the 1948 ethnic cleansing of palestine by ilan pappe

8/14/2019 The 1948 Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine by Ilan Pappe

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Ilan Pappe

Logos 3.1 – Winter 2004

relativist point of view than many of my colleagues and I was also highlyimpressed by the need-which informs my work in the last few years-to writemore a history of the people and less a history of the politicians, and more ahistory of the society and less of its ideology and elite politics.

Q:Y ou have often been associated with “revisionist history” and the emergence of a “post-

zionist” discourse: what do these terms mean and how have they affected the political

climate in Israel?

Pappe: Revisionist history means those books written by Israeli historiansabout the 1948 war that question the essential foundational Israeli mythsabout that war. First among them is that it was a war between a Jewish David

and an Arab Goliath. The new historians described an advantage for theJewish military side in most stages of the war. They also pointed to the prioragreement between the Jewish state and the strongest Arab army-the ArabLegion of Transjordan-that neutralized the Palestinian force and limited itsactivity to the Greater Jerusalem area. This prior understanding divided post-Mandatory Palestine between the Jews and the Hashemites of Jordan at theexpense of the Palestinians.

As for post-Zionism, this adjective is usually associated with critical researchin Israel on various chapters in the history of Zionism and Israel. It includessociologists who view Zionism as colonialism, historians who doubt the

sincerity of the Zionist effort during the Holocaust, and it also criticizes themanipulation of Holocaust memory within Israel. Among them you can findscholars identifying with the fate of the Mizrachi Jews in Israel and whodeconstruct the attitude of the state, especially in the 1950s, toward thesegroups employing paradigms of research offered by Edward Said and othersin postcolonial studies. Palestinian Israelis have done the same in looking atthe attitude of the Jewish state toward the Palestinian minority and feministshave critically analyzed the status of women and gender relations as theydeveloped through time in the Jewish State.

In the 1990s, when most the works of the revisionist and post-Zionist

historians and scholars appeared, there seemed to be some impact on thegeneral public. You could see it in documentary films on television, in op-edsin the printed press and in some textbooks and curricula in the educationalsystem.



Ilan Pappe


But after the outbreak of the second intifada in October 2000, not much wasleft of the previous readiness of Israeli society to hear critical voices on thepast. The electronic media loyally towed the official line; the printed presssilenced critique in general; and revisionist textbooks were taken out of theschool system.

One could probably say that it never affected the political system, but itseems to have taken root in Israeli civil society and its impact will, I think, befelt in years to come.

Q: Y our last book dealt with 1948 and you suggest that Israel is still living with the

consequences of choices made then. Could you elaborate on this?

Pappe: This was not my last book. My last book was A H istory of Modern

Palestine, published by Cambridge University Press. My last book on 1948 isT he M ak ing of the A rab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-19 51 published by I. B. Tauris.

Indeed, I think that the ethnic cleansing in 1948 will never allow Israel toreconcile with the Palestinians and the rest of the Middle East, nor to live inpeace with its own Palestinian minority unless Israel boldly faces the past.The ethnic cleansing included the destruction of more than 400 villages, 11towns and the expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians.

The Israeli state, as a political entity, has to acknowledge the ethniccleansing. Until today it had failed to do so and it should be madeaccountable for its deeds and offer compensation for the people it wronged.This should be done on the basis of UN Resolution 194 that allowed therefugees to choose between compensation and return.

Q: T he plight of the Israeli A rabs and those A rabs living in the occupied territories is

often underestimated: they are seen as poor and exploited but, if I can put the matter this

way, not particularly more than any number of other peoples. Is there something systematic

here that is reminiscent of apartheid or even ethnic cleansing?

Pappe: There are of course differences in the way Israel treats thePalestinians living under occupation and those whom it regards as citizens.But there are also common features of that policy. Let us begin by charting



Ilan Pappe


the common ground. It is beyond the scope of this interview to present theemergence of Zionist attitudes and perceptions about the indigenouspopulation of Palestine. What suffices in this context is to point to the finalformulations of this process: a dehumanization of the Palestinians, theirexclusive depiction as a security problem and the wish to have a pure Jewishstate, empty of any Arabs or Arabism.

The wish to retain the façade of a democracy complicated the translation of these attitudes into actual policy toward Palestinians inside Israel, those whoare officially regarded as citizens. Until 1966, in the name of security, therights of these Palestinians were removed and they were subjected to cruelmilitary rule. But when, after 1967, the U.S.-Israeli alliance became thecentral source for the Jewish State’s existence, one of the more democratic

features developed among them was the abolition of that military rule.Racism and apartheid-which were official policy under military rule-nowbecame illicit and in a way more dangerous because it was more difficult forhuman and civil rights organizations to expose them. In the years since 1967,as a Palestinian citizen you could never know where the racism anddiscrimination would hit you. It meant that at any given minute, withoutprior knowledge, you were likely to encounter de facto segregation,discrimination, abuse of basic rights and even death. This is still the state of affairs today, and in many ways it has worsened since the outbreak of thesecond intifada.

On top of all of this, Palestinian citizens in Israel suffer from a de jurediscrimination as well. There are three laws in the country that define most of the cultivated land as belonging exclusively to the Jewish people and hencecannot be sold to, or transacted with, non-Jews, namely Arabs. Other quaapartheid laws are the law of citizenship that demands naturalizationprocesses for the indigenous population while the law of return grants itunconditionally to unborn yet Jewish children everywhere in the world.

There are clear policies of discrimination in the welfare system, in thebudgeting of public services and in the job opportunities, especially inindustry, of which 70 percent is termed “Arab Free” as it is strongly

connected to the military and security sector. But I think it is the dailyexperience-as I described it above-of the license for everyone who representsthe state to abuse you at will that is the worst aspect of living as a Palestinianin the Jewish state. To this has lately been added the fear of ethnic cleansingand expulsion.



Ilan Pappe


The situation in the occupied territories is far worse. House demolitions,expulsions, killings, torturing, land confiscation and daily harassment at willof the population has been going on from the first day of occupation in1967: it did not start because of the suicide bombs which appeared for thefirst time in 1995 as a very belated Palestinian response for more than 25years of occupation. The situation has only become worse in the last fouryears. There are several spheres of brutality that should be mentioned: thecollective punishment, the abuse of thousands of detainees and politicalprisoners, the transfer of people, the economic devastation, the slaying of innocent citizens and the daily harassment at checkpoints. Lately to this wasadded the fence that is ghettoizing thousands of people, separating themfrom their land and their kin and/ or destroying their source of living and

their houses.

Q:T his wall is being termed a “wall of separation.” Perhaps you can offer some reflections

on this symbol of oppression and its implications.

Pappe: I think the wall fits well into older Zionist notions of how to solvethe problem of Palestine while taking into account realpolitik such as theneed to maintain Israel’s external image and keep a cordial relationship withthe West and the United States in particular. The aim has always been, and itstill remains, to have as much of Palestine as possible with as few Palestinians

in it as possible. Only very unique historical circumstances, such as those thatexisted in 1948, allowed for mass expulsions of the Palestinians on the way torealize the vision of a totally de-Arabized Palestine. In the absence of, orwhile waiting for such circumstances, more gradual means have beenemployed. The first is an internal Israeli decision on how much of historicalPalestine is needed for sustaining the Jewish State. The consensus betweenLabor and Likkud today is that the Gaza strip is not needed and that half of the West Bank as well can be given up. The half of the West Bank that is leftto the Palestinians, however, is not a contiguous territory: it is bisected byareas in the West Bank deemed necessary for Israel’s survival, because theyinclude water resources, historical sites, strategic positions and large post-

1967 Jewish settlements. The drawing of this new map can either be donewith the consent of a Palestinian leadership or without it.

The second device is a set of operations meant to cleanse the indigenouspopulation of those areas that were annexed to Israel from the West Bank.



Ilan Pappe


Today there are about a quarter of a million people inhabiting these regions.As in 1948, the issue is not just expulsion, but also anti-repatriation. So thewall that is being built demarcates the eastern border of Israel (so that theJewish State will consist of 85 percent of original Palestine) and is meant todraw a clear demographic line between the Jewish and Palestinianpopulations. People who have already been chased out of their houses whilethe wall and security zone around it was constructed, and those who are indanger of being evicted in the future, will be blocked from coming back bythe wall.

The third step is an Israeli willingness to define the Gaza strip and whatwould be left of the West Bank as a Palestinian state. Such a state cannot be aviable political entity and would be akin to two huge prison camps-one in the

Gaza Strip the other in the West Bank-in which many people would find itdifficult to find employment and proper housing. This may lead toimmigration and de-population that may raise the appetite of Israel for moreland.

Two final points: the wall would leave the Palestinians citizens of Israel, as a“demographic” problem inside the wall. Zionist policies in the past andpresent Sharonite plans raise severe concerns for the fate of these people,presently still citizens of Israel who number more the one and a quartermillion today. The second point is that the wall will also turn Israel into aprison hall-wardens and inmates are quite often both prisoners-which means

that the siege mentality that lies behind some of the most cruel andaggressive Israeli policies inside and outside the country will continue.

Q: T he Geneva A ccords have raised the hopes of many: critics have attack ed their

advocates, however, and emphasiz ed the need for a bi-national state rather than a “two-

state” solution to the current crisis. W here do you stand?

Pappe: First, I do support a bi-national state and find it a far better solutionthan the two-states solution offered by the Accords. In fact, I will even gofurther than that and claim that only a secular democratic single state will, at

the end of the day, bring peace and reconciliation to Palestine. It is the onlypolitical structure that allies with the demographic composition on theground-the absence of any clear homogenous territorial communities, theneed to repatriate the refugees, and the danger of the politics of identity onboth sides if they are to become state identities and the need to cater to



Ilan Pappe


crucial and urgent agendas such as poverty and ecological problems thatcannot be dealt with by a national structure in either Israel or Palestine alone.

The Geneva initiative is, like so many other peace plans in the past, an Israelidictate that seeks, and quite often finds, Palestinian partners. This presentpeace plan, like the previous one, has three assumptions that have to bedeconstructed. The first is that the ethnic cleansing of Palestine in 1948 isirrelevant to the making of peace. The second is that peace excludes anysolution for the refugee question based on the right of return and Israeliaccountability for the catastrophe of 1948. The third, is that the Palestiniansare not entitled to a state, but a dependency over roughly 15 percent of historical Palestine and for that they should declare the end of the conflict.

My point is that indeed everything possible should be done to end theoccupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip and liberate it from Israelicontrol and pass it to Palestinian hands. But this can only be a first step,because such a withdrawal does not solve the predicament of most of thePalestinian people, who live in refugee camps or are citizens of Israel. Theend of the occupation is not equivalent to the end of the conflict, as is statedin the Geneva document, it is a precondition for peace.

Israel has first to acknowledge the ethnic cleansing of 1948 and make itself accountable by implementing UN resolution 194. In the meantime, given therealities surrounding the return of refugees and the presence of so many Jews

in Palestinian areas, there will be a need to look for the appropriate politicalstructure that can carry this reconciliation. For me, the best is the one statestructure.

Q:W hat would you say to those who claim that the current policies of the Sharon regime

are in reality necessary in order to assure the security of Israel from terrorist fanatics?

Pappe: There are two answers. The first is that these policies were in tactfrom 1967, long before the first suicide bomber was even born. The secondis that we should say to them what we say to those who claim that the

neocons in Washington planned the occupation of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syriaand Iran because of 9/ 11. I think we all know that 9/ 11 was a pretext for astrategy born in a certain American school of thought of what America is allabout and how it should control the world politically, militarily andeconomically. The suicide bombers are a pretext for implementing a harsher



Ilan Pappe


version of policies of collective punishment meant to enable the territorialenlargement of Israel and the de-population of further parts of Palestine.

Q: Israel is often depicted as the lone outpost of democracy in the Middle E ast. H ow

legitimate is this claim? Or, further, is a redefinit ion of democracy tak ing place in your

country?

Pappe: I think that one of the major tests for a democracy is the treatmentof minorities. If this is accepted as a principal test case than it is ludicrous todefine Israel as a democracy, let alone as an outpost of democracy. There areofficial and formal characteristics which justify the definition of Israel as ademocracy, but it is so flawed in the field of maintaining basic civil and

human rights, that notwithstanding these attributes, one can still cast severedoubts about the definition of the state as a democracy.

As I have tried to show in the analysis of the Israeli attitude to Palestinians ascitizens or under occupation, the basic Israeli policy is a mixture of apartheidpractices and colonialist attitudes. But also the role of religion in the state andthe consequent violation of basic rights as a result are additional reasons tolook for a different definition for Israel, rather than search a new definitionfor democracy.

Q:W hat do you mak e of what has been termed the “new anti-Semitism”?

Pappe: I do not think there is a new anti-Semitism. There is anti-Semitism,rooted in the extreme right in Europe and the United States. It has beensilenced to a great extent since 1945 and it is still a marginal phenomenon.There are strong sentiments against Israel and Zionism both on the Left andamong the communities of Muslim immigrants. Some of the actions takenare reminiscent in form and tone of the old anti-Semitism, but for the mostpart, these actions have been taken against Jews who chose to representIsrael in their own countries and thus became targets for legitimate andillegitimate actions against them. Particularly appalling is the use by the Israeli

government and its supporters of the anti-Semitism card in order to silenceany criticism on its policies in Palestine.



Ilan Pappe


Q:D o you see any sources of change and hope?

Pappe: Alas, not in the near future, but I am quite hopeful about the longterm. I think there are signs that elements of civil society both in Israel and inPalestine are willing to take the issue of resolving the conflict away from thepoliticians who hijacked it for their own personal and narrow interests. Suchactions on the part of civil society, however, will unfortunately not proveeffective or assume a mass character unless there is strong external pressureon, and condemnation of, the Israeli state and its policies. A more hopefulscenario cannot materialize unless that occurs and more blood will be shed inanother round or two of violence.

Q:A rab critics have described Z ionism as a form of racism: how would you deal with that

assessment?

Pappe: Zionism is both a national movement and a colonialist project. Mostnational movements have an inherent racist element in them. They differ inhow significant this element in the national discourse and practice actually is.In Zionism, it is a particularly meaningful signifier of self-identity.

Colonialism is also very closely associated with racism and there are manyfeatures of Zionism in the past and the present that are purely colonialist in

character. The only thing I would object to in identifying Zionism and racismis the tendency to neglect other vital aspects of Zionism such as itsimportance for creating a Hebrew culture, a new nation state, and a safehaven for some Jews.



THE 1948 E THNIC CLEANSING

OF P ALESTINE

ILAN P APPE

This article, excerpted and adapted from the early chapters of a new

book, emphasizes the systematic preparations that laid the ground for

the expulsion of more than 750,000 Palestinians from what became

Israel in 1948. While sketching the context and diplomatic and polit-

ical developments of the period, the article highlights in particular a

multi-year “Village Files” project (1940–47) involving the systematic

compilation of maps and intelligence for each Arab village and the

elaboration—under the direction of an inner “caucus” of fewer than adozen men led by David Ben-Gurion—of a series of military plans cul-

minating in Plan Dalet, according to which the 1948 war was fought.

The article ends with a statement of one of the author’s underlying

goals in writing the book: to make the case for a paradigm of ethnic

cleansing to replace the paradigm of war as the basis for the scholarly

research of, and the public debate about, 1948.

ON A COLD W EDNESDAY AFTERNOON, 10 March 1948, a group of eleven men, vet-

eran Zionist leaders together with young military Jewish officers, put the final

touches on a plan for the ethnic cleansing of Palestine.1 That same evening,

military orders were dispatched to units on the ground to prepare for the sys-tematic expulsion of Palestinians from vast areas of the country.2 The orders

came with a detailed description of the methods to be used to forcibly evict

the people: large-scale intimidation; laying siege to and bombarding villages

and population centers; setting fire to homes, properties, and goods; expelling

residents; demolishing homes; and, finally, planting mines in the rubble to pre-

vent the expelled inhabitants from returning. Each unit was issued its own

list of villages and neighborhoods to target in keeping with the master plan.

Code-named Plan D ( Dalet in Hebrew), this was the fourth and final version

of vaguer plans outlining the fate that was in store for the native population

of Palestine.3 The previous three plans had articulated only obscurely how the

Zionist leadership intended to deal with the presence of so many Palestinians

on the land the Jewish national movement wanted for itself. This fourth and

ILAN P APP E, an Israeli historian and professor of political science at Haifa University, isthe author of a number of books, including The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,1947–1951 (I.B. Tauris, 1994) and A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two

Peoples (Cambridge University Press, 2004). The current article is extracted from early chapters of his latest book, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oneworld Publications,Oxford, England, forthcoming in October 2006).

Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XXXVI, No. 1 (Autumn 2006), pp. 6–20 ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614.C 2006 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permissionto photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’sRights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.

http://caliber.ucpress.net/action/showImage?doi=10.1525/jps.2006.36.1.6&iName=master.img-000.jpg&w=65&h=64



THE 1948 E THNIC CLEANSING OF P ALESTINE 7

last blueprint spelled it out clearly and unambiguously: the Palestinians had to

go.

The plan, which covered both the rural and urban areas of Palestine, was the

inevitable result both of Zionism’s ideological drive for an exclusively Jewish

presence in Palestine and a response to developments on the ground following

the British decision in February 1947 to end its Mandate over the country and

turn the problem over to the United Nations. Clashes with local Palestinian

militias, especially after the UN partition resolution of November 1947, pro-

vided the perfect context and pretext for implementing the ideological vision

of an ethnically cleansed Palestine.

Once the plan was finalized, it took six months to complete the mission.

When it was over, more than half of Palestine’s native population, over 750,000

people, had been uprooted, 531 villages had been destroyed, and 11 urban

neighborhoods had been emptied of their inhabitants. The plan decided upon

on 10 March 1948, and above all its systematic implementation in the followingmonths, wasa clear case of what is nowknown as an ethnic cleansing operation.

DEFINING E THNIC CLEANSING

Ethnic cleansing today is designated by international law as a crime against

humanity, and those who perpetrate it are subject to adjudication: a special in-

ternational tribunal has been set up in The Hague to prosecute those accused

of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, and a similar court was estab-

lished in Arusha, Tanzania, to deal with the Rwanda case. The roots of ethnic

cleansing are ancient, to be sure, and it has been practiced from biblical times

to the modern age, including at the height of colonialism and in World War II by the Nazis and their allies. But it was especially the events in the former

Yugoslavia that gave rise to efforts to define the concept and that continue to

serve as the prototype of ethnic cleansing. For example, in its special report

on ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the U.S. State Department defines the term as

“the systematic and forced removal of the members of an ethnic group from

communities in order to change the ethnic composition of a given region.”

The report goes on to document numerous cases, including the depopulation

within twenty-four hours of the western Kosovar town of Pec in spring 1999,

which could only have been achieved through advanced planning followed

by systematic execution.3 Earlier, a congressional report prepared in August

1992 for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee had described the “pro-

cess of population transfers aimed at removing the non-Serbian population

from large areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina,” noting that the campaign had “sub-

stantially achieved its goals: an exclusively Serb-inhabited region . . . created by

forcibly expelling the Muslim populations that had been the overwhelming ma-

jority.” According to this report, the two main elements of ethnic cleansing are,

first, “the deliberate use of artillery and snipers against the civilian populations

of the big cities,” and second, “the forced movement of civilian populations

[entailing] the systematic destruction of homes, the looting of personal



8 JOURNAL OF P ALESTINE S TUDIES

property, beatings, selective and random killings, and massacres.”4 Similar de-

scriptions are found in the UN Council for Human Rights (UNCHR) report of

1993, which was prepared in follow-up to a UN Security Council Resolution of

April 1993 that reaffirmed “its condemnation of all violations of internationalhumanitarian law, in particular the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ ” Showing how

a state’s desire to impose a single ethnic rule on a mixed area links up to acts

of expulsion and violence, the report describes the unfolding ethnic cleansing

process where men are separated from women and detained, where resistance

leads to massacres, and where villages are blown up, with the remaining houses

subsequently repopulated with another ethnic group.5

In addition to the United States and the UN, academics, too, have used the

former Yugoslavia as the starting point for their studies of the phenomenon.

Drazen Petrovic has published one of the most comprehensive studies of ethnic

cleansing, which he describes as “a well-defined policy of a particular group of

persons to systematically eliminate another group from a given territory on thebasis of religious, ethnic or national origin. Such a policy involves violence and

is very often connected with military operations.”6 Petrovic associates ethnic

cleansing with nationalism, the creation of new nation-states, and national

struggle, noting the close connection between politicians and the army in the

perpetration of the crime:the political leadership delegates the implementation

of the ethnic cleansing to the military level, and although it does not furnish

systematic plans or provide explicit instructions, there is no doubt as to the

overall objective.

These descriptions almost exactly mirror what happened in Palestine in

1948: Plan D constitutes a veritable repertoire of the cleansing methods de-

scribed in the various reports on Yugoslavia, setting the background for themassacres that accompanied the expulsions. Indeed, it seems to me that had

we never heard about the events in the former Yugoslavia of the 1990s and

were aware only of the Palestine case, we would be forgiven for thinking that

the Nakba had been the inspiration for the descriptions and definitions above,

almost to the last detail.

Yet when it comes to the dispossession by Israel of the Palestinians in 1948,

there is a deep chasm between the reality and the representation. This is most

bewildering, and it is difficult to understand how events perpetrated in modern

times and witnessed by foreign reporters and UN observers could be systemat-

ically denied, not even recognized as historical fact, let alone acknowledged as

a crime that needs to be confronted, politically as well as morally. Nonetheless,

there is no doubt that the ethnic cleansing of 1948, the most formative event in

the modern history of the land of Palestine, has been almost entirely eradicated

from the collective global memory and erased from the world’s conscience.

SETTING THE S TAGE

When even a measure of Israeli responsibility for the disappearance of half

the Arab population of Palestine is acknowledged (the official government




version continues to reject any responsibility whatsoever, insisting that the local

population left “voluntarily”), the standard explanation is that their flight was an

unfortunate but unavoidable by-product of war. But what happened in Palestine

was by no means an unintended consequence, a fortuitous occurrence, or even

a “miracle,” as Israel’s first president Chaim Weitzmann later proclaimed. Rather,

it was the result of long and meticulous planning.

The potential for a future Jewish takeover of the country and the expul-

sion of the indigenous Palestinian people had been present in the writings of

the founding fathers of Zionism, as scholars later discovered. But it was not

until the late 1930s, two decades after Britain’s 1917 promise to turn Pales-

tine into a national home for the Jews (a pledge that became enshrined in

Britain’s Mandate over Palestine in 1923), that Zionist leaders began to trans-

late their abstract vision of Jewish exclusivity into more concrete plans. New

vistas were opened in 1937 when the British Royal Peel Commission7 recom-

mended partitioning Palestine into two states. Though the territory earmarkedfor the Jewish state fell far short of Zionist ambitions, the leadership responded

favorably, aware of the signal importance of official recognition of the princi-

ple of Jewish statehood on even part of Palestine. Several years later, in 1942,

a more maximalist strategy was adopted when the Zionist leader David Ben-

Gurion, in a meeting at the Biltmore Hotel in New York, put demands on the

table for a Jewish commonwealth over the whole of Mandatory Palestine.8

Thus, the geographical space coveted by the movement changed according

to circumstances and opportunities, but the principal objective remained the

same: the creation in Palestine of a purely Jewish state, both as a safe haven for

Jews and as the cradle of a new Jewish nationalism. And this state had to be

exclusively Jewish not only in its sociopolitical structure but also in its ethniccomposition.

That the top leaders were well aware of the implications of this exclusivity

was clear in their internal debates, diaries, and private correspondence. Ben-

Gurion, for example, wrote in a letter to his son in 1937, “The Arabs will have

to go, but one needs an opportune moment for making it happen, such as a

war.”9 Unlike most of his colleagues in the Zionist leadership, who still hoped

that by purchasing a piece of land here and a few houses there they would be

able to realize their objective on the ground, Ben-Gurion had long understood

that this would never be enough. He recognized early on that the Jewish state

could be won only by force but that it was necessary to bide one’s time until the

opportune moment arrived for dealing militarily with the demographic reality

on the ground: the presence of a non-Jewish native majority.

The Zionist movement, led by Ben-Gurion, wasted no time in preparing

for the eventuality of taking the land by force if it were not granted through

diplomacy. These preparations included the building of an efficient military

organization and the search for more ample financial resources (for which they

tapped into the Jewish Diaspora). In many ways, the creation of an embryonic

diplomatic corps was also an integral part of the same general preparations

aimed at creating by force a state in Palestine.




The principal paramilitary organization of the Jewish community in Palestine

had been established in 1920 primarily to defend the Jewish colonies being

implanted among Palestinian villages. Sympathetic British officers, however,

helped transform it into the military force that eventually was able to imple-

ment plans for the Zionist military takeover of Palestine and the ethnic cleansing

of its native population. One officer in particular, Orde Wingate, was responsi-

ble for this transformation. It was he who made the Zionist leaders realize more

fully that the idea of Jewish statehood had to be closely associated with mili-

tarism and an army, not only to protect the growing number of Jewish colonies

inside Palestine but also—more crucially—because acts of armed aggression

were an effective deterrent against possible resistance by local Palestinians.

Assigned to Palestine in 1936, Wingate also succeeded in attaching Haganah

troops to the British forces during the Arab Revolt (1936–39), enabling the Jews

to practice the attack tactics he had taught them in rural areas and to learn even

more effectively what a “punitive mission” to an Arab village ought to entail.The Haganah also gained valuable military experience in World War II, when

quite a few of its membersvolunteered for the British war effort. Others who re-

mained behind in Palestine, meanwhile, continued to monitor and infiltrate the

1,200 or so Palestinian villages that had dotted the countryside for hundreds of

years.

THE V ILLAGE FILES

Attacking Arab villages and carrying out punitive raids gave Zionists expe-

rience, but it was not enough; systematic planning was called for. In 1940, a

young bespectacled Hebrew University historian named Ben-Zion Luria, thenemployed by the educational department of the Jewish Agency, the Zionist gov-

erning body in Palestine, made an important suggestion. He pointed out how

useful it would be to have a detailed registry of all Arab villages and proposed

that the Jewish National Fund (JNF) conduct such an inventory. “This would

greatly help the redemption of the land,” he wrote to the JNF.10 He could not

have chosen a better address: the way his initiative involved the JNF in the

prospective ethnic cleansing was to generate added impetus and zeal to the

expulsion plans that followed.

Founded in 1901 at the fifth Zionist Congress, the JNF was the Zionists’

principal tool for the colonization of Palestine. This was the agency the Zion-

ist movement used to buy Palestinian land on which it then settled Jewish

immigrants and that spearheaded the Zionization of Palestine throughout the

Mandatory years. From the outset, it was designed to become the “custodian”

on behalf of the Jewish people of the land acquired by the Zionists in Palestine.

The JNF maintained this role after Israel’s creation, with other missions being

added to this primordial task over time.11

Despite the JNF’s best efforts, its success in land acquisition fell far short

of its goals. Available financial resources were limited, Palestinian resistance

was fierce, and British policies had become restrictive. The result was that




by the end of the Mandate in 1948 the Zionist movement had been able to

purchase no more than 5.8 percent of the land in Palestine.12 This is why Yossef

Weitz, the head of the JNF settlement department and the quintessential Zionist

colonialist, waxed lyrical when he heard about Luria’s village files, immediately

suggesting that they be turned into a “national project.”13

All involved became fervent supporters of the idea. Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, a histo-

rian and prominent member of the Zionist leadership (later to become Israel’s

second president), wrote to Moshe Shertock (Sharett), the head of the political

department of the Jewish Agency (and later Israel’s prime minister), that apart

from topographically recording the layout of the villages, the project should

also include exposing the “Hebraic origins” of each village. Furthermore, it

was important for the Haganah to know which of the villages were relatively

new, as some of them had been built “only” during the Egyptian occupation of

Palestine in the 1830s.14

But the main endeavor was mapping the villages, and to that end a He-brew University topographer working in the Mandatory government’s cartog-

raphy department was recruited to the enterprise. He suggested preparing focal

aerial maps and proudly showed Ben-Gurion two such maps for the villages of

Sindyana and Sabarin. (These maps, now in the Israeli State Archives, are all

that remains of these villages after 1948.) The best professional photographers

in the country were also invited to join the initiative. Yitzhak Shefer, from Tel

Aviv, and Margot Sadeh, the wife of Yitzhak Sadeh, the chief of the Palmah (the

commando units of the Haganah), were recruited as well. The film laboratory

operated in Margot’s house with an irrigation company serving as a front: the

lab had to be hidden from the British authorities who could have regarded it

as an illegal intelligence effort directed against them. Though the British wereaware of the project, they never succeeded in locating the secret hideout. In

1947, this whole cartographic department was moved to the Haganah head-

quarters in Tel Aviv.15

The end result of the combined topographic and Orientalist efforts was a

large body of detailed files gradually built up for each of Palestine’s villages.

By the late 1940s, the “archive” was almost complete. Precise details were

recorded about the topographic location of each village, its access roads, quality

of land, water springs, main sources of income, its sociopolitical composition,

religious affiliations, names of its mukhtar s, its relationship with other villages,

the age of individual men (16–50), and much more. An important category was

an index of “hostility” (toward the Zionist project, that is) as determined by

the level of the village’s participation in the 1936–39 Arab Revolt. The material

included lists of everyone involved in the revolt and the families of those who

had lost someone in the fight against the British. Particular attention was given

to people alleged to have killed Jews.

That this was no mere academic exercise in geography was immediately

obvious to the regular members of the Haganah who were entrusted with

collecting the data on “reconnaissance” missions into the villages. One of those

who joined a data collection operation in 1940 was Moshe Pasternak, who




recalled many years later:

We had to study the basic structure of the Arab village. This

means the structure and how best to attack it. In the military

schools, I had been taught how to attack a modern Europeancity, not a primitive village in the Near East. We could not com-

pare it [an Arab village] to a Polish, or an Austrian one. The

Arab village, unlike the European ones, was built topographi-

cally on hills. That meant we had to find out how best to ap-

proach the village from above or enter it from below. We had

to train our “Arabists” [the Orientalists who operated a net-

work of collaborators] how best to work with informants.16

Indeed, the difficulties of “working with informants” and creating a collabora-

tionist system with the “primitive” people “who like to drink coffee and eat

rice with their hands” were noted in many of the village files. Nonetheless, by 1943, Pasternak remembered, there was a growing sense that finally a proper

network of informants was in place. That same year, the village files were re-

arranged to become even more systematic. This was mainly the work of one

man, Ezra Danin,17 who was to play a leading role in the ethnic cleansing of

Palestine.

In many ways, it was the recruitment of Ezra Danin, who had been taken

out of his successful citrus grove business for the purpose, that injected the

intelligence work and the organization of the village files with a new level

of efficiency. Files in the post-1943 era included for each village detailed de-

scriptions of the husbandry, cultivation, the number of trees in plantations, the

quality of each fruit grove (even of individual trees!), the average land holdingper family, the number of cars, the names of shop owners, members of work-

shops, and the names of the artisans and their skills.18 Later, meticulous details

were added about each clan and its political affiliation, the social stratification

between notables and common peasants, and the names of the civil servants in

the Mandatory government. The antlike labor of the data collection created its

own momentum, and around 1945 additional details began to appear such as

descriptions of village mosques, the names of their imams (together with such

characterizations as “he is an ordinary man”), and even precise accounts of the

interiors of the homes of dignitaries. Not surprisingly, as the end of the Mandate

approached, the information became more explicitly military orientated: the

number of guards in each village (most had none) and the quantity and quality

of arms at the villagers’ disposal (generally antiquated or even nonexistent).19

Danin recruited a German Jew named Yaacov Shimoni, later to become

one of Israel’s leading Orientalists, and put him in charge of “special projects”

in the villages, in particular supervising the work of the informants.20 (One

of these informants, nicknamed the “treasurer” ( ha-gizbar ) by Danin and

Shimoni, proved a fountain of information for the data collectorsand supervised

the collaborators’ network on their behalf until 1945, when he was exposed

and killed by Palestinian militants.21 ) Other colleagues working with Danin and




Shimoni were Yehoshua Palmon and Tuvia Lishanski, who also took an active

part in preparing for the ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Lishanski had already

been busy in the 1940s orchestrating campaigns to forcibly evict tenants living

on lands purchased by the JNF from present or absentee landlords.

Not far from the village of Furiedis and the “veteran” Jewish settlement,

Zikhron Yaacov, where today a road connects the coastal highway with Marj

Ibn Amr (Emeq Izrael) through Wadi Milk, lies a youth village called Shefeya. It

was here that in 1944 special units employed by the village files project received

their training, and it was from here that they went out on their reconnaissance

missions. Shefeya looked very much like a spy village in the cold war: Jews

walking around speaking Arabic and trying to emulate what they believed were

the customs and behavior of rural Palestinians.22 Many years later, in 2002, one

of the first recruits to this special training base recalled his first reconnaissance

mission to the nearby village of Umm al-Zaynat in 1944. The aim had been to

survey the village and bring back details of where the mukhtar lived, wherethe mosque was located, where the rich villagers lived, who had been active

in the 1936–39 revolt, and so on. These were not dangerous missions, as the

infiltrators knew they could exploit the traditional Arab hospitality code and

were even guests at the home of the mukhtar himself. As they failed to collect

in one day all the data they were seeking, they asked to be invited back. For

their second visit they had been instructed to make sure to get a good idea of

the fertility of the land, whose quality seemed to have highly impressed them:

in 1948, Umm al-Zaynat was destroyed and all its inhabitants expelled without

any provocation on their part whatsoever.23

The final update of the village files took place in 1947. It focused on creating

lists of “wanted” persons in each village. In 1948, Jewish troops used theselists for the search-and-arrest operations they carried out as soon as they had

occupied a village. That is, the men in the village would be lined up and those

whose names appeared on the lists would be identified, often by the same

person who had informed on them in the first place, but now wearing a cloth

sack over his head with two holes cut out for his eyes so as not to be recognized.

The men who were picked out were often shot on the spot.

Among the criteria for inclusion in these lists, besides having participated in

actions against the British and the Zionists, were involvement in the Palestinian

national movement (which could apply to entire villages) and having close ties

to the leader of the movement, the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husayni, or being affiliated

with his political party.24 Given the Mufti’s dominance of Palestinian politics

since the establishment of the Mandate in 1923, and the prominent positions

held by members of his party in the Arab Higher Committee that became the

embryo government of the Palestinians, this offense too was very common.

Other reasons for being included in the list were such allegations as “known

to have traveled to Lebanon” or “arrested by the British authorities for being a

member of a national committee in the village.”25 An examination of the 1947

files shows that villages with about 1,500 inhabitants usually had 20–30 such

suspects (for instance, around the southern Carmel mountains, south of Haifa,




Umm al-Zaynat had 30 such suspects and the nearby village of Damun had

25).26

Yigael Yadin recalled that it was this minute and detailed knowledge of

each and every Palestinian village that enabled the Zionist military command

in November 1947 to conclude with confidence “that the Palestine Arabs had

nobody to organize them properly.” The only serious problem was the British:

“If not for the British, we could have quelled the Arab riot [the opposition to

the UN Partition Resolution in 1947] in one month.” 27

G EARING U P FOR W AR

As World War II drew to a close, the Zionist movement had obtained a

much clearer general sense of how best to go about getting its state off the

ground. By that time, it was clear that the Palestinians did not constitute a real

obstacle to Zionist plans. True, they still formed the overwhelming majority in the land, and as such they were a demographic problem, but they were no

longer feared as a military threat. A crucial factor was that the British had already

completely destroyed the Palestinian leadership and defense capabilities in

1939 when they suppressed the 1936–39 Arab Revolt, allowing the Zionist

leadership ample time to set out their next moves. The Zionist leadership was

also aware of the hesitant position that the Arab states as a whole were taking

on the Palestine question. Thus, once the danger of Nazi invasion into Palestine

had been removed, the Zionist leaders were keenly aware that the sole obstacle

that stood in the way of their seizing the country was the British presence.

As long as Britain had been holding the fort against Nazi Germany, it was

impossible, of course, to pressure them. But with the end of the war, and es-pecially with the postwar Labor government looking for a democratic solution

in Palestine (which would have spelled doom for the Zionist project given the

75-percent Arab majority), it was clear that Britain had to go. Some 100,000

British troops remained in Palestine after the war and, in a country with a popu-

lation under two million, this definitely served as a deterrent, even after Britain

cut back its forces somewhat following the Jewish terrorist attack on it head-

quarters in the King David Hotel. It was these considerations that prompted

Ben-Gurion to conclude that it was better to settle for less than the 100 per-

cent demanded under the 1942 Biltmore program and that a slightly smaller

state would be enough to allow the Zionist movement to fulfill its dreams and

ambitions.28

This was the issue that was debated by the movement in the final days of

August 1946, when Ben-Gurion assembled the leadership of the Zionist move-

ment at the Royal Monsue hotel in Paris. Holding back the more extremist

members, Ben-Gurion told the gathering that 80 to 90 percent of Mandatory

Palestine was plenty for creating a viable state, provided they were able to

ensure Jewish predominance. “We will demand a large chunk of Palestine”

he told those present. A few months later the Jewish Agency translated

Ben-Gurion’s “large chunk of Palestine” into a map which it distributed to




the parties relevant to deciding the future of Palestine. Interestingly, the Jewish

Agency map, which was larger than the map proposed by the UN in November

1947, turned out to be, almost to the last dot, the map that emerged from the

fighting in 1948–49: pre-1967 Israel, that is, Palestine without the West Bank

and the Gaza Strip.29

The major topic on the Zionist agenda in 1946, the struggle against the

British, resolved itself with Britain’s decision in February 1947 to quit Palestine

and to transfer the Palestine question to the UN. In fact, the British had little

choice: after the Holocaust they would never be able to deal with the looming

Jewish rebellion as they had with the Arab one in the 1930s. Moreover, as the

Labor party had made up its mind to leave India, Palestine lost much of its

attraction. Fuel shortages during a particularly cold winter in 1947 drove the

message home to London that the empire was soon to be a second-rate power,

its global influence dwarfed by the two new superpowers (the United States

and the Soviet Union) and its postwar economy crippled. Rather than holdonto remote places such as Palestine, the Labor party saw as its priority the

building of a welfare state at home. In the end, Britain pulled out in a hurry,

and with no regrets.30

By the end of 1946, even before Britain’s decision, Ben-Gurion had already

realized that the British were on their way out and, with his aides, began work-

ing on a general strategy that could be implemented against the Palestinian

population the moment the British were gone. This strategy became Plan C,

or Gimel in Hebrew. Plan C was a revised version of two earlier plans. Plan A

was also named the “Elimelech Plan,” after Elimelech Avnir, the Haganah com-

mander in Tel Aviv who in 1937, at Ben-Gurion’s request, had set out possible

guidelines for the takeover of Palestine in the event of a British withdrawal.Plan B had been devised in 1946. Shortly thereafter, the two plans were fused

to form Plan C.

Like Plans A and B, Plan C aimed to prepare the Jewish community’s military

forces for theoffensive campaigns they would be waging against rural andurban

Palestine after the departure of the British. The purpose of such actions would

be to “deter” the Palestinian population from attacking Jewish settlements and

to retaliate for assaults on Jewish houses, roads, and traffic. Plan C spelled out

clearly what punitive actions of this kind would entail:

Striking at the political leadership.

Striking at inciters and their financial supporters.Striking at Arabs who acted against Jews.

Striking at senior Arab officers and officials [in the Mandatory

system].

Hitting Palestinian transportation.

Damaging the sources of livelihood and vital economic targets

(water wells, mills, etc.).

Attacking villages, neighborhoods, likely to assist in future

attacks.

Attacking clubs, coffee houses, meeting places, etc.




Plan C added that the data necessary for the successful performance of these

actions could be found in the village files: lists of leaders, activists, “potential

human targets,” the precise layout of villages, and so on.31

The plan lacked operational specifics, however, and within a few months, a

new plan was drawn up, Plan D ( Dalet ). This was the plan that sealed the fate

of the Palestinians within the territory the Zionist leaders had set their eyes

on for their future Jewish State. Unlike Plan C, it contained direct references

both to the geographical parameters of the future Jewish state (the 78 percent

provided for in the 1946 Jewish Agency map) and to the fate of the one million

Palestinians living within that space:

These operations can be carried out in the following man-

ner: either by destroying villages (by setting fire to them, by

blowing them up, and by planting mines in their rubble), and

especially those population centers that are difficult to con-

trol permanently; or by mounting combing and control oper-

ations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of

the villages, conducting a search inside them. In case of resis-

tance, the armed forces must be wiped out and the population

expelled outside the borders of the state.32

No village within the planned area of operations was exempted from these

orders, either because of its location or because it was expected to put up

some resistance. This was the master plan for the expulsion of all the villages

in rural Palestine. Similar instructions were given, in much the same wording,

for actions directed at Palestine’s urban centers.

The orders coming through to the units in the field were more specific.The country was divided into zones according to the number of brigades,

whereby the four original brigades of the Haganah were turned into twelve so

Documents from the IDF

archives show clearly that,

contrary to claims made by

historians such as Benny

Morris, Plan Dalet was

handed down to the

brigade commanders not

as vague guidelines, but as

clear-cut operative orders

for action.

as to facilitate implementing the plan. Each brigade

commander received a list of the villages or neighbor-

hoods in his zone that had to be occupied, destroyed,

and their inhabitants expelled, with exact dates. Some

commanders were overly zealous in executing their or-

ders, adding other locations as the momentum of their

operation carried them forward. Some of the orders,

on the other hand, proved too ambitious and could

not be implemented within the expected timetable.This meant that several villages on the coast that had

been scheduled to be occupied in May were destroyed

only in July. And the villages in the Wadi Ara area—a

valley connecting the coast near Hadera with Marj Ibn Amr (Emeq Izrael) and

Afula (today’s Route 65)—somehow succeeded in surviving all the Jewish at-

tacks until the end of the war. But they were the exception. For the most part,

the destruction of the villages and urban neighborhoods, and the removal of

their inhabitants, took place as planned. And by the time the direct order had

been issued in March, thirty villages were already obliterated.




A few days after Plan D was typed out, it was distributed among the com-

manders of the dozen brigades that now comprised the Haganah. With the list

each commander received came a detailed description of the villages in his field

of operation and their imminent fate—occupation, destruction, and expulsion.

The Israeli documents released from the IDF archives in the late 1990s show

clearly that, contrary to claims made by historians such as Benny Morris, Plan

Dalet was handed down to the brigade commanders not as vague guidelines,

but as clear-cut operative orders for action.33

Unlike the general draft that was sent to the political leaders, the instructions

and lists of villages received by the military commanders did not place any

restrictions on how the action of destruction or expulsion was to be carried out.

There were no provisions as to how villages could avoid their fate, for example

through unconditional surrender, as promised in the general document. There

was another difference between the draft handed to the politicians and the one

given to the military commanders: the official draft stated that the plan wouldnot be activated until after the Mandate ended, whereas the officers on the

ground were ordered to start executing it within a few days of its adoption. This

dichotomy is typical of the relationship that exists in Israel between the army

and politicians until today—the army quite often misinforms the politicians of

their real intentions, as Moshe Dayan did in 1956, Ariel Sharon did in 1982, and

Shaul Mofaz did in 2000.

What the political version of Plan Dalet and the military directives had in

common was the overall purpose of the scheme. In other words, even before

the direct orders had reached the field, troops already knew exactly what was

expected of them. The venerable and courageous Israeli fighter for civil rights,

Shulamit Aloni, who was an officer at the time, recalls how special politicalofficers would come down and actively incite the troops by demonizing the

Palestinians and invoking the Holocaust as the point of reference for the op-

eration ahead, often planned for the day after the indoctrination had taken

place.34

THE P ARADIGM OF E THNIC CLEANSING

In my forthcoming book, I want to explore the mechanism of the ethnic

cleansing of 1948 as well as the cognitive system that has allowed the world

to forget and the perpetrators to deny the crime committed by the Zionist

movement against the Palestinian people.

In other words, I want to make the case for a paradigm of ethnic cleansing

to replace the paradigm of war as the basis for the scholarly research of, and

the public debate about, 1948. I have no doubt that the absence so far of the

paradigm of ethnic cleansing is one reason why the denial of the catastrophe

has gone on for so long. It is not that the Zionist movement, in creating its

nation-state, waged a war that “tragically but inevitably” led to the expulsion

of “parts of the indigenous population.” Rather, it is the other way round: the

objective was the ethnic cleansing of the country the movement coveted for




its new state, and the war was the consequence, the means to carry it out. On

15 May 1948, the day after the official end of the Mandate and the day the State

of Israel was proclaimed, the neighboring Arab states sent a small army—small

in comparison to their overall military capability—to try to stop the ethnic

cleansing operations that had already been in full swing for over a month. The

war with the regular Arab armies did nothing to prevent the ongoing ethnic

cleansing, which continued to its successful completion in the autumn of 1948.

To many, the idea of adopting the paradigm of ethnic cleansing as the a

priori basis for the narrative of 1948 may appear no more than an indictment.

And in many ways, it is indeed my own J’Accuse against the politicians who

devised the ethnic cleansing and the generals who carried it out. These men

are not obscure. They are the heroes of the Jewish war of independence, and

their names will be quite familiar to most readers. The list begins with the indis-

putable leader of the Zionist movement, David Ben-Gurion, in whose private

home all the chapters in the ethnic cleansing scheme were discussed and final-ized. He was aided by a small group of people I refer to as the “Consultancy,” an

ad-hoc cabal assembled solely for the purpose of planning the dispossession of

the Palestinians.35 In one of the rare documents that records the meeting of this

body, it is referred to as the Consultant Committee— Haveadah Hamyeazet ; in

another document the eleven names of the committee appear.36 Though these

names were all erased by the censor, it has been possible to reconstruct them.

This caucus prepared the plans for the ethnic cleansing and supervised

its execution until the job of uprooting half of Palestine’s native population

had been completed. It included first and foremost the top-ranking officers of

the future state’s army, such as the legendary Yigael Yadin and Moshe Dayan.

They were joined by figures little known outside Israel but well grounded inthe local ethos, such as Yigal Alon and Yitzhak Sadeh, followed by regional

commanders, such as Moshe Kalman, who cleansed the Safad area, and Moshe

Carmel, who uprooted most of the Galilee. Yitzhak Rabin operated both in

al-Lyyd and Ramleh, as well as in the Greater Jerusalem area. Shimon Avidan

cleansed the south; many years later Rehavam Ze’evi, who fought with him,

said admiringly that he “cleansed his front from tens of villages and towns.”37

Also on the southern front was Yitzhak Pundak, who told Ha’Aretz in 2004,

“There were two hundred villages [in the front] and they are gone. We had

to destroy them, otherwise we would have had Arabs here [namely in the

southern part of Palestine] as we have in Galilee. We would have had another

million Palestinians.”38

These military men commingled with what nowadays we would call the

“Orientalists”: experts on the Arab world at large, and the Palestinians in par-

ticular, either because they themselves came from Arab lands or because they

were scholars in the field of Middle Eastern studies. Some of these were intel-

ligence officers on the ground during this crucial period. Far from being mere

collectors of data on the “enemy,” intelligence officers not only played a major

role in preparing for the cleansing, but some also personally took part in some

of the worst atrocities that accompanied the systematic dispossession of the




Palestinians. It was they who were given the final authority to decide which

villages would be ground to dust and which villagers would be executed.39 In

the memories of Palestinian survivors, they were the ones who, after a village

or neighborhood had been occupied, decided the fate of its peasants or town

dwellers, which could mean imprisonment or freedom or spell the difference

between life and death. Their operations in 1948 were supervised by Issar

Harel, who later became the first head of Mossad and the Shin Bet, Israel’s

secret services.

I mention their names, but my purpose in doing so is not that I want to

see them posthumously brought to trial. Rather, my aim here and in my book

is to humanize the victimizers as well as the victims: I want to prevent the

crimes Israel committed from being attributed to such elusive factors as “the

circumstances,” “the army,” or, as Benny Morris has it, “la guerre comme la

guerre,” and similar vague references that let sovereign states off the hook and

give individuals a clear conscience. I accuse, but I am also part of the society that stands condemned. I feel both responsible for, and part of, the story. But

like others in my own society, I am also convinced that a painful journey into

the past is the only way forward if we want to create a better future for us all,

Palestinians and Israelis alike.

NOTES

1. The composition of the group thatmet is the product of a mosaicreconstruction of several documents, as

will be demonstrated in my book, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford:Oneworld Publications, 2006). Thedocument summarizing the meeting isfound in the Israel Defense Force Archives[IDFA], GHQ/Operations branch, 10 March 1948, File no. 922/75/595, and in theHaganah Archives [HA], File no. 73/94.The description of the meeting is repeatedby Israel Galili in the Mapai center meeting, 4 April 1948, found in the HA,File no. 80/50/18. Chapter 4 of my book also documents the messages that wentout on 10 March as well as the eleven

meetings prior to finalizing of the plan, of which full minutes were recorded only for the January meeting.

2. The historian Meir Pail claims, in From Haganah to the IDF [in Hebrew](Tel Aviv: Zemora Bitan Modan, n.d.), p.307, that the orders were sent a week later.For the dispatch of the orders, see alsoGershon Rivlin and Elhanan Oren, The War

of Independence: Ben-Gurion’s Diary, vol.1 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), p.147. The orders dispatched to the Haganah

brigades to move to State D— Mazav

Dalet —and from the brigades to thebattalions can be found in HA, File no.

73/94, 16 April 1948.3. On Plan Dalet, which was approved

in its broad lines several weeks before thatmeeting, see Uri Ben-Eliezer, The

Emergence of Israeli Militarism,

1936–1956 (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1995), p. 253:“Plan Dalet aimed at cleansing of villages,expulsion of Arabs from mixed towns.”

4. State Department Special Report,“Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing inKosovo,” 10 May 1999.

5. The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina: A Staff Report to theCommittee on Foreign Relations,” U.S.

Senate, August 1992, S.PRT. 102–103.6. United Nations, “Report Following

Security Council Resolution 819,” 16 April1993.

7. Drazen Petrovic, “Ethnic Cleansing: An Attempt at Methodology,” European

Journal of International Law 5, no. 3(1994), pp. 342–60.

8. On Peel, see Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

(Boston and New York: Beford/St. Martin’sPress, 2004), pp. 135–37.




9. Smith, Palestine, pp. 167–68.10. Ben-Gurion Archives [BGA],

Ben-Gurion Diary, 12 July 1937.11. “The Inelegance Service and the

Village Files, 1940–1948” (prepared by Shimri Salomon), Bulletin of the Haganah

Archives, issues 9–10 (2005).12. For a critical survey of the JNF, see

Uri Davis, Apartheid Israel: Possibilities

for the Struggle Within (London: ZedBooks, 2004).

13. Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion and

the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).14. Teveth, Ben-Gurion.15. HA, File no. 66.816. Testimony of Yoeli Optikman, HA,

Village Files, File 24/9, 16 January 2003.

17. HA, File no. 1/080/451, 1December 193918. HA, File no. 194/7, pp. 1–3, given

on 19 December 2002.19. John Bierman and Colin Smith,

Fire in the Night: Wingate of Burma,

Ethiopia, and Zion (New York: RandomHouse, 1999).

20. HA, Files no. S25/4131, no.105/224, and no. 105/227, and many others in this series, each dealing with adifferent village.

21. Hillel Cohen, The Shadow Army:

Palestinian Collaborators in the Service

of Zionism [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem:Hozata Ivrit, 2004).22. Interview with Palti Sela, HA, File

no. 205.9, 10 January 1988.23. Interview, HA, File no. 194.7, pp.

1–3, 19 December 2002.24. HA, Village Files, File no. 105/255

files from January 1947.25. IDFA, File no. 114/49/5943, orders

from 13 April 1948.26. IDFA, File no. 105.178.27. HA, Village Files, File no. 105/255,

from January 1947.28. Quoted in Harry Sacher, Israel:

The Establishment of a State (London: Wiedenfels and Nicloson, 1952), p. 217.

29. On British policy, see Ilan Pappe, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,

1948–1951 (London: St. Antony’s/ Macmillan Press, 1984).30. Moshe Sluzki interview with

Moshe Sneh in Gershon Rivlin, ed., Olive

Leaves and Sword: Documents and

Studies of the Haganah [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: IDF Publications, 1990), pp. 9–40.

31. See Pappe, Britain.32. Yehuda Sluzki, The Haganah

Book, vol. 3, part 3 [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv:IDF Publications, 1964), p. 1942.

33. The English translation is in WalidKhalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for theConquest of Palestine,” Journal of

Palestine Studies 38, no. 1 (Autumn 1988),pp. 4–20.34. See discussion of State D ( Mazav

Dalet )—that is, the transition from Plan Dto its actual implementation—in chapter 5of Pappe, Ethnic Cleansing .

35. The plan distributed to the soldiersand the first direct commands are in IDFA,File no. 1950/2315 File 47, 11 May 1948.

36. The most important meetings aredescribed in chapter 3 of Pappe, Ethnic

Cleansing .37. “From Ben-Gurion to Galili and the

Members of the Committee,” BGA,

Correspondence Section,1.01.1948–07.01.48, documents 79–81.The document also provides a list of forty Palestinians leaders that are target for assassination by the Haganah forces.

38. Yedi’ot Aharonot , 2 February 1992.

39. Ha’Aretz , 21 May 2004.40. For details, see Pappe, Ethnic

Cleansing . The authority to destroy can befound in the orders sent on 10 March tothe troops and specific orders authorizingexecutions are in IDFA, File no. 5943/49doc. 114, 13 April 1948.



The Tantura Case in Israel: The Katz Research and Trial

Ilan Pappe

Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3. (Spring, 2001), pp. 19-39.

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This article examines the academic and legal controversy that has

arisen in Israel over a graduate thesis using oral history-the taped

testimonies of both Arab and Jewish witnesses-to document a massa-

cre carried out by Israeli forces against the Palestinian coastal village

of Tantura in late May 1948. Though the researcher, Teddy Katz, is

himself a Zionist, the case sheds light on the extent to which main-

stream Zionism is prepared to go in discouraging research that bringsto the fore such aspects of the 1 9 4 8 war as "ethnic cleansing." The

article also discusses the research itself and summarizes the actual

massacre as it can be reconstructed from the available sources. It is

followed by excerpts from some of the transcripts.

ON21 JANUARY 2000, the Israeli daily Ma'ariv published a long article on the

massacre of Tantura. Written by journalist Arnir Gilat, the article was based

mainly on a master's thesis by Teddy Katz, a student in the department of

Middle Eastern History at Haifa University. The thesis , entitled "The Exo dus

of the Arabs from Villages at the Foot of Southern Mount C armel," had be en

awarded the highest possible grade for a master's thesis several months ear-

lier. (It had be en submitted in March 1998, but for complications hav ing

nothing to d o with the case itself, was examined only at the e nd of 1999.)'

The thesis is microhistorical research o n the 1948 war focusing o n five Pales-

tinian coastal villages between Hadera an d Haifa, particularly on the villages

of Umm Zaynat and Tantura. The testimonies reproduced by Katz in his

fourth chapter tell a chilling tale of brutal massacre, the gist of which is that

o n 22-23 May 1948, som e 200 unarmed Tantura villagers, mostly young

men, were shot dead after the village had surrendered following the on-slaught of Haganah troops.

The basic idea behind Katz's thesis is that even works focused exclusively

o n the 1948 war, such as Benny Morris's Birth of the Palestinian Refugee

Problem, 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 4 9 ,~have not dealt in detail with the fate of individual

villages. At the heart of the thesis are the oral testimonies Katz obtained, for

ILANPAPPI!is a professor in the department of political science at Haifa University and theauthor of a number of books, including 7he Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,

1947-1951 (London: I . B. Tauris, 1992).

Journal of Palestine Studies XXX,no. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 19-39.



microresearch of this kind could not have been carried out relying solely on

archival material, which for individual villages is exceeding ly scant.

Certainly, Katz was aware of the pitfalls of oral history, but his supervisor

guided him, rightly in my opinion, to treat oral history as a significant and

vital com ponen t in the historical reconstruction of the Nakba (the PalestinianCatastrophe of 1948). Especially with the adven t of e lectronic recording , oral

history has gained increasing recognition in the past decades in the aca-

demic community worldwide: there are more than a thousand oral history

programs under university auspices in the United States alone.3 Nor is writ-

ten documentation still seen as necessarily more authentic or reliable than

oral history. This is particularly m e w ith regard to Israel Defense Forces

(IDF) documents concerning the 1948 war, which are mainly reports o r cor-

respondence by military men whose aim is at times less to report than to

conceal. This means that historians must often use as m uch guesswork andimagination in reconstructing what happened from the documents as they

wo uld in working w ith oral testimonies. (If one thinks ahe ad fifty years and

imagines the contrast between official IDF reports concerning the latest in-

tifada and the ocular testimony of witnesses, one has some idea of the

problem.)

Oral history is not a substitute for written evidence, but it is particularly

important in validating and filling in the gaps in the documentary evidence,

which gives us the "bare bones." Thus, what is in the official Israeli record

(the H istory of the ~ a g a n a h , ~or example) a brief reference to the act of

occupying a village-or "cleansing" it, to use the actual term of the Jewish

texts5-becomes in Palestinian history a detailed account of assault, expul-

sion, and in som e cases massacre. Indeed, in the case of Tantura, the m assa-

cre might not have come to light at all had it not bee n for oral testimony o n

the Palestinian side-later corrobo rated by Jewish testimony-because the

piecem eal ev idence currently available in the Israeli archives is too fragm en-

tary (as w e shall see) to more than hint at what hap pe ne dG n this case, then,

it is the documents that fill out the oral history, rather than the reverse.

Recently, the Israeli historian O mer Bartov wrote very movingly about the

value of oral history. He was writing about its use in the rec on sm ction of theHolocaust, and though no comparison between the Holocaust and the

Nakba is intended, one of his passages serves to remind us of the value of

oral h istory as a legitimate tool in reconstructing past traumas:

The m emory of trauma is often murky, unstable, contrad ic-

tory, untrustworthy. . . . What we learn from [memoirs of

camp survivors in this case] are not the fine details of camp

administration, train schedules, ideological purpose and

genocidal organization. These are matters far better left forhistorians. What w e learn is the infinity of pain and suffering

that makes the m emory of those years into a burde n w hose

weight stretches far beyond the ephemeral human exis-



tence, a presence that clings to the mind and inhabits the

deep recesses of consciousness long after it should have

been cleansed and washed away.'

In writing his thesis, Katz was w ell aware of the "murkiness" of the picturederived from the memories of participants and survivors so long after trau-

matic events. But he was not interested in fine details; he w ished to learn the

overall picture, leaving behind, perhaps forever, certainties about exact

chronology and names and precise numbers. He wished to learn the pain

and suffering as it was experienced by people in the midst of war and to

show the kaleidoscope of perspectives from the various testimonies. Into

these he wove the published and unpublished sources at his disposal-yet

another perspective. And despite the inevitable discrepancies in the details,

the b road picture he fo und is remarkably consistent. It is important to men-tion that he uses the same research technique for

Umm Zaynat, with w itnesses, Palestinian and Jewish, Katz was able to overcome

each from their own vantage point, telling ho w they the delegitimization

saw the village's occupation and the expulsion. Yet in applied to Palestinian oralthe case of Umm Zaynat, there is no mention of hi st oy only because he

massacre. also obtained testimonies

Katz was able to overcom e the suspicion and, in- from Jewish soldiers who

de ed , delegitirnization that is usually applied in Israel had participated in

to Palestinian oral history (and , indeed, to Palestinian the events.

history in general) only because he succee ded in ob-

taining testimonies about the massacre not only from Palestinian witnesses

but also from Jewish soldiers w ho had participated in the events. Had there

not been corroborating Jewish testimonies on the Tantura affair, even the

article in Ma'ariv would not have been taken so seriously.

Katz in terviewed 135 persons for his thesis. The Tantura chapter is based

on the testimonies of forty witnesses, by coincidence twenty Arabs and

twenty Jews , all of them taped. Tracking dow n the Palestinian survivors was

more difficult than finding the Jewish soldiers: Tantura had bee n captu red by

the 3 r d Battalion of the Alexandroni Brigade, and th e nam es of the veteranswere readily obtainable. The Palestinians he interviewed, on the other h and ,

most of whom live in Furaydis and Jisr al-Zarqa, villages near Tantura, as

well as Tulkarm in the West Bank, had to be found by word of mouth

through Jews who knew them or through the intervention of Palestinians

from Tantura living abroad. Moreover, while Jewish soldiers are accustom ed

to being sought ou t to talk about their war experiences, the Tantura survi-

vors still living in Israel were reluctant to participate in a project in which

they were asked to sh ed light on Jewish barbarism during the war.

The thesis is not without its faults. When he wrote it, Katz was not awareof some important material (which in fact add confirmation to the story, of

which more later), and he failed to address the important issue of w hy, in

contrast to many other massacres of the 1948 war, know ledge of this one



had apparently not gone beyond the immediate circles of the survivors:

neither Walid Khalidi's seminal work All T hat ~ e m a i n s 'nor the exhaustive

Palestinian ~ n c ~ c l o p e d i a , ~or example, mentions it. Other relatively minor

methodological deficiencies, typical in theses of this level and kind, later be-

came the basis for the prosecution's case in the libel suit brought againstKatz, which will be described be low. Nonetheless, Katz's thesis is a solid an d

convincing piece of work whose essential validity is in no wa y marred by its

shortcomings.

Much of the subtlety of the academic work was lost in the bald summary

of the Ma'ariu article, which m ade no mention of the methodological com-

plexities involved. Still, the gist of the story was accurately conveyed. The

article also includes positive and negative evaluations by a nu mber of schol-

ars. Among those praising the work w ere Professor Asa K asher, a philoso-

ph er from Tel Aviv University and the author of the IDF's e thical cod e; Meir

Pail, a military historian of the 1948war; an d this writer. These scholars were

more categorical than Katz in characterizing the Tantura events. Thus, while

Katz had no t used the w ord "massacre" either in his thesis or in interviews

about his work, they did not shrink from the term, and Professor Kasher

called wh at hap pen ed in Tantura a "war crime." Three historians with nega-

tive assessments were also cited in the article. Only one of the three, Yoav

Gelber, had actually read the thesis, but the others did not hesitate to join

him in condemning it as, at best, the product of unfounded rumors or, at

worst, a work written with the intention of weakening Israel's image and

position in the peace negotiations.Gilat also succeeded in tracking down some of the witnesses Katz had

interviewed. The Palestinians repeated what they ha d said to Katz, but some

of the Jews recanted. Several of them even joined the lawsuit against him,

subm itting affidavits denying their testimony-despite the fact that their testi-

monies are on tape and very clear. One of those who recanted, Shlomo

Ambar, affirmed in his affidavit that he d id not recall anyth ing he said to Katz.

Since the thesis was written, several other pieces of evidence have come

to light that reinforce Katz's findings. Four documents were extracted from

the IDF archives. One wa s a rep ort mentioning twenty Palestinians killed in

the battle,'' followed by a report a we ek later from IDF headquarters com -

plaining that the unbu ried co rpses in the village could lead to the s prea d of

epidemics and typhoid.'' In the third docum ent, the Israeli general chief of

staff inquired a bou t reports that had reached him "about irregularities in Tan-

tura" and received the response that "overenthusiasm because of the victory"

had led to s ome damage inflicted "immediately after our peo ple e ntere d the

place."12 Finally, a docum ent from the Alexandroni Brigade to IDF head-

quarters in Ju ne n otes: "We have tended to the mass grave, and everything is

in order."13



Another piece of evidence Katz had not been aware of was a passage in a

1951 Palestinian memoir that includes a graphic description of the massacre.

It is brought by Marwan Iqab al-Yihya, a survivor who had reached Haifa

after the massacre and described to the author what he had seen with his

own eyes.'* Additional testimonies were recently collected from Tanturasurvivors living in refugee camps in Syria by a Palestinian researcher, Mus-

tafa al-Wali, and published in the Palestinian journal Majalkat al-Dirasat al-

~ilastiniyya. '~ome of these testimonies are reproduced in the current issue

of this journal.

The Jewish and Palestinian testimonies, in combination with the few writ-

ten sources we have, including the official history of the Alexandroni Bri-

gade,'6 give us a clear overall picture of what happened in Tantura on 22-23

May 1948, though many details are still obscure and probably will remain so.

On the eve of the occupation, Tantura was a large village with a harbor-fitfor boats, not ships-on the coast thirty-five kilometers south of Haifa and a

few kilometers west of the main road linking Haifa to Jaffa and Tel Aviv.

From the evidence, it transpires that after the battle ended and the village

had surrendered to the Alexandroni Battalion, some 200 more people were

killed. The IDF documentation, as noted above, refers to about twenty Arabs

killed during the battle itself, and the commander in charge of the operation

affirmed in his interview with Katz that no more than thirty Palestinians had

been killed in the fighting. Yet one of the Jewish witnesses Katz interviewed,

who personally supervised burials, testifies having counted 230 Palestinian

corpses himself.

According to the witnesses, the killings took place in two stages. The first

phase was a rampage. From Katz's interviews with the soldiers, it was un-

leashed by the soldiers' anger caused by shots fired at them after the village

had officially surrendered. It appears that one or two snipers were still active

and that they killed or wounded one, two, or even eight Jewish soldiers (the

testimonies differ on the numbers) following the surrender. One of the Jew-

ish eyewitnesses said that a particularly popular soldier had been killed in

that fire. The rampage phase left about 100 people dead.

The second phase was more premeditated. It was carried out by intelli-gence units and people belonging to logistical units, most of whom lived in

the nearby Jewish settlements of Atlit, Binyamina, Maayan Zvi, and Zichron

Yaacov. These units systematically executed men suspected-often unjustifi-

ably, it seems-of concealing personal weapons in their homes or of belong-

ing to the Arab volunteers who had come to assist the Palestinians. These

executions were finally stopped by people from Zichron Yaacov, who ac-

cused the soldiers of killing the wrong people. Another 100 or so victims,

according to the witnesses, were dispatched in this phase.

After the rampage, the people of Tantura had been rounded up and led tothe beach, where the men were separated from the women and children (up

to twelve or thirteen years old). Aided by lists of names, the intelligence and

logistics soldiers selected groups of seven to ten or even more and took



them ba ck to the village, either to the graveyard or a place near the mo sque.

They were either seated or m ade to stand against a wall an d were shot at the

back of the head.

Those executed were between the ages of thirteen and thirty. Those

within that age range wh o were spared were held in detention cam ps for a

year and a half, separated from the w om en a nd children and old peop le w ho

had been transported after the massacre to the nearby village of Furaydis.

This village, by the w ay, along w ith Jisr al-Zarqa, were the only tw o o ut of

sixty-four villages on the road between Haifa and Tel Aviv that were not

wiped out by the Jewish forces. This was because men from these villages

had traditionally wo rked in the nearby Jewish settlemen ts, which pressed to

have them spared so they could continue to benefit from the cheap labor.

Most of the m en of Tantura were expe lled to the West Bank after their deten -

tion, where they w ere joined by their families. Most of those w ho rem ainedin Israel were able to do so through the intervention of Jews who knew

them.

In general, the ethnic cleansing in Palestine as a whole and in the area

between Hadera and Haifa in particular was carried out against a back-

ground of vague instructions from abo ve, as is testified by th e comm ander of

the battalion occupying Tantura. According to these instructions, every com-

mande r occupy ing a village had full authority to d o with the inhab itants as

he saw fit, whether they surrendered or were taken p risoner.

The usual practice followed by Alexandroni in occupying a village-thebrigade also captured the villages of Hayriyya, Kafar Saba, Qaysariya,

Sakiyya, Umm Zaynat, and (later) 'Ayn Ghazal, Ijzim, and Jaba', among

others-was to expel the inhabitants while the battle was in progress. Vil-

lages were purposely not fully encircled, an d on e of the flanks wo uld b e left

op en so that the inhabitants could be put to flight through this "op en gate."

But in Tantura, due to lack of coordination during the battle, the village was

completely surrounded; with Jewish boats offshore blocking the sea route

an d the A lexandroni units o n land, there was n o "escape gate." The concen -

tration of so large a village in the hands of the occup ier-Tantura had abou t

1,500 nhabitants-produced the rampage , the massacre, and the executions.

From the testimony of the perpetrators, it would appear that some saw the

executions as being in the service of the Zionist security apparatus (killing

young men they saw as soldiers of the enem y), others as part of a personal

vendetta. The pattern must have been similar in the almost forty other p laces

where massacres occurred.

Getting testimonies from both sides was sometimes painful. Those who

actually witnessed the acts of killing during the execution phase, aside from

the perpetrators, were generally young children or people who either

worked with Jewish intelligence or were about to b e killed and w ere savedat the last minute by Jews from nea rby settlements. An air of uneasiness ac-

com pan ies many of the testimonies. Mustafa Masri, w ho as a young child had

witnessed the killing of his entire family before his very eyes, concludes a



particularly chilling interview with Katz by uttering "But believe me, one

should not mention these things. I do not want them to take revenge against

us. You are going to cause us trouble. I made a mistake in giving you the

name of the person [a local Jew] who handed my family over." I think it is

even clearer why the Jews did not talk about the massacre. As one of theJewish witnesses, Joel Solnik, said to Katz "There were shameful things

there, very shameful. It was one of the most shameful battles fought by the

IDF. . . they did not leave anyone alive."

The resistance to talking about what happened came out clearly in an

interview with a veteran Israeli general, Shlomo Ambar, who had been a

young officer in the battle. He tells Katz that he had never gone back to

Tantura and that he had seen things he does not want to talk about. Pressed

by Katz, he says, "I associate [what had happened in Tantura] only with this.

I went to fight against the Germans who were our worst enemy. But whenwe fought we obeyed the laws of the war dictated to us by international

norms. They [the Germans] did not kill prisoners of war. They killed Slavs,

but not British POWs, not even Jewish POWs-all those from the British

army who were in German captivity survived." Katz prods him further:

"Come on, we are fifty years later, you'll go to heaven and they'll say that you

had a chance to talk and didn't." Ambar: "I had sinned so much in my life. . . .On this I would be questioned in heaven?" Ambar looks at Katz's tape re-

corder: "Why are you using that?" Katz: "Because I can't remember every-

thing." Ambar: "If I don't want to tell, it means I'm hiding something. It

means that the occupation [of Tantura] was not one of our most successful

battles." Katz: "You talk about Tantura, and you mention what even the

Germans did not do." Ambar: "That's right. They did not kill Western prison-

ers, only Russians." A few minutes later, he adds, "Let me tell you, I do not

recall too well. The intention was to empty the village, and people died in

the process. . . . People naturally are attached to their home place and do not

want to go, so under the pressure of an occupying army, they were made to

leave, toward the east. Period. Ask me something else."

A few days after the affair was publicized by Ma'ariv, the veterans of the

Alexandroni Brigade sued Katz for libel, asking for more than one million

shekels in damages. One would have assumed that Haifa University would

stand behind Katz. Given the high grade he had received, any discredit of his

work-especially in so public a way-could only reflect poorly on the uni-

versity's standards, but the moment the legal process began, the university

began acting as if he were already guilty of incompetence at best or fraud at

worst. Spearheading the crusade against Katz within the university were se-nior members of the Department of Erez Israel Studies, which has always

been in the forefront of providing scholarly scaffolding for the Zionist narra-

tive. As a result of the campaign, the university refused to offer Katz any



legal, moral, or practical support in facing the suit. It was a Palestinian legal

NGO in Israel, Adalah, that provided assistance on a pro bono basis. Katz

was in disgrace. His name was summarily removed from a list of those to be

honored for their work at a special ceremony. (Since the list had alreadybeen printed, his name had to be erased with tippex.) His status at the uni-

versity was equivalent to that of an employee suspended, and his hopes of

pursuing an academic career were shattered, at least for the time being.

Before the trial began, Katz tried to persuade the court not to take the

case, arguing that it was a scholarly debate that should be determined not in

court but within the university. If the university had supported this effort, he

may have succeeded in avoiding a trial, but the university refused, and the

trial opened as planned.

The trial began on 13December 2000, with Katz being called to the wit-

ness box by the prosecuting attorney. The crux of the prosecution's case

rested on six references-out of 230-in which Katz either misquoted or in-

terpreted too freely what the witnesses said. In Ambar's testimony, Katz sub-

stituted the word "Germans" for "Nazis." In another, he summarized the

testimony of a Tantura survivor, Abu Fihmi, as describing a killing, where the

witness did not say this directly (though in fact, this is clearly what he

meant). In four other instances, Katz wrote something that does not appear

in the tapes but only in his written summaries of the conversations. No dis-

crepancies were found in any of the remaining 224 references concerning

Tantura.

The presentation of these discrepancies consumed the first two days of

the trial. When the court broke for the day at the end of the second day, a

member of Katz's team of three lawyers (which had also checked through

every reference against the tapes) exulted in a private conversation that the

prosecution had exhausted its entire case.'' The cross-examination by the

defense concerning this material, and the defense's case, was to begin the

following day. None of the Jewish soldiers had agreed to appear in court, but

since it was expected to be a long trial it was expected that they would be

forced to testify. The defense and some of Katz's supporters were lookingforward to a trial that would mark the first time in Israel's history that, in

effect, Israel's role in the Nakba was on trial.

That night, however, for reasons Katz himself cannot explain even today,

he signed an agreement that in essence repudiated his own academic re-

search. Weakened by a stroke several weeks earlier and subjected to enor-

mous pressures by his family, friends, and neighbors in the kibbutz where he

lived, he acquiesced on the advice of one of his lawyers (a cousin of his) to

bring an end to the whole affair; he was likewise assured by the university

lawyer, an unomcial member of his legal team, that signing the agreement

would be for his own good, appearing to hint that it would enable him to

continue his studies at Haifa University.

The agreement Katz signed took his other two lawyers totally by surprise.

Titled "An Apology," the agreement is so sweeping as to bear an uncornfort-



able resemblance to a police "confession" extracted under dubious condi-

tions. The section relating to his research reads as follows:

I wish to clarify that, after checking and re-checking the evi-

dence, it is clear to me now, beyond any doubt, that there is

no basis whatsoever for the allegation that the Alexandroni

Brigade, or any other fighting unit of the Jewish forces,

committed killings of people in Tantura after the village sur-

rendered. Furthermore, I wish to say that the things I have

written must have been misunderstood [by the press] as I

had never intended to tell a tale of a massacre in Tantura. . . .I accept as truth [only] the testimonies of those among the

Alexandroni people who denied categorically the massacre,

and I disassociate myself from any conclusion which can be

derived from my thesis that could point to the occurrence

of a massacre or the killing of defenseless or unarmed

people.

Twelve hours later, Katz formally regretted his retraction and wanted to

continue the trial, but the judge refused. The judge's ruling made no refer-

ence to the merits of the case, but only to the court's ability to accept Katz's

retraction of his retraction. As this report is written, the matter now rests with

the High Court, which will decide by April 2001 whether the trial canresume.

The Israeli press, which had given front-page coverage to Katz's retrac-

tion, barely mentioned his efforts to rescind it. He was depicted in the three

major newspapers-both in the news sections and, later, in op-eds-as a

fabricator, a pseudohistorian who had invented a nonevent for ideological

reasons (a ridiculous allegation given that Katz, like the lawyer for the prose-

cution, is a member of Meretz). Because Katz had given in so early on, after

two days of testimony wholly taken up with undeniable discrepancies, it was

assumed that the six discrepancies were representative of the entire work.From there it was all too easy to conclude that there had been no massacre

and probably not really a Nakba in 1948.The national radio and television

exulted in Katz's "exposure." Even left-wing journalists like Tom Segev re-

marked that there may have been a massacre, but it met the wrong

historian.''

Haifa University did not accept his retraction of his denial either and acted

as if the agreement with the prosecution were valid. On 26 December 2000,

the prosecutor urged the university to strip Katz of his title. The university set

up two committees, one to check the tapes against the quotations in the

thesis, the other to investigate whether there had been failures of the super-

vision process. The fact that Katz's academic adviser was a Druze and that

one of his examiners was rumored to be a Palestinian (in Israel the examina-

tion process is anonymous) was the subtext that nobody openly talked



about. Nonetheless, these additional factors undoubtedly made it easier for

the university to move ahead with the unprecedented procedure of stripping

Katz of his title. His own department, the Department of Middle Eastern His-

tory, stopped it just in time, demanding that some of the measures be frozen

until the court issues a verdict.

As a faculty member of Haifa University, I posted on the university's inter-

nal Web site some of the more important transcripts of the more than sixty

hours of Katz's tapes, most of which had not been

After reading the referred to in court. They include horrific descriptions

transcrzpts, a number of of execution, of the killing of fathers in front of chil-

people, even i they had dren, of rape and torture. They come from both the

resewations about the Jewish and the Palestinian witnesses. As a result of

quality of Katz's research, these transcripts, a number of people, even if they

no longer had any doubts had reservations about the quality of Katz's research,about what happened no longer had any doubts about what happened in

in Tantura. Tantura, which is after all the important issue. I also

published an open letter accusing the university of

moral cowardice. A lecture of mine at the School of History, scheduled long

before, was abruptly canceled without explanation. Only two of my col-

leagues, in a university with hundreds of faculty members, openly protested

this basic violation of free speech. But then again, this was in January 2001,

the same month that Israel's famed technical university, Technion, took a

decision giving its president the authority to expel students and lecturers in-

volved in political activity on campus.

Without doubt, the response to the Tantura case reflects the hardening of

attitudes in Israel that has followed the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada and

especially the October events involving the Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Since then, the moral voice of Jews in Israel has been all but silenced.

"Prophets of Peace" such as David Grossman, Amos Oz, and A. B. Yehoshua,

have publicly stated in various radio interviews that they were wrong to trust

the palestinians19 and, far more important, signed a petition published on

the front page of Ha'Aretz on 2 January 2001 emphasizing their unequivocal

opposition to the Palestinian right of return. It is probable that had the Katz

case begun before the outbreak of the present intifada, or even better during

the more optimistic days of the Oslo process, the public and academic reac-

tion would have been somewhat more moderate. Poor Katz, himself a Zion-

ist, could not have chosen a worse time to bring evidence of a massacre,

raising the spectre of Israeli responsibility in crimes of war in 1948.

All is not bleak, however. Before the trial opened, an association organ-

ized to help Katz convened an impressive conference in November 2000 in

Tel Aviv, where for the first time old-timers in the Israeli peace camp, includ-

ing Shulamit Aloni and Uri Avineri, talked openly about the 1948 ethniccleansing. The event included screening of the film 1948 by Muhammad

Bakri, itself an impressive piece of oral history in which Jews and Palestini-

ans testify about the ethnic cleansing in 1948. Indeed, this was one of the first



public gatherings where the term "ethnic cleansing" was freely used and

where the central question was not whether collective crimes had been

committed in 1948, but rather their current implications with regard to a

peaceful settlement of the Palestine conflict. Many speakers wondered how

research in Israel on the Nakba could be furthered and protected.

More recently, on 2 February 2001, a group of highly respected academics

from Tel Aviv University and the Hebrew University organized a day of study

on the relationship between the legal system and academia. Among the par-

ticipants, surprisingly, were the presiding judge in the Katz affair and the

rector of Haifa University. The general tenor of the meeting seemed to be

against any interference by the legal system in academic research; more con-

cretely, many participants criticized Haifa University for its conduct in the

Katz affair. Professor Asa Kasher and Meir Pail reiterated their support for

Katz's research, specifically stating that the inaccuracies uncovered by the

prosecution did not significantly undermine the quality of the dissertation.

Thus far, the Katz affair sheds light on and raises issues in three areas: the

place of Palestinian oral history in the historiography of 1948 and the rela-

tionship of the Israeli judiciary and academia to the Nakba. Concerning the

first, one of the most noteworthy elements of the debate over the Katz affair

was the way in which Palestinian oral testimony was treated. Traditionally,Palestinian oral history-and indeed written works in general by Palestinians

concerning 1948-have been branded in Israel as sheer propaganda and

wild flights of "Oriental" magination.Yet the legal challenges to Katz's thesis

centered not on the truthfulness of the Palestinian testimonies per se or on

the validity of oral history as a tool in research, but on Katz's mishandling of

the testimony. Furthermore, several historians in dismissing Katz's findings

used as evidence to support their case the fact that the massacre is not men-

tioned in Walid Khalidi'sAll That~ e r n a i n s ~ ~ - aork not treated in Israel as

an authority before. This is not to say that a "revolution" in Israeli attitudestoward Palestinian history has occurred, and it is obvious that the Palestinian

sources were considered reliable only insofar as they did not mention the

massacre. Still, if the trial resumes, the oral testimonies by Palestinians on the

Nakba-like the testimonies of Jews on the Holocaust in the Eichmann and

Demanjuk trials-will have to be treated as a legitimate source, both in court

and in scholarly debate.

The second issue raised by the case is the attitude in principle of the judi-

cial system on the question of the Nakba. Zionist historiography on 1948 has

been almost universally accepted in Israel; even the "new historians" have

refused to use the term "ethnic cleansing" in reference to 1948 and with few

exceptions have been unwilling to concede that there was a "master plan" of

expulsion or conque~t.~'t is thus that the concept of war crimes in relation

to the 1948 war has never been raised. Yet it is difficult to see in any other



terms the expulsion (direct and indirect) of some 750,000 Palestinians, the

systematic destruction of more than 400 villages and scores of urban neigh-

borhoods, as well as the perpetration of some forty massacres of unarmed

Palestinians. Criminal suits are unlikely to be brought by Palestinians, which

legally speaking would face the principle of obsolescence (only grandchil-

dren who can prove direct harm can sue, at least theoretically).

This is why the Tantura case is so important. It is the only case so far in the

history of Israel in which the Nakba has been discussed in court. By not

allowing the trial to continue, the judge prevented Palestinian survivors from

telling their story in court. It also indirectly preempted future research on

1948 that does not subscribe to Zionist ideology by giving future scholars

reason to worry about the legal consequences of taking on the struggle over

the past. This becomes a particularly sensitive field of research in that it deals

with issues of the past that are relevant to the nature of a future comprehen-sive settlement of the Palestine question.

The third issue is Israeli academia's approach to the Nakba. A number of

members of the academy were only too happy to swoop down like vultures

on the methodological defects in the work of a historian just starting out on

his academic career-easy prey by all accounts. One could speculate that the

motivation was not simply denial of the massacre-in fact the Nakba-but a

kind of recognition that if Katz had won the case, Israeli academia's role for

more than fifty years in suppressing the truth about the Nakba would itself

be on the dock. Jewish participants in the 1948 war were surprised whenapproached by a Jewish researcher who did not, as is usually the case in

Israel, want to hear about their heroism in 1948 but rather confronted them

with their barbarism. The more honest among them were not afraid to tell

what they had seen, because they were confident, given the reigning ideol-

ogy that is not opposed to killing Arabs, that even such acts would be pro-

tected as exceptional or legitimate. For some, the opportunity to confide in

Katz helped to alleviate personal guilt and remorse. Zionist scholars of 1948,

it would appear, are less in need of such alleviation and have lived comforta-

bly enough with their role in covering these crimes. One can perhaps find

extenuating circumstances in the actions of the perpetrators, but not for the

deniers.

It is difficult to predict the final results of the Katz case, but based on reac-

tions so far, one can assume that the Jewish academic establishment will

continue to try to prevent the legitimization of oral history for 1948 and that

it will be more vigilant in making sure that fresh historians confirm the broad

lines of the Zionist narrative on 1948. Admittedly, certain foundational myths,

such as the "few against many" and "Arab voluntary flight," have already

been shattered, but the overall narrative has survived these setbacks. The

argument now runs as follows: yes, some Palestinians were expelled during

the war, but it was simply a byproduct of the fighting, certainly not because

of any plan of mass expulsion. Hence, such expulsions as did take place



were an integral part of any conventional war and have nothing to with eth-

nic cleansing and war crimes.22

The only way to confront this reality is to encourage independent NGO-

type research institutions in Palestine and in Israel entrusted with the task of

expanding research on the Nakba. The first priority is to establish a bank of

oral testimonies, before there is no one left to interview.

It should be clear by now that no true reconciliation between Israelis and

Palestinians can ever take place without full awareness of what happened in

the Nakba. It is for this reason that research on the Nakba by Jewish scholars

has to be part of a public campaign based on clear positions vis-2-vis the

conflict and its solution. The questions of compensation, the Palestinian right

of return, and Israeli moral responsibility are anyhow already in the public

mind of both Israelis and Palestinians as negotiable issues. Finally, research

on the Nakba requires some kind of international protection. The historicalresearch, the public campaign, and the legal defense should be part and par-

cel of the same political action in Palestine, Israel, and abroad.

Dan Vitkon, a soldier in Alexandroni

Vitkon: In Tantura, someone who later was a big shot in the Israeli Ministry

of Defense was an officer in Tantura, and he killed with his own pistol, one

Arab after the other, because they did not disclose where they hid theirweapons. . . . He shot them one after the other in his Parabelum and he killed

there [the name and identifying details are given].

Yosef Graf, a guide from Yaacov Zichronwho accompanied

the units

Graj The Arabs raised the white flags, the kuffiyya, the hatta. . . .Katz: Wait a minute. There was no battle going on?

Graj Before that, there were clashes, sure. Skirmishes. Our guys had taken

cover and shot back at the Arabs who then raised the white flags. . . . I called

to our guys: "Don't advance!" They did not heed and were shot at, and then

they [the soldiers] assaulted and killed them all.

Katz: That is, in response to the shooting at them, they stormed?

Graj Yes. And killed almost everyone.

Katz: How many, roughly?You remember a figure-twenty, fifty?

Graj No. I think they counted in the end 140 or 150, all young men.

Katz: Were these people killed in the battle?

Graj While occupying the village, there were many dead who were shot

while staying in their homes in the village.

Katz: After the surrender, actually?

Translated from the Hebrew by Ilan Pappe.



Graj There was no surrender. It was occupation.

[Later in the conversation/

Graj I am telling you these [Alexandroni] people, they massacred.

Katz: In an amok attack?

Graj Yes.

Salih 'Abd al-Rahman(AbuMashayiff),fromTantura

Katz: How were people killed in Tantura?

Abu M a s h a y8 There was fighting between them. In the end, they caught

them on the coast, in Tantura, and took them near a huge building and killed

them like this.

Katz: Which building?

Abu M a s h a y8 Houses near the coast. The sea was next to the village.

Katz: Killed them after they surrendered?Abu M a s h a y8 After they had caught them.

Katz: How many, roughly?

Abu Mashayifj Eighty-five.

Katz: You were there and saw it with your own eyes?

Abu Mashayifj Yes.

Katz: Ilow did it go? Only eighty-five were standing there, or the whole vil-

lage was standing there?

Abu Mashayifj No. Eighty-five stood. You know how it works. They came

to the villagers as a whole who were all seated on the beach, and on the spotthey said to this one and that one: "Get up! You, you. . . ."Katz: According to what?

Abu Mashayifj They had names.

[Later in the conversation]

Katz: Shimshon Mashvitz stopped killing after he was stopped by Rehavia

Altshuler?

Abu M a s h a y8 Yes. He agreed after he had killed eighty-five people.

Katz: He alone killed eighty-five people?

Abu Mashayifj Yes.

Katz: What was he using?

Abu M a s h a y8 A Sten. He killed them. They stood next to the wall, facing

the wall, he came from the back and killed them all, shooting them in the

head.

Katz: Every time he placed several of them next to the wall?

Abu Mashayifj Yes.

Katz: Groups of eight, five-how many?

Abu Mashayifj Every group twenty or thirty people.

[Later in the conversation/

Abu Mashayifj Twice or three times he changed magazines. Katz: That is, one bullet per person?

Abu Mashay* Yes.




Katz: With all the bodies?

Sokoler: With the bodies for two days. Then I brought people from Furaydis

and buried them.

Katz: It means that the family members stayed in the village.. . .

Sokoler: Another day or two.

Katz: With all the bodies?

Sokoler: Yes, yes.


Katz: How many people of Tantura surrendered with their hands over their

head?

Sokoler: Two hundred and thirty.

Katz: Two hundred and thirty-is that an accurate number? You counted

them?Sokoler: No, I evaluated them, but after they were killed, we counted them.

Katz: And how many were there?

Sokoler: The same number.

Katz: Two hundred and thirty?

Sokoler: Yes.

Katz: How many were killed in the battle?

Sokoler: They were all killed in the battle. The sniper hit one of the soldiers

in the leg, shooting began. And then they were killed, all hell broke out.

They did not know who was shooting.

Katz: For killing 230 people, it takes time.

Sokoler: pughing] They were concentrated in one spot.

[Later i n the conversation]

Katz: So you have counted and reached 230?

Sokoler: Yes.

Katz: From this you say only a few, maybe ten were killed in the battlefield?

Sokoler: Only ten [gives the names of the people of Tantura he knew who

died in the battle].

[Later i n the conversation]

Katz: The only question I still have is about where you personally were, so

that I can know what you saw with your own eyes.

Sokoler: The worst things I didn't see. I had not seen the end of the battle. I left the place. All and all, I was there one day and a half, mainly busy with

burying.

Katz: You were involved personally with the burial . . . Sokoler: I and Arabs from Furaydis laid [in the grave] one Arab after the

other, closed their eyes with the hatta, row on top of row, and that was it.

Katz: I understand that only their eyes and heads were covered [with the

kuffiyyeh].

Sokoler: Only the heads, we buried them with their clothing and all . . . Katz: And this was two days after the fighting.



Sokoler: After eight days, I came back to the place where w e buried them,

near the railway. There was a big mound, for the bodies had inflated. After

two or three days, the mound had go ne dow n.

Katz:Tw o or three days later? Sokoler: Yes.

Katz: I understand that later they added soil and spread it over the graves.

Sokoler: This 1 d o not know.

A l l 'Abd d-RahmanDekansh (Abu Fihmi), from Tantura

Abu Fihmi: They entered the village, stood us in a row next to the beach,

positioned a Bren [a subm achine gun] from here a nd from the re, an d

brought our boats, twelve in number, in order to shoot us. . . . Then came

three p eop le from Zichron Yaacov w ho said, "Why are you doing this? Why

are yo u killing [these] people?" They [the soldiers] said to them , "T hese are

Iraqis an d Syrians." They [the peo ple from Zichron] said, "These are the

people of Tantura, and in the summer we visit them. They give us their

houses, and they sleep outside. We spend the summer here. Why are you

doing this?" So they made us sit [and sto pp ed the shooting].


Abu Fihmi: Shimshon Mashvitz gave me two notebooks and two pencils,

gave me ten p eop le an d two stretchers to pick up the dea d from the streets

an d take them to our graveyard. He told me to write dow n the nam es of all

of them. He asked me, "Are you a native here? And I said, "This is m y village, an d this is my housev-our house was near the harbor. . . . I wrote

dow n ninety-five men and two w omen.


Abu Fihmi: The person who was with me knew Hebrew. He overheard

them saying that after they [the diggers] finish the first mass grave, let them

dig another one and kill them and put them in it [an action end ed b y the

arrival of people from Zichron Yaacov].


Katz: You told us that you surrendered. What does it mean? Abu Fihmi: We raised the white flag.

Katz: Alright, and afterwards they killed, after you raised your hands. How

many did they kill?

Abu Fihmi: We have n ot se en, they collected us together.

Katz: Roughly ho w many?

Abu Fihmi: According to the ann ouncem ent m ade by their army, they said

they ha d killed two hundred an d fifty.

Katz: This is all in all. But how many were killed after you raised your hands?

Two, four, how many?

Abu Fihmi: This I cannot tell you.

Katz: Roughly?

Abu Fihmi: This I do not know.

Katz: Did you count them? Many or few?



Ab u Fihmi: I am telling you their military annou ncem ent said they had killed

two hundred an d f ' i . t is a war military annou ncem ent, it was broadcast.

Najiah Abu Amr, from Tantura

Katz: What do you rem emb er from the day of the occup ation?

Abu Amr: They e ntered the village a nd killed p eople. They e ntered from all

directions an d killed the guards w ho watched the village an d then collected

us and took us from the center of the village toward th e east.

Katz: On the beach?

Abu Amr: Yes. First to the beach.

Katz: How long were you there?

Abu Amr: From 0500 to 1400 on the beac h.

Katz: All the women?

Abu Amr: All the men a nd the wom en, and they were separated. W ome n o none side, men on the other. And then they took us near the graveyard,

brought buses, and took the wome n an d children out of the village.

Katz: What time was this?

Abu Amr: 1500.

Katz: On the w ay to the graveyard, wha t did you see?

Abu Amr:. Corpses of the dead begins to list names].

Katz: Did you see men or women?

Abu Amr: I saw one woman killed, and four or five other corpses [gives

names].Katz: But did you see from afar other bodies?

Abu Amr: I have not see n with my o w n eyes, but I was told there we re m any

dead and that they brought people from Furaydis to bury them [gives

names]. But I have not seen them, I was told about them.

Katz: For instance, did you know that the Abu Safiyya family was murdered?

How many were they?

Abu Amr: There were [gives ten nam es of mem bers of the family]. These

ten names I reme mb er, but there w ere thirteen of this family. They we re all

murdered at the prime of their youth.

Katz: Do you kn ow ho w many dead were there?

Abu Amr: I know that many people were killed, but I do not know how

many. I estimate that there were about 100 dead [again begins listing

names]. There were so m any dea d in this village, betw een 100 and 150. . . .Katz: When you reached the graveyard, what did you see?

Abu Amr: I saw the soldiers trying to harass the women, but they were

pushed away by the women. And when they saw the women not suc-

cumbing, they stopped. When w e were on the beach, they took two w om en

and uy to undress them, claiming they have to check their bodies. They took

a lot of gold from the wo me n. I also saw them tying on e youn g m an, SalimAbu Shaqr, and killing him in the house of Ihsan al-'Abd.

Katz: I want to understand this. They took him with his hands tied behind

his back?



Abu Amr: No. They took him from within the group s of the young m en, tied

him with his jacket, and took him to a faraway house and shot him.

Katz: Why?

Abu Amr:They claimed that he brought weapons into the village. People informed o n him. He was very unlucky. His wife, Hayat, is my aunt, a sister

of my mother.

F a dMahmoudTanj (Abu Khalid), fromTantura

Katz: And what happened on the beach?

Abu Khalid: They took a group of seven to ten youn g m en, each time, took

them to the streets and s hot them.

Katz: Only the young men?

Abu Khalid: Yes.

Katz: Where did it happen ? On the beach?Abu Khalid: No. They took them to the village.

Katz: They took seven a nd killed them?

Abu Khalid: Yes. They shot them an d came to take another g roup.


Katz: How many times they did it?

Abu Khalid: They killed ninety people.

Katz: It means they came and took ten times?

Abu Khalid: Yes.

Katz: How many soldiers came?Abu Khalid: Many soldiers.

Katz: But with eac h group?

Abu Khalid: Ten to twelve.

Katz: The sam e soldiers?

Abu Khalid: No, each group took a group.

Katz: And the village is watching?

Abu Khalid: Yes, and then they took the men away to the graveyard.

Katz: And, tell me, how the people of Zichron stopped it.

Abu Khalid: Wait a minute, I will get there. They brought us to the

graveyard.

Katz: That is, those w ho remained? And you saw . . .Abu Khalid: We saw the bodies.

Katz: After killing ninety, they took those w ho remained?

Abu Khalid: Yes, to the graveyard.

Katz: And what happened there?

Abu Khalid: They took us there, seated us, aimed the weapons at us, and

wan ted t o kill us. [Then] the people of Zichron came a nd said, "These don't

[kill]. You have killed enough ."

[Later i n the conversation] Katz: Were you present in the digging?

Abu Khalid: Yes.

Katz: The same day?



Abu Khalid: The same day they took them and dug a big hole.

Katz: How many were killed in the battle itself?

Abu Khalid: Four or five.

Mustafa Masri (Abu Jamil), from Tantura

Katz: After they occupied the village?

Abu Jamil: An officer took the family-we were fourteen people-and

started counting us. [He] says to me, "Come here." "What do you want?" I

ask. "You sit with the kids." [Abu Jamil was thirteen at the timed I said OK.

He began questioning each young man: "Were you in the war?"This and that

said no. I and the [other] person who was released, we walked twenty me-

ters, and then he kills my father and the whole family.

Katz: This person knew your father from before?

Abu Jamil: No, the person who knew my father handed him to another person. I said to the person we knew, "We know you. We know your wife, your

children. You know my father. How could you do this?" He says to me, "In

the war, I do not recognize anyone."

Katz: In fact, he saved you and another one?

Abu Jamil: But they killed fourteen members of my family.

Katz: You were the youngest?

Abu Jamil: Yes.

Katz: So it was our luck you were thirteen?

Abu Jamil: No, it was from God. He also killed an old man, I think he was 100.And he killed someone seventeen years old-every man and his fate.

Katz: It means you left, and then heard the shooting?

Abu Jamil: No, we were close. Fifteen meters, no more. I said to him, "Why

did you do it?" He said to me, "I was told to kill them. What can you do in a

war?"

(Later i n the conversation]

Abu Jamil: There was a senior officer from Givat Ada, but not in the army.

Katz: You remember his name? I was told something like Shimshon.

Abu Jamil: Yes, Shimshon.

Katz: Shimshon what?

Abu Jamil: I do not remember. After he took them, he shot them directly in

the eyes. Then he took two, he had such a whip, and lashed them just for

fun. . . . (Toward the end of the conversation]

Abu Jamil: But believe me, one should not mention these things. I do not

want them to take revenge on us, you are going to cause us trouble. I made a

mistake in giving you the name of the person who handed my family

over. . . .



1. Theodore Katz, "The Exodus of the

Arabs from Villages at the Foot of South-

em Mount Carmel in 1948" (University of

Haifa, 1998).

2. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Pal-

estinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1988).

3. University of California, Los Ange-

les, Oral History Program, "Introduction

to Oral History," available online at

www.library.ucla.edu/libraries/special/ ohp/ohpintro.htm.

4. Yehuda Slutsky, ed., Sefer ha-

Hagana, vol. 3, parts 2 and 3 (Tel Aviv:

Am Oved, 1972).

5. The Hebrew tiher literally means

"to purify."

6. It has recently been learned that a

file containing reports on massacres and

atrocities in 1948 exists, but it remains

sealed. According to Ha'Aretz, Benny

Morris appealed to the government to

open the files in February 2001, but he

was refused.

7. Omer Bartov, "AnInfinity of Suffer-

ing," Times Literay Supplement, 15 De-

cember 2000, p. 6.8. Walid Khalidi, ed., All That Re-

mains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied

and Depopulated by Israel in 1948

(Washington: Institute for Palestine Stud-

ies, 1992).

9. Al-Mawsu 'a al-Filastiniyya (The

Palestine Encyclopedia), 4 vols. (Damas-

cus: Hayat al-Mawsu'a al-Filastiniyya,

1984).

10. A report from Tantura, 23 May

1948, IDF Archives, 922/75.

11. Correspondence from Commanderof the Naftali Region (coastal area) in

Zichron Yaacov to Alexandroni, 29 May

1948 and 31 May 1948, IDF Archives, 69/

585.

12. See the internal memo titled "The

Robbery of Tantura," 1 June 1948, IDF

Archives, 69/374.

13. IDF Files 57/4663/1949, Alexan-

droni to HQ, 9 June 1948.

14. Nimr al-Khatib, Nakbat Filastin,

(Damascus: n.p., n.d.).

15. Mustafa al-Wali, "Majzarat Tantura

fi al-Siyaq al-Tarichi li-Tahawid Filastin,"

Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya,no. 43

(Summer 2000), pp. 101-17.

16. Gershon Rivlin and Zvi Sinai, eds.,

The Alexandroni Brigade in the War of

Independence (Tel Aviv: IDF Publica-

tions, 1964).

17. At a stormy public meeting about

the Tantura case on 15 March 2001 held

under the auspices of Tel Aviv Univer-

sity's faculty of law, the lawyer for the de-

fense cited the same six discrepancies he

had analyzed at the trial. When asked to

provide additional examples, he said he

did not have time to go into them; when

pressed further, he demurred. During

that same meeting, suggestions that per-

mission be sought to excavate the sites of

the mass graves at Tantura were shouted

down by Alexandroni veterans present.

18. Ha'Aretz, 27 December 2000. No

one in the mainstream press defended

Katz. My own letters in defense of his

work, sent to Ha'Aretz, were never

published.19. Amos Oz expresses this view on

behalf of his group in an article published

in the Guardian on 13 October 2000.

20. Mordechai Naor, Ha'Aretz, 2 Janu-

ary 2001.

21. See Walid Khalidi's "Plan Dalet:

Master Plan for the Conquest of Pales-

tine," first published in November 1961 in

Middle East Forum and reprinted inJPS

28, no. 1 (Autumn 1988), pp. 4-19; and

Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestini-

ans: The Concept of "Transfer" in ZionistPolitical Thought, 1882-1948 (Washing-

ton: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).

22. See Ilan PappC, "Were They Ex-

pelled? The History, Historiography and

Relevance of the Palestinian Refugee

Problem" in The Palestinian Exodus,

1948-1998, ed. Ghada Karmi and Eu-

gene Cotran (London: Ithaca Press, 1999),

pp. 37-62.



A Critique of Benny Morris

Nur Masalha

Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Autumn, 1991), pp. 90-97.

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http://www.jstor.orgWed Jan 9 10:21:07 2008









A CRITIQUE OF BENNY MORRIS

NUR MASALHA

Since the publication in 1988 of The Birth o fth e Palestinian Refirgee Problem,

Benny Moms has come to be seen as the ultimate authority on the Palestin-

ian exodus of 1948. And indeed , his work has contributed to demolishingsome of the long-held (a t least in Israel and in the W est) m isconceptions

surrounding Israel's birth. His newly pub lished collection of essays, 19 48and After: Israel and the Palestinians, revisits the ground covered in Birth,

bringing to light new material he discovered or which became available onlyafter completion of the first book.

Morris's work belongs to what he calls the "New Historiography." He

does not like the term "revisionist" historiography, in part because it "con-jures up" images of the Revisionist Movement in Zionism, and thus causes

"confusion." He further eschews the term because "Israel's old historians,by and large, were not really historians, and d id not produce real history. In

reality they were chroniclers, and often apologetic." (1948, p. 6 ) Moms ex-amines this "oldW--orthodox and official-historiography in the open ing es-

say of his new volume, refemng to the historians who produced it over threedecades since 1948 as "less cand id," "deceitful," an d "misleading." (p . 2 )

As examples, he cites the accounts provided by Lieutenant-Colonel (ret.)Elhanan Orren, a former officer at the Israel Defense Force (IDF) History

Branch, in his Baderckh el Ha'ir (O n the Road to the City), a detailed account

Nur Masalha, who holds an M.A. from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem

and a Ph.D . in political science from the University of London, i s the au thorof the forthcoming book Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Trans-

fer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948 (Institute for Palestine Studies, Au-

tumn 1991).

Journal ofPalestine Studies X X I , no . 1 (Autumn 19911,pp. 90-97.



91EBATE ON THE 1948 EXODUS: MASALHA

of Operation D ani, published by the IDF Press in 1976 , and Toldot Milhemet

Hakomemiyut (History of the W ar of Independence), produced by the GeneralStaffIHistory Branch, as well as B en-Gurion's own "histories" Mideinat Yis-

rael Hamehudeshet and Behilahem Yisrael. (pp. 2-5) The "new" histories, onthe other hand, include the works of Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappe, Simha Flapan,Uri Milstein, Michael Cohen, Anita Shapira, Uri Bar-Joseph, and others. (p .8) Clearly those histories thoroughly demolished a variety of assumptionswhich formed the core of the "old" history. And although those who arguethe case of "revisionism" are a fringe group in Israel, they are an importa ntone.

Two remarks are in order in this regard; first, having myself examinedmany of the "old" and official Hebrew chronicles, it is quite clear that M om s

does not always live up to his c laim of using this material in a c ritical mannerand as a result this casts doubts on his conclusions. For instance, in Birth,

Morris quotes uncritically the "major political conclusion" Ben-Gurion drewfrom the Arab departure from Haifa and makes little effort to reconcile the"deceitfulness" of such a chronicle with uncritical reliance on it. And, gener-ally speaking, having based himself predominantly, and frequently uncriti-cally, on official Israeli archival and non-archival material, Moms'sdescription an d analysis of such a controversial subject as the Palestinianexodus have serious shortcomings. Second, Moms's description of the worksby the "new" Israeli historians-while ignoring the recent works by non-Zionist scholars on 194%-gves rise to the impression that these discoursesare basically the outcome of a debate among Zionists which unfortunatelyhas little to do with the Palestinians themselves.

Moms central thesis, as first expounded in Birth, is summed up in thefollowing passage from his new collection:

What occurred in 1948 lies somewhere in between the Jewish "robberstate" [i.e., a state which had "systematically and forcibly expelled the Arabpopulation"] and the "Arab order" explanations. While from the mid-1930 's most of the Yishuv's leaders , including Ben-Gurion, wan ted to es-tablish a Jewish state without an Arab minority, or with as small an Arabminority as possible, and supported a "transfer solution" to this minorityproblem, the Yishuv did not enter the 1948 War with a master plan forexpelling the A rabs, nor did its political or m ilitary leaders ever adopt sucha master plan. What happened was largely haphazard and a result of theWar. There were Haganah/IDF expulsions of Arab communities, some ofthem at the initiative or with the postfacto approval of the cabinet or thedefense minister, and most with General Staff sanctions. . . But there wasno grand design, no blanket policy of expulsion. (p . 17 )

In other words, only in "smaller part" were HaganahIID F expulsions car-ried out and these were improm ptu, ad hoc measures dictated by the militarycircumstances, a conclusion that deflects serious responsibility for the 194 8exodus from the Zionist leadership. But can his claim that there was notransfer design and expulsion policy in 1948 be sustained? Does the fact thatthere was no "master plan" for expelling the Palestinians absolve the Zionist



92 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

leadership of responsibility, given, inter alia, its campaign of psychologicalwarfare (documented by Moms) designed to precipitate Arab evacuation?How can Moms be so categorical that there was no Israeli expulsion policy

when his own work rests on carefully released partial documentation andwhen m uch of the Israeli files an d documents re lating to the subjec t are stillclassified and remain closed to researchers? Is it inconceivable that such a"transfer" policy was based on an understanding between Ben-Gurion andhis lieutenants rather than on a blueprint? Morris himself writes in an articlein Ha'Aretr, (entitled "The New History and the Old Propagandists," 9 May1989) in which he discusses the transfer notion and Ben-Gurion's role in1948: "One of the hallmarks of Ben Gurion's greatness was that the manknew what to say and what not to say in certain circumstances; what is al-

lowed to be recorded on paper an d what is preferable to convey orally or inhint." Ben-Gurion's admiring biographer Michael Bar-Zohar states: "In in-ternal discussions, in instructions to his men [in 19481 the Old Man [Ben-Gurion] demonstrated a clear position: It would be better that as few anumber as possible of Arabs should remain in the temtory of the Uewishlstate." (Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion [in Hebrew], vol. 2, p. 703)

Moms claims (1948, p. 16) that it "was the Arab con tention. . .that theYishuv had always intended forcible 'transfer'." Is this merely an "Arab con-tention," or perhaps, a figment of Arab imagination? Yet the evidence Morrisadduces points to a completely different picture. In h is 9 May 1989 article inHa'Aretr, Moms traces "the growth of the transfer idea in Ben-Gurion'sthinking" from the second half of the 1930s. "There is no doubt," Momswrites,

that from the moment [the Peel proposal was subm itted]. . .the problem ofthe Arab minority, supposed to reside in that [prospective Jewish] state,began to preoccupy the Y ishuv's leadership obsessively. They were justi-fied in seeing the future minority as a great danger to the prospective Jew-ish state-a fifth politica l, or even military, column. The transferidea. . .was viewed by the majority of the Yishuv leaders in those days as

the best solution to the problem.In Birth (p . 25) Moms shows that Ben-Gurion advocated "compulsory"transfer in 1937. In his Ha'Aretz article he writes of "the growth of the trans-fer idea in Ben-Gurion's thinking" and that in November 1947, a few daysbefore the UN General Assembly's partition resolution, a consensus emergedat the meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive in favor of giving as manyArabs in the Jewish state as possible citizenship of the prospective Arab staterather than of the Jewish state where they would be living. According toMoms, Ben-Gurion explained the rationale in the following terms:

If a war breaks out between the Jewish state and the Palestine Arab state,the Arab minority in the Jewish state would be a "Fifth Column"; hence, itwas preferable that they be citizens of the Palestine Arab state so that, if theW ar breaks out and , if hostile, they "wou ld be expelled" to the Arab state.And if they were citizens of the Jewish state "it would (only) be possible toimprison them."




Does not this show that the Y ishuv's leaders entered the 194 8 war at leastwith a transfer desire or mindset?

Moms argues that a new approach emerged in 1948 among the rulingMapai Party leaders, presided over by Ben-Gurion, in su pport of a transfer

"solution" to the "Arab demographic problem."Ben-Gurion. . .understood that war changed everything; a different set of"rules" had come to apply. Land could and would be conquered and re-tained; there would be demographic changes. This approach em erged ex-plicitly in Ben Gurion's address at the m eeting of the M apai Council on 7February: Western Jerusalem's Arab districts had been evacuated and asimilar permanent demographic change would be expected in m uch of thecountry as the war spread. (1948, pp. 39-40)

Other prominent Mapai leaders such as Eliahu Lulu (Hacarmeli), a Jersu-alem branch leader, and Shlomo Lavi, an influential Kibbutz movement

leader, echoed the same approach. In an interna l debate at the Mapai Centreon 24 July 1948, held against the background of the expulsion of Lydda and

Ramle, Shlom o Lavi stated that "the. . .transfer of Arabs out of the country in

my eyes is one of the most just, moral an d correct things that can be d one. Ihave thought this. . .for many years." (1948, p. 43) Lavi's views were backedby another prominent Mapai leader, Avraham Katznelson: There is nothing

"more m oral, from the viewpoint of un iversal human ethics, than the empty-ing of the Jewish State of the Arabs and their transfer elsewhere. . .This

requires the use of force ." (1948, p. 44) Contrary to what Morris claims,there was nothing new abou t this approach of "forcible transfer," n or did itemerge out of the blue merely as a result of the outbreak of hostilities in

1948.The Yishuv's leaders "obsessively" pursued transfer schemes from the

mid-1930s onwards. Transfer Comm ittees were set up by the Jewish Agencybetween 1937 an d 1942 an d a number of Z ionist transfer schemes were for-

mulated in secret. (A thorough discussion of these schemes will be found inmy forthcoming book on the transfer concept.) Shortly after the publication

of the Peel Com mission report, which endorsed the transfer idea, Ben-Gurion

wrote in his diary (12 July 1937): "The compulsory transfer of the Arabsfrom the valleys of the proposed Jewish state could give us something whichwe never had. . .a Galilee free of Arab population." (Ben-G urion, Zichronot

vol. 4, 1 2 July 1937, pp. 297-99) Already in 1937, he believed that theZionists could rid themselves of "o ld habits" an d put pressure o n the

Mandatory authorities to carry out forced removal. "We have to stick to thisconclusion," Ben-Gurion wrote,

in the same way we grabbed the Balfour Declaration, more th an that, in thesame way we grabbed Zionism itself. We have to insist upon this conclu-

sion [and push it] with our full determination, power and conviction. . .W emust uproot from our hearts the assumption that the thing is not possible.It can be done.

Ben-Gurion went on to note: "We must prepare ourselves to carry out" the

transfer. (ibid., p. 299) Ben-G urion was also convinced that few, if any, of




the Palestinians would be willing to transfer themselves "voluntarily," inwh ich case the "com pulsory" provisions would eventually have to be put intoeffect. In a n importan t letter to his 16-year-old son Am os, dated 5 October

1937 , Ben-Gurion wrote: "We must expel Arabs and take their places. . .andif we have to use force-not to dispossess the Arabs of the Negev an d Tran s-

jord an, but to guarantee our own right to settle those places-when we have

force at our disposal." (Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs.Oxford, 1985, p. 189 ) It is explicit in the letter of 5 October that the transfer

had become clearly associated with expulsion in Ben-Gurion's thinking. Inreflecting on such expulsion and the eventual enlargement and breaking

through of the Peel partition borders, Ben-Gurion used the language of force,

increasingly counting on Zionist armed strength. He also predicted a decisivewar in which the Palestinian Arabs aided by neighboring Arab states would

be defeated by the Haganah. (ibid.) From the mid-1930 s onwards he repeat-

edly stated his advocacy of transfer.The debates of the World Convention of Ihud Po'alei Tzion-the highest

political forum of the dominant Zionist world labor movement-and the Zu-rich 20 th Congress in August 1 937 revealed a Zionist consensus in supp ort of

transfer. Eliahu Lulu, for instance , had this to say at the debate of the IhudPo'alei Tzion convention:

This transfer, even if it were to be carried out through compulsion-all

moral enterprises are carried out through compulsion-will be justified inall senses. And if we negate all right to transfer, we would need to negateeverything we have done until now: the transfer from Emek Hefer [Wadial-Hawarith] to Beit Shean, from the Sharon [coastal plain] to EphraemMountains, etc. . . .the transfer. . .is a just, logical, moral, and humaneprogramme in all senses.'

During the same debate, Shlomo Lavi expressed a similar view: "The de-

ma nd that the Arabs should move an d evacuate the place for us, because they

have sufficient place to move to. . .in itself is very just an d very moral. . . ."l

There were, of course, Zionist leaders who su pported "voluntary" transfer,

but to suggest as Mo ms does that the no tion of "forcible transfer" i s merelyan "Arab contention" or that it was only in 1 948 that Mapai leaders such as

Ben-Gurion adopted the radical new approach of using force to transformPalestine's demographic reality is a misrepresentation of the facts, of wh ich

Moms must be aware.Is Morris's conclusion that a Zionist transfer/expulsion policy was never

formulated borne out by the evidence he adduces in Birth and in 1948? InBirth, Moms describes how the Yishuv military establishment, presided over

by B en-Gurion, formulated in early March 1948 and began implem enting in

early April Plan Dalet in anticipation of A rab military operations. Accordingto Moms, the essence of Plan Dalet "was the clearing of hostile and poten-

tially hostile forces out of the interior of the prospective temtory of the Jewish

State. . .As the Arab irregulars were based and quartered in the villages and

as the m ilitias of many villages were participating in the anti-Yishuv hostili-




ties, the Haganah regarded most of the villages as actively or potentially hos-

tile." (Birth, p. 62) Moms goes on to explain that Plan Dalet "constituted a

strategic-ideological anchor and basis for expulsions by front, district, bri-

gade and battalion commanders. . .and it gave commanders, postfacto, a for-

mal, persuasive covering note to explain their actions." (Birth, p. 63) In 1948

(p. 211, Morris states:

In conformity with Tochnit Dalet (Plan D), the Haganah's masterplan. . . .The Haganah cleared various areas completely of Arab villages-the Jersualem conidor, the area around Mishmar Haemek, and the coastalplain. But in most cases, expulsion orders were unnecessary; the inhabit-ants had already fled, out of fear or as a result of Jewish attack. In severalareas, Israeli commanders successfully used psychological warfare ploys toobtain Arab evacuation (as in the Hula Valley, in Upper Galilee, in May).

He further notes: "if the denial of the right to return. . .was a form of 'expul-sion', then a great many villagers-who had waited near their villages for the

battle to die down before trylng to return home-can be considered 'expel-

lees'." (Birth, p. 343, note 7) Even if we do accept that Plan Dalet was not a

political blueprint or a "master plan" for a blanket expulsion of the Arab

population, and even if the plan "was governed by military considerations,"

how can Moms square his own explanations with his conclusion that there

existed no HaganahIIDF "plan" or policy decision to expel Arabs from the

prospective Jewish state?

Furthermore, in the context of "decision-making" and "transfer" policy,Moms shows in his essay "Yosef Weitz and the Transfer Committees, 1948-

49," how Weitz, the Jewish National Fund executive in charge of land acqui-

sition and its distribution among Jewish settlements and an ardent advocate

of mass Arab transfer since the 1930s-he was on the Jewish Agency's

Transfer Committees between 1937 and 1942-"was well placed [in 19481 to

shape and influence decision-making regarding the Arab population on the

national level and to oversee the implementation of policy on the local level."

(1948, p. 91) From early 1948, Weitz began to exploit the conditions of war

to expel Arab villagers and tenant-farmers, some of whom cultivated landsowned by Jewish institutions. He personally supervised many local evictions

during the early months of war, frequently with the assistance of local

Haganah commanders. (1948, pp. 92-98) Moreover, Moms explains:

Everyone, at every level of military and political decision-making, under-stood that a Jewish state without a large Arab minority would be strongerand more viable both militarily and politically. The tendency of local mili-tary commanders to "nudge" Palestinians into flight increased as the warwent on. Jewish atrocities. . .(massacres of Arabs at Ad Dawayima, Ei-laboun, Jish, Safsaf, Majd a1 Kumm, Hule (in Lebanon) Saliha, and Sasa,

besides Dayr Yasin and Lydda and other places-also contributed signifi-cantly to the exodus. (1948, p. 22)

I cannot see how the above explanation regarding "decision-making" can be

reconciled with Morris's denial of a transfer policy. And does it matter in the

end whether such a policy was actually formulated, or whether it was just de




facto an d clearly understood at every level of m ilitary and political decision-making?

On the basis of the revelations, docum entation, a nd factual findingsbrought to light by M om s (a nd other "new" historians), the traditional Pales-

tinian contention that there was a Zionist consensus o n the question of find-

ing a "solution" to the "Arab demographic problemv-the Arabs, even in

1948, still constituted two-th irds of the popula tion of Palestine-through"transfer" of Arabs to areas outside the prospective Jewish state and ba m ngtheir return to their villages and towns, is corroborated . Zion ist parties of all

shades of opinion-with the exception of mu ted, inte rna l criticism from afew mem bers of the Mapam and Mapai parties-were in basic agreement

about the need and desirability of utilizing the 1948 War to establish an

enlarged Jewish state with as small an Arab population as possible. Yosef

Sprinzak, the relatively liberal secretary general of the Histadrut, a critic ofthe forcible transfer policy, had this to say at the 24 July 19 48 meeting at theMapai Centre, some ten days after the Lydda-Ramle expulsion:

There is a feeling thatfaits accomplis are being created. . .the question is notwhether the Arabs will return or not return. The question is whether theArabs are [being or have been] expelled or not. . .This is important to ourmoral future. . .I want to know who is creating the facts? And the facts arebeing created on orders. . .[There appears to be] a line of action. . .of expro-priation and of emptylng the land of Arabs by force. (1948, pp. 42-43)

It is difficult, using M om s's own evidence, not to see on the part of theleaders of mainstream labor Zionism a de facto, forcible transfer policy in

1948.M om s's analysis of the events of 1948 is also flawed by his treatment of

the Arab exodus largely in an historical and political vacuum, without anyintrinsic connection with Z ionism. Although he does refer to the Zionist

consensus emerging from the mid-1930s in support of transferring the Arabpopulation, he sees no connection between this and the expulsions of 194 8.

This brings us to the explanatory framework underlying M om s's work: the

Zionist leadersh ip's ideological-political, disposition for transfer-ringlexpelling Arabs resulted from the "security" threat (the "fifth column")

the Arab population posed to the Jewish state. The facts presented earlier,

on the other hand, show that the "voluntary/compulsory" transfer of the in-

digenous Arabs was prefigured in the Zionist ideology a long time before the194 8 war broke out and advocated "obsessively" by the Zion ist leadershipfrom the mid-1930s onw ards . Consequently, the resistance of the indigenous

Arab population to Zionism before and in 1948 ema nated from precisely the

Zionist goal of establishing a Jewish state that would, at best, marginalize the

Palestinians as a small, dependent minority in their own homeland, and, atworst, eradicate and "transfer" them . The "security" threat posed by the

"transferred" inhabitants of the Palestinian towns and villages resulted from

the Zionist movement's ideological premise and political agenda, namely theestablishment of a n exclusivist state.




From the perspective of Moms's "new" historiography, there was no in-herent link between the "transfer" of the Arabs and the acquisition of theirlands o n the one hand and Zionism 's long-advocated imperative of accom -modating millions of Jewish immigrants in the Jewish state on the other.

The nearest thing he says which provides a hint regarding such a connectionis the following:

The war afforded the Yishuv a historic opportunity to enlarge the Jewishstate's borders and, as things turned out, to create a state without a verylarge Arab minority. The war would solve the Yishuv's problem of lack ofland, which was necessary to properly absorb and settle the expected influxof Jewish immigrants. (1948, pp. 39-40)

W ould Zionism have succeeded in fulfilling its imperative of absorbing the

huge influx of Jewish immigrants while allowing the indigenous population

to remain in situ? If no t, could the Zionist objective of "transferring" theArabs from Palestine have been camed out "voluntarily" and peacefully,

without Arab resistance or the destruction of the ir society in 1948? Moms'sfindings constitute a landmark and are a remarkable contribution to our

knowledge because they show that the evacuation of hundreds of thousandsof Palestinians was a result of direct attacks, fear of a ttacks, intim idation ,

psychological warfare (e.g., the whispering campaign), and som etimes out-right expulsions ordered by the Haganah/IDF leadership. Yet a wider ex-

planatory and theoretical framework within which the exodus can be

properly understood must be sought elsewhere.

NOTES

1. 'A1 Darchei Mediniyotenu: Mo'atzah 'Olarnit Shel 2. Ibid., p. 100

lhud Po'alei Tzion (c.s.1, Din Vehisbon Male 21 July-7

August (1937) [A Full Report about the World Conven-tion of lhud Po'alei Tzion]. Tel Aviv, 1938 , p. 1 22.



The Saga of Deir Yassin:Massacre, Revisionism,

and Reality

By

Daniel A. McGowanand Matthew C. Hogan



ii

The Saga of Deir Yassin:Massacre, Revisionism, and Reality

By

Daniel A. McGowanand Matthew C. Hogan

Published by:Deir Yassin Remembered4078 Scandling Center

Geneva, New York 14456

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronicor mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system without writtenpermission from the publisher, except for brief quotations for a review or a thesis/dissertation. Inquiries should beaddressed to Daniel McGowan, 4078 Scandling Center, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, New York 14456(USA).

Copyright © 1999 by Daniel A. McGowan and Matthew C. Hogan

Printed in the United States of America



iii

Board of Advisers

Hanan AshrawiRamallah

Ilise CohenAtlanta

Mahira Dajani Jerusalem

Roni Ben Efrat Jerusalem

Marc H. EllisWaco

Nabila EspaniolyNazareth

Paul Findley Jacksonville

Dr. Bill FriendRockville Centre

Sahar GhoshehRamallah

Sherna Berger GluckLong Beach

Edmund R. Hanauer

Boston

Saleh Abdel JawadBirzeit

Hani Q. KhouryMercer

Rachelle MarshallStanford

Fuad Bassim NijimSanta Clara

Cheryl Rubenberg Boca Raton

Edward SaidNew York City

Stanley K. SheinbaumLos Angeles

Ahmad Tahboub Jerusalem

Lea Tsemel Jerusalem

Directors

Daniel A. McGowanExecutive Director

Khairieh Abu ShushehAssociate Director

Issam M. NashashibiAssociate Director

Cover DesignV. Nelson AssociatesDecatur, Georgia

Editing andDesktop PublishingWord WizardsAtlanta, Georgia



iv

Dedication

To Alfred M. Lilienthal, Jr.



v

Contents

Board of Advisers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiiDedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Landmark, Symbol, and New Revisionist Fantasy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Our Approach in this Monograph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Chapter 1The Mystery of the Deaths of Residents of Deir Yassin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Photographs of the Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Witness Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Ascertaining Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Massacre Contention Grows Stronger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22The Death-by-Combat Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26The Demeanor of the Accused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Admission by the Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Motives for Massacre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Chapter 2Reconstructing the Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

The Beginning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42The Selection of the Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42An Early Cover-Up? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Comedy of Terrors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50The Massacre in Hot Blood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52The Massacre in Warm Blood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58The Massacre in Cold Blood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Afterwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64Challenges to Pa'il's Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Why Pa'il's Credibility is Unrefuted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68Other Atrocities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Chapter 3Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Sources are indicated in parentheses with number reference to page or section. Abbreviations and precisenature of references are provided in this section.



Introduction 1

INTRODUCTION

Landmark, Symbol, and New Revisionist Fantasy

“How could you have done it?” berated Natan Friedman-Yellin, joint supreme commander in1948 of the Lehi (Stern Gang), a Jewish nationalist guerrilla group in the Palestine Mandate. “It wasinhuman.” The subordinate he addressed had taken part in the organization's April 9 takeover ofthe Arab town Deir Yassin (Kr 149). An experiment in military cooperation between his group anda larger allied militia, the Irgun (Etzel), had turned into “a landmark of the Israeli-Arab conflict and

a symbol of the horrors of war,” in the words of Israeli historian Tom Segev (Sg 25). “I am and wasrepelled by the fact,” the Lehi chief reflected later, “that the Deir Yassin massacre was a turningpoint in the history of the 1948 war” (Pr 217).

The moral, historical, and political significances of the Deir Yassin massacre continue to beexamined and debated. The tragedy symbolized and continues to affect issues at the heart of theunresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. These include the hazards of war, the suffering of Palestinians,conflicts within Israeli political identity, and American foreign policy interests. In the Deir Yassinincident, each viewpoint offers an occasion for reflection, a case for argument, and a slogan forpropaganda.

What has not been a focus of serious debate is whether the massacre actually occurred. It is a

sad and indisputable fact that over a hundred Palestinian men, women, and children, most or allnonresistant at the times of their deaths, were deliberately slaughtered by units of Irgun and Lehifighters on April 9, 1948. The slaughter is as immune to serious historical doubt as are suchatrocities as the My Lai massacre, the Bataan Death March, and the Holocaust.

Sadly, however, fraudulent revisionism lives in the form of revisiting an event with the aim ofaltering or amending an original truth. And it has now touched Deir Yassin, armed with allrevisionism's defects of blaming the victim, excusing the guilty, and twisting the facts. It appeals tothe partisan's desire to feel that “our side doesn't do that” and “those other people are lying.”Harry Levin, a Jewish journalist in Jerusalem at the time of the massacre, recorded that the reportsof the massacre were direct, fresh, and convincing, but “some still refuse to believe it” (HL 59). A

tract published in 1998 by the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), “Deir Yassin: History of ALie” is itself dishonest in its attempt to reignite that old and discredited refusal to believe. Thearguments in the tract are self-defeating but vigorously put forth.

The ZOA Tract. In “Deir Yassin: History of A Lie” (ZOA tract), author and organizationpresident Morton Klein insists that the massacre of Deir Yassin did not happen. Instead, he asks usto believe that the scores of victims—old men, women, and children scattered throughout thetown—died from repeated combat accidents that killed unintended victims, oddly with a lethalefficiency virtually unparalleled in military history. And it occurred, we are told, when a force of120 untested troops with insufficient ammunition and inadequate weaponry successfully managedto storm fortified stone houses but who miraculously suffered only 5 percent lethal casualties.

Then we are asked to believe that a vast conspiracy instantaneously sprouted among theInternational Red Cross, the Haganah, Arab villagers, Palestinian leaders, and British colonial



2 The Saga of Deir Yassin

police to smear the guerrillas with the charge of massacre. In the end, however, we are to concludethat the entire massacre story was manipulated by a Jewish Communist spy in search of a job.

Serious debate about Deir Yassin may not be affected by the ZOA tract, but such efforts canaffect popular discussion and understanding. Columnist Sydney Zion wrote a piece in the NewYork Daily News on March 23, 1998, commending the tract as a great research exposé. The articlewas no doubt read by hundreds of thousands of people. Our purpose here is to set the record

straight with information and analysis for those who are sincerely interested.

The ZOA's revisionist effort is fed by the fact that few institutions or persons who esteem theconcept of Zionism have denounced the tract issued in the ideology’s name. One significantexception is the herculean research of Ami Isseroff of Rehovot, Israel, who studied the issueindependently and with original skepticism. Inspired by his identification with Zionist, Israeli, and

Jewish values, he sought the published record and new witness information and made importantmaterial available in English. He eventually came to the only realistic conclusion possible: A large-scale deliberate massacre had occurred at Deir Yassin. His work is published on the Internet’sWorld Wide Web at www.ariga.com/peacewatch/dy.



The Saga of Deir Yassin 3

Fraudulent Scholarship and Self-Defeating Reasoning . The ZOA tract is demonstrablyfraudulent and frequently ridiculous. The tract concludes there is no evidence of prisonermistreatment or excess at Deir Yassin, all the while basing that conclusion primarily on the researchof an Israeli historian (Uri Milstein) who calls the Deir Yassin affair a “massacre” in which Irgunand Lehi forces “murdered Arabs” (Ml 273, 276). It is difficult to call the ZOA anything butdishonest when it informs its readers of this alleged lack of evidence of prisoner atrocity while itsmajor source provides many specific examples of prisoner executions, a number of which are

admitted to unambiguously by the Lehi and Irgun guerrillas themselves (Ml 263, 267, 276). Thetract also conveniently omits numerous other direct testimonies of reliable evidence of a massacre(Ml 275-277).

Beyond that, the ZOA tract engages in selective quotation by cutting the most incriminatingparts of witness testimony it cites. It ignores the many perpetrators who have admitted“liquidating prisoners,” “eliminating every Arab,” and witnessing a fellow fighter machine-gun asurrendering family. It cites witnesses who find no evidence of excesses like rape and mutilationand omits their clear testimony of mass murder. It also appears that the tract simply creates facts tomanipulate emotion, as when a dead Yugoslav Muslim fighter is described as a former S.S. membereven though the original source makes no such claim (Ml 263). A great many examples of this form

of self-serving omissions and selective quotations are set forth throughout this monograph.

Ultimately, however, there is good news. Revisionism is self-defeating despite its attempts torob victims of the dignity of their suffering. Because revisionists need to visit reality from time totime to shore up their case, the absurdity of their arguments and conclusions are forced to thesurface despite best efforts to conceal them.

One example is the ZOA's endless focus on the difference between the figure of 254 victims inthe massacre—which has been reported in most standard histories—and the lower figure of 110discerned from closer research. This is a central theme of the ZOA tract. How can we trust theclaims of massacre, the ZOA asks, when the writers who claim it repeat such an incorrect figure

(ZOA 153)? To repeat that false figure renders one's credibility on Deir Yassin fundamentallyflawed (ZOA 153). In an ironic twist, the same tract says that the exaggerated 254 figure wasoriginally arrived at by the attackers themselves. By the ZOA's main standard, the very peoplethey are defending stand convicted of the biggest fabrication in telling the history of Deir Yassin.

Thus, we need not go beyond the ZOA tract itself to perceive its problems. This is valuablebecause those in denial should not be able to force established history to meet the revisionists'burden of proof. That would mean victims almost literally reliving horrors as they revisited theirown and their loved ones' agony. Instead, it is the revisionists who should have the burden ofvalidating their views by independent witnesses, objective evidence, or significant retractions.

In that direction the ZOA fails miserably. They produce not a single independent (i.e., non-Irgun or non-Lehi) eyewitness to Deir Yassin or its aftermath who has concluded that anythingother than a massacre happened. And there were hundreds of such witnesses present. Similarly,the ZOA provides no independent witness to corroborate the intrinsically unlikely hypothesis thatan unusually heavy battle caused the deaths. Reality further erodes their tract when the ZOAadmits that the perpetrators seriously contemplated massacre even before attacking Deir Yassinand that there are irrefutable admissions of atrocities by the perpetrators. These points will bediscussed in greater detail.

We shall mention the ZOA tract many times in this monograph as it confirms or fails to providecorroborating evidence regarding particular issues. Also, we cite the ZOA document directly as a

source in an effort to illustrate how a critical reader could invalidate the ZOA tract even withoutadditional research. This emphasizes the self-defeating nature of such fraudulent revisionism.




Our Approach in This Monograph

In the next chapter, we approach the issue exactly as the ZOA tract defines it—a murdermystery. The historical debate comes down to a simple question of criminal responsibility: Werethe dead men, women, and children of Deir Yassin primarily the victims of massacre or were theyaccidentally killed in the hazards of active battle? Following the logic of that formulation, weproceed in an investigative fashion by following an imaginary detective puzzling a mystery

involving the discovery of those who have died violently. While traveling with our investigator,we shall visit the scene, take observations from witnesses, and formulate theories and conclusions.This structure allows logic and linearity, and not revisionism, to frame the questions that evaluatethe evidence.

We shall see rather quickly that the evidence that a massacre occurred is overwhelming. It is sostrong that, even before consulting independent observers, our investigator has no doubt that thevictims were primarily killed deliberately and outside the exigencies of combat. The circumstantialevidence, the scene of the incident, the confessions and behaviors of the participants demonstrate amassacre beyond all reasonable doubt. However, our investigator examines all evidence to take thecase full length and settle the matter through facts and not preferences.



Chapter 1 5




The Mystery of the Deaths of Residents of DeirYassin

Background

Let us follow an imaginary detective, one who is trained to investigate historical crimes. Thisinvestigator is brought to the task 50 years later to perform an “autopsy” of the incident. Like anycriminal investigator, he begins from the moment word arrives that the dead have been found. Hetakes great pains to search for all relevant forensic evidence and evaluate it fairly.

The place and time is Deir Yassin village in the Palestine Mandate, mid-afternoon, Friday, April9, 1948. Two guerrilla groups called the Lehi and Irgun attacked the village in the morning. Theywere in control of the town as reports of the dead began to enter public consciousness. Historybooks have called it a massacre. But the detective read a recent ZOA pamphlet saying the deadwere unintended casualties resulting from a tough battle to capture the village in a time ofincreasing warfare.

Our investigator first fills his notebook with general background information: British rule inPalestine was set to end the next month, May 1948. At that time, the official Jewish Agency forPalestine was to declare a Jewish state called Israel on the strength of a November 1947 United

Nations resolution recommending the partition of Palestine into one Jewish and one Arab state. Jerusalem was to be internationalized. Arab leaderships in Palestine and elsewhere forceablyopposed the plan.

Our detective knows that Arab-Jewish fighting broke out right after the U.N. resolution. Thedeparting British made no serious efforts to stop the violence. Arab states began to infiltrate armedunits detached from the Syrian and Iraqi armies, joined by some Yugoslavs. Around Jerusalem,these forces were led by Palestinian Arab Abdel Khader Husseini, and many Palestinian Arabvillagers joined the effort. The Jewish Agency, led by the Labor Zionist movement, opposed themwith its own armed force called the Haganah and its elite strike force, the Palmach.

The detective first seeks to identify the forces who took control of Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948.They were small Jewish guerrilla forces. One was the Irgun (National Military Organization) andthe other was Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, sometimes called the Stern Group or SternGang). The two operated independently from the Jewish Agency, especially around Jerusalem.Politically, they were right-wing Zionists (Jewish nationalists) who felt partition was insufficient.They believed all of Palestine and Transjordan (now Jordan) should be included in Israel. Theywere thus political and military rivals of the Jewish Agency.

Our investigator next turns to Deir Yassin, a Muslim Arab village of stone houses with villagerswhose chief activity was quarrying and cutting stone. It was located a few hundred meters to thewest of the Jewish settlement known as Givat Shaul. Population estimates varied from the middle

hundreds to over a thousand.




The detective then examines the immediate military situation. By April 1948, Arab forces hadcut off Jewish Jerusalem from the coast by ambushing traffic on the main highway. An armedoffensive by the Palmach and Haganah began the first week of April to protect Jewish convoysalong the highway. A vital chokepoint was Kastel, an Arab town not very far west of Deir Yassin.

The detective looks for consensus about the events of April 9 and finds that the Irgun and Lehigroups, in a united operation, attacked Deir Yassin in the morning. They met resistance. By the

mid afternoon, however, they were in control. There were a great many dead villagers. Thequestion facing our imaginary investigator is: Did they die in massacre or combat? Did they die inmass murder or wartime misfortune?

Photographs of the Scene

The most helpful investigative tool, our detective reflects, would be photos of the event or its

scene. This would allow less reliance on conflicting testimony of witnesses who may be biased,

dishonest, or confused. In this regard, the ZOA tract has promising news: There are indeed photos

of Deir Yassin from April 9, 1948 (ZOA 55).

Although photographs of Deir Yassin on the day of the incident exist, they have been kept hiddenand are currently held in the Archives of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and (as the ZOA tract

confirms) they have never been made public. Indeed, and suspiciously, they have been denied to

even in-house inspection by academic researchers (ZOA 55-56, Ml 275), even though it has been

over 50 years since the event. Opening the case notebook, our investigator records his first

impressions: “Suspicious. Why are these photos still not available? Is there something to hide? A

massacre?”

Strong suspicion that there was a massacre at Deir Yassin is warranted. Common sense provides

the reason: If an institution is concerned about some aspect of an event, and that institution then

conceals photographic evidence of the event, it is reasonable to suspect that the photos support theconcern. Regarding Deir Yassin, the concern for Israel is the allegation of a massacre. The ZOA

confirms this, noting that the charge of massacre at Deir Yassin is often used against the State of

Israel (ZOA 1).

A closer look only increases suspicion. This secrecy has continued through Israeli government

administrations run by the Likud party. The Likud are political descendants of the same guerrilla

movements accused of the Deir Yassin massacre (ZOA 4). In fact, one Likud Prime Minister was

Menachem Begin, a former Irgun chief who adamantly denied the charge of massacre at Deir Yassin.

Yet in all his years as Prime Minister, the photos remained secret. Surely, if they supported his

viewpoint, he would have released them.

Even more incriminating material appears in the ZOA tract. At the IDF Archives, the photograph

custodians have commented on the cause of death in some pictures. Interestingly, they did not

exclude intentional massacre as the cause of death of bodies in the photos (ZOA 56).

Witness Testimony

Our detective realizes that without photographs, witnesses are sorely needed. The investigatorneeds independent witnesses so he can compare what they say to what the attackers and theiradvocates say. The investigator assembles testimonies about the victims and the apparent causes oftheir deaths. He finds statements made by nine people, including Haganah officers, who cameupon Deir Yassin just after its conquest. There are also statements by several survivors andHaganah intelligence officer Meir Pa'il, who witnessed the event. Now let us explore our




detective's findings from the statements of the nine who arrived at Deir Yassin immediately after itscapture. Findings from statements by survivors and the Haganah officer will be examined in thenext chapter. What do the nine independent witnesses of the scene say?

Account 1: Mordechai Gihon, Haganah. Mordechai Gihon was a Haganah intelligence officerin Jerusalem, code name Elazar. He provided cover fire in the morning so that the guerrillasattacking Deir Yassin could remove their wounded. He later became a general in Israeli army

intelligence and a university professor. He was a British Army veteran as well. The ZOA cites himextensively, always favorably, and at one point narrates events through his eyes. However, all ofthe following statements were omitted from the ZOA tract. Gihon entered the village on theafternoon of April 9.

Before we got to the village we saw people carrying bodies to the quarry east of Deir Yassin.We entered the village around 3:00 in the afternoon. . . . In the village there were tens ofbodies. The dissidents got them out of the roads. I told them not to throw the bodies intocisterns and caves, because that was the first place that would be checked. . . .

At the time I had just been through British Army service and had met Holocaust survivors

in the camps. The visit to Deir Yassin was a moral shock for me. Before then I had neverseen so many bodies. The dead were lying in the houses and the fields without burial . . .

I didn't count the dead. I estimated that there were four pits full of bodies, and in each pitthere were 20 bodies, and several tens more in the quarry. I throw out a number, 150. (M1274, Lv 343)

It is not clear if Gihon's counting of the dead occurred on the first inspection or later. But in anintelligence report at the time, his summary assessment of the Deir Yassin incident isstraightforward: “the murder of falachim [Arab peasants] and innocent citizens” (Lv 343).

Account 2: Eliahu Arbel, Haganah. Eliahu Arbel was Operations Officer B of the Haganah'sEtzioni Brigade. He was an officer in Israel's armed forces in subsequent wars. He entered thevillage on Saturday, April 10.

On the following day, after the operation, I inspected the village, in accordance with theorder of Colonel Shaltiel. Accompanied by an officer of the attacking unit, I saw the horrorsthat the fighters had created. I saw bodies of women and children, who were murdered intheir houses in cold blood by gun fire, with no signs of battle and not as the result ofblowing up the houses. From my experience I know well, that there is no war withoutkilling, and that not only combatants get killed. I have seen a great deal of war, but I neversaw a sight like Deir Yassin and therefore I cannot forget what happened there. (YA-5-2-72)

Account 3: Jacques de Reynier, Red Cross. De Reynier, a French-Swiss, was Representative ofthe International Red Cross. He had been with that humanitarian organization in World War II.Before the Deir Yassin incident, he took part in an intervention to save the lives of Jewish fighterstrapped by Arab guerrillas. He came to the village on Sunday, April 11.

Finally the [Irgun] Commander tells me . . . for now I can visit some houses and thesituation is as follows: a total of more than 200 dead, men, women, and children. About150 cadavers have not been preserved inside the village in view of the danger representedby the bodies' decomposition. They have been gathered, transported some distance, andplaced in a large trough (I have not been able to establish if this is a pit, a grain silo, or a

large natural excavation). Impossible to visit because it's under fire. . . . About 20 bodies arelocated in the no-man's-land between the Arab and Irgun troops. About 50 bodies are in thevillage. . . .




I . . . enter the house. The first room is dark, everything is in disarray, but no one is there.In the second, I find among the ripped-open furniture, blankets, debris of all sorts, somecold bodies. Here the cleaning-up was done by submachine guns, then by grenade; theyfinished it off with knives, as anyone could tell. The same thing in the next room. . . .

In the neighboring house and so on . . . it is the same hideous spectacle. . . .

The houses visited by me presented an appearance of the most complete disorder,everything is broken, and bodies litter the floor. . . .

[One body was] a woman who must have been eight months pregnant, hit in the stomach,with powder burns on her dress indicating she'd been shot point-blank. (DeR 74, RC, CLP278)

De Reynier concluded that the villagers had been “deliberately massacred” (DeR 74).

Account 4: Dr. Alfred Engel, Magen David Adom (Red Shield of David, Jewish medicalorganization). Alfred Engel went to Deir Yassin with de Reynier. He had extensive medical

experience in wartime. The ZOA endorses him as a sober witness but omits the last two sentencesof his recollection.

We got into the village easily. There were only dissidents [Irgun and Lehi members] there,and they were putting bodies on trucks. . . . In the houses there were dead, in all about ahundred men, women and children. It was terrible. . . . It was clear that they (the attackers)had gone from house to house and shot the people at close range. I was a doctor in theGerman army for 5 years, in World War I, but I had not seen such a horrifying spectacle.(Ml 270)

Account 5: Two Haganah Photographers. Haganah broadcaster Harry Levin, later an Israeli

consul in the United States, published a recollection from his diary of the period. He related thattwo unnamed photographers from the Haganah reported entering Deir Yassin with the Red Crossrepresentative. He met them after their visit and refers to them only by initials “I.” and “H.”

I spoke with two, I. and H., who went [to Deir Yassin] with the Red Cross as Haganahphotographers. I. was too shaken to say anything. H. told me he saw a large pile of burnedand half-burned bodies in a pit; another pile of children's bodies, about 16 of them. In aroom of one house were the bodies of a woman and a child; in a second room the bodies oftwo villagers and two uniformed Syrians. . . .

Most Jews I have spoken with are horrified. Some still refuse to believe it. (HL 59)

Account 6: Drs. Avigdori and Druyan, Histadrut Medical Committee. These doctors visitedwhile the Haganah was taking over the village. The ZOA endorses their information but omits thefollowing account (ZOA 78).

By the invitation of the Jewish Agency, on April 12, 1948, we visited the village before noon.The village was empty. Looted houses. The commanders of the Haganah showed us bodiesin different places. A mother and her children that were killed by gunfire, two bodies ofwomen who were killed by shooting.

In the quarry five bodies [killed] by shooting, and two youths of 13 or 14 [killed] by

shooting; in the Wadi 25 bodies, one over the other, uncovered, children and women. . . .We did not check each body, all were dressed. Limbs were whole. . . . They were notburied. . . .




Piles of smoking bodies. There were 12 bodies, and 6 burnt children. We asked for morebodies. . . . There are other bodies in the houses. The Haganah commanders did not inspectthe houses. (Ml 271)

Irgun officer Yehuda Lapidot later said the two had reported 90 bodies (Ml 271).

Account 7: Yehoshua Arieli, Haganah. Yehoshua Arieli was a commander of the Haganah's

paramilitary youth group, the Gadna. He had also been a World War II veteran of the BritishArmy. He would become a distinguished Israeli professor of American history. He supervised theburials of the bodies and describes the scene (in a recollection omitted by the ZOA) and its scope.

Absolutely barbaric. All of the killed, with very few exceptions, were old men, women, andchildren. The dead we found were all unjust victims and none of them had died with aweapon in their hands. . . .

The 116 figure [of bodies] makes sense. I don't think we could have buried more than 120-40. (CLP 279, Sl 96)

Arieli saw “several men” lying dead in a quarry (Sl 94).

Account 8: Yeshurun Schiff, Haganah. Schiff was adjutant to Haganah Jerusalem chief DavidShaltiel. He was in Deir Yassin on April 9 and present to review the burial scene on April 12. Hisimpressions are provided below (again, omitted by the ZOA).

[The attackers chose] to kill anybody they found alive as though every living thing in thevillage was the enemy and they could only think ‘kill them all.’ . . . It was a lovely springday, the almond trees were in bloom, the flowers were out and everywhere there was thestench of the dead, the thick smell of blood, and the terrible odor of the corpses burning inthe quarry. (CLP 280)

Account 9: Yair Tsaban, Gadna Youth Organization. Yair Tsaban, later an Israeli peaceactivist, was one of several youths in the burial team at Deir Yassin on April 12. He describes somethings he observed.

When we buried the bodies, I saw no evidence of killing by knives. . . .

What we saw were [dead] women, young children, and old men. What shocked us was atleast two or three cases of old men dressed in women's clothes. I remember entering theliving-room of a certain house. In the far corner was a small woman with her back towardsthe door, sitting dead. When we reached the body we saw an old man with a beard. My

conclusion was that what happened in the village so terrorized these old men that theyknew being old men would not save them. They hoped that if they were seen as old womenthat would save them. (Sl 93, 95)

Ascertaining Facts

Our investigator notes that the ZOA tract does not produce even one independent witness whoreports a conclusion different from massacre. The witnesses, meanwhile, are highly credible. Still,the first thing the detective must do is separate the facts from the emotions and conclusions. Doingso, our historical sleuth finds that there is actually quite a bit of agreement on basic issues. Theinvestigator opens his notebook and begins to address objective questions of Deir Yassin.

How Many Actual Dead Were There? Our investigator reasons a fair estimate is about 110.The ZOA endorses a figure between 107 and 120 (ZOA 91). Except for de Reynier, the eyewitnesses




provide a range from 70 to 150. (De Reynier's figure of over 200 appears to be based not on directcount or observation but indirect information from the guerrillas.) The ZOA's low-end estimate of107 is based upon villager recollections. No source claimed to be totally precise, so 110 is a fairapproximate number (BZ 57 et seq.). (This figure does not include the four guerrillas killed on thescene who were removed.) Historian Uri Milstein also suggests the 110 figure (Ml 274).

Who Were the Dead? Almost all, if not all, were Deir Yassin villagers. The 107 figure is based

entirely on villager casualties (BZ 6, 57). Repeated, and uncontradicted, emphasis from thetestimonies our detective examined is on the large number of women, children, and old menamong the dead. The ZOA-endorsed Arab study lists victims as women, children, and elderly (BZ57-60).

There are no direct independent source reports of Arab soldiers among the dead (Levin'saccount is second-hand), except for a few dead soldiers claimed in the ZOA tract (ZOA 32-33). Inany event, it is clear from the witnesses and the breakdown of villager dead that almost all wereDeir Yassin villagers, the bulk being old men, women, and children.

Where Were the Dead? Perhaps the clearest thing that can be said is that they were not found

in one place. It is not clear where all of them died, as many bodies appear to have been movedquickly. The reports place large numbers of bodies inside several houses. (Many were burnedafterwards.) Some also appear to have been in one of the quarries or in the Wadi, the valley southof the village.

Whose Firepower or Lethal Force Killed Them? There is little debate that most of the deadwere killed by the Lehi and Irgun. Those who contend a massacre occurred attribute all or mostdeaths to the guerrillas. The ZOA, although describing general crossfire and the use of firepowerby the Haganah, does not allege that Arab firepower was responsible for most deaths (ZOA 31-45,114). The ZOA also does not accuse the Arab forces of executing the civilians of the town. The onlyissue is whether the lethal force was the product of the chaotic violence of close, intense combat or

the deliberate killing of persons who were not in a threatening position when they were killed.

While he is on the subject of objective data, our investigator pursues other areas of agreementregarding casualty statistics. He discovers some range of agreement exists here as well.

How Many Villagers and Village Defenders Were Wounded or Captured? For wounded, ourdetective finds a range of 12 to about 50; for prisoners, a range of 50 to 150. Captured and woundedwere mostly removed from the scene by the time Gihon and other witnesses arrived. The ZOAseems to accept a figure of 12 wounded based on an Arab study. A contemporary Red Cross reportsays 50 wounded were turned over to the British after the capture of the village (RC). As toprisoners, the ZOA is vague and even contradictory, stating 40 plus “a small number” (ZOA 47).

On the ZOA Website (www.zoa.org), however, a version of the ZOA tract published there as ofSeptember 1, 1998, reported over 100 prisoners. Another reference in the printed version saysseveral dozen (ZOA 42).

What Were the Attackers' Casualties? The ZOA reports four dead and “several dozen”wounded attackers on the scene (ZOA 65). Generally, sources place a figure of wounded at about36. One more appears to have died later (Lv 344).

Massacre Contention Grows Stronger

As our historical detective ponders the objective figures, his earlier suspicion of massacre

(originating with the missing photos and prodded by the powerful witness testimonies) grows tonear certainty. He continues to add to his notebook:




How Does the Number of Dead Argue a Massacre? One hundred ten dead, predominantlycivilians, in a single village battle is a huge red flag that there was deliberate killing. Groundcombat in a peasant village, even with modern weapons, does not usually cause that high a numberof civilian deaths. Common sense says that civilians do not want to be near the battle, and neitherside—usually—wants to kill them or have them in the way. Civilians hide, they surrender alive, orthey run away. Some illustrations follow.

In the bloodiest battle of the U.S. Civil War, over 100,000 soldiers with massed artillery fightingin and around the town of Gettysburg cost only one noncombatant civilian death. A casualty toll of180 civilians in one day in one town during the Civil War caused national shock, and that massacrewas the deliberate killing of most males in Lawrence, Kansas, by Quantrill's raiders (Hs).

In Vietnam, a civilian death figure of about 20 in a rural village battle was considered“abnormally high,” requiring special investigation by a command-level officer (SH 131). DeirYassin's death toll of 110 was thus as much as 5 times the number of civilian deaths considereddisturbingly excessive in bloodier village combat (helicopter gunships, artillery barrages, searchand destroy, etc.) where much greater firepower was typically brought to bear against flimsierdwellings.

Our detective knows that the death rate inflicted at Deir Yassin is also atypical and whollyinconsistent with normal combat-induced casualties. For example, a deliberate massacre of a

Jewish convoy over a period of hours by Arab fighters at Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, in retaliation forDeir Yassin had fewer deaths than Deir Yassin, about 75, a figure that included many noncivilianfighters (CLP 291). Nonetheless, that incident generated world headlines for its exceptional scope(NYT 4-14-48). Some months before, an Arab massacre of Jewish refinery workers in Haifa (inretaliation for an Irgun bombing of Arab refinery workers) had less than half the death toll of DeirYassin (Fl 95). The day after Deir Yassin was captured, more powerful Arab artillery pounded

Jewish neighborhoods in West Jerusalem, hitting a Talmud school. The total dead from a barrageof 40 shells: 3 (NYT 4-11-48).

In the 1948 war, all Israeli civilian casualties (about 2,000) inflicted by Arab forces averaged fivecivilians killed per day (approximately 400 days) (NL 450). At Deir Yassin therefore, the inflicteddeath rate exceeded by as much as 20 times all forms of anti-civilian violence by the Arab side,including airstrikes, artillery bombardments of urban areas, all hazards of combat, and alldeliberate atrocities. (Total Arab civilian casualty figures for the 1948 war are uncertain because ofthe dislocation of the Arab population.) Clearly, Deir Yassin was an exceptionally lethal event byany military standards. Deliberate excessive slaughter of the civilians is thus powerfully indicated.(It is not surprising that the ZOA does not attempt to provide evidence that the casualties inflictedat Deir Yassin were typical of village ground combat.)

Famous deliberate massacres by armed militias—where obviously the civilian death toll wouldbe higher than just the accidents of battle—often involve figures less than or comparable to DeirYassin. For example, Racak, Kosovo, 40 (January 1999) (NYT 3-18-99); Mountain Meadows, Utah,120 or less (September 1857) (JBr); Wounded Knee, South Dakota, 140 (December 1890) (JG). Theobservation by Deir Yassin eyewitness and military physician Alfred Engel, cited above, supportsthe notion that civilians do not normally die in such large numbers in regular ground combat. DeirYassin was more horrible than anything he had seen in the entirety of World War I. In sum, the 110or so deaths are an additional major indication that deliberate slaughter occurred.

How Does the Small Number of Wounded Demonstrate a Massacre? At Deir Yassin, thedead outnumbered the wounded. As one professional historian has explained, the careful

deliberateness of the killing in the massacre at Lawrence, Kansas, by Quantrill's raiders in the U.S.Civil War was evidenced by the fact that the dead civilians outnumbered the wounded, which isthe reverse of normal combat casualties (Hs). The standard ratio in ground combat is three




wonded for one dead (TF 126). The statistics on the attackers at Deir Yassin also indicate amassacre because the attackers, who were shot at deliberately, suffered more wounded than dead.This is the normal result of combat even for fighters: There are usually larger numbers of woundedthan dead.

Common sense reigns again. Even in deliberate killings, it is often hard to kill someone whodoes not want to be killed. Shooting and explosions are generally inaccurate and do not make a

direct path for vital organs even when they manage to hit a person. The person may be partlyprotected by obstacles or other persons, and when the battle stops, the wounded are usually helpedor at least left alone. But when one has the opportunity and will to kill deliberately withoutresistance or restraint as in a massacre, the wounded become fewer and fewer until only a few ornone are left.

In massacres like Lidice in World War II Czechoslovakia, no surviving wounded were reportedamong the casualties; it was entirely systematic (JB). In others, a few survive (e.g., by being mixedamong the dead) as at My Lai (ABC). At the massacre of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, the SiouxIndian dead also outnumbered the wounded with a ratio of 140 dead to 50 wounded. The massacrethere ran out of steam before all could become among the dead (JG).

The high ratio of 110 dead to 12 wounded at Deir Yassin is provided by the ZOA. The numberof wounded may have been as high as 50, but in either case the dead outnumber them (RC). Asystematic slaughter is powerfully indicated by this remarkable statistic alone. We wouldotherwise have to believe a group of ill-trained and poorly equipped fighters repeatedly scored amiraculously high rate of lethal wounds on persons they say they did not intend to hit.

How Does the Lack of Captives Fail to Challenge the Charge of Massacre? Even at thefamous Lidice massacre of Czechs, captives were taken (JB). At the battle of the Alamo, prisonerswere also taken despite the call for “no prisoners” (LT). People were taken alive after WoundedKnee. There were different reasons in each case. Some persons were not targeted for massacre

(e.g., women and children) or the massacre was undertaken for only a certain length of time.




The Death-by-Combat Explanation

Although our investigator has become virtually convinced of a massacre based on the casualtyfigures, the testimony of witnesses, and the concealment of the photos, he still must satisfy anylingering doubt. Strange things do happen, so it is important to get the story from the accused.

Our historical sleuth turns to the ZOA tract and learns of a firefight during the village takeover.

According to the ZOA, the attackers reported meeting stiff, accurate resistance from armed soldiersinside and outside the houses. Women and men dressed as women fought and used deceptivetactics of false surrender; women ran about giving assistance to village fighters; parts of somehouses were blown up or blown open as they were stormed and captured; guerrillas had toadvance and enter houses while firing wildly for fear of resistance (ZOA 35-46). There was alsosome mortar fire against one house by the Haganah, and some hand grenade use, but the ZOAalleges that by then most of the carnage had already occurred (ZOA 44).

Absorbing the new information, our detective draws a further conclusion: A massacre can nolonger be seriously doubted. Even assuming the ZOA description of the combat is accurate (whichis highly questionable, as shall be shown later), it still leads to a conclusion of massacre. The

notebook comes out again.

Why Is the Combat Explanation Inadequate to Explain the Dead? There is no set of combatincidents that could explain the extreme carnage. As already discussed, 110 dead, largely if notexclusively civilian noncombatants, is profoundly unusual for village ground fighting. Yet the onlyexplanation provided for this freakish outcome is a normal, unexceptional battle. That does not fit.

There is nothing unusual about the battle reported by the ZOA. Defending soldiers snipingeffectively from houses is a normal part of every war. Deception tactics like men disguised as Arabwomen to fight or escape, fake surrenders, etc., are as old as war itself. Women do fight. Therewere armed women in the Irgun, for example (Ml 265). Houses are stormed in all resisting villages

in all wars, but storming houses is one thing and executing the inhabitants is an entirely differentthing.

Most important is the fact that the greatest destructive acts reported—blowing up houses, orparts of them—is also nothing unusual. The New York Times' correspondent of the period recallsthat villages being raided and houses in them being blown up was standard for the period (DS 3-4).According to Aryeh Yitzhaki, an official historian of the Haganah, civilians were often in houseswhen blown up in ordinary operations by regular Jewish forces (Fl 94). Also, a letter from theHaganah commander to the guerrillas before the action at Deir Yassin advises against blowing upthe houses, as if that practice was already an established, standard battle tactic (ZOA 7).

Furthermore (in the ZOA tract or anywhere else), there are no reported airstrikes, heavyartillery fire, chemical weapons, suicide charges, or other powerful interventions that might explainan egregiously high civilian death toll. It is as if we are expected to believe that the untrained Irgunand Lehi guerrilla fighters spontaneously invented a new and lethal village ground-combat methodnever before conceived in warfare, and they did so while under fire. The death-in-combatexplanation fails by trying to explain an extraordinary civilian death toll by describing a veryordinary battle. But more important, as discussed next, the heavy-battle explanation is notsupported by the evidence.

How is the Account of Combat Deaths in Heavy Fighting Contradicted By Evidence? Onereported eyewitness has said that aerial photos of Deir Yassin, if taken, would have shown no

significant difference before and after the fighting (McG 39). The reports of house demolitions atDeir Yassin (accounts that appear in most conventional reconstructions of the incident) are not




supported by independent evidence of the scene. The ZOA cites no independent observer whorecalls houses being destroyed or concluding that such destruction had taken place.

Aftermath eyewitness Eliayhu Arbel, a veteran of several Middle East conflicts, who is citedabove, insists that houses being blown up were not the cause of the deaths. None of our detective'sindependent eyewitnesses report demolished houses, partly demolished houses or structural signsof heavy combat. De Reynier's description of a disordered house of damaged furnishings makes no

mention of stone rubble or crushed bodies. He describes the causes of death as knives, bullets, andhand grenades, not large bombs or structural collapse.

In fact, the most detailed examination of the bodies (by the Histadrut doctors) repeatedly saysthe deaths of women and children occurred by bullets. There are intact limbs, suggesting no strongexplosions. Dr. Engel specifically says the deaths in the houses were primarily by gunfire at closerange. The two Histadrut doctors and Dr. Engel are all endorsed by the ZOA. An additional pointof note is that most of our detective's eyewitnesses were experienced observers when they madetheir observations. And none of the independent eyewitnesses report any Arab or other soldiersamong the dead, except for a second-hand report of two soldiers. This further strongly argues thatthere was little or no professional military resistance from inside the village.

The claim of heavy resistance is also contradicted by evidence. The ZOA does not report even asingle hand grenade thrown by the village fighters. There is also no mortar fire, land mines, orextensive hand-to-hand combat. Although there are reports of a soldier body here and there in theZOA tract, our detective finds a lack of significant numbers of reported professional-soldier bodies.Nor is there a record of any specific number of captured guns to indicate the presence of enemyfighters. (A secret Haganah postbattle assessment categorically concluded that there had been noforeign Arabs in the village [Lv 343].)

The decisive question presents itself: How is it that there came to be so many dead amongthose presumably not targeted (women and children) but so few, if any, of those supposedly

targeted (soldiers)? If scores of civilians were hit by indirect fire at Deir Yassin while soldiers werethe actual targets, should we not expect to find many more soldiers or even young male fightersamong the dead?

Further, we learn that only 5 out of 130 attackers died. This ratio (1 in 26) is slightly lower thanthe normal ratio of dead to total Jewish fighters in the 1948 war (1 in 25; 4,000 out of 100,000).Using the more precise figure of total nonreserve Israeli soldiers in front-line combat—25,000—thecasualty rate at Deir Yassin of 1 in 26 falls well below the average 1 in 6 casualty rate for combatunits (NL 450, Fl 198-199). Considering that the Deir Yassin attackers had little experience ortraining in regular combat, one would expect instead that they would suffer higher than averagecasualties in their first combat. Thus, by the most generous objective calculation, the attackers at

best met average village resistance; by the more accurate combat-troop ratio, they met feebleresistance, not tough house-to-house fighting. Either way, the ZOA claim of an unusually heavyfight is contradicted. Irgun commander Mordechai Raanan himself recalls that the Haganahcommander spoke to him with a tone of ridicule about their performance, hardly the way even arival would act if green troops on the same side successfully overcame tough enemy resistance(ZOA 45).

The explanation of heavy combat and house-to-house fighting is not only inadequate to explainthe deaths, it is also contradicted by the evidence to this point. Deliberate killing of most of thevictims is the explanation consistent with the evidence to this point.

Our historical detective has found conclusive indirect evidence of massacre. Now he needs totrack down the accused to examine their demeanor after the terrible carnage. This would provideevidence of their intentions regarding civilians. Did they act in candid moments as if the deaths




were welcome or unwelcome? Doing so, our detective finds new evidence supporting theconclusion that a massacre occurred.

The Demeanor of the Accused

How is the claim of unintentional killing refuted by the behavior of the guerrillas? Ourdetective found no one to dispute that there were over a hundred corpses, including large numbers

of women and children, in Deir Yassin's aftermath. The ZOA argues that the guerrillas did notintend to massacre them or even harm them substantially. Yet not a single expression of horrorfrom the attackers about those results emerges in the ZOA tract. In fact, the broader recordrepeatedly indicates reactions that show the slaughter was quite intentional.

Our detective searches for at least one guerrilla who stepped away from self-justification to sayhow horribly the massive carnage affected him. He looks for someone like one of his independentwitnesses, many war-hardened professionals, some endorsed by the ZOA, and most engaged alsoin warfare against Arabs, who used phrases like “horror” and “moral shock” to describe the scene.He finds the reaction of the guerrillas, however, different. The guerrillas reveal no regrets or guiltbut rather indifference and even pride about the carnage that included women and children.

From the beginning, their behavior reflects a consistent theme of profound satisfaction with thegrisly slaughter. One of their first observed actions after the fighting was to sit down among thecorpses . . . and have lunch. “I was shaken,” Mordechai Gihon remembered, “by the sight of someof the [guerrillas] eating with gusto next to the bodies” (Ml 268).

A few days later, when the burial party arrived, one of the buriers broke down in tears at thesight. A guerrilla jeered, “Why are you crying, boy?” (Ml 272). When the guerrillas were asked toassist in the burial, Yeshurun Schiff says they scoffed and cracked, “We're fighters, not pallbearers”(Kr 147).

On the night of the attack, as the ZOA tract confirms, the leader of the Irgun consciouslyexaggerated the death toll to 254 in a public statement that has become the source of the mostcommonly reported figure by all sides. Such willingness to make a tragedy appear worse indicatesthe result was desired and that the fight was not gruesome enough for them.

De Reynier, the Red Cross representative, gave the most dramatic recollections of the behaviorof the attackers amidst the carnage. He described them as appearing “half-mad” (CLP 278). In arecollection not challenged by the ZOA, he finds a wounded child left untended two days after thevillage came into the hands of the attackers (DeR 73; ZOA 65). In his contemporary memo to theRed Cross in Geneva, he recalls a leader of the guerrillas telling him that when the “cleaning up” isfinished, there would not be a single Arab left alive in Deir Yassin (RC). In his memoirs de Reynier

recalls an Irgun commander saying that the villagers who did not surrender “got the fate theydeserved” (DeR 72).

De Reynier is attacked in the ZOA tract. It is imputed that he is on some mission to “expose Jewish savagery” to the world and that he was hostile to “the Jewish side.” The attacks on deReynier are in such desperate and demonstrable bad faith that it raises questions of slander. Forexample, the ZOA implies he fabricated an incident that occurred when he arrived at Deir Yassin,and then they cite Dr. Engel's testimony that reports the incident differently. What they fail to tellis that it is quite clear from de Reynier's account that these are two different stories (DeR 70-73;ZOA 61, 66). In a dishonest appeal to partisan emotions and fears of bias, the ZOA accuses deReynier of wanting to expose the world to “Jewish savagery.” However, contemporary reports

indicate de Reynier consulted the Jewish Agency staff prior to making statements; and he insistedthat Arab authorities mention the risks taken by Jewish medical personnel to help his mission(ZOA 63; RC).




A member of the Jewish paramilitary youth organization commented that the attackersappeared proud of what they had done as they carried the bodies about (Ml 271). Shimon Monita,a Haganah informant in Lehi, found an old crippled man hiding in one of the houses on April 10;another guerrilla casually told Monita to shoot the man (Ml 267). A final image de Reynier tookwith him is telling. It is of one guerrilla holding up a large dagger, wet with blood, and waving itabout like a trophy (RC). Natan Yellin-Friedman, Lehi supreme commander, encapsulated thepostbattle attitude to the carnage by Lehi fighters. Rebuking them at a conference on the subject of

Deir Yassin some time later he said, “Who asks you to come and boast about it?” (Lv 345).

The lack of sorrow or revulsion among the guerrillas at Deir Yassin in the face of a rare warhorror, and the apparent pride of the killers, even to a ghoulish degree, argue definitively that thecarnage was not an unintended misfortune but the grisly aftermath of a deliberate massacre.

Our historical investigator is now fully convinced of the culpability of the Irgun and Lehiguerrillas in a massacre at Deir Yassin. The concealment of the photos, the large number ofcasualties, the disproportionately low number of wounded, the grisly conclusions of experiencedeyewitnesses to the carnage, the death-by-combat excuse, and the lack of regret shown by thekillers provide, separately and together, an indisputable case of massacre.

Our detective must now assemble the case. Having assembled the overpowering circumstantialevidence, he turns to direct evidence of guilt. It does not take long. Knowing that culprits oftencan be caught boasting of their deeds in private, the sleuth's goal now is to find admissions ofmassacre. Although there has been no criminal prosecution about Deir Yassin to force testimony,admissions of intentional killing still readily surface.

Admissions by the Attackers

Have the attackers of Deir Yassin admitted to intentional killing and planning a mass murder?Yes, and often. In a public statement, Irgun commander Mordechai Raanan recalled that the

villagers of Deir Yassin stopped surrendering after they saw one of his men machinegunsurrendering prisoners. “A young fighter [from our side] holding a Bren machine gun in his handstook up a position,” Raanan remembered. “Having seen what happened to the inhabitants of theother houses, [the residents of the house] came out to us with their hands up. There were ninepeople there, including a woman and a boy. The chap holding the Bren suddenly squeezed thetrigger and held it. A round of shots hit the group of Arabs. While he was shooting he yelled ‘Thisis for Yiftach!'” (YA 4-4-72). Yiftach was the nickname of an Irgun officer who had been shotearlier. It bears repeating here that the ZOA claims there is no evidence of prisoner mistreatment.

The ZOA cannot conceal the enormous record of confession, although it ignores and omits mostof it. Still, it quotes Israeli author Uri Avneri's claim that he learned from Irgunists that the

massacre began when a local commander lost his head when the Irgun suffered casualties (ZOA70). The ZOA also concedes that journalist Dan Kurzman wrote in his book on the 1948 war thatsome attackers admitted that they “cold-bloodedly shot every Arab they found—man, woman, orchild” (ZOA 145; Kr 148).

In a similar revelation, Raanan implied to journalist Ned Temko that “excesses” wereperformed by his forces at Deir Yassin (NT 368). Raanan describes one such killing in the passage

just quoted. But the ZOA denies to its readers even the mention of these Raanan admissions.

The existing confessions and revelations are extensive in scope. Private recollections of theincident were collected in the Jabotinsky Archives, the institution named after the Irgun founder.

Much of this was discovered and published by Israeli journalist Yisrael Segal in 1983 (Sl 262). Irgunmember Yehoshua Gorodenchek declared that, as the attackers considered retreat, his unit “hadprisoners, and before the retreat we decided to liquidate them. We also liquidated the wounded.”




In one place, Gorodenchek learned, “about eighty Arab prisoners were killed after some of themhad opened fire. . . . [Male] Arabs who dressed up as Arab women were found, and so they startedto shoot the [surrendering] women also” (Sl 93).

Detailed reports can be found of atrocities and atrocity plans from the perpetrators. YehudaMarinburg of the Lehi told the Jabotinsky Archives of the execution of one group of male prisonersafter capture (Pl 52). Uri Milstein, whose work is the basis for the ZOA tract, tells of the execution

of two prisoners taken alive, a fact he drew from a key Lehi officer's own recollections (Ml 263).Another account is of the cold-blooded execution in Givat Shaul in front of numerous witnesses ofa man from Deir Yassin found disguised as a woman (Ml 267). Ben-Zion Cohen, Irgun commanderfor the operation, informed the Jabotinsky Archives that, at some point at Deir Yassin, “Weeliminated every Arab that came our way” (Pr 216). The ZOA does not report any of theseaccounts but instead insists that there is no evidence of prisoner mistreatment at Deir Yassin.

The same commander also related the preplanning of the operation. There, a debate occurredand “The majority was for liquidation of all the men in the village and any other force that opposedus, whether it be old people, women, or children” (Sl 90). The evidence of a massacre mentality isso strong that the ZOA, despite its pattern of concealment, cannot avoid discussion of the murder-

mindedness. From an attacker source, it tells of a Lehi proposal to massacre the inhabitants of DeirYassin (ZOA 28-30).

The admissions of deliberate atrocity from participants are numerous and broad. There are alsorepeated admissions of cold-blooded contemplation of mass murder in the village. No fair-mindedperson can reasonably doubt that the carnage of Deir Yassin was simply the result of anythingother than a massacre.

Motives For Massacre

Our historical investigation now has more than enough evidence to demonstrate a massacre at

Deir Yassin. There is circumstantial evidence and there are repeated confessions. Now thedetective asks the obvious next question: Why?

Murder usually has one or more motives. Perusing the record, the detective finds severalreasons, many straight from the killers' own words. From the outset it should be noted that theguerrillas were young people, teenagers even, most on their first military encounter (ZOA 28; NT368). The Irgun district commander was only 25 (Kr 140). They encountered deadly resistance.They were armed and in a violent situation. The analysis of motive begins with the most obviousemotional factors and proceeds to the more systematic ones.

Fear. The guerrillas encountered fire that killed four of them and left many wounded. They

advanced into an unknown situation without training. The most likely reaction was fear. Ben-ZionCohen stated that one reason his group “eliminated every Arab” who came their way was “fear ofthe battle starting up behind us” (Pr 216). Fear can also be an excuse for willful acts. Fear as amotive loses emphasis as other motives are clearly discovered.

Revenge. Inflicting a retaliatory punishment was a central motive. “Their feelings of revengewere unrestrained,” assessed the Haganah intelligence chief of the time (Pl 50). Ben-Zion Cohenindependently confirmed this in his Archives testimony. “In view of Deir Yassin's resistance, [we]felt a desire for revenge” (Pr 216). The attacking groups had suffered 4 dead and 36 wounded inthe action. This was their first time in pitched combat and this seemed enormous.

The desire for revenge was also for older grievances. The Irgun operations officer, JoshuaGoldshmidt, was the son of a Jewish fighter from the 1929 Arab-Jewish violence in which DeirYassin had participated. Goldshmidt's father had sworn him never to forget Deir Yassin's violent




hostility of the earlier period. It was Goldshmidt who apparently suggested Deir Yassin as a target(Lv 340).

Attacks and atrocities by Arabs in the growing warfare between Jews and Arabs played a part.The Irgun's Yehuda Lapidot specifically noted that, in planning its attack on Deir Yassin, the groupwas inspired by anger over the atrocities (including mutilation of bodies and take-no-prisonersfighting) committed by Arab irregulars at Atarot and Gush Etzion (Nebi Daniel convoy attack of

March 30) (Sl 90). Ben-Zion Cohen corroborated this in his testimony when he said that the desirefor revenge that influenced those who eliminated every Arab came “especially after the enemy[had] hit us hard in Gush Etzion and Atarot” (Pr 216).

A less explicit basis for revenge may have been the organizational humiliation engendered bythe village resistance. Before the attack on Deir Yassin, the attackers had planned to make a majorshow of their organizational strength. “If we, the IZL and Lehi are finally going to do a jointoperation, the Arabs should know it” (ZOA 30). Instead of the great showing, however,overcoming final resistance in Deir Yassin required help from the Palmach fighters, who weremilitary and political rivals. “They achieved in one hour what we could not accomplish in severalhours,” observed one guerrilla commenting on the superior performance of a much smaller unit

(ZOA 46). A Palmach member who rated the guerrillas' fighting performance as poor reported anangry exchange in Deir Yassin over the relative fighting obligations of the guerrillas and thePalmach (Ml 266).

Militarism: Violence, Terror, and Prisoner Abuse. Most fighters in most actions in most warsfeel fear and a desire for revenge. That is not enough to explain the large scope of the massacre.An additional factor was the militaristic cult of violence among the attackers. A common chantamong the Betarim, a nationalist group once led by Irgun chief Begin, promised that as Judea wasdestroyed by blood and fire so it shall be restored (Bl overleaf). The emblem of the Irgunorganization was a map of Palestine and Transjordan with a bayoneted rifle superimposed abovethe words “Only Thus” (NT 364). After the Deir Yassin operation, Irgun chief Begin issued a

statement exulting, “God, God, thou hast chosen us for conquest” (Sl 88).

In planning the attack on Deir Yassin, the guerrillas seriously contemplated massacre of thevillagers in order to display the fearsomeness of the two guerrilla groups (ZOA 30). About the timeof the attack The New York Times correspondent in Jerusalem interviewed an Irgun spokesman inTel Aviv who told him that terror, bombs, and assassination were the only weapons they had tofight the Arabs (DS 4-5).

Violence against civilians and prisoners was an operational tactic in this regard. BritishMandatory headquarters at the King David Hotel were bombed by the Irgun, and almost ahundred civilians were killed. The Irgun threw bombs into civilian bus stops, public squares, and

workplaces. On one occasion, they kidnapped two British soldiers and hanged them publicly. TheZOA passes over this as “retaliatory hanging” (ZOA 79). In a ghoulish twist, they set up a boobytrap for those who retrieved the bodies. On another occasion, captured British soldiers werepublicly flogged (CLP 116). Well before Deir Yassin, the attackers had an established mode ofoperation that included acts of demonstrative violence in which civilian casualties were sought andprisoners were abused and killed, sometimes publicly.

Communal Warfare. The fighting between Palestinian Arabs and Jews was often especiallycruel, a form of deeply fierce ethnic warfare. The mentality grew paranoid and racist such that noone of the “enemy,” no matter how innocent, was deemed immune, even children. Every actionhad some degree of excess associated with it. Israeli historian Uri Milstein, the main source for the

ZOA tract, observed that




Even before the establishment of the State, each battle ended with a massacre. In the [1948]war . . . most of the action happened between Jews and Palestinians. The education in theYishuv at that time had it that the Arabs would do anything to kill us and therefore we hadto massacre them. [Many were] convinced that the most cherished wish of say, a nine-yearold Arab child, was to exterminate us. (GE)

Harry Levin reflected on the atrocities of Deir Yassin and related the existence of “cultured,

kindly people . . . who condone it, [and] say the Arabs started it, and this is the only kind of replythey understand” (HL 59). Yehuda Lapidot of the Irgun said that a main motive for the attack onDeir Yassin was lifting morale after Arab victories and atrocities (Sl 90). With this kind of mentalityevery Arab man, woman, or child was a potential “legitimate” victim.

Ethnic Ideology. More than popular wartime prejudice, the attacking groups in particular hadcultivated an ideological ethos of hostility to an Arab presence. The Irgun's founder, Vladimir

Jabotinsky, said that Islam, the primary religion of Arab society, “must be broomed out of EretzIsrael.” The founder of Lehi, Avraham Stern, declared that “Arabs are not a nation but a mole thatgrew in the wilderness of the eternal desert. They are nothing but murderers” (Pr 212). Logically,what one is permitted to do to murderers is kill them in self-defense. Journalist Dan Kurzman

describes the thoughts of Lehi member Menashe Eichler, whom he interviewed about hisexperience at Deir Yassin. The latter considered the Arabs to be “thieves” since they were enemiesof Zionism. It was permissible to kill them in the act of theft, defined to mean the opposition ofArabs to (in Eichler's religiously-oriented nationalism) a divinely ordained Jewish state (Kr 143).

Inflicting high civilian casualties by massacre thus served the ideological motive of stampedingpanicked Arabs into submission or flight. The effect of a high casualty figure in causing mass panicwas apparent to Irgun district chief Mordechai Raanan when he exaggerated the alreadyhorrendous death toll at Deir Yassin to 254. “I told the reporters that 254 were killed so that a bigfigure would be published, and so that the Arabs would panic not only in Jerusalem but across thecountry, and this goal was accomplished” (Ml 269).



Chapter 2 21

Reconstructing the Event

This chapter is the story of the massacre from the available record of the events. It dealsforemost with the issue of mass murder; other alleged crimes are treated briefly and peripherallyand only where they are relevant to the main picture. Much of the story relies on the recollectionsof a witness to round out Arab testimonies and attacker admissions. That witness is Meir Pa'il. Heretired from the Israeli armed forces as a colonel in the early 1970s. He has spoken often of hisexperience at Deir Yassin (PAI).

Pa'il (then Pilevsky) was an intelligence agent in 1948 who monitored the Irgun and Lehi for theHaganah. He infiltrated the attackers on the day of the Deir Yassin raid. His presence at the sceneas an eyewitness is invaluable because he saw much of the event on April 9 th and saw it from theattacker side (PAI).

The following account is more detailed and critical in content than most other accounts. It isinformation from up-to-date research and includes a breakdown of the massacre in stages, aresolution of significant discrepancies such as the death toll, and a rejection of the common viewthat demolition of houses occurred in the course of the operation.

The Beginning

On April 5, 1948, the Palmach began its Operation Nachshon to force open the road to besieged Jewish Jerusalem. On April 6, a convoy of supplies made it through tough resistance from Arabfighters along the road. Meanwhile, Arab leader Abdel Khader Husseini came to the area to takepersonal command after the Haganah captured the strategically situated roadside town of Kastelearlier in the week (CLP 261).

The Irgun and Lehi guerrillas had not been part of this fighting. They were not cooperatingwith Haganah in Jerusalem because they opposed the internationalization of the city. On his owninitiative, Yeshurun Schiff of the Haganah invited the Irgun and Lehi guerrillas to join the battle ofKastel. They declined (CLP 255-256), but they wanted to perform some action of their own. By

April 7, they had closed in on the choice of a town they wished to attack: Deir Yassin (Kr 141).

The Selection of a Target

Deir Yassin was a curious choice for a target for several reasons. Months before, the elders ofDeir Yassin agreed not to allow the village to become a base for attacks against the neighboring

Jewish areas of West Jerusalem. The agreement was supervised by the Haganah (Lv 130; ZOA 19).In turn, Deir Yassin would not be attacked. The village was not situated on a main road; it waslocated on the other side of a hill and was over a kilometer away (AIP, BZ 6). Documents from thetime indicate that some villagers were sources for Haganah military intelligence (ZOA 20).

There has been much debate and recrimination since the 1948 incident about why Deir Yassinwas selected and who suggested it. One thing, however, is clear. No one, in planning the attack,considered it to be a center of active hostility in the growing conflict. Nowhere in the ZOA's entire




discussion of the selection of Deir Yassin, for example, is there information from any source that theguerrillas felt the village needed to be taken to quell ongoing attacks on Jewish targets emanatingfrom there, nor is such consideration reported in any of the guerrillas' planning discussions (ZOA5-15).

Arab villages had a great deal of autonomy because of strong personal and family loyalties andbecause of lack of modern transportation and communication facilities. Additionally, territory-

wide political organization of Palestine’s Arabs had often been officially repressed by the British.As the British departed, the breakdown of central authority enhanced the already powerful localleadership (BZ 49-52). Deir Yassin had been a hostile village to Jews and to the British in the 1929Palestine violence and the Arab revolt of the late 1930s. By the late 1940s, however, the village haddeveloped a good working relationship with the nearby Jewish settlement, Givat Shaul (Kr 138).

Deir Yassin made its own decisions in the 1948 conflict. Having chosen mutual nonaggressionwith their Jewish neighbors, the village elders stuck to the deal. The Lehi, in a publication a fewweeks before the attack, described the village as one that remained steadfast in honoring itsnonaggression agreement (Lv 340-341).

Of course the villagers did not trust their neutrality to fate or the good will of either side. Theypurchased smuggled weapons and set up a system of guard watches to patrol the village perimeter(BZ 50). On one occasion, Iraqi detachments fighting on the Arab side attempted to set up a basearound the village. The village leadership insisted on their departure; the confrontation grewviolent, and a young man from Deir Yassin was killed (Lv 340). Treading carefully, they kept upcontact with both the Haganah in Jerusalem and the Arab paramilitary base in neighboring EinKerem (Ml 257).

Fighting in the area grew intense as March ended, and the Kastel battle and OperationNachshon swung into gear. Pressure increased on Deir Yassin. On March 30, a large number ofSyrian and Iraqis were seen entering the village (Lv 340). They departed soon after, according to

the same report (the departure unmentioned by ZOA). In an independent account, a villagerrecalls an elder inviting the leader of a foreign Arab force to a meal about that time and politely butfirmly convincing him to abandon the idea of staying in Deir Yassin (Kr 139).

Soon after fighting began at Kastel, violence increased around the West Jerusalem Jewishdistricts. Some of these neighborhoods were hit by sniper fire coming from the wast, a general areathat includes Deir Yassin (Ml 257). As fighting spread from Kastel to Motza, some Arabprofessional troops came from the south and cut through Deir Yassin, assembling there on the wayto Motza (ZOA 22).

Despite open warfare looming closer and closer, Deir Yassin remained an oasis of stability. The

shooting in the area and movements of armed formations did not affect the basic quiet of thevillage. The elders refused a request from one Arab guerrilla leader, Erekat, to allow troops tomove into Deir Yassin (Ml 257). Dov Joseph, the Jerusalem area Military Governor for the JewishAgency and later Israel, recalled the town as “a quiet village, which had denied entry to thevolunteer Arab units from across the frontier and which had not been involved in any attacks on

Jewish areas” (Js 71). Irgun leader Raanan reconnoitered the village and, although he maintainedyears later that it served as an Arab militia logistical position of sorts, nevertheless admitted at thetime that the town did look “quiet” (Ml 256, 260).

Popular Arab militia leader Abdul Khader Husseini was reported missing on April 7 at Kastel.But only a handful of individuals left Deir Yassin to join the huge stream of Arab villagers that

stormed Kastel and took it back from the Haganah on April 8 (CLP 263, BZ 49). (This did notviolate the agreement between Givat Shaul and Deir Yassin because Jews from Givat Shaul couldalso fight elsewhere without violating the agreement.)




The village elders' policy to prevent attacks on Jewish West Jerusalem from Deir Yassin was sowell-maintained that the Haganah commander in nearby Givat Shaul, Yona Ben-Sasson, statedunequivocally that in the 1948 conflict there had not been a single incident between Deir Yassinand the Jewish community before the town was captured (Ml 257). Ben-Sasson is mentionedfavorably as a source by the ZOA, although this particular statement is omitted in the tract.Mordechai Gihon of Haganah intelligence inspected Deir Yassin after it was captured andreviewed movements of armed men he observed before the attack to determine if this was bad faith

on the part of the villagers. The ZOA cites Gihon extensively and always favorably but omits thefollowing. In a secret memorandum after the incident, Gihon concluded that the villagers had been“faithful allies of the western [Jerusalem] sector” who had “kept faith” even during a Jewishoffensive to take a nearby ridge (Lv 343).

The main reason for the selection of Deir Yassin by the guerrillas had nothing to do with DeirYassin being an actual or potential military threat. In private testimony, Irgun officer YehudaLapidot revealed that “the reason was mainly economic . . . to capture booty” for bases of theguerrilla groups (Sl 90). The siege of Jerusalem had created severe shortages. Lapidot alsomentioned a desire to improve morale by taking a village, especially in light of recent hits taken by

Jewish forces (Lv 340). A Haganah commander recalled that the guerrillas also told him the raid

was “punitive” in character (Ml 258). Some dissent was heard within the guerrillas' ranks. DavidSiton of the Lehi organization protested that hitting a friendly Arab village would endangerwestern Jerusalem (Ml 257).

In the guerrillas' discussions, another reason entered; namely revenge. Irgun operationcommander Joshua Goldschmidt had been sworn by his father, who grew up in Givat Shaul, neverto forget Deir Yassin's hostility in the violence of the previous decades.

When the suggestion of an attack by the guerrillas was brought to the Haganah, DistrictCommander David Shaltiel tried to dissuade them from it and suggested the town of Koloniainstead (Ml 259). Finally, he gave in and issued a cover letter that did not exactly approve the

attack but stated that an eventual Jewish takeover of Deir Yassin was a long-term goal, in order toset up an airfield. It cautioned against blowing up houses and causing the population to fleebecause Shaltiel feared that foreign troops would use blown-up houses as a base. Shaltiel alsostressed the need to hold the town after taking it for fear it could be taken over by hostile forces(ZOA 7).

The Irgun's Mordechai Raanan claimed that the town had been a protection point for a supplyroute from Ein Kerem to Arab troops at Kastel. A separate Lehi reconnaissance was made. Itsexcursion is said by a Lehi member to have reached the conclusion that Raanan's claim was falseand that the village was not a threat (Ml 256). Attackers would also say that the Deir Yassin raidwas requested by the Haganah to assist a Jewish attack on Kastel and to support the movement of a

road convoy (Ml 260). The Haganah sources do not support this, and concerns about what washappening in Kastel or on the road do not appear in attacker recollections of the actual battle (ZOA31-45).

Meir Pa'il of the “antidissident” intelligence unit learned of the attack after meeting a Lehimember on April 7 or 8. The Lehi member was unaware of Pa'il's espionage duties. The Lehimember told Pa'il of the raid and invited him to join it. Pa'il did not like what he heard. Heprotested to David Shaltiel that permitting the guerrillas to attack Deir Yassin was in violation ofthe agreement with the village, but Shaltiel said he did not want to risk a fight among Jewish forcesat that time (PAI). The Haganah's spy agency chief in Jerusalem, Yitzhak Levi, also opposed theplans and suggested to Shaltiel that they at least advise Deir Yassin that the truce was off. Shaltiel

refused, saying he would not alert Arabs to a possible Jewish action (Lv 341).




The guerrillas held meetings to plan the operation. They adopted a password: AchdutLochemet. It meant “Fighting [in] Unity” and signified the fact that this was the Irgun and Lehi'sfirst joint operation. Efforts were made to gather weaponry, much of which was illegally andpoorly made in underground factories. The commanders also knew their fighters had not beentrained for regular warfare (Ml 258, 261).

A natural question soon asserted itself. What is to be done about captives from the village?

Since this was the guerrillas' first regular military operation, it was a novel question. According tothe Irgun's Yehuda Lapidot, a proposal came from the Lehi side to slaughter any inhabitants of thevillage who did not flee (ZOA 28-30; Ml 258). Ben-Zion Cohen of the Irgun reported that themajority of his group favored killing all the men and any others who resisted (SI 90). Revenge for alate March Arab militia ambush of Jewish fighters and subsequent mutilation of the dead bodieswas put forth. It was also urged that a fearsome showing had to be made in a combined Lehi-Irgunoperation. Sending a loud message of terror to the Arabs appealed to the members (Ml 258).

A debate ensued and Irgun commander-in-chief Menachem Begin in Tel Aviv was apparentlyconsulted. He is said to have ordered the Irgun to honor the Geneva Convention's rules forhonorable treatment of prisoners and to have suggested that the raid begin with a loudspeaker

announcement telling the villagers to flee to Ein Kerem (Ml 258). How effectively this warning wasconveyed to the members before the battle is unclear. Leaders of both groups and Meir Pa'il havesaid instructions were indeed given, but Raanan of the Irgun said that Lehi Jerusalem district chief

Joshua Zettler admitted to him that he thought it unwise to give prebattle instructions that calledfor minimizing casualties and respecting captives (Kr 139, McG 37). Further, as the guerrillas weregetting ready on the night before the attack, fighters were observed by a Jerusalem family candidlyand excitedly discussing their hopes to do things in Deir Yassin that would send a message sofrightening that the Arabs throughout the country would panic and flee (Sh 36).

An Early Coverup?

Just after midnight on April 9, the raiders began to assemble. The total number of participantsappears to have been around 130 (ZOA 16). Infiltrated among the Lehi group was Meir Pa'il and aphotographer. Pa'il had decided to spy on the guerrillas to get an idea of their militaryperformance (PAI).

The groups proceeded in two main prongs. The Lehi came from Givat Shaul and traveleddown the main road into eastern Deir Yassin, accompanied by a small vehicle equipped with aloudspeaker. A Haganah squad under Mordechai Gihon was present in Givat Shaul (Ml 260; Lv343). In the same early hours, the Palmach began an assault to retake Kastel after its fall to Arabsthe previous day.

David Shaltiel made an odd entry in his operations log at about 2:40 a.m. He recorded that hesent a cable to Operation Nachshon's Palmach commander Shimon Avidan that the Arabs in DeirYassin had set up a mortar to shell a convoy on the highway (Ml 259). This information is quiteinconsistent with the Deir Yassin incident and is almost certainly false.

There is no report or suggestion anywhere else by anyone else (including attackers andvillagers) of a mortar or even mortar shells being used by the Arabs, all very valuable weapons.Nor is there any account of a mortar being discovered, concealed, sought, observed, used, or in anyother way involved with the action at Deir Yassin. Nor is there any published reference to such amessage being received by Avidan. The anomalous notation is thus not likely to be true.

An explanation may be simple error: a misstatement from another village because theimpending attack on Deir Yassin was on Shaltiel's mind. (The timing of the incident coincides withthe attack on Kastel.) Or it may represent an attempt by Shaltiel to concoct a justification to the




The Irgun decided to retreat from its positions south of the town. The equally ill-trainedvillagers did not press their advantages and launch a counterattack. One of the men of the townrecalled shooting in the hopes the attackers would run away. “We expected the fighting to last twoor three hours, after which they would retreat” (GN). But they did not pull out. The Lehisuggested the Irgun join them among the houses and buildings in the east of the village. Duringthis period of advance, confusion, and frustration, which constituted much of the morning, the“Deir Yassin massacre” took shape.

The Massacre in Hot Blood

After the initial advance, the village counter-fire from the Muktar's house caused manyattackers to hide. Meir Pa'il and others remained pinned in an empty house (PAI). Some who weremore organized and less exposed had begun early to move among the houses to take prisoners.Still, “the conquest was carried out cruelly,” as historian Uri Milstein summarized, involving thekilling of whole families (Ml 274).

Early on, any orders inhibiting the massacre appear to have lost their force under the lack ofcentral control and the fear and rage engendered by the resistance. Eyewitnesses reported several

gruesome stabbings of unresisting villagers that occurred in the morning. Two men are said tohave been thoroughly slashed with a very large knife. A pregnant woman was shot and stabbed(CLP 275).

Although Pa'il says that the attackers he saw had no knives (PAI; McG 43), there are manyreports of knife-killings (BZ 56, McG 51, CLP 275, DeR 74). It is possible that units he did notobserve had knives, or that knives and other implements were retrieved from captured houses.Pa'il's movement was hindered in the morning, and he could not see everything (PAI). Severalfighters among the ill-armed guerrillas planned to acquire weapons from casualties, either Jewishor Arab. Further, with ammunition low and a part of the force unable to operate their weapons(because of poorly trained fighters or poorly manufactured weapons), it is quite likely the attackers

resorted to other weapons. Weaponry was so scarce, in fact, that the units' medics were crudelyarmed with clubs (Ml 261).

The bloody-minded prebattle plans seem reflected in the takeover of one house and the killingof those who were inside. The murders echoed planning-stage proposals to kill the men first andany others who put up opposition, where “opposition” could simply mean a cry of protest orhorror. Village resident Fahimi Zeidan was about 12 years old the day of the raid. She recalls theattackers blowing open the door of her house where she, her family, and several relatives hid in astoreroom. “They . . . entered and started searching the place; they got to the storeroom, and tookus out one-by-one.”

They started with one man. “They shot the son-in-law, and when one of his daughtersscreamed, they shot her, too. They then called my brother Mahmoud and shot him in our presence,and when my mother screamed and bent over my brother (she was carrying my little sister Khadrawho was still being breast fed) they shot my mother too.” The children began crying andscreaming. They were told that “if we did not stop, they would shoot us all” (BZ 55). The childrendid not stop crying. So the attackers “lined us up, shot at us, and left.” She was wounded but notkilled. “I looked around to see who was still alive: my uncle, his children and his wife were alldead, my sister Soumia who was only four, and my brother Mohamad, were alive” (BZ 55).

She and her injured siblings were taken alive later by other fighters. Their restraint was notmuch less than those who killed her family. “We walked with some other women from the village,

then came across a young man and an older man, with their hands up in the air, under guard.” Thegroup with the two surrendered males and hers met. “When they reached us, the soldiers shotthem.” The mother of the younger man was with Fahimi Zeidan's group of gathered captives.




“She attacked the soldiers and started hitting them,” she remembered. So “one of them stabbed herwith a knife a few times” (BZ 56).

It was in the early morning, while retreat was being considered, according to confirmation bythe Irgun's Gorodenchik, that one Irgun unit executed its Arab prisoners and Arab wounded. Healso said that Arab women were compelled to function as human shields to carry woundedguerrillas out of the village; the women were then hit by fire from the villagers (Sl 93, Ml 266).

A Trigger Event? The above account, along with others, suggests a possible trigger event formany of these killings, although this is speculation. Desire for revenge over a particular man'sdeath and the use of disguise tactics by some villagers played a significant part in setting off theattackers on a murderous rampage, shooting everyone in sight. One villager's impression was thatthe attackers were not going to harm the townspeople until after an Irgun commander was shot(ZOA 111). Many survivors told an undercover Haganah agent that the massacre began after aconcealed weapon was found on a man dressed as a woman (Ml 267). These accounts may findreconciliation in Irgun leader Raanan's similar story of a group execution prompted by a keycommander's mortal wounding.

Irgun vanguard commander Yehuda Segal was shot and mortally wounded on the steps of ahouse in the morning fighting. When people in the house surrendered, a guerrilla gunned themdown with a machine gun, shouting “This is for Yiftach!” (Yiftach was Segal's nickname.) Thevictims of the revenge execution included at least one woman and child. According to Raanan'saccount, one of the men was dressed as a woman and had a gun. Raanan concedes that after thismass killing the villagers became terrified (Lv 344). The version from the undercover Haganahagent also indicates that villagers believed that after a man dressed as a woman shot an Irguncommander, the guerrillas began killing everyone they saw (Ml 276). Thus, there is evidence fromseparate sources that the shooting of Irgun officer Yehuda Segal by a person or persons disguisedin women's clothing set off a pattern of general slaughter. Whether this was indeed a trigger, orwhether there was a single trigger for the hot-blooded massacre, remains speculative.

What is not speculative is that needless slaughter kept happening during the fighting andtaking of prisoners. Villager recollections indicate one attacker set up a machine gun and moweddown all who passed (Ml 275). Reports from survivors also tell of family members being shot asthey attempted to aid fallen relatives (Ml 275, GN). Gorodenchek of the Irgun said thatsurrendering women who did not move fast enough were also killed (Sl 93). A woman namedThoraya, at the time a young girl, recalled that her aunts protected her with their bodies as theywere stabbed to death in a house. She survived by cowering beneath their stiffening bodies whilecovered in their blood (McG 51). The deaths were murderous excesses, not accidents of combat.Houses were not blown up. “No house in Deir Yassin was bombed,” Pa'il confirms emphatically(McG 39).

The Rescue of the Guerrillas Many guerrillas were in trouble—wounded were hard to reachand sniper fire from the townspeople was deadly (Lv 342; PAI). They could move among thehouses, killing and capturing, but they proved unable to advance decisively. Some of the attackersran to get help. What is clear is that by late morning a decisive difference was made when 17members of a Palmach unit with official authorization presented itself.

This was Company D of the Palmach's Harel 4th Brigade commanded by Mordechai Weg, betterknown by his nickname Yaacov or Yaki. Studying the situation, he brought a two-inch mortar and17 “Palmachniks” (Lv 344, PAI). Pa'il discovered the unit's presence when he heard the mortarfiring. It was now about 11:00 a.m. Three shots were directed at the mukhtar's house and all

significant resistance was stopped. The Palmach troops rapidly went through the village andsuppressed hostile fire (Lv 344).




The real victory had been won not by the guerrillas but by a much smaller number of rivalPalmachniks. Kalman Rosenblatt of the Palmach unit later expressed his dismissal of the militaryperformance of the guerrillas. “The [guerrillas] did not fight” (Ml 266). The Palmach did not suffera single injury in subduing the village. “They operated quickly and efficiently,” the Lehi's DavidGottlieb said, unfavorably comparing his own group's performance (Ml 266). Raanan recalledShaltiel exhibiting “a certain ridicule” about his group's fighting performance (ZOA 45).

Pa'il summarizes the earlier battle succinctly. “The fighting was not that heavy. If they hadbeen good soldiers, they could have conquered the whole village in about an hour” (McG 42). TheIrgun and Lehi immediately lost four men and one who would die later. The 5 guerrilla dead outof 130 and the lack of injury to the small Palmach unit members also attests that the resistance hadnot been professional or particularly tough. Most of the wounded were said by the guerrillas to be“lightly wounded” (NYT 4-10-48).

No Outside Help for Villagers There were few or no foreign soldiers involved in fighting inthe village (Lv 343). Certainly there were none who had any significant effect. The onlyindependent report of outside soldiers is an unusual and second-hand account reporting two deadSyrians (HL 59). If true, they may have been visitors or persons who managed to come from Ein

Kerem after Deir Yassin was attacked. It is also conceivable that uniforms were later put on civilianbodies by the attackers, a technique used to bolster claims of a tough fight. Villager recollectionsare a chorus of frustration over the inaction of Arab forces in the area (Kr 144; GN). “We had no aidor support from any party,” recalled Abu Mahmud (GN).

Some of the guerrillas claim that a Transjordanian deserter and a Yugoslav were found in thevillage (Ml 263). There are scattered reports of other soldiers (Ml 263). The ZOA omits asubsequent admission in the same source that the alleged deserter and Yugoslav were executedafter capture. More concrete is the report from Palmach personnel of a mysterious Arab man fromoutside the Jerusalem area, though there is no explicit claim of a military affiliation. A Palmachman executed him after capture, apparently causing protest from other members (Ml 276).

Though there may have been military deserters or guests in the village, or a few fighters whomanaged to slip in during the attack, no one has shown they were a sizeable group or part of anysystematic presence or defense. An internal Haganah assessment concluded categorically that noforeign Arabs were present and Weg's report also says nothing in regard to encountering foreigntroops (Lv 343). Nor is the presence of any outside fighters reported by any other Palmach menpresent or any other independent observer. The ZOA produces no independent witness tocorroborate any claims of a presence of foreign troops.

The Massacre in Warm Blood

Pa'il assessed the overall capabilities of the Lehi and Irgun at Deir Yassin in the followingmanner: “They didn't know how to fight, but as murderers they were pretty good” (McG 40). Hisobservations were based on what he witnessed. “I started hearing shooting in the village,” herecalls. “The fighting was over, yet there was the sound of firing of all kinds from differenthouses.” Were they suppressing new pockets of resistance in the homes, doing a “clean-up”operation? This was different, it was “sporadic firing, not like you would hear when they clear ahouse” (PAI).

The Palmach unit had already left by this time and Pa'il may have had something to do withthat. Late in the morning, perhaps close to noon, Pa'il revealed himself to Palmach CommanderWeg after the village was subdued. As a key intelligence man, Pa'il had some authority (PAI). He

urged Weg to take his unit and leave. “Yaki,” he addressed the Palmach commander, “you knowwe have a saying in Yiddish, ‘varf sich avek'—get away from here! Don't get mixed up with theIrgun and Stern Gang” (Pl 50). Pa'il profoundly regretted his action afterwards. He would feel that




had Weg and his people remained, they would have been able to prevent what the new sounds ofshooting represented (McG 40). After the Palmach left, Pa'il relates, “the Stern Gang and Irgunbegan what I'd call an uncontrolled massacre performance” (Pl 50).

A village boy named Mohammed Jaber was one of the few to survive and describe as aneyewitness the “massacre performance.” About noon, the attackers broke into his family's home.They “[drove] everybody outside, put them against the wall, and [shot] them.” This group was his

entire family. One woman victim, he remembered, “was carrying a three-month-old baby” (CLP276).

The enraged killings of the morning exploded into the entire village. The town had resisted,some had failed to leave or surrender, and as the Irgun's Ben-Zion Cohen later described thementality of his men, “We wanted revenge” (Pr 216). To Pa'il, the violence appeared spontaneous,not a result of a direct order. He considered this observation confirmed when postactionrecriminations were leaked by an informant in Lehi (McG 43).

The demeanor of the guerrillas stunned Pa'il as well. They appeared “mad with a desire tokill.” He followed after them with his photographer. The eyes of the guerrillas made a memorable

impression. “People were going around there, as I wrote in my [subsequent] report, with their eyesrolled about in their sockets” (PAI). “Their eyes were glazed,” is how he explained his meaningyears later to Eric Silver. The Irgun and Lehi appeared “mentally poisoned” as if “in ecstasy” (Sl94).

The attackers of Deir Yassin, by the accounts, had degenerated into unrestrained murderers.Most Arabs unfortunate enough still to be at large in the town were being shot dead. Some weregunned down as they tried to run away. Others found in the houses, women and childrenprimarily, were crowded into the corners of rooms and executed (Ml 274, PAI). The attackers alsothrew hand grenades at people huddled inside the houses (Sl 94).

Pa'il's own emotions were a mix of stunned outrage and fear. “I saw this horror, and I wasshocked and angry, because I had never seen such a thing, murdering people after a place had beenconquered.” As he and his assistant went about he “didn't say anything. I did not know theircommanders, and I didn't want to expose myself, because people were going around there . . . fullof lust for murder.” Pa'il felt himself in “a psychological trap” (McG 40). “I didn't know what todo” (PAI).

Pa'il described the postcapture event as “a massacre in warm blood.” The term seems todescribe a situation where, although there was no combat pressure, a spontaneous action aroseimmediately after the stress of combat. It appeared to Pa'il to be a sort of cold-blooded, mechanistickilling but driven by an unplanned, hot-blooded stimulus.

Pa'il and his photographer took pictures as they went through the houses where the guerrillashad been. “It was terrible,” he related. “I could see people dead in the corners—an old man, awife, and two children, here and there a male” (McG 40). The victims were the slowest and mostvulnerable—people least likely to resist or escape, but those who were taken alive while they triedto escape were also at risk. “They also shot people running from houses, and prisoners. Mostlywomen and children.” The young men had mostly been driven off. “Most of the Arab males hadrun away. It is an odd thing, but when there is danger such as this, the [more] agile ones run awayfirst” (PAI).

Young Mohammed Jaber who had seen his family rounded up and killed recalled his mother

screaming for a long time before she died (McG 51). Pa'il's memory of the event is the same. “Youcould hear the cries from within the houses,” he said. The screams came from “Arab women, Arabelders, Arab kids” (Sl 94). Pa'il called the guerrillas “pogromists,” using a term for violent police




terrorist gangs in Tsarist Russia. “But this time it was not just a pogrom to loot; it was a massacre”(McG 40). Looting and robbery soon followed, however.

One woman was taken alive about this time, along with her brother. Zeinab Akkel recalled that“my husband had given me $400. I offered it . . . and said, 'Please leave my brother alone, he is soyoung.'” The guerrilla took the money. “Then he just knocked my brother over,” she remembered,“and shot him in the head with five bullets" (Dn 4-11-98).

The frenzy now extended to the prisoners who had already been taken alive. “The Irgun andthe Stern Gang,” Pa'il has recalled, “put them in the school building.” Then “they surrounded thebuilding claiming they would bomb this schoolhouse on their heads” (McG 43-44). There are manyreports of various types of physical and psychological abuse of prisoners throughout the day. Pa'ilsaw no explosives but recalled that the guerrillas were dissuaded from further violence when agroup of civilian Jews from Givat Shaul entered Deir Yassin and shouted at the guerrillas to stop,angrily calling them “You bastards, you murderers” (McG 39).

The surviving captive villagers who were rounded up over the day (up to 150) were loadedonto trucks (RC). Young Fahimi Zeidan was part of the transport. “They . . . put us in trucks and

drove us around the Jewish quarters, all the while cursing us” (BZ 56). Thousands saw thistriumphal display of terrified massacre survivors (Lv 344, Ml 267).

Harry Levin recorded in his diary on April 9 that “at 2 o'clock this afternoon I saw three trucksdriving slowly up and down King George Avenue bearing men, women, and children, their handsabove their heads, guarded by Jews armed with sten-guns and rifles.” In the front truck, he saw “ayoung boy, a look of anguished horror bitten into his face, his arms frozen upright.” The peoplewatching with him “looked revolted” (HL 57).

One Jewish Haganah soldier, Gavriel Stern, had a similar reaction. “I watched from myposition on Neviim Street, when they took the survivors of the massacre on a revolting victory

parade” (Ml 267). The decision to parade the prisoners was taken, according to the Haganah'sinformant in the Lehi, in order to boost civilian morale in the besieged city (Ml 267). Among theterrorized prisoners, Levin saw an old man he believed to be the father of the young man killed inDeir Yassin weeks earlier when the town had honored their agreement and forced Arab militiamento leave (HL 57). Most prisoners were eventually released in East Jerusalem. Some prisonersappear also to have been taken to a Lehi base in a warehouse. One Deir Yassin woman taken therehad her baby murdered in front of her and when she fainted, she was also shot according to aHaganah intelligence report from the time (MI 267). This account given in Milstein is omitted inthe ZOA tract.




The Massacre in Cold Blood

Part of the parading of prisoners was the beginning of a cold-blooded execution in one of thequarries while the warm-blooded slaughter continued in the town itself. Pa'il saw a truckload ofprisoners containing captured males leave the town around noon and come back less than an hourlater (PAI). The Lehi's Yehuda Marinburg testified about this in the Jabotinsky Archives. “Ourappearance [in Jerusalem] encouraged the people very much and they received us with applause”

(Pl 52). Then, after that parade, “we executed the prisoners” (Pl 52).

Pa'il remembers seeing those male prisoners executed in a quarry. His photographer tookpictures. Pa'il has estimated about 25 victims. “They put them up against the wall” and shot them(McG 37). Marinburg's admission suggests his unit shot to death eight prisoners (Pl 52). The ZOAconfirmed that plans for a quarry execution took place. Yona Ben-Sasson, the Haganah commanderin Givat Shaul, said he encountered the guerrillas preparing a prisoner execution in the quarry butwas able to talk them out of it (ZOA 58). It is not clear when this happened or if he was watchingall the quarries at all times. In any event, Yehoshua Arieli, head of the burial crew, later didobserve “several men” lying dead in a quarry (Sl 94).

The quarry firing squad was apparently the final large-group killing at Deir Yassin, and themost cold-blooded. It was done in an organized fashion, away from the combat area and combatcircumstances and with deliberation. Another individual killing is claimed by an Arab militialeader who says that when the main prisoner transport arrived near the Arab part of the city, anadolescent boy was pulled away as he was being released and shot to death in front of his mother(Jr).




Afterwards

Pa'il left Deir Yassin in the mid-afternoon as the final prisoner trucks departed (PAI). When hewrote a report of the incident that evening for the Haganah, he started by quoting Chaim NachmanBialik's poem about a Russian pogrom: “Arise and go to the city . . . and with your eyes you will see. . . on the trees and on the stones and on the plaster the congealed blood and battered brains of theslain” (Sl 93). His report—along with two rolls of developed film—went to Haganah Commander

Shaltiel and then on to headquarters in Tel Aviv. Pa'il never saw the photos. He instructed hisphotographer only to develop the negatives, for fear the pictures might circulate (McG 40). Hisreport and photographs remain classified.

By about 3 p.m. on April 9, Shaltiel had sent Yeshurun Schiff and Mordechai Gihon to DeirYassin. Both expressed shock and horror by what they saw in and around the dozens of houses.About 110 Deir Yassin residents had been killed, almost all in outbursts of murderous violence.

Most were killed by close range gunfire, some by stabbing, a few in combat, and some whilefleeing. Most of the victims of the massacre, as the burial chief later lamented, were old men,women, and children, who died with no weapon in their hands. There was no combat chaos or

circumstances necessitating their deaths, despite the early fighting. They were intentionallymurdered.

It was an act of violence that was proposed and discussed in advance. The guerrillas' lack ofrestraint after meeting resistance caused many to follow through on plans to murder regardless ofinstructions to inhibit them. Their leaders proved unwilling or unable to stop them. Afterwards,they proved quite willing to benefit from the fear effect and embellish the bloody outcome. Thatevening, Irgun chief Raanan met with the international press in a tea-and-cookies party in GivatShaul and told them that 254 Arabs had been killed (NYT, 4-10-48, 4-13-48).

The massacre and the 254 figure soon entered the history books and the verbal warfare of the

Middle East (ZOA 109-110). The massacre was a real event. The figure was exaggerated; butbecause it came from the source with the best access, it has become the conventional figure. In the1980s, authors like Eric Silver began to make efforts to correct the figure, documenting both themore correct number killed and additional evidence confirming the murderous nature of theatrocity. Palestinian Arab researchers of the same period published similar findings in a report onthe village. The ZOA agrees with that detailed research and lower number but omits that samereport's voluminous testimony of mass murder (ZOA 90-91; BZ 50-59).

Challenges to Pa'il's Credibility

Taking a final look at the now discredited ZOA tract, the investigator sees that the ZOA

challenges Pa'il's credibility as an eyewitness, alleging that he might not even have been there onthe day of the raid. The investigator easily dismisses the objections to Pa'il's credibility, which hesees as weak and minor. (See the general discussion at ZOA 46-59.) Statements made over manyyears are alleged to be wrong or contradictory. For example, Pa'il also reported the 254 deathfigure. But Pa'il relied on the Irgun for the final figure, as did most historians. He did not count thedead himself and never said he did. Pa'il also claimed that the photos he produced showed amassacre in progress but the Israeli Defense Forces archives allegedly said that they only showbodies, not an execution (ZOA 56). This discrepancy could be resolved by releasing and tracing thephotographs. In any event, Pa'il never saw the developed pictures. On one of several occasionsdescribing the incident, Pa'il said the attackers entered houses and killed people found “sleeping”(ZOA 51). This is alleged to be a problem to his credibility. But the attack began in the early

morning and the context is unclear.




The ZOA claims that Pa'il's report of an execution of prisoners in a quarry is “denied” by theHaganah commander in Givat Shaul, Yona Ben-Sasson (ZOA 58). However, Ben-Sasson's accountmerely says that he stopped a group of guerrillas from performing an execution in the quarry. Hedoes not say that he monitored the quarries throughout the day, nor that he stopped every group.

Other alleged challenges to Pa'il's credibility are also strained and questionable. For example,his credibility is challenged because he said that the village had no strategic value and was not

situated on any important route (ZOA 50); but Deir Yassin was not on the main highway and didnot overlook it. Pa'il is also chided for not identifying the photographer with him, saying he isfearful (ZOA 53). Our investigator reasons that an eyewitness to a mass murder who providedevidence might have reason to be fearful.

Testimonies about the Deir Yassin incident from several Haganah officials (Shaltiel, Meret,Eldad, and Schiff) fail to mention Pa'il (ZOA 52). This insinuation that he was not there is arguedto be a significant challenge to his credibility. But Pa'il was a spy among Jewish organizations. It isnot hard to imagine that his activity would be kept secret; he himself did not reveal publicly forover 20 years (PAI). Since we do not know what issues the testimonies cover, his absence in ill-defined testimony about secret matters carries little weight.

Finally, we come to allegations of bias, a tactic of revisionists. Pa'il is alleged to have been “outof work” just before the Deir Yassin incident and in search of a budget to continue an operationsunit to monitor the Irgun and Lehi (ZOA 48). Apparently, we are to conclude that in order to winfavor for his own spy unit in 1948, he would fabricate a massacre by fellow Jews at a criticalmoment in the formation of the state. Our detective wonders in this scenario how Pa'il wouldexpect to gain stature as an intelligence officer by concocting false reports embarrassing to his sideof the conflict and challengeable by numerous independent Jewish witnesses from his own faction.And why would he persist decades later to present information that damages the state he fought tofound and in whose army he served for years as a high-level officer?

We are further led to ask how Pa'il could then coordinate a incident instantaneously amongArab villagers, Haganah High Command, the British Criminal Investigation Department, theMagen David Adom, the Red Cross, and numerous Jewish observers, none of whom fail tochallenge him on the main picture over several decades. We also need to ask how he did all thiswhen the ZOA offers that he was not even in Deir Yassin (ZOA 55-56). This kind of conspiracythinking, ironically, parallels Holocaust revisionism.

One point also needs to be stressed. It is almost inevitable that atrocities of a political naturewill be reported by political or ethnic “opponents.” Any criminal act is most likely to be reportedby people who do not like the criminal and do not belong to his group. To illustrate, imagineinsisting—as Holocaust revisionists do—that the only valid Holocaust evidence must come directly

from non-Allied, non-anti-Nazi, and non-Jewish sources. That would put an enormous andneedless strain on demonstrating the events. In its tract, the ZOA engages in those kinds ofdemands. In a brutal irony, the ZOA tract is an eerie echo of Holocaust revisionism in that theZOA is implicitly challenging atrocity information because it came from a Jewish Communist.

Why Pa'il's Credibility is Unrefuted

Pa'il has enormous credentials for his personal recollections of Deir Yassin. First, no witnesshas placed him any place but the action. No independent witness whom he claimed to haveencountered at Deir Yassin has said he did not see Pa'il there. Yisrael Galili, head of the Haganahin the 1948 war, gave a written endorsement of his credibility about the incident (PAI). Even the

ZOA does not challenge that Pa'il produced photos of the incident (ZOA 56). That is very goodcorroboration of his claim that he was there. Pa'il's report on the massacre remains classified,which indicates it is a significant document in the eyes of the government of Israel (PAI).




Pa'il's recollections of the incident are essentially that it was a minor, incompetently foughtbattle that degenerated into a general massacre after the attackers suffered casualties. This matchesthe circumstantial evidence, the villagers' testimonies, and admissions by the guerrillas. Hisrecollections on the killings also match those of the surviving villagers (except on the use of certainmethods of killing).

Pa'il's account of the main developments is sound, generally consistent with other evidence,

and well attested. Our investigator has pieced together what happened that fateful time at DeirYassin by using direct eyewitness sources like Meir Pa'il, the villagers of Deir Yassin, and others. Itis a tale of a raid on a nonhostile target that goes awry and is transformed by personal history,emotion, attitude, incompetence, and ideology into a mass murder that would permanently scar theface of the Middle East.

Other Atrocities

There were certainly other excesses committed at Deir Yassin. In this monograph, we havestudied only the mass murder. Some accusations against the killers (e.g., rape, mutilation) are morecontroversial and elusive than others (e.g., general looting, prisoner exhibition). Focusing on other

discrepancies in details of the event in an effort to confuse the issue is standard revisionism and aregular feature of the ZOA tract. We can find similar and more clear examples of this in Holocaustrevisionism: Conventional debates over whether the Nazis made soap from human beings orscholarly controversy over which facilities were used as gas chambers are used maliciously to callinto question the entire genocide program. In any widely witnessed traumatic event, confusionand rumor alone can cause different recollections. For example, half the survivors of the Titanicthought the ship broke up before sinking; the other half did not (Ps 235). Additionally, there can bemotives to conceal and fabricate among both victim and aggressor and their political champions.Nonetheless, the overwhelming consistency of the evidence of Deir Yassin not only shows that amassacre took place but gives us a fair idea of its inception, progression, and scope.



Chapter 3 35




Conclusion

The massacre of Deir Yassin is neither lie nor exaggeration, despite the claims of the ZionistOrganization of America. The only significant exaggeration is the estimated death toll of the massmurder, which was created by the perpetrators themselves for the admitted purpose of incitingmass terror. Nor can the massacre be said to be “in serious dispute” or “controversial.” There is noroom to invoke “balance” here; there can be no balance between clear truth and clear falsehood.Those who demand such balance are acting with a hidden agenda or out of fundamental ignorance.

As this monograph has shown, the casualty numbers alone tell an honest and informed

commentator that the dead villagers of Deir Yassin—largely women, children, and old men—wereprimarily killed deliberately and outside the necessities and incidents of combat. The explanationsgiven by the perpetrators' excusers—blown-up houses, very tough resistance—do not justify suchan extraordinarily high figure nor are they supported by the evidence. In addition to this are theadmissions by the perpetrators themselves of deliberate murder along with the testimony ofnumerous independent witnesses who corroborated a scene of exceptional horror. Finally, thereare the photos concealed for over half a century, suggesting something to hide far more terriblethan ordinary war.

The massacre of Deir Yassin is also not “Arab revisionism.” Many of the primary sources ofinformation on the massacre—witnesses to the scene and event—were non-Arabs. Several were

Jewish soldiers and humanitarians; some were the attackers themselves. The conventionally citednumber of casualties, likely exaggerated, was also not concocted by Arabs. The ZOA notes that theexaggeration was actually corrected by Arabs (ZOA 91). Labeling the Deir Yassin massacre “Arabrevisionism” is simply an appeal to those who are concerned because Arabs have gained sympathyfrom the massacre. Saying it did not happen (or cannot be said to have happened) is a sad methodto keep blame from the Jews and sympathy from the Arabs. “Loyalty is involved,” as GeorgeOrwell observed, “so pity ceases to function” (Or).

In a 1945 essay that also included one of the earliest warnings about Holocaust denial, Orwelldescribed this partisan mentality regarding truth in the past. “Those who rewrite history doprobably believe with part of their minds that they are actually thrusting facts into the past. . . .

They feel that their own version was what happened in the sight of God, and that one is justified inrearranging the records accordingly. . . . One has no way of verifying the facts, one is not even fullycertain that they have happened, and one is always presented with totally different interpretationsfrom different sources. . . . Since nothing is ever quite proved or disproved, the most unmistakablefact can be impudently denied” (Or).

Describing the Deir Yassin massacre as false, exaggerated, or in dispute, is to indulge in thesame impudence as Holocaust Revisionism. The same applies to alleging a false origin of thereports of massacre. Ironically for partisans of Israel, by implicitly challenging the moral andfactual honesty of so many Jewish witnesses of the event and its results, one slanders patrioticIsraelis who risked their lives to build the state.




In that regard, it is interesting that the ZOA also relies on mutually contradictory pamphletsfrom the 1960s and 1970s by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Of course, government statements aboutcontroversial events have no value whatsoever as direct evidence of the event (ZOA 110-112). Thesame point applies more strongly to the ZOA's use of an Israeli veteran's benefit hearing forwounded raiders of Deir Yassin. Years after the massacre and on legal appeal after initial rejection,an interested government ruled that the raid had involved fighting against hostile forces. Even ifthe decision could amount to credible direct evidence, the judgment nevertheless did not deny a

massacre (ZOA 1-2).

Since the time of these propaganda pamphlets, Yitzhak Levi, former Haganah intelligence chiefin Jerusalem, wrote a book called Nine Measures, showing that the military record does indeedreveal a terrible massacre at Deir Yassin. This serious work was published by the Israel DefenseArmy Press (Lv). Meanwhile, Meir Pa'il, the chief eyewitness of the Deir Yassin massacre is todaythe author of the official history of Jewish military organizations in pre-Israel Palestinedisseminated by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). If the government of Israel hadserious credibility questions about Pa'il, the massacre, or its witnesses, it has obviously been apassing phenomenon. However, few, if any, of the more established American organizationsidentifying themselves with the label “Zionist” have distanced themselves from the ZOA's

revisionism.

For 50 years no serious controversy surrounded the claim of mass murder at Deir Yassin, andthe ZOA has not created one. It is thus only right that those organizations that align themselveswith Zionism dissociate themselves from the ZOA tract, “Deir Yassin: History of a Lie.”

A broader question asserts itself nonetheless. It is one that may put a silver lining to the cloudof the ZOA tract. That question is how the Deir Yassin massacre ought to be remembered for thebetterment of all the peoples of the region. The real area of challenge and debate lies there.Searching for and understanding the evidence, as our detective did, can lead to better performance,not worse. But insofar as the ZOA may have helped call attention to that issue, its diatribe against

reality may yet serve some good. Certainly it has taught us that wishing something doesn't make itso.




Sources

( All number references in the text are to page numbers of printed text unless otherwise indicated.)

ABC — www.abcnews.go.com/century/tvseries/tvseries_ vietnam_mylai.html

Bl — J. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion: The Fight for Israeli Independence (Transaction Publishers,1996)

BZ — Sharif Kanani & Nihad Zitawi, “Deir Yassin, Monograph No. 4 ,” Destroyed Palestinian VillagesDocumentation Project (Documentation Center of Bir Zeit University, 1987) (translation by MahaMansour)

CLP — Larry Collins & Dominique Lapierre, O Jerusalem! (Simon & Schuster, 1972)

DeR — Jacques de Reynier, A Jerusalem un drapeau flottait sur la ligne de feu (Histoire et Societed'Aujourd'hui, 1950)

Dn — Dawn (Karachi) (citations are to date of issue)

Fl — Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (Pantheon, 1987)

DS — Dana Adams Schmidt, Armageddon in the Middle East

GE — Guy Ehrlich, "Not Only Deir Yassin," Ha'ir, May 6, 1992 (translation by Elias Davidsson)

GN — Elias Zananiri, Gulf News, April 9, 1997

HL — Harry Levin, Jerusalem Embattled (Victor Gollancz, 1950)

Hs — “Quantrill's Raiders”, In Search of History, History Channel (March 22, 1999)

JB — J. F. N. Bradley, Lidice: Sacrificial Village (Ballantine, 1972)

JBr — Juanita Brooks, The Mountain Meadows Massacre (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)

Jr — Badil Resource Center and Leone Films & Video, Jerusalem 1948: Yoom Ilak, Yoom Aleik (ArabFilm Distribution, 1998) (video)

Js — Dov Joseph, The Faithful City (Simon & Schuster, 1960)

LT — Lon Tinkle, 13 Days to Glory: The Siege of the Alamo ( Texas A&M University Press, reissue

edition, 1996)




Lv — Yitzhak Levi, Nine Measures (Israel Defense Army Press 1986) (translation by Ami Isseroff)

McG — Daniel McGowan & Marc Ellis, eds., Remember Deir Yassin: The Future of Israel and Palestine( Olive Branch Press, 1998)

MFA — Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website (as of March 16, 1999) athttp://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp

Ml — Uri Milstein, The War of Independence: Out of Crisis Came Decision (Zmora-Betan, 1991)

NL — Netanel Lorch, The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949. (G.P. Putnam'sSons, 1961)

NT — Ned Temko, To Win or Die: A Personal Portrait of Menachem Begin (William Morrow & Co.,1987)

NYT — The New York Times ( date of edition cited in text)

Or — George Orwell, “Notes on Nationalism,” May, 1945 (Ian Angus, ed.) The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell (Harcourt Brace, 1968)

PAI — Meir Pa'il & Ami Isseroff, Meir Pa'il's Eyewitness Account ( PEACE Middle East Dialog Group1998) (available on line at www.ariga.com/peacewatch/dy)

Pl — Michael Palumbo, The Palestinian Catastrophe ( Quartet Books, 1987)

Pr — Amos Perlmutter, The Life and Times of Menachem Begin (Doubleday, 1987)

Ps — Gerald Posner, Case Closed, Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK (Random House,

1993)

RC — Letter of de Reynier, I.C.R.C. Jerusalem to I.C.R.C. Geneva, April 13, 1948, (AICRC.G3/82)(translation by Matthew Hogan)

Sg — Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis (Henry Holt & Co., 1986)

SH — Seymour Hersh, Cover Up, (Vintage Press, 1973)

Sh — David K. Shipler, Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land (Times Books, 1986)

Sl — Eric Silver, Begin (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984)

TF — Thomas Fleming, Liberty! The American Revolution (Penguin Group, 1997)

YA — Yediot Ahronot (particular date edition cited in text)

ZOA — Morton Klein, Deir Yassin: History of a Lie (Zionist Organization of America, 1998). Allnumber citations are to the text between the footnote number that corresponds to the number givenand the footnote before it. For example, ZOA 13 means the text between footnotes 12 and 13.



1

Nakba Eyewitnesses



2



3

Nakba EyewitnessesNarrations of the Palestinian 1948 Catastrophe

Prepared by Ala Abu Dheer

Palestine Media Unit (Zajel)

Public Relations DepartmentAn-Najah National University

Nablus - Palestine

Edited by

Liam Morgan & Alison Morris

Also by

Ala Abu Dheer

* “Al-Aqsa Uprising in Cartoons”, Palestinian Perspective,

2003* “The Image of the Palestine Question in the American

Cartoons”, American Perspective, (Arabic)

* The Image of Iraq in the American Cartoons, American

Perspective, (Arabic)* Narrations of the Survivors of 1948 War (Arabic).



4

Also by Ala Abu Dheer* “Al-Aqsa Uprising in Cartoons”, Palestinian Perspective,

2003

* “The Image of the Palestine Question in the American

Cartoons”, American Perspective, (Arabic)* The Image of Iraq in the American Cartoons, American

Perspective, (Arabic)



5

Dedicated to

my father and all refugees



7

Here We Shall Stay

As though we were twenty impossibilities

In Lod, Ramla, and Galilee

Here we shall staylike a brick wall upon your chest and in your throat

Like a splinter of glass, like spiky cactus

And in your eyes

A chaos of fire.

Here we shall stay

Like a wall upon your chest

Washing dishes in idle, buzzing barsPouring drinks for our overlords

Scrubbing floors in blackened kitchens

To snatch a crumb for our children

From between your blue fangs.

Here we shall stay

A hard wall on your chest.We hunger

Have no clothes

We defy

Sing our songs

Sweep the sick streets with our angry dancesSaturate the prisons with dignity and pride

Keep on making children

One revolutionary generationAfter another

As though we were twenty impossibilities

In Lydda, Ramla, and Galilee!



8

Here we shall stay.

Do your worst.We guard the shade

Of olive and fig.We blend ideas

Like yeast in dough.Our nerves are packed with ice

And hellfire warms our heart.

If we get thirsty

We'll squeeze the rocks.If we get hungry

We'll eat dirt

And never leave.Our blood is pure

But we shall not hoard it.

Our past lies before us

Our present inside us

Our future on our backs.As though we were twenty impossibilities

In Lydda, Ramla and GalileeO living roots hold fast

And--still--reach deep in the earth.

It is better for the oppressor

To correct his accountsBefore the pages riffle back

"To every deed..."--listen

Tto what the Book says.

Tawfiq Zayyad



9

Contents

Preface

IntroductionNarrations

Abu Anees Al-Fakhouri

Abu Khaled Al-RefaeeAbu Bassam Al-Arda

Huda Abu- DheerMuhammad Ahmad Abu Kishek

Shaheir DadoshSadiq Anabtawi

Saleem Abu DheerMuhamad Saleh Abu Leil

Abdul Ghani Ismail Doleh

Abu Raed BarakatAbu Saleem Jibril

Abu Salem Katooni

Mahmoud Barakat

Mohammad Ahmad Abu EishaOm Issa Abu Sereyyeh

Abdul Qader Yousef Al-Ha

Abu Khader Hamdan

Fatmeh Daoud Abdul RahmanKhalid Rashid Mansor

Hafiza AbdullahMuhamad Radwan

Nasoh WafiJawdat Ali Issa Abu Serreyeh

Om Hasan Al-Abed

Radeyeh Husein Meri`

Rushdeyeh Awad Jabaji

13

17

21

30

35

43

49

545864

69

73

7787

96

100

105109

112

117

119122

126128131

135

137

140142



10

Shaker Mahmud Darwish Abed

Abdul Rahman AwadAbu Omar Lidawi

Muhamad Ahmad HuwaidiAbu Abdallah El-Halaq

Appendix

Questionnaire about oral narrations of the 1948 war

Bulfor Declaration

UN Resolution 194, Right to Return

Maps

1-United Nations Partition Plan. Rhodes Armistice Line,

iiiiii19492-Land Ownership and UN Partition Plan. Palestinian

iiiiiivillages depopulated in 1948.

3-Population Movements 1948-1951

4-Palestinian Refugees: UNRWA Refugee Camps, 2001

145

150

152

156160

171

176

178

187

185

186

187



11



12



13

Preface

The situation of the Palestinian refugees is one of the largestand most enduring refugee problems in the world. Discussions

on allowing them to return to their former homes within what is

now the State of Israel, on granting the refugees compensation,

and on resettling the refugees in new locations, have yet toreach any definite conclusions.

The number of Jews in Palestine was small in the early 20th

century: most residents of Palestine at that time were Arabic-speaking Muslims and Christians. Beginning in 1914, with the

outbreak of World War I, Britain promised independence for

the Arab lands under Ottoman rule, including Palestine, inreturn for Arab support against the Ottoman Empire, which

had entered the war on the side of Germany.

In 1916 Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement,which divided the Arab region into zones of influence.

Lebanon and Syria were assigned to France, Jordan and

Iraq were assigned to Britain, and Palestine was to be

internationalized.

In 1917, as stated in the Balfour Declaration, the British

government decided to endorse the establishment of a Jewishhomeland in Palestine. Jewish immigration into Palestine sawan immediate and dramatic increase.

In 1919 the Palestinians convened their first National

Conference, expressing their opposition to the BalfourDeclaration.



14

After WWII, at the 1920 San Remo Conference, Britain was

granted a mandate over Palestine. The mandate was in favorof the establishment of a homeland in Palestine for the Jewish

people. The terms of the Balfour Declaration were includedin the mandate, which was approved by the Council of

the League of Nations in 1922. By that year Palestine waseffectively under British administration, and Herbert Samuel, a

declared Zionist, was sent as Britain’s first High Commissioner

to Palestine.

In 1936 the Palestinians organized a six-month general strike,to protest the confiscation of their land, andJewish immigration

to Palestine.

In 1939 the British government published a new White Paper

restricting Jewish immigration, and offering independence for

Palestine within ten years. This proclamation was rejected by

the Zionists, who then organized terrorist groups, and launched

a bloody campaign against the British and Palestinians. Theiraim was to drive out both the Palestinians and the British, and

to pave the way for the establishment of a Zionist state.

In 1947 Britain decided to leave Palestine, and called on the

United Nations to make recommendations. In response the

UN convened its first special session in May of 1947, and on

November 29, 1947 it adopted a plan calling for the partitionof Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem as

an international zone under UN jurisdiction. The population

balance in the new state of Israel was drastically alteredduring the 1948 war. The armistice agreements extended

the territory under the Jewish state’s control beyond the UN

partition boundaries.



15

Historically, Palestinians consider a refugee to be a citizen from

Palestine who was deported or fled from his or her own countryduring the Zionist movement’s attacks launched against

Palestinians after November 29, 1947. The Palestinian’s callthis the Nakba, meaning “disaster” or “catastrophe”.

The United Nations definition of a “Palestinian refugee” is

a person whose “normal place of residence was Palestine

between June 1946 and May 1948, and who lost both their

homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-

Israeli conflict.

About two thirds of Palestinians fled or were expelled from

Palestine as it came under Jewish control. This deportationcontinued until after the armistice that ended the war: these

refugees were generally not permitted to return to their

homes.

The Israeli government passed the Absentee Property Law,which cleared the way for the confiscation of the property

of refugees. The government also demolished many of therefugees’ villages, and resettled Jewish immigrants in many

of the Arab’s homes in urban communities.

Whereas most of the world’s refugees are the concern of

the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), mostPalestinian refugees come under the older body of the

UNRWA, established in the aftermath of the Nakba. The United

Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees inthe Near East (UNRWA) is a relief and human development

agency, providing education, healthcare, social services

and emergency aid to over four million Palestinian refugees



16

living in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and

Syria.

On December 11, 1948, UN Resolution 194 was passedin order to protect the rights of Palestinian refugees. The

Palestinian refugees believe in the “right of return”, basedon Article 13 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of

Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to leave any country,

including his own, and to return to his country”.

***



17

Introduction

While the Israeli assaults continue against the Palestiniancommunities, cities and homes, Palestinian heritage

becomes nothing more than a memory. Many places havebeen destroyed during the last few years. To have a more

comprehensive understanding of the present, we must

look back to the past. We must learn from the experiences

of our elders, who suffered through difficult circumstances

that forced them to leave their homelands, farms, cities andvillages. Their presence inspired the present generations, the

children and grandchildren of those who suffered during thatfirst expulsion, to be steadfast in the face of occupation.

The experience of the 1948 Nakba had a profound influence

on the development of Palestinian political awareness, andhas made Palestinians cling to their lands and learn from

the mistakes made during the earlier war. With the 1967

Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the

Palestinians stood firm on their lands, refusing all attempts bythe Israelis to drive them out, as had happened in 1948.

It is necessary to re-open the file on the Palestinian Nakba, to

help the coming generations understand the importance of

studying this crucial period in Palestinian history. The criticalyears began with the Balfour Declaration of 1917, continuing

up to the decision by the United Nations to partition Palestine,

on November 29, 1947. The consequence of this decisionwas the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian

people, who fledto refugeecampsacrosstheregion, including

the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, as



18

well as to Europe, and North and South America.

The documentation of oral narrations is not an easy task.

Some narrations are missing important information due toeither the advanced age of the narrators, or their fears about

revealing their role in the resistance movement during theBritish Mandate. All of the narrators, however, agreed on the

mandate’s historical, political, and moral responsibility for the

Nakba: the departure of the Palestinians and the occupation

of their lands by the Zionists. The number of elderly narrators

is small, and most of them suffer from health problems andfailing memory. The process of verifying the information they

have shared has been made more difficult by the deaths of a

number of the narrators, as well as the difficulty of interviewingrefugees living outside of Palestine.

We insisted on documenting the largest number of oral

narrations as many of our narrators had passed away a short

while after being interviewed. In the Arabic version of thisbook the documentation was made in the narrator’s colloquial

language. This was done both to maintain the accuracy of theinformation, and to preserve the old vocabularies used by the

narrators. These colloquial dialects of the West Bank, Gaza,

Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and other areas, are now infrequently

used, even among the grandchildren of the refugees, who are

most familiar with them.

In this book we have aimed to document the historical

dimensions of the events of 58 years ago. In editing thenarrations we strove to maintain the essence and coherence of

the original ideas as much as was possible, while presenting

the information in the narrators’ own words. The interviews



19

which were the basis for the oral narrations followed a

questionnaire in the style used by Dr. Shareef Kana’na, aPalestinian professor with the longest and best known history

of collecting oral narrations. Dr. Saleh Abed Al-Jawad of BirZeit University, who trained us in administering it while we

studied for our Masters degrees, developed the questionnaire.In conducting the interviews, we attempted to obtain answers

to all of our questions, while taking into consideration the

individuality of each single narrative.

I thank and do appreciate the efforts of the volunteers of thePublic Relations Department, the volunteers of the Zajel Youth

Exchange Program, Dr. Nabil Alawi, Kima Avila, Nour Kharraz,

The Administration of An-Najah National University and theSocial Development Centre at Askar Refugee Camp, who

helped us coordinate the interviews and bring that project to

success.

Ala Abu Dheer Palestinian Media Unit (Zajel)

Public Relations Department

An-Najah National University

Nablus-Palestine



20


Born in 1938

Original home: Lydda



21


Born in 1938

Original home: Lydda

Current address: Ras Al-Ein, Nablus

It was a tragic situation and people lived in the mosques and schools.

Like the majority of people from Lydda, my father worked

in Jaffa. My uncle was living in Jaffa until he was deported,

then he came to Lydda to live with us. There was a group offighters who formed a committee in Lydda which prohibited

the people from leaving; they used to ask those who wanted

to leave not to do so as this is what the Jews wanted.

We would hear many stories of how the Jews reached Tierah

in Haifa and Deir Yassin near Jerusalem, and that they killedmany people. This permitted the horror to spread throughout

the rest of the country and consequently forced people frommany cities to flee. However this was not the case of the

people of Lydda who preferred to stay and resist the Jews.For this reason, Lydda was called “state No. 8.” The people

of Lydda tried to liberate Palestine but they did not find any

supporters.

The Jews came to Lydda three days before Ramadan from allfour sides. They came from the south through Ennabah, Abu

Shusheh, Deir Tareef, and Al-Abbasyah; they came along

the mountains through Jemzo, Al-hadethah and camped inBeit Nabala that was used by the Jordanian army which had

withdrawn to Bodrus. They closed every road and started to

shell the city using Mortar cannons. They delivered a leaflet



22

asking the people to surrender because there were no Arab

states to protect them.

The Jews bombed the vegetables markets in Lydda, Jaffaand other places to scare the people. We were not deterred

as Lydda was more fortified than any other town and we hadmany young men guarding it. They were united together

and they worked in shifts so that somebody was always on

guard.

Lydda had the biggest agricultural land in Palestine. Peoplegrew wheat, barley, corn and sesame. When they were driven

out, they left their crops behind them.

When we heard about the atrocity in Deir Yassin, we stood

fast and we were prepared to resist because we felt strong. If

the Arab armies had not helped the Jews, Lydda would never

have fallen under occupation. The committee held a meeting

in their headquarters.

My uncle had become a leader working alongside AbdulQader Al Husseini, the leader of the resistance in Jerusalem.

Apparently his attendants had told him that the Arab countries

had decided to send their armies to liberate Palestine. However

Al Hussaini had responded by saying, “Palestinians do not

want armies; we want people who provide us with financialsupport and weapons.” At which point another one of those

attendants said that it was too late as Palestine had already

fallen in the hands of Jews.

We were living in the old city of Lydda in a place called al

Moraba`a, where there was a market, Grand Mosque, Al-



23

Saraya (government house) and the mini Bazaar. There was a

colony called Hazboon on the road between Jaffa and Lydda.There were Jewish gunmen there who targeted passersby with

their guns. Those who passed this road had to move as fastas they could so that they would not be killed. Many young

Palestinians attacked the colony of Hazboon in retaliation.

There were many British military Camps in the area. Some of

these camps were given to the Jews by the British. The camps

which were on the Arab side were evacuated of weapons, but

the British camp that was not directly on either side was notgiven to any party. The British people said to us, “Whoever

wants the camp can take it.” Following this a battle took place

between the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs won this battleand therefore took control of the camp. During the night, the

Arabs attacked the Jews in Wadi Al-Khyaar and many Jews

were killed there.

When the Arab Rescue Army arrived they told the fighters,“We’ll guard the camp at night and you will guard it during the

day. Go home.” They fighters were a little simple and so eachone of the fighters returned home. The next day, the fighters

returned to the camp to find the machine guns shooting at

them. The Rescue Army had given it to the Jews and had

been driven out of the Wadi. At this time the Egyptian army

was not actually too far away from the camp and because ofthis the idea of a truce arose.

The Jews suggested a truce for 28 days, which would givethem more time to buy heavy artillery from abroad. In contrast

we as resistance fighters had to pay for our bullets with our

own money which meant we were able to buy very little. When



24

the Jews were rearmed they were able to put their hands on

the whole region and they forced the Egyptian army to retreat.This ultimately led to the fall of Lydda, Jaffa and the Negev.

The Arabic Rescue Army also helped in the fall of Lydda. I am

completely sure of this. The citizens used to say, “Be patient,an Iraqi and Jordanian Army are coming to help you.” The

Jews did not have enough forces to occupy Palestine and

that is why the British and Arab armies helped them.

The Arab armies were in charge of protecting Palestine. TheIraqi army was in what is now the north of the West Bank,

camping in Huwwara and Nablus. The Jordanian army was in

the village of Ain Az-zarqa and the Egyptian army was in thesouth. There was competition between all three to see who

could get the most territory. The Jordanian army, which was

camping in Yalu and Emwas villages, by mistake, attacked the

Egyptian army which was based nearby. The English officers

who were leading the Jordanian army ordered the Jordaniansto shoot the Egyptians until they finished them.

The Jordanian army then arrived in Lydda but they did not

stay long. Following their departure the Jews arrived to

occupy the city. Everybody took what they could to fight with

to resist the onslaught. The Jews were too strong though and

the fighters had to withdraw to the Jordanian police station.Many people also managed to hide in the Dahmash mosque

and the church opposite it. The Dahmash mosque was the

scene of a massacre as the Jews shot many of the peoplewho were hiding inside.

The next day, the Jews asked the children and those who were



25

more than seventy years old to leave. The Jews asked us to

leave to Parphelia, a village near Lydda which they had cameto occupy. Then the Jews entered houses and killed some

of the inhabitants. They would stop the people in the streetsand if they had a nice jacket, a watch, money or jewelry they

confiscated it; they took almost everything.

When we left, people walked as if they were in a demonstration.

If someone had a goat or a cow, the Jews would take it. If the

Jews saw a cart driven by a horse they would try to take it.

If the owner put up a fight, they would shoot the horse dead.The road to Lydda was strength sapping as it was very hot

and we did not have enough water. Many people were dying

from dehydration and dead bodies littered the path.

My cousin went down an old well, filled a jug with water and

when he came back up he found a girl who was about to die

out of thirst, “Do me a favor and let me have a sip of water”

she said. He let her drink even before his mother. Anotherman swore that he would have jumped at a lizard in order to

eat it out of thirst, hunger, and detestation.

We walked until we reached Bodurs village and at this point

we began to split up. Some people went towards Na’ileen

and the villages to the west of Ramallah such as: Deir Abu

Mashael, Kufur Ad-Deik, Deir Balloot, Jammalah and BeitAllo. Deporting the people of these villages took place on the

third day of Ramadan. We reached Bodrus in the evening,

and then we moved to Jammalah, Shoqba, and Jafnah nearBeir Zeit where we found tents pitched under trees. We were

not ready for such a situation; everybody had arrived without

belongings and I remember trying to buy a straw mat to sleep



26

on.

After Jafnah, we moved to Huwwara on foot. We were very

lucky since we had some farm animals with us including goats,sheep and cows. When we reached Huwwara, we found the

Iraqi army there. It was a big army with many weapons and Iam sure it could have defeated the Jews if it had had the will

to do so. One of the Iraqi officials in the engineering forces

told me that he wanted to sell some of his bullets so that he

could buy what he needed. He also told me that they did not

come to protect Palestine and save the Palestinians, but tohelp the Jews settle and create their state.

Following a short stay at Huwwara we moved on to Nablus.This meant we had walked the whole way from Lydda to

Nablus. Many people had died; I saw an old woman dead

with her baby sitting on her body trying to wake her. Some

people died out of subjugation, others from thirst and hunger

and some were simply killed by the Jews who chased them.

We went to our relatives in Nablus who were living in the Al-Yasmeenah neighborhood. There was a Samaritan Church

there, where some people wanted us to stay. However we

were stubborn and told them that we would rather stay in the

refugee camp than live there.

When we arrived in Nablus, we had two Liras. We were naive

enough to believe the promises of the Arab countries that

Israel was only an illusion and that it would withdraw withinthe next few days. Unfortunately what happened was the

opposite and therefore we remained in Nablus, I was very

despondent.



27

The reason that we came to Nablus was because we had

some relatives there who we were able to stay with. God blessthose who were forced to live in refugee camps during the

winter; it snowed heavily and they suffered a lot. Their tentswere pitched in the old market during miserable conditions

and sometimes the tent posts were blown away.

It was a tragic situation and people fought each other for

water. They lived in the mosques and schools, people suffered

from mange (itch), others suffered from lice, and some people

suffered from lack of food and drinking water. Life improvedgradually especially when UNRWA came and built small

houses. During the Jordanian era, life was still very difficult

and most people were struggling to get enough food.

After the people had left their cities and villages, some of

them returned to collect some of their belongings such as the

gold they had buried, their cows or their crops of oranges.

The borders were closed, but some people still managed toreach their lands. The Arabs used to punish those whom they

caught as they accused them of collaboration with the Jews.

Whenever someone left to bring back his cows, the Jews used

to call the Arabs who started to look for them in Nablus. His

descriptions were given to them by the Jews, and if the Arabs

found him they used to imprison him.

After the Nakbah, I returned to Lydda and I found the

experience very depressing. I traveled there with my brothersand some of my friends via Jerusalem. When we reached

Lydda, we went to the airport in the south. It was a big airport

built by the British and I knew it well. Beside it there were



28

Kufor Annah and Kufor Jinnis; the two villages that fell into

the hands of the Jews. The southern part of Lydda was stillthe same and the church and one of the mosques remained

untouched. However the Jews had damaged the old city andthe stores. Dahmash Mosque, where the massacre had taken

place had been turned into a workshop. The Jews had alsopulled down all of the trees and changed many features of

that area. Everything had gone, including the olive trees, the

vineyards, and the almonds.

I thought I remembered the land well but those who were withme knew it better, they said, “This is our house and that is

yours.” We knocked at the door but we did not enter because

the Jews inside did not answer the door. Some Jews allowedus see our houses while others did not. We used to have a

piece of land called “Abdaat” in the south near the station but

the Jews had built many buildings there now. Some squares

were still the same, but about half the area was destroyed. I

went past Lydda again a few years later and this time I closedmy eyes. I did not want to see anything as I did not want to

get upset.

During 1970s, the Red Cross negotiated with the Jews about

the refuges right to return and the Jews agreed to a small

amount of families returning to Lydda. The Red Cross chose

the Hajjah Family that we knew well to return. The Hajjah familyused to have an orange farm near the airport and their family

was very fortunate to be selected. The Red Cross chose nearly

20 families in total. The Jews allowed these refugees to live ina place called Nawader in Al-Minqa’e Square neighborhood

in Lydda.



29

The Arabs handed the Jews what was known as Al-Muthalath

(The Triangle). When the people living in the Al-Muthalath wentto bed, the Arab flag was there, but when they woke up, they

found it had been replaced by the Israeli flag. The Arabs saidthat they had negotiated a border modification. “The Triangle”

was handed to the Jews. King Abdullah was subsequentlykilled I believe by the British who, in turn, accused Mustafa

Eshoo of killing him. It is my belief that Glubb Pasha who was

one of the British officers commanding the Trans-Jordanian

Arab Legion urged Eshoo to kill King Abdullah. Consequently,

the outcome of this was that the Palestinians were blamed forthe King’s death.

***



30

Abu Khaled Al-Refaee

Born 1941

Original home city: Yaffa City

Current address: Askar Refugee Camp, Nablus

Many families forgot their children; some others died from thirst; people walked for tens of kilometers without anything to

drink; many of them went without even shoes

We lived in a coastal area called Ras El Ein, very close to Kufor

Qasim town. We had a shop where we used to sell productsto the Palestinian, Jewish, and English people living in and

around the British Ras El Ein train station. The train station

was the main one for trains coming to the country. We had agrove about 49 dunum in size; when we were kids we used to

go there to play. Our area was popular with people from Yaffa

City – they would come here for a break, staying for 20 days inspringtime to enjoy the vast green lands. It was an inspiration

to see those green lands and pigeons when you woke up inthe morning.

The Al-Oja River ran through Ras El Ein. The river water

was treated before being sent on to Jerusalem. Every night

Jewish militiamen would come to Ras El Ein. Between 10 and

15 armed people would station themselves in a fortification

there, and every night around 100 Jewish militia man wouldcome and shoot at them. We knew that the Jews attacked in

great numbers and when we would go to the banana grove

on the following day we would find some tactics written inthe ground, and in the places where we used to store our

oranges.



31

We used to have armed guards protecting us when we went

to collect wheat from our land, to protect us from the Jewishsettlers. One time, when I was young, I saw a snake and I

started to scream. The Jewish people in the grove next to oursheard my screams and they started shooting at us. Luckily we

were able to escape. We went back later and this time wewere able to collect our wheat.

We left after the Arab Rescue Army, which had taken our

weapons from us so we didn’t have the ability to defend

ourselves any more, left town. One afternoon, at 4pm, I sawthe vehicles carrying the Arab army out of town. My father was

disappointed as he had stocked his shop with goods, thinking

that the Arab Rescue Army would use them while they wereprotecting us. We asked them where they were going and

they answered that they had been ordered to leave. Abd Al

Kareem Qasem, who became the Iraqi President, was in the

Iraqi contingent and he wanted to blow up the water pump in

Ras El Ein because the water was used by the Jewish coloniesin Jerusalem, but an order was sent to him not to do that and

to leave every thing as it was.

In 1948, three or four members of the Tette family that worked

in our land were killed, and the whole family fled with us to

Majdal Sadeq.

We stayed in Majdal town for two months but then the Jewish

militia started shooting at us from a colony. We fled to the

west of the town. We walked and it was a long way, especiallyas we had no water and food. Then we went to Lydda City,

where we lived for six months. We didn’t take anything with

us. My father, who was always careful, closed the door of the



32

house and put a piece of wood against the door to make sure

nobody could get in to attack us.

The people of Lydda fought hard to defend their city, but theJewish assault was intense and prolonged. The Arabs weren’t

well equipped; they didn’t have mortars, for example. All theyhad were simple guns and bullets and home-made Molotov

cocktails. One gun cost the same as four or five cows.

And weapons were hard to obtain, too – the British military

controlled all the borders between Palestine, Syria, and Egypt

and it was hard to get contraband weapons through theseborders. Before the British military left, they gave everything

they held in the country to the Jews. We’d see the British

soldiers on the trains, going to Haifa and then to their ships.

While we were in Lydda we bought some new things. When we

were leaving Lydda we wanted to take our new possessions

with us, but the Israeli soldiers prevented us from doing so.

We hitched a ride on a tractor. The driver told us he was goingto Deir Ghassaneh village, near Ramallah. When we arrived

there the mayor, Saleh Al-bargothi, told us we could stay inhis house until the situation improved. The house had a small

garden planted with pine trees. That very night, Lydda fell

into the hands of the Jewish militia. And the following day, my

mother, who had stayed on a farm near Majdal and so was not

with us, gave birth to a baby boy.

The Jewish militia left one of their army cars on a road near

Lydda, at Der Al Letron- Lydda, and turned it into a landmark.It’s still there, between the pine trees, and they paint it every

year. I’d say the arrival of the Arab Rescue Army was a disaster

for us, as the soldiers took the guns and bullets from us and



33

left us empty handed.

When Lydda City collapsed, my father sent me off, early in the

morning, to visit my mother in Majdal and collect some potsand plates. He said I should stay the night there. I went on

foot. I arrived in the afternoon, exhausted from having climbedup mountains. I collected the pots and the other essential

household items. I told my mother I would like to sleep two

nights instead of one because I was very tired. I thought about

getting a donkey to help me carry our belongings back.

I woke up at around three o’clock in the morning to the

sound of missiles. My mother told me the Iraqi cannons were

shooting from Kofor Qasim at the Jewish militias. We had toleave quickly. Two of my siblings were staying with us; I carried

one, while my mother carried the other. This made escaping

even more difficult.

We arrived at Deir Ballot village in the region of Salfit. Thevillagers of Deir Ballot used to visit us in Ras El Ein, so we

had good relations with them. They welcomed us and lookedafter us, but the conditions were horrible. We had nowhere

to stay except with the cows and sheep, and the mosquitoes

attacked us in the evening. Then we arrived at the village of

Deir Ghasaneh and after this we went on to Nablus.

I always remembered the good life we had in Yaffa. Such

memories would come to mind when we were working as

carriers or street sweepers. People couldn’t really afford tobuy trolleys to carry things so we carried goods for people

on our backs. I remember Khadir Salem, who carried wheat

sacks on his back from the Eastern part of Nablus city to the



34

West. We also worked in the ice factory, and we delivered

ice to houses and shops and hospitals. I would see refugeesin Nablus sheltering in mosques, caves and schools; the

sanitation facilities were not good.

I visited Ras El-Ein in the 1970s. The train station buildingswere still there, and when I visited Abu Sameer Nageb

Nasser’s house near the railway station, I found it pretty much

as I remembered it, it had a distinctive fence around the

garden, it made me remember how we used to play with his

children there when I was young.

We may have had some support from the UNRWA, but it

doesn’t compensate for the land we lost in Jaffa and othercities and towns in Palestine. We left our green lands to the

Jews and became refugees. I don’t want the United Nations

assistance; I want to go home to my land, and I am living here

in the Refugee Camp of Askar only temporarily. George Bush

is not our envoy and he has no right to speak about us or onbehalf of us. He does not have the right to speak about our

right to return, or to cancel our right to return! I hope people ofthe world will wake up one day and discover the truth.

***



35

Abu Bassam Al-ArdaBorn in 1930sOriginal home: Yazoor village/ Jaffa

Current address: Al-Ein Refugee Camp-Nablus

In the winter nights, we used to go out in the mud with or without boots to fix the pegs of the tent.

It was 1948 and I was barely 13 years old, I remember that

I started to get an understanding of the conflict at this point.

One of my first memories was of some activists who usedto visit us at our school. They would encourage us to hold

strikes against the British occupation who they claimed was

depriving us of everything and executing our fighters. Ourgeneration used to consider the British soldiers as deceptive.

I was also involved in the conflict despite the fact of my young

age and that I was unable to carry a gun.

I recall an incident that happened in my village of Yazoor whichwas 4 km from Jaffa. The British guards used to come in tanks

that were called troop carriers, and we would run behind themin the main road. The British soldiers were targeting Yazoor

with heavy shooting from the western side. Our village had

four families and each family had its own Mukhtar or Head.

Hajj Othman Jibril was one of the four heads and he went

and talked to the British guards about them apparently firingat Yazoor. He told us he touched the submachine gun that

had been used to fire at us and he discovered that it was hot.

He raised his hand and said that this was clear proof that theBritish were the ones who were shooting at us. Hajj Jibril was

wise and very alert.



36

Moreover this incident proved to us that the British were

collaborating with the Jews and inciting conflicts. From thispoint I can remember the story and begin to analyze it. First of

all they said, “Let’s divide Palestine into areas.” Of course, ourpeople refused assuming that we were capable of fighting the

Jews and insisting that we were able to carry weapons.

At this time I was with adults who were much more involved

than me. They were almost 25 while I was only 13 years

old. Even though I was young, I like many others in my age

managed to stay in Yazoor with the fighters even when myfamily was deported.

When we were in Yazoor many battles took place elsewheresuch as that of the Al-Qastal Mountain in Jerusalem. They

announced on the radio while we were in the café that the

famous Palestinian leader, Abd Al-Qader Al-Husseini was

killed in Al Qastel. Apparently the Jews had occupied Al Qastal

and slaughtered the women and the children there. The storyhad affected everybody in the town including senior citizens,

women and children. Following this people from towns andvillages near us started to be deported.

The Jews began to occupy the outskirts of our village. Many

Jews used to come at midnight from the orange orchards and

fire at Yazoor. People who lived in the western part of townand in the extended areas would come and live in the center

as it was safer. We were living in the southern part of town that

was one kilometer from the town center.

Few Jewish houses were close to us, the nearest being 2 km

away. The Jews were the owners of a factory in Sawafi Al-



37

Raml that was part of Yazoor’s lands but it was like a desert.

To my knowledge, I think that somebody from Jaffa sold someof those lands to the Jews illegally. Somebody had faked the

ownership of those lands claiming that he bought them fromthe families in Yazoor. After this he started to sell the land to

the Jews.

The people prepared themselves to fight and families bought

weapons. Men were selling their wife’s jewelry so they could

buy guns. They chose some people to be responsible for

acquiring weapons while others had to build trenches. Todig a trench, one had to remove the sand with a shovel and

put it in some sand bags. One of those men responsible for

organizing the work was Abu Mahmood Barakat, who hada strong character. They made battlefields and appointed a

person to be responsible for each site. The fighters were told

to stay awake during the night and Abu Mahmood used to go

to check whether they were sleeping or not. The fighters were

responsible people but their lack of training let them down.Actually, we didn’t have a regular army but freedom fighters.

I recall that while the skirmishes were taking place betweenour fighters and the Jews, the owners of the orange orchards,

were going with guards to the orchards in order to continue

picking oranges.

During the skirmishes, one member of the Jadallah familywas killed, as well as Abu Raíd’s uncle and a man from Abu

Safeyyah’s family was killed near the railway, others lost their

lives too. In addition the mukhtar’s father, Abu Raid Barakat,was injured and another man from the Jabir family lost his

hand.



38

If the Jews knew that there was a base in a certain house,

they would shoot heavily at it. They would also sneak intothat house and plant mines and bombs. There were some

other houses that they destroyed since these houses causedtrouble for them. They also destroyed another factory that they

believed, was a place the fighters were using as a base.

We thanked God that we were in excellent condition before

the interference of the Arab Rescue Army. I recall when the

Syrian Rescue Army came to Yazoor; it was the reason behind

our fall. I remember this well because I stayed in Yazoor tonear the end. I first heard that they had brought a cannon or

something similar and had started to fire at Tel Aviv and other

areas. They said to the people of the town, “You can leavewith your women and children in order to save them and we

will stay here to protect your village. We can safeguard your

village; Jews are nothing.”

Actually, only a few of the Rescue Army members came.People were comfortable when they saw them because this

regular army was an Arab army who had cannon. On theother hand, it wasn’t a regular army, it consisted of just 12

inexperienced soldiers many who were originally policemen.

In the end the Rescue Army decided to leave while many of

us were still in Yazoor. They pulled out, and we stayed withsome of the young men carrying weapons in order to defend

ourselves. I think as young men, who used to listen to the

news and analyze it, we believed it was a conspiracy thatthe Arab Rescue Army had just arrived to try and remove the

fighters peacefully.



39

A serious allegation at the time was that the Jews raped

women and killed them but at the time we did not know if thiswas true. However, when the Arab radios kept repeating the

crimes Jews were committing in other towns, one would feelever more afraid.

The villages of Al-Khayriyah and Salama had fallen before

Yazoor, but it seemed the Jews were afraid of occupying

Yazoor. What actually affected us most was the situation in

Jaffa. People were leaving carrying their furniture on cars and

trucks whilst we could only watch on. This situation, of course,made people very fearful.

Following the deportation of many citizens from Jaffa therewas hardly anybody left in the district, except us. The old

generation considered honor the most important value in life.

Despite the fact that we were positioned closer to the Jews

than the people of Beit Dajan, they had left but we were still

in Yazoor. Nevertheless we finally had no choice but to departfrom Yazoor as we believed a Jewish attack was imminent.

There were still people leaving in cars from Jaffa. We were

asking them to give us a ride, but they refused. Later, one of

the young men I was with started shooting his gun in the air

until the cars stopped. Finally, we got in a car that loaded with

furniture and we headed for the city of Lydda.I still recall that our neighbor, Muhammad Ashawafi, had

returned to Yazoor with a horse and cart after we had all left.

He discovered that the Jews hadn’t occupied Yazoor, sincethey were not sure that it was safe.

We stayed in Lydda for 2 months and life was bearable but



40

my family decided it was time to move on. At this point we

were divided into two groups. My mother left with her brotherto a town near Salfit called Qir, for we had some relatives

there, while some of my brothers and I left for Tulkarem, wherewe also had family. We stayed in Tulkarem for few months.

Then in harvest time we met up with the rest of our family andmoved to Nablus.

I was empty-handed when I was driven out while there were

some people who managed to leave with their cattle along the

railway. Some people would sneak back to Yazoor to collecttheir belongings. Altogether it took us one year to get from

Yazzor to the Al-Ein refugee camp in Nablus.

People in the city welcomed us and helped us and the

relationship between all was good. Some of us stayed in

mosques, others at schools. In Nablus, we had met up with

the Barakat’s family and we fortunate to be able to live together

in Abu Asu’ud house that was very kind to us.

We didn’t go to school since the situation, after 1948, wasvery difficult; there was hunger and there was hardly any

work. If a man could find work, he would work the whole day

for a shilling or six pennies. God helped us to overcome those

difficult times.

In the year when it snowed, we were in the house and the camp

was being built. The Red Cross was erecting tents which the

people started to come and sit in. In the winter nights, weused to go out in the mud with or without boots to fix the pegs

of the tent. We would fix the pegs whenever the wind removed

or broke them, it was real misery. How else can I describe it?



41

UNRWA gave us a refugee house and I myself developed this

house to live in.

I returned to Yazoor on foot, for I worked near it after the warof 1967 which enabled us to visit the land we had been forced

from. What I noticed first was the difference in the constructionof the roads. The Jews were guarding these roads that were

exclusively used by the Jews. The school where I received

my education had not changed. They removed some houses

from the quarter where we used to live because they built

factories instead. The small hill that we still consider as ourquarter remained as it was and there were sycamore trees

which I recognized. On the other hand, the orange orchards

were removed to build factories instead.

Yemani and Iraqi Jews had settled in our houses. Some

people dared to knock on the doors of the houses where they

used to live and talked to the Jews there saying, “This house

was ours”. The Iraqi Jews offered them water and coffee. TheIraqi Jews used to say, “We hope we can live in peace some

day when we are able to return to Iraq and you may be able toreturn here.” It was extremely difficult for me to see my house

with other people living it, but what can I do? I have to bear

this situation since we were in need of work there.

They want to compensate us, how I ask? In addition to thepsychological compensation, I want them to compensate me

for all the years where they used the land. They have been

using the land and taking its crops for 50 years. I can provewith documents that this land is mine and that I never wanted

to sell it.



42

Lately, we concluded; having been deported, after Lydda

had fallen, after the West Bank had been taken completely,that this was a long of events in which Arab kings, Arab

princes, Arab leaders and educated Palestinians interferedand ultimately achieved nothing. Actually, Arab countries as

well as our leaders were the reason behind our Nakba anddeportation. Moreover, our leaders were not as responsible

as they should have been. They kept talking about the Mufti

of Jerusalem, Amin Al-Husayni as the only one who was able

to solve our problem. They really deceived us.

Our families of Yazoor were dispersed all over the world, and

ultimately, we became refugees. Originally they told us that

it would take only two weeks to return, then two months, butwe are still here today hearing such promises. We now found

ourselves under occupation and we have no land. One, who

does not have a land, does not have dignity.

***



43

Huda Abu - Dheer13 years old in 1948Original home: Al- Manshiya neighborhood/ Jaffa

Current address: Old City/ Nablus

At this time the relationship between Jews and Palestinians was peaceful. We were friends and neighbors and there were

no problems between us.

When we departed from Jaffa I was thirteen years old. We did

not have a radio in our house, so my father would listen to theradio in the local cafe. When he returned home he would relay

the stories to everyone.

At this time the relationship between Jews and Palestinians

was peaceful. We were friends and neighbors and there

were no problems between us. We lived in the neighborhoodof Al-Manshiya between Tel Aviv and Jaffa, beside Hasan

Beik Mosque and near Al-Carmel market. We would alwayshave to go to the Al-Carmel market to buy vegetables for my

mother. My father used to work in the market, and my sisterand I used to visit him. He was normally sat down reading the

newspaper.

Palestinians used to build tents and put flags on them on the

occasion of Prophet Robin that lasted forty days. I went onthis occasion many times. It was just as a feast. There were

camel races and we used to ride on them and eat many sweet

products.

Once my brother Mahammed came from Tel-Aviv and said,

“The Jews are going to divide Palestine and they are having



44

celebrations where they sing and dance.” We did not know

anything about this despite living so close together. We hada Jewish neighbor who came and sat with us, she told us,

“You Arabs know nothing, we want to take Palestine andyou will have nothing.” We told her that she was lying but

she responded, “You will see tomorrow.” After two or threedays, celebrations were held in the streets of Tel-Aviv and the

partition plan was issued.

My brother, Mohammad, worked as a mechanic in a Garage

owned by Jews in Tel-Aviv. In Tel Aviv the relationship betweenArabs and Jews was a lot more volatile. On one occasion I

had the misfortune of witnessing a Jew being murdered in

Al-Manshiya. I immediately rang my brother and he left hisjob to come and investigate. When he arrived on the scene,

British soldiers took my brother and incredibly accused him

of the murder. At the time of the murder my brother had been

working in the garage and after interrogation by the British

soldiers they accepted his alibi and released him.

Following his release he returned to his place of work at thegarage. By some bizarre twist of fate, a Jew that worked at the

garage was killed when the car he was working on collapsed

on top of him. The jack had slipped while he was repairing the

underside of the car and he had been crushed to death. My

brother was once again accused of killing him, and he wasdetained for forty days. During this time he was thoroughly

interrogated before he was finally released without charge.

My brother Khalid worked in Tel-Aviv for a Jewish man. He

was selling vegetables using a horse. When the war started,

between Jaffa and Tel-Aviv, Khalid insisted on returning the



45

horse to his employer. We tried to tell him that there were great

clashes but he was adamant and insisted to return the horseto his Jewish employer.

As the situation intensified we were forced out of Al-Manshiya

to the neighborhood of Al-Ajami. Fighting was taking place alot more frequently now. Arab fighters were opening fire on

Jews and they were retaliating with equal force. The people

from the neighborhood would support the fighters by sending

them food. In these days of intensive fighting, we wouldusually

sleep early. We would frequently wake up in the morning tofind bombs in the streets.

When we had departed from Al-Manshiya we had left all ourfurniture behind. Therefore my father decided he would sneak

back to the house to retrieve our belongings. He would bring

with him one piece of furniture each time he went. On one

occasion he took my sister, Nada, with him. My sister told me

she was very nervous as a cat kept meowing while my fatherwas playing with his prayer beads. My sister demanded that

my father stopped doing this in case the cat meowing wouldalert the Jews to come to our house. My sister said she was

very afraid and she was counting the minutes until my father

had finished.

We remained living in Al-Ajami until the massacre of DeirYassin occurred. We heard that the Jews had raped the girls

and killed many pregnant women. My father and my uncle

said that they had to move their daughters far away as he wasvery concerned for our safety. My father had four daughters

including me and so did my uncle. They decided to send all

of us with our mothers to Nablus where we had relatives while



46

the male members of the family remained in Jaffa.

My father and my uncle didn’t want to leave Jaffa, neither did

I. When my mother stayed in Jaffa, I asked her, “How couldI leave Jaffa and you behind?” I asked her to give us some

clothes but she said, “You want to stay for a long time in Nablus;it is just a short time and you will return.” our neighbors were

Jews. They left before things went bad and told us to leave

because the situation would be very bad.

We traveled from Jaffa to Nablus in a truck. My mother was satabove the truck and there was a canister of gasoline behind

her back. There was a leak in the canister which allowed oil

to pour out onto the road and also down my mothers backcausing her skin to burn. When we arrived in Nablus I was

intrigued to see if it was as beautiful as many people had told

me. My initial opinion was that Jaffa was more beautiful as it

was by the sea. The first thing I did when I arrived in Nablus

was to go to the Al-Khadra Mosque beside my grandfather’shouse.

My father, uncle and brother had remained in Al-Ajami where

the situation was deteriorating and the electricity and water

were now out of service. On one occasion my brother went

out to buy some bread, but he could not find any. When he

was returning he had been shot in the leg and this story wasreported in the newspaper. My brother was concerned that

my mother would find out from the newspaper, so he decided

to come to Nablus to calm her fears. My uncle and my fatherremained in Jaffa until all hope was lost and they arrived in

Nablus not long after we had arrived, without bringing anything

with them.



47

We stayed in my grandfather’s house in Al-Yasmina

neighborhood in the old city. We lived there with the AlamAddin family as my uncle and his family slept elsewhere.

There were eight of us in the same room and we had no bed,chairs or wardrobe. We went to borrow some bed sheets from

the house my uncle was staying at but they only had oneblanket and his family was already using it.

Bit by bit we bought furniture for our one room where we lived

for our first few years in Nablus. We managed to eat there,

clean our clothes and even turn part of it into a small bathroom.We used to bring water from the spring source in Al-Yasmina.

There was no electricity so we used to have lamps with us.

When radios became available, we used to listen to the playsthat would be broadcast. There were many of us who would

all sit around and listen to the radio. We had been offered a

room in the refugee camp but my father declined it as despite

the difficulties we were happy where we were.

Many more people now arrived in Nablus on foot especially

from Lydda and Ramleh. Some of them were allowed to stay inthe mosques, schools or the refugee camps. By coincidence,

my brother Mohammad recognized the An-Nakib family

who were our neighbors in Jaffa. A woman from this family,

whose husband had been put in prison, had arrived in Nablus

with three children and no blankets or clothes. My brotherMohammad went to many shops to collect some money to

buy clothes for the children. He also asked our father for some

extra thyme, cheese, a blanket or anything to give to this poorwoman who had nothing. My mother provided some thyme,

cheese and a blanket. My cousin was able to bring a blanket,

two cushions beside and even some clothes. Life was very



48

difficult but we were surviving.

After An-Naksa in 1967, it came to my mind to go to Jaffa

to see what had changed. I always said that I did not wantto stay in Nablus. I went with my uncle and aunt. When we

arrived we found nothing, there were some new buildingswhere our houses used to stand. We visited the Al-Carmel

public market which was now being used by Russian and

Iraqi Jews. I noticed that a part of Hasan Beik Mosque was

demolished and we only stayed in Al-Manshiya long enough

to pray.

I often reminisce about our trips to the beautiful orchards of

Salama village which was near Al-Mansheya. It was a lovelyenvironment where Jews and Palestinians relaxed in harmony

together. The Jews of Salama were good people and we had

a good relationship with them. We used to turn the lights on

for them on the Sabbath when it was forbidden for them to do

so.

In hindsight people left Jaffa relatively peacefully in comparisonwith people from Lydda. Some people had stayed in Jaffa,

and in hindsight I wish we had done this and never came to

Nablus. Life had been good in Jaffa as people were able to

earn a good living. It is difficult to have a good quality of life

when one is a refugee.***



49

Muhammad Ahmad Saleh Abu Kishek Born 1935Original home: Abu Kishek, Yafa

Current address: Askar Refugee Camp, Nablus City

We are passing the story of our deportation from our generation to the next so that the “Question of Palestine” will never be

forgotten.

Our village belonged to the Abu Kishek tribe, although we

did have other tribes in the village with us, such as Quran,Araysheh, Khatatra, Labadeh and Mawalha. There were 5,000

citizens living in our village and our tribe consisted of more

than 50 families. Our main form of work was farming: plantingwheat, vegetables and raising animals.

People lived in peace; life was good enough and we wantedfor nothing. But Jews were buying lands from rich Turkish

officials who were appointed as leaders during the Ottomanrule. Those officials imposed taxes on poor farmers, and

the farmers were too poor to pay these taxes so the Turkishofficials took parts of the farmers’ lands instead. They did not

appreciate the importance and the value of the land as they

were not the ones who worked on it, so it was easy for them to

sell it to Jews after the collapse of the Turkish Empire.

When Palestinians started to be aware of the danger of

Zionism on their lands they started to resist and stopped

selling their lands to Jews. In the 1920s, Sheikh Shaker AbuKishek, the head of our tribe, led a campaign against the

newly-built Jewish colony on our land, Beitah Tikfa, which

was called Emlabes by the Palestinians. However, the British



50

occupation troops supported the Jews and tried to put down

our revolution.

When I was a child, people talked about the Alburaq Revolutionof 1929, as well as the three revolutionists who were hanged by

the British occupiers: Muhamad Jamjum, Ata Zeir and FouadHijazi. I had also heard about the Revolution of 1936 and the

six months strike when all the shops were closed and nobody

went to work. The strike was a Palestinian protest against the

Jewish migration from Europe to Palestine. The Iraqi leader

became involved, convincing Palestinians to suspend theirstrike after he got some promises from the British mandate,

but nothing changed over the immigration issue. More and

more immigrants were entering Palestine, and there wereclashes between Palestinians, Jews and British troops.

Palestinians tried to buy weapons, but it was very difficult

as the Palestinians were not permitted to have arms by the

British. Every Palestinian revolutionist had to buy his own gun

secretly with his own money. Sheikh Abu Kishek, was the lastone who left the village; he did not leave the village until he

was sure that everybody had gone; he was doing his utmostfor the cause.

The wheat spikes were tall when we fled, as we left in spring. I

truly believe that Jews occupied our lands by force; we did not

leave them voluntarily. I remember that the British troops weresupporting the Jewish militia when they attacked Palestinian

villages; they helped them get stronger and become

entrenched in the newly-occupied villages. If Palestinianstried to support each other if one of their villages came under

attack they were prevented from doing so by the British, who

barred the way for the Palestinian support groups.



51

We didn’t leave immediately though. We tried to continue with

our normal life, but we were surrounded: Jewish colonies werebuilt on three sites around the village and there was only one

road to Yaffa city. We were scared when the citizens of Yaffafled. We were isolated from the Palestinian villages that were

on the western side of our village. The Jewish militia did notallow supplies to reach the village and there were negotiations

between both sides.

There were some clashes between our resistance and the

Jewish militia two nights before our deportation and both

sides lost fighters. We had prepared ourselves to resist, butwe could not continue the resistance without supplies. We

were surrounded, it didn’t matter how long we were prepared

to continue fighting we just couldn’t go on. The head of thePalestinian fighters in our village had brought three guns

from Egypt but he was unable to enter the village as it was

surrounded. We agreed to leave our village and our weapons

and were given safe passage through an opening in the

eastern entrance to the village.

After we left the village everyone was angry with the Arableaders who had lied to us. We had been told the Arab armies

were coming and we would be able to return to our villages

after one week. We heard their propaganda from the British

Near East Radio Station, and we believed it.

The Jewish militia destroyed our village after we left it. We

could hear the explosions from our shelter in the village of

Jaljolya. We saw the smoke with our own eyes. We went toJaljolya region, which was not that far from our village, in order

to be as close as possible to our lands. We stayed there for few

months, until they signed the truce between the Arab states



52

and the Jewish militia that became the so-called “Israel”.

We lost our fertile lands and our homes, but we were lucky

in comparison to our neighbors in nearby villages – we wereallowed to take our clothes but they weren’t. We had time to

gather possessions during the negotiations before we weredeported. Other villages, though, were cleared under fire

so the residents had no time to gather their belongings. Our

family ended up traveling to Nablus, while some other families

went to Jordan and other countries.

Some families from Tulkarem and Qalqilya owned some farms

in the Muthalath region, which was occupied by Israel; they

would sneak back to their farms in order to gather oranges.Many of these farmers were killed by Jews when they sneaked

back to their farms.

The clearance of Lydda City increased significantly the

population of the refugee camp we were in. Everyone hadto fend for themselves when it came to getting food for their

children, but it was very difficult to get any sort of employment.Each family had one room to live in, although some families

lived in caves.

The Arab armies recruited the Palestinian militants into

their units for four months after the 1948 war, and then theydischarged them and confiscated their guns. The Iraqi

Army left the West Bank, while the Egyptian Army was in the

Southern part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

After the 1967 war, Israel occupied the rest of Palestine; both

parts of Palestine were united under one occupation, so we



53

could travel with the so-called “Israel” in order to see our

homes, which we had not been able to see since the war of1948. We saw our village had been converted into an industrial

zone where many factories had been built. I saw my villageoccupied by Jewish immigrants from Europe. It was so painful

to see my village and land occupied by strangers. Manyvillagers returned to visit after 1967 and many were overcome

with emotion. My sister did not stop crying when she saw her

village and she remembered her childhood there.

Every Palestinian is eager to go home to their original villageand leave the refugee camps. We are passing the story of

our deportation from our generation to the next so that the

“Question of Palestine” will never be forgotten. We willcontinue until the refugees get back their rights. The refugees

will not give up; this conflict started in 1917 and has continued

until now and nobody has been able to solve it. It will never

be solved if they continue to ignore the right to return of the

Palestinian refugees.

Even if I wanted to accept compensation in lieu of my land,my children wouldn’t let me take it. Even if the whole world

decides our right to return should be cancelled, I will never

accept it. Even though it seems like an impossible dream, we

will keep demanding our right to return, and we will not give

up on this. If somebody accepts the cancellation of this rightit will not be a decision that comes from heart.

***



54

Shaheir DadoshBorn in 1933Original home: Om Alfahim

Current address: Old City/ Nablus

Shame on the country that meets civilian resistance with tanks!

In 1947 I was working in an ice cream shop on Hadar Mountain

on the outskirts of Haifa. I lived with my uncle, who also worked

there. My father was a butcher and one of his brothers wasa shepherd. Another brother of mine was working in Haifa, in

a shop owned by a British man. Haifa was a vital city for the

Palestinians, and we had a population of 100,000, comparedto a Jewish population of only 20,000. Life was good and

there were plenty of job opportunities. But then my life was

disrupted by the clashes that erupted in the city.

The villagers of Om Alfahim lost their village after May 151948, when the state of Israel was declared. The Rhodes

Agreement was a treaty signed between the newly-foundedstate of Israel and Arab that delivered villages and towns

situated near the border of the West Bank. This agreement

obliged Israel to give these lands back after five years. Israel

did not respect the agreement and has kept possession of

these lands even until now. The reason for this agreementwas that Israel needed a larger piece of land between the

coast and the West Bank. This is one of the reasons behind

the presence of Palestinians living in towns and villages inIsrael.

In 1948 I joined the Jordanian Army and after war broke out



55

we were promised that we could continue fighting with them.

Unfortunately, they changed their minds and dischargedaround 400 of us because we had family inside Israel. I was

staying in Baqa village when Jews took up a position very closeto the village. We had heard that they had killed soldiers, so

we escaped to the West Bank to avoid being slaughtered.

When we arrived in the West Bank we found that the Iraqi

Army was stationed there. The Iraqis were glad to have our

service and we were given Iraqi uniforms. There were still

around 400 of us and we worked with them for a time. ThenIraq and Jordan agreed that Jordan would take control of the

West Bank region. The Iraqis left in 1951 and this meant we

were unable to continue our service.

Even though I was born in Om Alfahim village and my family

still lived there I was unable to obtain residency because I

was in the West Bank when citizenship was granted. In 1967,

when Israel occupied the rest of Palestine, I was the first oneto return to Om Alfahim, although I had revisited my village

before then because I had been sneaking across the borderonce or twice a year to visit my family ever since the early

1950s.

I knew this country very well as I am a son of its land. I would

travel secretly through the mountains alone and at night. Itwas a great feeling whenever I reached my village, as I was

able to see all the members of my family that I had been

separated from, and they gave me money, as there were nojobs in the West Bank at this time. My mother was raising

goats and hens, which she would sell to raise money for me.

I did not like relying on my family and so I came up with a



56

way of making money for myself. This involved smuggling

goods across the border. There were no Palestinian clothesavailable in Israel, the only clothes you could buy there were

of Western origin. Therefore, there was a substantial marketfor Arab clothes among the Arabs still living there. I would

buy the clothes from Amman and smuggle them into Israel,where I would sell them to a friend who would distribute them.

I usually made five Jordanian Dinars on each trip.

Once, my friends asked me to help them smuggle a cow across

the border. I did not like the idea as I preferred smugglingclothes and I told them that I was not interested. I had already

been arrested twice by the Jews; once I was detained for

one-and-a-half years in Shata Prison and the other time I wasdetained for a month. Once I went secretly to Haifa after the

war of 1948 in order to work in construction and earn some

good money. I did this for two years and I saved a lot of money,

which enabled me to return to Nablus and open up a shop.

Before the Diaspora of 1948, my mother told me that if I got

stuck in the West Bank I should go and live with my aunt, wholived in the village of Yabad near Jenin in the north of the West

Bank. This is exactly what happened and I ended up living

with my aunt for 17 years. In fact, when I was 21 years old I

married this aunt’s daughter, my cousin.

More than 20,000 refugees found themselves in Nablus. I

witnessed the poverty and the hunger; I saw the refugees’

tents in the village of Janzoor on the way to Jenin – therewas only one meter between each tent. People were enduring

incredibly tough living conditions and it made for a tragic

scene. Then they moved them to different refugee camps



57

and gave every family one room – while the Jews who were

coming from Europe found Palestinian houses waiting forthem in Haifa.

Today we are an unarmed people while Israel has nuclear

weapons. Israel invades us every day while we offer resistanceby throwing stones. Shame on the country that meets civilian

resistance with tanks! They have taken our lands for free and

want us to leave the region.

***



58

Sadiq AnabtawiBorn in 1942Original home: Lydda

Current address: Nablus

All the money in the world will not compensate the Palestinian for his loss; the financial compensation is an easy thing, but

the psychological compensation is something else.

We had a battery radio at home that my father used to sit and

listen to at certain times of the day. I remember its shape andthe fact that it did not produce a clear sound. It was the Near

East Radio Station but I remember that the whole concept of

the radio seemed something quite bizarre.

My father had high status in Lydda; he was married to the

chief justice’s daughter, and he had a good office job. Myfather worked in an office for Farid Al-Anabtawi. I was a little

boy then and remember going to the office to run errandsfor him. My major concern at the time was to go to Saa’doo’s

shop and buy a bottle of sweet lemonade which I liked verymuch. I used to hear the word “committee”, uttered by different

people who came to see my father. It was called the national

committee and it aimed at keeping the people on their lands

and staying in Lydda. At this time some people had begun to

make the pre-eminent move of leaving Lydda, as they feareddeportation.

Many people though did want to stay fight for their land, andyou could feel that a momentous event was taking place. I

heard about the desire of people to have weapons. However,

there was no money, so people were forced to sell everything



59

they had in order to buy them. The main problem was the lack

of real leadership to unite the people despite the intentions ofthe Grand Mufti, Haj Ameen Al-Husseini.

My uncle, Bahjat Tibara, was an important official in the

Jordanian army. I remember when he came to see us hearrived in an army car. He told my father that he should leave

Lydda with the whole of his family. I still recall the conversation

between them, with my father insisting on staying. However,

in April 1948, much to the surprise of the National Committee,

my family, including my father decided to leave Lydda.

There was one member of my family who did not want to go and

that was my grandfather. My grandfather was very emotionaland very stubborn and he was adamant that he would not

leave. My mother was very worried about my grandfather

especially as he was blind and she wanted to make sure that

he was alright. The next morning, a car came for us, driven by

a Jordanian officer who was a friend of my uncle. There waseight of my family in total who crammed into the car. This did

not include my grandfather who could not be persuaded toleave and he stayed in his house.

We left Lydda without taking anything with us except the

clothes we were wearing. My father’s uncle, the late Haj

Muhamad Anabtawi arranged for two trucks so that ourfurniture and belongings could be taken to Nablus. However

as soon as my father found out, he refused this offer out of

pride and because he really believed that we would be ablereturn in the near future. His uncle told him that Lydda would

be conquered but my father did not want to hear this.



60

I remember as we were leaving there was some disorder in

the town. We were traveling in a big black car that slowlypushed its way through the commotion. Some people came

and tried to stop the car, and so my father spoke with them.As we drove off my father told us that he had been talking to

some of the committee members. My father had told themthat we were leaving but we would be back soon if God wills,

and they replied that God knows best. The Jordanian officer

told us that the Jews were close to occupying Jaffa. This

prompted me to realize that the commotion was caused by

the Arabs fleeing from there as Jaffa was very close.

Once we had escaped the chaos circulating Lydda the rest of

the journey to Nablus was quite smooth. Shortly after we hadarrived a truce was declared meaning that we might be able

to return. This caused some people to return to Lydda, but my

family decided to wait in Nablus to see what would happen.

This proved to be an excellent decision, as the infamous

deportation events took place not long after.

We had been fortunate that we were able to take a car asmany people had no choice but to walk. This is what my blind

grandfather had to do once the city had been occupied. It

took my grandfather a long time before he reached Nablus

and my family was greatly relieved when he arrived. He was

in good spirits although he had obviously suffered a lot onthe way. We were informed that five Arab armies had entered

Palestine and accomplished nothing. The Palestinian people

guessed that the battle would be lost as there seemed to be aserious lack of real effort from the neighboring Arab countries.

We were told that despite the massacre in Lydda some Arabs

had actually managed to stay there.



61

In Nablus, we lived in many houses. First, we went to my aunt

Um-Thabet’s where life was difficult as we had no possessionsof our own. Then a kind family let us use an apartment which

is now where Adel Zu’aiter School is built. There was nothingin the apartment, but people donated mattresses and beds.

Nablus was poor because of the state of its economy whichdid not help the already dire situation.

In the winter, I remember the family that was allowing us to

stay in their apartment brought a jacket for me. I remember my

mother crying because I had neither boots nor even sandalsduring those desperately cold times. Since we arrived in

Nablus, my mother had not stopped crying, and when we

asked her why this was she replied, “Your uncles where arethey? The family is scattered; where are my brothers and my

friends whom I miss so much?

She used to bring us to An-Najah University area, then an

empty square piece of land and let us play. There was onlyone other family living in our street and two of the women from

that family came and said to my mother, “Sister, we alwayssee you crying, what is the matter.” My mother gave them the

same answer she had given to us. One of my uncles worked

with the UN in Jericho, and he thought it was best for my

grandfather to live with him. This scattered the family further

making my mother more upset.

I thank God for having educated parents. My mother had

graduated at The Arab College in Jerusalem before we weredeported, and my father had earned a Diploma in Agriculture.

My father started working with his cousin and they started

a small business. At this time the Iraqis were in control and



62

the economy was stable. This situation changed when the

Jordanians took control and the economy took a turn forthe worse. This downturn in the economy led to my fathers

business not succeeding. My father then became a teacherand after two or three years my mother worked in the same

profession.

Before 1967, I traveled to Lebanon to study there. When I

graduated, my father asked me to return to Nablus. At that

time, it was under occupation and I wondered how I would

cope with such a situation. Nevertheless in 1968, I returnedto Nablus after finishing my studies as I desperately wanted

to see my family.

After a week in Nablus, my brother asked me if I wanted to go

with him to Jerusalem, which I agreed to. In Jerusalem I met

up with some old friends who we stayed with. The following

day, they suggested that we drive to Lydda. Just hearing its

name rekindled some childhood memories and I got quiteexcited at the prospect of seeing the place we were forced to

leave. When we reached there I was shocked to see the hugeairport which now existed there. This provoked me to shout,

“For God’s sake, where is Lydda?”

The entrance to the city looked very different and I could not

recall which street was which. My friends informed me wewere on the main street and I then recalled the café, where I

used to play outside with my friend. I told my friend to stop as

I wanted to see it and he actually stopped under the balconyof my home, which was a little further down the street. Hardly

anything had changed on this street one small exception was

that Saa’doo’s shop now had a door of iron instead of a glass



63

one. My friends wanted to leave soon after but I managed to

get them to stay a little longer as I was really fascinated to seewhat had happened there. We looked at what was left of the

old city after it had been destroyed. Then we came acrossour school which was still intact, which was heartening, and

following this we decided it was time to leave.

My father refused resolutely to go to Lydda. The only time

he went was when he went to Lydda airport. When he went

he closed his eyes all the way from Nablus to the airport. I

actually returned once more to Lydda and it was mainly bychance. I had got lost driving back from Tel Aviv after I had

bought some goods. The first sign that I saw was that of Lydda

and I decided to go there to take another look. I entered ourold street and stopped in front of my front door. I felt a desire

to knock but I was afraid of who I might encounter living there.

So I walked around the quarter, and looked at the buildings

and the people, and then I got back in my car and drove off.

I never went to Lydda again.

All the money in the world will not compensate the Palestinianfor his loss; the financial compensation is an easy thing, but

the psychological compensation is something else. When I

went to Lydda, the first thing I looked for is the place where

I used to play. I searched for the place where Samir Zlatimo

and I used to play in the dust, to rekindle my memories. Whatpsychological compensation would I have? We do not own

any property in Lydda anymore, but we do have real memories

there.

***



64

Saleem Abu Dheer10 years old in 1948Original home: Al- Manshiya/ Jaffa

Current address: Nablus

…They also found a hairdresser with his hand over the head of his client on the chair and both of them were dead.

I was nine years old when we left Jaffa, but I still remember

it very clearly. I used to go to the market with my father, and

I still remember many events that took place at that time. Myfirst memories were of happy times and but the atmosphere

started to change. I recall that because of the rising hostilities

my brother decided to stop working for his Jewish employer.My father supported his decision and gave him a cart full of

almonds to sell, from which he made a lot of money.

Once my brother had done this his next job was to go in his

lorry to the farms to collect oranges that he would then sell.On one occasion he was stopped when returning through the

Jewish colony of Niter. The British soldiers who arrived on thescene allowed him to return to Jaffa but without his lorry. The

following day he returned through a closed road in an attempt

to retrieve it. However, much to his distress he found that his

lorry had been burnt out.

As the situation deteriorated British soldiers would come to

our neighborhood of Al-Manshiya and open fire at some of

the Arabs. They did this to deceive us into thinking that itwas the Jews who were firing at us. They wanted to stir up

hostilities between us in order to quicken our departure. There

was another occasion where the British soldiers invaded the



65

orphanage with snuffer dogs for an unknown reason.

When the Rescue Army arrived we were very excited. It was

led by an Arab commander called Fawzi Al-Kowikji and weclapped very enthusiastically when he led his army into town.

Our spirits were dampened when we heard the terrible newsthat Abed Al-Qader Al-Husseini, the leader of the Palestinian

resistance had died. My sister brought the newspaper and

she was crying and shouting, “Father, look at the paper and

read what is in there.” The paper was black to mourn the

death of Al-Qader Al-Husseini.

Despite the appearance of the Rescue Army people had

started to flee mainly because out of fear from many of therumors that were flying around. Nevertheless, therewere many

people who would simply not leave. Some people had the

attitude that they would rather die in their town than be forced

to leave. I recall the family of Abu-Laban who had placed a

canon on top of the mill they owned in order to defend it.

We did not leave Jaffa until the last moment. When we finallydid leave we certainly did not anticipate that we would become

refugees. My father brought the house key with him when we

left. He also brought his nail clippers and a copy of the Holy

Quran. All our remaining belongings we put into bags that we

intended to come back for in the next few days. My father puttwo pieces of wood over our door in order to prevent the Jews

from getting in. As we did not want to go too far from home

we stayed in the Al-Ajami neighborhood for a while with myuncle.

After two weeks we returned in a lorry to Al-Manshiya to pick



67

the day, therefore many of my female relatives would come to

our house in the evening, and we would all swim together.

When we reached my house I was pleased to find it thesame as I remembered it. We walked to the next street where

my Aunts and cousins had lived and this street was alsounchanged. When we reached the Hasan Beik Mosque I

became very disillusioned. It had been neglected and had

it was being used for acts of fornication as there were now

nightclubs nearby. We entered Al-Derhali and al-Balabseh

markets where we ate some fish and then we went to visitAl-Ajami. After that we went to Beit-Yam which we used to

call Al-Jabaliya neighborhood where my uncle Abu Ali Ash-

Sharqawi was living.

At a later date I returned with my father and my father-in-law.

We went to visit our old house and then we visited the Al-

Madfa Cafe. Here we sat and reminisced about how our life

used to be here.

I took my brothers, Khalid and Abdulghani again to Jaffa. Wefound Al-Manshiya upside down. There was a place called

Irsheid; we found it destroyed except for the mosque and

the hill of Beidas Family. When we reached Al-Manshiya, we

found no homes on the left or the right. Beidas house was a

beautiful one with some tiles on its roof, the family of Beidaswas very wealthy. They had a square and a Cornish. My deaf

brother, Khalid, started to remember the days of his youth,

while Abdulghani was only three years old when we weredriven out, he did not remember anything but the porch and

the stairs.



68

During the first Intifada, I took my son, Ali, and my daughter,

Aida, with me to visit Jaffa so that they could see al-Manshiyaneighborhood. Afterwards, I took them to the house of my

uncle, Al-Hajj Asaad Abu Dheer, in the Al-Ajami neighborhood.We knocked at the door and entered the three storied house.

We asked the workers who were painting there if we couldsee our house and they agreed. While we were entering,

I told my children that here was the kitchen, there was the

living room; the wooden doors were decorated in a beautiful

way. The whole house was still the same. The Jews who now

owned it wanted to rent it to other people. My son noticed thename of uncle that was still engraved in stone at the front of

the house.

We then traveled through Al–Balabseh neighborhood, passed

Al-Dajani Hospital, Al Hamra Cinema, the Monastery, Al-

Darahalli Market, Abu Nabbout Public Fountain and Dar Al-

siksek Mosque. We visited everywhere, and I used to tell my

children how great it was to live there. My late mother used tosay, “If I die, please take me to Jaffa, I do not want to die here

in Nablus.”***



69

Muhamad Saleh Abu LeilBorn in 1936Original home: Jamaseyen/ Yaffa

Current address: Balata Refugee Camp, Nablus

It has been half-a-century now and still we are dreaming about going back to our homes

We lived within walking distance of Yaffa city. We grew

watermelons, tomatoes and peas and would walk to Yaffa

and sell our produce in the main groceries market there. Welistened to the news on the radio, and read it in the newspaper.

There was a British radio station that we listened to and the

newspapers we read were Aldefa and Falastein – I rememberthey cost one-and-a-half pennies. People were desperate

to hear about what was happening because they were so

frightened: we had neither tanks nor guns and the Jewswere shooting and shelling our village. We were peasants,

but some people tried to buy guns; each one cost around 40Palestinian Pounds, which was very expensive.

The British turned a blind eye as the Jews committed their

crimes against Palestinians. The Jews massacred 12

members of the family of Aldabas, who had been living and

working at the farm of Haj Hamid Abu Laban. We went to see

the bodies in the early morning; they included children, whowere killed while they were sleeping. A member of my own

family was killed as he went to Yaffa to sell his vegetables;

another villager, from the Ishtiwi family, was also killed by theJewish gangs. I remember Abdul Latif Ayash, who was also

murdered, as he was one of the resistances. Somebody else

from Sheikh Emwanes Village was also killed in our village



70

and we buried him near Al-Oja River.

We were poorly prepared for war and we had no military

training. We managed to dig some underground tunnels andwe had some guns but they were of poor quality and only

housed 11 bullets. But the Jews had automatic guns withnever-ending magazines of bullets. We had heard that there

was some smuggling of guns and weapons from Egypt and

Syria, but British soldiers executed any Palestinian who owned

a gun – while Jews were permitted to have whatever they

wanted. They detained my brother, Saber, and sentenced himfor four years’ hard labor because they found he had an old

gun in his house. We used to visit him in jail.

We had some militants in our village, and eight of the militants

of Hasan Salameh`s group were killed there. We lost the

villages of Salameh and Yazoor as well as the farms of Yaffa

city. Abdul Latif Abu Ayash and another six fighters were

defending our village, but in the end they gave up their gunsto another group from Abu Kishek village.

We were told we should leave our village before the Jewish

militia arrived, so we left – otherwise we might have been killed.

Even though we had documents to prove we owned the land,

we were scared. People left because they were frightened

and had no weapons with which to defend themselves.

I remember members of my family crying and screaming

and asking our father about where we were going. He said itwould be for just one month and then we would come home. It

has been half-a-century now and still we are dreaming about

going back to our homes. The Arab Armies did nothing to



71

help us go back, while the Jews took Palestine from us.

We left at night and went first to Abu Kishik village, where we

stayed for six days, until we went to Qalqilia. The citizens ofQalqilia town cried when they saw the terrible state we were

in. We had lost everything and we were homeless, and wesuffered a lot over the winter. We spent two years in Qalqilia

town. The Iraqi Army was there at this time. The soldiers

were fighting the Jewish militia, and they managed to arrest

some militants – we clapped when we saw the Jewish gang

members be arrested by the army. Then the Iraqi soldierswent off to defend Jenin, where many of them were killed.

After two years in Qalqilia we had spent most of our money,

and we decided to move to Nablus.

In Nablus we were given shelter in a zone called Rafidya; we

lived in tents. Then more refugees arrived from Lydda City.

They told us the Jews had slaughtered many people there in

a mosque and many innocent children had been killed. TheRed Cross was supplying us with basic necessities, but then

UNRWA took over this responsibility. We built our homes inthe refugee camps, although we used the term “units” instead

of “houses”. My mother died here in the camp, as well as my

wife; we have been dying in the refugee camps and in the

Diaspora.

After the war of 1967 I went to work in Hartzilya city. Many

Palestinians were there to work in industry and farming. I told

my boss that this land was ours. He replied that I was just aworker here and that this was no longer Palestine but Israel.

We went on trips to Yaffa after the war of 1967 and I was able



72

to see my village and my house. My village had changed, but

I could still easily recognize my house. The people living in myhouse “allowed” me to go inside. During our trips to Yaffa we

would pray in the Sidi Ali shrine and we would offer sacrificesof goats. I remembered our past and the nice memories we

had before our Diaspora.

The land we owned was relatively small and I wouldn’t accept

any compensation in return of it. At the time the Jews had

offered a lot of money to buy our land but many of us had

refused to sell it.

We escaped from the fear and terror, but if we had known

that we would become refugees we never would have left. Itwould have been better if we had stayed there; it was a lovely

place that was near to the beach and also near to a river. I

always wonder how we ended up in this mountainous area of

the West Bank. I wish I could return to my village right now

and stay there for the rest of my life.***



74

We moved to Lydda City, but it surrendered while we were

there. People’s spirits had been lifted when they saw somekind of military group coming towards Lydda, because they

thought it was support for the Palestinians. But then werealized it was the Jewish militia of Hagana. The Hagana had

no respect for the law and they butchered people without fearof punishment by the British authorities.

My two brothers were involved in the resistance; one of them

was killed when the Hagana arrived in Lydda. We were scared

when we saw the Jews because we knew they were killingPalestinians in the other villages. The support we had from

the other towns was minimal, probably because they were

under attack at the same time.

We were devastated when the Arab forces withdrew, and

then we had the trauma of seeing our town destroyed. That’s

when we fled; we knew what would happen if we stayed: then

Jewish militia had been scattering leaflets warning us that ifwe did not leave we would be killed.

After they had taken control of the town the Hagana militants

came to our house and took my two brothers and five of our

neighbors to help them carry some weapons to their cars.

After doing this – coming under fire in the process – the

commander told the militants to send the Palestinian menback to their homes. But on the way home, one of the Hagana

militants pointed his rifle at them and ordered them to put their

faces against a wall and raise their hands. It looked likely hewas going to shoot them, but the commander saw what he

was doing and stopped him. “I told you to take them to their

homes and not to kill them,” the commander said, and he



75

cursed the militant.

Then all the young men were told to go to Dahmash Mosque.

We really thought they would be killed there. My brother toldme we should all face the same destiny together – if it was

our fate to be killed there, and then we would be killed there.We went together. I was very young. We passed men and

elders with their hands on top of their heads. The mosque

was full of people. One of the Hagana leaders came and told

us that anyone who had a knife must throw it away. In this

mosque there was a yard and a wall; the Hagana militantswere on the roof of the mosque pointing their arms and rifles

towards us. Then another commander came and said that all

the young men should leave the mosque and only the eldersremain there. We left the mosque. We had walked less than

100 meters when I heard the sound of automatic weapons

coming from the mosque. And one hour later, the militants

came and ordered us to leave Lydda.

We owned a truck. The Hagana tried to tow it away with a

bulldozer. My brother was so angry he went into the houseand picked up a knife, intending to threaten those trying to

take the truck. But my mother wouldn’t let him leave the house.

She told him: “Money can be compensated for but your life

cannot.”

Our city surrendered when the resistance realized there

was no point fighting any more. The Jews came to people’s

houses and shouted: “Go to Abdallah [the West Bank underJordanian rule]!” That very day we walked to Nileen village. It

was the first day of Ramadan, a hot day in July 1948. Some

members of my family stayed behind – two of my aunts and



76

my sister – but my other brother is still missing today.

Some villagers sneaked back to their farms to pick up some

fruit, such as oranges, or property or animals, but the Jewskilled all those they caught. My aunt did not want to leave

because she was sick, but on the departure day everybodywas scared. Everyone was rushing. Some forgot their babies

and children because they were panicking so much.

We thought we would stay here [Nablus] for a few days or

weeks and then we would return home. We came through themountains, where there was no Jewish militia, and we were

welcomed by the citizens of Nablus city. The Nablusi citizens

sheltered us and took care of us. We lived in Balata refugeecamp, although some family members later left for Amman in

Jordan. There were no job opportunities here; we did have

some money, but others had no money at all.

I visited my home after the war of 1948. I found Jewishstrangers living there. They invited me to visit my home. They

told me they had rented the flat from the Government. Thenthey offered me some coffee – in my own home.

***



77

Abu Raed BarakatBorn in 1937Original home: Yazoor/ Jaffa

Current address: Al-Ein Refugee Camp/ Nablus

My wife and children were with me picked the pomegranate and said, “This is ours.” I told them, “This pomegranate was

planted by your grandfather.”

When I left Yazoor I was in the sixth grade. We used to listen to

the news on the radio in the Café. In those days, radios werenot widespread and the news concentrated on the Second

World War. However there was an increasing amount of news

regarding the situation in our own country.

The British soldiers were supporting the Jews; they constituted

a corps for them in the British army. We saw the British trainingthem at night, holding sticks like scout leaders. In contrast if

the British army found any Arab in possession of a weaponor even a bullet they would demolish his house and execute

him.

We did not imagine that things would progress as far as they

did. In fact, I didn’t imagine that one day I would become a

refugee. Our people expected a lot from the Arab Armies. It

started with sporadic skirmishes and then the Jews started toattack the towns to weaken its inhabitants and force them to

leave. The Deir Yassin massacre had a great psychological

influence on us. The Arab radio broadcasts from Egypt, Jordanand Syria were greatly hyped in order to frighten people and

get them to leave the land open for the Jews. One was ready

to sell his wheat to buy a gun and some bullets and stay to



78

defend his property.

Every house had its own provision of wheat, lentils and onions.

All were grown on one piece of land. My father was an officialof the Military Committee at Yazoor. He was responsible for

arranging the guarding shifts. My father organized the youngmen to guard the town in shifts. They were armed with worn

out guns to such an extent that you needed to use a skewer

to adjust them. These poor quality guns were sent to our

house and my father taught me how to clean them. There was

about twenty or thirty guns and two or three machine gunsand bombs. Our people were not trained to use the weapons

properly and they used them haphazardly.

People used to fear going into the farms to pick fruit for fear of

getting shot at. The Jews used to attack Yazoor at night, never

in the morning, and the British army was supporting them.

Each one of us had the necessary amount of kerosene forboiling water and there was no serious food shortage. Most

of the families were gathering inside the town; we were livingnear the orchards and we were close to the colony of Moledet.

It was armed and it used to overlook the whole area.

The Jews did not dare to come in to the town at night. During

the day they would travel in groups when they were driving onthe main street. We used to shoot at them and this led to them

getting tanks to escort them on the main road.

The country was divided into two parts; the left and the right.

In the middle of the country there was a main road. On this

main road there was a strategically positioned house between



79

Yazoor and Beit Dajan that acted as a base for the Jewish

militia. It was called Hezbon and they dug tunnels under theground from there that led them to E’yoon Kara. The young

men of Yazoor had decided to bomb Hezbon which theymanaged to do successfully. The next day, the Jews were

sitting on a pile of rubble.

My uncle, Haj Sa’dallah became a martyr the day he asked my

father’s permission to guard the town at night. He proceeded

to a region which was near Moledet, carrying a short Italian

gun. It was of poor quality and when it fired it producedenough light to give the location of the shooter. Consequently

this enabled the Jews to determine my uncles position after

he had fired, and they shot him dead. His family was livingwith us after they had been driven out from their house in

the orchard. Uncle Sa’dallah was supposed to hand over his

shift at mid night. Since he did not return my father and some

friends went to search for him. They found my uncle sitting on

his knee, with his hand still holding his gun. They thought thathe might still be alive so one of the men carried him on his

back. When I saw him, I told them that there was some bloodon my uncle’s hand. They examined his body and discovered

that a bullet had entered his left shoulder and passed through

his heart.

I also remember that Abdel Hameed ‘Abu Zubaidah’ andHaj Abu Safieh, who were from Yazoor, became martyrs.

My father-in-law, Haj Abdel Hadi Jaber, was wounded. His

hand was cut when a Suliban bomb, which was like a Mortarbombs, was blown up. It killed the person who was standing

next to him, Abdel Hamid Abu Zubaidah. The Jews then

bombed the Spinning Factory that was called Shanata and



80

the Ice Factory.

When things became worse, we, the children, were driven out

to Lydda. Everybody who was able to carry weapons stayedin the town to defend it hoping that the Arab armies would

come and help with the resistance. We only had English andCanadian guns in good enough condition to fight with. Those

who had Canadian guns would get the best results since they

had field glasses that helped with targeting.

When the Rescue Army finally arrived we thought that thiswould instigate the demise of the Jews. Fawzi Al-Kawukjy

introduced himself as the leader of the Rescue Army; he said

to my father, we are responsible for defending the town. Takethe armed men out and we say goodbye.” My father agreed

to leave the Rescue Army in charge which was a mistake as

they did not stay very long. Yazoor had been steadfast and it

only fell after we had handed over to the Rescue Army.

My father decided to gather the militants that had left Yazoor

and lead them to Lydda where I was at the time to aid theresistance. Sadly, they only reached the village of Safreyeh,

where the Jews were sitting ready in the trenches so they

returned back.

One day shortly after we had arrived in Lydda a friend and Idecided to return to Yazoor to pick up our bicycles which we

had left behind. We went on foot and when we entered the

town we were surprised to find it completely deserted; therewas no rescue and no Jews. We had a dog in Yazoor that

we were unable to take with us. Incredibly when I called his

name, “Max”, he appeared, climbed on my shoulders, and



81

was trying to kiss me.

I looked at our house and I went inside and I took just a

mattress and a blanket. The furniture had not been movedfrom its place. As I looked through the key hole of the shed I

could see the bicycles and I felt happy. I brought a metal barto open the lower lock so that I could open the door. Suddenly

the latch came free and fell on Mohammed’s hand causing

him to shout loudly.

I then heard something else in the distance so I said toMohammed, “They are coming, and I can hear them.” We

left everything and fled through the side streets in an area

called Al-Bobareyeh, crossed the ancient ruins and arrived atthe school. To be honest I just heard a sound but I didn’t see

anything. When we reached the school we met a man called

Mohammed Al-Akel. We helped him push his car so it would

start and he told us he was going to Jaffa. We asked him,

“How can you go there? The Jews have invaded it. Take uswith you instead to Lydda.” He replied adamantly, “No, I want

to go to Jaffa,” and this was the direction he drove off in.

We reached our agricultural school and we looked at our

quarter called the Nawabilseh neighborhood. We had a fifty

square meter plot of land which was part of our store-cropping

rights. The wheat that was growing there was ready to harvestas it was as tall as a man. In 1947 someone who lived near

our village claimed this was his land and sold it to the Jews.

He had no right to do this and my father told the police aboutthis matter. The police official in charge Salah Nazer agreed

and ruled that the land must be returned to my father.



82

Mohammed and I came from behind the sweet factory on foot

and there we found that the Jews were stopping the cars.So we took a detour through the orange farms. As we were

walking we met a man from Yazoor called Mohammed AbuHamdeh, who was deaf and driving a carriage. I asked him

loudly, “Where are you going Abu Al-Abed?” He replied, “ToYazoor, as I want to bring back some coal oil.” He wanted

to bring back some kerosene from a barrel in his orchard.

The gallon of kerosene, which used to cost one shilling, had

become too expensive and so this made Abu Al-Abed return

to Yazoor to get a barrel of it.

We kept walking and we came to the village of Beit Dajan.

We heard a shooting sound coming from the direction of thepolice station. We didn’t know the reason and we did not want

to find out. Next we came to the Safreya region where we met

someone from our town from the Ass’oad family and he had a

big Cyprus donkey with him.

We said to him, “How about picking us some good oranges

from the top of the trees. The oranges have stopped growingin these orchards, but there are a few oranges at the top

of the trees.” He left the donkey with me while he climbed

the tree for us. I quietly said to Muhammad, “We are tired!

Sit behind me!”We harshly left the man who was picking

us some oranges, and fled, riding on his donkey’s back, allthe way across the Safreya region. When we reached the

Lydda railway, the man was still running behind us. We tied

the donkey to the rail, jumped the fence and walked the restof the way until we reached Lydda in the early evening. My

family had been searching for me, and I apologized but I did

not tell them I had been to Yazoor.



83

The Jews then came to take Lydda approaching from the

eastern side. Coincidentally or more likely on purpose the ArabRescue Army who had come to Lydda left the night before

the Jews invaded. Some people hid in Lydda’s mosques butthe Jews entered one of them and killed the people hiding

there. Following this a big fight broke out, but it was futile; theJews were abundantly armed with weapons left by the British.

The Jews shouted at the raging people, “Go to Abdallah, the

prince of Jordan, Go to Abdallah.” We fled with my brother,

my uncle and his wife. It was like doomsday.

We were fleeing from Lydda during Ramadan and it was too

hot. Women and children were struggling to continue; since

there was hardly any water to drink. I was able to drink froma basin in which there was dirty water that contained some

creatures and moss. We finally came to a place where we

found a well and this caused me to dance with joy. We were

extremely thirsty at this point. In order to get water from the

well we tied our hettahs (head scarf) together and loweredthem into the well. We would then bring them up, wring them

out and drink the water.

When we reached Qibya village, there were some tractors

coming towards us. People of Qibya mistook them for the

Jews and started to run. We jumped over the roofs of the

houses and apparently a woman forgot her baby and in theensuing panic. Then somebody shouted, “Come back! Come

back! They are not the Jews.” They were Arabs who had

come to help us.

After that, we went to Deir Ammar to be far away from the

confrontations. We stayed there for two days, and then we



84

went to Nablus. We were in the lower Refugee Camp, which

was close to a source of water. We were putting the sacks on tothe trees in order to protect us from heat and we stayed a few

weeks in these conditions. The people of Nablus sympathizedwith us and they would always offer their help. The schools

and the mosques were opened for all the refugees. In themosques, they used to bring food and blankets. The mosque

was partitioned out with each family having its own area.

When winter was close upon us, we left the camp and rented

a house that belonged to Abu So’ud family.

After the winter we returned to the refugee now named, Camp

Al-Ein where the Red Cross was distributing tents although

some people decided to remain in the caves. When my fatherfinally reached Nablus he and found out his family was living

in the refugee camp he was dumbfounded. The people of the

camp had heard a lot about my father and knew that he was

one of Yazoor’s notables, so they assigned him their Mukhtar,

(Head), and the Jordanians at that time approved this. Thishelped my father come to terms with the fact that he was

living in a refugee camp.

The following winter we spent the whole season in the camp.

It was a very tough experience, as sometimes the tent would

fall on us. People used to remove the snow on their tents to

prevent this from happening. We also had communal toiletswhich was uncomfortable for us. We continued living in the

camp until 1958.

The Iraqi army used to bring their cars to Camp Al-Ein for

us to wash and they paid us some money for that service. In

return people used to go to the Iraqi army camps and bring



85

food, rice and dates. While some other people went there to

beg.

I was fortunate to be able to return to school. I studied at thenew national college before the Jews demolished the center

of the city. When they destroyed the college, I studied at An-Najah College and got my diploma in accounting. I worked as

a clerk before I got a job with UNRWA.

My father and I visited Yazoor after the war in 1967. It is too

difficult for one to describe his feelings the moment he seeshis birthplace destroyed. I found my house damaged but

there were still the pomegranate and sycamore trees. My wife

and children were with me picked the pomegranate and said,“This is ours.” I told them, “This pomegranate was planted by

your grandfather.”

We had a piece of land which was called Abu Al-Maiz. When

my father saw our hometown, he got confused; he couldn'trecognize the location of our land. He asked me, “Where is

our land?” I said, “Isn't this Muhammad Abu Fudeh's waterpump? Therefore this must be Abul Maiz.” My father agreed

with my conclusion.

We didn't stay long at Yazoor. My father lost his house, his

land, and his money there. I did not want him to see and sufferanymore. In Yazoor, we found many Iraqis, and Yemenis who

would say that it was not their fault what had happened. The

people occupying our house refused to let us look around itand this prompted us to leave.

When we went back to Nablus, my father suffered a heart



86

attack. I looked at his face which was blue and said to him,

“Our condition is much better than many others,” Tragicallythis heart attack took his life and this was a terribly sad time

for our family.

I was working at the time in the Green Market in Nablus, andI used to go to Tel-Aviv to buy some goods. Whenever I was

traveling through Yazoor, I hid my head between my legs so

as not to see it. I didn't want to glance at the land in which we

used to grow corn, cucumber, tomatoes and eggplants.

I swear to God even if they gave me Nablus and the West

Bank, I would not agree to this as compensation for my home

land. I would prefer to live in a tent in Yazoor and I wish to beburied there.

***



87

Abu Saleem Jibril74 years oldOriginal home: Yazoor village/ Jaffa

Current address: Al-Ein Refugee Camp / Nablus

It snowed over us and we used to go out from the tents in order to remove the snow by our hands in order to keep the

tents from falling down.

We used to listen to the News Broadcasting Station which

came from Cyprus. The broadcast was British and it spoke inparticular about our area. However, we were so close to Jaffa

that we did not need to hear the news about it from the radio.

We were practically one of the suburbs of Jaffa and we couldsee any explosions that took place there.

We were building our hopes on the Rescue Army but they letus down. They said that they had come to liberate Palestine.

When the news was announced that the Rescue Army wasarriving, everybody’s spirits was raised as we thought they

would save us. In general, when you are in trouble and peoplecome to help, you naturally feel better.

I expected the war would reach us because Yazoor was on

the main road between Jaffa and Jerusalem. In addition,

there were Jewish colonies such as Niter and Moleedit thatwere only 2km from us. The Palestinian village of Salama was

on the southern side and Hazboon was on the western side.

Jaffa, Salama, and Yazoor were almost occupied at the same

time. However, I did not expect to become a refugee. I did not

think about that at all because we knew that the Zionists were



88

gangs while the Arab armies should exceed them in number.

It is incredible! We had seven Arab armies and we relied onthem, but they let us down. Before they arrived, the youth of

the village guarded Yazoor in shifts. If any trouble happened,they defended and fought.

The intensity of the situation increased the level of good will

and the facilities provided by the citizens. Every one paid

everything they owned to buy a gun. Despite all the troubles,

the people went to their lands to work. They devoutly believed

that they would not have to leave their country. I saw the Jewsseveral times while they were passing into the village. They

did not fire at us as they were only passing by on the main

road.

The story of the seven Hagana members who were killed by

the old people showed that not only the young fought. They

attacked a car of seven Hagana men and killed them at the

entrance of Yazoor.

The prices of the fuel oil and kerosene rose. The price of a50-piaster tin had become 10 pounds which was a significant

amount of money. Most children sacrificed themselves and

some even lost their lives. Some youth who owned tractors

and cars tried to help and would attempt to bring back fuel

which was very difficult.

Many battles took place, on one occasion I saw a Jewish gang

get out of their car and run after a group of Arab youth. Theycaught them and killed them at the door of Al-Haj Khamis. My

God, I was still a boy when I saw this. The Jewish gangs were

wicked people and they did not want any truce. They wanted



89

to take control of the whole country.

I still recall Abu Ali who became a martyr and Al-Haj Abu

Safiah who was killed at night by an act of deception. Theytricked them by saying that they were Arabs and they killed

him near the irrigating mill of his farm. Around this time theybombed the orchards of Al-Dracherma which caused many

more deaths. There were many people from our village who

were working in Jaffa. When the government house was

bombed there, two or three people from our village lost their

lives in that explosion.

I was scared of being shot by a careless bullet from the

machine guns whilst I was waking my dad who was sleepingon the roof. Everybody was seized with fear. The fighting

continued and Beit Dajan village was occupied before us

while we were practically blockaded in the village. We wanted

to escape but it was not easy.

My family left almost one week before me as the situation was

getting worse and everything was confused. I heard that noone remained in Beit Dajan which was concerning. My mother

did not take anything with her when she left except some

money. My father carried some furniture and some friends

helped take our sheep.

The fighting was getting more severe and the Jews bombed

the ice factory in Yazoor. One night, another attack was

launched against the village and we believed the British hadbeen involved in this attack. My cousin Al-Haj Othman Jibril

was Mukhtar, (Head of the village), and he went to speak to

the British people. Al-Haj Othman had touched the British



90

machine guns and felt that they were hot. So he said to the

British, “You are the ones who are attacking us with the Jews.”They said to him, “Get out from here or we will kill you.” We

were convinced they were collaborating with the Jews.

The Jews used to come into the orchards at night where theywould fire bombs and shoot at us. We found cartridges and

bombs on the ground in the morning. What could a person

say? One wished he was dead at that time. One day I found

they had left a new type of bomb and I decided to defuse it. I

pulled it apart from the back and removed the capsule, then Iclosed it and threw it away and it did not explode.

Every village was autonomous as we were unable to coordinatewith other villages and towns. We were told about that the

Rescue Army was arriving which we believed was excellent

news. When they arrived they started shelling Tel Aviv with a

manual canon that they had. However after they had fired a

few rounds they packed up and left. Then it was like hell thatnight because of what they had done earlier in the day. We did

not give up though and I think that Mohammad Alarddah andI were the last people who left Yazoor. We were so exhausted

when that day came. Our village surrendered in the same way

as many of the other villages in the area. It meant that we left

Jaffa in a worst position once Yazoor had surrendered.

We departed to Lydda during the harvest time shortly before

Ramadan. At this time of the year, if anyone walked among the

plants, they would not be seen. We did not spend a long timein Lydda. We had relatives in Nablus including the second wife

of my father, and so we decided to go there. When we were

driven out, my mother was asked to go with her brothers and



91

sisters to Gaza, but she refused and said, “How can I leave

my children in Nablus?” This meant that she was separatedfrom the rest of her family who remained in Gaza.

When we reached Nablus, we entered from the side of the

dark old city, Al-Yasminah Quarter. I could not believe we hadleft from the sea shore to this dark, depressing place. I used

to ask my mother why there were no roofed streets like the

ones in Jaffa. We lived in Algazaliah School at the beginning

and we met some people from Jaffa there.

We stayed in the school for a while but it was very crowded.

So my brothers and I agreed to leave the school. Originally

we were a group of 8 and we were the first people who wentinto the refugee camp. We set up tents and we stayed in them

for two or three years. It snowed over us and we used to go

out from the tents in order to remove the snow by our hands in

order to keep the tents from falling down. Later on the rest of

the people started to follow us and others joined us from thenorth. Many people had buried their money back in Yazoor

and some people returned some time later to retrieve it.

I returned to my village after the occupation of 1967. Our two-

storey house had been demolished and they had turned it

into a garden. There was an archeological site behind our

house, called Al-bobareyiah in which Moshe Dyane fell downand broke his hand while they were excavating the ruins. It

was said that it was a street, 40 meters in length under the

ground. It even had shops and it still exists until today.

I found the school as it was but they had demolished a large

part of our graveyard. My family were buried their, and half



92

of their graves had broken tomb stones. There were some

tombs had survived unscathed and I found the mosque in itsplace but it was in bad condition.

It broke my heart to see my village in such a situation. I felt as

though I had been punched in the gut after I had seen thatthree quarters of my village had been demolished and that I

was now a stranger amongst the foreign people living there.

My brother came from Europe and visited me for thirty days.

He told me that he wanted to visit Yazoor, so we traveled thereevery day for the whole of his stay. On one such day we came

into contact with one of the Iraqi Jews living there, and he

asked us in Arabic, “Why do you come here every day? Ihave built two floors on this house and I am going to build

another one. So what are you doing here?” I told him that

Yazoor was our village and I pointed at the garden where our

house used to stand and said, “This where I used to live”. The

Jew responded, “Two days ago, another man came and alsosaid that”. I told him he had been an older brother of ours who

had come to visit the house earlier in the week.

On a different day a relative came with us so he could see his

old house. When we were in Yazoor he thought he recognized

his house but I told him that this was not his, I told him, “This

is the house of Haj Abed Alaziz Tyim. If you want to seeyour house, come with me. I think I can remember where

your house used to be.” I walked with him and my memory

started to return. We entered into a corridor and I said to him,“Come here, this is your house. Here is Beit Glood, which is

the square that overlooks the Al-bobareyiah.” The man looked

carefully at a palm tree of our neighbors. He said, “My God!



93

You have a good memory. It is true that this is the palm tree of

our neighbors.”

While we were talking, the Iraqi Jew and his wife came out andwelcomed us by saying “Hello my friend.” My relative told him

that he was living in his house. The Jew responded by askinghim what he was talking about. This led to my relative saying,

“You are living in my house. Come! I can describe the house

without entering it.” He told the Jew about every thing in the

house and even the color of the marble. He described what

was drawn on the ceiling, as they had decorated the ceiling inthe past. The Jew said, “My God you are telling the truth.” He

let us enter our house and said to us, “I agree that this is your

house, I admit it. However, where is my house in Baghdad?Take me back to it.” He was a very hospitable man.

Our taxi driver, who was with us, had previously been a

taxi driver to Baghdad. His name was Haj Mohammad and

he asked the Jew “Can you tell me where you are from inBaghdad?” Haj Mohammed began to name some streets and

roads in Baghdad until the Jew suddenly told him, “Stop myfriend this is the name of my neighborhood. How is Baghdad?”

The Jew’s eyes were filled with tears while his wife started to

cry. He repeated, “How is Baghdad my friend? I was living

there, I miss it. By God, you can have your country; just let us

return to Baghdad. God will punish both Arabs and Jews whocaused this situation.”

After we had left his house we managed to lose our way, sowe stopped a car to ask for directions. We asked a man about

the road to Natania and Tulkarem. He was also an Iraqi Jew

and he said, “Welcome my friends; it is not possible for you



94

to leave because you are my guests.” We replied, “Thank you

very much but we must leave so can you show us the way.”He said, “No way, my father was a sheik in Iraq, I cannot leave

you.” Finally, he agreed to show us the way.

Every time I returned, I felt as if my heart was bleeding. Thedeserted streets of Jaffa only highlighted the vibrant past that

I still recall. Jaffa was busy and crowded just like a beehive,

now the shops are closed and deserted. We used to go into

Al-Shabab beach, where the youth would meet from all over

Palestine. We found it empty and sad. My God, It was like anightmare!

I do not regret that I saw it because it would have been a bigmistake if I had not. One has to come back and visit his village

in order to remind his children of it. I still have the registration

papers for the land but the Jews have built houses on it now.

Nevertheless, the shop of my father is still there and so is the

shop of my cousin, Ahmad Jibril. There were some housesthat the Jews decided to take for themselves, but the rest of

the houses they had demolished. They had even uprootedmany of the trees from the farms and I had the misfortune of

witnessing some people urinating there now.

The graves of my father, family, cousins and ancestors were

all at Yazoor. They were there, not here in Nablus. We are thebranches that belong to these roots. When we went back to

our town, we recited some verses of the Holy Qur’an on the

remaining graves. It was enraging to know that even al ImamAli’s shrine was closed and the Jewish rabbis were staying

there.



95

The last time I visited Yazoor, I still remember the spinning

factory which was owned by a Syrian man called Sulatah. It isstill working but currently run by Jews. Not only did we have

agriculture but we also had industry. It’s impossible to forgetthe landmarks of the country. Now when I visit Yazoor, I let my

memory reel back fifty years and I quickly remember all thepaths which I’ll never forget.

***



97

region.

My uncle died during the war, his name was Said Al-Katoni.

He fought until he was captured and killed. Hassan Salamehtook the responsibility of defending our village and other

neighboring communities like Salama village and Jaffa.

Unfortunately our village ended up being captured very easily.

I did not see the Jews the moment they entered the village

because I had already left the village with my family, although

my father had stayed. My father said the Jews had distributedpamphlets by planes the moment they entered the village,

which meant the village was surrounded. When the Jews

entered our village, my father said he ran to the closet, tookeverything from it and left immediately. Few fighters stayed

the moment the Jews entered the village; a number of them

met martyrdom and the rest fled.

I remember a man called Abu-Omar, who lost one of hischildren in the confusion created by the departure. Fortunately

the child was found by some kind people who took him withthem to Amman. In Amman they managed to find out the name

and place of his family and sent him to meet up with them.

We also left our grandfather in the village as he was old

and very stubborn. When the Jews came they captured himand ordered him to leave. The Jews put him on the back of

a donkey and told him to leave. They gave him his wooden

slippers to take with him. My grandfather decided to burythem in a nearby field and he anticipated on retrieving them

when he returned.



98

After Al-Khayria had been captured we went to the village

named Bedia. On our way to this village we rented a vanto carry our personnel belongings and household items. I

remember my grandmother moaning, “They will take the fertilevalley and give us the mountain.” We chose Bedia because

we had a relative there who helped us.

We then traveled to the village of Al-Zawia and stayed there

for one month before heading to Nablus. In Nablus we bought

a burlap cloth and prepared makeshift tents for us to live in.

The weather was cold and it started snowing, so we were sentalong with many other refugees to a place called Yakhor. This

happened to be a large store that belonged to Sheikh Helme

Al-Edresei and it served the purpose of protecting us from theharsh winter elements.

After a while we ended up in a neighborhood in Nablus called

Ein Mera. We settled there and built a house out of stones.

The door was made of tin which was closed using of a pieceof wire. In 1954 we left this house and lived in Al-Ein Refugee

Camp. I was the first one in our family to get a proper job inNablus. I worked in the Soap Factory for a while and after this

I sold yogurt.

We visited our village after 1967 with one of my uncles and his

wife. When we arrived at our farm we found an animal farm inits place. I told the Jews there that this used to be our orchard

but they were not interested.

Do you know how our village looks like now? They bring their

garbage and throw it there. They only place of importance

that remains is the cemetery. What do you expect me to say



99

when I see our village like this? My sons know that they are

from Al-Khayria. Our village was captured on the 28th of April1948 and I always remind them of this.

***



100

Mahmoud Barakat20 years old in 1948Original home: Yazoor / Jaffa

Current address: Al-Ein Refugee Camp-Nablus

I have not returned to Yazoor and I will never do that. How could I go back to my land and house to find that my enemy

is still there?

I was only 20 years of age and still not married in 1948. We

used to follow the news the traditional way and were not inneed of radios. We were situated on the main road that ran

from Jaffa through Jerusalem to Gaza and divided the town

into two parts. The road went from Yazoor to the village ofBeit Dajan, then to Lydda, Ramlah and Bab al Wad. Heading

further south it passed through the colonies and reached

Gaza.

Originally the Jews from the neighboring colony sent messagesto the families of Yazoor to accept us as neighbors asking for a

ceasefire. We too wanted to cast aside any problem betweenus. However we also knew that they were compelled to ask

for a ceasefire with us in order to pass through Yazoor so that

they could bring in supports and reinforcements. When they

asked why we didn’t accept we told them it was because of

this reason.

From the moment the English people started to talk about

partition and their intention to pull out, skirmishes started totake place. I still recall that skirmishes between us began as

early as 1936. However I never expected that things would

lead to Nakba. The Jews would pass through on the main



101

road near us. We were firing at each other throughout the

night. Not a single day would pass without skirmishes. Almostfifteen or twenty persons from Yazoor lost their lives during the

skirmishes, including my uncle.

The rebels said that they wanted 25 pounds from each familyto buy weapons. People were buying the weapons from their

own savings. The cartridge clip was about five pounds. Some

people sold the jewelry of their women to buy weapons. They

bought the remains of some German guns from the First World

War. When one fired, the bullet would either kill its shooter orfail to explode. It was all staged. It was a British, Arab plot and

all Arabs were colonized then.

From the beginning of the Arab revolt in 1936 until 1948,

the British used to shoot any Arab if they had arrested him

carrying any sort of gun cartridge. In contrast the Jews were

trained on how to use the weapons with the attendance of the

British. The first high commissioner who came to Palestinewas a Zionist.

Working on the land was still continuing until the last moment.

Everybody went to their land with a gun on their shoulder.

Every town was self-sufficient in defending itself. The situation

was just fine, as long as working on the land continued.

The Jews had no opportunity to enter; they would get engaged

in skirmishes and shooting at us from Tel- Aviv and Niter

colony. The Jews did scare people, particularly, when themassacre of Deir Yassen happened. We were not frightened

In Yazoor, even when we heard the news of Deir Yaseen. On

the contrary, we remained for two or three weeks in our village



102

after the massacre.

A group of people came from the neighboring villages in

order to help us; but they were merely individuals. We keptfighting until the Arab Rescue Army arrived. Apparently the

Rescue Army had come to rule the area and fight for us. Thewhole Rescue Army, which came to our village, consisted of

just four people in a jeep. They said, “Show us the high areas

of the town.” Later on, the rest of them came and this made

us feel safer. I remember a woman from our village started to

sing and utter thrilling cries of joy. Unfortunately, the RescueArmy was useless.

My father was a leader and when the Rescue Army came tothe town, they inquired about his name. He told them that his

name was Abu Saleh. They demanded that my father show

them the high places, which he did since they would take

ambush positions there. They told him that he needed to take

all the inhabitants outside the town. My father suggestedthat they would let the children and the women leave while

the armed men would stay. They said, “We don’t want anyarmed person to stay here. We order you to leave and we

will manage.” My uncle, Jaber used to say during the exit,

“If any one decides to go out, I will shoot him dead. All of you

should stay here. You have to protect your land and honor.”

Nevertheless we had no choice and we left as the RescueArmy instructed.

The Rescue Army did not come to liberate a country; the local

people were the only ones who carried out the resistance.After we had left a senior person who stayed behind said that

the Rescue Army stayed only two more days, shelled three

bombs on Tel Aviv and then left.



103

Someone from Lydda rented a piece of land in Yazoor for

cultivation purposes. He irrigated his plants by using our ownirrigating mill. When the Rescue Army came and told us to

leave, half of my family went with that man. Some people wentup to Lydda, and others to Ramlah.

First, we went from Yazoor to Lydda by foot and stayed there

for a short time. It was the summer when a friend of my father

came and told him “Abu Saleh, we have a farm of cactus in

Qibbia. You can take your family and stay there for two months.

Afterwards, you can come back to Lydda if you wish.” Therewere no skirmishes in Lydda and Qibbia at this time and the

situation was good.

We were then told that the Jews had come at night and had

occupied Yazoor and they had cut off the supplies to the village

of Salama as they both were on the main road. Later, the Jews

occupied Lydda and so we remained in Qibbia as guests.

We had left all our furniture, clothes, and other belongings inLydda. We did not take anything because we were told that

we would return. Therefore we lost all our possessions whenLydda was occupied.

All the people of Yazoor were scattered and every one

managed the situation according to their own circumstances.

We spent two months in Qibbia, before leaving to the villageof Deir Ammar and then we moved on to Nablus.

When we came to Nablus, my father refused to live with anyof his friends there or even with his uncles in the village of

Alzawiah, such was his pride. Therefore, we made a housing

unit and stayed in it for a period. Later on, when the tents



104

were made, people started to go to Balata refugee camp

and others to Jericho. Some people lived for ten years in thetents of the refugee camp. The first year in the tents there was

heavy snow. The people of Nablus were incredibly hospitableand they helped to accommodate many of us. People lived in

schools and mosques for almost five or six months. The morewealthy people could afford to rent houses in Nablus.

Many stories were narrated in the camp about the panic that

took place when the people were deported from Lydda. We

were told that every one tried to escape in any way they couldfrom Lydda. It was said that a woman carried a pillow with her

instead of carrying her baby from utter panic and confusion.

Some people were killed while they were escaping and othersdied because of thirst. Parents had to leave their children. In

other words, the battle of Lydda sounded just like doomsday.

When the Jews invaded again in 1967, which meant we could

now work in Israel, the Head of our family gathered all thepeople of the camp to speak to them. He told them if any

woman wanted to work in Israel, they must leave the campimmediately and they would not be allowed to live here. The

males were the only ones who were allowed to work in Israel.

One woman ran away and she did not dare come back.

I have not returned to Yazoor and I will never do that. Howcould I go back to my land and house to find that my enemy is

still there? I would stand at the door of my house like a stranger.

My father went there and saw it and when he returned he diedfrom a heart attack.

***



105

Mohammad Ahmad Abu Eisha18 years old in 1948Original home: Al-Sufsaf village/ Safad

Current address: Al-Ein Refugee Camp/ Nablus

My children and I were waiting eagerly at the taxi rank. When she arrived, I found myself embracing her in the street and

crying.

In the last few days before our departure, it was difficult to

get a newspaper and there were no radios in our village. Ianticipated that the war would turn into a catastrophe. This

view was reinforced after the city of Safad, which was just 6

kilometers away, was captured. We lived in the village of Al-Sufsaf and were told that every family should buy a gun and

cartridges. We organized shifts so somebody was always

guarding at night and we dug many tunnels. The fightersonce detained a Jewish woman who spoke Arabic.

Most people had no idea how to use a gun and because of

this one man accidentally shot his own brother. There wasno training in place on how to use them which was a major

problem. The Jews did not approach us at this time because

they were preoccupied in Safad.

After Safad was captured, the Rescue Army came to our villageand they brought a canon with them. Some of the fighters in

the village were allowed to fight alongside the Rescue Army.

In all there were more than one hundred fighters attempting todefend our village. The presence of the Rescue Army gave us

a real sense of safety and security. The relationship between

the fighters and the Rescue Army was strong.



106

The main reason the Rescue Army had come to our village

was because it was strategically important for the Jews.During this time we continued to live as normally as possible;

we continued planting tobacco, grapes, figs, olive trees andwheat. One day the shepherds found some empty bottles of

beer and weapons; it was evidence that the Jews had beenon our territory. The Rescue Army placed markers every few

meters in the west to highlight the places where the Jews had

been walking.

We fought bravely to defend our village and we weredetermined to stop any forces from entering. We felt well

prepared as we constructed many trenches and barriers. On

one occasion the Jews kidnapped two girls from the villagebut thankfully they returned them unharmed. The fighting had

now begun to take place daily and the Jews managed to kill

one or two of our fighters hoping that this would force us to

evacuate. Unfortunately this prompted the Rescue Army to

leave our village and when they left our hope went with them.The Jews had now started firing mortars at us from Safad.

In the final battle the Jews used modern planes which firedmissiles at us, and we had no anti aircraft missiles to defend

ourselves with. The village was finally captured after a strong

defense.

We gathered and hid in two houses in the north of the villagewith about three hundred citizens gathered in each house. It

was said that to die with people is much more merciful. We

stayed there till sunrise; a person came to us and said thatthe village was captured and that the Jews had took it. We

raised white clothes and covers above our heads as a sign of

surrender; three Jewish militia soldiers came close to us and



107

said, “Go back inside.” We managed to escape through the

windows and ran across the fields until we reached the villageof Yaroon.

When we were fleeing from the village, I had my niece with me

who was just a little girl. During the total bedlam that developedshe tragically slipped from my grasp and she became lost

among the people running out of fear. We spent a long time

looking for her but without any success. I felt terrible about

this and it was one of my biggest regrets in life.

We stayed in Yaroon for one day where we told the shocking

news that fifteen people had been killed in our village. We

were told that the Jews had ordered fifteen people to stand ina row and then opened fire on them. After the execution the

Jews dragged the corpses to a hole called Al-Ain that was

a huge whole, 70 meters in length that was to be used as

reservoir for irrigation purposes. The old people in our village

then had to bury the bodies. The following day we were toldthe Jews had gathered another fifteen men and killed them

and also did this on the third day as well. Once the Jews hadfinished they had turned 49 people into Martyrs. They had

killed every one who they believed was able to carry a gun.

After leaving Yaroon our next destination was the village of

Bent Jebail. After an extremely long walk with a few morestops along the way we finally ended up in the Al-Borj refugee

camp in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

Life was difficult there as the salary of a Palestinian worker

was one fifth that of his Lebanese counterpart. Due to this

discrepancy I decided to return to the West Bank. That is



108

how I turned up in Nablus and now live in the Al-Ein refugee

camp. To reach Nablus I had to travel through Jordan and thisjourney took me a long time.

Many years had passed when one day the Palestinian

Authority called me and said that there was a woman whohad contacted them and wanted to speak with me. I told them

to put her on the line to me and I was immediately greeted by

the woman who said, “How are you uncle?” and she started

to cry, immediately afterwards. I could not believe it, I was

so happy. She continued, “I married someone who worksfor the Palestinian Authority and I returned to Palestine with

him. Now I am living in Gaza and I desperately want to see

you. We decided to meet each other in Qalqilya city becausethis is the town where the taxis stop when bringing people

from Gaza. My children and I were waiting eagerly at the taxi

rank. When she arrived, I found myself embracing her in the

street and crying. It was a fantastic feeling as she told about

everything that had happened to her since we split.

In 1983, I returned to the village to find it demolished. Myhouse, my property, and every thing were gone. I stumbled

around without being able to speak a single word. I wanted

to find out what had happened in my village. Some strange

people were living there now and I felt uncomfortable taking

photos. I could not believe that they had even chopped downthe trees. Everything in my village was destroyed. My village

had suffered the same fate as every other village that had

resisted and been destroyed.***



109

Om Issa Abu SereyyehBorn in 1916Original home: Shekh Emwanes, Yafa District

Current address: Askar Refugee Camp, Nablus City

I do have hope that I will be able to go home to my village and this thought does not leave my mind

We owned a 100-dunum farm, which we planted with wheat

and other cereals and vegetables, but we were forced to

leave it without harvesting our crops.

For a time the Palestinians and Jews were like one people,

There was a sizeable Jewish minority but we lived togetherin peace, as these were not the same as the Jews who came

from the West. Those who came from abroad were militants

and racists. They formed the Hagana and Stern militia gangsin Palestine, which started killing us and forced us to leave

our homes.

We did not bring the title deeds to our land with us, as we wereafraid that we would lose them on the way and we were certain

that we would be returning soon. So we hid the contracts in

the ground and covered them with sand and soil. We did not

take anything with us – I didn’t even take my slippers.

Some people collaborated with the British occupation. They

came with the British soldiers. They would sit in the soldiers’

armored vehicles with their faces covered and they wouldidentify activists for the soldiers. The people they singled out

would be detained by the British.



110

All the members of our family left our village. Jews were killing

people indiscriminately. We left with our children, in the rainand with the Jews shooting at us. We headed for Qalqilya

town; everybody had to look after themselves as there wasnobody to organize us. After Qalqilya we went to Salfit town

and after that to Nablus city. In Nablus we lived in cavessurrounded by snakes and hyenas; we didn’t sleep properly

because we were afraid of them.

While we were living in the caves, UNRWA built a camp for the

refugees. We moved there after living in the caves for threeyears. We were given one room to shelter six people. Once

my sons were able to earn money we were able to improve

our room by adding more rooms and installing electricity anda water supply.

Many people were slaughtered as they fled from their villages,

and many became lost and separated from their families. Many

went to Jordan or Kuwait, even though they had nowhere tolive there. All anyone could think about was escaping from the

Jewish militias, because of what we had heard about them.But if I had known I would become a refugee and unable to

return home, I would have stayed in my village, regardless of

what might have happened to me. I would like to go back to

my home village and to die there.

My son took me to visit our village after the war of 1967. I

remember I had been building a new house before the

deportation of 1948; I had been fixing the windows andapplying the finishing touches. I went to see my house; I

found new Jewish immigrants living there, who had moved

from Iraq. I told the lady there that this was my house and she



112

Abdul Qader Yousef Al-HaBorn in 1938Original home: Qaqon village, Tulkarem


Some of the villagers had built new homes but they didn’t get chance to enjoy them, as they had been living in them for only

one or two years when they left

I fled with all my family members, my parents and the rest of

the villagers. Our village had fertile land and we had a fieldnext to it; the Mediterranean Sea was just eight kilometres

away. We had troubles with Jews for over five years before the

deportation. We tried not to flee, but in the end they broughtarmed militia with tanks and a large number of armed people

and launched a sustained attack on our village; they wanted

to clear all the people from our village.

They wanted our village in particular because it was in animportant location strategically. We thought about what we

should do and we decided we had to evacuate the women andchildren; only the young men stayed behind. We had some

military support from neighbouring villages, but we couldn’t

really do much against the Jewish militia, as they were so

well-armed. So in the afternoon we left our village and went to

stand in the fields around the neighbouring village, waiting tosee what would happen.

We already knew that the Jewish militia was coming to attackus with a view to occupying our land. So during the night,

around Midnight in fact, the men of the armed resistance left

the village too. By the way, we had lost around 50 members of



113

the Iraqi army and Palestinian resistance by this stage. These

men had been defending the village while the Jewish militiasshelled it. We had had more than 100 Iraqi soldiers in our

village, and we had built tunnels around the village as well.

The resistance had been buying weapons in Syria andsmuggling them into the country. One single rifle cost 100

pounds – and that was without ammunition. The Palestinian

pound was worth quite a lot of money then: one pound was

worth around four or five US dollars. So we would share the

cost of the rifle with another family; we had to defend ourvillage within our limited budget.

We expected that the situation we lived in the five yearsbefore 1948 would lead to the deportation, because we

had had conflict, clashes, and many other troubles with the

Jewish militia. They would build a colony with a checkpoint,

they would kill some people and we would avenge the deaths

by doing the same.

The British mandate allowed Jews to strengthen their positions;through the Balfour Declaration, the British made it possible

for the Jews to settle in Palestine. The Jews did their best and

used all manner of tricks to displace us from our country. The

British gave the Jews their national home in our homeland.

The Jews are still using the same strategy and trying to deportus from the West Bank – they settled here through force and

murder.

The first missile to hit our village did no damage – it landed

outside the town. But when people went there to see the

damage, the Jewish militia shelled them, killing and wounding



114

almost 50 people. This forced people to flee. We did not see

the Jews when they entered the village, but the men in theresistance did.

We had been living in peace in our village; the land was fertile

and we had been able to live well off it. Some of the villagershad built new homes but they didn’t get chance to enjoy them,

as they had been living in them for only one or two years when

they left.

I did not go back to my village, but some people did – they wouldsneak back in at night to collect some of their possessions.

We did not carry anything with us of our clothes—we left

everything. We left our money and land.

Many refugees lived in caves and tents. The tents were hot

in summer and miserable in winter. There was no water,

electricity, or toilets; the sewers were open. People got rained

on in winter and sometimes it snowed. Then the UNRWA builtsome units for refugees… each family had one unit but we

didn’t get an electricity supply until 1963. Some donationscame to the camps from westerners but we didn’t have a

piped water supply – we had to struggle carrying water until

one was installed. Even when we got an electricity supply,

people were too poor to pay for it, or for medical treatment.

After the war of 1967, I went to work in Israel, which was

Palestine, but I did not go to visit my village. My parents also

did not visit it after the deportation. I did not like to see itoccupied and until this day I dream of going there and seeing

it liberated from occupation. I would be prepared to walk it

there – it wouldn’t take more than a day. I know the road; it



115

would take only a few hours to get there.

We keep in touch with our neighbors who became refugees.

They went to different places – some went to Kuwait, others toother places in the Gulf and Jordan.

As for us, well, when we first left we went to Shweikeh village

near Tulkarem. Then we went to Burqa village and we stayed

there for two years. People there supported us, but there

were no jobs. We stayed with friends of my father’s for seven

months. They took care of us, but we had to continue lookingfor work. We moved to Tulkarem for three years. Life was hard:

there was no farming there. We existed but we didn’t live; we

had to rely on the UNRWA for food, and we only survivedbecause of what we got from them.

Then we moved to Nablus and we stayed there until 1960. We

stayed in the Old City where there was no electricity and we

couldn’t really afford the rent of the flat. We had to wait till 1955for jobs in the city, after people started to move to the Arab

Gulf to work. Many died in the desert, but those who managedto get to Kuwait were able to provide their families with a

monthly allowance. This enabled people to build houses and

improve their living conditions in the West Bank. The situation

continued in this way while we were under the rule of Jordan,

even until 1967; when we saw the Jewish militia that becamethe Israeli army occupies the rest of Palestine.

In 1967, the Israeli occupation authority opened its civiladministration and imposed taxes on us. They attacked

the commercial businesses, companies, shops, and stores

and this affected life under occupation. Many people were



116

detained, then people started to work in Israel as employees.

They went to work in their lands, but not as owners, asemployees.

***



117

Abu Khader HamdanBorn in 1928Original home: Salameh, Yaffa District

Current address: Askar Refugee Camp/ Nablus

We fled immediately, taking to the mountains. It was very hot on the mountains and many Palestinians died there

I lived and worked in my home village, Salameh, which was

less than six kilometers from Tel Aviv. There was just a field

separating us from the outskirts of Tel Aviv, but the relationshipbetween us and the Jews was fine. The Jews were expanding

Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv is a relatively new city, it was built on Palestinian

land called Tel Al-Rabe, and it was part of Yaffa city.

Things started to change after November 1947, when the UN

decided to devide Palestine between Palestinians and Jews.This caused conflict between the residents and the British

Mandate’s policy, which was biased in favor of the Jews, didnothing to make things better.

For five months we resisted the Jewish militia, from November

until the spring of 1948. But the Jews were getting more and

more weapons from Czechoslovakia. It meant that we were

fighting with just guns while they had mortars and missiles.

The Jewish militia shelled Salameh. As they were committing

massacres in the villages, we decided to flee – on foot. The

Jewish militia did not close the exit from our village and we lefton 17th April 1948. It was during the orange season and we

had managed to harvest our oranges for a month before we

were deported. Our village was far from the truce line so it was



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so hard for us to sneak back in order to continue collecting

our oranges.

We went first to the town of Sarafand, which was on the border.But then the Jews occupied Sarafand too, even though it was

supposed to lie outside the border of their state. So we wentto Lydda city, where the Jews committed an atrocity in July

1948. [Gathering older men at the mosque and opening fire on

them]. On our third day in Lydda we heard Jews announcing

on the speakers: “Get out of the city immediately”. We fled

immediately, taking to the mountains. It was extremely hot onthe mountains and many Palestinians died there. But the Jews

would not allow us to use the main street; they drove us into

the mountains to die there. We went from village to another, along, long journey.

I visited Yaffa city after the occupation of the West Bank in

1967. Some refugees were afraid of visiting their villages or

seeing them. Many refugees died after they saw their villages– they got sick or had heart attacks. My village became one

of the neighborhoods of Tel Aviv. I could visit Yaffa but I didnot visit Salameh village. My friends who did visit it told me

Salameh is not there any more – it has been removed from the

map.

***



119

Fatmeh Daoud Abdul RahmanOriginal home: Mzera`, Lydda CityCurrent address: Askar Refugee Camp, Nablus

The Jewish militia invaded our village in armored vehicles

and destroyed homes causing people to flee

I used to get news each day from my husband, Who would go

to the coffee shop where there was a radio then come back

to update us on the latest developments. We knew that some

sort of evacuation was planned under the British mandate.We thought we would end up with our independence but we

were wrong – our land was given to Jews instead. We cried

and prayed to God for that not to happen. We were looking forindependence from the British and we were frustrated when

they were replaced by the new colonizers.

Before the Jews arrived in our village an English soldier arrived

and told us that we should leave for another place and thatthey would stay long enough for this to happen safely. An old

man stopped some of the people who were leaving and toldthem not to leave as it was a trick that the British wanted to

empty the village to allow the Jews to occupy it. He managed

to convince some of them not to leave. My husband was one

of these and because of this he decided to stay longer.

The Jews put bombs inside barrels and exploded them in the

Palestinian streets and neighborhoods to scare us and force

us to leave; people stayed in their homes, and many of themdid not had enough food for days.

Somebody called Muhammad Salah was wounded in the field



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and he was stranded alone there. He managed to reach the

farm and was taken to the hospital in Ramleh town. Anotherperson called Abed was killed when he was climbing over a

tank and a Jewish female soldier shot him in the chest. I sawthe Jewish troops invading our village; they did not leave the

tanks as they were afraid to leave them. Some fighters camefrom Deir Ghassaneh village and Majdal and Quliah towns

to help us. They were fighting on the mountain but people

were afraid because they were listening to the rumors spread

about the Deir Yassin massacre.

Somebody called Abu Kayed was warning those planning to

emigrate against leaving, but I gathered my children and took

with me some pieces of bread and a gallon of water and wentto my father’s house, which was downtown. The Jewish militia

invaded our village in armored vehicles and destroyed homes

causing people to flee. We escaped while they were shelling

and surrounding the village. The scene of the shelling was

horrible; people were scared, especially after what they haveheard about the massacre of Deir Yassin. People were trying

to carry some of their belongings and fled to the neighboringvillages of Marj Ubaid and Ras Tananeh. We stayed without

shelters for hours and hours, at a time when we were fasting

because it was the holy month of Ramadan. It was too hot

and we were extremely thirsty so the Sheikh told us to break

our fast in order to survive. We would shelter under the trees,because of the heat but also because of the shelling. The

Jews would follow us and shoot at us. We stayed in these

conditions of horror and fear for three days.

We went to Deir Ghassaneh, where we lived for nine years

in a wooden hut. People from other villages gave us bread



121

and sheltered us for a while, but many of our neighbors fled

to different parts of the country; I moved three times before Iarrived in the refugee camp of Askar.

***



122

Khalid Rashid MansorBorn in 1932Original home: Ejzim, Haifa

Current address: Jenin Refugee Camp, Jenin

A woman was crying and screaming because she realized she was carrying a cushion instead of her baby when she

had to flee

I was born in the village of Ejzim and I was 16 at the time of the

Nakba. I studied at the Arab School of Haifa, which suffereda lot of damage and has now been converted to a bar. It was

located in a street called Albasha.

My family left the village to work in Haifa in 1938 and stayed

there until April 21 1948. My family went to work in Haifa

because the job opportunities were good there: there werefactories and economic associations, and companies such

as the cement factory and the oil filtration factory. We fled toAkka city during the war, but we left there when we had no

more guns with which to fight.

I kept up with the news through the Head of the village who

got the news from the radio. I’ll never forget hearing about the

massacre at Deir Yassin. We were very sad about what had

happened, but we were very scared, too. I expected the warwould turn out as it did because we were informed by our

teacher that Jews would like to occupy our land and establish

their Jewish state here.

The peasants of Ejzim village had a big role in resisting the

Jewish militia in Haifa city, as well as in the village. They bought



123

guns and rifles from Egypt and Syria. The British Mandate

authorities facilitated the emigration of the Palestinians; around50 families from our village left from the port of Haifa. We went

to Akka and then to Sor and Saida in Southern Lebanon, beforereaching Syria. Then we went back to Tantorah village, near

Haifa, and back to Ejzim Village to continue the resistance forfour more months. The Iraqi Army provided us with guns but

they stopped that once the Rhodes Ceasefire was signed,

so we were forced to leave. 15 days later the Jewish militia

entered the village.

The colonies neighboring our village tried to make agreements

with us, but we refused. The Jewish militia occupied Tantorah

village and killed around 250 of its people in one of the wellknown massacres; they also stole their money and gold.

Abdul Rahman Qasim, our relative, was killed during the

clashes; his house was very close to the Jews' homes, they

killed him at night while he was in his house.

We did not see the Jewish militia in our village before wewithdrew; they attacked us every night but we were ready

to defend our village and kick them out. They would hit us,

we would hit them; it went on for some time like this. The

neighboring villages helped us too.

A Syrian man came to help us too; he had a Haown cannon,

but the Jews killed him and destroyed his cannon. Many

volunteers came from Lebanon and Syria, but they left whenthe village fell. We left because we were afraid because of the

massacres the Jews were committing in every village and city.

We had no option but to flee in order to protect our families.



124

We all left the village, except a man called Mahmud Almadi;

he did not like to leave the village because he had much landand refused to leave it. Most of the village was damaged. I

visited it a few years ago; I found the school still there but asynagogue was built next to it.

We left and went to Arah village. We arrived there the following

day. Local people gave us food, and then the Iraq Army took

us, in their trucks, to the town of Jenin. From there people

scattered in the Diaspora.

I will never forget one incident that happened to us while we

were escaping from Haifa, a story that seems like fiction but

is true; I saw it with my own eyes. A woman was crying andscreaming because she realized she was carrying a cushion

instead of her baby when she had to flee. This shows how

scared we were of the Jews’ massacres.

Many people took their gold and money when they fled, butthe Jews stopped some people and took their gold from them.

My mother hid our money and gold in the baby's clothes. Wewere hoping that we would be back after a few days or weeks,

but our itinerant life lasted a long time and even now we still

live in hope of returning to our farms.

I worked in farming when we stayed in Jenin; there were somefarms around. I had to do any work I could get in order to get

food my family needed. I worked for five pennies a day. The

UNRWA supported us and provided us with food. I then wentto Amman in Jordan to work in the sweets industry. After that

I worked in Germany for four years and then I came back to

the West Bank.



125

After the war of 1967, I and my seven sons were arrested

by the Israeli occupation authorities. I was sentenced to sixmonths in jail, and then I went to look for a job in Haifa. I like

Haifa. I spent my childhood there, I have good memories ofthere, so I went to work there and luckily I found a job there.

***



126

Hafiza AbdullahOriginal village: Kanon/ Tulkarem districtCurrent address: Shweikeh/ Tulkarem

For one summer we lived under the trees, waiting for tomorrow.

Then we discovered it was all just lies

We lived off what we grew on our farm – watermelons,

cucumbers, corn and wheat for example. Our lives were

enjoyable. We got our news from listening to the radio. I

remember hearing the news about the Germans and Hitlerand people were talking a lot about the Second World War.

We did not think for a moment that war would reach us; we

talked about it but it never occurred to us that it would lead todeportation.

The people of my village were only simple farmers and did nothave any weapons when we were driven out during the wheat

and watermelon picking season of 1948. Around 27 peoplefrom our village were killed before we fled, including men,

women and children. My brother Samer was one of thosethat were killed and my father would not leave the village until

he had buried him in the house. Two bombs fell on separate

places in the village killing two families. I still remember some

of those who died: there was wife of Alhayet, as well as the

Shumali family, the daughters of Abu Sabah and the son ofAbdul Rahem was killed and buried in the village too.

Our village lands were taken and I can still remember thesizes: Alkhuwar, 30 dunum; Nareyeh, 27 dunum, and Aljereh,

15 dunum. Our trees were uprooted, we lost our home; we had

no more wheat, no more corn and no more farm. Even today,



127

the image of what the wheat fields looked like is as fresh in my

mind as if I had seen it yesterday. They damaged them andleft nothing for us. We did not leave of our own accord: we

were forced to flee from the terror and the murders; we wereafraid because of what we had heard about the massacres.

We went to Shweikeh village, next to Tulkarem city. We lived

there because we were told that Shweikeh was close to our

village, so we would not have to walk far when we were able

to return. Days passed, and then years and we are still waiting

to return. It is now more than fifty years since we left and stillwe wait for and dream of the day of our return.

We did not carry anything with us when we left our village.When we arrived to Shweikeh village we could not find work

to help us to survive. We spent the money we had saved in

the past up until we had no more money. We lived for one

summer season living under the trees, waiting for tomorrow.

Then we discovered that it was all just lies.I went to my village after the war of 1967 to visit. I saw strange

people living there; I saw those who had deported us in 1948living on our lands and planting in our farms. They had made

us a homeless and sad nation.

***



128

Muhamad RadwanBorn in 1931Original home: Wadi Hawartheh

Current address: Tulkarem Town

It still depresses me today that Jews can come from all over the world to live in my village while I am not allowed to live

there.

We followed the progress of the war through the radio; we

didn’t read newspapers at that time. We had been living inpeace with the people living in the Jewish colonies nearby;

we’d go to the same coffee shops and everything. But then the

Jews started to establish their own militia; they were havingmilitary training and drilling and acquiring equipment. Then

they attacked us. We didn’t have any weapons, but they still

attacked us.

Life was difficult, but it was bearable; we could still go toour farms, for example. But then the Jewish militia started to

attack people as they made their way to their farms, so wewere too afraid to go. Naturally, people were worried about

their farms, their crops and their cattle; this situation lasted

for around three months. Food and other goods became very

expensive.

The village was attacked several times; some houses were

shelled. One day, a militia group of Jews called Hagana came

to the neighboring zone of Tulkarem. They captured six Arabmilitants there. They executed four of them and released the

other two. This caused chaos and a feeling of terror within

the Palestinian community; we were scared and many people



130

At first we lived in tents, then later we moved to houses, or

what I will call “home units”. It still depresses me today thatJews can come from all over the world to live in my village

while I am not allowed to live there.***



131

Nasoh WafiBorn in 1936Home city: Yafa


It is hard to speak of those beautiful days as they bring back memories of the childhood that was taken from us.

We followed the news on the Near East and Al-Quds radio

stations and in the newspapers. I still remember the names

of many of the journalists who gave us the news: MohammadAbu Dla’aene, Hazem Al-Shanty, Sami Al-Shanty, George

Dahboor, Raje Sohyoony and Hosam Hamad. Moosa Al-Dajne

and Kosay Hashem, who worked at the Near East Station, andEssa Al-Esaa, the Editor of the Falasteen newspaper, and his

cousin Dawood Tamer Al-Eleh.

In the last months of 1947 the news was about the League of

Nation’s Partition Plan, 181, and the British Withdrawal, whichwas to take place on 15 May 1948.

Our reaction was the same as anyone who had heard such

news: great fear and anxiety. We expected war to break

out anywhere in Palestine. Six months before the League of

Nation's Partition Plan 181, Bessan Town and Taybarah city

were invaded. After this, many more cities were invaded– Haifa, Safad, Acre, Nazareth, Ramleh, Lud, Yaffa and

Beer-Sabe. On 9 April 1948, the Jewish militias carried out a

massacre at Deir Yassin.

Al-Muthalath, a very fertile area of Palestine covering between

10 and 15 towns, was given to the other Jewish State and was



132

lost because Israel did not respect the Rhodes Agreement.

The international imperialists, led by the United States ofAmerica, needed a base from which to protect their interests

within the region. If America didn’t have Israel as a base in theMiddle East the Arab countries could become a united power,

one capable of challenging America, so posing a threat to thewellbeing of America.

The news scared us a lot because seven Arab countries and

their armies couldn’t stop the Stern and Irgun Jewish militia

gangs. We were hoping that the Palestinian leader, the GrandMufti Haj Amin Al-Huseini would work with our Arab neighbors

to help with the liberation of Palestine. But they let us down.

And we are still suffering the consequences today: despitehundreds of projects and initiatives, the Arab leaders have still

not been able to convince subsequent Israeli administrations

to acknowledge the rights of the Palestinians. They have been

unable to establish a Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its

capital, and give the refugees the right to return even to theland they lost 20 years later, on 4 June 1967.

In 1948, we started to stockpile food and ammunition because

there were rumors that the Arab armies were advancing

towards us. Weapons had to be smuggled in and people were

smuggling them in from Syria and Egypt. At the same time,

the British were arresting and torturing people, and all areasof life came to a standstill because of fear and the difficulties

encountered in trying to get to work.

Many people were killed and injured. I may not be able to give

their individual names, or those of people who distinguished

themselves defending the town, but everyone did more than



133

was expected of them.

I saw the Jewish militia orders people out of their houses.

As I remember it, some people went to help their brothers innearby towns, while many volunteers came from the east of

Jordan. They brought weapons with them, but their weaponswere not enough to face down the army.

The volunteers got on well with the local residents, and when

the moment came for the volunteers to withdraw, we felt

scared. Nobody told us what to do, so we did what we thoughtwell. The city wasn’t totally destroyed, but a few buildings

collapsed.

The Arab leaders didn’t advise us to leave, but as the radio

stations spread stories about towns being destroyed and

we heard about the killings and what the Zionists used to do

with the children and women and we became really scared

about what they might do to us and we left. Haifa city fellinto the hands of the Jews after a struggle. Lud city, Ramleh,

Latroun and Deir Yassin fell after ferocious battles and severeresistance. The Jews gathered all the residents of these cities

in one place and made them leave along just one route.

Deir Yassin was completely destroyed, but the city where we

are now was partially demolished. I remember that many werearrested and many others were injured.

This wasn’t the first time I had left the city. I left with myparents, my mother, brothers and sisters; we didn’t leave

any of our children behind, although some people left their

relatives behind thinking that they would come back soon. I



134

don’t remember who left the city after we did.

We went to Lebanon for six months, then Syria – we stayed

there for eight months – then Jordan and, finally, Nablus, wherewe have been ever since. I can’t put into words what we went

through and had to bear during our wanderings, what thingswe lacked. The Syrians and Lebanese welcomed us warmly

and sympathized with us but we couldn’t work there.

After 1967 war, I visited my old house; it was half-ruined. I

was really emotional and I wished I hadn’t been to see it. Iremembered the happy days I had spent there in my childhood.

It is hard to speak of those beautiful days as they bring back

memories of the childhood that was taken from us.***



135

Jawdat Ali Issa Abu SerreyehBorn in 1942Original home: Sheikh Emwanes, Yafa District


We have the right to have our land given back. We will keep demanding to get it back: a right will never be forgotten as

long as somebody speaks of it to his children.

When we left our village we did not take any pots, plates

or even a glass. We were sure we would be back after thewar between the Arab armies and Jewish militia. We lived in

caves for three years, until UNRWA built the refugee camps. I

remember in 1950 when it was snowing in Nablus city and wewere living in a cave. The snow was very heavy at that time

and it was so cold. The snow actually covered the entrance

of our cave and we were stuck inside until some citizens ofNablus came and rescued us by shoveling out the snow

blocking the entrance.

There were no jobs in the West Bank after the Nakba in 1948.Life was hard. The conditions were unbearable and people

were even struggling to get bread. The UNRWA gave us sugar

and wheat and they had opened some schools for Palestinian

children. I attended one such school in 1949, as they were

accepting students from the age of seven. They gave uspencils and books but I did not feel like a proper student as I

did not even have a pair of shoes to wear to school. We were

very deprived and I was suffering terribly from the cold in thewinter.

I am afraid that the UNRWA will count each piece of medicine



136

it gives to us in order to discount it from the compensation that

people speak about. They might also count the sugar, wheatand education they offered to the Palestinian refugees over

the past decades. I would like to mention that our land hasbeen producing great vegetables since 1948 for the benefit

of Jews who are working it, even though it is our land that wasstolen in front of the United Nations. However, who do you

complain to if the judge is your enemy?

We have the right to have our land given back. We will keep

demanding to get it back: a right will never be forgotten aslong as somebody speaks of it to his children. I will tell the

story to my children, and they will pass the story of their lands

in Yafa to their children. I won’t accept millions of dollars inreturn for my family's lands. The struggle is going to be very

long but we are patient enough to keep waiting.

***



137

Om Hasan Al-AbedBorn in 1942Original home: Yazoor village, Yafa District

Current address: Al-Ein Refugee Camp, Nablus city

Where is the democracy and justice in this situation? I am living under occupation; why do I have to accept this?

Even though I was only six years old in 1948, I remember my

village of Yazoor well. We left it to go to Beddo village, where

we stayed for three months until the Jewish militia followedus there and occupied it. We were then deported to Naleen

village, where we stayed for a while, and then we moved for

Deir Ammar village. While we were homeless and travelingfrom place to another looking for a better life we heard

about somebody from the League of Nations called Count

Bernadotte, who was the League of Nations`s mediator. Hewas sent to Palestine to check whether Israel was respecting

the Partition Plan, Resolution No 181. He wrote in his reportthat Jews were enlarging their state and had occupied more

land than they should have, forcing Palestinian citizens toflee. He was assassinated in Jerusalem by members of the

Lehi group.

When we first left our village, an Iraqi commander told us that

we would be able to return home soon. More than 57 yearshave passed since then, and we are still waiting… If anything

the opposite has happened, as the Jews occupied the rest of

Palestine in 1967 – the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heightsand even East Jerusalem – and they still continue with their

aggression today.



138

We lived in the village of Deir Ammar for a while. The League

of Nations gave each family a tent and we ended up livingin ours for 10 years. The UNRWA gave us wheat, sugar,

sardines and oil every month to exist on. Then the UNRWAbuilt a room for every family; we added to our room to make it

more comfortable to live in.

In 1967, after the Six Days War, I went to visit the village of

Yazoor; in fact, I have visited it seven times now. It was nearly

empty and most of the cemetery had been removed; we

found only one tomb still standing. There were some Israelifactories, and some homes that were now ruins. Most of the

villages that were around Yazoor were removed totally from

the map. We did not find our house at all; we found whatwas left of the police station, while the rest of the village had

disappeared or was in ruins. I felt I needed to cry in order to

release the sadness in my heart. I sat on the ground and cried

with my cousin who had come with us from Jordan. He took

some sandy soil of Yazoor village home with him.

A few days ago, a group of international volunteers visited meto hear my testimony about what happened in 1948, I asked

them: “What are you doing for justice? Your countries claim

they are democratic, the countries of fairness and freedom.

You can make the needed change in your countries, but I

would like to ask you why international law has allowed Israelto deport Palestinian people from their villages? You saw how

we are treated by the Israeli occupation at the roadblocks.”

They told me that Israel has power and influences most of the

western media in order to distort the truth. They continued that

they themselves could see that the truth they had witnessed



139

was different to that which they had been subjected to through

the media. They promised me that they will protest in frontof the European Union to condemn the Israeli occupation.

Then I told them that I wondered how the western mediacould fabricate links between the Palestinian resistance and

the terror attacks organized by Osama Bin Laden. I don’tunderstand how they can fool the people so much. Where is

the democracy and justice in this situation? I am living under

occupation; why do I have to accept this? Why do the Israelis

have the right to hit us with F16s? Where are our human rights?

My home is occupied by the Israeli troops and I am astonishedby those who are fabricating stories about ties between our

struggle for freedom and international terror. This comparison

is ridiculous.This is the age of power, Jews have power, but that land

remains mine. I don’t forgive and I don’t grant my right to

Jews. They occupied my village by force and terror. We did

not leave so that they could leave it empty, and we only left it

because of the massacres they had committed.

We should not remain refugees for ever, there should be asolution. The USA and Europe should solve this tragedy that

affects the Palestinians. Who gave Europe and USA the right

to give our land to the Jews? We did not discriminate against

the Jews; it was Europe that discriminated against them. Why

then can Israel still be allowed to occupy our lands whilethe international community does nothing against it? There

must be an end to these double standards; the international

community should force Israel to withdraw from the occupiedlands exactly as they forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

This is the only way to approach peace in the Middle East.

***



140

Radeyeh Husein Meri`Born in 1942Original home: Almansye village/ Haifa

Current address: Jenin Refugee Camp/ Jenin

We took some sand from our village and returned to our refugee camp in Jenin. I often smell the sand. It reminds me

of the soul of my village and farm

I was afraid when I heard the sound of bullets and the shelling

of Haifa city. We were thinking of leaving our village beforethe arrival of the Jews; we had heard what had happened

to the other neighboring villages. The people in my village

did not resist or be involved in any way with the resistance;they were just ordinary working people. We kept up with what

was happening every day through the updates on the radio.

Everyone fled when we heard the Jewish militia was headingto the village. Nobody stayed there, everybody left. They

left secretly at night, taking none of their property with them,neither clothes nor furniture.

We went to Lajon village because we had some friends there,

then we left for the village of Zulfa. Our people asked the

head of our village to form a good relationship with the Jews

so we could remain in our village but he refused. So we left

our village, intending to come back later.

One of the women fleeing with us was pregnant. She gave

birth while we were on the move. She suffered a lot. She hadno clothes for the child and no food either. She put the baby

under her dress and cuddled him until we arrived at Lajon,

where the women helped her and looked after the baby. Our



141

village was occupied by the Jewish militia the day after we

left; we heard that it was mostly destroyed and that they haduprooted its orchards.

After staying in Lajon for a while we went to Zulfa village, where

we lived in makeshift homes. We stayed there almost a month.Some people from my village tried to go home to collect fruit

and other food, to gather some of their crops, But the Jews

had laid mines to prevent us from reaching our farms. My

cousin was one of those who tried to reach the village, but he

was caught and murdered.

Then we went to Rumaneh village, and then Taybeh village.

We moved from village to another until we arrived in the townof Jenin, where we settled in the refugee camp. We lived in

tents. My father worked on a nearby farm to get money for

food and other necessities. Everyone else who left my village

ended up in different villages, where they had relatives and

siblings. I visited my village a few years ago, in the 1990s,when I went with some other women and men from my

village to see what had happened to it. We saw the villagehad been comprehensively destroyed. We saw some rubble

and many newly-built settlements and convoys of new Jewish

immigrants, who had come from Russia to live on our land.

I cried along with the others. We took some sand from our

village and returned to our refugee camp in Jenin. I oftensmell the sand. It reminds me of the soul of my village and

farm. This was the first and the last time I visited my village.

***



142

Rushdeyeh Awad JabajiBorn in 1929Original home: Lydda


We were sure that we would return. We had a lamb at the time of our deportation and I remember leaving him some food

then closing the door on him.

I was 19 years old in 1948 and I can remember what happened

very well. There were clashes between Palestinians and Jewsand there were some Arab troops in our region. We didn’t

have many weapons and some men even sold their wives’

gold to buy weapons so they could defend themselves.

We weren’t able to harvest our crops before we left; we left

them in the fields. After the Jews declared independence inMay there was meant to be a two-month ceasefire, but the

Jews didn’t respect this and continued to occupy our city,commit crimes against us and deport us during this period.

A Jewish militia group entered Lydda from Beit Shemel Colony

and started to shoot randomly in the city. My family, along with

many others, hid in the mosques while other families hid in

the churches. The Palestinian resistance struggled to defend

the city. We spent three days in the mosque, and then, whenthe resistance was subdued, they kicked us out of the city. It

was at this time that the Jews gathered many people in the

main mosque and opened fire on them. My husband was in adifferent mosque to us and we were unable to find out how he

was, but, thankfully, we were reunited in the village of Naleen

after the deportation.



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We were deported while we were fasting during the holy month

of Ramadan. I had a one-year-old child at the time, and thismade things even more difficult. It was too hot and we were

thirsty, and we found nothing on the way that we could eat ordrink. We remained hungry for two days as we had absolutely

no food. We were walking and dreaming of water when trucksarrived to transport us to different destinations. We were taken

to Naleen. We stayed there for 12 days, and then somebody

suggested we go to Jericho. We decided this was a good

idea, but when we got there it was too hot.

We stayed out in the sun for a few days then some people

brought us something similar to tents. There was one cover

for every three families and it was uncomfortable, so peoplestarted to move elsewhere. Some of them went to Jordan,

but we stayed where we were for 16 years, although we did

spend two years away from Jericho, in Gaza. My husband

had no work in Aqabet Jabr Refugee Camp in Jericho, so he

went to work in Jericho town as a carter, but he was sick andthis prompted us to come to Nablus after 16 years.

I went with my husband to Lydda after the war of 1967, I went

to see my city and we still had relatives living there. We cried

when we saw it; many streets were still as they were when we

left them in 1948. I was so sad when I saw the shop of anyone

I had known; the tears would not stop rolling down my face.One of my relatives was with us and I said to her: “This is

the shop of Ahmad Alhafi, and this is the shop of Abu Hasan

Jabber”. The shops of Alqudsi and Abdul Halim Huso werealso still there as I remembered them.

My parents died during the Diaspora in Jordan and that is



144

where my brothers live now. We took the keys of our house

in Lydda with us when we left, as we were sure that we wouldreturn. We had a lamb at the time of our deportation and I

remember leaving him some food then closing the door onhim. I still wish I could return to live in Lydda, but it does not

look as though this will be possible anytime soon.***



146

surrounding it. My uncle and seven comrades were hit by a

Jewish shell. Luckily, he was not killed and he fled to Hebron.One of the Egyptian commanders during the siege went on to

become the President of Egypt. He was Jamal Abdel Nasser,who took control after the revolution of 1952.

Israeli fighters continued to shell the Al-Faloja resistance until

October 1948. We were told that the Egyptian commander

Taha had ordered his soldiers to open a tunnel so they

could surprise the Israelis. However, the Israelis used six

fighter aircraft against the resistance and so the resistancesurrendered. Many people were killed that day, many were

injured; people tried to shelter in the mosque but they were

not safe there as the Israelis bombed them.

Then the fake weapons scandal erupted in Egypt, contributing

to the revolution of 1952. The guns would fire backwards,

killing the person shooting the gun rather than the person

they were aiming at. After that, the citizens left in Al-Faloja forthe Gaza Strip. The Jewish militia, which became the Israeli

Army after the British withdrew, destroyed the wheat mill andthe water mill then they destroyed the rest of Al-Faloja.

We had left Al-Faloja at the beginning of the conflict, to stay

in the village of Yazoor, where my father had been working.

When the time came for the British Army to withdraw, theytold the Arab forces to come and take the military camp of Tel

Hshomer. But the Jews had already taken it over, and when

the Arab forces arrived, they were easy targets for the Jewishmilitiamen. The British betrayed the Palestinians all the time,

but protected and supported the Jews. For example, there

was always a British armored vehicle to assist the Jewish



147

caravans on the main road from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. Once,

the Palestinian resistance of Yazoor put a mine on this road,the mine exploded and killed three Jewish people. The day

after, Jews came and bombed the ice factory that was at theentrance of Yazoor. The leader of our village complained to

the Jews but they told him that they might bomb the wholevillage too.

Soon the Jews were attacking us every night and then they

invaded the village, which caused chaos. Take the mother

of Saleh Abdul Nabi, for example. She was terrified by theshelling and she was running, trying to escape, She gave

birth to twins. She managed to carry one but she forgot the

other, who was Saleh. It was a terrible situation, with the Jewskilling people randomly. Fortunately, her sister remembered

Saleh and ran to get him, even though she came under fire as

she did this. This heroic act saved Saleh and enabled him to

have a good life, to get married and have children. But there

was a tragic end to this story, as Saleh was shot and killed bythe Israelis during the first Intifada.

Once the war started we headed for Lydda city, where we

stayed for three months. The troubles followed us to Lydda

and we had more traumatic experiences there. The Jewish

militia gathered people in Dahmash Mosque, where they

slaughtered them. The Jewish militia was well-armed andthey yelled that we should go to Jordan. They stole gold from

Palestinian women and detained anybody they wanted to. My

uncle, Abed, was detained by them. He told us after he wasreleased how he was tortured in the detention camp. Once

we had been deported we went to the village of Deir Abu

Mishal, near Ramallah.



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We lived for four months in Deir Abu Mishal; our suffering

continued. We had to collect water on foot from a spring inanother village, and we would go there once a week to wash

ourselves. We decided this life was too difficult so we came toNablus, where we stayed in the municipal park. Just when it

seemed things could not get any worse we became infectedwith smallpox and we had to be kept in quarantine until we

were cured. Finally, after all this, we ended up settling in Balata

Refugee Camp in Nablus.

While living in Balata I worked in Nablus. During this time, Itaught myself Hebrew, and this meant I was able to work in

Haifa in the 1990s.

I returned to Al-Faloja after the 1967 war. It was a shocking

sight – there was nothing left of the village apart from a mosque.

But the Israelis had built a new colony there, Quryat Qat. I

also visited Yazoor village, as well as many other Palestinian

villages and towns in what is now called “Israel”.

My mother came with me when I went to see our housein Yazoor. As we were fleeing from Yazoor my mother had

hidden some gold next to the fence of the place where we

had been staying. We found the house was now occupied by

Jewish people, and we asked them if we could see inside our

house. They told us that it was not our house and that they hadbought it from the government. We told them that my mother

had buried something next to the fence and asked if we would

be able to look for it. They said yes, but, unfortunately, mymother could not identify exactly where she had buried the

gold because all the trees had been uprooted and the fence

removed.



149

I wish I could die in Al-Faloja. If I was given the choice, I would

be prepared to leave my house here in the refugee camp andlive in a tent at Al-Faloja. At one point I worked in Saudi Arabia

but I could not carry on doing this as I could not bear my lifeoutside Palestine. There is no place like home – as I keep

repeating this to my sons and daughters.***



150

Abdul Rahman AwadBorn in 1936Original home: Lydda city


They took my home and my land, drove out my family, made us refugees

We owned some land in the Lydda region, around 10 dunums

(around 10,000m²). We planted it with olives, okra and

cactus. There was no fighting in our area; we were drivenout of our home after the ceasefire. The Jews turned up with

armored vehicles and other craft; we had nothing. It took us

completely by surprise – we didn’t even have time to think,let alone organize any resistance. All we had was 12 ordinary

guns and four automatic ones. Anyway, guns weren’t that

much use against the Jewish troops who became the Israeliarmy. There was an imbalance of power between us; we

had some Palestinian fighters, but what could we do againstwell-armored Jews, and, anyway, what is the point of having

well-trained men if there are no guns for them? And the Jewswere able to operate with even more impunity after the British

withdrew from Palestine.

All the cities and villages around Lydda were cleared. We

walked from Lydda to the village of Naleen, where we lived fortwo years before moving to Nablus. We fled with the citizens

of Ludda, which was cleared at the same time. I was in my

father’s house when the Jews invaded our city. They drove usout like cattle and treated us very badly; women, children and

elderly people were forced to leave Lydda immediately. I was

the one who locked the front door of our house. I still have the



153

city immediately. People were panic stricken as they tried to

escape.

Some people forgot to carry their babies as everybody wasrushing in order to be safe. There was no time to look for

your wife or your children. The Jewish militias were shootingrandomly at people and many fell to the ground as they tried

to escape. As I was near the coffee shop I could not reach our

house. The Jewish militia did not allow me to reach it to see

my father and my family. A man pointed a gun in my face and

told me to leave or I would be killed. Fortunately, I managedto meet my family in a village as we were fleeing.

In order to escape, people had to negotiate the treacherousthorn bushes that surrounded the village. There were many

thorn bushes that were too high to climb and people had

to find an uncomfortable way through. The Jews were still

shooting at us as families attempted to climb the mountain;

it was a terrible scene. To make matters worse, people werefasting as it was the month of Ramadan. It was too hot, our

throats were dry and there was no water.

Lydda city was the last city to fall into the hands of the Jews.

The Jewish militia had announced on the loudspeakers that

we should go to the village of Parfilya. However, I knew this

village was low on water so we decided to head for the villageof Naleen instead. We were instructed not to walk down

the main road that we must leave through the mountains.

At Naleen we found some cars that were taking people toJordan, the Gaza Strip or Ramallah. We went to Ramallah and

settled there.



154

We were able to occupy an empty house in Ramallah that was

owned by a Palestinian family working in the USA. Anotherperson allowed us to use their farm in order to get our food,

while other refugees stayed in the camps. After one year wewent to Nablus city, where we rented a flat. Nablus was a

poor city when we came to it, and there were no jobs. I wentto Jordan and worked there as goods distributor, I was selling

products in the Arab Gulf and Lebanon.

I went to Lydda City after the war of 1967. I was very sad

when I saw it. The first time I went there I saw a Jewish manliving in my house; I could easily recognize my house even

after 20 years. I told the owner that this was my house and he

told me to go away otherwise he would shoot me. He wouldnot even allow me to see my house from the inside to allow me

to recall my memories.

Two years later, I went back to visit my city again. I found that

my house was gone and a new building stood in its place,a larger building, to house the increasing number of Jewish

immigrants. I could recognize all of the neighborhoods ofLydda city, I remembered it very well. I couldn’t stop crying

when I saw what had happened to my house and other parts

of the city.

I went to the cemetery of Lydda and read some verses ofthe Holy Quran. The Jews had displaced the people and the

buildings, so I was concerned that they would remove the two

cemeteries as well. The mosque was still standing, as wasthe church, but the Jews were not allowing the Palestinian

citizens still living in the city to renovate either. I suspect this

is so they will collapse by themselves.



155

Some Palestinians have been able to return through the Red

Cross, and I met some of them. There are only around 50families now, compared with 70,000 or so people before the

Diaspora.

The Jews have occupied my land and my father’s land, andthey want to cheat us out of adequate compensation. I have

a “Right of Return”, recognized by the United Nations. The

Jews have taken our lands by force and power, and taken

them for free as well. They came from Europe and Russia in

order to occupy our lands, and now they want us to shut ourmouths. I don’t expect to get a home in paradise in return for

my house in Lydda City. My country is so dear to me, and we

would like to live in our land in peace.***



156

Muhamad Ahmad HuwaidiBorn in 1930Original village: Abu Kishek Village, Yafa


I don’t want compensation for the loss of my land – I want to go home to my village, and to visit the Shrine of Sidi Ali; I know

how to go there but the Israelis won’t let me go to it.

I got married in 1948 in Hableh village near Qalqilya town,

where we owned a farm. I heard about the Jewish project inPalestine; the Balfour Declaration and then the partition Plan.

The Jews didn’t have so much power in the beginning, but

they did get more powerful later, when they formed the militiasof Stern and Hagana. They were arming themselves while

cursing at us when they saw us going to our work. We had

no weapons – only one gun for every ten men – because ithad not been easy to smuggle weapons in. somebody called

Sheikh Shaker went to Egypt to buy guns but they were notvery good. The English mandate troops had been detaining

the armed Palestinian citizens and sentencing them to around15 years for having a gun and five years for having a bullet.

We used to plant everything we needed for our daily life. As

we had no mosque nearby we had to travel for one hour to

Sheikh Emwanes Mosque.

Jews were living next to our village. One of our Jewish friends

came to us and said, “Don’t leave your village because if you

do that and flee to the mountains (West Bank) you will not beable to come back again. You will not defeat the Jews because

they are very strong and they have obtained many weapons

from the British.” We asked him what we have to do then. He



157

said, “You can raise the white flags of surrender.” However,

we did not trust them and we left when other villagers startedto flee.

The people of Yaffa left first, then those from Salameh village,

and then the residents of Sheikh Emwane’s village left too. Jewswere shooting on Palestinians randomly; some Palestinians

fought back, with the poor-quality weapons that were available.

We were not trained for war; we had done no military training

or exercises compared to the Jews. Many people were killed

there in Salameh and Yazoor villages because they resisted.Five people were killed in the Shawabkeh area, which was

very close to us.

Once, some Palestinians from the Al-Shobaki family went to

the British Administration and informed them about the Jewish

militia growing in Hertselia Colony and their increasing military

power there. However, the British told the Jews about this

family. The Jewish militia attacked the family and slaughteredfive of its members; we buried them in the village. This incident

caused us to become scared, and we decided it was time toleave.

We had been producing milk and butter, which we would

store in jars, but my father, did not let us bring them with us

when we left. He hid them under the ground, covering themwith sacks in order to protect them, believing that we would

soon return. We also left our wheat and hay, but we did take

the house key with us.

Jews laughed at us and sang while we were leaving. They

didn’t shoot at those who left voluntarily, because they wanted



158

to encourage us to leave our homes. And we all left – nobody

remained in the village. My father brought some sacks andwe sewed them together in order to make a tent, or something

that looked like one.

We had had 75 dunum of fertile lands; we had cows andsheep. My father was married to three women; all three of

them, and their sons and daughters, became refugees in

Jordan, Kuwait and the USA. I myself left for Qalqilya, and

then went to Nablus City. We owned a camel so we put some

of our essential belongings on it; we left our goats and sheep.We sold our cows before the deportation.

My father bought a gun from Egypt; he sold it when we wentto Qalqilya so he could feed his children. People were using

donkeys and camels to carry their furniture or mattresses; the

people of Yaffa used their cars, while the poorest people had

to carry their belongings as they went by foot.

We lived in tents in Qalqilya and we had no jobs. We rented

a piece of land in order to plant it with vegetables and fruits,and then we left for Nablus and rented land and farmed there.

Some people went through occupied Palestine after 1948 in

order to pick oranges they didn’t have chance to pick before

the deportation. Some of them were detained and others were

killed by the Israeli soldiers on the border.

I worked in a farm in Nablus City for 15 years. We got some

supplies from UNRWA. I managed to do well enough tosend my sons to university. I went to work in Israel after the

Occupation of 1967. I worked in construction, and I worked in

Tel Aviv until the late-1990s.



159

Some of my relatives, who had been in Lydda in 1948 and

didn’t leave there, have Israeli residency now. Some of mybrothers went to see our village next to Yaffa and they told me

that it was completely destroyed. On one occasion I went tovisit them and told them that I would like to visit Sidi Ali shrine

in Yaffa. We went there and prayed; it was one of the holysites that we used to pray in. Then we went to visit my village.

I was shocked when I was not allowed to get in to the village

because it had been converted into a military camp.

I don’t want compensation for the loss of my land – I want togo home to my village, and to visit the shrine of Sidi Ali; I know

how to go there but the Israelis won’t let me go to it.

***



160

Abu Abdallah El-HalaqBorn in 1938Original home: Sha’ib Village / Acre

Current address: Al-Ein Refugee Camp / Nablus

The fighting meant that life stopped in the land; wheat was not harvested, and olives and corns were not cultivated. There

was genuine fear, the prices rose.

The first outbreaks of fighting started at the end of 1947,

and the news about deportation and emigration was quicklyspread by the Jerusalem and Cairo radio stations. We heard

news about how the Haganah had forced their way into Jaffa

and were confronted by Arab revolutionists. Despite the Arabresistance Jaffa had fallen, and was quickly followed by

Yazoor and Salama.

Shortly afterwards both the cities of Haifa and Acre fell, with

the volunteers unable to do anything in response. They werewaiting for the Haganah to come and face them, instead of

going to confront them. There was no real military confrontation,just guerilla wars. When the city of Acre fell, my village of

Sha’ib, along with the village of Majd El-Krum became the

next line of defense.

Arab resistance fighters and their leadership had gathered inSha’ib village after the state of Israel had been declared. This

prompted the young people from all the surrounding villages

of the Galilee to assemble in Sha’ib to protect the leadership.I remember one of them called Abu Es’aaf, who went to Syria

to bring weapons back for them.



161

We were afraid that due to so many Arab towns being

captured we would be unable to have a state of our own. Wedesperately wanted a state, and this was the reason behind

the people of Sha’ib not wanting to leave. Although we did notactually think that the war would reach as far as Sha’ib. We

were optimistic about independence especially if the RescueArmy was to come to our aid. We did not expect that things

would turn out the way they did and we assumed people

would be able to return home in a couple of months.

Regarding preparations, people were collecting money fromeach family in order to buy weapons. There were nearly 400

volunteers present in Sha’ib but they were not trained in using

weapons during the British Mandate. The local volunteers andthe volunteers from outside were fighting without any direction

whatsoever.

The Rescue Army brought us hope but they turned out to

be total fakes. When they first came they coordinated withthe leaders of the resistance and took up strategic military

positions. A war took place between the Rescue Army, withthe support of the fighters and the Haganah. I attended one

of the battles with some friends and was amazed to see

the women supporting the volunteers by joyously shouting

encouragement and carrying water on their heads to give

them. They managed to take back the village of Al-Barwah onthe outskirts of Haifa. It was a happy day, apart from the fact

that three volunteers became martyrs.

At this stage the Rescue Army had given us a certain amount

of confidence. There next move though was to ask the fighters

to pull out from Al-Barwah, so they could replace them, and



162

the fighters agreed to this. Shortly afterwards the Rescue

Army gave it up to the Jews, causing a great deal of pain tothe resistance fighters.

In Sha’ib I have one of my most clear memories as I was

attacked. I was with a group of about 12 youth who werewalking on the outskirts of the village. Suddenly we heard

gunfire and one of my friends shouted, “Lie down”. It was true

that the bullets were fired in our direction and some of them

passed between us, we were very lucky.

Although the Rescue Army remained in Sha’ib there was a

significant lack of trust between them and the resistance

fighters. This led to a severe lack of coordination with theresistance groups operating autonomously. One of the local

resistance groups reminded me of a scout group and they

were called Najjadah. I can still recall the words to a special

song that they would sing,

We the Najjadah, glory seekers… all of us, all of us

Every one of us represents hope for the country… all of us,all of us

And for the fluttering of the flag… all of us, all of us

And for the sword and the pen…all of us, all of us

My homeland, by the proud youth,

If a foreigner does harm to you,We, the Najjadah, the glory seekers will fight for you.

We actually had our own song that my friends and I woulduse to sing. We had been taught it before at school as The

Department of Education was keen on disseminating the

national spirit. This is what we used to sing,



163

Anybody else may love beautiful women

But for me, I love my homeland only.How beautiful, my country, you are!

How dear you are! I sacrifice my life for you

Your soil is more sublime than the stars I protect your glory as long as I live

If any hardship afflicts you, without being protected by us,

Then we would not be worthy of being your sons.

The fighting meant that life stopped in the land; wheat was notharvested, and olives and corns were not cultivated. There

was genuine fear, the prices rose, and the people had to live

on low supplies. We stayed in Sha’ib for a month before myfamily decided to move on to the village of Majd Al-Krum.

After we had left, Sha’ib fell because once again the Rescue

Army had surrendered. The old people of the village stayed

for two months, before cars came to collect them and takethem to the region of Marj Ibn-Amer. The Jews even brought

some Bedouins from Al-Huleh, and made them settle downin Sha’ib; in fact two thirds of Sha’ib’s people were now not

originally from Sha’ib.

We walked to Majd Al-Krum during Ramadan with many other

people and we were all still fasting. I remember the sun settingas we walked over the hills. For large parts of the journey I

was carrying my brother who was very troublesome. We had

taken nothing with us, not even food or blankets. Fortunatelythere were many friendly people in Majd Al-Krum who helped

us. We were able to sleep relatively comfortably for twenty

days under the olive trees.



164

Despite the Rescue Army surrendering Sha’ib they were

still in the area and in Majd Al-Kruom we felt relatively safe.However this all changed when one night when we heard

shooting on Al-Layat Mountain that continued until midnight,which we assumed was between the Rescue Army and the

Jews. Al-Layat was clearly visible from Sha’ib and so thefollowing morning we could see that the Rescue Army had

disappeared. The belief at the time was that the Rescue Army

had faked the shooting incident in order to escape without

protest.

This meant the defense lines were now vacant as some

believed the Rescue Army planned, and the village had

no form of protection. Therefore, the people of the villagedecided to climb to the top of Al-Layat Mountain and raised

the white flags. The Jews took over Majd Al-Krum captured

the remaining resistance fighters and sent them to Lebanon.

We knew that the Rescue Army had apparently left for Syria.

Once the Jews entered Majd Al-Krum, they participated in

acts of terrorism against its inhabitants. They entered Majd Al-Kroom at ten o’clock in the morning, and they went on shooting

sporadically for two days. The village was besieged, and

they used this same plan on many villages to terrorize people

in order to leave. The people, who now resided in Majd Al-

Krum, included many people who had fled from neighboringvillages.

All the males in the village were forced to go to the Hananacafé on the main street, where they were all forced inside. At

which point the Jews selected seven or eight young people

to go and stand outside. They were lined up on the pavement



165

and blindfolded and then they decided to shoot one of them

from Al-Ghrabi’s family. Following this they chose a new group,of seven to eight young people to line up outside. Then an

Arab came and talked to the Jews in English and they werereleased. This incident looked very suspicious and I suspect

that this Arab was acting for the Jews.

During that night, people were deported to Lebanon without

their belongings. Half of the people did manage to remain in

Majd Al-Krum but the Jews continued to occupy the village

day and night. Most of us were still gathered in the HananaCafe which they allowed us to leave for two hours a day so

we could get water. It was uncomfortable and the Jews were

harassing the women near the well.

After a week, the Jews departed but they returned two weeks

later, besieged the village and demanded all the remaining

males gather in the yard. They sorted the people into groups

according to their villages: Al-Barwah, Sha’ib, Adamoon andMajd Al-Kroom. The men from Sha’ib lied about where they

were from because they were afraid to tell the truth. They knewthis may antagonize the Jews as there had been a Palestinian

militant base there.

I sat on the floor with my family. They asked my father for his

identification papers which the Jews had given to some of theArabs after they had declared their state, but he did not have

it with him. This meant that my father was arrested. As he was

being taken away he told us to remain in Majd Al-Krum and hewould come back for us. Many families were being led away

by Jewish soldiers to be transferred from the village in large

trucks. They were being deported to places like Jenin and



166

even as far as Amman.

We were very fortunate that we were able to avoid being

expelled as we were able to stay with a friend of my motherin the village. After two months my father was released and

returned to Majd Al-Krum for us. He was very tired and saidwe would go to Acre with our ID papers to prove we had

been allowed to stay. However when we reached Acre and

explained the situation we were told, “Go to King Abdallah”.

They put us on the military trucks and we were transported to

the village of Romanah near Jenin. My father was old, and hedied three months after the shock of the deportation.

***



167

Conclusion and recommendations:

After our reading of the oral narrations published in the pages

of this book, we realized the nature of the Palestinian issue andPalestinian-Israeli conflict that lie in removing the Palestinian

people and settling Jews in their homeland instead. Palestinewas not a barren land, or a land without a nation, as the Jews

still claim today; on the contrary, it was a fertile land that was

exporting almonds and fruit daily to Europe, through the Yafa

and Haifa harbors. If Palestinian land had not been rich, the

invading forces would not have made such efforts to occupyit, and drive its people away.

Palestinian farmers did not leave their lands willingly andquickly. When they were driven out, they thought that their

leaving would be only for a few days. It did not enter their

minds that their departure would be forever.

Media propaganda, no doubt, played a negative role in thedeparture of residents by not reporting on the massacres

and crimes committed against the land and the Palestinianpeople. This does not negate the fact, however, that there were

massacres committed. The illiteracy of many of the people

contributed to the immigration. If the Palestinian people had

been better informed about the goals of the occupation and

the 1948 war, they would have refused all attempts to drivethem away from their lands and homes. Perhaps the deciding

factor was the lack of political and military proficiency of the

Arab and Palestinian leaders during the 1948 war.

The Palestinian people had suffered a lot, having been

occupied many times over the years. After the Ottoman age,



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Palestine was ruled by the British mandate, leaving no era

of independence in which to foster a scientific and culturalrebirth of the Palestinian people.

After our reading of the oral narrations in this book, I offer

the following recommendations, hoping to encourage otherresearchers to study the Palestinian oral history of the 1948 war,

and other important events in the history of the Palestinians.

In addition, I encourage other researchers to document the

daily sufferings of the Palestinian community, and the daily

military siege on the Palestinian cities and villages, includingthe attacks and humiliation. My recommendations could be

summarized as follows:

* Teaching oral Palestinian history in the Palestinian universities

as a general course for students, not only for the students of

history and political science.

* Translating oral narrations from Arabic into English, to makeit possible for the Palestinian issue to reach the external and

non- Arab world.

* Conducting additional interviews with narrators as soon as

possible, to benefit from those who are still alive. Many of the

narrators passed away soon after being interviewed, due to

their advanced age.

* Broadcasting oral narrations as they were written, in colloquial

language, through television and radio.

* Focusing on the period of the Palestinian Nakba in any

negotiating process, stressing the importance and continued



169

relevance of this event. The refugees’ issue shouldn’t be

forgotten. We have a moral duty to raise these issues inpolitical, diplomatic and media conferences.

* Producing translated televised and documentary programs

about the Palestinian Nakba, to ensure that the internationalcommunity knows the facts of this issue, and the nature of

Middle East conflict.

7. Demanding that the British government formally apologize to

the Palestinian nation for its abrupt departure from the region,the crimes that they committed against the Palestinian people

during the British mandate, the resulting occupation, and

deportation of the Palestinian people from their lands in 1948.Moreover, we have to pressure the British civil community to

do their best to compensate the Palestinian people for the

historical injustice they were exposed to as a result of the

tendentious policies of the British government.

Overall, the international community and the Britishgovernment are responsible for the atrocities committed, and

that continue to be committed daily in Palestine, since theBritish mandate in 1917. Successive generations of British

citizens, and the international community, should know that

the crimes committed against the Palestinian people, both in

the past and today, are the result of taking the largest portion

of the Palestinian’s lands, and giving it to the Jews fleeingfrom the discrimination, anti-Semitism, and crimes committed

against them in Europe. The Palestinian nation did not commit

these crimes against the Jews. They did not deserve to bedriven from their lands, forced to pay the price for the crimes

committed by Europeans. The problems created for the

Jewish people should have been solved at the expense of



170

the Europeans who created them, through their hate for the

Jews in their countries. The Palestinian nation did not have ahand in these European crimes, and should not have had to

pay for them with their lives and their lands.Ala Abu Dheer

Media Unit (Zajel)

Public Relations Department

An-Najah National University

Nablus-Palestine

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.zajel.org/

http://www.zajel.org/

mailto:[email protected]



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Appendix 1

A questionnaire about oral narrations of the 1948 war

* The name of the narrator:

* The age of the narrator:* Name of the village or the city:

* The date of the interview:

* The place of the interview:

* How did you follow the news of the war? Was it through

the radio, newspapers, or conversations with people incafés?

* What did you hear in the news? What was your reaction?

* Did you expect that the war would reach your village andlead to the Nakba?

* Were there any preparations for war in your city or

village, such as buying ammunitions and weapons,digging trenches, stockpiling food, or making contact with

leaders?* Had there been any military professionals in your village

who knew how to fight? Was there weapons’ trafficking fromEgypt or Syria? What was the reaction of British against

that?

* What had the British done to armed people?

* Did your village experience disruption to daily life before

the residents were forced to leave, such as difficulty ingetting to fields?

* Was there anarchy or a sharp rise in the cost of

foodstuffs?* Were you ever subjected to bombing, occupation, military

attacks, starvation, or to car bombs?

* Do you still remember the date of departure? (You



172

can help the witness to remember the date by using

agricultural seasons or plants that were in season duringimmigration.)

* Did you flee at dawn, or after prayer?* Had there been any attempts to contract an oral agreement

between the head of the village and with the head of theIsraelis settlement?

* Did you ever hear about such agreements?

* Were you offered such agreements and you refused?

Why?

* In case of approval between the two sides, did the Israeliside abide by the agreement?

* Do you know any one that was killed or injured during the

war from your relatives or village? Do you remember thecircumstances of the incident?

* Did any citizen from the city or village distinguish

themselves while defending the village?

* Did you see Israeli forces in your village? If the answer

is no, what did you hear about them? If the answer isyes, where and when did you see them and what was the

situation like?* Did the Head of the village help you during the Israeli

attacks?

* Did the rescuing army give you a hand?

* Did any foreign or Arab volunteers from East Jordan or

Yugoslavia help you? Did they come in time or too late?Were there many of them? Were their weapons enough to

fight the Israeli gangs? Did their presence give you security

and hope?* How was their relationship with citizens generally and with

city and village leaders in particular?

* Did you have to provide them with food and



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accommodation?

* Were they fighting for your village and the neighboringareas?

* In case of their withdrawal from the village before itsoccupation by Israeli gangs, did that lead to decrease of

citizens’ morale before immigration?* Did any one give you instructions in case you were

attacked?

* Was there any destruction to your village during Israeli

attacks?

* Were you advised to leave by any Arab or Palestinianleaders or in radio broadcasts and if so why?

* When did you leave your village?

* Can you tell us about killing and horror stories?* have you heard about women being abused?

* Were you subjected to psychological warfare such as air

attacks and rumors?

* When and how was your village occupied?

* Was it occupied after a prolonged battle or after simplearmed clashes?

* Was it occupied after being besieged or after the Israeligangs reached the village when the resistance had decided

that it was useless to continue fighting?

* Did the Israelis enter the village while the residents were

still present? If the answer is yes, how did they deal with

people?* Did any elderly people remain in the village or city after

other residents had fled?

* Was the village damaged immediately after occupation orafter a short or a long period of time?

* Did the Israelis use the village as a military camp?

* Have you returned to your village since you left? When



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and why?

* Did any of your neighbors or relatives return, and why?* Did villagers try to return in groups?

* Was any one arrested or injured when he tried to comeback in 1948?

* Do you know any stories about villagers secretly attemptingto harvest oranges or fetch sheep and other livestock?

* Was this the first time you had left your home?

* Did you flee alone? If the answer is no, who left with

you?

* Did you and the other refugees leave any of your relativesor family members, such as one parent or both, behind?

* Do you know anyone who forgot their infant or child

because of the sudden departure?* Did any one leave the village before you?

* Do you know any one who is still in the village now?

* When did the head of the village leave? Was he the first

or the last to leave the village?

* Had any one encouraged you to leave?* Did you take with you money, food, clothes, furniture, bed

sheets, animals or sheep when you left the village or not?Why?

* What did other take, and why?

* Where did you go at first?

* How many times did you have to move before you reached

stability? (You have to narrate the story of departure).* Why did you choose that place?

* Was it far away from your house?

* How long did it take you to reach that place?* How long did you spend in that place?

* How were you received as a refugee in the places you

went to?



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* Did the people of your village move to the same places?

* Were you able to find a job quickly after your departure?Tell us about employment/unemployment in general and

finding shelter.* Did you visit your house after the West Bank was occupied

in 1967? If the answer is yes: Did you talk to the Israelisliving in your house? What did you talk about? Did they

allow you to enter your house?

***



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Appendix 2

The Balfour Declaration

2nd November, 1917

The British government decided to endorse the establishment

of a Jewish home in Palestine. After discussions within the

cabinet and consultations with Jewish leaders, the decision

was made public in a letter from British Foreign SecretaryLord Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild. The contents

of this letter became known as the Balfour Declaration.

***

Foreign OfficeNovember 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you. On behalf of His

Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy

with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to,

and approved by, the Cabinet

His Majesty’s Government views with favor the establishment

in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will

use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of thisobject, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done

which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing

non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political



177

status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the

knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours,Arthur James Balfour

***



178

Appendix 3

UN Resolution 194, Right to Return

General Assembly, A/RES/194 (III), 11 December 1948

194 (III). Palestine -- Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator The General Assembly, Having considered further the

situation in Palestine,

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved

through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator

in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation ofPalestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; andExtends its

thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued

efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of threeStates members of the United Nations which shall have the

following functions:

(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing

circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations

Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General

Assembly of 14 May 1948;

(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to

it by the present resolution and such additional functions anddirectives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or

by the Security Council;



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(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any

of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediatoron Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by

resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to theConciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect

to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediatoron Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of

the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of

China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, theUnited Kingdom and the United States of America, shall

present, before the end of the first part of the present session

of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, aproposal concerning the names of the three States which will

constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once,

with a view to the establishment of contact between the partiesthemselves and the Commission at the earliest possible

date;

5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned

to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the

Security Council’s resolution of 16 November 1948 1/ and to

seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with theConciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final

settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to

assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve

a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;



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7. Resolves that the Holy Places - including Nazareth -

religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protectedand free access to them assured, in accordance with existing

rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this endshould be under effective United Nations supervision; that

the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presentingto the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its

detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for

the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations

concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to

the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission shouldcall upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to

give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the

Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakingsshould be presented to the General Assembly for approval;

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three

world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present

municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages andtowns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most

southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (includingalso the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu’fat,

should be accorded special and separate treatment from the

rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United

Nations control;

Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure

the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible

date;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth

regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals



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for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem

area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy fordistinctive groups consistent with the special international

status of the Jerusalem area;

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a UnitedNations representative, who shall co-operate with the local

authorities with respect to the interim administration of the

Jerusalem area;

9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailedarrangements among the Governments and authorities

concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road,

rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately

to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ,

any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements

among the Governments and authorities concerned whichwill facilitate the economic development of the area, including

arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of

transportation and communication facilities;

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to theirhomes and live at peace with their neighbors should bepermitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, andthat compensation should be paid for the property ofthose choosing not to return and for loss of or damageto property which, under principles of international lawor in equity, should be made good by the Governments or



182

authorities responsible; Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the

repatriation, resettlement and economic and socialrehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation,

and to maintain close relations with the Director of the UnitedNations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with

the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such

subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts,acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the

effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under

the present resolution;

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters

at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintainingorder in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures

necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. TheSecretary-General will provide a limited number of guards to

the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress

reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission

to the Security Council and to the Members of the United

Nations;

14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to

co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take allpossible steps to assist in the implementation of the present

resolution;



183

15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary

staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangementsto provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the

terms of the present resolution.* * *



184

Maps

United Nations Partition Plan, Rhodes Armistice Line, 1949



185

Land Ownership and UN Partition Plan, Palestinianvillages depopulated in 1948.



186

Population Movements 1948-1951



Palestinian Refugees: UNRWA Refugee Camps, 2001