countries around the worlddid not back the United States, and the U.S.proposal was ultimately rejected. The CEPTcountries were again able to muster strong inter-nal and external support, and were uncompromis-ing. Their strong position made the U.S. proposaldifficult for other countries to accept.

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONSAs a result of the two sets of frequencies

allocated by WARC-92, aircraft may have tocarry two different kinds of equipment to provideAPC services in different parts of the world.Alternatively, aircraft may have to be outfittedwith new transceivers that operate in both bandsand that presumably would be more expensive.This issue could be revisited at a future worldradiocommunication conference if a dual systemproves technically unworkable or economicallyundesirable.

In the long term, terrestrial APC systems maybe augmented or even superseded by satellitetechnology. For example, Comsat, GTE Airfone,and Northwest Airlines have successfully demon-strated a satellite-based communications systemfor both cockpit and cabin telecommunicationsservices. 182 The system, linked through Inmarsatsatellites and Comsat’s Earth stations, will pro-vide global telephone and other communications

services when aircraft are out of range of GTE’sterrestrial network.

For the United States, the WARC-92 APCallocation could undermine the U.S. advantage interrestrially-based airline communication sys-tems. The United States is currently the worldleader in developing APC services and providingcommunications services for airline passengers.Japan has focused its efforts on delivering suchservices via (Inmarsat) satellite. Until now, Eu-rope has been unable to match the systemsoperating in North America because commonfrequencies to carry such services did not exist.183

The WARC-92 decision essentially levels theAPC playing field-erasing the previous U.S.advantage and starting development of and com-petition for such systems and services back atsquare one. The decision clearly benefits Euro-pean APC interests by allowing them to “catchup” to American developers.

The longer-term implications of the decisionare unclear. U.S. manufacturers of APC equip-ment will either be shut out of world marketsaltogether, or will have to retune production linesto manufacture radios compatible with the newworld frequencies. This could mean producing totwo different frequencies and sets of standards.lw

U.S. equipment makers will have to work hard tomaintain their technical and market lead in APCin the face of divided markets and productioninefficiencies.

I Fixed-Satellite Service at 14.5-14.8 GHz

BACKGROUNDFixed-satellite service (FSS) refers to communi-

cations systems that use satellites to link

182 ‘‘CCJIMSAT, GTE &fOne and Nofiw@ Airlines Successfully Test satellite ComKUuniatiODS, ” TelcomHighlights International, April29, 1992, p. 17.

183 ‘ ‘The Executive OffIce Arrives on Airliners, ’ Telcom Highlights International, vol. 14, No. 20L21, May 20, 1992, p. 23.

184 A ~~ ~~r=omendationprowse~ ~tonly hose phones tit ~mplywi~ Eq~~~~omm~catio~ Smtids hl,?dhlk @’rsI)

standards be allowed to operate in Europe. Evagora, op. cit., footnote 156.


Figure 2-1 l-Data Relay Satellite System—Data relay

satellite

*

~~•

P

\Newer satellites

requlrlng high rate

$

data transmissionuse 14/1 5 GHzspace research

\allocations

Low dat;r a t e s a t e l l i t e suse 2 GHz

Data to Earth and

\

s p a c e r e s e a r c hsatelhte controls use allocations14/1 5 GHz spaceresearch allocahons

// ..7+LEO satellite

I Emergency satellltecontrol uses 2 GHz

~. space research allo-cations

Y’

Earth

White Sands ground termmal

—.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1993.

stationary (fixed) satellite antennas on Earth.185

The FSS is used around the world to providelong-distance communications links for tele-phone conversations, data files, and video pro-

gramming. Currently, international use of the14.5 -14.8 MHz band is limited to transmission ofvideo programming for BSS, and is used exten-sively by Intelsat. In the United States, however,these frequencies are allocated solely for gover-nment use, and are used primarily to supportDepartment of Defense operations. NASA alsouses the band (on a secondary basis) to support itsTracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS),which relay data from remote sensing satellites toEarth (see figure 2-11). WARC-92 consideredreallocating these frequencies in order to correct

shortages in the amount of spectrum available forFSS uplinks relative to downlinks. The shortagewas 500 MHz in Region 2 and 250 MHz inRegions 1 and 3.

U.S. PROPOSALBecause of existing uses in the band 14.5 -14.8

GHz, the United States strongly opposed reallo-cating these frequencies for FSS. The UnitedStates said it would not agree to any licensing offreed-satellite operations in the band, nor toprotect such operations from interference fromother users. As a result, the United States pro-posed that the allocation at 14.5 -14,8 GHz remainunchanged.

RESULTSThe United States was successful in preventing

WARC-92 from reallocating the band. Instead,the conference allocated 250 MHz to FSS uplinksat 13.75 -14.0 GHz. The allocation is coprimarywith radiolocation services, and standard fre-quency and time signal-satellite and space re-search services are secondary. Two footnoteswere added to the allocation. Footnote 855Aspecifies power levels and antenna sizes for Earthstations, and footnote 855B lays out a phase-inschedule for making FSS primary in the band. Inaddition, WARC-92 adopted Resolution 112,which calls on the CCIR to conduct sharingstudies between FSS and the existing services inthe band, and evaluate the impact of the FSS onthese other services.

DISCUSSIONThe U.S. Government had put an absolute

block on these frequencies in order to protectDepartment of Defense systems supporting na-tional security interests. Intelsat, with the backingof many developing countries, strongly supportedthe reallocation, while some European countriessided with the United States in opposition.

185 ~ese Sateui(e antennas are the large dishes famik to most people.


ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONSThe FSS allocation at 13.75-14.00 GHz has

mixed implications for the United States. On thepositive side, government operations at 14.5 -14.8GHz were successfully protected. On the otherhand, the United States must now share 250 (outof 600) MHz of spectrum that had been devotedto active sensors, such as radar altimeters. Theimpacts of this sharing on the existing services inthe band, especially the space services, are notknown, and will be studied as noted above. Someprotections are given to the existing services inthe footnotes adopted by WARC-92. The UnitedStates may revisit this issue at a future conferencein order to allocate additional frequencies forsensor applications or further protect existingservices.

I Space Services

SPACE RESEARCH AND OPERATIONS SERVICESBELOW 2 GHz

Background —The need for communicationsto support space activities by the nations of theworld has grown significantly in recent years.Radio frequencies are used in space to communi-cate with manned spacecraft, to command andcontrol satellites, to relay data from remotesensing satellites to Earth, and to communicatewith astronauts working outside their spacecraft.The United States, for example, uses thesefrequencies during shuttle missions, for supportof the Hubble Space Telescope, and may needthem for future operations of Space StationFreedom.

The frequencies allocated to these communica-tions and support services, like frequencies inmany other bands, have grown increasinglycongested over the years.186 The 2 GHz bands,which were used for both the Apollo and Soyuz

space missions, are becoming especially prone tointerference because of their favorable transmis-sion characteristics and high reliability. In 1979,there were just over 70 assignments for space usesof these frequencies. By 1992, this number hadrisen to over 300 assignments around the world. 187

The most recent and dramatic example of thecongestion now plaguing space communicationswas demonstrated during the rescue of the IntelsatVI satellite by U.S. shuttle astronauts—interference was evident in conversations be-tween the astronauts and their colleagues in theshuttle and on the ground.

U.S. Proposals-The United States had sev-eral proposals for Space Research and SpaceOperations Services in the 400-420 MHz and 2GHz bands. In the band 400.15-401 MHz, theUnited States proposed that a footnote be addedto the Space Research Service specifically allowspace-to-space communication between mannedvehicles in space-in support of docking maneu-vers, for example. In the band 410-420 MHz, theUnited States proposed to add a coprimaryallocation for the Space Research Service to allowcommunications in support of extra-vehicularactivities (EVA)—work performed by astronautswhile they are outside their spacecraft. Theseactivities include such things as maintenance onboth the shuttle and Space Station Freedom andfuture satellite rescues.

The United States proposed to upgrade alloca-tions to the space services to primary status invarious frequencies between 2025 and 2290MHz. Previously, these bands had only beenallocated to the space services through footnotes(747, 748, 750), and were subject to difficultcoordination requirements under Article 14 of theinternational Radio Regulations. The proposed

186 w~c_fj~_gg, for ~=ple, ~ot~ fi Reco~en&tion 716 fie incr~sing use of ~ese bands by tie space research ~d space operation

services, leading to increased coordination difficulties. Recommendation 716 further notes that this congestion may slow the development ofsuch services. Both W= C-ORB-88 and WUC MOB-87 requested that a conference be convened to address these issues.

187 Ro&fl Taylor, spe~~ -gement speci~l~t, National Aeronautics ad Space Adminis@atioL persoti communicatio~ July 10,

1992.

136 I The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy implications

upgraded allocations (which would eliminateArticle 14 coordination requirements) included188:

2025-2110 MHz to space research, spaceoperation, and Earth exploration-satellite(uplink and space-to-space) services;2110-2120 MHz to space research service(uplink for deep space activities-defined asdistances greater than 2 million kilometersfrom the Earth); and2200-2290 MHz to space research, spaceoperation, and Earth exploration-satellite(downlinks and space-to-space) services.

Results-U.S. proposals were generally suc-cessful. In the band 400.15-401 MHz, the re-quested footnote was added to the primary spaceresearch allocation enabling these frequencies tobe used for space-to-space communications. Thesefrequencies will be shared among a number ofservices, including downlinks for little LEOSservices. Spectrum was also allocated to theSpace Research Service at 410-420 MHz, but ona secondary basis. It is likely that the UnitedStates will seek to have this allocation upgradedat a future conference, once interference andsharing concerns with terrestrial users are re-solved.

In the 2 GHz bands, all U.S. proposals wereaccepted by the conference. However, a footnotewas added to the bands 2025-2110 MHz and2200-2290 MHz to protect communications be-tween geostationary and non-geostationary satel-lites. WARC-92 also adopted Resolution 211,which calls for additional study of sharing be-tween the space services and mobile services (seebelow) and Resolution 710, which calls for afuture conference to consider upgrading the statusof the Meteorological-Satellite and Earth Exploration-Satellite Services (401-403 MHz) to coprimarystatus.

Discussion and Implications-In years past,some ITU members had opposed the upgrading ofthe space services, primarily because of thepossible interference they could cause to existingfreed and mobile systems. Observers note severalreasons for the change at WARC-92. First, thespace services had been operating in these bandsunder their footnote allocations for many years.Experience had shown that sharing with the freedand mobile services could be accomplished, atleast for some mobile services (see below).Second, the various space agencies of the worldhad been working on these issues before theagenda for WARC-92 was even set, and hadalready reached a tacit agreement in the SpaceFrequency Coordination Group (SFCG), com-posed of space agencies from around the world.That agreement was translated back to membergovernments and was used to build support forU.S. space proposals at WARC-92. As a result, ahigh degree of coordination and cooperationexisted between SFCG members prior to WARC-92, making the negotiations for space servicesallocations at the conference relatively easy.Interestingly, CEPT was an important element ofthis process, since Germany, France, and theEuropean Space Agency are all members of theSFCG.189 The successful negotiation and resolu-tion of the space issues serves as a counterpoint tothe difficulties the United States had with theCEPT bloc in other areas, and indicates that theUnited States and Europe may be able to worktogether in the future.

Sharing between mobile services and the newlyupgraded space services will be a subject ofcontinuing study and experience. Sharing diffi-culties may limit the number and/or kinds ofmobile services that can operate in the bands.Proponents of the mobile services point out thatsharing has been demonstrated over time. How-ever, this sharing has generally only been with

168 WI ~ese Wocations wollld be on a coprimaxy basis and would share with terrestrial freed and mobile WVkes.

IS9 ~ of Novem& 1992, he membem of the SF(2G included: Argentin~ Aust.dh, Austi, Bel@W Brazil, c~~, c~~ EufoP~Space Agency, France, Germany, Indi4 Italy, Japq Netherlands, Russia, SpaiLL Swedeq United Kingdon and the United States.


“low-density mobile systems, ” such as elec-tronic newsgathering (ENG) services. Resolution211 notes that the introduction of conventionallandmobile systems, such as cellular/PCS/FPLMTS-type services, would cause “unacceptable inter-ference to the space services,” and calls for theCCIR to continue its studies of protection for thespace services from mobile services.l90 It alsosuggests that future limits on mobile systems maybe needed to permit the services to continue toshare the bands. This would clearly constrain thetypes of mobile services that could use the band,Until the CCIR finishes its studies, the resolutionrecommends that only “low-density mobile sys-tems,” be permitted-no conventional land mo-bile services such as cellular phone service orPCS/FPLMTS.191 Resolution 211 also calls for afuture conference to define the conditions forsharing between mobile and space services.

U.S. space service proponents won what theyperceive to be an important battle against theincreasing number of mobile services in the 1-3GHz band. With their new status, and the newlimits proposed in Resolution 211, the spaceservices seem well-positioned to continue andexpand their use of these 2 GHz bands. The limitsproposed on mobile services, on the other hand,should not greatly affect future U.S. interestssince the FCC’s emerging technologies proceed-ing does not include these bands. The impacts arelikely to be greater in Europe, with their increas-ing push for terrestrial mobile systems (althoughthis will not affect FPLMTS, since it is notidentified for use in 2025-2110 MHz or 2200-2290 MHz). The new allocations may also help tosolidify the status ENG operators, of which theUnited States has many, since they apparently canshare with the space services, and future competi-tion from other mobile systems will be limited.

SPACE SERVICES ABOVE 20 GHzBackground—As the bands around 2 GHz

become increasingly crowded, space operationsand services have had to look for additionalspectrum at higher frequencies. Congestion in the2 GHz bands is exacerbated by the ever-increasing bandwidth requirements of NASA’sspace operations, especially data collection fromremote sensing satellites. For example, althoughNASA currently uses the 14 GHz bands for datarelays, it is already considering higher bands(around 23/26 GHz) to serve future generations ofsatellites.

U.S. Proposals and Results--The UnitedStates had a number of proposals regardingvarious satellite-related and space services above20 GHz. These are summarized below.

Inter-Satellite Links: The United States pro-posed to allocate the 21.7-22 GHz band to supportlinks between satellites of the various mobilesatellite services. These frequencies, for example,could be used to provide communications be-tween satellites as envisioned in Motorola’sIridium system. The United States also proposeda primary allocation in the 25.25-27.50 GHz bandfor wideband space-to-space links to supportspace research and Earth exploration-satelliteapplications. These links would be used totransmit data, including high-resolution video,from low orbiting spacecraft such as the UnitedStates space shuttle or Space Station Freedom togeostationary data relay satellites, including theU.S. TDRS.192 The existing intersatellite serviceallocation would be used for TDRS-to-user linksin the 22.55-23.55 GHz band based on theavailability of bandwidth and the feasibility of

I$Q IT(J, FiM/ Acts, Resolution COM4L2, op. cit., footnote 27, p. 81.

191 KS ad ~L~S, however, are not ~rrently proposed for use in these bands.

192 Fou ~RS systems me now being develop~.by me United S@tes, tie E~ope~ Space Agency, Jap~ and tie co~onwealt.h Of

Independent States. The United States system is the only one operational at this time, serving approximately 100 satellites.


sharing, See figure 2-11.193 In addition, thesewideband space-to-space links could be used toprovide communications between Space StationFreedom and a variety of space vehicles flyingnear it.194

The U.S. proposal for 21.7 -22.0 GHz was notaccepted. However, an equivalent amount ofspectrum (300 MHz) was allocated at 24.45-24.75 GHz for intersatellite service. For thewideband satellite links at 22.55-23.00, the BSSallocation was deleted to make more room forfuture intersatellite links. The U.S. proposal for aprimary allocation at 25.25-27.50 GHz was ac-cepted.

Space Research Service Requirements: Tosupport domestic and international space researchefforts, the United States proposed two newallocations. The first proposal was for coprimaryallocations at 37-38 GHz (downlink) that wouldsupport space research activities such as VeryLong Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) by satel-lite,195 which requires wide bandwidths to senddata. In addition, the 37-37.5 GHz (downlink)would also be used in conjunction with 39.5 -40.5GHz (uplink) to provide communications with aplanned station on the Moon and the mission toMars in the 21st century. Because of the intenseuse of data communication these efforts willrequire, wideband radio links will be needed.

There are no frequency bands allocated in theRadio Regulations that could be used for widebandwidth links between the Earth and the Moonand between the Earth and Mars. Use of the same

band for both sets of links is desirable because itwould permit use of common equipment, ..196

The United States also proposed a worldwideupgrade for the Space Research Service (for deepspace research-such as the Voyager and Vikinginterplanetary missions) to coprimary status at31.8 -32.3 GHz (downlink) and 34.2-34.7 (uplink)to support increasing space activities in thesebands. Currently, these bands are allocated to theSpace Research Service worldwide, but only on asecondary basis, and not for deep space research.The United States, however, and 10 other coun-tries had different allocations.197 This disparitycreated a situation that the United States believedthreatens future deep space research missions ata time when the trend toward internationalcooperative missions for deep space explorationcreates the need for increasing unity andcooperation.

There is a serious potential for interference tonational and international deep space missionsbecause the current allocations allow uplinks anddownlinks for space research conducted by Earthorbiters to use the same bands as deep space links.These links are not compatible because of thewidely different transmission [power] and re-ceived signal strengths, 198

The U.S. proposal for space research (VLBI)and communication downlinks (for a lunar col-ony) at 37-38 GHz was accepted, but WARC-92allocated only half the proposed amount for theuplink frequencies--4O-4O.5 GHz. Although thiscreates an imbalance in the frequencies available

193 CWent~RS ~te~tes use ls.4_lQ.OG& forsenfig the&@ fmm tie DRS sate~te to tieground station at white S~ds, New Mexico.

These space research frequencies, however, are only secondary (to radiolocation services). The next generation of sateUites, however, will usegovernment frequencies in the 20.2 -21.2 GHz band.

lx pofio~ of tiese frequencies may also be used to co remand and control remote robots working on the space stationj and retrieving remotescientific modules that would be in orbit near the space station.

195 ~1 refers t. mewwements ~de us~g SateUites tit emble scientis~ @ ~~k geodetic movemen~ on [email protected] md provide information

on the changes caused by earthquakes.

lx U.S. Dep~ent of State, u.S. Proposals, op. Cit., fOOt.130te 5.

197 See foo~otes 8$)() and 891 of the ITU, Rudio Regulations, op. cit., fOOtOOte 19.

1% u.S. Dep~ent of State, U.S. Proposa/s, Op. Cit., fOO@Ote 5.


for uplinks and downlinks, the needs outlinedabove should be satisfied.

The U.S. proposal for deep space downlinks at31.8 -32.3 GHz was accepted, but an existingfootnote (893) designed to protect the navigationsystems in the band could limit some uses.Sharing and interference criteria will have to beworked out on a case-by-case basis. The U.S.proposal for deep space uplinks at 34.2 -34.7 GHzwas accepted. Additional allocations were madeto the space research service (downlinks) on asecondary basis in the band 74-84 GHz.

General-Satellite Service: The United Statesproposed a new service, the General-SatelliteService (GSS) that would have operated at19.7 -20,2 GHz (downlinks) and 29.5 -30.0 GHz(uplinks), and would have replaced current pri-mary fixed-satellite and secondary mobile-satellite service allocations in those frequencybands. This proposal was based on efforts nowunderway in the United States to develop andimplement communications satellites integratinga wide variety of capabilities on a single, flexible-use satellite. These include fixed, mobile, andpoint-to-multipoint applications. The U.S. (Gov-ernment and industry) position is that suchflexibility is needed in order to better match futuresatellite capacity with future satellite communicat-ion needs.

The concept of a General-Satellite Service wasnot adopted by WARC-92. The United States didwin a minor victory by having MSS upgraded tocoprimary status in 19.7 -20.1 GHz, but only inRegion 2 (see figure 2-12). MSS was also madecoprimary worldwide at 20.1 -20.2 GHz. Simi-larly, MSS was upgraded to primary status in29.5 -29.9 in Region 2 and worldwide only at29.9-20.0. However, a number of footnotes willaffect the use of these bands. First, existingfootnote 873 allocates these same bands to theterrestrial fixed and mobile services on a primarybasis for large sections of Africa, the Middle Eastand Asia. Five new footnotes describe variouslimitations and conditions that MSS networksmust meet to operate in the bands, including

Figure 2-12—U.S. Proposal forGeneral-Satellite Service

Down links19.7 -20.2

Worldwide

Previous

!.

Fixed-Satelliteallocations Mobile-Satelllte

Worldwidet 1

Us.proposal I

General-Satellite IL— I

I

WARC-92a Region 1 Region 2 Region 3outcome Fixed-Satellite Fixed-Satellite Fixed-Satellite

19.7 -20.1 Mobile-Satellite Mobile-satellite Mobile Satellite

20,1 -20.2 LFixed-Satellite Mobile-Satellite

I

Uplinks19.7 -20.2

Worldwidem 1

Previous Fixed-Satelliteallocations Mob@ Satellite I

—.—.-~

vWorldwide

pro~a-____ General-Satellite.J

v

WARC-92a’b Region 1 Region 2 Region 3outcome Fixed-Satellite Fixed-Satellite Fixed-Satellite

29.5 -29.9 Mobile-Satellite Mobile-Satellite Mobile-Satellite

29.9 -30.0 !--- —–Fixed-satellite Mobile-Satellite I

a A number of footnotes further define the uses of these bands.b This band is also allocated to the Earth Exploration-satellite Service

on a secondary basis.

NOTE: Radio services in all capital letters are allocated on a primarybasis. All others are secondary.


coordination requirements relating to the coun-tries in footnote 873. WARC-92 also adoptedRecommendation 719 that calls for studies to beconducted on the technical and sharing character-istics of ‘multiservice’ satellite networks.


In line with the decisions of WARC-92, theFCC has adopted an NPRM to upgrade MSS tocoprimary status in the 19.7 -20.2 GHz and29.5 -30.0 GHz bands. The notice responds to aJuly 1990 proposal by Norris Satellite Communi-cations to establish a general satellite service toprovide fixed, broadcast, mobile, and personalcommunications services in the Ka-band. Whilethe upgrade to MSS will enable Norris to operatemany services, broadcast services are still notallowed. The FCC hopes that broadcasting exper-iments in the 20/30 GHz range as part of NASA’sAdvanced Communications Technology Satellite(ACTS—scheduled for a 1993 launch) will an-swer sharing and interference questions regardingshared use of the band by broadcasting and othersatellite services. Depending on the success orfailure of the ACTS experiments and Norris’efforts, the United States may pursue a GSSdefinition and allocation at future world radio-communication conferences.

Earth Exploration-Satellite; Earth Exploration-Satellite Services (EESS) are being increasinglyused by the United States to obtain higher qualitydata about the Earth and regions of the atmos-phere that are not available through the use ofother frequencies. To avoid the potential of futureinterference to these activities, the United Statesproposed a primary allocation for EESS (passive)allocations at 60.7 -60.8 GHz and 156-158 GHz.199

However, because of domestic coordination andpreparation problems, the 60 GHz proposal waswithdrawn.

The 156-158 GHz proposal was accepted.Other EESS allocations made at WARC-92include secondary allocations at 25.5-27 GHz

(downlink-to be shared with the intersatellitelinks noted above), 28.5 -30.0 GHz (uplink-limited to data transfer), and 37.5 -40.5 GHz(downlink-shared with a variety of services).200 Anumber of footnotes, however, which relate to theoperation of the FSS in the 28.5 -30.0 GHz bandwill affect EESS operations, and may constrainfuture development of EESS services in thatband.201 Sharing and coordination arrangementswill have to be developed for all these allocations.

Radiolocation-Satellite Service: The UnitedStates proposed to define a new space service, theRadiolocation-Satellite Service, and to provide aprimary allocation for this service in the band24.55-24.65 GHz. This new definition and alloca-tion will provide for satellite-based locationservices to a variety of users.

The U.S. definition was adopted, but theproposed allocation was made in a slightly higherband-24.65-24.75 GHz, and only for Region 2.

Discussion—The U.S. proposals for spaceservices were the most successful proposals theUnited States made at WARC-92. Much of thesuccess of these proposals has been attributed tothe work done prior to WARC-92 in the SFCG.As noted, this group provides a forum withinwhich the space agencies of the world can discusstheir spectrum needs and identify future spectrumrequirements. This mechanism makes it mucheasier to precoordinate frequency allocations forspace services and applications at internationalconferences such as WARC-92. The group alsoprovides a mechanism for space agencies to buildsupport for their proposals and generate cross-support among different nations.

199 The use of ~ese bands for this type of data collection is “ptiSive,’ meaning that radio waves being reeeived by the satellite are merelymeasured and recorded for analysis. “Active” data collection on the other hand, is accomplished by a satellite sending out signals (such asradar) to a particular target (layers of the atmosphere, the Earth itself) and analyzing the signal when it returns.

~ A p- ~Wation was alSO made to EESS at 040.5 G*.

201 some of~ese foo~otes were props~ by tie United S@tes to provide up~power ~nbol systems tit will & re@redto enhance FSS

performance. Currently, the 27.5-29.5 GHz band is allocated to the FSS for uplink use only. A downlink signal is required to provide adequateinformation to control system perfo rmance. To aceommo&te a dowrdink transmission to support these power control systems, the United Statesproposed to add a footnote to permit the use of downlink beacon operations within the 27.5 -29.5 GHz band. This proposal was accepted, butwas further refined and divided into footnotes 882A and 882B.


The problems with GSS were slightly differentand more political in nature. The Europeans sawno need for the new service, maintaining thatexisting allocations provide adequate flexibil-ity.

202 This view is similar to the European views

on and opposition to the generic MSS allocationproposed by the United States. This recurringsplit may indicate either a deeper philosophicalopposition to more generic, vague service alloca-tions, or it may simply indicate a fear of,generic-type services on the part of the Europe-ans. 203

Depending on the actual reason for this opposi-tion, two factors may influence the success offuture U.S. GSS (and generic MSS) proposals.First, the European preference for more stratifiedallocations may come from a stronger belief inplanning and/or that more specific allocations areeasier to use. The United States, on the otherhand, generally has rejected a priori spectrumplanning, preferring to let market forces dictatespectrum uses. Second, and perhaps more likely,economic advantage may be the driving forcebehind European opposition. It appears the UnitedStates has a slight technological lead in MSS andadvanced space applications, and the Europeans

may believe that GSS systems will give theUnited States a greater advantage in buildingsystems and providing services in these new, andas yet undefined, allocations.204

Implications—The space communications al-locations made at WARC-92 represent some ofthe United States’ more clear-cut successes atWARC-92. The United States got most of theallocations it wanted in this area (with theexception of GSS), and seems well-positioned tomove ahead with plans for future space missionsand activities.

The implications for future GSS-type servicesare less clear. Proponents maintain that theallocations made will allow services very similarto what a GSS would have allowed-permittingde facto GSS systems to operate. This belief isprobably overoptimistic. The various footnotesand political opposition associated with the so-called GSS bands will make establishment of aGSS-type service complex. The successful devel-opment of such systems by the United States orothers will depend on how much the politicalopposition fades and the manner in which sharingarrangements are resolved. Systems will developas negotiations allow.

202 Repofie~y, ~ awcmen[ t. Supwfi some me of multiuse satellite concept was worked Out behvmn rePresen@ves of ~eufited ‘tates

and CEPT. EC observers, however, apparently feeling that Europe had been too willing to compromise on other issues, decreed that nocompromise on GSS would be acceptable. Consequently, the Heads of the European Delegations opposed the U.S. proposal.

203 It is ~tems(~g t. note, howevm, tit he E~ope~s did suppofi ~L~s, a Concept tit is as poorly defined as GSS or generic mobile.

204 on tie o~er ~d, when tie Europeans have tie perceived adv~~ge, as hey do ~ ten~~~ mobile systems, for eMmple, tie tables

turn--the vagueness and flexibility (of FPLMTS) become acceptable to them but not to the United States.

NextSteps and

Lessonsfor

the Future 3

wARC-92 set the stage for the development of radiocom-munication technologies and services for the nextdecade or more. Future world radiocommunicationconferences will build on the agreements of WMC-

92 in an attempt to bring high-quality communication services topeople all around the world. In order to ensure the most effectiveparticipation of the United States at these future conferences,U.S. spectrum managers and policymakers must understand thecontext within which international decisions will be made, andthe U.S. agencies primarily responsible for conference prepara-tions and negotiations must adapt their cultures and structures tothis new environment. The first test of the government’s and theprivate sector’s understanding of this new context will come inthe implementation of WARC-92 decisions and their prepara-tions for the next world radiocommunication conference to beheld in the fall of 1993.

The consequences of ineffective U.S. participation in interna-tional telecommunications negotiations and rulemaking could besignificant. The rules and regulations set at international fora, r rand U.S. responses to them, will substantially influence thedevelopment of new communications services and how well U.S.companies can compete in radiocommunication services and -equipment worldwide. Economic, technical, and political factorsmust be integrated into a focused, long-term strategy for meeting l== ,..

~ \U.S. radiocommunication needs. The lessons of WARC-92 can .1contribute to the realization of such a policy and strategy ,- ~ ‘yframework, and will enhance the effectiveness of future U.S. ~delegations and improve chances for U.S. “success” at future ~world radiocommunication conferences. /AK A

143


INTERNATIONAL ISSUES INWARC-92 IMPLEMENTATION

WARC-92 represented neithernor the end of work for spectrumentrepreneurs worldwide. Rather,

the beginningmanagers andit marked the

end of one phase and the beginning of another.With WARC-92 agreements finalized, membercountries of the International TelecommunicationUnion (ITU) must now decide individually howto implement the allocations agreed to at WARC-92+1

1 Foreign Allocations and LicensingLike the United States, most countries usually

accept the bulk of the international allocationsand incorporate them into their domestic fre-quency tables. However, also like the UnitedStates, individual countries will exercise theirright to adapt or ignore allocations they believeare not in their best interests or that will interferewith their existing uses of the spectrum. Becauseradiocommunication systems must be licensed ineach country in which they plan to operate, asingle country’s refusal to license a service (orallocate spectrum for it) could jeopardize systemsthat are regional or global in nature, such as somebroadcasting and mobile satellite services. At theleast, one country’s refusal (out of several coun-tries in a given geographic area) to allocate aservice or license a particular system will posesubstantial engineering challenges. Service toneighboring countries, who have accepted theallocation and licensed the service provider,could be adversely affected.

Given the opposition expressed at WARC-92toward some services, international acceptance ofsome proposed systems and services is still indoubt. At the conference, many countries, includ-ing the United States, indicated through footnotesto the allocation table that some services (using

specific frequencies) would not be permitted tooperate within their borders, or could not operateuntil after a specified date. The United States, forexample, prohibited Broadcasting-Satellite Service-Sound (BSS-Sound) services from using L-bandallocations in this country. Since Canada andMexico have indicated that they will both usethese frequencies, and since those uses will likelyinterfere with U.S. telemetry operations, coordi-nation will be necessary in North America.

I Sharing and CoordinationThe development of sharing and coordination

arrangements among new systems and betweenincumbent and new users of the spectrum willchallenge U.S. Government and private sectornegotiators. Other countries will try to protecttheir existing services and gain advantages inservice, price, or technical sharing arrangements.As noted in chapter 1, footnotes to the interna-tional Table of Frequency Allocations in somecases limit how, when, and where a service can beoffered. For example, 75 countries joined to-gether in a footnote that limits the operation oflow-Earth orbiting satellites (LEOS) in the 148-149.9 MHz band to secondary status (see chapter2). This could constrain or preclude operation ofLEOS services in those countries. In addition,limits on power, such as those imposed on LEOSsystems operating above 1 GHz (big LEOS), mayalso make coordination of new services difficult.Because the systems are not yet operational, thepower requirements and characteristics of thesenew services are not yet known, and the limitsagreed to at WARC-92 may not be practical.Negotiating the technical details that will allowdifferent services to share frequencies will becontentious, as shown by the debate in the UnitedStates over the provision of big and little LEOSservices (see chapter 2).

1 The agreements reached at WARC-92 will enter into force on Oct. 12, 1993, unless otherwise noted in the text of the Final Acts ofWARC-92.

Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future 1145

I Trends Affecting InternationalImplementation

In addition to the themes discussed in chapter1, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)has previously identified several broader trendsthat are shaping the evolution of world radiocom-munication technology, services, and policy.2

These include: rapid technological advances,globalization of systems and services, increasingregionalism, privatization and deregulation, andshifting geopolitical power centers and alliances.Each of these trends will affect how WARC-92decisions are implemented.

RADIO TECHNOLOGY IS ADVANCING RAPIDLYThe rapid development of new radio technolo-

gies and services have serious consequences forthe implementation of WARC-92 allocations andregulatory decisions. First, the rapid changes andadvances in technology make setting rules andstandards for radiocommunications systems in-creasingly difficult. The decisions made at WUC-92 were necessarily made on the basis of today’stechnology, but some of these decisions will notcome into full force for 10 to 15 years. During thattime, the technical bases for the decisions or thetechnical parameters agreed to at WARC-92 arecertain to change and become outmoded.

In an era where the product cycles for electron-ics are measured in months, not years, a rapid andflexible approach to standards-setting and manu-facturing is vital to domestic and internationaleconomies, As rules and regulations continue tobe negotiated both domestically and internatio-nally, it will be important to not lock in technologysolutions and systems that may be quickly super-

seded. Enough flexibility in the rules must beassured so that technology can continue to grow.A flexible approach will be extremely beneficialto U.S. companies-enabling them to take advan-tage of their radiocommunication expertise andresearch and development (R&D) strengths toquickly bring new technologies and services tomarket throughout the world. The United Statesexplicitly recognized the benefits of such anapproach in its proposals for generic Mobile-Satellite Service (MSS) and General-SatelliteService (GSS).

GLOBALIZATION OF RADIOCOMMUNICATION

As the world becomes increasingly reliant oninformation services to sustain economic growthand productivity, the importance of global tele-communication systems increases. Companiesseek to be more closely connected with custom-ers, suppliers, and partners around the world.Individuals increasingly depend on and expectreliable communications wherever they are. Tele-communication systems serving these needs mustbe global in scope. The LEOS systems now beingdeveloped by the United States and other coun-tries are designed to meet such needs.

The trend toward globalism was not well-served by WARC-92. At the conference, coun-tries and groups of countries doggedly fought tohave their own positions advanced and their ownservices protected, despite the almost universalrecognition that global allocations would betterpromote the development of new services andreap higher economic benefits for all.3 Compro-mise on many of the issues facing WARC-92delegates was notoriously difficult, and countries

2 U.S. Congress, Office of Technolgy Assessment The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. InternationalSpectrum Policy, OTA-BP-TCI’-76 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1991), hereafter, 4 ‘OTA, WMC-92.’ Thegovernment of Canada cited many of the same factors as the driving forces behind its recent reassessment of Canadian spectrum policy. SeeCanadA Depmment of Communication, A Spectrum Policy Framework for Canada, Cat. No. Co 22-120/1992 (Minister of Supply andServices, September 1992).

3 The benefits of a single worldwide allocation for any new service, leading to a single standard would provide economies of scale formanufacturers, allowing equipment prices to be lower, It is possible that the txnefits of this situation may unevenly benefit the countries ofthe world—all countries and consumers would benefit from lower prices, but the other benefits (increased revenues and profits) tomanufacturers would accrue only to those developed countries actually making the equipment.


did not hesitate to insert country-specific foot-notes that either exempted them from specificdecisions or made unilateral decisions to promotetheir own national interests.

In large part, the blows to worldwide alloca-tions were spurred by the increasing importanceof regional ties in world affairs. In Europe, forexample, the convergence of economic interestsand the emergence of a unified approach toeconomic policy has made the European countriesmuch more active in promoting their economicself-interest, especially in telecommunications. Inorder to protect their existing radiocommunicationservices and advance European technology world-wide, the Europeans have taken a strong stancepromoting uniquely European proposals and re-quirements. They are no longer quite so willing tofollow the American lead in technology, prefer-ring instead to stake out their own g-round.

Similar alliances, formal or more informal,exist in many other regions of the world as well,including southeast Asia, and, to a lesser extent,Latin America and Africa. As a result, instead ofglobal allocations, WARC-92 adopted differingregional allocations for many important servicesincluding BSS-Sound and high-definition televi-sion, MSS, and aeronautical public correspon-dence. Such divisions may make future negotia-tions more difficult, and global allocations harderto achieve.

PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION

Reflecting the new connection of economicsand telecommunications, perhaps the most im-portant trend influencing the future of worldradiocommunications is the increasing privatiza-tion of telecommunication services coupled withthe increasing liberalization of markets and de-regulation of telecommunication and radio-communication industries. In the past, and tosome extent, the present, one of the largestimpediments to expanding the U.S. telecommuni-cations presence abroad has been the monopolies

and monopoly relations maintained by the govern-ment-controlled post, telegraph, and telephoneadministration (PTTs) around the world. As thesole supplier of telecommunications services andbuyer of telecommunications hardware, thesegovernment institutions wielded tremendous eco-nomic and political power-power that was oftenused in concert with other foreign governmentpolicies to exclude U.S. companies from freelycompeting in many countries.

In recent years, however, in response to intenseglobal competition in telecommunication equip-ment and services and user complaints about highcosts and poor service, many countries haveattempted to replace their traditional governmenttelecommunication monopolies with more ag-gressive privately-owned companies and liberal-ized rules on provision of services and equipment.These trends represent a tremendous opportunityfor U.S. companies to expand their markets andsales overseas. Combined with the increasingglobalization of telecommunication services notedabove, U.S. companies now have an opportunityto compete in countries they previously wereexcluded from.

The effects of liberalization and privatizationalso have led to a number of new players in worldradiocommunications, and U.S. companies seek-ing to deploy their new WARC-approved serviceswill face a different world than only a few yearsago. Instead of one government ministry to dealwith, U.S. companies may now be faced with agovernment ministry, a private national telecom-munications company, and a plethora of competi-tors. Both potential support and opposition willbe more diffuse, forcing American interests to bequicker to recognize potential allies and moreagile in forming alliances with foreign nationalcompanies or even other foreign competitors-atrend already evident in the bidding for someforeign telephone system contracts. The implica-tions of this trend are discussed in more detailbelow.

Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 147

THE FUTURE OF THE ITU ANDSPECTRUM POLICYMAKING

Another important factor affecting the imple-mentation of WARC-92 agreements will bechanges in the structure and functioning of theITU. In June 1991, the Administrative Council ofthe ITU endorsed the recommendations of a HighLevel Committee (HLC) that had been estab-lished to examine the procedures and institutionalstructure of the ITU and recommend changes thatwould allow the organization to more effectivelycarry out its responsibilities.4 As a result of theHLC deliberations, the Council called for aspecial Additional Plenipotentiary Conference(APP) to be held in December 1992 that wouldconsider the recommendations outlined by theHLC. The Council also established a “DraftingGroup’ of experts from various ITU membergovernments to develop revisions to the ITU’sConstitution and Convention based on the HLCrecommendations.5 This Drafting Group, whichthe United States participated in, finished draftingthe revised text in March 1992, and the APP tookplace as scheduled over the last weeks of 1992.The United States generally supported the changesrecommended by the HLC, since it participatedactively in the work of the HLC and the formulat-ion of the recommendations contained in thefinal report.

In order to prepare for the APP, the StateDepartment’s Bureau of International Communi-cations and Information Policy (CIP) formed atask force in December 1991 to develop U.S.positions and propose changes and/or modifica-tions to the HLC recommendations. The meetingsof this task force were held under the auspices ofthe national International Radio Consultative

Committee (CCIR)/International Telegraph andTelephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) com-mittees, the activities of which are also coordi-nated by the State Department. More than 60representatives of the private sector and of thevarious Federal agencies involved in interna-tional spectrum matters participated in the workof this group. The task force submitted its finalreport in early December 1992, but has recentlybeen reconvened to address how the United Statesshould respond to the changes made at the APP.6

The APP adopted changes in three broad areasthat will significantly influence the conduct offuture ITU activities and world radiocommunica-tion conferences.7 First, ITU members adopted anew institutional structure that is intended tostreamline decisionmaking and that gives greateremphasis to development efforts (see figure 3-l).Second, the APP laid the groundwork for expand-ing the role of the private sector in ITU activities,although many of the specifics of their participa-tion in the new ITU remain to be worked out.Finally, the APP adopted a 2-year schedule forfuture WARCS, which have now been renamed‘ ‘world radiocommunication conferences.These new conferences will combine the tradi-tional functions of WARCS for frequency alloca-tion and revisions to the international radioregulations, with the functions of the CCIR’sPlenary Assembly, which will form a separatepart of the conference.

The most important, and potentially disruptive,of these changes is the conversion to a regular2-year cycle of conferences. Because of theoverlap in planning and preparation cycles, the2-year schedule means that ITU members will be

d For further discussion of the HLC, see OTA, W~C-92, op. cit., footnote 2.5 The proposed changes are being made to the ITU Constitution and Convention as approved by the 1989 Nice (France) Plenipotentiary

Conference. However, this Constitution/Convention has not yet entered into force and ITU is still technically guided by the Nairobi Conventionof 1982.

6 See ‘ ‘Final Report of the CCI’IT and CCIR Joint Task Force, ’ submitted to Ambassador Bradley P. Holmes, U.S. Coordinator andDirector, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Communications and Information Policy, Dec. 4, 1992.

7 For tie comp]ete text of tie APP decisions, see International Telecommunication UniorL Final Acts of the Additional plenipotentiary

Conference (Geneva, Dec. 22, 1992).


Figure 3-l—New Structure of the International Telecommunication UnionRecommended by the High Level Committee

I

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preparing for conferences constantly. In fact, eachcountry will be preparing proposals for a confer-ence at the same time that it is beginning planningfor the following conference.

This change has important implications forhow the United States prepares for future confer-ences. First, the 2-year schedule presents anopportunity for the United States to rationalize itsbudget and personnel approaches to world radio-communication conference preparation. For those

, IStrategicPolicy and

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Federal agencies and private companies involvedin the planning and preparation for these confer-ences, a 2-year cycle will put an enormous burdenon both personnel and funding resources.8 In thepast, few, if any, resources were devoted exclu-sively to WARC preparations on an ongoingbasis. In most cases, staff assigned to work onWARC preparations had other responsibilitiesthat shared time and attention with WARC. Suchan arrangement, while not necessarily ideal, was

s It should also be noted that few companies will have interests in each and every W.4RC that is held. Depending on the agenda for eachconference, private sector interests will change, as will the relative participation of the various Federal Government agencies.


justifiable based on the sporadic nature of theWARCS, their varying agendas, and tight budg-ets. In the future, however, conference prepara-tion and planning will require full-time attentionon the part of all involved, but especially theFederal Communications Commission (FCC),National Telecommunication and InformationAdministration (NTIA), and the State Depart-ment. Adequate staff must be assigned to work onthese issues, and enough finding must be securedto assure that these staff can do their jobs. Inparticular, enough money must be budgeted fortravel and international bilateral/multilateral ne-gotiations that lay the crucial groundwork fornegotiating success.

The scheduling of regular conferences mayalso provide benefits in the U.S. radiocommuni-cation policy process. Because of the continuousnature of the preparations, this schedule mayforce the United States to look forward morepurposefully and identify longer-term require-ments for domestic radio technologies and serv-ices. This, in turn, may also force the UnitedStates to develop more explicit strategies forpursuing these new goals, and could result in thedevelopment of a broader framework for identify-ing needs, prioritizing goals, and conductingnegotiations—providing much-needed focus tothe overall U.S. spectrum planning and manage-ment process.

It is too soon to assess the full range of impactsof ITU restructuring. The immediate changes inthe structure of ITU will be dramatic, but thelonger-term impacts on the mission, and theeffectiveness of ITU in the face of new technolo-gies, new players, and an increasingly privatizedworld are likely to be more subtle. As a result,U.S. policy toward ITU and its various organs andconferences is entering a period in which U.S.policymakers must be especially sensitive to thechanges in the international telecommunicationand radiocommunication arenas. Government poli-cymakers and private sector representatives must

continue to look ahead and share information witheach other in order to best promote the competi-tive interests of the United States.

DOMESTIC CONTEXT FORWARC-92 IMPLEMENTATION

The decisions made at WARC-92 will beimplemented in a domestic context that is com-plex and contentious. Radiocommunication poli-cymaking is a world of dealing, bargaining andnegotiating, and as in any politically chargedforum, deals can fall apart and on occasion aresabotaged. The domestic battles now beingfought over WARC-92 spectrum allocations andservice rules are characteristic of strategies oftenused ‘‘inside the Beltway’ ‘—maligning the char-acter of the competition, disputing every claim,relying on assumptions and half-truths, manipu-lating the media and Congress.

United States preparations for WARC-92 wereconcentrated in the FCC, NTIA and the StateDepartment. The functions, processes, and issuesinvolved in this 3-way division of responsibilityhave been previously discussed.9 This sectionwill examine the roles these agencies play in theimplementation of the decisions made at WARC-92 and the larger role they play in developing U.S.radiocommunication policy.

E Federal Government Agency RolesIn the United States, responsibility for imple-

menting the decisions of WARC-92 will bedivided between the FCC and NTIA (see figure3-2). The FCC is implementing decisions thataffect the private sector and nonfederal use of thespectrum, while NTIA is implementing the deci-sions that affect Federal Government use of radiofrequencies. Together, the two agencies mustwork out the necessary arrangements in thoseareas of the spectrum where Federal Governmentand private sector users must share radio frequen-cies. The State Department provides input to the

9 OTA, WMC-92, op. cit., footnote 2.


Figure 3-2-Steps in the Federal Government’s Preparation for, andImplementation of, WARC-92 Agreements

II

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Chapter 3-Next Steps and Lessons for the Future ! 151

FCC and NTIA in matters with important intern-ational repercussions. In almost every case, thebattle over access to the newly allocated frequen-cies is fierce, and U.S. spectrum managers facemany difficult choices in reconciling new inter-ests with existing users and in choosing betweencompeting systems promising similar services.

In the past, the FCC and NTIA had longer timesto work out the details of implementation. Thedecisions of WARC-92, however, are beingimplemented more quickly for a number ofreasons. First, as noted below, the FCC had anumber of proceedings dealing with WARC-92already in progress. Folding the agreementsreached at WARC-92 into these proceedings canbe done quickly. Second, the private sector ispushing for rapid action on these proposals,fearing that foreign and domestic competitorsmay enter the race now that allocations have beenestablished. They also want to begin offeringservices and start revenue flowing as quickly aspossible. l0 The result is that many highly visibleissues, such as personal communications service(PCS), big and little LEOS, and BSS-Sound arealready being considered by the FCC.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONImplementation Issues

The FCC is the focus of much of the work nowbeing done in the United States to implement thedecisions made at WARC-92. In the past, the FCCusually initiated a single comprehensive proceed-ing to implement WARC decisions. In the case ofWARC-92, however, the FCC already had severalongoing proceedings (begun prior to WARC-92)dealing with specific items that also appeared onthe WARC-92 agenda.11 Because of the impor-tant economic and competitive issues involved in

several of these items, especially LEOS, the FCCis acting quickly to resolve those issues first, andholding less contentious issues for later action.These existing proceedings will provide the basicframework for FCC implementation of the W~C-92 agreements. Observers expect that the remain-der of the allocations and implementation issues,including HF broadcasting, HDTV, and aeronau-tical public correspondence, will be dealt withinone comprehensive proceeding. It will take sev-eral years for the FCC to adapt the WARC-92decisions and allocations to fit national needs.

This incremental approach has both benefitsand drawbacks. By considering a number ofissues separately, the process may become frag-mented at a time when a cohesive approach isneeded. In many cases the frequencies to beconsidered in different proceedings overlap, butthe services vying for the same bands might notbe compatible. Many services, for example, arecurrently competing for frequencies in the 2 GHzband, including the existing users of the band(utilities, public safety agencies, and telephonecompanies), PCS, new space communicationservices (the responsibility of NTIA) and MSS.12

It is not clear how these different proceedings willrelate to each other. On the other hand, gover-nment officials point out that by separating theissues in this way, no one issue can hold up theconsideration of the others. With the complexvariety of issues decided by WARC-92, and thecontentious nature of some of the issues, separat-ing the items may be a better solution.

Challenges for the FutureThe FCC, however, faces a number of prob-

lems that could hinder its ability to quickly andeffectively implement WARC-92 decisions and

10 Fears of Comytition me often just~led. Inrna.rsa6 for example, immediately after WARC-92 concluded, aUnOUUCti its titention to use

some of the new frequencies for future LEOS aftd/or geosynchronous satellite services.11 ~e~e prW~~gs include props~ for emerging technologies, Personal commtimtiorIs services, littte MOS, big ~OS, and

BSS-Sound.

12 smc~lc~ly, theb~ds kvolv~ Me lg5(J-’20lcl MHz, 21 1(L2140MHz, and 2160-2200 W, which all overlap to varyi% degr~s between

the FCC’s Emerging Technologies proposal (for PCS), MSS allocations made at WARC-92, and the bands made available for Future PublicLand Mobile Telecommunication Systems at WARC-92. See figure 2-4 in chapter 2.

330-071 0 - 93 - 6 QL 3


that could undermine its long-term ability toeffectively regulate the Nation’s airwaves. Firstand foremost, the FCC has been put in theposition of trying to do too much with too fewresources. Funding at the FCC continues to sufferfrom past battles that took place between theagency and the Congress as a result of differencesinvolving philosophy, approach, and specificFCC actions. As a result of chronically lowfunding levels, the FCC has weathered a siege ofhiring freezes and staff shortages. Delays inbeginning the negotiated rulemaking that will setregulations for the delivery of big LEOS services,for example, were attributed to staff shortages atthe FCC. Had the agency’s responsibilities re-mained static, these staff shortages might havebeen more easily dealt with, but they came at atime when the regulatory burden on the FCC wasincreasing. New radio technologies and servicesare being rapidly introduced, and the passage ofthe Cable Television Consumer Protection andCompetition Act of 1992 has put even morepressure on the FCC’s resources. 13

As a result, the FCC’s ability to effectivelyfulfill its mandate is hampered. By and large, theFCC can handle the day-to-day activities ofregulating the Nation’s telecommunications is-sues, albeit sometimes very slowly. However,lack of staff and funding constrain the Commis-sion’s ability to look forward and aggressivelyplan for the next generation of telecommunicationservices. “The handful of engineers and othertechnical specialists on [the FCC’s] staff lack theresources to become deeply involved in techno-logical planning and evaluation. Technologyissues are taken over by parties battling foradvantages in the marketplace, and the FCC just

barely manages to referee these disputes.”14

brig-term planning is almost nonexistent inmany areas, and in radiocommunications espe-cially, the FCC has failed to develop a long-termstrategy for managing the boom in wirelesscommunications services. In short, the FCC hasbecome primarily a reactive agency, with littleability to look forward.15

The second major constraint on FCC action isthe litigious nature of American society. Almostevery decision the FCC renders is challenged incourt and often appealed numerous times. It is asad fact that FCC decisions are often written withthe expectation that they will end up in litiga-tion. l6 While acknowledging the importance ofoverturning improper decisions, the consequencesof this are to siphon staff time and resources awayfrom aggressive (new) policymaking to defendpast actions. Court battles also delay the introduc-tion of new services for the American consumer,and cause uncertainty for equipment manufactur-ers and service providers alike. In an attempt tohead off potential lawsuits in the implementationof WARC-92 decisions regarding big and littleLEOS, the FCC used negotiated rulemakings thatbrought together all interested parties to work outacceptable compromises that could be writteninto FCC rules and regulations (see appendix E).This approach shows promise in some cases (likelittle LEOS), but its success in resolving morecomplicated and controversial issues has yet to beproven.

Options for Improving the FCC’s PerformanceIn light of current Federal budget realities,

Congress has several options to improve thefunctioning of the FCC. First, require structural

13 fibfic hw 102-385, Oct. 5, 1992.

14 W. Page Montgomery, ‘‘1992 at the FCC: The Year of the Paradox,’ Business Communications Review, vol. 22, No. 3, March 1992, pp.32-33.

15 KC stfi often exp~ heir lack of anticipatory action by claiming that there is nothing they can do until someone or some companyformally petitions the FCC for action.

lb R~enfly, tie FCC hm attempted to find alternatives to it procedures that would reduCe the CkCeS fOr litigation ~d Str-e theregulatory process. See box 2-B.


and/or procedural changes that would concentratemore resources on international radiocommuni-cation issues. For example, more focused andcoherent international radiocommunication poli-cymaking might be promoted through the crea-tion of a formal or informal internal policydevelopment group.

17 Given cur-rent staffing short-ages and increasing responsibilities, this optionmay be of limited effectiveness without addi-tional funds. Increases in the number and types ofradiocommunication services and the FCC’s newrole in regulating cable television will continue topress FCC staff and resources.

Second, increase funding for the FCC. Thismoney could either be targeted for internationalradiocommunications or come in the form of anacross-the-board increase in the FCC’s appropria-tion. Additional funding would allow the FCC tohire more engineering and legal staff to betterhandle an already large workload. More staffwould also make it possible to redeploy staffresources to concentrate on international matters-those with international experience would be ableto focus their attention on international matters.Increased funding would also allow FCC staff toparticipate more effectively in bilateral and multi-lateral meetings held in foreign countries-acrucial consideration when preparing for aninternational meeting such as a WARC.

Such increases could be provided for bychanging the way the FCC is funded. Proposalshave been advanced in the past that would allowthe FCC to fund its operations, at least partially,through fees that it would charge radio licensees,or from the money to be raised by spectrumauctions. The added revenues produced in thismanner could contribute a significant amount ofmoney to the FCC’s operations.l8 A combination

of appropriated funds and fee-based funds couldimprove the FCC’s performance, while keepingpresent funding levels and congressional over-sight intact.

However, simply “throwing” money at theFCC will not solve its problems. Rather it wouldbe a first step in a long-term campaign to boost theagency’s efficiency and policymaking abilities.Just as crucial is the attention given to theimportance of international issues at high levels,a more coherent focus for international radiopolicymaking, and a more forward-thinking andaggressive approach to policy. Successful poli-cymaking at the FCC will result from a combina-tion of changes/improvements in structure, fund-ing, and philosophy. Setting specific goals forfuture policy development and reorganization ofthe FCC, perhaps through legislation, and closelymonitoring progress toward those goals will benecessary to achieve better policymaking results.

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANDINFORMATION ADMINISTRATIONImplementation Issues

NTIA, like the FCC, is now developing proce-dures for implementing the decisions made atWARC-92, especially as they affect governmentradiocommunication services such as space re-search and operations. NTIA will coordinate itsefforts closely with the FCC because many of thefrequency bands allocated at WARC-92 are usedby both private sector and government systems.NTIA's efforts, however, are not as visible as theFCC’s, because most of the high-profile systemsand services are those to be provided by theprivate sector, and hence are regulated by theFCC.

NTIA’s efforts to implement WARC-92 agree-ments will be influenced by two separate, but

i T AS OTA noted k tie pas~ FCC hte~tio~ staff are spread throughout various bureaus and divisions. B@ing M t.heSe exP@ togetiain one formal office would be almost impossible, given internal FCC pohtics. For this reaso~ a formal group could be convened that allowedstaff to retain their current positions.

18 For emple, tie con~essio~ Budget oftlce estimates that spectrum auctioning of licenses for consumer land-mobile cO~tiCatiOnservices could generate between $1.3 and $5.7 billion over 3 years. U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Auctioning Radio SpecrrumLicenses, March 1992.


hopefully complementary, activities. The primaryfocus for NTIA’s activities will be the Interde-partment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC),which has retained Ad Hoc 206, its forum forWARC-92 preparations, and changed its terms ofreference to include implementation of WARC-92 allocations and decisions.l9 In this processNTIA will coordinate its implementation andspectrum management activities with the FCCthrough both informal staff contacts and theformal participation of the FCC as a liaison toIRAC. In addition to the specific implementationissues to be worked out in Ad Hoc 206, NTIA hasalso launched a Notice of Inquiry dealing withfuture U.S. spectrum requirements, including theimplications of WARC-92.20 Presumably, thework of IRAC will inform this proceeding andvice versa. The outcome of this inquiry will be areport on national spectrum requirements andtechnology trends affecting long-range planningfor new radio services.

Challenges for the FutureThe dual role played by NTIA in the domestic

radiocommunication policy Process creates asignificant problem in developing domestic andinternational radiocommunication policy. On onehand, NTIA is the executive branch advisor to thepresident on telecommunications policy. In thiscapacity, it should weigh all sides of the issuesand present reasoned recommendations to thepresident. However, NTIA is also charged withthe responsibility of managing the Federal Gov-ernment’s use of the spectrum. In this mission, itpromotes the interests of the Federal Governmentspectrum users-a mission that often conflicts

with its other mandate of providing roundedadvice on telecommunications policy. In the pastNTIA has seemingly put more weight on thegovernment side of the equation. However, withthe increased activism of the agency in the lastseveral years, it has become more sensitive to theneeds of the private sector and criticism that it istoo “closed” to private sector input and coopera-tion. Steps have been taken to open NTIAactivities to the public as much as possible.21

In addition to balancing its role as presidentialadvisor for all telecommunications issues againstits advocacy for government spectrum users,NTIA must also confront the difficult task ofbalancing different agency needs and missions inthe management of the Federal Government’s useof the spectrum. As exemplified by the disputeover new allocations for HF broadcasting and thedebate over use of the L-band, this task can oftenbe highly contentious and political.

Options for Improving NTIA’s PerformanceWhile NTIA is trying to improve its perform-

ance relative to the private sector, its conflictingpolicy responsibilities have not been resolvedand, indeed, cannot be resolved by the agencyitself. Action must be taken by the Congress andthe Administration to determine just what NTIA’srole and responsibilities should be and take thenecessary actions to implement that decision—whether it be in the form of legislation, a newexecutive order, or as part of a more comprehen-sive effort to revamp all U.S. radiocommunica-tion policy.22 The specific options for resolvingthese problems are discussed in more detail inchapter 1.

19 M Hoc XM fi now c~ed @ an offIcial from NI’IA’s OfIice of Spectrum Management. For a discussion of the XOle of IFUC and Ad

Hoc 206 in the preparation of U.S. proposals, see 0~ W~C-92, op. cit., footnote 2.

m U.S. Dep~~t of commerce, National ~lecommunications and ~O_tiOn ~‘ “ tration, ‘‘Current and Future Requirements forthe Use of Radio Frequencies in the United States,” Docket No. 920532-2132, June 1, 1992.

21 o~ wfic-92, op. cit., foo~ote 2.

22 ~ ~to~ 1992, Cowess p~sed le@+tion that gives NTIA statutory authority (Public Law 102-538). This action effectively coddiedExecutive Order 12,046, which had been the basis for NTIA’s authority since 1978. Unfortunately, this legislation cxmfii the duality in~’s mandate noted above.


STATE DEPARTMENTImplementation Issues

The State Department is not directly involvedin the implementation of WARC decisions in theUnited States. It does, however, provide input andcoordination to the FCC and NTIA on interna-tional matters. In most cases, this involvement isthrough State Department coordination of andparticipation in bilateral and multilateral discus-sions with other countries about implementationof specific radiocommunication systems. TheState Department also coordinates U.S. participa-tion in the work of the CCIR and CCITT, thesections of the ITU that study telecommunica-tions services and make technical recommendat-ions on standards and system characteristics. TheCCIR, especially, will play an important role inthe implementation of WARC-92 decisions as aresult of the conference’s call for technical studiesin many areas, including LEOS, future mobileservices, space services, and BSS-Sound. TheState Department is also active in coordinatingU.S. activities with other international telecommuni-cations organizations such as The Inter-AmericanTelecommunications Conference (CITEL) andthe European Community (EC).

Challenges for the FutureThe State Department plays an uneasy role in

the U.S. radiocommunication policy process. It isthe official representative of the United States inall formal international telecommunications meet-ings, such as WARCS. It also plays an importantrole in selecting the head of the delegation andproviding most of the administrative supportduring the conference.

However, the role of the State Department isconstrained in several ways. The State De-partment plays no direct role in developing orimplementing domestic radiocommunication pol-icy (e.g., WARC decisions), and has no authority

over the radiocommunication policies of otherexecutive branch departments. The State Depart-ment’s almost nonexistent role in the develop-ment and implementation of domestic telecom-munication policy limits its effectiveness ininternational radiocommunication policymakingand negotiations. Although State Departmentspokespeople are technically experienced andpolitically knowledgeable, many foreign dele-gates know they have no power over domesticimplementation of international decisions. Thismay inspire them to deal directly with domesticregulators (FCC and NTIA) in order to streamlinenegotiations.

The Bureau of International Communicationsand Information Policy (CIP), which is the focalpoint for telecommunications within the StateDepartment, has a relatively small staff of tele-communication professionals, and no formalengineering staff to support them. Established in1982, CIP is also a relatively new addition to theState Department structure and, as a result, doesnot enjoy the prestige, status, or power of otherbureaus in the Department.23

This relatively low position reportedly causedproblems at WARC-92. There was initially littlecooperation from other parts of the State Depart-ment in the preconference phase of negotiations,and members of the delegation leadership werefrustrated trying to get things done through theDepartment. In part to solve this problem, GeraldHelman, a former ambassador and the U.S.representative on the ITU’s High Level Committ-ee, was brought onto the delegation to provide abetter liaison with State Department officials.

These initial difficulties between the StateDepartment and the U.S. WARC-92 delegationleadership also point out a more fundamentalconcern that must be addressed-the lack of

23 AS noted in chpter 1, the Snte Department is now considering a restructuring that would place CIP under the Bureau of monomic ~dBusiness Affairs. This change may affect CIP’S ability to carry out its coordination functions for international policy, and further reduce itsstature in the State Department.


high-level attention to telecommunications pol-icy in the State Department, and a lack ofappreciation of the importance of telecommuni-cations for international trade and competitive-ness. It is clear from the pre-conference phase ofWARC-92 preparations that the State Departmentcan play an important role in promoting U.S.radiocommunication policy around the world.During that period, but only after much prodding,U.S. embassy staffs supported U.S. pre-conferenceefforts by meeting with high-ranking telecommun-ication officials in ITU-member countries andexplaining and promoting U.S. positions. Suchinternational support will be crucial before futureconferences in light of the restructuring of tradi-tional alliances and the rise of regional blocksaround the world. Despite the relative success ofsuch efforts, however, there is currently littleevidence to suggest that higher levels (above CIP)of the Department understand or appreciate thispotential role.

Opt ions for Improving theState Department’s Performance

Although many are critical of the historical rolethe State Department has played in past WARCS,and doubt its continued usefulness, other analystsbelieve that CIP and the State Department have animportant role to play in negotiating internationalradiocommunication policy. As telecommunica-tion becomes a more global industry, telecommu-nications policymaking will assume a moreinternational character. As regional and world-wide communications systems develop and asgeopolitical relations continue to evolve, theforeign policy aspects of U.S. international radio-communications policymaking will become moreimportant. The State Department, as the U.S.Government expert on foreign affairs, can play animportant role not only in promoting U.S. inter-ests abroad, but in formulating positions that havethe best chances of acceptance in internationalfora—helping U.S. companies enter and success-fully compete in new and existing markets. TheState Department already has the basic frame-

work in place-through its embassies-to makean effective impact on international telecommu-nications policy. Neither the FCC nor NTIA hasthis advantage. Those who believe that continuedState Department involvement in the intern-ational telecommunications policy process wouldbe beneficial have argued that restructuring andstrengthening CIP would solve its past problems.

Strengthening CIP may require revising itsmission and restructuring its staff. A clearer rolein developing international telecommunicationpolicy may be needed. CIP must make a seriouscase for itself within the State Department inorder to show its relevance to the conduct offoreign policy. Most importantly, an overhaul ofCIP would require a commitment from seniorState Department leaders to integrate telecommu-nications issues with foreign policy considera-tions. Remodeling CIP would probably alsorequire increased funding for travel and staff. Theaddition of a small engineering staff may helpintegrate ClP’s role in international policy withits counterparts at the FCC and NTIA.

An alternative is to strip the State Departmentof its authority in telecommunications entirely,and move its fictions to another agency--eitheran existing one or a new agency for radio andtelecommunication development. The specificoptions for restructuring are discussed in chapter1. Given the uncertainties of the new ITU process,it is imperative that Congress decide what role theState Department should have in internationaltelecommunications policymaking and represen-tation. If action is not taken, CIP will continue tostruggle in its present form. Congress can influ-ence international telecommunications policythrough CIP, but that leverage could be moreeffective.

One potential roadblock to the State Depart-ment increasing its role in the area of telecommu-nications is the division of responsibility betweenthe State Department and the U.S. Trade Repre-sentative (USTR). The EC letter to AmbassadorBaran (see the section on LEOS in chapter 2)requesting a meeting on LEOS licensing and


coordination raised two important public policyquestions that have not yet been adequatelyaddressed. The first issue is a fundamentalquestion of what agency in the United Statesshould be in charge of, or participate in, telecom-munications meetings and negotiations that in-volve trade. Historically, the USTR has handledall negotiation between the United States and theEC. In this case (LEOS), the USTR did participatein the meetings, but not substantively. In thefuture, however, as trade and telecommunicationsissues become increasingly blurred, such an easyresolution may be hard to come by, and frictioncould develop between the State Department,NTIA, and the USTR. In order to avoid future turfwars, rights and responsibilities should be clearlyoutlined.

A parallel issue raised by the EC request is whodoes the United States deal with in Europe ontelecommunications matters—the EC’s telecom-munications committee or European Radio Com-munication Office (ERO)? The divisions anduncertainties in the European telecommunica-tions structure present an opportunity for theUnited States. And while the United Statesobviously has no direct input into how the variousroles and responsibilities ultimately are divided,a careful study should be made and steps taken toensure the best interests of the United States.

WARC-92: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

I Conference PreparationsPRIORITY-SETTING AND GOVERNMENTPOLICY LEADERSHIP

Because of the limited, and increasingly con-gested, nature of the radio frequency spectrum,setting priorities for its use is critical to ensuringthe effective and efficient development of radiotechnologies and services in the long-term. Poli-cies must be developed, with appropriate inputfrom the private sector, that promote the develop-ment of new technologies and that also protectvital public safety and defense interests. WARCproposals and positions, because they help set the

international context for all radiocommunicationdevelopment and use, are thus critically importantin this regard. Unfortunately, both before andafter WARC-92, the government has been con-sistently criticized, by both members of theprivate sector and the government itself, for itslack of leadership in developing U.S. proposalsand positions for the conference.

Two primary factors contributed to this lack ofleadership. First, as noted in chapter one, the U.S.approach to spectrum policymaking and WARCpreparation is based primarily on a democratic,market-driven model that tends to be reactiverather than forward-looking. And while thisapproach allowed the United States to producedecisions (WARC proposals) on time, it is lessclear that those decisions were (and are) in thebest long-term interests of the country. Theapparent success in setting WARC-92 proposalsquickly obscures the fact that long-range strategicplanning on the same issues is almost nonexistent.

One incident in particular from WARC-92illustrates the impacts that a lack of focusedleadership and inadequate priority-setting canhave. During the preparations for the conference,a conflict developed over the U.S. position withregard to the use of the L-band. Here, two clearpolicy issues clashed—support for big LEOSversus support for the future Global NavigationSatellite System (see chapter 2). The UnitedStates found itself in the politically difficultposition of supporting two different uses for thesame frequency band--one a private sector usebacked by powerful companies promising bil-lions of dollars in revenue and the other aninternational system for improving air safety andnavigation that was already partially planned andcoordinated. No policy determination was madeto support one use/system or the other. Rather, theU.S. delegation tried to finesse its position tosupport both proposals, despite evidence that thesystems could not share the same frequencies.The conflict will continue as the United Statesand other nations try to reconcile the decisions ofthe conference regarding these two services.


The second factor underlying the lack offocused government leadership is the dividedstructure of the radiocommunication policy proc-ess. Each of the agencies involved in the WARCpreparation process has its own priorities. TheFCC is concerned with promoting the interests ofthe domestic radiocommunication industry andU.S. radio service users. NTIA’s primary concernis to protect the Federal Government users of thespectrum, while also promoting the competitive-ness of U.S. companies overseas. The StateDepartment, based on its mandate for advancingforeign policy, is most concerned with negotiat-ing the best deal once positions are set. Unfortu-nately, these three perspectives and the differingmissions of the various Federal agencies can oftengive rise to divergent policy directions andconflicts over the ‘best’ policy alternative. Moreto the point, there is currently no effectivemechanism that stands above the agencies thatcan mediate such policy-oriented disputes whenthey arise.

But the deeper problems created by a dividedpolicy structure and lack of leadership may bemore subtle and far more serious. As noted inchapter two, during the consideration of addi-tional allocations for HF broadcasting, a conflictdeveloped between private broadcasters and U.S.Information Agency (USIA)/Voice of America(VOA), who wanted additional allocations andother government agencies, who opposed furtherallocations for broadcasting in the band, noting itsextensive use for drug interdiction activities. Inmany respects this situation mirrored prepara-tions prior to WARC-79. In both cases, VOA lostits case in the traditional preparation process ofIRAC, and appealed the decision to the NationalSecurity Council (NSC). Before WARC-79, NSC

accepted VOA’s position. In 1992, however, NSCdid not rule on VOA’s request until after theconference had ended, effectively nullifying theappeal. 24

The issue of whether VOA was justified in its

request is not the crucial issue. The more funda-mental questions involve the policymaking andappeals processes-are they fair and adequate,are they adhered to, and, ultimately, do thedecisions made reflect the best interests of theAmerican public? Because of the different inter-pretations of events leading up to WARC-92 andbecause much of the negotiations over HF broad-casting spectrum took place in the closed pro-ceedings of IRAC, it is difficult to determine whatreally happened, and when. It is clear that a policyprocess is in place, but what is less clear is howclosely and fairly formal procedures were fol-lowed, and how much each side took advantage ofthe process. Some government and private sectorrepresentatives from the HF broadcasting com-munity believe that they did not get a fair hearingof their requirements in the U.S. preparatoryactivities, leading some to claim that a policy“deal’ was struck between the FCC, NTIA, andother government users. They similarly feel that

the appeals process was not handled in anaboveboard manner by those involved. Theypoint to this instance as part of a more generalproblem in the way the IRAC/Ad Hoc 206process works-a process they view as biasedagainst broadcasting interests specifically andagainst smaller, less powerful agencies in general.

NTIA rejects this view. Agency officials main-tain that there is no bias in the IRAC policymak-ing process, and that in the case of HF broadcast-ing, proper appeal procedures were followed.25

They point out that VOA was actively involved in

~ NSC subsqumdy rejected the VOA POshion.U ~cmes where a di~~ment exists, the nod pr~~urc is for the issue to be passed to progressively h.i@Er Ievck fOr reSOhtiOn. muS

the debate (in the IRAC preparation process) over additional frequencies for HF broadcasting moved horn Working Oroup A of Ad Hoe 206to the full membership of Ad Hoc 206, to the full IRAC, to NTIA, where a policy decision was made, and ftiy to the National SecurityCouncil. While this process is well-understood, it is also possible that both sides can use the process to their own advantage. There is evidencethat both sides manipulated parts of the process in order to advance their negotiating strategies.


the IRAC process, and that the FCC, whichparticipates in the proceedings of the IRACthrough a liaison, did support VOA’s and privatebroadcasters’ position. As a result of the prepara-tion and appeals process, NTIA decided that theexisting uses of the band were more importantthan VOA’s planned uses, and consequentlymade a policy decision not to support VOA’srequests.

Complicating the analysis of this situation isthe secrecy that tends to shroud the deliberationsof IRAC and its preparations of Federal Govem-

26 Because many of the govern-ment positions.ment’s uses of radio frequencies support classi-fied activities, IRAC meetings have historicallybeen closed to the public. This contributes to animpression that hidden agendas are being pursuedand protected under the veil of ‘‘national secu-rity. ’ ‘ This perception is reinforced by a beliefthat government users may not always fullydocument their use of the spectrum to thepublic.27 FCC staff, who represent “the public,’do attend IRAC meetings, but it is unclear howforcefully they articulate private sector interestsin such meetings or how much information theycan pass on to private sector representatives.Some commenters have noted that the FCCliaison is an effective force within IRAC, wellable to represent the interests of the private sector.Other private sector commenters, however, arenot convinced that the FCC always representsthem as forcefully as it could.

Since IRAC meetings are mostly closed to thepublic, such claims and beliefs are difficult toevaluate. In the case of HF broadcasting, there isno way to discern at what level the decision wasactually made, who made it, what policy dimen-

sions were considered, and how carefully privatesector concerns were addressed. There is no wayto check what information was provided by theexisting users of the band, and there was no opendiscussion at the policy level of which agencymission was most important in this case-thepublic diplomacy mission of the VOA and others,or the use of the frequencies to support druginterdiction efforts. However, it should not beassumed that because VOA did not have all itsrequests granted that the process is biased. On theother hand, the fact that VOA did get some ofwhat it wanted does not prove the fairness of theprocess either.

On a more general level, secrecy leads to animpression that government frequency use infor-mation is not being shared. Some believe that itmay not even exist. Again, because of the closednature of the proceedings, an objective analysis ofsuch claims is difficult. The agencies participat-ing in IRAC negotiations maintain that they doshare information, and that inadequate frequencydata is also a problem with the FCC. Executivebranch officials also point out that at certainpoints, internal debate at the FCC is just as closedfrom public view as is the IRAC process—atsome point, (public) inputs must be closed off anda decision made. While this is true, the workingsof IRAC are generally more difficult to analyze--it is still unclear what inputs are made and howthey are considered. Decisionmaking may need tobe closed off, but accountability must also be builtinto the system to the extent possible. A way mustalso be found to insure the accuracy and com-pleteness of both government and private sectorfrequency data, and to provide adequate access toit for those with legitimate needs. Basing policy

M NTLA~ ~en steps t. o~n tie IRAC process so that its activities are more accessible to the public. This includes a public presentationperiod at the beginning of each IRAC meeting. For further discussion of NTIA’s plans, see U.S. Department of Commerce, NationalTelecommunications and Information Admru‘ ‘stratio% U.S. Spectrum Management Policy: Agenda for the Future, NTIA Special Publication91-23 (Washington DC: US. Government Printing OffIce, February 1991).

27 ne extent to which gov ernment spectrum users must disclose and describe such use is unclear. NTIA official.s maintain that they requireusers to support their proposals. What constitutes adequate support in this context is not defined. Especially in cases affecting national securityuses of the spectrum even NTIA officials may not Imow exactly where where, or how extensively a given frequency or band of frequenciesis used.

330-071 0 - 93 - 7 QL 3


decisions on flimsy or anecdotal data is no way toformulate good public policy.

In general, critics of the IRAC process com-plain that few high-level, open policy determina-tions were made that could have guided theWARC-92 preparation process, and solved majordisputes like HF broadcasting. Instead of beingguided by policy goals and accepted priorities, theoverall approach to WARC-92 preparations wastopic-oriented and ostensibly consensus-driven,both within the Federal Government’s IRACproceedings and in the FCC’s Industry AdvisoryCommittee. Unfortunately, this approach doesnot necessarily ensure that the best proposals areput forward, only those that are supported by thestrongest (politically and/or financially) propo-nents and the best lawyers and consultants. Thismay lead to cases in which the “little guy” getstrampled-their concerns expressed but discounted.In such cases, consensus can become in practicelittle more than a rubber stamp for the wishes ofthe most powerful.

The HF broadcasting case also highlights thetension between NTIA’s mission as FederalGovernment spectrum manager and its role aspresidential advisor on telecommunications-itmust walk a fine line between what the Federalagencies (as represented in IRAC) want, and whatis good for the country as a whole. Policies anddecisions involving Federal Government spec-trum use, based on the consensus of the Federalusers involved, may not reflect the larger publicinterest. In such cases, it is possible that thespectrum manager mission supersedes its advi-sory role, and private sector interests may lose out

to Federal Government interests. The outcome ofthe HF debate provides little evidence either way.HF broadcasting interests did get additionalallocations, but they did not get as much as theywanted. From this broadest perspective, regard-less of how the decision was made, claims of biastoward Federal agencies are not supported; nei-ther are claims that private sector interests werewell-represented and fairly considered.

The overarching question becomes: Who ismaking U.S. Government communication pol-icy? Based on what principles and concerns? Inlieu of guiding policy directives from above, itappears that Federal policy is often developed outof the consensus-based process of IRAC. This, inand of itself, is not necessarily improper, but withsuch a heavy concentration of defense-relatedinterests serving on that committee and a lack ofclear policy guidance, it is unclear if the workingsof IRAC represent a ‘‘level playing field’ onwhich all agencies can get a fair hearing of theirneeds and in which the best interests of the publicare served.28 It is also not clear that IRAC has theauthority or is at the appropriate (high-enough)level to deal with fundamental questions ofpolicy-especially since IRAC is chartered inonly an advisory capacity to NTIA, which isformally charged with developing policy andmanaging the radio spectrum.29 The appealsprocess for IRAC decisions is well-defined, iftime-consuming. It should be noted, however,that an effective appeals process does not com-pensate for or justify a poor policy-developmentprocess.

28 As of Feb~ 1992, tie membership of IRAC consisted of: the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, HAth ~d HumServices, Interior, Justice, State, Treasury, Veterans Affairs, Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, National Aeronautics and Space Achmm“ “StratiomNavy, Nationat Science FoundatiorL U.S. Information Agency, U.S. Postat Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, General ServicesAdministration, Federat Aviation Administration, and a liaison from the Federal Communications Commission. The Defense InformationSystems Agency, National Communications Systerq and National Security Agency participate only as observers. IRAC is chaired by unofficialfrom NTLA’s OffIce of Spectrum Management.

29 ~ ~s noted ~s temion i~e~: ~ ~Sfi~e tie RC c~m is the Deputy Associate Adrmrus“ ‘ trator of [the Offke of SpectrumManagement] and most of the subcommittee chairmen are also NTIA employees, it may appear to some that NTIA decisions are actually madeby IRAC or vice versa. The advisory role of KRAC and the decisionmaking role of NTIA should be cltiled and the abitity of the IRAC todevelop independent policy proposals emphasized. ” NTIA, op. cit., foomote 26, p. 22.

Chapter 3--Next Steps and Lessons for the Future I 161

PREPARATION OF OFFICIAL PROPOSALS ANDNEGOTIATING POSITIONS

Despite some problems, initial U.S. prepara-tions for WARC-92 went well. The officialproposals were developed on time (with someexceptions) and were among the first to besubmitted to ITU. However, once that processwas completed, the development of negotiatingpositions and strategies (based on the formalproposals that were submitted to ITU for WARC-92) became difficult. Several factors combined tomake this happen. First, the multitude of privatesector and government views were very difficultto blend. A broad range of interests, a largenumber of participants, and the lack of govern-ment leadership noted above are cited by mostobservers as contributing factors.

Second, an almost universal complaint heardfrom both private sector and government dele-gates and analysts was that the official U.S.delegation was chosen and officially named muchtoo late in the preparation process. This complainthas been made a number of times in the past.Critics argue that the delegation must be pickedand announced well in advance of the conferenceif the United States is to develop effectivepositions and if the members of the delegation areto learn to cooperate. Although an informal coreof industry and government representatives hadbeen preparing for WARC-92 well before theconference, uncertainty about the makeup of thedelegation and the government’s efforts to pre-serve the secrecy of U.S. positions, made thedrafting and elaboration of fallback positions andnegotiating strategies difficult.

These problems led some observers, foreigndelegates, and U.S. delegates to complain thatdeveloping formal and final U.S. negotiatingpositions took too long. The result was a lack of

firm positions and strategies that made earlypreconference diplomacy very awkward. Theunsettled form of U.S. positions had the furthereffect that, in many international bilateral andmultilateral meetings (such as the CITEL meetingheld in Washington, DC in May of 1991), theUnited States could not forcefully push (renegot-iate) its views because they were not set. Somedelegates believe that having more time to “sell”the U.S. positions, for example BSS-Sound andHF, would have produced better results at theWARC.

While more time to lobby for U.S. positionscould have helped promote U.S. interests, theU.S. process could not have worked much faster.The timeline for WARC-92 was set by the ITU atits June 1990 Administrative Council meeting,and the United States was one of the firstcountries in the world to submit its proposals,which were some of the most detailed andcomprehensive presented to the conference.

Another complaint about how proposal andposition development was handled involves in-formation on other countries’ proposals andpositions. Critics complain that foreign positionswere not adequately considered in the preparationprocess.

30 Preconference meetings between coun-

tries were a good source of information, but criticscharge that such information was not integratedinto the preparation of U.S. positions and strate-gies. One example these critics cite is the U.S.proposal for BSS-Sound/digital audio broadcast-ing. In this case, existing domestic use of theL-band outweighed international opinion; goinginto the conference, worldwide support for theU.S. S-band proposal was almost nonexistent,while strong support existed for L-band and otherS-band allocations. The result of the U.S. prepara-

30 See Cements of tie I~ti~[e of Electrical and Electronics Engineers before the NationaJ ‘fkIecormmmications wd ~omtiOnAdministration+ Notice of Inquiry in the matter of Current and Future Requirements for the Use of Radio Frequencies in the United States,Docket No. 920532-2132, released June 1, 1992.


tion process, however, left the United States withlittle flexibility at WARC-92.31

While this may be true, such charges may alsobe a matter of perception. In any case they pointout the tension in balancing domestic needs andrequirements with international concerns. In somecases, the United States will have an overridinginterest in protecting its existing services, likeaeronautical telemetry, just as other countries do.Attributing this decision to a lack of flexibility orsensitivity to international concerns is not neces-sarily accurate.

Since good preparation is the key to a success-ful conference, an examination should be made ofways to allow U.S. representatives to negotiatemore effectively before the conference, while stillpromoting the democratic ideals of participationthat characterize the U.S. process. Some analystsnote that the root of U.S. inflexibility lies in thenature of its preparation process. This process,which is the result of long, and often contentiousdebate, results in positions that are often veryrigid—there is no time or will to review the issuesagain. This can force U.S. delegates to negotiatefrom difficult and inflexible positions—a situa-tion that closely resembles the Conference ofEuropean Postal and Telecommunications Ad-ministrations (CEPT) negotiating style, accord-ing to some U.S. delegates. These analystssuggest that starting from a position that is notquite so set and specific may have benefits inallowing delegates more room to negotiate. Start-ing with more flexibility could lead to betteroutcomes in the long run.

An inevitable tension arises between makingdecisions that allow U.S. interests to advocateU.S. proposals and closing off debate too early.With adequate time and resources, the U.S.process works well. In cases such as WARC-92,where deadlines were short, the process worksless well. In entering an era in which conferences

will occur every 2 years, it becomes moreimportant to reach decisions in a timely fashion.Ways must be found to speed the process while atthe same time allowing all voices to be heard.

1 Preconference NegotiatingEXTENSIVE PRECONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONIS CRUCIAL

One clear lesson from WARC-92 is the impor-tance of extensive and open (as much as possible)talks with other countries prior to the opening ofthe conference. Such talks, either informallybetween staff, or in more formal bi- or multilateralmeetings give countries an opportunity to presenttheir positions and gauge support and/or opposi-tion to them, get information on other countriesproposals, and begin to find areas of commonground on which to cooperate or areas of dis-agreement that will require negotiation and support-building. Such contacts are a crucial forerunner tothe conference itself, and represent an importantopportunity to refine positions and gather intelli-gence for future negotiations. Although the UnitedStates did conduct meetings prior to WARC-92 inan attempt to inform other countries of ourpositions and concerns and gauge potential sup-port or opposition, many delegates feel that moreextensive prenegotiation would have been benefi-cial.

Delegates and observers had several com-plaints about the way in which preconferencemeetings were handled. Some observers havecomplained that in some cases, the key spokespeo-ple for the United States did not participate in thebilateral talks that were held with many countries.Government and private sector analysts havenoted that such participation by experts is crucialin the early stages of WARC prenegotiationbecause it informs other countries what the U.S.positions are and provides crucial early feedbackthat should allow U.S. negotiators to further

range, making it impossible for them to support the U.S. position. Each side’s position was made inflexible by existing uses. In the last claysof the conference, however, some European countries did break ranks and support the L-band allocation proposals.


refine and develop positions and strategies thathave a better chance of success at the conferenceitself. Such meetings also provide an opportunityfor private sector representatives to explain (sell)their systems in great detail, including an expla-nation of how such new systems would beimplemented, how they might affect existingradio services, and what benefits would comefrom using the new systems and services.

Several factors contributed to this problem.First is the fact that the official delegation wasnamed so late in the preparation process. Theindividuals who would later become spokesmenfor the United States had not even been officiallynamed to the delegation, In a few cases, thepeople who did make these trips were not the mostknowledgeable about the subjects to be discussedand were not the ones who later represented theUnited States at WARC-92. Another reason forthis is a matter of time: U.S. experts andgovernment spokespeople were needed in theUnited States to help develop policies and posi-tions, but at the same time, they were also neededto participate in bi- and multilateral discussionsabroad.

Finally, a lack of travel funds hindered theparticipation of some key individuals at earlymeetings. The FCC, for example, which shouldhave been represented on any meetings withforeign representatives, was able to send only oneor two representatives because of limited travelfunds and other work commitments, and thesewere often not the FCC staffers who were experton the topics, who were involved in the prepara-tion of proposals and (fallback) positions, andwho became delegates to WARC-92. Thesechoices deprived the United States of building orstrengthening relationships with foreign dele-gates and prevented in-depth (more technical)discussions on some topics prior to the conference.

Another complaint heard about the conduct ofpreconference negotiations is that at least two

potentially important trips (one a trilateral meet-ing with the United Kingdom and Russia inMoscow and another a tour of a number ofcountries in Africa) were canceled at the lastminute. Explanations as to why the trips werecanceled have been vague, although turmoil in theformer USSR has been blamed for the cancella-tion of the Moscow trip. Meetings were resched-uled with some of these countries.

Some delegates have also complained aboutthe distribution of the bilateral meetings heldbefore the conference. There was apparently aheavy concentration of meetings with CEPTrepresentatives, but less contact with other poten-tially important countries. In retrospect, Ambas-sador Baran has stated that, given CEPT’s reluc-tance to compromise, he thinks time would havebeen better spent working with other countries.The expansion of work with the CITEL countriesmay provide a useful forum in this regard.

In addition to the bilateral and multilateralmeetings scheduled as part of WARC prepara-tions, CCIR activities provide an important forumfor explaining U.S. views and systems. U.S.(government and private sector) representativeswere active in the work of CCIR study groups.These study groups, which meet periodically overa number of years, consider specific allocation/regulation topics, and develop (technical) recom-mendations on WARC agenda items. Theserecommendations provide crucial input to thework of the conference, and often carry greatweight in the deliberations. The work of CCIR inpreparation for WARC-92 culminated in a JointInterim Working Party meeting in March 1991.The product of this meeting was a voluminousreport that contained all the technical recom-mendations to WARC-92 concerning frequencyrequirements and suitable allocations for thevarious services under consideration, frequencysharing and interference criteria, and other techni-cal recommendations.32

32 For a more ~.dep~ dismssion of role of the CCIR and its study groups in WARC preparations, see O’IX, WMC-9Z, op. cit., foomote2.


Several observers have noted the important, ifunderrated, opportunity such meetings offer fordeveloping support for U.S. proposals. Becausethe United States is one of the world’s leaders indeveloping radiocommunications technology, andbecause membership in the study groups is moreopen to private sector input and more limited (innumbers) than that of the WARCs, U.S. compa-nies play a leading role in the technical studiesundertaken in CCIR. Thus, the United States(through the papers it develops for the studygroup topics) can have a significant impact on therecommendations developed by CCIR and henceon the work of the WARC itself. Some observersbelieve that more extensive and effective work inthe CCIR fora before the WARCs leads to moresuccessful outcomes for the United States at theconferences. In addition, the activities of thestudy groups not only offer important opportuni-ties for building support for U.S. proposals, butalso expose U.S. representatives to other coun-tries’ ideas-allowing the United States to takebetter account of them in our formal proposals.Given these benefits, the activities of CCIRshould continue to be an important focus ofpre-WARC negotiations.

THE NEED FOR NEW ALLIESThe increasing power of Europe as represented

by the CEPT coalition has important implicationsfor future preconference negotiation strategies.U.S. experts in international spectrum policyrecognize that Europe will be the single mostpowerful force in the ITU for some time. Prior toWARC-92, meetings that were held between theUnited States and CEPT were not very produc-tive. Each side attributed this to the other’s lackof willingness to compromise. Preconferencenegotiations suffered because of this, and, as aresult, WARC-92 deliberations were made moredifficult because few issues could be resolvedbefore the conference.

In order for the United States to most effec-tively address the new power of the European

countries, many analysts believe that more regu-lar meetings with the Europeans will be necessaryfor U.S. spectrum managers to monitor Europeanviews and directions, and to gauge their futurepositions and assess their response to U.S. pro-posals. This approach will allow U.S. representa-tives to gather intelligence on European goals andto more easily cooperate with them on issues ofmutual interest. The important advantage of earlytalks and greater cooperation (than was evidentprior to WARC-92) with CEPT is that conferencenegotiations could be easier, and the UnitedStates would gain a strong ally that could help indefeating proposals from other blocks of coun-tries. The new ITU conference schedule will alsoforce more regular meetings between the UnitedStates and Europe as they prepare for conferencesevery 2 years, providing increased opportunitiesfor cooperation.

Although the power of CEPT was clearlyevident at WARC-92, it did not ensure success onall issues. Many countries were put off by the lackof flexibility on the part of the Europeans (and theUnited States) and their unwillingness to compro-mise or negotiate on some issues. Reportedly,even some European delegates were unhappyabout the lack of flexibility CEPT showed.Delegates from both the United States and CEPT.countries recognize that such a lack of willingnessto compromise made the work of WARC-92much more difficult. This recognition provides animportant opening for the United States to workwith CEPT to resolve disputes before both sidesbecome too committed to them and incapable orunwilling to compromise.

As a complementary approach, in order tocounter the power of CEPT countries, WesternHemisphere countries are seeking to build thestrength and unity of CITEL. CITEL has longbeen an underused resource in harmonizingWestern Hemisphere telecommunications views,but before WARC-92 serious efforts were made


to bring North and South American intereststogether. 33 CITEL countries did meet severaltimes as a group at WARC-92, but no substantiveagreements or common views could be devel-oped, in large part because of infighting betweenmember countries (including the United States)for control of the agenda of the group and theoutcomes on various issues.

Despite its relative ineffectiveness at WARC-92, CITEL remains an important potential sourceof support for the United States in the future.Historically, it has been held back by a lack ofstatus, a lack of recognition of its importance byCITEL member governments, and a consequentlack of adequate funding to produce meaningfulresults. Gradually, these factors are changing.There is a growing recognition of the importanceand promise of CITEL among both U.S. andforeign government officials. If the promise is tobecome reality, however, this recognition must bebacked up by renewed efforts to compromise andincreased funding.

It is unlikely that CITEL will become anotherCEPT--a collection of countries with commonpositions that cannot be changed easily. Thetelecommunication interests, economies, and po-litical structures of CITEL member countries aretoo diverse to promote that level of collaboration.Rather, CITEL members see it as a way toimprove coordination and cooperation betweenthemselves, and exploit common interests wherepossible.

The United States will also have to engage inmore extensive preconference negotiations andmeetings outside the developed countries. Build-ing on the alliances developed before and duringWARC-92, a new program of extensive outreachto the developing countries of Asia, and espe-cially Africa, could pay important benefits atfuture ITU conferences.

RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS HAMPEREDNEGOTIATIONS

One of the most serious limitation on precon-ference negotiations was lack of resources. Manydelegates have noted that the meetings held priorto WARC-92 were hampered because key gov-ernment spokespeople often could not make thetrips. Lack of adequate travel funds was theprimary factor limiting more active participationof government representatives. As a result, therewere a few occasions on which some matterscould not be discussed because they were tootechnical for those U.S. representatives present.The seriousness of this limitation is open toquestion.

The State Department, through its Office ofInternationa1 Conferences, controls (some of) thefunds that pay for U.S. participation in allinternational conferences, including WARC-92.Funds from this office are used to pay for theadministrative costs of U.S. attendance at theconference (computers, office rental, supplies,etc.), and to pay for the head and the vice-chairsof the delegation, along with two or three supportstaff. Beyond those individuals, the question ofwho the State Department will pay for is alwayshotly contested. The Office of International Con-ferences has limited funds, and each Federalagency—including CIP--vies for additional staff.The agencies must cover remaining staff costs outof their own travel budgets.

While State Department funding is used to paythe administrative expenses of the conferences,travel funds for preconference meetings usuallycome out of individual agency budgets. Foragencies such as the FCC, which has operated ona chronically tight budget for many years, thismeant that its representation on bilateral talks wasoften limited to one or two people or none.Agencies with larger budgets, such as the Na-tional Aeronautics and Space Administration, had

33 Several m&ting5 wercheld byCInL inpreparation forw!MC-92. The goal of these meetings was to generate common vlewS tit C~Lmembers could use as a guide in developing their own country’s WARC-92 proposals, Although this goal was not achieved, the meetings wereextrcmely valuable achwving the broader objective of increasing the cooperation and unity of the countries of the Western Hemisphere. SeeOTA, W~C-92, op. cit., footnote 2.


fewer difficulties. The State Department also hasfunds to send U.S. Government representatives tomeetings of CCIR at which bilateral meetingscould also be conducted. This way of “piggy-backing” one meeting on another allowed theUnited States to send issue experts from agenciesthat could not afford the costs themselves.

The funding for future world radiocommunica-tion conferences must be rationalized. The spo-radic nature of past conferences made them verydifficult to budget for—travel budgets variedwildly from year to year. The regular schedule ofconferences planned for the future will makesetting travel budgets easier. However, the fundsto support the continuous series of bilateralpreparation meetings and the funds for the confer-ences themselves must match this ambitious newschedule.

BUILDING BROADER SUPPORTFOR U.S. PROPOSALS

In addition to the targeted prenegotiation thattakes place before WARCs, a number of delegatesand observers have identified the importance oflong-running U.S. efforts that have helped buildsupport for the United States. The best example ofsuch efforts is the United States Telecommunica-tion Training Institute (USTTI), which providestechnical training to spectrum managers andtechnicians from developing countries. A numberof WARC-92 delegates from other countries weregraduates from this program. Although it is notpossible to assess the direct impacts of thisprogram and U.S. training of foreign nationalsgenerally on the support for U.S. proposals, manydelegates believe that the exposure to U.S. ideasand technology that these students receive isimportant in building a broad base of support forfuture U.S. radiocommunication policies.

CONFERENCE MANAGEMENT9 Head of Delegation

The head of delegation’s job is to have U.S.proposals adopted at WARC-92. Because of the

generally late selection of heads of delegation,Ambassador Baran played almost no role in thedevelopment of U.S. proposals. As is the normalprocess, proposals were developed in concert bythe FCC (for private sector issues) and NTIA (forFederal Government issues). His primary func-tion, therefore, was as a negotiator--conductingpreliminary/exploratory negotiations with for-eign countries before the conference, and workingduring the conference to resolve the most difficultissues that could not be resolved in lower-levelworking groups. The Ambassador was also re-sponsible for the day-to-day and strategic man-agement of the delegation at the conference itself.

RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS EXPERT?One of the criticisms heard during the prepara-

tion for WARC-92 was that Ambassador Baranwas not a radiocommunications expert, nor evenparticularly knowledgeable about internationaltelecommunications. Some believe that the headof delegation should be well-versed in radiocom-munications, which would eliminate the need fortime-cons uming education (essentially on-the-job training) of an ambassador prior to theconference. Others believe, however, that themost important skills for a head of delegationinvolve leadership, international experience, ne-gotiation skills, and an understanding of politics.They point out that an intelligent individual canlearn the issues and surround him/herself withexperts to filter and explain technical details thatarise. Ambassador Baran fell into this lattercategory and, by most accounts, did a good job infamiliarizing himself with the issues.

These divergent views are not irreconcilable.WARC-92 was an extremely wide-ranging con-ference. It addressed many technologies, services,and issues, a number of which were leftover fromprevious conferences. A single individual wouldhave difficulty mastering all the topics that werediscussed at WARC-92 in such a short period of


time.34 Past WARCs, with the exception of thegeneral WARCs such as WARC-79, concentratedon narrower topics such as mobile services or HFbroadcasting or satellite communications. In suchcases, it may be possible for an individual tounderstand the range of issues addressed by theconference. Because future world radiocommuni-cation conferences are expected to be morelimited in scope, it may be possible to find a headof delegation who is well-versed in internationalnegotiation and knowledgeable of the issues.

TERM OF APPOINTMENTOne problem identified by observers critical of

U.S. WARC preparations in the past is that theU.S. head of delegation, who receives temporaryambassador status (but does not get paid by thegovernment), is chosen too late in the preparationprocess. The reason for this is that there is a6-month limit on the terms of temporary ambassa-dors. Before WARC-92, Ambassador Baran wasselected, and began working in late 1990, al-though he was not formally sworn in until August1991.

The length of a head of delegation’s termcomplicates the management of preconferencemeetings and preliminary negotiations. AlthoughAmbassador Baran began (unofficially) workingon WARC-92 issues roughly 1 year before theconference, some preparation activities and meet-ings had been scheduled and were taking placebefore he started. The result was that U.S.representatives were participating in many meet-ings around the world covering a number oftopics—a confusing array that sometimes con-flicted with directions the Ambassador was tryingto take. Individuals sometimes had to be ‘grounded”in order to have the preparations work at home berationalized with the need for meetings abroad.

To solve such problems, some have suggestedthat the ambassadorship should be a fixed-termappointment-perhaps 4 or 6 years. Consequently,

the position of head of delegation is most oftenmentioned in connection with a permanent agencyto coordinate U.S. planning and preparations forinternational radiocommunications conferences(see chapter 1). Among WARC-92 delegates andobservers, opinion is split over whether theUnited States should have a permanent head ofdelegation, and, if so, what requirements andresponsibilities should go with the post. Such aposition could, if properly conceived and set upprovide a valuable focus for future WARCpreparations. A permanent head of delegationcould bring consistency to delegation manage-ment and the preconference negotiations thatform an important part of WARC outcomes. Alonger appointment could also provide continuityto U.S. conference activities-preparation, nego-tiations, and implementation-and would allowan individual to build experience that is not lostwhen the conference ends. On a broader scale, alonger freed-term appointment could providecontinuity to U.S. negotiating efforts before,during, and after WARCs—building trust andrelationships among foreign heads.

Among those who oppose establishing a con-ference preparation agency and/or a more perma-nent head of delegation, many believe that thecurrent system works the way it is—’ ‘if it ain’tbroke, don’t fix it. ” Many observers believe thata permanent (or fixed-term) head of delegation isnot needed since continuity is provided in themembers of the delegation itself. Other analystswarn that appointing a more permanent head ofdelegation could be difficult politically becausesuch a move could create a power center inaddition (opposition) to the FCC/NTIA/StateDepartment troika. The officials in charge ofconference preparation at these agencies couldsee the creation of such a post as a threat to theirpower. The creation of such a position would alsofurther diffuse the policymaking procedures thatare in place. Some fear the dislocations that would

~ Several obse~ers ~ve pointed out that some i.ndividtis on both the U.S. and foreign delegations were well-versed k mosc if not tall,

of the important issues discussed at WARC-92-experience gained over many years of participation in ITU aetivitieis.


result from changing the existing power struc-tures and balances, and believe that changing therelations of NTIA, the FCC, and the StateDepartment will result in less effective prepara-tion. Such dislocations, however, would likely beshort-term, and would dissipate after a settling-inperiod.

If a freed-term appointment is adopted, anexamination must be made of what role the headof delegation is expected to play—what rightsand responsibilities will the individual have? Inmaking this analysis, a number of factors willhave to be considered. What type of backgroundshould the head of delegation have? As noted,many have argued that the head should besomeone with radiocommunication experience.Others argue that diplomacy and internationalnegotiating skills are more important at the toplevel. If a freed-term appointment is not made, itmay be easier for a diplomat to learn thetechnology and issues and tap the experience andexpertise of good (technical) advisors. On theother hand, an individual well-versed in radio-communication policy would know the issuesbetter. If a longer-term appointment is made, thequestion becomes somewhat moot; over thecourse of the term, the appointee could betterlearn all aspects of the job.

Should the position be full- or part-time?Conferences separated by many years may onlyhave required a part-time position in the earlystages of preparation. With ITU consideringholding world radiocommunication conferencesevery 2 years, a full-time position may be moreappropriate.

Should the position be filled by a private sectoror government representative? Since the positionwould likely be a presidential appointee, either ispossible. Some private sector observers believethat the only way the private sector can be fairlyrepresented is with a private sector head ofdelegation. A head of delegation chosen from thegovernment, they argue further, would be too

enmeshed in the institutional battles of theagencies involved. Government interests, ofcourse, would rather see one of their own in theposition. It may also be difficult to convinceprivate sector individuals to serve 4 years andthen leave (if the post is nonsucceeding).

A related question is whether or not the head ofdelegation necessarily needs to be an ambassador.At WARC-92, some heads of other delegationswere ambassadors, some were not. Some main-tain that naming an ambassador for WARCS isoverkill, that the connotations of the term take itout of the more technical realm of the WARC andcontribute to the political nature of the negotia-tions. Others believe that the rank of ambassadorconveys an important level of status that is usefulin negotiations and that it underscores the U.S.appreciation of and commitment to the WARCprocess.

H Divisions of ResponsibilityThe division of responsibility for domestic

spectrum policy and the problems it creates havebeen previously discussed.35 The problems of adivided structure were also evident at WARC-92.Foreign delegates reportedly had a difficult timedeciphering the U.S. delegation and were con-fused by who was in charge of U.S. policy onspecific topics. Several factors contributed to thecomplexity of the U.S. delegation. First, thedelegation itself was large. There were multiplelayers of leadership, including the head of delega-tion, six vice-chairs, the official U.S. spokesper-son for each major committee, a spokesperson foreach subcommittee and working group, officialdelegates, the support staff, and the observers. Inaddition, delegates were assigned as liaisons tospecific countries or observer groups on majorissues. This structure was overlaid by the distinc-tions between FCC, NTIA, State Department, andprivate sector representatives. To some foreigndelegates the U.S. Government delegates may

35 o~, WMC.92, op. cit., foo~ote 2.


have seemed indistinguishable, but the moresavvy delegates know that responsibility forimplementing WARC-92 decisions will be di-vided between the FCC and NTIA, and theywould prefer to negotiate with those who arelikely to be involved in actual implementation.One simple solution that has been suggested is topublish a list of U.S. delegates and spokespeoplefor the various issues, and distribute it to foreigndelegates at the beginning of future conferences.

In addition to contributing to foreign confu-sion, the divided nature of the delegation also ledto questions among U.S. delegates about who wasin charge-institutionally and personally. Re-flecting the overall lack of focus at home, no oneagency took the lead at the WARC. And whileAmbassador Baran was in overall charge of themanagement of the delegation at the conference,he did not lead negotiations on most of theissues. 36

The hierarchical structure and large size of thedelegation also caused some communicationproblems in the delegation itself. Although thedelegation leadership held daily meetings todiscuss strategy, and full delegation meetingswere held every other day, many delegatesthought that communication between the delega-tion leadership and the delegates was poor—thatinformation was passed up to delegation leaders,but information from the leadership was notpassed down. Several members of the delegationcomplained that there were too many layers ofmanagement, and that they were never sure whatthe leadership was doing.

9 Execution of Negotiating StrategiesThere is some question over how flexible the

United States was at WARC-92 and how flexiblethe United States should be in WARCs generally.As with the evaluation of outcomes, perceptionsof ‘‘flexibility’ are highly variable and depend

on the individuals and issues involved. Criticscomplain that before and during WARC-92negotiations in Spain, the United States took avery hard line on many issues and refused toreally negotiate. This is reflected in commentsthat the United States did not really try toaccommodate foreign positions in its proposals orpreconference negotiations and spent more timeon selling U.S. positions rather than negotiatinga solution.

Members of the delegation leadership maintainthat the United States was flexible on all but a fewissues. The truth lies somewhere in between. Asis usually the case in international negotiations,the United States was more willing--more flexible-to negotiate on some issues than on others.Different issues had different degrees of flexibil-ity attached to them based on the outcomes of theinitial preparations process and the way that(fallback) positions were written.

Several U.S. and foreign delegates have notedthat a lack of flexibility in some U.S. positionsoften left the United States isolated on importantallocation issues. To foreign observers, the U.S.delegation and its leadership often appeared to beheld hostage to previously established positionsand decisions. In order to (substantially) deviatefrom formally established U.S. positions andstrategies, the U.S. delegation was required toconstantly communicate with the home team forinstructions and approvals. This added time to thenegotiation process and frustrated some foreigndelegates, who saw the United States as effec-tively unable to participate in on-the-spot deci-sionmaking that occurs throughout the confer-ence, especially in the closing days.

Some analysts and observers, from both theUnited States and foreign countries, have notedthat the United States was just as inflexible onsome issues as U.S. representatives charge CEPTwas. The reasons for this perception vary. Some

36 ~tereSt@ly, @baSSadOr B~~ ~ ~de Sfilla Cements abut the European block. CEP’I’, although presenting a coherent block at

WARC-92, did have internal divisions and negotiating through theru was quite difficult. There was uncertainty as to who controlled individualnation’s positio~the delegates of the country itself, or CEPT leaders. Usually, CEPT positions won out.


attribute it to the slow preparation of positionsand the late formal naming of the U.S. delegationand head of delegation. They point out that evenlate in 1991, the U.S. delegation had not beennamed and U.S. positions were still closelyheld—making preliminary negotiations betweenthe United States and other countries extremelydifficult, and by some accounts, not very produc-tive. U.S. negotiators, however, rightly point outthat certain U.S. positions had been set as a resultof difficult domestic processes that concludedsuch inflexible positions were necessary andjustified in order to protect and promote U.S.interests. They further note that a certain amountof secrecy is necessary to successful negotiations.Whatever the case may be, this inflexibilitycertainly contributed to the difficulty of negotia-tions at WARC-92.

Lack of flexibility maybe most directly relatedto our open, democratic form of policy develop-ment. Proposals and positions are so hard-foughtin the preparations process that it can be verydifficult to modify positions rapidly enough toeffectively negotiate at international conferencessuch as WARC-92. Too many interests have to beconsidered and consulted to allow reaction timesas quick as some delegates would have liked.Other delegations reportedly had more flexibilityto make decisions without such consultations.Changes may be required in the instructions givento the delegation that would allow U.S. negotia-tors greater latitude in future negotiations.

Another reason given for the lack of flexibilityon the part of U.S. negotiators is that hard-linepositions were part of the U.S. negotiatingstrategy. According to some accounts, the inflexi-bility of the U.S. delegation was not a problem,rather it was a deliberately conceived part of astrategic framework designed to achieve thegreatest possible success for U.S. proposals.Staking out positions early and refusing tocompromise may in fact have forced somecountries to move further toward U.S. positionsthan they would have under a scenario of mutualcooperation, but the opposite may also be true.

Some countries, especially CEPT countries, mayhave become less willing to negotiate in the faceof U.S. determination.

One solution to these problems is to invest thedelegation with greater power and flexibility tonegotiate, and to make the head of delegationultimately responsible for the outcomes. Thismodel is closer to that of several countries,including the United Kingdom. Such a solution,of course, has its advantages and disadvantages.The advantages are that the ability of the delega-tion to negotiate quickly is improved and thatlines of authority and responsibility are clear. Inthe context of a new era of world radiocommuni-cation conferences, change and flexibility willbecome more important. It may also be possiblethat with more narrowly focused conferences, theissues will be simpler to manage and the necessityof consulting extensively with the home teamreduced. Giving the delegation more power alarmssome analysts, however, who fear that such powercould be abused. Changes in positions or negoti-ating strategies, for example, could be madewithout consulting all the affected parties or byignoring the positions of some interests (seebelow). While such abuses will always be possi-ble, the benefits of added flexibility and speed innegotiations may make the risk(s) worthwhile.

Because it is not possible to compare theadvantages and disadvantages of each approachunder real-world conditions in this case, it isdifficult to judge whether or not inflexibility wasthe most appropriate or effective strategy for theUnited States to pursue. Did U.S. inflexibilityhurt us in negotiations or in any way work to thedetriment of the United States vis-a-vis the finaloutcomes? Could outcomes have been improved?Or were such strong stances necessary to achievethe goals and needs identified in the domesticpreparation process? It is easy to believe on atheoretical level that greater flexibility wouldhave better served U.S. interests in the negotia-tions both before and at the conference. Thereality, however, may be that such a hard-lineapproach was best, and, obviously, U.S. negotia-


tors perceived it to be so (although others stronglydisagree). Unfortunately, there is no way toobjectively assess what could have happened ifthings had been different. The more relevant pointis whether or not such absolute positions werenecessary and how such positions were deter-mined. The domestic preparation process againappears as a crucial element in the success orfailure of U.S. proposals to WARC-92. It is theseprocesses, and the structures and ideology under-lying them, that must be carefully examined. Incases where the United States feels it must stakeout an inflexible, and often isolated, position, itbecomes critically important to carefully assessthe reasons, benefits, and disadvantages of suchan approach. As noted throughout this report, it isunclear to what extent such evaluations weremade.

The larger policy/management question thatarises is who has ultimate control of the delega-tion’s actions. Prior to arriving at WARCs, theU.S. head of delegation is given a set of instruc-tions drafted by the State Department in consulta-tion with the FCC and NTIA that serve as theblueprint for how negotiations should be con-ducted. These instructions set out objectives andgoals and list priorities and outcomes the UnitedStates could not accept under any conditions.Such a document, however, cannot possiblyforesee all the twists and turns negotiations take.As a result, the delegation leadership must havesome degree of flexibility to make decisionson-site. Substantial deviations from acceptedU.S. positions are traditionally cleared throughconsultations with the U.S. home team. The issueis how much discretionary negotiating power thedelegation should have vis-a-vis the home teamand the agencies. The uneasy balance of powerbetween the delegation and the home team blursthe lines of authority and obscures responsibility—confusing both foreign and U.S. delegates. Whois ultimately responsible for the conduct andoutcomes of negotiations, the head of delegation,

the home team expert on specific topics, or thebroader collection of home team representatives?

One example from WARC-92 illustrates theproblem. In discussions over MSS, as notedpreviously, a major U.S. concern was preservingthe 1435-1525 MHz band for aeronautical te-lemetry uses. At WARC-92, however, conferencedelegates decided to allocate portions of this bandto BSS-Sound (1452-1492 MHz) and MSS (1492-1525 MHz—for Region 2 only). The UnitedStates was forced to insert a footnote (722B) toprotect aeronautical telemetry interests. Thestrength of the wording of the footnote, however,was the subject of hot debate between privatesector interests, who wanted to leave open thepossibility of future (MSS) uses of the band, andDefense Department/NTIA interests, who be-lieved that strong language was needed to keepunwanted services out. Following the originalU.S. position, the delegation drafted languagethat was very strict, and sent it to the U.S. hometeam for comment and approval. The home teamconcluded that the language was too uncompromis-ing and sent draft language back to the delegationthat NTIA/Defense Department believed was notstrong enough. In the end, the delegation stuck tothe original U.S. position, and the harsher versionof the footnote became the official footnote.Opinions differ as to what the real effect of thiswording will be.

In this case, the original delegation instructionsfor the issue were followed to the letter, a decisionmade by the delegation itself in spite of newinstructions from the home team. Several ques-tions arise: Does the delegation or the head ofdelegation have the authority to ignore the hometeam’s instructions? Who made the policy deci-sion that the footnote should be so harsh? Wasadequate consideration given to private sectorconcerns? Is the private sector at a disadvantageonce WARCs start in terms of influencing subse-quent policy decisions?

Appendix A: Structureand Proceedings

of WARC-921

T he supreme body of WARC-92 was theplenary, in which all countries participated.The plenary was chaired by the HonorableJose Barrionuevo Peña, member of the Span-

ish Parliment.2 WARC-92 delegates selected fivevice-chairs to assist him, including Ambassador JanBaran, the head of the U.S. delegation.3 Agreementswere Finalized at the plenary sessions, most of whichtook place in the last several days of the conference.

B Structure of the ConferenceThe work of WARC-92 was functionally divided

among seven committees, With the exception ofCommittee 1, each of the committees had a single chairand vice-chair.

Committee 1: The Steering Committee was com-posed of the chair and vice-chair of the confer-ence and the chair and vice-chair of the othercommittees listed below. It coordinated themeetings and other activities of WARC-92.

Committee 2: The Credentials Committee wascharged with verifying the diplomatic credentialsof the delegations present at WARC-92.

Committee 3: The Budget Control Committee hadtwo purposes, overseeing conference expendi-

tures and identifying the financial implicationsof WARC-92 decisions.

Committee 4: The Frequency Allocations Com-mittee was the focus of much of the work atWARC-92. All of the decisions on how toallocate the spectrum were made during thedeliberations of this committee and its subcommitt-ees. Committee 4 divided its work into threesubcommittees: working groups A, B, and C.Working Group 4A considered allocation issuesin the frequencies below 137 MHz, specificallyhigh-frequency broadcasting. Working Group4B considered allocations for services between137 MHz and 3 GHz. Among the topics includedin 4B discussion were most of the ‘‘hot’issues—mobile satellite services, including bigand little low-Earth orbiting satellites (LEOS),Future Public Land Mobile TelecommunicationSystems (FPLMTS), Broadcasting-Satellite Ser-vice-Sound (BSS-Sound), and some of the spaceservices. Working Group 4C considered alloca-tions above 3 GHz, including space services,high-definition television (HDTV), and generalsatellite service. In addition to these workinggroups, Committee 4 also assigned specific tasks

1 The following section is based on International Wlecommunication Uniou “Inauguration of WARC-92, ” Telecommunication Journal,vol. 59, No. 3, 1992, and U.S. Department of State, United .Ytates Delegan’on Report,’ 1992 WorldAdministrative Radio Conference, publication9938, July 1992, Annex F.

z When ITU conferences are not held in Geneva, the headquarters of ITU, the chairman of a WARC is traditionally provided by the countryhosting the ecmference.

J The other vice-chairs were from the Russian Federation, Cote d’Ivoire, China, and Norway.

173


to a number of other smaller groups, some ofwhich are described below.

Committee 5: The Regulatory Committee was theother most important committee at WARC-92. Itconsidered the regulatory changes and proce-dures resulting from the decisions made inCommittee 4, and debated definitions for newservices. The committee also split its work intoworking groups—5A, 5B, and 5C- and a numberof subworking groups to address specific regula-tory issues.

Committee 6: The Editorial Committee “aligned”the texts developed in the Allocations andRegulatory Committees-ensuring that the textscontained the same meanings in the officiallanguages of the International TelecommunicationUnion (ITU)--French, English, and Spanish.This was an important committee because coun-tries could try to “align” the texts to their bestadvantage-sometimes trying to make changesthat altered the substance of the agreements,especially if they had earlier “lost” on an issuein committees 4 and 5.

A Technical Working Group to the Plenary was alsoestablished in order to consider complex technicalissues that required in-depth analysis or study and thatcould not be resolved in the work of Committees 4and/or 5. In addition to providing technical advice tothe conference, the Working Group to the Plenary alsohad its own set of issues to consider, including makingrecommendations for future conferences to addressmeteorological and Earth-exploration satellite serv-ices, new space services in bands above 20 GHz, andmeteorological aids services in bands below 1 GHz.

With so many different groups covering so manydifferent topics, overlapping meetings were unavoidable.In many cases, the deliberations of Committees 4 and5 went on simultaneously. For the United States, with71 delegates and support staff, covering all importantmeetings was not all that difficult. For smaller nations,however, who sent only one or two delegates to theconference, attendance at all relevant meetings wasimpossible. These countries tended to split their timebetween the various working, ad hoc, and draftinggroups of Committees 4 and 5.

# Negotiation and DecisionmakingThe work of the conference was hierarchically

structured. In Committee 4, allocations issues weredivided among the appropriate working groups (listedabove). Once these groups started their discussions,some issues were decided relatively easily and early inthe conference. Other issues, however, were moredifficult. The most contentious issues, includingMobile-Satellite Service (MSS), Broadcasting-Satellite Service-Sound (BSS-Sound), and FPLMTS, were handeddown to smaller working groups, which usuallyconsisted only of the major parties involved in thedebate. Often the membership in these subgroups wasbalanced to ensure fair geographic representationamong the ITU’s three regions.

The process of formalizing agreements followedthis hierarchy in reverse order. Each small drafting orad hoc group would come to an agreement and thenreport its findings to its parent group or committee. Incases where agreement was not possible, the topic was“bumped up” to the parent committee for discussionand resolution. In this way, issues worked their wayback up the conference structure. After final texts hadbeen agreed to in Committees 4 and 5, these documentswere sent to Committee 6 to be aligned. FromCommittee 6, draft agreements finally reached theplenary level, where the drafts were read throughseveral times for final agreement, each time refiningwording further and resolving any remaining issues orquestions.

By the end of the conference, most issues had beenresolved in the committees or their subcommittees.However several issues—MSS, including big LEOS,BSS-Sound and FPLMTS-had not been resolved.They were brought to the floor of the full Committee4 and eventually to the plenary for final resolution,

I Ad Hoc and Drafting GroupsIn addition to the above committees, ad hoc groups

and drafting groups were established as needed through-out the conference. Some of the more notable groupsare listed below.

Appendix A-Structure and Proceedings of WARC-92 I 175

COMMITTEE 4Ad Hoc Group 1—To harmonize allocation op-

tions for the general-satellite service.Ad Hoc Group 3-To identify from options

resulting from the work of Drafting Group 1 toWorking Group 4C a single allocation option to putforward to Committee 4 that meets the requirements ofthe proposing administrations and addresses the con-cerns of affected administrations, taking into accountthe Report of the Chairman of Working Group 4C tothe Chairman of Committee 4 (Dec. 207) with respectto the general-satellite service.

Drafting Group 4B1-Space research and opera-tion service 1 GHz, mobile and mobile-satellite servicebelow 1 GHz.

Drafting Group 4B2--Consolidation of all propos-als for the mobile-satellite service between 1 and 3GHz.

Drafting Group 4B3-Consolidation of all propos-als for the broadcasting-satellite service (sound).

Drafting Group 4B4---Consolidation of all propos-als on regional and worldwide mobile communicationsincluding FPLMTS.

Ad Hoc Group 4B5--To harmonize proposals forthe space operations, space research, and Earth explor-ation-satellite services in the bands 2025-2110 MHzand 2200-2290 MHz.

Drafting Group to Ad Hoc 4B5To harmonize the texts of Resolutions concerning

the space research, space operation and Earth exploration-satellite services at 2 GHz.

Drafting Group 4B6--Aeronautical public corre-spondence.

AD Hoc Group 4B7—Consideration of the mobile-satellite service in the upper and lower L-bands.

Ad Hoc Group to 4B-Consideration of newmobile satellite service allocations above 1 GHz andbelow 3 GHz.

Ad Hoc to Subworking Group 4C2-To considerthe issue of feeder links for the broadcasting-satelliteservice for wide-band HDTV.

Drafting Group 4C1—To consider all proposalsfor allocations to the space research, Earth exploration-satellite and inter-satellite services above 25.25 GHz.

Ad Hoc Group 4C2-Consideration of proposalsfor an allocation to the fixed-satellite service in theband 14.5 -14.8 GHz.

Drafting Group-Ad Hoc 4C2Consideration of conditions under which the fixed-

satellite service could operate coprimary with theradiolocation service.

Ad Hoc Group 4C3-To consider proposals forallocations to the general-satellite service.

Drafting Group-To integrate proposals from fiveadministrations to establish frequency bands for use byspace-to-Earth 30 GHz Beacon in the fixed-satelliteservice for purposes of uplink power control.

COMMITTEE 5Ad Hoc 3 to Committee 5-To monitor progress of

work in the working group to the plenary and decisionsof Committee 4 and to incorporate such changes inconsolidated texts of changes to Articles 27,28 and 29.

Drafting Group 5B-Consideration of possibleways of eliminating the differences of interpretationamong the English, French and Spanish texts.

Drafting Group 5C3--Redraft of text from thedraft resolution relating to terrestrial digital broadcast-ing.

TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP OF THE PLENARYDrafting Group l—To consider new resolutions or

recommendations regarding primary allocations formeteorological-satellite and Earth exploration-satelliteservices in the 401-403 MHz band.

Drafting Group 4-To consider proposals con-cerning modification to Resolution 703.

Drafting Group 5-To consider technical issuesrelating to proposals concerning modification of thedefinition of ‘geostationary-satellite orbit.”

Ad Hoc 6-To examine the necessary technicalparameters required to protect service allocationsmade by Committee 4, particularly with respect toArticles 27,28,29.

Appendix B:International Observersat WARC-921

Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU)Asia-Pacific Telecommunity (APT)Arab Satellite Communications Organization (ARAB SAT)Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU)Asociacion Internacional de Radiodifusion (AIR)Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU)Comite International Radio Maritime (CIRM)Commission of the European Communities (CE)Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications Administration (CEPT)Cooperation in Space-Search and Rescue Satellite (COSPAS-SARSAT)European Broadcasting Union (UER/EBU)European Meteorological Satellite Systems (EUMETSAT)European Space Agency (ESA)European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT)Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)International Air Transport Association (IATA)International Amateur Radio Union (IARU)International chamber of Shipping (ICS)International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)International Maritime Organization (IMO)International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)International Organization of Space Communications (INTERSPUTNIK )International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)Inter-Union Commission on Frequency Allocations for Radio Astronomy and Space Science (IUCAF)Organization Meterologica Mundial [World Meteorological Organization-WMO] (OMM)Pan African Telecommunications Union (PATU)Societe Internationale de Telecommunications Aeronautique (SITA)United Nations (UN)Union des Radio-Televisions Nationales Africaines [African National Radio-Television Union] (URTNA)

1 Based on U.S. Department of State, United States Delegation Report: 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference, publication 9988, July1992, Annex E.

176

Appendix C: SelectedWARC-92 Resolutionsand Recommendations

Resolution/Recommendation Numberl Topic

Resolution 112 (COM 4/1) Coordination and technical sharing parameters for the Fixed-Satellite Service at 13.75-14 Hz.

Resolution 211 (COM 4/2) Use of the bands 2025-2110 MHz and 2200-2290 MHz by theMobile Service.

Resolution 711 (COM 4/3) Convening a WARC to reallocate frequencies supporting spacemissions from the 2 GHz band to frequencies above 20 GHz.

Resolution 212 (COM 4/4) Implementation of Future Public Land Mobile TelecommunicationSystems (FPLMTS); invites International Radio Consultative Com-mittee (CCIR) and International Telegraph and Telephone Consulta-tive Committee (CCITT) to study and develop administrative plans.

Resolution 113 (COM 4/6) Invites a CCIR study on adjustments to the Fixed Service as aconsequence of changes to the frequency allocations within therange 1-3 GHz.

Resolution 114 (COM 4/7) Convening a WARC to address space issues not dealt with atWARC-92, particularly Earth Exploration-Satellite Service used formonitoring environmental data.

Resolution 523 (COM 4/8) Convening of a WARC for the planning of the High-FrequencyBroadcasting Service; also, the additional bands are not to be useduntil a planning process has been completed.

Resolution 518 (COM 4/W) Convening of a WARC not later than 1998 to plan the Broadcasting-Satellite Service-Sound (BSS-Sound) and development of proceduresfor the coordinated use of the complementary terrestrial service.

Resolution 213 (COM 4/X) Invites the CCIR to conduct sharing studies concerning the use of thebands 1492-1525 MHz and 1675-1710 MHz in Region 2 by theMobile-Satellite Service.

1 In this appendix, both the provisional and final numbers of the resolutions and recommendations are noted. The numbers listed in parenthesesarc the provisional designation adopted and used at WARC-92.

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Resolution 411 (COM 5/1) Implementation of the new provisions applicable in the frequencybands allocated exclusively to the Aeronautical-Mobile (Off Route)Service between 3025 kHz and 18030 kHz.

Resolution 412 (COM 5/2) Procedures for transfer of frequency assignments of aeronauticalstations operating in the frequency bands allocated exclusively to theAeronautical-Mobile (Off Route) Service between 3025 kHz and18030 kHz.

Resolution 524 (COM 5/3)








Resolution 70 (COM 5/1 1)

Resolution 710 (GT-PLEN/1)



Convening of a WARC to review and improve the region 1 and 3Broadcasting-Satellite Service (BSS) plans in frequency range11.7 -12.5 GHz (Region 1) and 11.7 -12.2 GHz (Region 2).

Provisional application of article 56 to ensure harmonization withthe International convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)as revised in 1988.

Introduction of BSS high-definition television (HDTV) systems inthe band 21.4-22.0 GHz in Regions 1 and 3.

Procedures to ensure flexibility in the Broadcasting-Satellite Service-HDTV and associated feeder links.

Implementation of changes in frequency allocations between 5900kHz and 19020 kHz.

Interim procedures for the coordination and notification of fre-quency assignments of non-geostationary satellite networks, incertain space services, and other services allocated in the band.

Asks future world development conference to develop priorities sothat the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) can providesupport to developing countries in implementing the decisions ofWARC-92.

Convening of a WARC to address VHF terrestrial digital audiobroadcasting (DAB) for Region 1 and interested Region 3 countries.

Invites ITU to carry out technical, legal and operational studiesleading to standards governing operation of low-Earth orbitingsatellite (LEOS) systems.

Examination of the meteorological-satellite and Earth exploration-satellite allocations in the bands 401402 MHz and 402-403 MHzwith the intent of raising the allocation status to primary.

Further CCIR study concerning BSS-Sound with the view todeveloping regulatory provisions for sharing with other services inthe same frequency band.

Reviews of resolutions and recommendations of previous WARCsto continue.

Appendix C-Selected WARC-92 Resolutions and Recommendations I 179



Resolution 410 (GT-PLEN/AH-1)

Recommendation 519 (COM 4/A)

Recommendation 520 (COM 4/B)

Recommendation 718 (COM 4/C)

Recommendation 719 (COM 4/D)

Recommendation 621 (GT-PLEN/A)

Recommendation 717 (GT-PLEN/B)

Review of certain resolutions and recommendations of WARC-79,1983 WARC for the Mobile Services, 1987 WARC on highfrequency broadcasting (HFBC), 1987 WARC for the MobileServices, and the 1988 WARC on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It.

Development of an arrangement for the allotment of frequencies forthe Aeronautical-Mobile (Off Route) Service in exclusive bandsbetween 3025 kHz and 18030 kHz.

Recommends that a future WARC advance the date for implementa-tion of single-sideband emissions in the high-frequency (HF)broadcasting bands.

Elimination of HF broadcasting on frequencies outside the HF bandsallocated to broadcasting service.

Asks ITU to hold a future WARC to consider the possibility ofaligning amateur and broadcast allocations around 7 MHz so as toprovide a worldwide allocation.

Asks CCIR to carry out studies on the technical characteristics andsharing criteria of multiservice satellite networks using geostation-ary orbit.

Asks CCIR to study characteristics and requirements of windprofiler radars with a view to allocating appropriate frequency bandsaround 50,400, and 1000 MHz; also invites Administrative Councilto include question of appropriate frequency allocations for opera-tional use of wind profiler radars.

Recommends that the CCIR study sharing criteria in frequencybands shared by the Mobile-Satellite Service with the Fixed, Mobileand other radio services.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, United States Delegation Report; 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference, publication 9988, July1992.

Appendix D:Acronyms andGlossary of Terms

Ad Hoc 206: A subcommittee of the IRAC that wasestablished to coordinate Federal agencies’ prepara-tions for WARC-92. Ad Hoc 206 was reconvenedin order to consider how to implement WARC-92decisions.

Allocation: The designation of a band of frequenciesto a specific radio service or services. Allocationsare made internationally at World AdministrativeRadio Conferences and are incorporated into theinternational Table of Frequency Allocations. Inter-national allocations are usually, but not always,incorporated into domestic frequency tables.

Analog: In analog radiocommunication, informationis transmitted by modulating a continuously vary-ing electronic signal, such as a radio carrier wave.Voice and video messages originate in analog formsince sound and light are wavelike functions. Inorder to send these analog signals over digitalmedia, such as fiber optics or digital radio, theymust be converted into a digital format.

APC: Aeronautical public correspondence. APC refersto radiocommunication services that allow airlinepassengers to place telephone calls while in flight.Also known as air-to-ground (ATG) communication.

Assignment: The granting by a government of theright to use a specific frequency (or group offrequencies) to a specific user or station. Eachtelevision station, for example, is assigned a smallgroup of frequencies that correspond to a specificchannel number.

Bandwidth: The total range of frequencies required totransmit a radio signal without undue distortion isits bandwidth. It is measured in hertz. The band-

width of a radio signal is determined by the amountof information in the signal being sent. Morecomplex signals contain more information, andhence require wider bandwidths. An AM radiosignal, for example takes 10 kHz, while an FMsignal requires 200 kHz, and a television signaltakes up 6 MHz. The bandwidth required by atelevision channel is 600 times greater than that ofan AM radio channel.

BSS: Broadcasting-Satellite Service. An ITT-J-definedservice that refers to the delivery of information orprogramming from satellites directly to user receiv-ers. The BSS includes new systems planned todeliver high-definition television services (BSS-HDTV) and audio services (BSS-Sound).

CCIR: International Radio Consultative Committee.An organ of the ITU that studies and makesrecommendations on the technical standards forradiocommunication.

CCITT: International Telegraph and Telephone Con-sultative Committee. An organ of the ITU thatstudies and makes recommendations on the techni-cal and operational standards for internationalwireline communications. CCITT also addressesinternational tariff issues.

CDMA: Code division multiple access. CDMA is arecently developed radiocommunication format thatuses digital technology and spread spectrum trans-mission to send information. Each radio signal isassigned its own unique code and is then spreadover a range of frequencies for transmission. At thereceiving end the receiver reconstructs the originalsignal by following the code.

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Appendix D–Acronyms and Glossary of Terms I 181

CEPT: Conference of European Postal and Telecom-munications Administrations. Established in 1959,CEPT consists of 33 European telecommunicationsadministrations. It acts to coordinate and reconcileregional telecommunications policy.

CIP: Bureau of International Communications andInformation Policy. Bureau of the State Departmentthat represents the United States in internationaltelecommunications negotiations and conferences.CIP’s bureau status was recently revoked and thebureau placed under the Bureau of Economic andBusiness Affairs.

CITEL: The Inter-American TelecommunicationsConference. A specialized conference of the Organ-ization of American States (OAS) that deals withboth radio and wireline communications. CITEL isa permanent, ongoing series of conferences that has35 members from North and South America and theCaribbean.

CT2: Cordless telephone 2. Personal communications

system that allows users to make calls, but notreceive them. CT2 systems have been demonstratedin Europe, but only one system has been demon-strated in the United States.

DAB: Digital audio broadcasting. DAB refers to thetransmission of audio broadcasts in digital form asopposed to today’s (AM or FM) analog form. DABpromises compact disc quality sound over the air.Many formats are being developed, and transmis-sion is possible via terrestrial transmitters, satel-lites, or hybrid systems.

DBS: Direct broadcast satellite. Medium- to high-power satellites that are designed to transmitprogramming directly to small satellite receiverdishes at users’ homes. No DBS systems areoperating in the United States, although severalsystems are planned.

Digital: In digital communication, the continuouslyvarying signals of images and voice are convertedto discrete numbers represented in binary form byO’s and 1‘s. These binary digits, orbits, can then besent as a series of “on’’ /’’off’ pulses or can bemodulated onto a carrier wave by varying the phase,frequency, or amplitude according to whether thesignal is a 1 or a O.

Downlink: In satellite communications, the signal thattravels from the satellite down to the receivers on

Earth. The direction the downlink signal travels isalso called space-to Earth. See uplink.

FCC: Federal Communications Commission. An in-dependent Federal agency that regulates private andall nonfederal government use of the radio fre-quency spectrum. The FCC is also responsible forregulating most other forms of communication,including broadcast and cable television, and sometelephone services.

Fixed Service: An ITU-defined radiocommunicationservice between specified, fixed points. Also knowncolloquially as point-to-point communication.

FPLMTS: Future public land mobile telecommunica-tion systems. FPLMTS is a concept now beingdeveloped in the CCIR for future mobile services,including PCS.

GSM: Global System for Mobile communications,formerly, Groupe Special Mobile. A digital mobilecommunications standard now being deployedacross Europe that is intended to replace existinganalog cellular telephone services. GSM will allowsystems in different countries to interoperate, per-mitting consumers to use their cellular phonesanywhere in Europe.

HDTV: High-definiton television. Refers to futuregenerations of television that will have higherpicture resolution, a wider aspect ratio, and digitalquality sound.

Hertz (Hz): Cycles per second. Radio frequencies aredescribed in multiples of hertz:

kHz, kilohertz: thousand cycles per second;MHz, megahertz: million cycles per second;GHz, gigahertz: billion cycles per second.

HF: High frequency. Refers to radio frequencies in therange 3-30 MHz. These frequencies are used byinternational broadcasting services including Voiceof America, religious broadcasters, and fixed serv-ices such as the point-to-point communicationsystems used by developing countries.

HFBC: High Frequency Broadcasting Conference.Specialized world radio conferences were held in1984 and 1987.

HLC: High Level Committee. The HLC was estab-lished by the Administrative Council of the ITU, inresponse to instructions from the Nice Plenipotenti-ary, in November 1989 in order to review thestructure and functions of the ITU. The studyincluded organization, finance, staff, and coordina-


tion. The group finished its work in June 1991, andits recommendations were considered at the SpecialPlenipotentiary Conference in December 1992.

IAC: Industry Advisory Committee. The FCC set upthe IAC to coordinate and focus private sector inputfor the WARC-92 preparation process. It consistedof 35 representatives from the private sector andwas cochaired by FCC Commissioner SherrieMarshall. It issued its final report in April 1991.

IFRB: International Frequency Registration Board.The organ of the ITU responsible for maintainingthe list of radio frequencies used worldwide. It alsoconducts technical and planning studies for theITU. According to changes agreed to at the ITU’sDecember 1992 Special Plenipotentiary, the IFRBwill be replaced by a 9-member part-time board.

IRAC: Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee.Established in 1922 and now located in the Depart-ment of Commerce, the IRAC consists of approxi-mately 20 to 25 representatives from the variousFederal Government agencies involved in or usingradio frequencies. The IRAC advises NTIA onmatters relating to Federal Government use of theradio frequency spectrum.

ITU: International Telecommunication Union. TheITU is a specialized agency of the United Nationsresponsible for international regulation of telecom-munications services of all kinds, including tele-graph, telephone, and radio.

LEOS: Low-Earth orbiting satellite. LEO satellites aresmaller and cheaper to design, build, and launchthan traditional geosynchronous satellites. Net-works of these small satellites are being plannedthat will provide data (“little” LEOS) and voice(“big” LEOS) services to portable receivers allover the world.

Modulation: The process of encoding informationonto a radio wave by varying one of its basiccharacteristics-amplitude, frequency, or phase-in relation to an input signal such as speech, music,or television. The input signal, which contains theinformation to be transmitted, is called the modulat-ing or baseband signal. The radio wave that carriesthe information is called the carrier wave, The radiowave that results from the combination of these twowaves is called a modulated carrier. Two of themost common types of modulation are amplitudemodulation (AM) and frequency modulation (FM).

Mobile Service: An ITU-defined service in whichcommunication services are provided to mobileusers through terrestrially-based systems (largetowers). Cellular telephone systems provide mobileservices. PCS and FPLMTS would also be classi-fied under the mobile service. See Mobile-SatelliteService.

MSS: Mobile-Satellite Service. MSS is an ITU-defined service in which satellites are used todeliver communications services (voice or datausually, one- or two-way) to mobile users such ascars, trucks, ships, and planes. It is a generic termthat encompasses several types of mobile servicesdelivered by satellite, including Maritime MSS(MMSS), Aeronautical MSS (AMSS), and LandMSS (LMSS).

NTIA: National Telecommunications and InformationAdministration. The agency in the Department ofCommerce that oversees all Federal Governmentuse of the radio frequency spectrum. NTIA alsoserves as the President’s adviser on all telecommu-nication matters,

OIA: Office of International Affairs. The office inNTIA responsible for international aspects of tele-communications, including preparation and partici-pation in international communications negotia-tions and conferences.

OIC: Office of International Communications. Estab-lished by the FCC in January 1990 to coordinateand serve as the focal point for internationalactivities in the FCC.

OSM: Office of Spectrum Management. The office ofNTIA responsible for day-to-day management ofFederal Government spectrum use. Also providestechnical assistance to OIA in preparation forinternational negotiations and conferences.

PCS: Personal communication network/service. Al-though the term is not yet clear, PCS seems to beemerging as an umbrella term that refers to any ofthe many mobile services (voice and data) designedto serve individuals wherever they are (walking,driving, flying).

Primary status: Radio services with primary statushave full rights to use any or all of the radiofrequencies that have been allocated to them, unlessmodified by a footnote to the international Table ofFrequency Allocations. Such a footnote can specifycountries in which a service may not operate or can

Appendix D–Acronyms and Glossary of Terms I 183

specify technical constraints such as maximumlevels of power allowed. When two primary serv-ices share the same frequencies, they must coordi-nate their use to ensure that interference is mini-mized. See secondary status.

PTT: Post, telegraph, and telephone administration.PTTs are the government agencies that have beenthe sole providers of telecommunication services inmany foreign countries for years. Today, theirpower and monopolies are declining in the face ofliberalization and privatization.

Radio astronomy: The study of the stars and planetsusing radio waves. Radio waves allow scientists todetermine the composition of planets and theiratmospheres. Because radio waves received fromspace are very weak, radio astronomy receiversmust be extremely sensitive.

RDSS: Radiodetermination-Satellite Service. RDSS isan ITU-designated service in which satellites pro-vide location information to ships, planes, vehicles,and even individuals such as hikers.

Secondary status: Secondary radio services are notallowed to cause interference to primary servicesand cannot claim any protection from interferencefrom primary services. They must accept interfer-ence from a primary service if it occurs. See primarystatus.

Spectrum: The spectrum of an individual radio signalis the range of frequencies it uses, The width of thespectrum is also called the bandwidth of the signal.More broadly, the radio frequency spectrum con-sists of all the radio frequencies that are used forradiocommunications.

SSB: Single sideband. A method of transmitting radiosignals in which only one sideband is transmittedand, often, the carrier is transmitted at reducedpower.

Uplink: In satellite communications, the signal thattravels from an Earth transmitting station up to thesatellite. The direction the uplink signal travels isalso known as Earth-to-space. See downlink.

WARC: World Administrative Radio Conference.WARCS are the primary forum for distributing thefrequencies of the spectrum to the various radio-communication services, They can address all radioservices (a general WARC) or only specific por-tions of the spectrum (specialized WARC). TheFinal Acts of a WARC have international treatystatus and must be signed by member governments.The allocations decided on at a WARC usually areincorporated into domestic tables of allocations.WARCs have now been renamed by the ITU, andwill be called world radiocommunication confer-ences in the future.

Appendix E:Negotiated Rulemaking:An Alternativeto Traditional Rulemaking

I BackgroundFor several years, the FCC has been searching for a

better way to develop new service rules and licensenew service providers. This search is, in part, the resultof the rash of litigation that often surrounds FCCdecisions, and the FCC’s desire to avoid lengthy courtbattles in order to speed the introduction of (new)services to the public. Several options have beendiscussed and tried including lotteries, spectrum auc-tioning, a consortium, and now negotiated rulemaking.This is the first time such an approach has been triedby the FCC, and observers and proponents of othernew services are watching the process closely. If theprocess succeeds for little LEOS, the FCC expects touse it as a model in other proceedings-with poten-

tially widespread effects on the traditional approach torulemaking at the FCC.1

In order to speed the development of the rules andregulations governing the new little LEOS systems, theFCC established an Advisory Committee under theFederal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)2 and theNegotiated Rulemaking Act3 to assist in the develop-ment of the technical and service rules and regulations

that will govern the provision of mobile (and fixed)services provided by LEOS systems operating infrequencies below 1 GHz. Pursuant to the require-ments of the FACA, the FCC issued a public notice ofits intention to form an advisory committee on littleLEOS in April 1992,4 Numerous parties responded tothe notice, including Orbcomm, Starsys, Volunteers inTechnical Assistance (VITA), who submitted jointly-filed comments that outlined their proposals fortechnical and service rules.5 These comments wereintended to form the basis for the FCC Notice ofProposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on little LEOS servicerules, thereby eliminating the need for the AdvisoryCommittee altogether. The FCC did not accept thisapproach, and proceeded to form the Advisory Committ-ee, It met for the first time on August 10, 1992, atwhich time the charter of the group and a work planwere discussed.

D ParticipantsIn addition to the companies that have filed applica-

tions to provide little LEOS services-VITA, Starsys,Orbcomm, and Leosat6-representatives from several

1 The FCC, in fac~ has begun a negotiated rulemaking for LEOS systems operating above 1 GHz. Federal Communications Comrnissio~“MSS Above 1 GHz Negotiated Rulemaking Committee,” Public Notice, DA 92-1691, released Dec. 15, 1992.

25 USC App. 2 (Dec. 21, 1982).3 Negotiated Rulernaking Act of 1990 (NRA), Public Law 101-648, Nov. 28, 1990.d Federal Communications Commission ‘‘FCC Asks for Comments Regarding the Establishment of an Advisory Committee to Negotiate

Proposed Regulations, ” Public NotIce, DA 92-443, released Apr. 16, 1992.5 See Jointly Filed Comments of ORBCOm STARSYS, and WTA, ‘‘In the Matter of Establishment of an Advisory Committee to

Negotiate Proposed Regulations for Imw-Earth Orbit Satellite Services Operating Below I GHz,” CC Docket No. 92-76, May 18, 1992, andJointly Filed Supplemental Comments of Orbcomm, St.arsys, and VITA in above proceeding, Aug 7, 1992.

b hosat’s application was dismissed by the FCC on procedural grounds, bosat filed for a reconsideration of this dismissal, but that appealwas denied. It was allowed to sit on the Advisory Committee despite objections by Orbeomm.

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Appendix E–Negotiated Rulemaking: An Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking I 185

government agencies and the aeronautical communityparticipated in the work of the committee.7 Gover-nment representatives were primarily interested inensuring that their existing use of the frequencies inand adjacent to the bands to be used by little LEOSwould be adequately protected. The Air Force, forexample, is planning an addition to its meteorologicalsatellite system that could be subject to interferencefrom the new LEOS systems.

B Charter and Work ProgramThe official charter of the Advisory Committee

states that the task of the Committee was to “gatherand discuss information necessary to form recommend-ations to the FCC for the regulation, licensing andcoordination of little LEO satellite services. Thisinformation will be used by the FCC in conjunctionwith its separate proceeding on the frequency alloca-tions for little LEOS9, and will form the basis for anNPRM that will outline technical and service rules fornew little LEOS services. In order to accomplish thiswork in a timely manner, an informal working groupwas formed to look at the specific issues outlined in thework plan for the committee. An editorial workinggroup was formed to develop the language for theCommittee’s final report to the FCC.

The FCC’s general goal, as outlined in the workprogram for the committee, was to find ways tofacilitate sharing-not only among the three proposedsystems, but also between them and existing (terres-trial and space) systems using the proposed (andadjacent) frequencies, between U.S. and internationalusers of the frequencies, and between present andfuture users of the bands, including future additionalLEOS systems.

In the course of its deliberations, the committeeaddressed the following issues, among others:

How to license multiple operators;The impacts of the footnotes adopted atWARC-92 on little LEOS services;Sharing considerations, as noted above;Which modulation (code division multipleaccess, time division multiple access, orfrequency division multiple access) methodshould be employed;The need for separate rules for nonprofitproviders such as VITA;Coordination mechanisms with other serv-ices, including services sharing the samebands and services using adjacent bands thatcould be subject to interference from littleLEOS operations.

The committee finished its work as scheduled andsubmitted its final report to the FCC on September 18,1992.

DISCUSSIONThe work of the committee was contentious for

several reasons. First, the frequencies in question areto be used by both the Federal Government and theprivate sector, and some of these frequencies werebeing opened up for the first time to the private sector.In the United States, the 148-149.9 MHz band, forexample, was previously reserved for military fixedand mobile communications.

Second, the international ramifications of the deci-sions made in the committee and the FCC weresignificant, The United States will be the first countryto operate commercial LEOS systems in these bands,and other countries are apprehensive that what isdecided in the United States will become the &facto

7 The full membership of the committee consisted of: ARINC, Inc., Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Department ofthe Navy, Federal Aviation Administratio~ National Aeronautics and Space Mministratiom National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration Leosat, Orbcornrq Starsys, and VITA. The FCC supplied the facilitator and the designated Federal representative for the group.

8 Federal Communications Commissio~ ‘ ‘Charter for the Below 1 GHz LEO Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, ’ Document LEOAC- 13,Aug. 10, 1992, p. 1.

9 Federal Communications Commission, “Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commission’s Rules to Allocate Spectrum to theFixed-Satellite Service and the Mobile-Satellite Service for Low-Earth Orbit Satellites,” ET Docket No. 91-280, FCC 91-305, released Oct.18, 1991.


rules for little LEOS operation all over the world. l0 TheFCC was keenly aware of these concerns.

Third, the timeline for the process was ambitious.The FCC wanted to move the process along quickly inorder to let the prospective companies get theirservices up and running as soon as possible--astrategy that would allow U.S. companies to bring theirservices into operation ahead of any foreign competi-tion. 11 This short timeline was also instituted so that anegotiated rulemaking on big LEOS could begin assoon as possible--conducting two negotiated rule-makings simultaneously was not possible due tolimitations on FCC staff time. As a result, thecommittee was given only 37 days to do its work.Meetings were held every week, supplemented bywork conducted in the informal working group and theeditorial group.

Finally, in an attempt to speed the process,12 andsome have argued, circumvent potential dissent, thethree main little LEOS system proponents met infor-mally and devised a set of rules and sharing arrange-ments that they submitted to the FCC with the hope ofhaving them adopted by the FCC. 13 The FCC chose notto adopt them whole, but to include them as inputs tothe work of the Advisory Committee. Leosat, a littleLEOS proponent whose application was dismissed bythe FCC, was not part of those informal meetings andaccused the others of trying to stifle competition.

I ResultsThe final report represented, as much as possible, a

consensus of views reached in the course of the

month-long deliberations of the committee and itsinformal working groups. However, disagreements onseveral matters were not resolved. To accommodateadditional views on these matters, the report includesseparate statements from several of the participants.The committee submitted its final report to the chief ofthe FCC’s Common Carrier Bureau for considerationin the FCC preparation of its formal NPRM on littleLEOS service rules. The NPRM was adopted inJanuary 1993.

One issue that remains unclear is how future LEOSsystems will be accommodated. The FCC has main-tained a commitment to promoting competition in littleLEOS services, and has said that it would like to see atleast three competitors and maybe more offering suchservices. A crucial question not determined in thenegotiated rulemaking process was how many entrantscan be accommodated. The private sector participantsin the process, of course, would like to limit entry bypotential future competitors and have said that tryingto accommodate unspecified future needs would beimpossible.

Another unresolved issue, and the subject of heateddebate during the course of the committee’s workcentered on the question of which modulation schemeis best suited for little LEOS applications. Orbcommand VITA have indicated that they will use a frequencydivision multiple access system, while Starsys andLeosat have proposed code division multiple accesssystems.

10 Sm, for ~~ple, tie comments of Michel Carpentier, Director General (telecommunications) for the European CO~U@ commission:‘‘It is a matter of some importance to the commission to ensure that the initial LEO systems are introduced in such a manner as not to prejudicecompetitio~ and in particular, to ensure that future systems can operate within the constraints of the existing allocation. ” Quoted in “U.S.Accepts EC Commission Request for Informal Talks. . .“ Telecommunications Reports, July 27, 1992, p. 15,

11 smol~~ a Russian LEOS syste~ is already pmdy OperatiOM1.

12 Sptig Up he process helps the LEOS providers in at least two ways. Firsti the delay costs them money. The quicker tiese sYstems wbe licensed and begin operations, the faster they can begin making money and producing revenue. In the meantime, all the companies still havecosts (salaries) that must be paid. Second, a quicker start keeps actual and potential investors interested-the longer to returns on investmentthe less these systems are likely to attract new investors and the more discontented existing investors become. They are less likely to keep puttingmoney in for salaries when the potential returns keep slipping in time. This is an important consideration in an era where private capital forexpensive and somewhat risky ventures is tight.

13 S= Jotidy Filed Comments of Orbco- StarSyS, and VITA, ‘‘In the Matter of Establishment of an Advisoxy COmIUittee tO NegotiateProposed Regulations for Imw-Earth Orbit Satellite Services Operating Below 1 GHz,” op. cit., footnote 5, and Jointly Filed SupplementalComments of Orbcomm, Staxsys, and VITA in same proceeding, Aug. 7, 1992.

Index

Ad HOC 206, 154, 158Administrative Council (of the ITU), 15, 147, 161Advanced communications technology satellite (ACTS),

140Aeronautical-mobile satellite service (AMSS), 89-90Aeronautical public correspondence (APC), 5,25, 119,

132-134, 146Aeronautical telemetry, 16,53,65,69,71,75-76, 144AfriSpace, 71Allocations table. See international Table of Fre-

quency AllocationsAmerican Mobile Radio Corporation, 68American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC), 87-

88,92,95,96-97, 116Ardis, 107Aries, 114Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 23

Baran, Ambassador Jan, 10,21,28,103,120,156, 163,166, 167, 169

BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), 55Berrada, Abderrazak, 17Broadcasting-Satellite Service-high-definition televi-

sion (BSS-HDTV), 5, 11, 25, 128-132, 146Broadcasting-Satellite Service-Sound (BSS-Sound),

4, 11, 15, 16,53, 63-64,64-76, 144, 146, 161Bureau of Communications and Information Policy

(CIP), 46, 48, 147, 155-157. See also Depart-ment of State

Bureau of Telecommunications Development (of theITU), 16

Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-tition Act of 1992, 152

Canadaand APC, 133and BSS-Sound, 70, 76, 144paging operations in, 105

CaribSpace, 71CCIR. See International Radio Consultative Commit-

teeCCITT See International Telegraph and Telephone

Consultative CommitteeCDMA (code division multiple access), 116,121,122,

124Cellular telephone, 77,85, 125, 137

digital standard for, 34, 85-86Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association,

77Celsat, 117Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), 103CIP. See Bureau of Communications and Information

PolicyClTEL. See Inter-American Telecommunications Con-

ferenceCoast Guard, 59,60Communications Act of 1934, 101, 107Comsat, 87, 88, 133Conference of European Postal and Telecommunicat-

ions administrations (CEPT), 17, 18-21, 125,133, 137, 162

and aeronautical public correspondence, 133and Broadcasting-Satellite Service-Sound, 65, 70and future public land mobile telecommunications

systems, 82and high-definition television, 130and low-Earth orbiting satellite systems, 118, 125and Mobile-Satellite Service, 94

187


and Space Services, 136in W~C-92 negotiations, 18-20, 163-164restructuring of, 20-21

Constellation Communications, Inc., 113, 114CoveragePlus, 107CT2 (cordless telephone 2), 78-79, 84

Department of Communications, 47,49Department of Defense, 69,71, 134, 135, 171Department of State, 7,40-49, 147, 149, 155-157, 165Digital audio broadcasting (DAB), 64,66-76Digital European cordless telephone (DECT), 84Digital Satellite Broadcasting Corp., 68Direct broadcast satellite (DBS), 36-37, 129-130DirecTv, 131Double sideband (DSB) transmission, 60-61Dual-mode mobile telephones, 113, 116, 123-124

Earth-Exploration Satellite Service, 140-141Electronic Industries Association (HA), 71Ellipsat, 113, 114European Community (EC), 20, 84, 106, 119-120,

125, 155, 156-157European Radiocommunications Office (ERO), 20,

157European Telecommunications Standards Institute

(ETSI), 20Extra-vehicular activities (EVA), 136

Federal Aviation Administration, 122Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 59,60Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 7, 37,

4049, 149-153, 165Fixed Satellite Service (INS), 134-135Fixed Service, 61Footnotes, 14,26, 144Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunications Sys-

tems (FPLM1’S), 15,77-86, 125, 137

General-Satellite Service (GSS), 139-140, 141Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS),

93Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), 118-119,

123, 157Global Positioning System (GPS), 118-119Global system for mobile communications (GSM),

84-86,78,82Globalstar, 114

GLONASS, 111, 112-113, 118-119, 121-122Gonets, 104GTE Airfone, 133

Head of delegation, 166-168Helrnan, Gerald, 155HDTV. See Broadcasting-Satellite Service-high-

deftition televisionHFBC-87, 56,58High-frequency (I-IF) broadcasting, 11, 55-64, 154,

158-159High Ixwel Committee, 37, 147Hubble telescope, 135Hughes Communications, 131

Industry Advisory Committee, 59,99, 160Inmarsat (International Maritime Satellite Organiza-

tion), 26, 88-89, 96-97, 116, 124-126, 133Intelsat (International Telecommunications Satellite

Consortium), 134, 135Inter-American Telecommunications Conference

(CITEL), 21-23, 155,163-165Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC),

41,48,60,61,72, 154, 158-160International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 93,

118International Frequency Registration Board (IF’RB),

57International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR),

6, 15,53, 147, 155, 163-164International Table of Frequency Allocations, 11, 26,

52-53, 144International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 1, 8,

11,27, 146-149International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative

Committee (CCITI’), 15, 147, 155Iridium, 113-116, 120-121, 124, 128, 138

Joint Imng-Range Planning Committee, 4546Joint Strategic Planning Council, 45

L-band, 35,54,67,69, 144, 154, 157, 161Land Mobile-Satellite Service (LMSS), 89-90Leosat, 101Leosat Panamericana, 104Lincom Corp., 68I.mral Aerospace Holdings, 68Imral Cellular Systems, 111-112

Index I 189

Low-Earth orbiting satellites (LEOS), 3,4, 11,26,156big, 15, 108-128, 144little, 15,97-108, 144, 157See also Mobile-Satellite Service

Lundberg, Olof, 53

Maritime Mobile-Satellite Service (MMSS), 89-90Mexico,

and APC, 133and BSS-Sound, 70, 76, 144

MOB-87, 89, 119, 133Mobile-Satellite Service (MSS), 4, 11, 15,25,86-128,

146, 151, 171See also low-Earth orbiting satellites

Mobile Service, 4, 77-86Motorola, 26,29,37, 113, 116, 120, 124, 126, 128

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),37-38.134, 137, 165-166

National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), 69,70National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

105National Security Council, 60, 158National Security Directive 51,61National Telecommunications and Information Ad-

ministration (NTIA), 7,37,40-49, 149, 153-154,171

and Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee,4849, 158-160

Negotiated rulemaking, 152for big LEOS, 117-118, 121, 152for little LEOS, 103, 106

Norris Satellite Communications, 139Northwest Airlines, 133

Odyssey, 114Office of International Communications (OIC), 40Office of Science and Twhnology Policy (OSTP), 48Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP), 47,48OmniTracs, 107ORB-88, 128Orbcomm, Inc., 101-103Organization of American States, 21

Pena, Jose Barrionuevo, 10

Personal communication networks (PCN), 84, 85

Personal communication services (PCS), 4, 73, 77,

78-86, 125, 137, 151FCC proceedings on, 79-82

Plenipotentiary Conferences of ITU, 15Special Plenipotentiary of 1992, 11, 147

Primosphere, L. P., 68Private sector, 27-29

domestic policymaking and, 28-29,32-33, 34-35role in international negotiations, 27-28

Project Acorn, 68Project 21, 116-117

Qualcomm, 107Quayle, Dan, 26

Radio astronomy, 101, 105, 111, 122-123Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 59Radio Moscow, 55Radio Regulations, 57, 136Radiocommunication policymaking

implications of WARC-92 for, 30-39long-range planning and, 36-38market forces and, 30-36options for improving, 39-49structural problems, 158

Resolution 46 (COM5/8), 111, 120

S-band, 70, 161Satellite CD Radio, 67-68, 70Senior Interagency Group, 45Shortwave, 55Single sideband (SSB) transmission, 58-59,63Sky-Highway Radio Corp., 68Smolsat, 104Space Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG), 37-38,

137, 141Space Services, 5, 105, 135-139, 151Space shuttle, 135, 138Space Station Freedom, 135, 138Starsys, Inc., 101-103Strother Communications, 68

Taos satellite system, 104Task Force on ITU restructuring, 15,40, 147TDMA (time division multiple access), 116, 121, 122,

124Tracking and data relay satellites (TDRS), 134, 138TRW> Inc., 113, 114


USA Digital Radio, 68U.S. Air Force, 105U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 59, 158U.S. Trade Representative, 46-47, 156-157United States Satellite Broadcasting, 131United States Telecommunication Training Institute

(usT-rI), 166

Voice of America (VOA), 55,57,59-61, 158-159Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), 101-103

W~C-92background, 2,9-15factors affecting implementation, 144-157implications for policy, 30-39structure, 10-11themes and trends from, 15-29U.S. delegation, 9-10, 168-169U.S. negotiating strategies, 169-171

WorldSpace, 71

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