territorial power sharing and the regulation of conflict in africa

Civil Wars, 2013

Vol. 15, No. S1, 123–143, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2013.850891

Territorial Power Sharing and the Regulation ofConflict in Africa

CHRISTOF HARTMANN

The article argues that there is a relative lack of territorial power sharing in sub-Saharan Africa, but that this should not surprise us given the socio-ethnic context of most African countries which lack both majoritarian ethnic groups and clear culturally based distinctions between contending groups. A comprehensive analysis of the various federal systems and of some decentralising countries reveals a sobering record of conflict management and discusses some explanatory variables. In this context, forms of power sharing that include provisions on territorial autonomy, amounting to full-fledged federalism or restricted to some degree of decentralisation, should be regarded with caution. Regional autonomy as a solution to civil war will not work in most cases.

INTRODUCTION

Among students of politics in deeply divided societies, ‘territorial approaches’ have

always been considered as a major institutional strategy of conflict regulation.

Territorial strategies rely on the assumption that conflicts can be managed by

dividing power between central and regional elites. The possibility of self-rule over

political, economic or cultural issues within a part of the national territory should

thus minimise the potentially conflictive sharing of rule at the central level.1 At the

same time, the institutional features of such territorial conflict regulation strategies

vary enormously with regard to the degree of autonomy that one or all sub-national

units enjoy as well concerning the co-existing elements of shared rule built into the

institutional mechanism such as representation and decision-making rights for sub-

national units at the central level.2

Historically, institutional features of territorial autonomy and decentralisation

were introduced in many polities because previously independent states decided to

join in a larger polity while keeping own institutions and identity, or because a

decentralisation of the state structures was considered to increase the democratic

quality and/or the economic and developmental efficiency of the political system.

The capacity of territorial autonomy or self-governance to influence the dynamics of

existing or potential violent conflict did generally not feature among the main

concerns of many constitution-makers.

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2013.850891

124 CIVIL WARS

Many violent conflicts, especially in non-western contexts, centre on the role of

the state in society and are directly related to its structure and organisation. It has

been argued that some of these conflicts could be prevented or mediated by a

conscious design of sub-national political institutions such as federalism, autonomy

or other types of decentralised governance. This should be particularly so for sub-

Saharan Africa with its majority of ethnically heterogeneous states and its many

protracted violent conflicts. The decision of Ethiopia to create the first ethno-federal

system on the continent in the early 1990s has attracted a lot of interest, although the

assessment on its management of conflicts is largely negative. The broader often

donor-driven trends towards more decentralisation in most African continents which

was initiated for developmental objectives might also have increased political

stability and reduced the likelihood of violent conflict.

The apparent advantages of territorial autonomy might explain why such

provisions also feature prominently in peace agreements after civil wars. In this

context, power-sharing formulas seem to have become the dominant mode of ending

violent conflict worldwide, but certainly so in sub-Saharan Africa.3 The empirical

verification of this trend is certainly rendered difficult by contrasting

operationalisations of power sharing itself. Following Hoddie and Hartzell, one

might distinguish between different dimensions of power sharing, i.e. the type of

powers to be shared: power sharing might thus refer to political power at the central

level, to economic or to military power, and finally to territorial issues (federalism/

decentralisation).4 Others have distinguished between horizontal and vertical power

sharing with the latter referring to the sharing of (political or economic) power

among multiple layers of government5 or between mandates (relatively hard

guarantees) and opportunities (soft guarantees).6

This debate has therefore slightly modified the contours of the concept of power

sharing.7 It has a rather wide understanding of power sharing which might relate to

any institution dividing or sharing any degree of political, economic, territorial and

military power. Hartzell and Hoddie stress that the likelihood of maintaining peace

depends on the number of dimensions that are included in the power-sharing

agreement.8 In his analysis of African power-sharing agreements, Mehler also

follows this logic by including in his analysis all cases where at least one type of

power is included (in Africa this is nearly always the military one).9 Political power

sharing within this research perspective covers very different situations, ranging

from roughly proportionate appointment of leaders of warring groups within

government (as in Chad) to a new constitution based on an explicit pact among all

main political-military actors (as in South Africa). From a conflict management

perspective, details and differences of political or territorial power sharing are less

important than the basic question of ‘who shares power with whom and who can still

be excluded from the sharing arrangement?’.10

Most debates on power sharing after violent conflict have so far put little

emphasis on the role of territorial self-governance or vertical power sharing as one

aspect of solving conflict and institutionalising democratic rule. Hartzell and Hoddie

argue that ‘recognising that the government is typically the most powerful

125 TERRITORIAL POWER SHARING IN AFRICA

organisation within a country, territorial power-sharing institutions call for the

devolution of powers to regionally concentrated groups in the hopes that this will

enhance their sense of security’.11 They define territorial power sharing as including

both federalism and regional autonomy, where ‘only one or a few country’s regions

are likely to have special powers devolved to them’.12

On the basis of their statistical test, they state that the inclusion of provisions for

establishing territorial power-sharing institutions ‘decrease the likelihood of

settlement failure by 99 per cent’. These provisions ‘have the demonstrated capacity

to set the stage for the period of transition by enhancing a sense of confidence among

former enemies that their interests will not be jeopardised in the context of the post

war state’.13 Lake and Rothchild, however, failed to find any evidence of successful

institutionalisation of territorial provisions in any post-war constitutional order,

although it has to be acknowledged that Hoddie and Hartzell were concerned with

the immediate post-war peace and not with long-term benefits in terms of stabilising

a polity.14 The recent Uppsala Peace Agreement Data Set proposes a typology with

six different types of ‘territorial provisions’ as included in peace agreements:

autonomy, federalism, local power sharing, regional development, cultural freedoms

and local government.15

Looking at all African power-sharing agreements for the period since 1990, we

see that the majority of these agreements do not contain any provisions with regard

to territorial power sharing. Such provisions are absent in Central African Republic

(2007), Chad (2003, 2006, 2007), Congo (1999), Democratic Republic of Congo

(2002, 2009), Cote d’Ivoire (2003, 2007), Guinea-Bissau (1999), Liberia (1993,

1996, 2003), Rwanda (1993), Sierra Leone (1996, 1999, 2000) and Somalia (1994,

1997, 2004, 2008). Table 1 shows those that have been classified as containing

territorial power sharing.

While we have got a better access to data over the last years, we still lack a more

systematic and comprehensive research about these specific institutional features of

peace agreements and their effects on violent conflict. Over the last two decades,

TABLE 1

TERRITORIAL POWER SHARING AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1990 – 2011

Peace agreements Type of territorial power sharing

Mali 1992, Mozambique 1992, Niger 1993-4, Various types of decentralisation reforms Angola 1994, Djibouti 2001, Burundi 2003, Senegal 2004, Angola 2006

South Africa 1993, Comoros 2003, Sudan Different types of federal state reforms 2005 with constitutional rights for sub-national units

Sources: Own compilation based on information from the database on power-sharing agreements of Hartzell and Hoddie (data for the phase until 1999), as complemented by Andreas Mehler, Not Always in the People’s Interest: Power-Sharing Arrangements (Hamburg, German Institute of Global and Area Studies 2008) for the African continent, and the Uppsala Data Bank on Peace Agreements (covering the period until 2011, as updated by Stina Hogbladh). Coding of peace agreements differs among these sources, though.

126 CIVIL WARS

there has been increasing research on the supposed theoretical nexus and the causal

mechanisms linking decentralisation with conflict16 and I will discuss some of this

research in more detail further. Students of federalism have also analysed whether it

matters for conflict management, but there are few federal systems worldwide and

comparative empirical analysis has been additionally hampered by the problematic

operationalisation of both decentralisation and federalism and of (violent) conflict.

The academic debate on territorial self-governance and conflict in sub-Saharan

Africa has been interested in the specific issue of secession,17 or mostly restricted to

the assessment of specific cases, especially South Sudan and the federal systems of

Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa (although there are some comparative analyses

linking Nigeria to India, for example).18 A few studies dealing with Africa are

noteworthy for their scepticism concerning federalism and territorial autonomy as

an adequate strategy of conflict management.19

The article will thus engage with these assumptions. The core argument is that the

social and political context in most African countries is not conducive for territorial

strategies to have an impact on conflict. For territorial power sharing to be relevant,

some pre-conditions have to be met and these pre-conditions are mostly absent in sub-

Saharan Africa. We will start by exploring the theoretical nexus between different

forms of territorial power sharing (federalism anddevolution) and conflict, highlighting

some critical context variables for territorial power sharing to be relevant.Wewill then

review Africa’s experience with federalism and decentralisation, including the

territorial power-sharing provisions of the recent peace agreements. The empirical

analysis reveals that there is indeed a relative lack of territorial power sharing in sub-

Saharan Africa, and that these few cases represent rather exceptional trajectories of

ethno-political contexts on the continent. I will finally argue that the track record of

territorial power sharing is not without success but not for the reasons advanced in the

literature, and largely because self-rule is complemented by some degree of power

sharing at the national level.

DECENTRALISATION, FEDERALISM AND CONFLICT

The decentralisation of central power and resources has been a constant element of

state reforms both in industrialised and developing countries. Over time, the

meaning of decentralisation has become rather blurred. It has been applied both to

the vertical reorganisation of the state apparatus and to the horizontal delegation of

state powers to non-state actors. Decentralisation was also discovered as a theme in

development policy discourse, and international donors urged many developing

countries to adopt decentralisation in order to enhance the effectiveness and

efficiency of their administration and the quality of services. External pressures to

decentralise led, not unsurprisingly, to rather superficial reforms of decentralisation

in many countries, especially in Africa.

Since the early 1980s and Rondinelli’s influential contribution, the conventional

distinction is between (administrative) deconcentration as a form of decentralisation

which mainly concerns the reorganisation of responsibilities within the government


apparatus and (political) devolution as the type of decentralisation which shifts

power, resources and policymaking to sub-national levels of government with

elected councils thereby giving local citizens a say in decision-making.20 The

political practice of decentralisation policies in many developing countries tended to

blur Rondinelli’s basic distinction, because many sub-national governments were

more than implementing agencies and had some minimal degree of decision-making

while at the same time were lacking guaranteed fiscal transfers or significant own

revenue generating capacity. For decentralisation to be considered a form of power

sharing, some real power has obviously to be devolved to sub-national units.

A federation as a specific type of political devolution presupposes a division of

sovereignty, a constitutionally protected status for the devolved units (usually states

in their own right with parliaments, governments and a distinct political process

whose rights can only be revoked by constitutional amendment), a constitutional

procedure to solve conflicts between the central and the decentralised levels and an

organ at central level where the decentralised units have a veto-power over national

policy-decisions affecting their rights. A defining feature of federalism is thus that

self-rule and shared rule are constitutionally enshrined.21 A federation is certainly a

form of vertical power sharing as the representatives of the sub-national units do

influence policy decisions, but federalism itself says nothing about how much power

each level enjoys.

The provinces within a decentralised unitary state, may, however, have more

effective power than the member-states of a federation. This is one of the reasons

why recent research on federalism has proposed to replace the dichotomy between

federalism and unitary states with a more differentiated typology of variables such

as the degree of fiscal decentralisation.22 Attempts to actually compare types and

degrees of vertical power sharing have not yet produced any generally accepted

measurement or universally applicable criterion. Fiscal approaches to decentralisa

tion use the share of sub-national government expenditure and revenue as main

indicator of real decentralisation.23 Many political scientists insist, on the contrary,

on the categorical distinction between federalism and other forms of decentralisa

tion.24

There are other aspects of institutional design beyond the degree of autonomy

which also matter. There are many details to be considered in the constitutional

division of powers, the electoral system, and the modalities of representation in

central institutions, or how many subunits the federation has.25 The general

observation seems to be that federalism tends to be more stable with multiple

constitutional units rather than with two or three.26 Autonomy can be granted as a

specific representation right to a selected territory or the degree of sub-national

competencies is identical across the country. Federalism can accordingly be

symmetrical or asymmetrical.

The question whether regional political structures of self-rule are likely to

encourage or impede violent conflict or lead to secessionism has sparked a lively

debate over the last decade.27 The debate is mainly concerned with the concept of

ethno-federalism or multi-nation federalism, a type which was introduced in

128 CIVIL WARS

industrialised countries such as Belgium, Canada or Switzerland (but also India),

and which consciously grants federal (or quasi-federal) forms of territorial

autonomy to at least one sub-state national or ethnic group. In the ‘non-ethnic’ or

‘national’ federal systems, such as the USA, the Latin American federations or

Germany, sub-state units were not designed to enable ethno-national groups to

exercise self-government over a traditional territory.28 The debate is based on the

assumption that the conflicts to be managed are of an ethnic or linguistic nature, and

are rooted in a desire for increased autonomy from the central state, and in the belief

that the groups’ survival is threatened by the actions or inactions of the central state.

Scholars are interested in the capacity of federalism to avoid a civil war between

central state elites and ethno-regional elites. Interestingly, other types of territorial

power sharing such as political devolution are hardly considered in this debate.29 In a

similar way, the likelihood of federalism or territorial self-governance to influence

other types of conflict is rarely addressed.30

A number of scholars have considered territorial autonomy and more specifically

multi-nation federal arrangements as useful strategies for managing violent

intrastate conflict ‘by increasing political participation and allowing minorities a

degree of political autonomy sufficient to persuade them of the merits of continued

engagement in the existing state structures’.31 Bermeo stressed the ‘peace

preserving’ function of federalism.32 Others have argued that ethno-federalism helps

preserving ethnically divided states by satisfying demands for autonomy on key

issues, localising potential conflicts, promoting unifying identities and reducing

opportunities for the central government to exploit minority regions.33

According to the critics of ethno-federalism, the territorial recognition of

minorities perpetuates and strengthens the differences between groups and provides

minority nationalists with the institutional tools for eventual secession. ‘Group

recognition ensures the perpetuation of the differences and provides minority elites

with a vested interest in the continuation of the divided system’.34 Ethno-federalism

creates strong incentives for elites to mobilise mass support around ethnic themes

and would encourage secessionist movements by providing institutional bases and

political legitimacy for alternative national projects.35 For Roeder, ‘particularly after

civil wars, ethnofederalism and autonomy arrangements represent imprudent

institutional choices’.36

While the debate was apparently stirred by the (temporary) enthusiasm among

policymakers for federal solutions in internationally administered countries such

as Iraq or Afghanistan, many newer contributions rather discuss under which

conditions different types of federalism and territorial autonomy may have positive

effects.

Following an influential contribution by Stepan, it is generally agreed that the

context of formation of federal systems matters.37 Stepan distinguishes between

three types of federations: those that came together voluntarily from distinct polities,

those that are created from unitary states in an attempt to hold the polity together and

those that are put together (or forced together) by a dominant group. While many

theorists of federalism stressed that the willingness to cooperate and accommodate


must precede the creation of federal institutions,38 the actual context in which

federations emerge might include a civil war settlement or the desperate attempt to

keep a state together. Federations which are not coming together on a voluntary basis

will have a more difficult life in managing internal conflicts.39 Federal systems are

rarely agreed upon in peace times, but rather after ethno-political groups started to use

military force to defend their interests. Horowitz noted in his seminal study on ethnic

conflicts that ‘a more general constitutional change provides an auspicious setting in

which to consider new territorial arrangements to cope with ethnic problems’.40 If the

constitution is negotiated under a democratic dispensation, though, introducing a

federal system will not be easy, because the threat of constitutionally entrenched

autonomy rights will water down the independence of sub-national units or defeat the

option of federalism.

There are also economic and structural background factors. Many authors have

stressed the relevance of the level of economic development and the degree of

economic disparity.41 A prosperous state and society can provide for instruments

of fiscal equalisation and distributive fairness or specific policies designed to

accommodate the interests of marginalised ethnic groups. It might offer economic

benefits for members of an ethnic group outside their ethnic homeland. At the same

time, secession will also be facilitated by strong institutional and societal capacities

at the sub-national level.42

Since Horowitz’ book appeared in 1985, most of the debate has turned around

what kind of ethnic demography might be more conducive to resisting secessionist

pressures in a federal context. According to O’Leary, federalism relies on a

Staatsvolk, a national or ethnic people who are demographically or electorally

dominant,43 because a group with a decisive majority of the federal population has

no reason to fear federation. Hale, on the contrary, perceived a ‘core ethnic region’

as the major threat.44 There is thus a general disagreement whether the creation of

ethnically homogenous sub-national units should be engineered or avoided, with

McGarry and O’Leary arguing that historically mobilised ethno-national groups do

not take kindly efforts to disorganise them through the re-drawing of internal

political boundaries.45 The core puzzle seems to lie in the combination of the relative

size of ethnic groups with their concentration and dispersion in specific territories.

Horowitz had already discussed the different strategies in having heterogeneous and

homogeneous sub-national units and suggested, inter alia, that federations can

be partly designed to prevent ethnic minorities from becoming local provincial

majorities.46

A final critical variable is the regime type. According to Brancati,

decentralisation mitigates conflict in democratic contexts by increasing political

participation, but indirectly increases it by encouraging the growth of ethnic and

regional parties.47 Bermeo claimed that ‘no violent separatist movement has ever

succeeded in a federal democracy’.48 A democratic federalism could block the

systematic transgression of individual and group rights, and prevent minority

secessionist elites from claiming an exaggerated support for their preferences.

130 CIVIL WARS

An autocratic system will, on the contrary, strengthen the hegemony of ethnicised

elites and further increase polarisation.49

FEDERALISM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Although there have been various attempts at creating federations in sub-Saharan

Africa following independence, many were quite short-lived and superficial. Failed

experiments include at the supra-national level the Federation of Mali and Senegal,

of Senegal and Gambia and the East African Federation, and at the national level

Cameroon (1962–72), Zaire (1960–65) and Uganda (1962–66).50

Among the still existing federations, Nigeria has been a federation since

independence in 1960. The four other cases are of a more recent nature, although

both Sudan and Ethiopia had been federations before and Apartheid’s creation of

bantustans had created a strong de facto asymmetrical autonomy regime (Table 2).

Even without taking a closer look at conflict databases, the conflict dynamics in

these cases represent quite different trajectories. We will not further consider the

case of the Comoros for lack of reliable data on the functioning of the federal system

in this small island archipelago.

South Africa

South Africa’s post-apartheid system has the best record in managing ethnic conflict.

Notwithstanding a strong legacy of violence and social unrest, and despite isolated

violent protests at local level and xenophobic attacks againstmigrant communities over

the last years, the political system has been quite effective in building a peaceful order.

South Africa’s quasi-federalismwas the result of protracted constitutional negotiations

in the transition fromApartheid. Vertical power sharing did not result from the wish to

‘come-together’, but from the need to ‘hold together’.51 Federalismwas not introduced

due to its functional advantages (such as effectiveness of policymaking), but as the

outcome of bargaining processes between contending groups who saw federalism as a

second-best solution but could not agree on something else.

It is doubtful that this weak federalism which was instituted in the mid-1990s has

a major responsibility in achieving political stability. Electoral victories of the

opposition in the Western Cape have strengthened accountability and the democratic

quality of the regime. Political stability and inter-ethnic cooperation have mainly

been produced by the formal and informal consociational elements of the political

system. Nearly 20 years after the introduction of the new political dispensation,

there is so little fear of ethno-federalism that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) was recently considering to return to the four old provinces of the Apartheid

times (ostensibly to weaken the Democratic Party’s grip on the Western Cape which

would be diluted in one bigger Cape Province).

Nigeria

In Nigeria, the federal option came with independence and in an attempt by the

British to ‘force together’ a vast and ethnic and religious heterogeneous territory.

131

TABLE 2

AFRIC

A’S

CURRENT FEDERALSYSTEMS

Since

Main structural features

No. of federal units

Nigeria

1960

Product of Independence; ‘holding-together’ federalism w

ithin a religious and ethnically plural country

36a

Tanzania

1964

Asymmetrical federalism w

ith Zanzibar retaining its own government

2

Sudan

1991

Part of post-w

ar power sharing; federalism as a transitory m

echanism

17b

Ethiopia

1992c

Product of Civil W

ar, ‘ethnic federalism’ with secession clause

11

South

Africa

1994

Partofpost-apartheidpower

sharing;strongdevolutionas

barrier

toANC dominance

9

Comoros

1999

Product of separatist tendencies

3

Sources:Own compilation.Three cases(South

Africa,Comoros andSudan)ofpost-conflictverticalpower

sharing werelackingfrom thelistofDavid

A.Lakeand

DonaldRothchild,‘TerritorialDecentralizationandCivilWar

Settlem

ents’,in

PhilipRoeder

andDonaldRothchild(eds) Sustainable

Peace: P

ower

and

Dem

ocracy

after

Civil

Wars

(Ithaca:

CornellUP 2005), because they did not consider

South A

frica as civilwar (following B

arbaraF. Walter,Committing

to

Peace: The

Successful Settlem

ent of Civil

Wars

(Princeton: PrincetonUP2002),andComoros andSudan notbeingcovered

by theirdata-set (to1999).

a The number of states stood as three at independence, and has been increased in several steps.

b Thefirstfederalconstitutionof1991provided

forninestates

(theform

erprovinces).In

1994,a

majorreorganisationcreateda totalof26states

andthe number

was

reducedto

25in

2005.Withtheindependence ofsouthern Sudan on9July

2011,the10southern statesdeparted.Since

January2012,thefederalrepublicofSudan

counts 17 federal states.

c Ethiopia

was

afederal

system

(withthetwo federal

unitsEthiopia

and Eritrea) alreadybetween 1952and1962.

TERRITORIAL POWER SHARING IN AFRICA

132 CIVIL WARS

Suberu claims that at independence, leaders of the three major ethnic groups

‘appeared to come together’ in a multinational federation and that subsequently

there has ever since the failed Biafra secession in the late 1960s been a large elite

consensus on federalism as building principle of the Nigerian state.52 ‘Nigeria is

arguably the sole African country in which federalism is deeply entrenched and its

constituent sub-federal governments are among the most powerful sub-national

units on the continent’.53

Nigeria’s record in managing violent conflict has been more mixed. It is true that

following the Biafra civil war with its massive loss of lives, the federal reforms have

been successful in preventing a recurrence of large-scale ethno-secessionist conflict. At

the same time, the country is plagued by high levels of ethnic protest, violent communal

conflicts and political and economic discrimination against the so-called non-indigenes

at the sub-state level. Many of these violent conflicts have occurred not in spite of

federalism, but exactly because of the specific dynamics of Nigerian federalism,

especially the creation of ethnically heterogeneous states. At the same time, many

students of Nigerian politics claim that the formal and informal institutions of power

sharing at the centre have been as important as federalism in creating stability. The so-

called ‘federal character’ is actually a geographic distribution rule which stipulates that

the composition of public institutions should reflect the federal character of the country

at each level of government.54

Ethiopia

Ethiopia comes closest to Bermeo’s category of ‘forced together’ federalism. Its

constitution did not result from a participatory constitution-making process, but was

imposed after the military victory of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary

Democratic Front (EPRDF) and was apparently inspired by the Soviet-Stalinist

model.55 While Ethiopia’s federalism has avoided state disintegration and large-

scale civil war, it is held together by the rule of a highly integrated bureaucratic party

structure, and actually governed very much like ‘a centralised unitary state with

most powers residing at the center’.56 Despite the international attention accorded to

the Ethiopian constitution, the political practice is certainly not providing for any

vertical power sharing. The government effectively rules by force.57 The success (or

not) of Ethiopia’s regime in creating some degree of political stability can thus not

be attributed to the decentralised features of its constitutional system.

Using the criteria that we deduced from the comparative literature, Ethiopia is also

the least likely case for a functioningmulti-nation federal system. It is a poor country,

has an authoritarian regime, and federalism was forced upon a certainly multiethnic

society but without any aspiration of creating a federation of nations. It has not passed

the test of peaceful departure from power of the government that created it.58

Tanzania

Tanzania has actually not a federal system, but a Union Government which was

created in 1964 by the merger of two pre-existing territories, Tanganjika and

Zanzibar. Both governments created a new centralised union government with


representatives from both previously independent countries, but Zanzibar being so

small in comparison to Tanganjika retained a certain degree of autonomy with a

separate government and parliament. Although various constitutional reform

commissions proposed the transformation of this peculiar structure into a fully

fledged federal system, the government preferred to retain the status quowhichmeans

that mainland Tanzania (Tanganjika) has no separate tier of government below the

union structures.59

The autonomy regime awarded to the Zanzibar islands grants thus more political

discretion to sub-national elites than is the case in most of the other federal systems.

The system did not prevent the break out of violence especially in the aftermath of

the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1995 as a fierce competition between

the former single party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, result of a merger of the then

dominating parties of Tanganjika and Zanzibar in 1977) and the main opposition

party Civic United Front (CUF, a major player only in Zanzibar, but not on the

mainland) emerged. Peace agreements in 1999 and 2001 eventually led to a local

power-sharing agreement in 2009. Further claims for a secession have thus been

quelled, especially within CUF, and the functioning of the broader asymmetrical

quasi-federal system is not really challenged. A more informal rotating principle at

the Presidency induced Nyerere to hand-pick Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a Zanzibari

Muslim, as his successor as Tanzanian President (1985 – 95).

Sudan

Sudan went through a first quasi-federal experiment (1972 –83) following years of

violent conflict, but the central government gradually undermined the federal

institutions until it was effectively ended with the break-out of another civil war. The

discovery of huge oil in southern Sudan 1978 and the direct interference of Ethiopia

in southern Sudan largely explain the failure of the federal system. In the middle of

the civil war, Sudan returned to a federal constitution transforming the existing

provinces to states. In order to weaken the southern states, the system was further

fragmented by increasing the number of federal units to 26 in 1994.

The federal system was never effectively working and certainly not instrumental

in ending the civil war(s). Federalism featured prominently in the 2005 Machakos

agreements ending the war between Sudan and South Sudan, but the federation was

‘seen as a compromise on the road towards secession rather than a permanent

solution to the problems of national accommodation in Sudan’.60

With independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, the southern states left in

order to build a new non-federal state, while the remaining states continued to build

a federation whose weakness was further exposed when President al-Bashir created

two further states by decree in January 2012.

Institutional Design and Ethnic Demography

The five cases represent contrasting institutional options. Ethiopia is a clear-cut case

of ethno-federalism with the whole state divided into supposedly ethnically

homogeneous homelands although practically none of these states has any tradition

134 CIVIL WARS

of self-rule. The risk of two core groups (Oromiya, Amhara both roughly 39 per cent

of the population) dominating the federation is so far counterbalanced by the

dominance of the ruling party.61 South Africa with its Apartheid history of

‘homelands’ and strong provinces decided to create new provinces which do not

coincide with any ethnic homeland. The Horowitzian ‘drawing through’ principle

was thus applied, although it was made possible through a major transformation of

the political system. South Africa’s weak federalism is decisively non-ethnic.

Although in different formats, in South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Ethiopia,

federalism was introduced to protect the interests of ethno-regional minorities.

Ethiopia’s ethno-federalism with secession clause served as exit-option for the

ruling minority, while South Africa’s constitution rather represented a guarantee for

political, cultural and economic rights of white and black minorities. Zanzibar’s

autonomy regime was introduced in the 1960s to guarantee the ethno-religious

interests of the small islands in a much larger polity, but the elites of both constituent

and independent units clearly ‘came together’ in the wake of the 1964 Zanzibari

revolution. Sudan’s federalism in its post-2005 version was a compromise solution

to keep southern Sudan in the Sudanese state while protecting the economic,

political and military interests of the southern elites.

Nigeria, finally, started with a multi-nation federation, but has over time moved

towards a centralised and non-ethnic federalism.62 The incremental increase of sub-

state units (from 3 to 36) diluted hegemonic or secessionist tendencies of the three

major ethnic groups. Suberu called this ‘a conscious and creative, albeit somewhat

controversial shift since the civil war towards a US-style national federal model in

Nigeria’s otherwise multiethnic or multi-national federal society’.63

Level of Economic Development

The specific economic and social contexts also matter in this comparison. Ethnic and

racial tensions in South Africa have been significantly absorbed by social policies

and black economic empowerment programs while (the otherwise completely

different) types of federal systems in Sudan and Nigeria were largely stabilised by

the redistribution of oil rents through federalism. Although Ethiopia has seen a

strong economic growth over the last decade, it continues to belong to the category

of least developed countries. Sub-national units heavily rely on grants and subsidies

from central government and the most lucrative income sources such as foreign

trade taxes are given to the central government.64 Such a federal structure is

therefore more likely to increase conflict both within the poorer sub-national states

and between the states and the central government.

Regime Type

The five cases represent contrasting regime trajectories. South Africa’s federal

constitution was both the result of a democratic negotiation and the basis for a

further democratic process. Nigeria’s federalism has been a constant feature of post

independence history, independent of the alternating political regimes. It has been

strengthened under democratic rule, notably with regard to the activism of the


Supreme Court in arbitrating intergovernmental conflicts, although it increased the

pressures for more decentralisation and arguably increased the level of corruption.

Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sudan have introduced federalism in clearly non-democratic

circumstances, and it would be difficult to claim that especially the Ethiopian and

Sudanese regimes have evolved with their federal constitutions in a more democratic

direction since then. Kymlicka claimed that for a multinational democracy to have a

positive impact on conflict, it has to be democratic and there has to be a cross-ethnic

consensus on human rights and liberal constitutionalism.65 ‘The ultimate stability of

post-conflict multi-nation federalisms, however, will probably depend on

overcoming the security and human rights fears that prevented their peaceful

adoption in the first place. In Ethiopia, for example, it is difficult to see how genuine

autonomy will be possible for groups like the Somalis, who are viewed by the

government as secessionists, backed by foreign enemies’.66

DECENTRALISATION IN AFRICA

Political decentralisation within a non-federal polity is hard to measure, and it is thus

more difficult to give an empirical overview of devolution in the remaining non-

federal states of sub-Saharan Africa. Schneider measured political decentralisation

by the holding of elections at different sub-national levels,67 but this is certainly not

very convincing (and he included few African countries in his analysis). Brancati

used the constitutional division of competencies as main indicator and considered

countries to have vertical power sharing if they have regional legislatures with

independent decision-making power over at least one issue area.68 Brancati further

measured decentralisation with a four-point index on whether or not regional

legislatures are elected and the types of issues over which regional legislatures have

control – tax authority, education and public order or police.

According to such criteria, none of the non-federal cases in Africa implements a

strong form of devolution. Central governments in Africa have tended to keep

decentralised authorities under strict political surveillance and with little financial

discretion over how to spend the largely centrally collected resources.69 Qualitative

research on individual processes of decentralisation in Africa highlights the many

differences among the countries and the growing assertiveness of local and regional

councils in many places. It should thus not be excluded that even weak forms of

decentralisation might be relevant for conflict management.

For lack of data, it is impossible to give a comprehensive assessment of how the

very different decentralisation reforms have affected the dynamics of violent

conflict in African states. It is possible that within a decentralised unit, different

groups with contrasting political views or structural disparities in economic power

or different ethnic or religious affiliations may conflict with each other, or different

local government units may clash with each other.70 The scenario of conflict between

one (or several) decentralised unit and the central government over the extent of

political, cultural, financial and economic autonomy and authority is thus just one

possible outcome of decentralisation reforms.

136 CIVIL WARS

Let us have a closer look at the cases of decentralisation/territorial power sharing

with post-conflict peace agreements. We can distinguish three types:

In Angola, Mozambique or Djibouti, decentralisation reforms were promised

without any guarantee that meaningful powers are devolved to sub-national level.

While the power sharing might have a territorial component, this was not the real

issue in any of these agreements, and hardly amounts even to some sort of autonomy,

let alone to power sharing. In Angola and Djibouti, decentralisation was actually

never implemented; in Mozambique, the law was passed nearly 7 years after the

ending of conflict, and in a way which minimises the influence of the rural-based

opposition party Resistencia Nacional Moc�ambicana (RENAMO) by effectively

adopting an asymmetrical type of decentralisation granting local self-government to

selected municipalities only (Table 3).71

In Burundi, the very comprehensive power sharing within government also

included the different territorial layers of government. Again, this provision does not

share power, but simply attributes posts to the rebels who are appointed by the

central government.72

In a final group, decentralisation was consciously used by state elites to counter

violent regionalist movements. Seely has analysed the decentralisation policies

enacted in Mali since 1992 as a deliberate attempt of the new democratic regime to

co-opt the Tuareg rebels into the political system.73 The National Pact provided for

integration of Touareg fighters in the security forces and reserved four seats in the

National Assembly to delegates from the northern peoples of Mali. The agreement

amended the political structure of Mali through a decentralisation of authority to

regional and sub-regional assemblies of an executive character. Special

administrative structures were agreed upon for the northern region. These new

assemblies mainly had powers in socio-economic and cultural sectors of

governance. It might be questioned, however, whether the territorial component

had a particular importance for managing the conflict, especially in comparison to

TABLE 3

DECENTRALISATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1990 – 2011

Peace agreements Type of decentralisation

Mozambique 1992, Angola 1994, Djibouti 2001

Decentralisation reforms were promised without any guarantee that meaningful powers are devolved to sub-national level. While the power sharing has a territorial component, this was not the real issue in any of these agreements

Burundi 2003 Comprehensive power sharing within government also included the different territorial layers of government. Attributes posts to the rebels that are appointed by the central government

Mali 1992, Niger 1993/94, Senegal 2004, Angola 2006

Asymmetrical devolution/regional autonomy


the integration of rebel fighters into the army. In the Cabinda Peace Agreement of

2006, the Angolan government offered the rebels some degree of local autonomy

which represented a progress with respect to the status quo ante, but did not really

allow the population of this small oil-rich exclave to effectively control the polity or

economy on their territory.

Although not introduced through a peace agreement, the decentralisation

reforms in Senegal and Uganda fit into this same pattern. During the early 1980s, a

violent conflict erupted in the southern province of Casamance, virtually cut from

the rest of Senegal by the enclave of the Gambia. The mostly Dioula and Christian

population, living in the western (or lower) part of Casamance, resented a growing

economic and social marginalisation and a large influx of ‘Northerners’ within the

administration and business elites of the Casamance.74 The local populations

eventually started to give widespread support to a rebel movement (Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance, MFDC) fighting for the separation of

Casamance from Senegal. Large-scale violence was brought to an end in the early

1990s, but violence re-erupted again and again and no sustainable political solution

has been found yet.75 Decentralisation was mainly introduced in Senegal as a

developmental strategy, but included political subtexts in dealing with Casamance.

Although President Abdoulaye Wade promised a more substantial autonomy in the

latest peace agreements of 2004, nothing substantial followed, and in the run-up to

the last presidential elections in 2012, new violence erupted.

The Ugandan case has attracted much interest because decentralisation was

designed in the mid-1990s as a strategy to appease the proponents of federalism

(largely concentrated in wealthy Buganda). Interestingly, it was not designed to deal

with the ethnic grievances of the northern populations and the brutal civil war in

northern Uganda. As the survival of the ruling coalition depended on Buganda’s

support of the new Constitution in the Constituent assembly, and decentralisation

was welcomed by donors, some concessions to autonomy demands had to be taken.76

In the further decentralisation process, minorities emerged to demand the creation of

new districts thus fragmenting the existing sub-national units and denying the bigger

ethno-nationalist movements any possibility to use decentralised units as

springboard for secession while shifting the problem of ethnic conflict to local

levels where it was supposedly less threatening to state integrity.77

On balance, these political hidden agendas explain why decentralisation is rarely

amounting to territorial self-governance or territorial power sharing. If

decentralisation is introduced to placate donors or to appease localised rebel

movements, it is very unlikely to lead to a durable sharing of power between the

central state and local or regional state elites. These cases thus illustrate to what

extent decentralised institutions can effectively function as an obstacle to regional

autonomy. Regime type might matter here again as decentralisation with its non-

constitutional basis is certainly more likely to be manipulated in the presidentialist

and hybrid or authoritarian regimes. The core intervening variable, however, is the

ethnic geography or nature of ethnic identity in the African context.

138 CIVIL WARS

THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

What follows from this previous discussion for the prospects of federalism and

territorial power sharing in Africa and its role in managing violent conflicts? We

have seen that there are few cases of substantive territorial power sharing in Africa

(although in contrast to many other world regions during the last two decades, two

new federations emerged on the continent, Ethiopia and South Africa) and that the

existing cases of vertical power sharing have contributed only to a limited extent to

conflict management.

We assume that the degree to which federal institutions can contribute to

preserving peace depends on how these institutions reflect the characteristics of the

societies they govern. The idea of multi-nation or ethno-federalism relies on the idea

of ‘competing nationalisms’ within a single state. According to this view, a

dominant core group forming a clear majority of the population used nationbuilding

policies to impose its language and culture on the rest of the population. Minorities

had to constitute themselves as nations and typically tried to consolidate this

nationhood in institutions at sub-national level.

Most African states, however, do not have such a core majoritarian ethnic group.

They are rather composed of a multitude of ethno-cultural groups. Compared to

countries in other regions of the world, African countries contain large numbers of

small groups, none with sufficient numerical strength to constitute a majority in a

country.78 ‘Comparatively few ethnic groups in black Africa are candidates for

nationhood, and few of them have such aspirations’.79 In most cases, it is not the

language of a proto-nation to monopolise public space and public institutions, but

the language of the former coloniser. There is consequently less need for ethno

federalism to protect minorities from the injustices that arise as a result of majority

nationbuilding, as pointed out by Mozaffar and Scarritt:

Because of the combination of modal characteristics of ethnopolitical groups in

Africa – many small and relatively similar groups that do not differ greatly from one

another by global standards, the heterogeneity of these differences, multiple levels of

ethnopolitical identity, the absence of long histories of autonomous rule, and significant

changes in the ethnopolitical landscape – most African countries are not deeply divided

societies. They are more accurately characterised as multiethnic societies comprised of

large numbers of relatively evenly balanced, or dispersed, communal groups.80

The ethnic conflicts we observe in Africa rather ‘take the form of struggles for a

share of state power at the central level, rather than ethno-nationalist struggles for

self-government and autonomy at a regional level, (. . .) the problem is that while the

state may be neutral (that is, language, culture and symbols are not tied to any

particular ethnic group), access to the state remains ethnicized’.81 This requires

groups to maintain a strong group identity, but does not necessarily provide

incentives to exaggerate cultural differences.

In the context of a ‘gatekeeper-state’ which sits astride the interface between a

territory and the rest of the world collecting and distributing resources that derive

from the gate itself82 (such as customs revenue and foreign aid, permits to do


business in the territory, entry and exit visas), fighting for political and economic

autonomy within peripheral regions of this territory is less obvious than aspiring to

be included in some form of horizontal power sharing at the central level, i.e. the

gate.83 The few centre-periphery conflicts which exist in Africa thus do typically not

lead to ethno-nationalist struggles. Even in places such as Casamance or the recent

Tuareg uprising in Mali where the dominant discourse frames these rebellions as

nationalist struggles, these movements rely much more on transnational criminal or

terrorist networks than on any substantial domestic mobilisation.

A small number of African states do, however, not correspond to this model of

primarily horizontal (or unranked) ethnic relationships and the ensuing competition

among non-hierarchical ethnic groups.84 In Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Rwanda,

Burundi and the former Apartheid states of southern Africa (Namibia, South Africa),

statebuilding was not neutral amongst ethnic groups, but one racial or ethnic group

managed to shape the state which reflected its language, history and culture and in

which social status corresponded with ethnic affiliation. This is most evident in the

fact that non-European languages spoken by the core group such as Amharic or

Afrikaans became national languages. These societies can indeed be characterised as

deeply divided societies in which ethnic or other particularistic groups are strongly

polarised by overlapping political, social and economic cleavages.

Some minorities in these countries with a strong territorial base and a history of

autonomy have responded with ethno-nationalism. What we find there ‘is something

akin to the problem of competing nationalisms’.85 Ethno-federalism could thus be

the institutional answer and has been chosen in Ethiopia (and to an extent in southern

Sudan). Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi are both too small as countries and have also

mixed settlement patterns which excluded a consideration of federalism. For very

obvious historical reasons, ethno-federalism was no longer an option in South Africa

and Namibia (not even for the White hardliners during the constitutional

negotiations).

CONCLUSION

The article has argued that there is a relative lack of vertical power sharing in

sub-Saharan Africa, but that this should not surprise us given the socio-ethnic

context of most African societies which lack both majoritarian ethnic groups and

clear culturally based distinctions between contending ethnic groups. In this context,

forms of power sharing that include provision on territorial autonomy should be

regarded with caution. Regional autonomy as a solution to civil war will not work

in most cases. By interregional comparison, many African states are small in

population (a third of all states having less than 3 million inhabitants), and

federalism certainly makes sense only in states of a certain size and population. Most

African peace agreements which included territorial power sharing might have been

essential in sending signals of commitment86 but did nothing to create a viable and

institutionalised form of vertical power sharing.

140 CIVIL WARS

Critics of ethno-federalism mainly discuss the spectre of disintegration. The

African experience shows that decentralisation might fuel or mitigate violent

conflicts below the level of full-scale partition, and future research should thus be

more interested in this multitude of conflict patterns and how these conflicts are

influenced by territorial power sharing.

We have shown that territorial power sharing might be a solution in a couple

of countries with rather hierarchical inter-ethnic relationships. Our analysis has

revealed, however, that even in cases such as Nigeria and South Africa, conflict

management effectively relies on non-ethnic federalism or a combination of

different modes of power sharing, in that territorial self-rule is complemented by at

least some elements of consociationalism. Where it lacks, such as in Ethiopia,

federalism does not work well, and positive effects on inter-ethnic conflict can

be excluded. Further research should thus be primarily interested in a better

understanding of the precise interaction patterns of vertical and horizontal forms of

power sharing in Africa and beyond.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A first version of the paper was presented at the project workshop on Institutions for Sustainable Peace at the International Studies Association Conference in San Diego in April 2012. I thank all participants and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback.

NOTES

1. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1977). 2. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘Territorial Approaches to Ethnic Conflict Settlement’ in Karl

Cordell and Stefan Wolff (eds) Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict (London: Routledge 2011) pp.249 – 65.

3. Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (eds) From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008); Andreas Mehler, ‘Not Always in the People’s Interest: Power-Sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements’ (Hamburg, German Institute of Global and Area Studies 2008); Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds) Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2005).

4. Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, ‘Power Sharing in Peace Settlements: Initiating the Transition from Civil War’ in Roeder and Rothchild (note 3) pp.83 – 106.

5. Pippa Norris, Driving Democracy. Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008).

6. Donald Rothchild and Philip G. Roeder, ‘Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy’ in Roeder and Rothchild (note 3) pp.29 – 50.

7. Anna Jarstad, ‘Power Sharing: Former Enemies in Joint Government’ in Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (eds) From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008) pp.105 – 33.

8. Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, ‘Institutionalizing Peace: Power-Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management’, American Journal of Political Science 47/2 (2003) pp.318 –32.

9. Mehler (note 3). 10. Ibid. p.7; Jarstad (note 7). 11. Hoddie and Hartzell (note 4). 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. p.103. 14. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, ‘Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlements’, in

Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds) Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2005) pp.109 –32.


15. Uppsala Conflict Data Program/StinaHogbladh, Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook Version 2.0 (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2012). This definition of peace agreement clearly extends beyond the idea of power-sharing.

16. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985); Kristin M. Bakke and Erik Wibbels, ‘Diversity, Disparity, and Civil Conflict in Federal States’, World Politics 59/1 (2006) pp.1 –50; Jan Erk and Lawrence Anderson, ‘The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?’ Regional and Federal Studies 19/2 (2009) pp.191 – 202; Dawn Brancati, ‘Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?’, International Organization 60/3 (2006) pp.651 –85 and Stefan Wolff, ‘Conflict Management in Divided Societies: The Many Uses of Territorial Self-Governance’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20/1 (2013) pp.27 – 50.

17. Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel, ‘Let’s Stick Together: Understanding Africa’s Secessionist Deficit’, African Affairs 104/416 (2005) pp.399 – 427.

18. Andrea Iff, Peace-Preserving Federalism. Making Sense of India and Nigeria (Saarbrucken: Sudwestdt. VerlagfurHochschulschr. 2010).

19. Eghosa Osaghae, ‘Federalism and the Management of Diversity in Africa’, Identity, Culture and Politics 5/1–2 (2004) pp.162 –78 and Shaheen Mozaffar and James R. Scarritt, ‘Why Territorial Autonomy is Not a Viable Option for Managing Ethnic Conflict in African Plural Societies’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 5/3–4 (1999) pp.230 – 53.

20. Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis, and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralisation in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience (Washington, DC: World Bank 1983).

21. William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 1964) and Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press 1987).

22. Ugo M. Amoretti, and Nancy Bermeo (eds), Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press 2003) and Jonathan Rodden, ‘Comparative federalism and decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement’, Comparative Politics 36/4 (2004) pp.481 – 500.

23. Ronald Watts, ‘Models of Federal Power Sharing’, International Social Science Journal 167 (2001) pp.23 –32; Rodden (note 22).

24. Norris (note 5). 25. Yash P. Ghai, ‘Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural

Autonomy’ in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002) pp.141 –70 and Watts (note 23).

26. Brendan O’Leary, ‘An Iron Law of Nationalism and Federation?’ Nations and Nationalism 7/3 (2001) pp.273 –96.

27. See references in note 16. 28. Alfred Stepan, ‘Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model’, Journal of Democracy 10/4

(1999) pp.19 – 34. 29. But see Kent Eaton and Ed Connerly, ‘Democracy, Development, and Security as Objectives of

Decentralization’, in Ed Connerly, Kent Eaton, and Paul Smoke (eds), Making Decentralisation Work (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2010) pp.1 –24 and Joseph Siegle and Patrick O’Mahony, ‘Decentralization and Internal Conflict’, in E. Connerly, K. Eaton, and P. Smoke (eds) Making Decentralisation Work (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2010) pp.135 –66.

30. For Africa, compare Andreas Mehler, ‘Decentralization, Division of Power and Crisis Prevention: A Theoretical Exploration with Reference to Africa, in Tobias Debiel (ed.), Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence, and Development in Crisis Regions (London: Zed Books 2002) pp.72 –86 and Christof Hartmann, ‘Decentralisation and the Legacy of Protracted Conflict – Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa’ in Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann (eds) Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway Out of Poverty and Conflict? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP 2008) pp.169–90.

31. Graham K. Brown, ‘Decentralisation and Conflict: Introduction and Overview’, Conflict, Security and Development 8/4 (2008) pp.387 –92, 389.

32. Nancy Bermeo, ‘Conclusion: The Merits of Federalism’, in Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo (eds) Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore, CA: John Hopkins UP 2003) pp.457 – 82.

33. Will Kymlicka, ‘ Emerging Western Models of Multination Federalism: Are They Relevant for Africa?’, in David Turton (ed.) Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (London: James Currey 2006) pp.32 –64 and John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation’ in J.R.S. Noel (ed.) From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (Toronto: McGill-Queens UP 2005) pp.263 – 96.

142 CIVIL WARS

34. Erk and Anderson (note 16) p.192. 35. Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions. The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State

(Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1999); Svante E. Cornell, ‘Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective’, World Politics 54/2 (2002) pp.245 –76 and Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York, NY: W.W. Norton 2000).

36. Philip G. Roeder, ‘Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms’, Regional and Federal Studies 19/2 (2009) pp.203 –19, 206.

37. Stepan (note 28); Bermeo (note 32) and McGarry and O’Leary (note 2). 38. Daniel J. Elazar, ‘Federalism and Consociational Regimes‘, Publius: Journal of Federalism 15/2

(1985) pp.17 –34. 39. Stepan (note 28). 40. Horowitz (note 16) p.623. 41. E.g. Bakke and Wibbels (note 16). 42. Erk and Anderson (note 16). 43. O’Leary (note 26). 44. Henry Hale, ‘Divided We Stand: International Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse’,

World Politics 56/4 (2004) pp.165 –93. 45. McGarry and O’Leary (note 2). 46. Horowitz (note 16). 47. Brancati (note 16). 48. Nancy Bermeo, The Import of Institutions, Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2002) pp.96 – 110, 108. 49. Roeder (note 36). 50. Rotimi Suberu, ‘Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective’,

Ethnopolitics 8/1 (2009) pp.68f. 51. Stepan (note 28). 52. Suberu (note 50). 53. Ibid. p.67. 54. Daniel Bach, ’Indigeneity, Ethnicity and Federalism’, in Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and

OyeleyeOyediran (eds) Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1997) pp.333 –49; Osaghae (note 15); Anthony Smith, ‘Fractured Federalism: Nigeria’s Lesson for Today’s Nation Builder in Iraq’, The Round Table 94/1 (2005) pp.129 –44 and Suberu (note 50).

55. Christopher Clapham, ‘Afterword’, in D. Turton (ed.) Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (London: James Currey 2006).

56. Edmond J. Keller, ‘Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia’, African Journal of Political Science 7/1 (2002) pp.21 –50, 46.

57. International Crisis Group 2009, ‘Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and its Discontents’, Africa Report 153 (September 2009).

58. Clapham (note 55) p.237 and David Turton (ed.) Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (London: James Currey 2006).

59. For details see Romuald R. Haule, ‘Torturing the Union? An Examination of the Union of Tanzania and its Constitutionality’ Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 66 (2006) pp.215 – 33.

60. Rohan Edrisinha, Lee Seymour, and Ann Griffiths, ‘Adopting Federalism: Sri Lanka and Sudan’ in Ann Griffiths (ed.) Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005 (Montreal: Mc Gill-Queen’s UP 2005), p.445.

61. Edmond J. Keller, and Lahra Smith, ‘Obstacles to Implementing Territorial Decentralization: The First Decade of Ethiopian Federalism’, in Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds) Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2005).

62. Horowitz (note 16); Rotimi Suberu and Larry Diamond, ‘Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict-Management and Democracy in Nigeria’, in Andrew Reynolds (ed.) The Architecture of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002) pp.400 –28.

63. Suberu (note 50) p.73. 64. On Ethiopian federalism see particularly Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State:

The Ethiopian Experience 1991–2000 (Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute 2002). 65. Kymlicka (note 33). 66. Ibid. p.52. 67. Aaron Schneider, ‘Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement’, Studies in Comparative

International Development 38/3 (2003) pp.32 –56.


68. Brancati (note 16). 69. Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann (eds) Decentralisation in Africa. A Pathway out of Poverty

and Conflict? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP 2008). 70. Mehler (note 30). 71. P.S. Reddy, Local Government Democratisation and Decentralisation. A Review of the Southern

African Region (Kenwyn: Juta 1999). 72. On Burundi Daniel P. Sullivan, ‘The Missing Pillars: A Look at the Failure of Peace in Burundi

Through the Lens of Arend Lijphart’s Theory of Consociational Democracy’ Journal of Modern African Studies 43/1 (2005) pp.75 –95 and Rene Lemarchand, ‘Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, African Affairs 106/422 (2006) pp.1 – 20.

73. Jennifer C. Seely, ‘A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg Threat in Mali’, Journal of Modern African Studies 39/3 (2001) pp.499 – 524.

74. For a more detailed historical account and political-economic explanation see Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2003) pp.94ff.

75. On Senegal compare Vincent Foucher, ‘Pas d’alternance en Casamance? Le nouveau pouvoir senegalais face a la revendication separatiste casamanc�aise’, Politique Africaine 91 (2003) pp.101–19.

76. Pierre Englebert, ‘Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 40/3 (2002) pp.345–68.

77. Anna Katharina Schelnberger, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Kibaale, Uganda’, in Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann (eds) Decentralisation in Africa. A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP 2008) pp.191 – 212; Elliot Green, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda’, Conflict, Security & Development 8/4 (2008) pp.427 – 50.

78. Mozaffar and Scarritt (note 19). 79. John Markakis, ‘Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn of Africa’, in Paris Yeros (ed.) Ethnicity and

Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan1999) pp.65 –80, 77.

80. Mozaffar and Scarritt (note 15) p.241. 81. Kymlicka (note 33) p.48. 82. Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2002). 83. For a similar argument Englebert and Hummel (note 17). 84. The terminology goes back to Horowitz (note 16). 85. Kymlicka (note 33) p.48. 86. The idea of signaling, and ‘costly signals’ is based here on the discussion by Matthew Hoddie and

Caroline Hartzell, ‘Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements’, Journal of Peace Research 40/3 (2003) pp.303 – 20.

territorial power sharing and the regulation of conflict in africa

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