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Culture, region, and Thai political diversityRobert B. Albrittona; Sidthinat Prabudhanitisarnba Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, b Department of Sociology and

Anthropology, Chiang Mai University,

To cite this Article Albritton, Robert B. and Prabudhanitisarn, Sidthinat(1997) 'Culture, region, and Thai politicaldiversity', Asian Studies Review, 21: 1, 61 82

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/03147539708713141URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03147539708713141

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Culture, Region, andThai Political DiversityRobert B. Albritton

Depa rtment of Political ScienceNorthern Illinois University

Sidthinat PrabudhanitisarnDepartment of Sociology and AnthropologyChiang Mai University

Culture is not a primordial social force, as some scholars appear to assume.Rather, it represents adaptive responses of social groups to their environments.Because these "social groups" are more diverse than nations, a focus on"national" or "regional" cultures obscures this highly important differentiationoccurring within nations on the basis of geography, ethnicity, or other socialcleavages that reflect differentiations of natural or social environments.Furthermore, cross-cutting cleavages, such as formal culture-popular culture,urban-rural cultures, class cultures, occupational cultures, and other key socialvariables, appear to pose more important sources of behaviour than "traditional"cultural characteristics.Scholars have identified a variety of cultural streams in Thailand thatcorres pon d to sub-national social groupin gs. Eve n the older literature noteshighly important cultural distinctions among interest groups, such as cultures ofthe military or the bureaucracy. 1 This notion of distinct cultural variationsassociated with economic or political interests casts doubt on perspectives thatposit national or regional cultures as homogenous or representative of singlecultural streams.

Recent analysis of attitudes and opinions of Thai respondents indicates thatwhat are regarded as fundamental cultural sourcesnational, religious, and

1 Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu:East-West Center Press, 1966), pp. 326-29; Pisan Suriyamongkol, Institutionalizationof Dem ocratic Political Process in Thailand: A Three-Pronged Democratic Polity(Bangkok: Tham masat University Press, 1988), pp. 4-14; Pasuk Phongpaichit andChris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UniversityPress, 1995), pp. 323-31.


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62 Asian Studies Review Vol. 21 , No. 1

ethnic identificationsm ay be less profound than previously conceived. SuntareeKomin, for example, finds no significant differences between Thai Muslims andBuddhists in fundamental values and behavioural patterns beyond the sphere ofreligious belief.2 Sa-Idi, etal., find little variance in women's roles betweenBuddhist and M uslim communities in Pattani.3More important, perhaps, for modern Thailand, are more fundamentalcultural cleavages associated with modernisation and the movement toward statusas a "newly industrialising country (N IC)". One source of this cleavage is afundamental difference in perspectives between rural and urban areas,4 a sourceof political conflict in virtually all societies. Pasuk Phongpaichit and ChrisBaker have carried the distinction between rural and urban cultures a stepfurther. They suggest that fundamental political and social cleavages in Thaisociety represent more than conventional antinomies between urban and ruralclasses; rather, the urban-rural cleavage represents a more fundamental divisionbetween those who have adapted their culture to accommodate participation inthe global economy (urban-Bangkok) versus those who have benefited less (rural-provinces) and who are repositories of traditional cultures and behaviours of thevillage:Members of the new urban society had more and more difficulty finding[traditional Thai culture] relevant to their lives and lifestyles .. .. Th e [economic]boom stopped Thailand thinking of itself as a rural nation The urban middleclass began to rework the practice of Buddhism to meet their new aspirations andto cope with their new insecurities. Popular culture began to change the meaningof a Chinese origin . Intellectuals and artists began to recast history to give bette rroots to the new urban society.5

More importantly, for students of politics, is the fact that culture is not, primafacie, the same as political culture. Although cultural patterns may contribute toformulations of political culture, theory has not established clearly how ethnicity,religion, or other cultural manifestations convert to specific attitudes or behav-

2 Suntaree Kom in, Psychology of the Thai People (Bangkok: National Institute ofDevelopment Administration, 1991), pp. 91-94.3 A nn Sa-Idi, Kuson Nakachart Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Sunandpattira Nilchang andDwight Y. King, "Women in Rural, Southern Thailand: A Study of Roles, Attitudes,and Ethno-religious Differences", Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 21 (1996),

81-98.4 Jim Logerfo, "Attitudes Toward Democracy among Bangkok and Rural NorthernThais", Asian Survey 36 (1996), 904-23.5 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand's Boom (St. Leonards, Australia: Allenand Unwin, 1996), pp. 137-40.


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July 1997 Culture, Region, and Thai Political Diversity 63

iours toward government. Emphasis upon political entities, such as nations,leads scholars to blur distinctions between the two and the literature often impliespolitical significance from highly personalised attitudes and opinions that, moreappropriately, relate to concepts of personal efficacy, "post-materialism" and"achievement motivation",6 or to policy values or orientations.7Although conventional wisdom suggests that religious differences in Thailandresult in highly differentiated orientations to political activity, Albritton, et al.,show that, in southern Thailand, there are no significant differences betweenBuddhists and Muslims in their evaluations of government actions, their politicalattentiveness, their political efficacy, or in measures of political culture.8Except for cleavages in support for political parties, a result of interest-groupmobilisation, there is little relevance for positing religious dimensions of cultureas translating into political cleavages.Far more significant than religious differences for political orientations is"ethnic" diversity. Thai-speaking Muslims are more similar to Buddhists (whoare also Thai-speaking) than to their Malay-speaking Muslim counterparts. Infact, ethnic cleavages, based upon language, are a source of political stresswithin the Muslim population of southern Thailand. But, even these stresses arelargely interest-group and socioeconomic status related, rather than cultural intheir origins.9Thus, considerably more thought needs to be directed to the distinctionbetween "culture" and "political culture". Elazar's typology conceives politicalculture as fundamentally distinct from its cultural streams. Although orientationstoward government clearly flow from cultural norms and values, political culturerepresents specific orientations or attitudes as to the appropriate relationship ofcitizens to government. These orientations lead to specific forms of politicalorganisation and activity, so that they exist prior to the institutions, procedures,and rules that frequently serve as products and, therefore, only indicators ofmore fundamental phenomena.10

6 Jim Granato, Ronald Inglehart and David Leblang, "The Effect of Cultural Values onEconomic Development: Theory, Hypotheses, and Some Empirical Tests", AmericanJournal of Political Science 40 (1996), 609-11.

7 Robe rt S. Erilson, Gerald C. Wrig ht, Jr. and John P. McIver, "Political Parties,Public Opinion, and State Policy in the United States", American Political ScienceReview 83 (1996), 729-50.

8 Robert B. Albritton, Phan-Ngam Gothamasan, Noree Jaisai, Mano p Jitpoosa,Sunandpattira Nilchang and Arin Sa-Idi, "Electoral Participation by Southern ThaiBuddhists and Muslims", South East Asia Research 4 (1996), 127-56.9 Ibid.

10 Robert W . Jackman and Ross A. Miller, "A Renaissance of Political Culture?",American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996), 632-59.


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Furthermore, Elazar acknowledges a more complex mixture of culturalstreams than is represented by an analysis of national or regional cultures.

11Dran, et al., take this insight a step further by showing the peculiar configur-ations of political culture streams depending on the geographic boundaries chosenfor analysis.12 Such discrete patterns of political culture are implied byBanfield's13 and Putnam's14 analyses, but not often emphasised within thecontext of cross-national research.Culture and Political Culture in ThailandThis paper explores the applications of "culture" and "political culture" withinthe nation of Thailand. In fact, Thailand, like most societies, is a complex blendof a variety of cultural streams. Thai history has been, in most respects, ahistory of the hegemonisation of a geographic region by Bangkok (read also theformer capitals of Sukothai and Ayuddiya) by the peculiar take of that culturalstream in language, religion, and patterns of political organisation.15 Still,impacts of Chinese cultural streams, Lao, Khmer, Karen, Malay, and a varietyof indigenous cultures have influenced the mix that constitutes the Thai nation.Religious orientations of southern Thais constitute one of the most dramaticcleavages in cultural orientation. Although the national religion of Thailand isTheravada Buddhism, populations in the four southernmost provinces arepredominantly Muslim (in excess of 70 per cent). Because of historical conflictsover assimilationist policies in the southern provinces {changwat), conventionalwisdom assigns major political cleavages to religious differences betweenBuddhism and Islam.Recent analysis of political orientations among southern Thais, however,suggests oth erwise . The basic sources of political cleavage lie not in religiousorientations at all, but rather in ethnic differences represented by language.Muslims who speak Thai in the home, for example, tend to be significantly

11 Danie l Elazar, American F ederalism: A V iew from the States, 3rd edn (New York:Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 124-35.12 Ellen M. Dra n, Robert B. Albritton and Mikel Wyckoff, "Surrogate versus DirectMeasures of Political Culture: Explaining Participation and Policy Attitudes in

Illinois", Publius 21 (1991), 15-30.13 Edw ard C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press ,1958).

14 Robert D . Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).15 Chaiyan Ratch agool, The Rise and Fall of the Thai Absolute Monarchy (Bangkok:White Lotus Press, 1994), pp. 163-74; David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 255.


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closer to Buddhists in their political party orientations than to their Malay-speaking M uslim coun terparts. Fu rther mo re, significant differences in incomeand education, associated with ethnicity, appear to translate into an interest-group-based politics with Malay-speaking Muslims on one side, Buddhists andThai-speaking Muslims on the other. Thai-speaking Muslims tend to findcommonalities of interests with Buddhists, rather than with political agendas ofMalay-speaking Muslims.16At a more fundamental level, however, there is little difference betweenBuddhists and Muslims or between Thai-speakers and Malay-spe akers. Nosignificant differences exist between these groups, for example, in terms ofevaluations of government actions, of political efficacy, or at least one measureof political cultu re. Exce pt for cleavages in associations with political par ties,there are virtually no differences in political orientations that can be associated

with cultural cleavages among southern Thais.17Formal culture, popular culture, rural culture, urban culture, ethnicity,region and languageall provide a multiplicity of cultural streams that arelinked , conce ivably , to political cultures when defined as fundamental attitudesabout relationships between citizens and their governments, and render problem-atic more broadly defined cultural orientations that are the subject ofcontemporary political discourse. Additionally, Phongpaichit and Baker argueexplicitly and implicitly that political cultures are products of individual andsocietal interactions with rapidly changing forces of economic modernisationthat restruc ture percep tual systems about the most a ppropriate roles ofgovernment.18This study examines variations in political cultures and orientations inThailand using a conceptual framework suggested by the discussion above.Based upon probability samples from two regions (north and south), the analysisexam ines variation attributable to three types of factors. Fi rst, the analysisexamines variations associated with indicators of social structure: income andeduc ation. Seco nd, the analysis treats ethnic and cultural streams , especiallylanguage and religion , as sources of political culture orientations. Fina lly, thepaper posits a model based upon geographic regions and rural-urban cleavagesa perspective consistent with the thesis that different experiences with social andeconomic developments within nations may be more important for shapingsignificant aspects of political culture than more gross indicators that coincide

with national or global boundaries.

16 Albritton, et al. , op. cit., pp . 147-48.17 Ibid ., pp . 150-52.18 Phongpaichit and Baker, op. cit., pp. 115-40.


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Data A cquisitionThe analysis that follows is based upon probability samples of respondents in twogeographic regions of Thailand (north and south) in eight changwat (provinces):Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Phayao, and Phrae in the north and Narathiwat,Pattani, Satun, and Yala in the south. These samples were obtained coincidentwith 1992 Thai parliamentary e lections. The latter point is important becausepolitical attitudes and opinions are more salient in the context of electioncampaigns. When election details represent a focus of the inquiry, the saliencyof political parties, issues, and candidates in elections virtually dictate thatsurveys designed to elicit reliable responses be conducted in conjunction withelection cam paigns.The data for this study were obtained by a process of cluster samplingelection precincts, followed by systematic sampling of individuals across selectedprec incts. The total number of respondents obtained by this method is 399 outof projected 400.The survey was stratified by region, yielding 250 respondents from the northand 149 from the south. The ratio of the samples of these regions is, thus,1.68:1.00, when , in fact, the true population ratio is 2: 1 . For purposes ofgeneralising to the whole population (across all eight changwat), the sample isweighted to conform to the true distribution. When comparing regions, how-ever, the unweighted samples are used.Although the samples were obtained at elections in March (south) and inSeptember (north), respondents are not significantly different on key indicators,such as policy attitudes or levels of interest in and knowledge of the election.Because the analysis undertaken here involves more stable attitudes than thoseassociated with participation or party identificationpolitical efficacy andpolitical culturewe do not believe that this poses a problem for the analysis.This procedure produces a sample that closely conforms to the distribution ofthe population across the eight changwat (provinces). Table 1 indicates that thesample presents a representative profile of the population by changwat; weighted,it provides an accurate representation by region.One interesting outcome of the survey was the under-sampling of women.Experts on Thailand, dubious as to the ability to conduct field surveys in Thairural areas, expressed belief that such an effort would over-sample women.Results were contrary to this expectation. Because the survey in the southernregion was conducted during Ramadan, a holy period of fasting for Muslims,most men identified for the survey were located at their homes. By contrast,women continued to work in their occupations. This meant that, in some cases ,a substitution procedure required interviews with the male resident of the house-hold. The resu lt of this characteristic of the sampling procedure was a sample


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that included 38.1 per cent women, instead of the 49.2 per cent indicated by thenational census, but still within the projected margin of error. 19

Table 1Comparison of the Sample Population to Actual Populationswhen W eighted by R egion, 1992

ChangwatNorth: Chiang MaiChiang RaiPhayaoPhraeSouth: NarathiwatPattaniSatunYala

% of Sample29.316.010.710.711.010.84.96.7

% of Actual Population27.020.49.99.711.110.54.47.0

Sourc e: Survey data and National Statistical Office, T hailand , 1990 data

Attentiveness, Efficacy, and Political CultureA major focus of the data-gathering was on factors affecting electoral attentive-ness of the population. Measures of attentiveness included self-reporting of levelof interest in the election and a rigorous measure of knowledge of the electionthe ability to name candidates and to match those candidates with the appropriatepolitical party . As in most democracies, level of electoral interest was relatedsignificantly to socioeconomic status, specifically, level of education and level ofincom e. Table 2 shows the impact of level of education on level of electoralinterest (level of income has an almost identical impac t). Nearly 50 per cent ofrespondents expressed high levels of interest in contemporary elections.

19 Albritton, et al. , op. cit., p . 133.


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68 Asian Studies Review Vol. 21, No. 1

Table 2Respondent's Interest in Parliamentary Electionsas a Function of Level of Education(weighted by region)

Level ofInterestVery Little

AverageA Great Deal

Column Total

Level of Education (%)Less thanElementary

16.9

31.451.7

9621.6%

Elementary14.1

43.942.0

24054.2%

Secondary10.3

42.047.7

5211.8%

Post-Secondary

26.173.9

5512.4%

RowTotal5512.5%

17238.7%21648.7%443100.0%

Chi-Square = 24.054 Cramer's V = 0.16471 Significance = 0.0005

The ability to match parties with candidates was also highly related to educa-tional attainment (as well as income). W ell over 60 per cent of persons with atleast a post-secondary education were able to match at least three or more candi-dates with their correct political party and 38 per cent were able to identify fouror more (Table 3) . In these regions of Thailand, factors affecting v oter atten-tiveness are consistent with experiences of other democracies.One of the most significant factors affecting political attentiveness in mostdemocracies is the level of political efficacy, that is, a belief in the politicaleffectiveness of individuals operating in democratic systems. The data alsoinclude a political efficacy score based upon traditional measures of the conceptin National Election Studies of the United States.20 Analysis of variance ofthese scores shows that beliefs in efficacy of political citizenship are also highlyassociated with levels of education (Table 4).

20 Ibid., 1996, Appendix I.


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Table 3Knowledge of Elections, Expressed as Ability to Associate Candidateswith Parties in Parliamentary Elections as a Function of Education

(weighted sample)

Number ofCandidatesRespondentcan Match0

1

2

3

4

Column Total

Level of Education (%)Less thanElementary

43.1

14.5

8.3

24.7

9.4

9621.5%

Elementary25.5

11.3

20.4

21.8

20.9

24054.1%

Secondary17.5

17.2

19.1

34.0

12.2

5211.7%

Post-Secondary

3.9

12.8

12.8

31.2

39.3

5612.6%

RowTotal

11425.6%5712.9%7416.7%

11125.1%8819.7%

44 4100.0%

Chi-Square = 52.435 Cramer's V = 0.1 983 4 Significance = 0 .00 00

One intriguing result of the analysis is that level of income has virtually noimpac t on sense of political efficacy. Only education appears to structureorientations towa rd the political system in this regard . Although income andeducation are highly correlated, effects of these factors are often independent ofeach other in affecting attitudes and opinions in Thailand.The data also include indicators of respondents' understanding of relation-ships of citizens to government. The indicators are based upon Daniel Elaza r'stypology that yields scores on three dimensions of citizen orientation: individual-istic cultu re, moralistic culture , and traditionalistic culture . Questions indicatingthese three dimensions produce corresponding factors.21 In contrast to the UScontext in which individualistic political culture characterises the population as a

21 Ibid., p. 143.


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whole, the most important dimension of Thai political orientation proves to betraditionalism.

22This means that a major d ifferentiation in Thai societyrevolves around the degree to which citizens accept elite domination of politicalleadership.

Table 4Analysis of Variance of Impacts of Educationon Political Efficacy and Political Culture(weighted by region)

Political EfficacvLess than elementaryElementarySecondaryPost-secondaryTotalR =

Political Culture (Traditionalism')Less than elementaryElementarySecondaryPost-secondaryTotalR =

N8118248533640.30

7017044553390.02

Mean7.668.399.508.69

-0.060.04-0.04-0.01

F-Ratio11.38

0.19

F-Prob,0.000

0.905

Using factor scores based upon the traditionalism factor, the data are analysedfor correspondences with education and income. Neither of these demographiccharacteristics appear to be related to any of the dimensions of political culture(Table 4 ). The sources of political culture appear to be rooted in characteristicsother than socioeconomic status, a finding that suggests an independent role forpolitical culture from conventional behavioural models. Considerable insight intothis finding comes from an analysis of differences between Buddhists andMuslims in the southern Thai sample.

22 Ibid., p. 145.


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The Role of Culture in Thai Political CultureSocial stratification by socioeconomic status and education is one of the mostcritical factors differentiating Buddhists and Muslims in southern Thailand.Table 5 shows the strong association between ethnicity and level of education forthese diverse cultural groups in the southern Thai sample. The associationbetween ethnicity and level of income is virtually identical.23

Table 5Level of Education by Ethnicity in Southern Thai Sample

Level ofEducationLess than elementaryElementary

Secondary or higherColumn Total

EthnicityThai-Buddhists4.3

37.0

58.74631.5%

Thai-Muslims15.852.6

31.61913.0%

Malay-Muslims28.451.9

19.88155.5%

RowTotal2819.2%6947.3%4933.6%

146100.0%Chi-Square = 23.770 Cram er's V = 0.28532 Significance = 0.00009

Table 5 also shows that Thai-speaking Muslims are significantly better off thantheir Malay-speaking counterparts, in terms of education. Although Buddhistsare characterised by significantly higher levels of income and education thaneither of their Muslim counterparts, Thai-speaking Muslims also have asignificant advantage relative to Malay-speakers in the four southern provinces.Because Buddhists have significantly higher levels of education and income

23 Ibid., 1996, Table 5.


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72 Asian Studies Review Vol. 21, No. 1

those characteristics associated with higher levels of political knowledge andinterestone would expect that Buddhists would have higher levels of politicalinterest in and knowledge of the election.Tables 6 and 7 do not support this expectation. The data reveal no signifi-cant differences among Thai-speaking Buddhists, Thai-speaking Muslims, andMalay-speaking Muslims. Although higher levels of education and incomepromote higher levels of interest in and knowledge of the election, Muslims,both Thai-speaking and Malay-speaking, who lag behind their Buddhist counter-parts on socioeconomic dimensions, appear to have compensated with levels ofinterest and knowledge higher than expected. Controlling for socioeconomicstatus, Muslims outperform Buddhists in their knowledge of and interest in theparliamentary elections.

Table 6Interest of Respondents in Thai Parliamentary Electionsby Ethnicity in Southern Thailand

Level of Interestin the ElectionVery littleAverageVery much

Column Total

EthnicityThai-Buddhists8.7

45.745.7

4631.5%

Thai-Muslims15.831.652.6

1913.0%

Malay-Muslims17.346.935.8

8155.5%

RowTotal2114.4%6544.5%6041.1%

146100.0%Chi-Square = 3.767 Cramer's V = 0.11357 Significance = 0.43852

Because citizens with lower levels of education tend to have a lower sense ofpolitical efficacy, one might expect to find that Muslims in southern Thailandscore low er on this political indicator. On the other hand, the find ing of no


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significant differences between Buddhists and Muslims in political attentivenesssuggests that there would be no marked differences between Buddhists andMuslims in political efficacy.

Table 7Number of Candidates Respondent can Identify by Political Partyas a Function of Ethnicity in Southern Thailand(unweighted sample)

Number ofCandidatesCorrectlyIdentified

012

3 or more

Column Total

Ethnicity (%)Thai-BuddhistsLOO

21.719.619.639.1

4631.3%


60.0

2013.6%

Malay--Muslims3.0030.9

8.616.044.4

8155.1%

RowTotal

4127.9%1812.2%2215.0%6644.9%

147100.0%Chi-Square = 8.934 Cram er's V = 0.17432 Significance = 0.1773 1

An analysis of variance shows no significant differences between Buddhists andMuslims. Although scores of Buddhists are slightly higher than those of Malay-speaking Muslims, these differences are well within chance probabilities, that is,not statistically significant. Furth erm ore, Thai-speaking Muslims have higherpolitical efficacy scores than Buddhists, but these differences are non-significantas we ll. In fact, the only significant difference is that Thai-speaking Muslimsappear to feel more politically efficacious than their Malay-speaking Muslimcounterparts (Table 8).


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74 Asian Studies Review Vol . 21 , No. 1

Table 8Analysis of Variance in Indicators of Political Efficacy and Political Cultureby Ethnicity in Southern Thailand:Thai-Buddhists, Thai-Muslims and Malay-Muslims

Political EfficacvThai-BuddhistsThai-Musl imsMalay-Musl ims

TotalThai-BuddhistsThai-Musl ims

TotalThai-Musl imsMalay-Musl ims

TotalThai-BuddhistsMalay-Musl ims

TotalPolitical CultureTraditionalistic: Thai-Buddhists

Thai-MuslimsMalay-Muslims

TotalIndividualistic: Thai-BuddhistsThai-Muslims

Malay-MuslimsTotal

Moralistic: Thai-BuddhistsThai-MuslimsMalay-MuslimsTotal

N

361869

1233618541869873669

105

391863

120391863

120391863

120

Mean

9.083310.00008.8261

9.083310.0000

10.00008.8261

9.08338.8261

-0.0561-0.16010.0285

-0.08180.05770.0439

-0.0352-0.06110.0625

F-Ratio

2.3966

2.8691

4.5451

0.3710

0.2785

0.2164

0.1694

F-Prob.

0.0954

0.0963

0.0359*

0.5438

0.7574

0.8058

0.8444

* Sig. < 0.05


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The data also include scores on the dimension of traditionalism in politicalculture . Although southern Thais also differentiate themselves in understandingtheir relationship to government along dimensions suggested by Elazar, analysisshows that these dimensions of political culture do not discriminate betweenBuddhist and Muslim communities.The one area showing marked differences between Buddhists and Muslims insouthern Thailand is in identification with political parties by the respectivegrou ps. Over three-fourths of respondents naming at least one political partynamed either New Aspirations, Democrat, or Moral Unity parties. On thisdimension, there are clear demarcations between Buddhists and Muslims.Table 9 shows that Buddhists strongly identify with the Democrat Party, whileMalay-speaking Muslims identify with New Aspirations.

Table 9Identification with Major Political Parties by Southern Thai Ethnicity

Party ID

Kwam Wang MaiSamakeetamPrachatipat

Column Total

EthnicityThai-Buddhists.32.4

2.964.7

3434.3%


1313.1%

Malay-Muslims67.319.213.5

5252.5%

RowTotal

5151.5%1313.1%3535.4%99100.0%

Chi-Square = 25.347 Cram er's V = 0.35779 Significance = 0.00004

One of the most interesting aspects of the study is that Thai-speaking Muslimsare closer to Buddhists in partisan identification than they are to Malay-speakingMuslims (Table 9) , a finding that argues for an interest-group basis for partypolitics , rather than a cultural interpretation. These cleavages between Thai-


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speaking Muslims and Malay-speaking Muslims became an even more pronoun-ced political division during the 1995 parliamentary elections, when Muslimrepresentatives were elected to all parliamentary seats in the four southernprovinces.To summarise, the data show clear stratification by education and incomecoinciding with ethnic orientations: Thai-speaking Buddhists, Thai-speakingMuslims, and Malay-speaking M uslims. However, M uslims compensate for theimpact of these disparities on electoral attentiveness and political efficacy toequal (and sometimes exceed) Buddhists. Even potent indicators of culture, suchas language and religion, do not differentiate the populations of southernThailand as far as political interest, knowledge, efficacy, and, most importantly,political culture are concerned. The major source of differentiation comes aboutin their respective orientations to political parties aggregating interests ofBuddhists and Muslims in the politics of the region, a finding that points more tointerest-based, rather than cultural, distinctions.Regional Differences in Thai Political O rientationsThe major hypothesis of this study is that Thai society is highly differentiated byvalues and political orientations associated with geographic regions of the countryand with an urban-rural cleavage. In order to test these hypotheses, the analysiscompares regions by the variables discussed aboveinterest in elections, know-ledge of elections, sense of political efficacy, and political culture.In examining the association of these variables with the urban-rural cleavage,the analysis shows little difference in levels of political interest. There aresignificant differences between these areas in terms of political knowledge(p < 0.006), political efficacy (p < 0.017), and political culture (traditionalism)(p < 0.03 8). Howev er, these associations prove to be largely a function ofdifferences in educational levels. When relative impacts of the urban-rural cleav-age are examined controlling for education, the role of the urban-rural indicatorvanishes (Table 10).One problem with this finding lies in the examination of differences between"municipal" and "non-municipal" areas, with some of the municipal areas beingcommunities of only ten thousand peoplehardly different from their surround-ings. Log erfo's findings of differences in political orientations in a comparisonof respondents in Bangkok and northern Thai provinces are more likely to revealeffects of the rural-urban cleavage by maximising variance on this indicator.However, because he does not control for education, the true role of urban-ruralculture is inconclusive.24

24 Logerfo, op cit . , p p . 920-23.


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Table 10Analysis of Variance in Indicators of Political Efficacy and Political Cultureby Urban-Rural Location of Respondents, Controlling for Education

Political EfficacvMain EffectsUrban-RuralEducationInteractionR =

Political Culture ^Traditionalism}Main EffectsUrban-RuralEducationInteractionR =

F-Test

8.7802.4389.5930.3080.316

1.4633.5510.4762.9340.138

Sig. of F

0.0000.1190.0000.820

0.2130.0610.6990.034

Examination of the impacts of region (north-south) on the measures of politicalorientation produces a very different result. Table 11 shows that there isvirtually no differentiation by region, in terms of political knowledge. Althoughboth regions are characterised by relatively high levels of political knowledge,they do not differ on this indicator in significant respects. He re, region has nomore impact than religion or ethnicity.When political efficacy is examined, however, the picture is quite different.An analysis of variance of political efficacy scores shows that southern Thais areconsiderably more "efficacious" politically than respondents in the northernprovinces (Table 12). Table 12 also shows that political culture is significantlydifferentiated by region. Southern Thais are significantly more "traditionalist" intheir political orientations than northern Thai counterparts, although they do notdiffer significantly on "moralistic" or "individualistic" dimensions.One plausible rival hypothesis to this finding is that the analysis reallyrepresents comparisons between northern Thai Buddhists and southern ThaiMuslims , who compose two-thirds of the southern Thai sample. In order to testthis hypothesis, Table 13 presents an analysis identical to Table 12, w ithMuslims omitted from the sample, thus comparing northern Thai Buddhists withsouthern Thai Buddhists.


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Table 11Effects of Region (North-South) on Knowledge of Elections

Number of CandidatesRespondent can Identifywith Political Party01234

Column Total

Region (%)North24.813.217.226.018.8

25062.7%

South27.512.115.422.822.1

14937.3%

RowTotal10325.8%5112.8%6616.5%9924.8%8020.1%

399100.0%Chi-Square = 1.437 Cram er's V = 0.06000 Significance = 0.838

The results indicate that region is clearly the operative cause of differencesbetween southern and northern Thais. The analysis, presented in Table 13, isvirtually identical to that in Table 12, in which Muslims a re included. Theresults simply reinforce the previous findin g that there are no significant differ-ences between Buddhists and Muslims and enhance the probability that politicalefficacy and political culture are functions of regional differences.


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Table 12Analysis of Variance in Indicators of Political Efficacy and Political Cultureby Region (North-South)

Political EfficacvNorthSouth TotalR =

Political Culture (Traditionalism)NorthSouth TotalR =

N

2021253270.260

1891133020.199

Mean

8.089.08

-0.150.26

F-Test

23.640

12.329

Sig. of F

0.000

0.001

Table 13Analysis of Variance in Indicators of Po litical Efficacy and Political Cultureby Region (Buddhists only)

Political EfficacvNorthSouth TotalR =

Political Culture (Traditionalism")NorthSouth TotalR =

N

200382380.222

1874022 70.150

Mean

8.079.11

-0.150.25

F-Test

33.895

5.182

Sig. Of F

0.001

0.024


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Finally, we consider the possibility that educational differences that have signifi-cant impacts on political efficacy (though not on political culture) may overrideregional variation s in producing differences in political efficacy or po liticaltraditiona lism. Tab le 14 presents an analysis of these possibilities in a factorialdesign that enables us to examine the relative impacts of education and region.

Table 14Analysis of Variance in Indicators of Political Efficacy and Political Culture

by Region (North-South) Controlling for Education

Political EfficacvMain EffectsRegionEducationInteractionR =

Political Culture (Traditionalism")Main EffectsRegionEducationInteractionR =

F-Test

14.38922.31210.9293.5180.387

4.40215.1961.6324.6020.233

Sig. of F

0.0000.0000.0000.015

0.0020.0000.1820.004

As in Table 4, the analysis still shows strong, positive impacts of education onpolitical efficacy. Ho we ver , Tab le 14 also indicates significant independ enteffects of region , producing ev en highe r levels of political efficacy. Fu rthe r-mo re, the effects of region are considerably stronger than even education. Theclear implication is that while social status, as education, contributes signifi-cantly, factors associated with region are even more significant in accounting forsense of political efficacy.

Tab le 14 also supports the earlier analysis of the relationship be twe eneduc ation, reg ion, and traditionalistic political culture . As in Table 4 , educationproves to have no significant impact, but region continues to have a highlysubstantial impac t in producing traditional political culture. The more com plex


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factorial design thus supports the analysis in Table 12, while ruling out possiblespurious associations with differences in educational levels by region.The analysis in Tables 12-14 documents strong impacts of region on orienta-tions of northern and southern Thais toward politics. Southern Thais turn out tohave substantially higher levels of political efficacy, but also higher levels oftraditionalism, that is, acceptance of elite-dominated politics. By contrast, north-ern Thais are less oriented toward an elite-dominated political culture, but, at thesame time, are less politically efficacious.Sources of Political Diversity in ThailandAnalyses of the data show a complex resolution of social forces affecting polit-ical orientations in Thailand. Clearly, levels of education and incomethat is,socioeconomic status in societysubstantially account for levels of politicalinterest and knowledge. This finding is consistent with expectations based uponstudies across a wide variety of polities and cultures. One conclusion, then, isthat the behavioural model is one stream affecting orientations toward politicalexperience.But, equally clearly, socioeconomic status or class interest is not the onlyfactor affecting political orientations of the Thai people. There are cleavages incultural experiences between rural and non-rural society. How ever, these proveto be the result of a spurious relationship with education.By far the most significant component for explaining political efficacy andpolitical culture is "region". Results of the analysis show large and significantdiversity in sense of political efficacy and traditionalism in political culture thatare based only in regional contexts. Even when other factors are controlled,region stands out as a potent predictor of citizen orientations on these variables.What are the characteristics of "region" that result in diverse levels ofpolitica l efficacy and political culture? This is a more difficult question. Onehypothesis is that northern and southern regions represent diverse culturalstreams of history, geography, and economic orientation that produce attitudestoward democracy and the state represented by Logerfo's typology. W e believethat the varied cultural experiences form the nexus between "culture" and"political culture" in the case of Thailand.

The problem is that "region" remains a "dummy" variable whose content isopaque to scholars. It "explains", but does not "reveal" the intricacies orcomplexities of the role of regional variations on Thai political orientations.What is important for this study, however, is the clearly identifiable diversitythat exists within the nation of Thailand across regions. This demonstrates that"political culture" has its origins, not only in historic, ethnic streams, but also inthe interactions with contemporary forces of modernisation and development.


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82 Asian Studies Review Vol . 21, No. 1

Phongpaichit and Baker are right to emphasise the evolution of culture and polit-ical culture in encounters with these forces.The picture presented here (of a dynamic, evolutionary, cultural develop-ment), creates problems for notions of static and enduring value systems rootedin European or Asian value perspectives. As Phongpaichit and Baker argue,Thai culture has adapted to the forces of world markets and an increasinglyglobal society. This is no different from the European experience. As Weberand others have noted, the cultural synthesis of European society was hostile tonascent capitalism; Protestantism evolved as an ethos-environment that couldaccommodate and provide cultural support as an adaptation to free markets andcapitalistic enterprise, not as their cause.Today, Asian cultures are adapting to demands of market economies andthose cultures will change to the extent that is necessary in order to accommodatethe new economic forces. Democracy is the political ethos that is most accom-modating to market forcesbut not in all respects. To the extent that masspublics are left out of national economic developments, democracy may makedemands for constraints on pure free-market enterprise.These widespread and diverse encounters with modernisation and develop-ment are, apparently, highly varied within nationsacross socioeconomicbackgrounds, regional, urban and other geographical features of a nation. Forall their weaknesses as measurements, diversities of northern and southernregions of Thailand may be more accurate descriptors of true Thai culture thanany "dummy" variable representing Thailand as a whole.Identification of this deep and widespread cultural diversity in Thailand hasbroad implications. If culture is a set of shared values and practices, as mostscholars agree, the boundaries of those shared values and practices is not acasual matter. If nations, or even regions of the world, are assumed to be theirconfines, what does it say about the role of culture if variance within nations orregions turns out to be greater than variations among them? At the very least, itwould be mortal for the East-West cultural relativity debate over indigenousdemocracies25 and would provide support for applications of general theoreticalframeworks to politics of nations instead of an emphasis on idiosyncrasies ofsocieties, rather than their universa lities. Now that Thailand has achieved itsgargantuan objective of nation-building, scholars can turn their attention to thesedimensions, that may prove far more significant for understanding politicalculture and its effects than comparisons of national and global-regionalcharacteristics.

25 Samuel Hun tington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (1993).

thai culture region political

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