terrorism report

8/2/2019 Terrorism Report

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Terrorism:A Brief for Americans

The Scope, Causes, and Means for Reducing Terrorism,Including Commentary on Iraq

A Report from American Respect andthe New America Foundation American Strategy Program


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Terrorism: A Brief for AmericansThe Scope, Causes, and Means for Reducing Terrorism, Including Commentary on Iraq

Richard W. Vague

February 2007

American RespectPO Box 26324

Wilmington, DE 19899 www.americanrespect.com www.americaspurpose.org

[email protected]


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People dont rebel because they are poor but because they are excluded system. o give people a stake in the economy, to prove to them that govis in the business o including them in ormal society, is to put the terro

o business. Hernando de Soto

Force does not subdue, it enrages. American Respect essay, September 2004

Te Marshall Plan or Europe stands as the greatest vindication o targument that the tactics o terror must never be met with like behavi

Caleb Carr

With malice toward none. Abraham Lincoln


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7/48Terrorism: A Brief for Americans -

On November 7, 2006 Americans went to thepolls and registered a deep concern on the course

o the war in Iraq. For months ahead o the mid-term elections, they understood what leadersin the White House re used to acknowledge: A region spiraling downward in violence andbloodshed. American troops with no exitstrategy. Most horri c o all, U.S. soldiers Americas nesttortured, killed and mutilatedin a war making no observable progress inachieving the promised reduction in terrorism.

We hold the view that there is a better plan

or exiting Iraq, one that is based on a clearerunderstanding o both thatcountrys history and thecivil war underway therenow . We also hold theview that there is a betterpath to reducing terrorismthat is very di erent thanthe one currently beingpursued. Tis new path adheres to the valuesthat have made this country greatjustice andstrength combined with respect, humility andinclusivenessand, i ollowed, can rea rm thisgreatness. Unlike the current course, this planis built upon a recognition and understandingo the causes and nature o terrorism.

Simply put, U.S. policies and actions in Iraqand throughout the world have increased world terrorism. Te predictions made by ouradministration regarding the war have been

badly wrongpredictions regarding how quickly it would end, how much it would cost,how we would be greeted as liberators, andhow terrorism would decline as a result. Now predictions are no longer even o ered.

Te predictions have been wrong becausetheir view o the cause o terrorism is wrong.Tere ore the plan or de eating terrorism also

has been wrong. By leading our nest into th wrong war, and leaving them there too lon

we have put them in an untenable situationHaditha and Abu Ghraib are the ailure o oleadership in Washington, not our soldiers othe ront lines.

ragically, the Administrations policies, oundon misunderstanding, will most probably lead the ascendance o yet another repressive regor regimes in Iraq as the only way to restoorder to the country. But the damage will nobe limited to that country alone. Our mistake

in Iraq will haunt us throughout the region anbeyond. Violent terrorismhas accelerated and spreaMore livesmilitary anciviliancertainly will blost.

Our thesis is thisextremists who comm

acts o terror exist in virtually all religions societies, including our own. Te most seriouproblems with terrorism occur in countrieor regions where extremists have gained tsympathy and support o a broad populatioGenerally, that receptive population is endurinoppression or occupation. Te most e ective way to eliminate that support, to isolateanthus neutralizeextremists, is to overcomoccupation or oppression. And the moe ective way to achieve that is through trua decentralized and representative governme

Opportunity must replace despair.

Crucially, power cannot be decentralized ina democracy i economic opportunity a wealth are not also decentralized in close the same time rame. Economic developmeis an integral and indispensable part o tequation.

U.S. policies and actionsin Iraq and throughoutthe world have increasedworld terrorism.

IntroductIon


8/48 - Terrorism: A Brief for Americans

Many new plans and policy alternatives arenow being put orward, including the report o the Iraq Study Group. Most, however, are builton these same misunderstandings that led us to where we stand today. Increasing the numbero troops will not bring real progress in Iraq.Military strategy cannot be properly set untilthe political situation is rightly understood.

Nothing can excuse the horrors o terrorism. Yet terrorists are not born. Tey are createdby external orces. Tis essay will explain thecauses o terrorism, o er a solution to reducingterrorism, and outline a realistic path orward.Tis is not an exclusive, or unique, view.Rather, it incorporates, distills and synthesizesmuch that has been written by historians andcommentators in this area, analyses that

un ortunatelyhave accurately orecast theevents o the last three years. We cite the workso those experts here to augment our ownopinions and buttress our recommendations.Tis essay points to a path away rom ourdilemma and toward better times.

Tis essay addresses these issues:

What is terrorism? Why they hate us How to reduce terrorism What we have wrought in Iraq What we should do in Iraq Toughts on Palestine, Lebanon and

Iran How we should conduct relations with

Islamic countries going orward Te current administrations position

on Iraq and terrorism

Robert Wright wrote in his July 16, 2006article on progressive realism,Exploring the root causes o bad behavior, ar rom being a sentimentalist weakness, in orms the de t use o real power. Arthur Schlesinger wrote,Te great strength o history in a ree society is its capacity or sel -correction.

We heartily agree.

On a personal note, as primary author o thisessay, I must state that I am a businessperson andhave rarely been deeply involved or interestedin politics. When I have, it has almost alwaysbeen to support conservative policies andcandidates. However, my passion is history,and because o that, I have been speaking outsince be ore the invasion o Iraq against whathistory has shown would be the ine ectivenesso this administrations approach to the war onterror. My motives have included the sa ety o amily and riends as well as the avoidanceo death and destruction in Iraq. I believe ourcurrent course is making things worse. I alsosee rsthand the detrimental e ects o this waron U.S. business. A ter the invasion, a barrelo oil spiked rom $28 to over $70, short-terminterest rates climbed by 4.25 percent, the U.S.

de cit grew to record levels and global tradeacrucial engine o Americas business growth was impacted.

We hope that you will take the ew minutesneeded to read this essay. It is a message that wehope will be heard.

Richard W. Vague American businessman and concerned citizenFebruary 2007Philadelphia, Pennsylvania



In virtually every society and historical era therehave been extremists who have used the tactics

o terror to advance their causes. From WhiteSupremacists, the Black Panthers and anti-government militia movements in America, tothe anarchists in Europe and America in theearly 20th century, to the IRA in Ireland and theRed Army in Japan in the a termath o World War II, extremists have arisen using bombs andvarious means o terror to attack others in a way calculated to bring attention to their causeand infict damagedirectly or indirectlyonthe perceived enemies o that cause.

Tere have been excellent works, includingMarc SagemansUnderstanding error Networks ,Lawrence Wrights Te Looming ower , andMichael Lind and Peter Bergens A Mattero Pride (Democracy: A Journal o Ideas , Winter 2007), which have shown that the core

members o theseextremist groupsare o ten youngmen, in many cases pro essionaland well-to-do, who join becauseo alienation,humiliation anddisa ection andthrough thepull o socialand recruitingnetworks. Tese

groups o tencome to embracestrong -ismsreligionsor ideologies,

including communism, ascism or the dictao a charismatic leaderthat bring a senseo purpose and a oundation or their causes.But disa ection and alienation, not religion or

ideology, are the common threads that binthese groups.

O the thousands o such groups that existhave existed, the validity o their causes is oquestionable or worse. One element remaiconsistent throughout time and geographyhowever. Tese extremists believe themselvdenied the resources or opportunity to advanctheir cause through conventional means. Teybelieve acts o terrorism will gain them accand relie .

Te historian Jay Winik, in a book about the American Civil War written be ore the 9/attacks and the current Iraq war, describes w what terrorists are and why terrorists succeeIn reading this passage, where Winik uses thterm guerillathe term coined to describthe terrorists ghting Napoleonsubstitutthe term terrorist:

[G]uerrilla war are is and always has been the very essence o how the weak make war against the strong. Insurrectionist,subversive, chaotic, its methods are o ten chosen instinctively,but throughout time, they have worked with astonishing regularity.By luring their adversaries into endless, utile pursuit, guerrillas erode not just the enemys strength, but, ar more

importantly, the enemys morale as well. (Jay Winik, April 1865,HarperCollins, 2001, pp 147-8)

Te act that a weak group resorts to terroristactics to ght the strong does not excuse thhorror and repugnance o their acts, but it ispattern that is well-established.

What Is t errorIsm ? W hat c auses o thers to be Influenced by t errorIsts ?

TomPaine.com Reprinted with permission.



In a comprehensive study o thousands o terrorist activities rom the past hal century, William Eubank and Leonard Weinbergconclude that such actions occur most o ten instable democracies and suggest that is becauseo the openness and reedom within thesesocieties. (Tey cite such examples as the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Ku KluxKlan in the United States.) But the extremistscommitting these terrorist acts rarely gain truly broad acceptance within a stable democracy because there are other available options toexpress discontent, notably the ballot.

Te terms terrorists, extremists, insurgents,guerrillas, jihadists and undamentalistshave been used reely and in many casesinterchangeably in discussions o al Qaeda, Iraq,

Lebanon, Palestine and the Mideast. Tis hasadded much con usion and imprecision to thediscussions. For our purposes, and in this thesis,our working de nition will be this: errorismis a method or a weaker group, most o tenan extremist group, to ght an establishmentor those in power. errorism can include any number o violent tacticsincluding targetedguerrilla attacks on small and unsuspectingparts o that in-power groups military, and/orthe intentional targeting o civilians or politicalpurposes. Te extremist group o ten uses an -ism as a cause or source o ideological strengthagainst the perceived oppressors or occupiersthus the terms jihadism and undamentalism todescribe these movements in the Middle East.I the extremist cause resonates, it will spreadto a broader population. I large enough, it willtrigger a civil war.

Our concernone o the keys to this essayare those situations where the issues advancedby the extremists come to be shared by a truly broad constituency within a country or a ectedgroup. Tat occurs when the issue in confictresonates and there exist no bona de channels

or that broad population to nd redress.

Across time and geography, extremism mosto ten takes root and gains support only insituations where occupation and/or oppression

exist. In these circumstances, those holdingpower ail to adequately provide the a ectedpopulation with any voice in government,property rights, opportunity or economicadvancement, and personal reedom andsa ety. Tis is o ten accompanied by wholesalegovernment corruption and harsh suppressiono dissenting voices. Te deprived eelpowerless and humiliated. It is no coincidencethat governments ailure to provide these basicneedsespecially property rights and a truevoice in governancealmost always creates orexacerbates extreme poverty. Te truly poorare o ten receptive listeners to the message o extremists and become ready recruits or theircause.

Oppression, as we de ne it here, has taken the

orm o a strong, repressive central governmentsuch as existed in Saudi Arabia, Peru, and Egypt,or the decentralized chaos o warlords, as hasbeen the case in A ghanistanbecause in bothexamples the basic obligations o governmentdescribed above are not met. Hear the voice o Carlos Marighella, writing in Brazil in 1969 inhis Minimanual o the Urban Guerrilla:

Te urban guerrilla is animplacable enemy o the regime,and systematically in icts damage on the authorities and on the people who dominate the country and exercise power.Te primary task o the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear down, to demoralize the military regime and its repressive orces,and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property o the oreignmanagers and the Brazilianupper class.

We will also include in our de nition theoppression o a cultural, ethnic or religiousgroup such as the Basques in Spain and theSerbian and Albanian situation in Kosovo. Insome cases, these extremists are establishedor supported by an external state or entity.However, even in these cases, extremism will



not take root unless the message resonates withthe general populace.

Examples o occupation, under whatever guise,include the Soviet occupation o A ghanistan which led ultimately to a generation o terroristsincluding the aliban and Al Qaeda; the Frenchoccupation o Algeria which spawned the FLN,and the British occupation o Ireland whichultimately produced the IRA.

Importantly, whether a given population is justi ed in its perception o occupation oroppression is not within the scope o this paperto debate, and not all occupation or oppressionleads directly to extremism. However, one thingis certain: or extremists to be harbored by thebroad population, the perception o occupation

or oppression has to be widely shared.Te Middle East is a breeding ground orterrorism because dictatorships and economicinequality abound. As Lawrence Wright wrote,re erring to Al Qaeda and those recruited to the A ghan resistance to the Soviets:

It was death, not victory in A ghanistan that summoned many young Arabs to Peshawar. Te lure o an illustrious and meaning ul death was especially power ul in cases where the pleasures and rewards o li e were crushed by government oppressionand economic deprivation.From Iraq to Morocco, Arab governments had sti ed reedomand signally ailed to create wealth at the very time whendemocracy and personal income were sharply climbing in virtually all other parts o the globe. Saudi Arabia, the richest o the lot, was such a notoriously unproductive country that the extraordinary abundance o petroleum had ailed to generate any other signi cant source o income;indeed, i one subtracted the oil

revenue o the Gul countries, 260 million Arabs exported less than 5 million Finns. Radicalismusually prospers in the gap betweenrising expectations and declining opportunities. Tis is especially true where the population is young, idle, and bored; where the art is impoverished; where entertainment--movies, theater,music--is policed or absent altogether; and where young menare set apart rom the consoling and socializing presence o women. Adult illiteracy remains the norm in many Arab countries.Unemployment was among the highest in the developing

world. Anger, resentment and humiliation spurred young Arabs to search or dramatic remedies. (Lawrence Wright, Te Looming

ower, Knop , 2006, pp. 106-107)

Muslim extremists are not qualitatively di erethan extremists o other countries, religionseras. What is di erent isquantitative the acthat there are over 1.3 billion Muslims. I a ti

raction0.01 percento a population that size is extremist, it is a more material issthan i 0.01 percent o the 1.5 million NortheIrelanders were extremist in the 1970s, 0.01 percent o the 20 million Peruvians weextremist in the 1980s, or 0.01 percent o th120 million Russians were extremist in thyears o incubation leading up to the Bolsherevolution. Te sheer size o the pool o tdisa ected merits the attention we put orwain this essay.

In the Muslim world, poverty makes thpopulation receptive to an extremist messagBut the problem goes beyond subsistencPaul Pillar, ormer deputy chie o the Ccounterterrorism center, wrote:

Te challenge is not simply one o poverty Rather, it is one o



closed, state-dominated economies and undemocratic, unresponsive political systems, which deny citizens the opportunity to realize their ull potential and to efect peace ul political change whenthey are dissatis ed with their lack o opportunities. And once people become alienated,it becomes harder to develop the entrepreneurial spirit needed or economic growth and the civic culture needed to make democracy work. (Paul Pillar, errorismand U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001,Brookings, p. xlvi.)

Tis is not a problem con ned to one

geographic region. errorism and its rootcauses are becoming part o a global reality. Writing in 1996, Robert Kaplan noted theconnection between poverty and modern war:

Scholars have been writing more and more about the corrosive efects o overpopulation and environmental degradation inthe third world, while journalists cover an increasing array o ethnic con icts that dont con gure within state borders. O the eighty wars since 1945 orty-six were civil wars or guerrilla [read terrorist] insurgencies. Former UN secretary-general [Javier] Perez de Cuellar called this the new anarchy. In 1993, orty-two countries were immersed inmajor con icts and thirty-sevenothers experienced lesser orms o political violence: Sixty- ve o these seventy-nine countries were in the developing [read poverty-stricken] world. (Robert D.Kaplan, Te Ends o the Earth,Vintage, 1996, p. 8)

Extremists broaden their support by doingtwo things: protesting an unpopular occupier

or government and o ering services thatgovernment does not supply. We shouldnot have been surprised that Hizbollahprovided charitable services such as hospitals,schools, security and nancial support to thedispossessed in its region o Lebanon. Norshould we have been surprised to learn that the

aliban opened schools in A ghanistan. Teirrespective governments simply werent ul llingtheir basic obligations to the citizenry. Examples abound: In Egypt oppression led tothe Muslim Brotherhood; in A ghanistan the

aliban; in remote areas o India, the Naxalites,and the oppression o the sars in Russia led torevolution and Bolshevism.

Tose holding power requently play into the

hands o the extremists, who may start withtactics that are mild. But government reprisalsraise the level o deadliness until both sides arecommitted to an escalating cycle o violenceand become hardened purveyors o extremetactics. Extremists eed on these reprisals andin many cases welcome them, or they winnew adherents to the cause. Popular support isessential i terrorism is to be sustained or longperiods. Ultimately the confict expands into what can rightly be called a civil war.

As the cycle o violence rises, the populationsresentment o its government grows. Tatresentment can spill over to include thegovernments alliese.g. Al Qaedas jihadagainst the United States or its perceiveddisproportionate support o Israel. Somegovernment reprisals rise to extraordinary levelswitness Putin and Kadryov inChechnya. Although governmental authoritiesthere appear to have beaten back terrorism,they have only driven it underground or anextended period where it will mutate into amore virulent orm.

As mentioned, the oppressive conditions thatlead to extremism and enhance its appeal amongthe dispossessed are requently accompaniedby -isms or ideologies that provide a rallyingmessage, a promise o solutions. Tis can be



a religion, a philosophy or the dogma o acharismatic leader that gives meaning to theextremism and potentially provides the broadpopulation a psychological sa e harbor againstoppression.

In a number o Muslim countries, thishas mani ested itsel in an extremist, or undamentalist, orm o the Islamic religion.Te extremists message is this: secularism andmodernity have disrupted lives and produceddictatorships, poverty and discrimination. Teonly way to restore purpose, dignity and socialorder is to turn away rom this corrupted ormo Islam, casting out the secular and alsely religious establishment. Te oppressors are evil,it is claimed. Tey and their allies, includingthe West, must be overcome.

For Islamic undamentalists, the primary enemy here is not the United States and the West, but rather the Muslim establishment, which has ailed to prevent the corruption o abelie and to protect Muslim society rom theunholy infuence o the secular world, a worldthat has only brought poverty and misery tomany. According to Reza Aslan:

Fundamentalism, in all religious traditions, is impervious tosuppression. Te more one tries tosquelch it, the stronger it becomes.Counter it with cruelty, it gains adherents. Kill its leaders, and they become martyrs. Respond with despotism, and it becomes the sole voice o opposition. ry to control it, and it will turnagainst you. ry to appease it,and it will take control. (Reza Aslan, No god but God, RandomHouse, 2005, p. 247)

Tose ew Islamic extremist groups who attack us commit acts o terrorismnot because we are

ree. We are, in act, a secondary target chosenbecause we support governments and policiesthat are sources o their oppression, andbecause attacking us brings greater attention

to their cause. Al Qaedas current rallying cis the perceived injustice in Palestine and tpresence o a non-Muslim military (ours) sacred Muslim soil in Saudi Arabia. Previousit was the anger over the secular Sovoccupation o A ghanistan, which gave birththe movement. Hizbollah was ormed becauIsrael was occupying Lebanon. Hamas wantsreclaim lost territory in Palestine. Te driving

orce behind them all is not simply ideology, brather, achieving speci c events and outcomResolve the problem and the motivation ad

Many extremist groups spawn splinter group which are usually smaller than the originTe IRA in Ireland ormed multiple splintegroups, including the Real IRA and INLAto name just two. Al Qaeda can be viewed a

type o splinter group most directly stemmirom the Muslim Brotherhood. Tese o shootevolve or one o several reasons: the core gbegins to negotiate, and the splinter group ethat is an intolerable compromise; the splintgroup believes an increased level o terrorismneeded to urther its agenda; or another natioor outside infuence sponsors or incites thsplinter group to more aggressive behavior.

Tese splinter groups have ambitions that aremore extreme and less closely aligned to ttrue grievances o the broad population. Fexample, some current Islamic splinter groubelieve that all non-Islamic governments mube overthrown and brought into the Muslim

olda view hardly shared by the bulk o citizenry o Islamic nations.

Because they are generally smaller and lestablished, they must go to greater lengtto gain notoriety. Prior to 9/11, Osama BinLaden was nding it hard to gain the notoriehe was seeking, and Al Qaeda was simply ogroup vying or ascendancy within the Musl world:

...Bin Laden ound himsel , by the mid-1990s, bottled up in the A ghan badlands, having beenstripped o his Saudi nationality



and booted out o ostensibly Islamist-ruled Sudan. Among his camp mates, the ragtag le tovers o the Muslim oreignlegion o A ghanistan, the re o armed jihad still burned. But their passion lacked a satis actory immediate outlet. Radical insurgencies had been de eated,or severely constrained, across a number o local ronts, romEgypt to Algeria to the SouthernPhilippines. Most ordinary Muslims in these countrieshad not merely ailed to join in the ght but questioned its very premises.

With these so-called near enemies in Asia and the Middle East proving inconveniently resilient, the idea emerged o trans erring jihadist zeal instead to the ar enemy. Hitting the United States would in itsel score points, considering that America was seen as a pillar o support or compromised Muslimregimes, such as Egypts and Saudi Arabias, that bin Ladenhad as his target. Te boldness o attacking the strongest world power would propel Islam (or rather, the jihadists versionthereo ) onto the geopolitical stage as a orce demanding equal stature. Tis would not only inspire reluctant jihadists to join in the ght. It would alsohelp cement the broader, and growing, Muslim sense that their aith was somehow under threat,and needed vigorous de ense. Tis strategy is not original. (Max Rodenbeck, Te ruth About Jihad, Te New York Review o Books, August 11, 2005, p. 52)

In cases where the extremist cause takes rootamong a larger populace as a result o occupationor oppression, and when that occupation oroppression continues or extended periods,then the terrorism becomes more virulent. Additional splinter groups are likely to orm,the probability o a diaspora o experiencedterrorists rom that country to other countriesincreases, and an ultimate resolution becomesmore di cult. Over the long haul, mostextremist initiatives have resulted in solutions worse than the original problem. As horribleas the sarist reign became, or example, theBolshevism that replaced it under Lenin andeventually Stalin was worse.



Why do they hate us? By and large,they dont.Te very in erence that all Muslims hate us is

reminiscent o the mantra o the 1950s and1960s that all communists hated us. Tat, too,proved to be largely alse.

Tere are over 1.3 billion Muslims amongthe 6.6 billion people in todays world, and45 o the worlds 193 nation states are largely or predominantly Muslim. Te economiccircumstances, religious attitudes and politicalpre erences o these Muslims vary widely,o course. Te vast majority are moderate,

responsible citizens, who are the same aspeople everywhere. Tey want meaning andpurpose in their lives, sustenance and economicopportunity, amily, riends and happiness.Tey need to matter and to have respect. AsPresident George Herbert Walker Bush hassaid, People everywhere want the same things.

But there are millions among these Muslims who are despairing,disen ranchised andexcluded, and are thusvulnerable to the messagesand leadership o extremists.Some heed that message;many others becomesympathizers, most o tenbecause they are looking ornothing more than hope anda better li e. Only a smallnumber hate usbut that

number is rising.

In this section o the essay we will speak to theurther reasons the broad Muslim population

under occupation or oppression would besusceptible to these extremists and this hatredprimarily the legacy o colonial subjugation,the rapid pace o global social change anddire economic poverty. Cultural and religious

actors are secondary to these. Religious accome into play primarily where stress an

change have precipitated a broader return undamentalism as discussed below.

For well over two centuries, especially sinthe Industrial Revolution, European countriehave subjugated Islamic nations. 41 o the predominately Muslim nations in the worl were ormer European colonies or subsumedSoviet states, and these imperialists EnglanFrance and othersmoved in varying degreto dispossess the people o their land, ass

sel -determination and religion. Colonstatus prevented or impaired the developmeo leadership and political in rastructuand there ore most37 by our impercalculationhave not transitioned rom colonto bona de democracies. Most are e ectivdictatorships, many with the complicity o t West, and most remain in economic disrepaTis imperialism was too o ten accompanie

by murder, torture, rapede acto enslavement anhumiliation. When citizeno these colonies protestor rebelled, they wersuppressed or crushed. Ino small way, this legacy humiliation remains.

At its most extreme, thicolonial attitude wacaptured by Cecil Rhode

when he stated, [W]Britons are the rst race oworld, and the more o the world we inhabibetter it is or the human race .

A colonial legacy is not by itsel su cientcause extremism, but it has contributed. Te liso the 41 current Muslim countries that we

ormerly colonies is long and includes Alge

They want meaning and purpose in theirlives, sustenance andeconomic opportunity,family, friends andhappiness. They needto matter and to haverespect.

Why t hey h ate u s



Pakistan, India, Somalia, Indonesia and (deacto) Egypt. In the a termath o World War

I, Britain and France carved Middle Easterncolonies out o the de eated Ottoman ( urkish)Empire and kept many countries under theirdirect rule, including modern-day Iraq, Syriaand Lebanon.

Te West has also intervened in Muslimcountries that were not its colonies. WhenIranians took steps toward a democracy in1953 by electing their own premier, the UnitedStates, because o concerns about Sovietinfuence on Iran and oil supplies, acted todepose the democratically elected premier andreturn the Shah to power. Te Shahs regime was corrupt and oppressive, but was supportedby the United States because it was anti-Soviet

and receptive to U.S. directives regarding oiland other oreign policy matters.

Years earlier, the Russians also had helpedsuppress an Iranian pro-democracy movement.During the Iranian Constitutional Revolutiono 1905-11, hundreds were imprisoned andmany executed

or theirre orm e orts.Te Iranianrevolution o 1979and itshostage crisisunder AyatollahK h o m e i n i , which sodeeply shockedthe U.S.publicwas inmany respectsa reactionto these two

oreign interventions. In addition, the UnitedStates armed and trained tens o thousands o Muslims as part o its Cold War e orts, mostnotably against the USSR a ter the invasion o A ghanistan in 1979. Osama bin Laden wasa bene ciary o this support. And the U.S.intervened to aid Saddam Hussein in Iraqs war with Iran.

Te United States also played a signi cant rolein the establishment o Israel in 1948, which tothis day helps de ne the Muslim worlds view o the policies o the West in general and theU.S. in particular. Tis is not to suggest thatthe U.S. should not have supported its creation.Rather, as a result o that action, our country now has a particular responsibility to help bringabout a air, impartial and balanced solution tothe dispute between Israel and Palestine. Weare strongly supportive o the existence andcontinued health o Israel, but circumstancesin Palestine continue to contribute pro oundly to concerns and adversarial attitudesbetween Muslims and the West, with deadly consequences throughout the Middle East,Europe and the world. A balanced resolution

to this Palestinian dilemma is one o the keysto reducing global terrorism. Tat act has beenunder recognized.

Te United States has recently backed highly repressive Middle Eastern regimes. Tis is nota new phenomenon. Historically, we supported

many o theseregimes becauseo the need

or Cold Warallies as well asoil. Tus, the West appearsto be tacitly s u p p o r t i n gr e p r e s s i o n ,imprisonmento dissentersand economicinjustice, in which a select

ew reap great wealth while the majority is excluded romopportunity

Te U.S. invasion o Iraqwithout thesupport o the United Nations and against theconclusions o U.N. weapons inspector HansBlix about the presence o weapons o massdestructionhas added considerably to the



Islamic worlds suspicions. Many hold that theoil elds o Iraq were as much a motivation

or the invasion as any other actor. And thehorrors that occurred within the Abu Ghraiband Guantanamo Bay prisons pro oundly colorthe current views o many Muslims regarding Western justice and morality. (Ironically,experts have long known that the surest way toget in ormation rom prisoners is not throughtorture, but by establishing trust and rapport.)

Beyond this, Muslim and other developingcountries also are struggling with the onrusho global social change, which, in turn, hasstirred pro ound trans ormations in all aspectso daily li e, including the amily. For Muslimsocieties, this changeis roaring ahead much aster and trans orming the lives o many more

people. Britain supported just 8 million people when it began its 250 year progression rom the arm to the laptop. Indonesia is making that same journey in only our decadeswith a populationo more than 200 million. (Hernando De Soto,Te Other Path, Basic, 1989, p. xxxiv.)

Rapid change o ten destabilizes. It causespeople to seek out the traditions and theperceived certainty o the past. Te alienatingand disruptive e ects o the modern world wascaptured in 1978 by Michel Foucault, one themore notable philosophers o the 20th century, who put his nger directly on the pulse o thecurrent Muslim unrest while reporting romthe Shahs Iran:

Foucault could see how the experience o deprivation,loneliness, and anomie made many Muslims in urban centers turn to rather than away from Islam; how there was little protection or the millions o uprooted Muslims except inIslam, which or centuries has regulated everyday li e, amily ties, and social relations withsuch care. Foucault could alsosee how, in the absence o any democratic politics, Muslims

used Islamic themes o sacri ce and martyrdom to challenge despotic and corrupt rulers whoclaimed legitimacy in the West as modernizers and secularizers.Foucault also managed to see that this Muslim revolt was unlikely to be con ned to Iran. Te West had deemed modernization and securitization as the highest aim or Muslim societies ever since it began to dominate them in the nineteenth century.But the process, now advanced by westernized postcolonial elites, o uprooting people romtheir traditional cultures and orcing them into Western-style

cities and occupations was only likely to produce more converts to political Islam. (Pankaj Mishra, Te Misunderstood Muslims, Te New York Review o Books, November 17, 2005, p. 15)

A society coping with stress o ten turns the certainties o tradition and the past as con ronts the unknown. Tis helps explaithe movement toward undamentalism withIslam. Fundamentalism strips away the newFundamentalism lends meaning to an extremimovement. Widespread stress and uncertaincan make the certainty o the undamentamessage more appealing to a broader audiencNot all undamentalists embrace terrorism, nare all terrorists undamentalists. Nor is tphenomenon o embracing undamentalismthe ace o societal upheaval exclusive to Ior the Middle East.

All religious traditions contain certaexclusionary tenants, yet practitioners o threligionsIslam, Christianity and Judaismhave ound ways to coexist productively wother aiths in society. Examples abound in thistory o all three o these great religionstimes o pro ound change or stress, howesome actions within those three religions ha



embraced undamentalist, exclusionary orhostile principles.

All this helps to set the stage or understandingterrorism in the Middle East. But what aboutterrorism in places like Britain and Spain? AsEuropes own population growth has slowed,and in some countries declined, immigrantsincluding millions o Muslimshave lledthe continued demand or the workersnecessary to sustain economic expansion. Tispopulation regularly aces discrimination anddisen ranchisement in the new countries wherethey nd themselvesexclusion rom better jobs, political o ce, social services and othervital resources.

Whether in their home countries or as

immigrants elsewhere, those enduringextreme economic poverty also labor underdi cult social pressures. People seek relie .Fundamentalists purport to have solutions andactively market them. It should have surprisedno one that when the citizens o Palestine andEgypt nally had a chance to vote, many voted

or undamentalist opposition parties. A ter all,the current regime was ailing them and theseparties were o ering the promise o a betterli e.

wo other actors are inextricably intertwinedin this equation. Te creation o the Israeli statein 1948 and the worlds dependency on oil,both o which have only heightened the stakesand complicated the solutions.



o overcome the terrorism that is rooted in theMiddle East, we must do these things:

We need to make a comprehensive, concertedand sustained global e ort to seek out andcapture terrorists that have attacked the UnitedStates. Enlisting other nations o the world inthis e ort is critical.

We must provide domestic protection againstterrorist acts, including gathering e ectiveintelligence regardingpotential attacks. We must

know the location and statuso nuclear materials aroundthe world. At present, thesesa eguards are not receivingthe unding or priority required because o the costand distraction o the Iraqi war.

Achieving these goals willonly serve to reduce thenegative. Te in nitely moreimportant and e ective work requires buildingup the positive.

In cases where the cause o the extremists hasgained currency among a larger constituency,and where these extremists are carrying out actso terrorism, the population will only rescindits support i occupation or oppression isaddressed. Te evidence that this has occurred

will be a withdrawal or acceptable compromise with the occupier, or, to replace the oppression,the implementation o government that truly

ul lls its basic obligations: providing thea ected population with a genuine voice ingovernment, en orcement o property rights,broad opportunity or economic advancement,and personal reedom and sa etyalong withthe absence o large-scale public corruption and

suppression o dissenting voices. We cannre orm terrorists, but we can eliminate th

appeal. We do not need to appease terroristrather we must study closely the plight the population o those countries that havsupported them and use our infuence to eastheir plight. I we succeed, we deprive terroro their sympathizers and their prospectirecruits.

Te current administration is correct in its beliethat bona de democracy iskey in de using terrorism. I

mistake was implementinthis strategy rst in Iraq reasons we will discuss.

Merely moving a governmentoward democracy is noenough. Tere must bean equally vigorous e oto develop economiopportunitya modernday Marshall Plan. Politicpower cannot become o

remain broadly distributed unless econompower and opportunity and assets are alsbroadly distributed. Progress on either thpolitical or economic ront can accomplimuch, yet only progress on both together cabring change that is truly enduring.

Tere are many ways to assist a country indistributing economic opportunity and wealth

Direct aid has its place, yet cannot achiethe job o broadly and sustainably sowiopportunity when it is poorly conceivecoordinated or managedwhich is all-to

requently the case. Such aid o ten brecorruption and bene ts only the ew. Miclending programs have shown promise, as haspecial economic zones. Some o the msuccess ul e orts have been built on trade a

Political power cannotbecome or remainbroadly distributedunless economicpower and opportunityand assets are alsobroadly distributed.

h oW to r educe t errorIsm



land re orm and distribution.

Consider briefy the example o Peru, acountry o great poverty, which in the 1980s was emerging rom a military dictatorship andundergoing rapid change with a concentrationo wealth and land ownership among the elite. A terrorist organization known as the ShiningPath bombed government buildings andattacked citizens. Tey were terrorists in every modern sense o the word, but in this case they advocated communism as a solution to thedespair o Peruvians. Hernando de Soto writeso the choices acing government leaders:

As early as 1984, I became convinced that the Shining Path (Sendero) would never be

eliminated as a political optionwithout rst being de eated inthe world o ideas. Like many, I elt that Senderos major strengthstemmed rom its intellectual appeal to those excluded by the system and its ability to generate a political cause or natural leaders, whether in universities or shantytownsResearchtold us that one o the primary unctions o terrorists in the Tird Worldwhat buys themacceptanceis protecting the possessions o the poor, whichare typically outside the law. Inother words, i government does not protect the assets o the poor,it surrenders this unction tothe terrorists, who can then use it to win the allegiance o the excluded. (Hernando de Soto,Te Other Path, Basic Books,1989, pp. xiv-xxxix)

Te Peruvian government continued movingtoward a more representative orm o governance, established and en orced property rights, decentralized decision-making to includecitizen input, and trans erred public land toprivate ownership among the disen ranchised.

Tis unlocked a large reservoir o wealth andentrepreneurship within that country. A terundertaking these e orts, the Shining Path

aded in size and relevance until little remained.Not because the government had attacked itsmembers, but because the government hadattacked the root causes o their support. A surprising way to ght terrorism? Te weaponis the spirit and power o the individual, notguns.

It is economic injustice that uels globalterrorism, writes De Soto, not cultural heritage. As a power ul example, De Soto reports thatdespite the worlds poor having accumulatedover $9 trillion o real estate, it is their lack o

property rights clear title and a legal systemto support it that prohibits them romleveraging these assets into new capital, andthus retards their progress.

Democracy is a power ul instrument. Tecurrent Administration is correct in this regard.But merely the ability to vote is not su cient.Te e ectiveness o Americas government restson three principles o limit, each o whichacknowledges the corrupting infuence o power:

Explicit limitation o government ,as embodied in our constitution,especially such keys as habeas corpus



and property rights Checks and balances created by a true

separation o powers, including powersover the military

Decentralizationo government so thatmany decisions can truly be made atthe local level.

Representative government by its very nature isnot exclusionary. But we should not be misledby alse indicators o open government, stagedby some countries to create the impression thatthey are advancing in the proper direction.Tese are charades; voters are given no bona

de choices; opposition is suppressed.

Government re orm, while important, is notsu cient on its own. Broad economic progress

must also occur.Sustained, across-the-board economicprosperity cannot occur in a country unless property rightsare assured and poweris distributed anddecentralized.

Te United States, inconjunction with thecommunity o nations,should use its economicsupport, its tradepolicy, and every othernon-military meanso positive infuence itpossesses to encouragecountries to migratein this direction. Tepath to democracy iscomplex, and while change will not happenovernight, incremental steps can be taken.

An important additional note must bemade. Recent terrorist attacks have occurredin countries like Spain and Britain, whereoccupation and oppression do not exist in themanner that we have described above. Rather,this terrorism refects the migration o violence

rom countries where it does. Palestine is cimore than any other cause. Close behind is thsupport o countries like Britain or perceioccupiers and oppressors. Tese acts o terrorisalso refect the scars that result rom the colonlegacy and the stark economic disparities these countries relative to the West. Musliimmigrants rom the Middle East residing London, as one example, have relatives a

riends in Palestine, Iraq and elsewhere ao ten deeply share their concerns. It ollows extremism will not signi cantly abate in a plalike London unless occupation and oppressioin the Middle East abate as well.

Te extremism in counties like Britain andSpain refects the plight and alienation o anexcluded minority in any societyand in th

sense is at least partialakin to the black civrights movements anrace riots in the UniteStates in the 1960s. A America has learnedprogressive policies inclusionand policiethat leave room or thcustoms and traditiono these immigrantsare a necessary part oaddressing the plight oan excluded minorityProperly conceivedthese policies wiconvey a sense o welcome that wibring psychologicai n t e g r a t i o n identi cation withand loyalty to tha

immigrants new country. Contrast, or exampthe vitriol to be ound in Americas newspapand political speeches in the 1890s regardin Jewish, Italian and other immigrants with thcontributions they provide to American societoday.



We should recognize the true cost o invadingIraq.

Te war has ueled terrorism. Our invasion hasbecome a power ul rallying point or many inthe Muslim world who regard it as unjust. In anational intelligence estimate completed in April2006, Americas National Intelligence Councilc o n c l u d e dthat the Iraq war has ueledthe growtho Islamic

extremism andterror groupsand is beingused to spreadthe globale x t r e m i s tmessage.

Tousands havetraveled romaround the world to Iraqto ght againstthis newestperceived aggression. errorist organizationsacross the globe, including Al Qaeda, have wonnew converts to their cause and their methodsbecause o the invasion. errorist attacks are onthe rise. According to terrorism specialist PeterBergen:

Te president is right that Iraq is a main ront in the war onterrorism, but this is a ront we created and the Iraq war has expanded the terrorist ranks:the year 2003 saw the highest incident o signi cant terrorist attacks in two decades, and then, in 2004, astonishingly,

that number tripled [ rom 175 to 655]. (Boston Globe, July

17, 2005, Study cites seeds o terror in Iraq, by Bryan Bender;Foreign Afairs, Nov/Dec, 2005 with Alec Reynolds)

Note that the U.S. State Department declinethus ar trelease thesstatistics 2005. A British Join

I n t e l l i g e n cC o m m i t t e ereport rom2006 ound thaIraq is likely be an importanm o t i v a t i n actor some time come in thradicalization oBritish Muslimand or thextremists w

view attacks against the U.K. as legitimate .

As was said by Republican Melvin Laisecretary o de ense under Richard Nixon architect o Vietnamization (the withdrawo troops rom Vietnam),Our presence is wh eeds the insurgency.

According to a study by Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize-winning economist at ColumbUniversity, and Linda Bilmes, o the KenneSchool o Government at Harvard, by invadiIraq, we are on course to spend $1 trillion.Te Iraq Study Group Report: Te Way Forward New Approachstates that amount might be amuch as $2 trillion. Tat is money that instead

What We h ave Wrought In Iraq

By Steve Sack, Star Tribune Editorial Cartoonist, / 0/0



could have been used more productively.

War is not de acto wrong because it is expensive.I there are observable and measurable bene tsto ghting a war, costs can be tolerated. But wecan nd no such bene ts in the war in Iraq. Itdoes nothing to advance the global search orterrorists. Rather, it breeds them.

Te toll o war in purely economic terms hasbeen high. Consider its impact on oil prices.Since the invasion began, the price o oil hasincreased rom$28 per barrelto a priceabove $70, andis currently above $50, due

in large part tothe disruptedsupply anduncertainty the war has created.Some haveattributed theprice increaseto heightenedglobal demand,e s p e c i a l l y

rom Chinaand India, but many analysts contend that,absent Iraq and the geopolitical allout romour con rontations, the price o oil would besigni cantly lower$45 or less per barrel.

Te national debt has increased by 30 percentto $8.6 trillion during the war, a result o therecord-setting de cits caused by the price o this war.Te toll can be measured in other ways, as well.

We have taken our eyes o A ghanistan,resulting in an increase in insurgency anda dramatic increase in opium production.

erroriststhe aliban and Al Qaedahavegained a renewed oothold in A ghanistan. As we have seen elsewhere, the aliban was initially welcomed because o the services and order

they restored to the country. Te emergence o democracy there was not accompanied by thesustained resources to enable that governmentto properly serve the needs o the people. Andso the country has re-devolved to the warlordsand the aliban.

Another toll has been the loss o enormousreserves o international and domestic goodwill. At home, some soldiers have concluded that weare spending lives and money or a people whodo not want our help. And many Americans that

were contentto let ourg o v e r n m e n tlead in thissituation now

eel di erently,

as the 2006e l e c t i o n ssignaled.

Te U.S.invasion hasnow broughtIraq into a civil warby any m e a n i n g u lc u r r e n td e i n i t i o n

o the termand that civil war has beenescalating. Over a million Iraqi citizens havefed the country, including disproportionatenumbers in the pro essional classes, creatinga potential re ugee crisis in Jordan, Syria andelsewhere.

Te Iraq war has brought orward the specter o corruption that inevitably accompanies armedconfict . Te Iraq Study Group Report citesestimates o losses to corruption per annum inIraq o $5 to 7 billion. Allegations abound o misspent unds by contractors, and o oil andother resources being diverted to the personalenrichment o Iraqi politicians.

And, nally, this war has cost livesover 3,000U.S. military atalities and a minimum o 46,000 Iraqi casualties and counting. However,

Clay Bennett / 00 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved.



this estimate o Iraqi casualties is almostcertainly low since a recently released U.N.report counts 34,000 Iraqi deaths in 2006alone, and respected researchers overseen by Johns Hopkins University have estimated thatthe Iraqi death toll may be as many as 655,000people.



We must withdraw rom Iraq, where our presenceuels the insurgency. We must participate

with a greatly reduced presencein a solutioncra ted by Iraq itsel , with involvementand assistance rom a broad community o countries.

War hasits place,un ortunately,and there havebeen and willbe unavoidabletimes or theUnited States touse its military. We believe inthe need ora strong andtechnologically a d v a n c e dmilitary. But ininitiating this war, we ignored the dictum that military actionmust be a last resort. Violence begets violence.

Removing Saddam revealed realities that wedid not properly consider and were unprepared

or: the hideously oppressive rule by a Sunniminority o a Shiite majority, the deeply-seated and erocious desire or retributionthat had built up or over thirty years insidethis Shiite majority, and a historically strong, well-established Kurdish separatist movement.

While extremists rom outside Iraq haveentered that country, their activity is dwar edby the Shiite retribution against Sunnis thatis being enacted now in what has become a widespread and terrible civil war. Combine thelack o insight on those issues with the lack o an adequate strategy and it is easy to see howand whychaos ensued.

o understand what to do in Iraq, we musknow how Iraq was created. In 1919, in th

a termath o World War I, as the Allied powcarved up the remains o the Ottoman Empirthe provinces o Basra, Baghdad and Mosul w

d i s a s t r o u s lpieced togetheto orm a newcountry: IraqTe unrestand rebellion

rom this 191combinat ion was almosimmediate. Tecity o Mosuin particular was a desirabprize becauso the growinrecognition othe value o oand the British

were in a position to take it:

In 1919 there was no Iraqi people; history, religion, geography pulled the people apart, not together. Basra looked south, toward India and the Gul , Baghdad had strong links with Persia; Mosul had closer ties with urkey and Syria. Putting together the three Ottoman

provinces and expecting to create a nation was, in European terms,like hoping to have Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs inone countryTe populationwas about hal Shia Muslim and a quarter Sunnibut another division ran across the religious one: while hal the inhabitants

What We s hould d o In Iraq

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were Arab, the rest were Kurds,Persians or Assyrians. Te cities were relatively advanced and cosmopolitan: in the countryside,hereditary tribal and religious leaders still dominated. Tere was no Iraqi nationalism, only Arab (Margaret McMillan,Paris 1919, Random House, 2001, pp. 397-8)

We are making the same mistake almost acentury later. In Iraq, we are insisting on the co-existence and co-governance o Sunnis, Shiitesand Kurds who have long been adversaries.Te Sunnis and Shiites are the two primary branches o the Muslim religion and havebeen intermittent adversaries since the seventh

century CE. Under Saddam, the Sunnis hadoppressed the Shiites intensely or decades. TeKurds have been without a stable homeland inthe Middle East or centuries, and they haveregularly been persecuted and in confict duringthat period.

Iraq has remained a single entity primarily because it has been ruled by an iron hand inthe period since 1919, rom the British toSaddam Hussein. Unless there is a change inthe current structure and design o our e ortsin Iraq, the only option to overcome civil warmay be another iron hand.

Any plan or Iraq must recognize and properly accommodate the reality o these threeconstituencies. I success ul, democracy canproceed. We believe that a plan to urtherdecentralize Iraq is now a more realistic andproductive next stepi we can do it soon. Anything short o this increased ederalism andlocal autonomy among the three groups and theenergies o the country will remain absorbed by this civil war.

Involvement in this process by Iraqs neighborsand other countries around the world isabsolutely necessary or success.Te Iraq Study Group Report puts orth an excellentplan and process or accomplishing this and

accommodating the concerns and enlistingthe support o these countries. Te report allsshort, however, on providing rm deadlines

or the exit o our troops and on realistically addressing the civil war between Sunnis andShiites.

Strategic Redeployment: A Progressive Plan or Iraq and the Struggle Against Violent Extremists authored by Lawrence Korb and Brian Katuliso the Center or American Progress is ane ective plan or a responsible withdrawal. Ithas the advantage o speci c dates, and leavesthe management o the government where itbelongswith Iraqisincluding the increased

ederalism and sectarian separation which isalready rapidly occurring by de ault.

I deployed in consensus with other countries,better yet is the proposal advanced by Senator Joseph Biden and Leslie H. Gelb, presidentemeritus o the Council on Foreign Relations, which appropriately addresses the need or

ederalism and ethnic separation, and leans on Americas more success ul experience in Bosnia with the Dayton accords. David Brooks,columnist or theNew York imes , has endorsedthis approach and labeled it so t partition.So t partition has been advocated in di erent ways by Michael OHanlon o the BrookingsInstitute with Edward Joseph, by Pauline Bakerat the Fund or Peace, and in a more extremeversion, by Peter Galbraith, ormer U.S. Ambassador to Croatia.

As stated in the Biden/Gelb plan:

A decade ago, Bosnia was tornapart by ethnic cleansing and acing its demise as a single country. A ter much hesitation,the United States stepped indecisively with the Dayton Accords, which kept the country whole by, paradoxically, dividing it into ethnic ederations, evenallowing Muslims, Croats and Serbs to retain separate armies.With the help o American and



other orces, Bosnians have lived a decade in relative peace and are now slowly strengthening their common central government,including disbanding those separate armies last yearTe idea, as in Bosnia, is to maintaina united Iraq by decentralizing it, giving each ethno-religious group Kurd, Sunni Arab and Shiite Arab room to run its ownafairs, while leaving the central government in charge o commoninterests. We could drive this in place with irresistible sweeteners

or the Sunnis to join in, a plandesigned by the military or withdrawing and redeploying American orces, and a regional nonaggression pact. Iraqs new government o national unity will not stop the deterioration.

Te rst is to establish three largely autonomous regions witha viable central government inBaghdad. Te Kurdish, Sunni

and Shiite regions would each be responsible or their own domestic laws, administration and internal security. Te central government would control border de ense, oreign afairs and oil revenues.Baghdad would become a ederal zone, while densely populated areas o mixed populations would receive both multi-sectarian and international police protectionTe second element would be toentice the Sunnis into joining the ederal system with an ofer they couldnt re use: money to make

their oil-poor region viable. Te Constitution must be amended to guarantee Sunni areas 20 percent (approximately their proportiono the population) o all revenues.

[ ]he president must direct the military to design a plan or withdrawing and redeploying our troops rom Iraq by 2008 (while providing or a small but efective residual orce to combat terrorists

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and keep the neighbors honest).We must avoid a precipitous withdrawal that would lead to anational meltdown, but we alsocant have a substantial long-term American military presence... Fi th, under an international or United Nations umbrella,we should convene a regional con erence to pledge respect or Iraqs borders and its ederal system . A contact group o major powers would be set up tolean on neighbors to comply withthe deal. (Joseph R. Biden and Leslie H. Gelb, Unity Trough Autonomy in Iraq, New York

imes, May 1, 2006)Some have argued that this would be too di cultin Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk, because, unlikein Iraqs rural areas, they are not neatly dividedinto Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish enclaves. Yet thisdivision is happening today through sectarian war are, and Biden and Gelbs plan wouldachieve it in a less violent way. We would agree,though, that the Biden-Gelb proposal shouldonly be implemented with the involvement o the community o a ected countries, and asmodi ed, where possible and prudent, throughdialogue with those countries. Tat community,through preparation and nancial support, would need to success ully address the concernthat this separation may increase bloodshedand disruption. America must conduct itsel insuch a way as to truly engage all concerned, andavoid having this e ort perceived, with adverseconsequences, as simply a U.S. plan.

A power ul case has been made or thisincreased separation in Chaim Kau mannsstudy o the analogous situation o ethniccivil wars, Possible and Impossible Solutionsto Ethnic Civil Wars (International Security ,Spring 1996). A ter care ul analysis o all suchsituations in the twentieth century, Kau mann writes, Stable resolutions o ethnic civil warsare possible, but only when the opposing

groups are separated into de ensible enclaves.He then goes on to outline an orderly approachto attaining this separation.

In the eyes o a very large number o Iraqis,Saddam the oppressor has been replaced by the United States, the incompetent and deadly occupier. As discussed above, oppression andoccupation are the two principle causes o extremismand the Iraqi populace has now

aced both in succession. Te sooner we exit,the sooner the Iraqis will be relieved o thedictates o an occupier.

Without an approach such as that just outlined, we do not have a clear marker by which to know when we can leave, other than the judgmento our current administration. Not standing

down until Iraqis stand up is a very hazy milestone by which to gauge our exit, especially given that things are getting worse.

An increase in troops20,000 additionalsoldiers deployed to a nation o 26 millionpeople is now underway. Tis will only infame the situation. Some have irresponsibly proposed that we seek to eliminate Muqtadaal-Sadr. Tat would be disastrous, morally andmilitarily, and antagonize Iraqs majority Shiapopulation.

Some say reducing our presence in Iraq willencourage terrorists, and all agree that areduction might bring a temporary increase inviolence. But this same stay-the-course rhetorichas been used be ore many times: many o the French didnt want to leave Algeria in1961 because it would encourage the Muslimrebellion, but the French le t and by 1963 theissue was quiet. Many didnt want America toleave Vietnam because it would encourage thecommunists, but we le t, the communists didnot extend their empire, and today Vietnam hasembraced a vibrant and peace ul capitalism.

With a signi cantly decreased military presence,Iraq could truly proceedhope ully on ademocratic path. But the vital underpinningsto ensure economic advancement would still



be absent. U.S. economic assistance to Iraqhas largely dried up. We need to redeploy themoney we are spending on war into economicassistance, and deal with terrorism by attackingone o the undamental contributors toterrorismpoverty and economic exclusion. A side note: resource-rich countries such asIraq tend to be less success ul in making across-the-board, diversi ed economic progressthe

amous oil curse. Wealth breeds dependency,and there is a tendency to simply exploit this wealth rather than to develop intellectual capitaland other assets. Tere ore another important,but di cult, idea to consider is creation o a und that would distribute ongoing oilrevenues as dividends to the citizens o Iraq,an idea put orward by Steven C. Clemons.

Tis has been done in Alaska, where the annualdividend to a amily o our recently amountedto $8,000 per year. An Iraq Permanent Fundcould send payments directly to Iraqs 6million households, making a huge di erenceto amilies in a country whose per capita grossdomestic product is about $1,800.

One nal note: In resolving the problems inIraq, as our President ound out too late, weneed to adopt a rhetorical tone o goodwill asopposed to one o antagonism.



Our oreign policy has become two-dimensional. Countries and populations are

either evil or goodthey are either or us oragainst us, as President Bush has declared. Butthe vast majority o the people in Iran, Lebanonand Palestineand every other country orthat matterare no di erent than peopleeverywhere, with issues too complex to berelegated to such simplistic categories. As George Washington said in his 1796 arewell address,at a time whenpassions on

oreign a airs

ran venomously h i g h , [ C ] u l t i v a t e peace and harmony withall, adding,Te nationwhich indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual ondness is insome degree aslaveexcessive partiality to one oreign nation and excessive dislike o another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts o in uence on the other.

Here are some actors regarding each:

Palestine

In discussing Palestine, we would reiteratethat we are very strong supporters o the stateo Israel, but we believe that many o Israelspolicies and actions have only served to decreaseits security. Much Muslim concern regardingU.S. support o Israel stems rom the view

that it is out o balance with U.S. support Muslim countries. We would join those whos

call is not or less support o Israel, but msupport o Israels neighbors.

Palestine, where poverty is dire, is one o most important, i not the most importantstumbling blocks on the path toward reducinterrorism. It can airly be called the epiceno concern or the Muslim community in t

Middle East andar beyond

to Muslim

co eehousin London A m s t e r d a mand elsewhereTe Palestinianproblem haexisted in p r o n o u n c e d

orm sincdecades be o1948. Tedisplacemeno hundredo thousando Palestinian

pursuant to the establishment o Israel hled directly to the ormation o the PLHamas and other groupsarguably includinHizbollah. Regardless o the validity o Palestinian Muslims perceptions o injustithey believe them to be real.

We ignore this issue and leave it unresolvat our peril. Clearly, there is no solution thasatis es everyone. But just as clearly, there solutions that will satis y a plurality withthe broader population. A solution must bcra ted, agreed to, and then ully supporand en orced by a representative communitynations. Such a solution, when achieved, w

t houghts on P alestIne , h Izbollah and Iran



remove one o the major causes that led to theormation o Hamas, and to a slightly lesser

extent other groupsincluding Hizbollahand Al Qaeda.

Tat will just get usto the starting line,however. We must thenvigorously make theinvestment to ensurethat the citizens o Palestine are providedthe basic services o government. We alsomust be a catalyst tothe economic progressthat should ensue

rom this by cra ting aMarshall Plan ttedto the speci c needs o this country.

Hizbollah in Lebanon

Lebanon was part o the Ottoman Empire that was intentionally divided by the victorious Alliespursuant to World War I and became a Frenchcolony. Colonial status at worst emasculates,and at best, retards establishment o organicleadership. Lebanon is an amalgamation o Sunni, Shiite, Christian and other religioussects.

When Palestinian extremists, including Yasser Ara at, became committed to reclaiming landthey believed to be theirs, they used southernLebanon as a base or their activities. Israelinvaded southern Lebanon in 1982 to counterthis extremist activity, but then remained as anoccupier or almost two decades. Hizbollah, bornas an extremist group to de y this occupation,is now a mature political organization. Tecurrent dilemma there would not exist i thePalestinian issue had been resolved early on. It was not.

As with other situations we have touched onhere, many Lebanese believed their governmenthad not adequately ul lled its role, either

by resisting the occupation or by providing acircumstance whereby property rights were

en orced and poverty eased. Hizbollah lledthat void, evolving intoan organization thatprovided services suchas schools and hospitals. A ter Israel le t in 2000,the world missed acritical opportunity tomaterially strengthenthe Lebanesegovernment, economy,institutions andin rastructure in a way that would havemade Hizbollah less

relevant. Instead, thecorruption o Lebanonsgovernment continued, and daily li e did notimprove.

When Palestine held democratic elections, which brought the extremist group Hamas topower (replete with its extremist polemics),the global community responded by insistingon an immediate re orm o its rhetoric. Whenthat was not orthcoming, it intervened to shutdown access to cash and assetssigni cantly exacerbating an already horrible economicsituation. o the Islamic world, this action wasegregious, and many contend that Hizbollahsmost recent incursion into Israel was in part areaction to it.

In any event, Israels retaliation to thatincursion, in keeping with our thesis, has only served to heighten the enmity on both sides.Every cyclein which one side attacks andthe other retaliates, in which we dont nd apeace ul solution that simultaneously provides

or economic well-beingseems to guaranteethat the next eruption will only be worse.

Iran

Tings are more complex in Iran than in Iraq.It is important to view Iran in the context o



both its proud historywhich dates back to the Persian Kingdom o Xerxes, Dariusand Cyrusand its present circumstance. As discussed earlier, Iran attempted ormso democracy in 1905 and in 1953, only tobe thwarted by Russia, Great Britain and theUnited States. Even todays Iran, though clearly controlled by a Muslim theocracy, has somedemocratic elements.

Iran watched as three o its geographicneighborsIndia, Pakistan and Israeldeveloped nuclear arms despite the objectionso the United States and the internationalcommunity. At the same time the U.S. movesto limit Irans nuclear capability, Iranians blamethe U.S. or supporting Iraq in its 1980s war with Iran, and or helping Saddam acquire

the chemical weapons that caused so muchsu ering there. In early 2003, the IranianForeign Ministry sent a detailed proposal to Washington, stating it was prepared to open adialogue on its nuclear program and to addressconcerns about it to such groups as Hizbollahi Washington would start li ting long-in-e ectsanctions and re rain rom destabilizing Iran.Te United States rejected this proposal. FlyntLeverett, ormer senior director or MiddleEast a airs at the National Security Council,argues that a grand bargain, resolving ourconcerns regarding Iran in exchange orsecurity guarantees and a commitment to notattempt a regime change, could be an outcomeo diplomacy, but that is an arrangement theU.S. is not currently willing to consider.

Iran has been reviled or its support o Hizbollah, but or many within the Muslimcommunity, any such support is not regardedas di erent rom U.S. military and nancialsupport o Israel.

Iran is not a monolith, nor is any nation.Considerable internal disagreement anddissension exist there. It is a nation with a largepopulation o young people eager or a betterli e. Large actions within Iran want to movetoward secularization and modernization, andthe current economic di culties o the country

contribute to such views. Other actions withIran are devout Muslims, yet neverthelebelieve that it is inappropriate or their religioleaders to also be their political leadersa viand debate that goes back to the beginnings Islam. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad likedoes not have as much power as representin the popular press. But U.S. attempts tdemonize him have made him stronger withihis own country, given him greater visibiliand importance, and weakened the e orts oany moderate or pro-U.S. actions in Iran.

President Ahmadinejad has made statementhat have horri ed much o the worlSpeaking in ehran in 2005, he said: Isramust be wiped o the map. We join those whresoundingly condemn these statements, bu

we recognize they may be savvy politics withis constituency. In an ironic developmengiven Ahmadinejads role in the 1979 studeuprisings in Iran, some Iranian universistudents have begun protests against hpolicies. His party has also very recently su eelectoral setbacks.

Ahmadinejad may be irrational and dangerousas some have said. Dealing with Iran migsomeday require orce, and we cannot rule thout. Regardless, the time is not now. Tere iroom or diplomacyalbeit open-eyed, acare ul. Te world community should ocus the present on such diplomacy.



Any solution to reducing extremism mustincorporate our relationship with all

predominantly Muslim countries, not just oneor a ew. Tere are 45 predominately Muslimcountries in the world rom Morocco in thenorthwest o A rica, to Syria and the United Arab Emirates, to Azerbaijan on the CaspianSea, to Indonesia in the Indian Ocean, andmore. Our relationship with each o these addedtogether shapes the global Muslim communitysview and posture toward the United States.Success ul relations with urkey and Morocco,

or example, positively a ect the perceptiono America in Syria (as well as among Muslimimmigrants in Europe and elsewhere). Negativerelations with Palestiniansadversely a ect our dealings with Muslims in Egypt. It isall deeply interconnected. As noted in the Pew Global Attitudes Project, a crucialillustration is Indonesia, where in 2000, 75 percento Indonesians viewed Americans avorably. Tisnumber ell to 15 percenta ter the invasion o Iraq, with 80 percent o Indonesians saying they

ear an attack by the United States. However,Indonesians approval o the U.S. climbedsigni cantly a ter extensive U.S. aid to rebuilda ter the devastating 2004 tsunami.

Other than de ense itsel , Americas principleobligation to the countries o the world is tobe a good and enlightened neighborso that Americas citizens and their institutions andenterprises can interact sa ely, productively and success ully with other countries citizens,enterprises and institutions.

Tere are speci c policies and priorities

that should characterize our relations wipredominantly Islamic countries. I pursue

we believe these behaviors will increase glo wealth, reduce terrorism, and set the stage productive relations or generations to com As Robert Wright wrote,Americas ortunes growing more closely correlated with the ort people ar away; ewer [ oreign policy eforsimple win-lose outcomes, and more have win-win or lose-lose outcomes. (An AmForeign Policy that Both Realists and IdeShould Fall in Love With, Te New York im July 16, 2006)

First, we should bring our very best e orts bear to resolve hotspoon the rontiers oIslamPalestine, as whave discussed, but alsKashmir and others. Tesehotspots are a much biggecontributor to the totaproblem than is understoodor acknowledged. ignored, they will continuto provide a power ul souro grievance and hateana power ul motivation

terrorists and the people they are trying to wover.

Anything the United States can do to incenthese governments toward being morepresentative, and to improve the econom

lot o their entire citizenry, is a power ul toocombat terrorism.

But in almost all cases, we should seek to work with those countries that invite uand provide incentives that motivate othcountries to seek us out. We should primariuse a carrot and not a stick. Many o thegovernments are making positive steps towa

Our relationship witheach of these addedtogether shapesthe global Muslimcommunitys view andposture toward theUnited States.

h oW We s hould c onduct r elatIons WIth IslamIc c ountrIes g oIng f orWard



more representative government and economicprogress. Tey should be rewarded or whatthey have accomplished and encouraged todo more. Te tools to accomplish this includeeconomic development and trade support, as well as assistance on issues o governmentalre orm.

An excellent example is urkey. urkey has madebold strides in the twentieth century to becomeboth democratic and secular. In urtherance o this, the nation is currently seeking admissioninto the European Economic Union, but may not succeed.Many o its citizensr e g a r dmembership

in the EU asa re erendumon theacceptanceo Muslimc o u n t r i e sinto the West. It may very well becentral to thes u c c e s s u lp r o g r e s so U.S. anti-terror policy to seek to acilitate

urkeys EU candidacy.

As mentioned, 41 o the 45 predominately Muslim nations in the world were ormerEuropean colonies or subsumed as Soviet states.Tis status impaired the growth o leadershipand political in rastructure. Most have nottransitioned to bona de democracies andmost are still in economic disrepair. 20 o these45 are oil exporting nations. As we have said,signi cant resource wealth generally retardseconomic and political progress. A ter World War II, the United States used itseconomic prowess to stave o world chaos withthe Marshall Plan in Europe, one o historysmost magnanimous and astute initiatives. Aspart o this plan, the U.S. spent over $200billion (in todays dollars) to help rebuild

European economies which were in real dangero being taken over by the Soviet Union, orplummeting into economic and social chaos,or both:

Te public outcry that would have been raised had Germany (been bombed with the atomic bomb) would likely have beensimilarly muted (as with Japan),and or the same reason: the twocountries were not only terrorist states but expansionist terrorist

states, and their grim ates ( or re-b o m b i n g was in many

ways ahorror equal to nuclear a t t a c k )were never considered by the vast majority o the worlds citizens, and c e r t a i n l y not by those

who had sufered most at their hands, as anything other than just. All o which made it only more remarkable that the United States should have decided, whenGermany and Japan nally lay prostrate, to rebuild bothcountries and make them viable nations once more. Te generosity embodied in the Marshall Plan or Europe and the similar measures overseen in Japan by General Douglas MacArthur stand as the greatest acts o not only civilian but military generosity in the history o the world, as well as the greatest vindication o the argument that the tactics o terror must never be



met with like behavior; or bothGermany ... and Japan responded to this unprecedented decency by rejoining the community o constructive, civilized nations.Postwar reconstruction can be viewed as the clearest demonstration o the most important o all lessons tobe learned rom the history o war are-- the enlightened sel -interest embodied in the embrace o ormer enemies (CalebCarr, Te Lessons o error,Random House, 2002, pp. 196-7)

I we make it our policy to ocus on building

up Muslim nations, as opposed to making war,terrorism will begin to recede.

Our support should be care ully directed soas not to simply enrich the corrupt. Measuresshould be in place to gauge the e ectivenesso these overall e orts. A scorecard or successin building up and thus combating extremism would be a simple one to create. We couldmeasure the growth in the size o the middleclass and the breadth o inclusion o peoplein the political process in each o thesecountries. Tese are readily quanti ed. I thenumber o citizens legitimately participatingin governmental decisionsespecially throughbona de electionsin a given year is greaterthan the previous year, and i the size o themiddle class rises rom one year to the next, theunderpinnings o terrorism in those countries will begin to abate.

It has not been a mistake to push or democracy in the Middle East. Te mistake was pushing

or it militarily in Iraqand without rstaddressing more undamental issues. We shouldinstead have done such things as nurtured thefedgling democracy in A ghanistan, encouragedthe continued movement toward democracy inMorocco, continued to positively engage andsupport urkey in its democratic e orts, anddone the like in a number o other countries.

Tere are risks, o course. In some nationthere has been movement toward democracbut the outcomes have been worrisome. IPalestine, a true election was held, but thcitizens voted or extremists. Tis was to bexpected, because the incumbents had nosucceeded in staving o military humiliatioand creating a path out o economic distreTe citizens o Palestine are among the poorein the world. Unless we help to equitably relieand resolve the egregious conditions in thregion, we cannot reasonably expect a di ereoutcome. In Egypt, where any movementoward truly ree political contests would resin large gains or the Muslim Brotherhoothe situation is similar. Egypt has been highrepressive towards any party that has a genui

chance o unseating those in power. Its citizeare politically restrained and excluded, apoverty is pervasive, so no other result is like Yet large-scale e orts to decentralize weaand economic opportunity could create a mormoderate outcome. U.S. priorities should bclearthe true decentralization o power aeconomic opportunityeven though theselectoral risks exist. And most Islamic politipartiesincluding those in Jordan, Kuwait anMoroccoare peace ul.

Many people have mistakenly suggested ththe terrorism in the Middle East is somehorelated to the intrinsic characteristics Islam. Some believe there exists an inhereantagonism within Islam against Christianand Jews. We attribute that misperceptioprimarily to undamentalists and splintextremists. Tough multiple interpretations othe Koran are possible, it is crucial to note ththere is not a structurally irreconcilable confibetween Islam and Christianity, or Islam an Judaism. Note the treatment o Jews anChristians under o the Prophet Muhammadborn 552 AD, and under Islam in the yearimmediately a ter:

...Jews throve under Muslimrule, especially a ter Islamexpanded into Byzantine lands,



where Orthodox rulers routinely persecuted both Jews and non-Orthodox Christians or their religious belie s, o ten orcing them to convert to Imperial Christianity under penalty o death. In contrast, Muslimlaw, which considers Jews and Christians protected peoples (dhimmi ), neither required nor encouraged their conversion toIslamMuslim persecution o the dhimmi was not only orbiddenby Islamic law, it was in direct de ance o Muhammads orders to his expanding armies never totrouble Jews in their practice o Judaism, and always to preserve

the Christian institutions they encountered. warning that he who wrongs a Jew or a Christianwill have me as his accuser on the Day o Judgment. (Reza Aslan,No god but God, RandomHouse, 2005, pp. 94-5, 101)

Heated rhetoric doesnt mean that the people o these countries are permanently pitted against America. In our revolutionary war, a numbero Americans used the term Great Satan and worse to describe England and its leaders. Tistype o propaganda is o ten part o an attemptto shape a distinct identity and to articulate anew order.

Te United States must set an example orthe Islamic community by its own conduct.Practicing the values o reedom, riendshipand justice that are the spirit o America andrejecting repressive regimes, coups, torture,illegal detention and the murder o civilianssends a stronger message than any act o orceor coercion.

As we have seen, in some instances, ourdependence on oreign oil has compromisedour judgment and values in dealing with certain

oreign governments. Over the long term, we should be making intelligent, concerted

investments in alternative uels. It is notunreasonable to think that the trillion dollars we are spending on Iraq would be su cient tohave brought us to energy independence i spenton alternative uels development instead.

Even with the e orts outlined above, we needto be prepared or setbacks, di culty andbacksliding, and keep our spirit o goodwilland resolve in the ace o them.



As this essay has attempted to illustrate, theadministrations position on Iraq and terrorismdemonstrates a undamental misunderstandingo the nature and causes o these acts o violence.

Te validity o any theory is shown in itspredictive power. Te Administrations belie inthe value o democracy is correct. But its belie in the causes o terrorism, its belie that they hate us because we are ree, and its prescribedsolutions are badly o the mark.

Tis administrations theory, stripped to itsessence, is that terrorists are evil and i we killthem all, and destroy those who support them,terrorism will end. But as Aslan noted aboveregarding the

undamentalistbrand o e x t r e m i s m ,Te more one

tries to squelchit, the stronger it becomes.Counter it withcruelty, it gains adherents. Kill its leaders, and they become martyrs. Tei n t e l l i g e n c eon which weinvaded Iraq was wrong, butthe theory on which terrorism is being oughtis equally wrong. In the long run, that may prove to be an even graver mistake.

We hear some say that we cant leave Iraq becauseAmericans dont run. Running or notrunning are not the correct benchmarks. Our

obligation is to understand our true objectiveand to show wisdom. It is not a question omilitary strength or bravery. Historically, ncountrys military has dominated the othecountries o the world the way ours does todand that will be just as true when we leave IraGeorge Washington, who was our greategeneral, side-stepped confict more than mosHis understanding o what the true objecti was and what winning truly required led hito avoid most battlesyet win the war. LeaviIraq under the Biden-Gelb plan will be an ao intelligence, not surrender, and instancesterrorism will go down, not up.

We hear that i we leave our absence wencourage the enemy. We hear that i we gi

an exit date i will encouragthe enemy. Wehear that i wcriticize ou

government oits strategy w will encouragthe enemyBut terroristare highlye n c o u r a g e dnow, and ourcurrent policiein Iraq playdirectly intothei

terrorism report

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