term paper india-pakistan_relations_an_enduring_rivalry

India-Pakistan Relations: An Enduring Rivalry [

Submitted to:

DR. Razia Sultana

By:

Jamshed Khan

M. Phil 2st

Department of HistoryQUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY

Islamabad-Pakistan

Contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………… 3

Historical Background………………………………………………………………... 4

Theories of Enduring Rivalry………………………………………………………… 5

Seeds of the Rivalry between India and Pakistan…………………………………….. 6

(1) The power asymmetry…………………………………………………… 6

(2) Security Competition between the Two Countries……………………….. 8

(3) Kashmir: A stumbling Block to Peace……………………………………. 10

(4) India’s Hegemonic Design and Pakistan………………………………….. 12

(5) Role of External Factors in Indo-Pak Relations…………………………... 15

How can this rivalry come to an end?............................................................................ 19

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. 20

Notes and References…………………………………………………………………. 22

India-Pakistan Relations: An Enduring Rivalry 2

Introduction

In an interview given to a Swiss journalist on 11 March 1948, in answer to a

question whether there was any hope of India and Pakistan reaching a peaceful

settlement, Quaid-i-azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah said, “yes, provided Indian government sheds

its superiority complex and deals with Pakistan on an equal footing and fully appreciates the realities.” 1

This statement gives us an insight into the underlying reason for the unending conflict

between the two nations.

Unfortunately, since their independence, India and Pakistan have rarely

experience a happy phase in their relations. Immediately after their independence the

story of both states started with wars, tensions, mistrust and misperception. Four times

they have gone to war. The hostile relationship between the two countries have resulted

in both states economic as well as political and security challenges and has also severely

affected the security environment of the whole region. There were also brief periods

when these relations could be described as normal and cordial. However, this was an

exception rather than a normal practice. Many efforts were made by both countries to

normalize these relations, but all have proved fruitless. Immediately after independence

they fought a war over the issue of Kashmir; in 1965 they fought another war over the

same issue. In 1971 the two countries went to another war that led to the separation of

East Pakistan. In 1999 they fought once again over the Kargil hills. As a result of these

hostile relations, both nations have suffered considerable losses in term of life and

material. Instead of bringing peace and prosperity to their vast majority of population

both the states feel threatened and insecure by each other.

The Indian-Pakistan rivalry remains one of the most enduring and unresolved

conflict of our times. Begin in the aftermath of the birth of the two states from British

colonial rule in 1947, it has continued for well over half a century with periodic wars and

crises erupting between two rivals. The conflict has affected all key dimensions of inter-

state and societal relation of the two antagonists. Despite occasional peace it shows no

signs of a permanent settlement in the near future. Since the late 1980s, the open

1Noor ul Haq, “Pakistan and the Indian quest for hegemony”, Ipri journal, vol. III, No. 2,

summer 2003, p.21.


acquisition of nuclear weapon by the two states, the increasing number of crises

involving them, and the introduction of terrorist tactics into the conflict have led to he

heightened possibility of a cataclysmic war breaking out in South Asia with unimaginable

consequences.2 Thus the South Asian conflict and regional security dynamics revolve

basically around the rivalry and antagonism between India and Pakistan.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the phenomenon of India –Pakistan

enduring rivalry. It is an attempt to know the seeds and causes of persistency of this

rivalry even when some other long-running conflicts in different parts of the world have

come to an end. These are followed by suggestions and conclusion.

Historical Background

The history of Indo-Pak relation is a story of two hostile neighbors, having

different religious ideologies, different socio-economic bases and conflicting national

interest. Its reality can be best described as a dichotomous model; one where the two

countries are seen as locked in a zero-sum conflict i-e the gain for one is seen as the loss

of the other. A variety of historical, psychological and social factors lie at the heart of this

antagonistic relationship.

Mutual distrust and antagonism marked the relations between two countries since

1947 when they achieved their independence. They fought three wars (1947-48, 1965,

and 1971), and on at least four occasions 1987, 1990, 1999 and 2002, they were at the

brink of a major armed conflict. There were also brief periods when these relations could

be described as normal and cordial. However, this was an exception rather than a normal

practice in their bilateral relations. The motive, which impelled both India and Pakistan

towards acrimony and rivalry “are embedded in history and politics of the Sub-

Continent.3 From the very beginning, the relations between the two countries are marked

2 T.V. Paul, “Causes of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry”, in T.V. Paul(edited), The India-

Pakistan conflict An enduring rivalry. (Cambridge: Camridge university press, November 2005),

p. 3.

3 Muntzra Nazir, “The political and strategic Dimensions in Indo-Pakistan Relations (1988-

2004)”, Pakistan vision, vol.5, No. 2, December 2004, p. 21.


by conflict and discord; mutual distrust and suspicions; and misperception and wars. The

most important events that really affected the relations between these two antagonists are;

the saddest event of 1971 war- the separation of East Pakistan and the creation of new

state of Bangladesh; the 1999 Kargil crises between India and Pakistan; the terrorist

attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001 and the terrorist attack on Indian

railways in August 2006 Mumbai which damage the pace of the peace process between

the two countries. The “crux” of the difficulties between the two states is the Kashmir

issue. Kashmir issue has bedeviled relations between the two countries since their

independence.

The rivalry between the two countries intensified when India began to assert its

role as the hegemonic power in the region; Pakistan, though accepted India as a

significant role player in the region, sought to resist its attempts for domination.

Consequently, at the most of the time Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India has been

reactive.4

India and Pakistan have followed a “swing” model of relations whereby the

pendulum of the relationship swings from one end to the other – conflict in May 1998 to

peace in February 1999 to conflict in May 1999 to peace in November 2001 to conflict

in December 2001 to peace in April 2003 to further peace in January 2004 to November

2008.5 Nowadays the relations are again very much tense and poised and does not need

more than a few hours to inter into a conflict situation, because of the 27th November

terrorists attack on Taj Mehal hotel in Mumbai. India is overwhelmed by waves of

sorrow and anger. Despite Pakistan’s rejections of all imputations of involvement in the

terrorist attack, Indian government is pointing its finger at Pakistan.

Theories of Enduring Rivalry

Enduring rivalries are defined as conflicts between two or more states that last

more than two decades with several militarized inter-state disputes punctuating the

relationship in between. An enduring rivalry is characterized by a “persistent, 4 Ibid.

5 WWW.google.com/ Cost of conflict between India and Pakistan, 2004/ wikipedia/ encyclopedia. htm


http://WWW.google.com/

fundamental, and long term incompatibility of goals between two states,” which

“manifests itself in the basic attitudes of the parties toward each other as well as in

recurring violent or potentially violent clashes over a long period of time.”6 Although

there is difference of opinion among analysts on the number of disputes and inter-state

crises required for calling a rivalry “enduring”. According to Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz,

an enduring rivalry as one that involves at least six militarized disputes during a twenty

year period. This specification, according to them, allows defining the concept along

“spatial consistency, duration and militarized competition.7 In other words, an enduring

rivalry cannot be episodic or of short duration; it should be ongoing for a reasonably long

period on a continuous basis before it can be termed “enduring”. Enduring rivalries are

also called “protracted conflicts,” but the main difference between the two concepts are

perhaps lie in the inter-state dimension of the farmer. Where a protracted conflict can be

internal or intra-state, involving state and /or non-state actors, an enduring rivalry

specially refers to inter-state conflict.

An enduring rivalry is often characterized by zero-sum perspectives on the part of

the participants. The conflict can become entrenched and societal as parties view each

other as highly threatening to their security and physical survival. Enduring rivalries tend

to be typified by periodic inter-state crises and, in some instances, war, although war is

not a necessary condition for a rivalry to be categorized as “enduring”. John Vasquez

argues that relative equality in power capabilities is necessary for a rivalry to remain

enduring, since in a highly unequal power situation the stronger party will in general be

able to impose its will on the weaker side and put an end to the conflict.8

Seeds of the Rivalry between India and Pakistan

6 T.V. Paul, “causes of the India –Pakistan enduring rivalry”, in T.V. Paul(edited), The India-

Pakistan conflict An enduring rivalry. (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, November

2005), p.3-4.

7 Ibid. p. 4.

8 Ibid.


The present conflict between India and Pakistan is a legacy of the past. There are

a number of reasons behind the Indo- Pak persistent rivalry, of which, the most important

are discussed below;

(1) The power asymmetry: The India-Pakistan power relationship is characterized by a

distinct form of power asymmetry. The inability of either state to impose a settlement or

convince the other to make significant concessions is because of the peculiar power

asymmetry that has existed between the two states. India is over seven times larger than

Pakistan in population and size of natural economy, and four times in territorial size.

However, Pakistan has been able to borrow power to balance India through externally

procured military capabilities and alignment with outside powers. Until the 1980s ,the

Pakistani economy also performed slightly bitter than India due largely to external aid,

remittances of Pakistani expatriate workers, and its embraced of limited free market

economic policies. However, this situation began to change after India launched its policy

of economic liberalization in 1991. As the power differential between the two countries

in terms of economic and conventional military strength began to alter in India’s favor

after the early 1990s, Islamabad increasingly resorted to asymmetric strategies such as

supporting insurgency and proxy war to continue its struggle with India.9

Until 1965, India’s defense posture against Pakistan was based on “matching

capabilities” but since 1965 India’s policy has been to maintain “sufficient deterrence” or

a “slight edge” in its force deployments vis-à-vis Pakistan. Thus, in 1965 India possessed

seven divisions while Pakistan had six, with Pakistan holding qualitative superiority in

tanks and aircraft. Since 1971, India has maintained the “slight” in both qualitative and

quantitative defense areas. With the acquisitions of nuclear weapons, Pakistan believes

that it has obtained a “great equalizer” at strategic level, since its missiles can hit most

parts of India. Furthermore, the politico-military support that Pakistan enjoyed off and on

from US and continuously from China since the 1960s has enabled Pakistan to reduce the

power asymmetry with India. While the US gave aid with the intention of using Pakistan

9 T.V. Paul, “Causes of the India-Pakistan enduring”, in T.V. Paul (edited), The India-Pakistan

conflict An enduring rivalry. (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, November 2005), p.12


for its larger strategic goals, Pakistan’s main goal has always been to increase its

capabilities vis-à-vis India.8 Some argue that the period of Indian military preponderance

was associated with stability or absence of war and crises in South Asia. During 1972-87,

Pakistan was weakened considerably following its defeat in the Bangladesh of 1971.

Thus, nuclear acquisition is viewed by the Pakistan military elite as way to equalize the

power relationship with India and as a cover for conducting sub strategic level operations

in Kashmir with more vigor.10

The peculiar power asymmetry between India and Pakistan has also generated

different patterns of resolve and resentment. Most often, the weaker party has shown

more resolve to acquire the territory through military means, including guerrillas/terrorist

operations. The sense of resentment is higher in the weaker party as the status quo seems

to favor the stronger side. Further, the territorial dismemberment in 1971 solidified the

existing resentment of Pakistan about the “unfairness” of territorial divisions. This high

level of resentment among Pakistanis tends to manifest itself intensely in societal

dimensions, especially the teaching of history that perpetuates negative and stereotypical

images of India and Hindu religion. Indian also holds stereotypical images of Pakistanis,

as is evident in the often negative media coverage of that country and the burgeoning

number of Bollywood movies with anti-Pakistan themes.11

The India-Pakistan power asymmetry is affected by perceptions that each side

holds of the other. Much of the Pakistani elite believe that India and Pakistan ought to be

coequals geopolitically and it sees relative parity in military and diplomatic terms as a

goal worth striving for, even at a high cost to society. Thus, India’s efforts at achieving

major power status and gaining permanent membership in the UN Security Council are

viewed with great alarm and all means are employed to avert this prospect. Pakistan fears

that Indian hegemony in the subcontinent will adversely affect its security and power

position. Since independence, Pakistan has consistently pursued a policy of obtaining

parity with India, often through military and diplomatic means. Alignment with outside

powers and the acquisition of qualitatively superior weaponry have been two key planks

10 Ibid. p.13-16.

11 Ibid. p.16-17.


of this strategy.12 The nuclear arms race between the two states has been another basis for

the parity notion. So, as discussed at the start that, the inability of either state to impose a

settlement or convince the other to make significant concessions is because of the

peculiar power asymmetry that existed between the two states.

(2) Security Competition between the Two Countries: Security competition

in South Asia dates back to the dissolution of the British Raj in 1947, which resulted in

the birth of two successor states, India and Pakistan. The partition of British India was a

traumatic event that involved an artificial division of territory, the uprooting of about ten

million individuals, and the death of perhaps a quarter of a million people in violence that

accompanied the greatest mass migration in modern history. What was perhaps most

problematic about this event, finally, was the fact that neither of the two states appeared

to be satisfied with its outcome. India viewed partition as unnecessary and tragic, but

essentially complete. Pakistan viewed partition as inevitable and necessary, but

fundamentally incomplete because Kashmir, a Muslim majority state, remained with

India .The loss of Kashmir was highly significant because it was the last component

necessary to complete the vision Pakistan’s founder had of a cohesive republic composed

of all the adjoining northwestern Muslim majority areas of erstwhile British India.13

Giving this history, the competition between India and Pakistan is

multidimensional. First there is a contest over territory. Besides Kashmir, there are

unresolved territorial disputes over the Siachen Glaccier, where India and Pakistan

continue to fight an active, high-altitude war, and over Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch,

where in 1964 both states fought a limited action that included the use of armor. The

Wular Barrage constitutes a dispute over water rights pertaining to one of the tributaries

of the Indus. Although only Kashmir contains the potential for full-scale conventional

war, the others have contributed to discordant “atmospherics” and occasional political

crises in the past. Security competition is supplemented by competing political visions

and contested identities. India draws its inspiration from the ideal of liberal democracy,

which includes secularism, even as it struggles to accommodate new revisionist parties 12Ibid, p.17-18

13 WWW.google.com/ Stability in South Asia /Wikipedia/encyclopedia.htm



that espouse more self-conscious forms of Hindu nationalism. In contrast, Pakistan not

only disparages Indian secularism as a myth obscuring the reality of Hindu domination,

but also holds out a yet-to-be defined Islam as its preferred ideal over nonreligious

secularism. Pakistan’s vision of itself as the guardian state for South Asia’s Muslims,

however, is challenged by a disconcerting empirical fact: India’s Muslim population is

almost as large as, if not already larger than, Pakistan’s entire population, thus making

India, not Pakistan, the larger “Muslim” state.14

Finally, Indo-Pakistan competition is defined by the twin motifs of dominance

and resistance. In Indian conceptions, true security can drive only from an unchallenged

recognition of its standing as an important state about to actualize its vast potential after

several centuries of division and subjugation. India is heir to both an ancient civilization

and the erstwhile Raj. It possesses a large population and an extensive landmass. It has

great economic, technological, and military potential. Thus for India, survival means

survival as a great power and security has come to described the safety that enables India

to develop, maintain, and prosper in its political eminence.15

This vision of security is by no means directed primarily at intimating Pakistan.

Rather, it draws upon India’s perceptions of itself, its history, its view of the world, and

the role it seeks in the global arena. The Indian desire for eminence engenders unintended

consequences where Islamabad is concerned. From Islamabad’s point of view, the

eminence that guarantees India permanent security is highly menacing and could

represent the end of Pakistan as an autonomous political entity. Consequently, it is

naturally inclined to resist Indian political dominance, by diplomacy when possible but

by force if necessary. The stage is thus set for continued rivalry between the two states.

Political and strategic circumstances thus have cast Pakistan as the anti-status-quo state in

the Indian subcontinent. The rivalry between the two countries intensified when India

began to assert its role as the hegemonic power in the region; Pakistan, though accepted

India as a significant role player in the region, sought to resist its attempts for

domination. Consequently, at the most of the time Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


has been reactive.16 This competition is supplemented by the achievement of nuclear

weapons by both states. In 1998, India heightened regional tension with five nuclear

weapon tests including that of fission trigger hydrogen bomb. Within days Pakistan also

responded with similar test program.

(3) Kashmir: A stumbling Block to Peace: Since independence, Pakistan-India

relations have revolved mainly around the issue of Kashmir. This issue has been a major

bone of contention between Pakistan and India since their independence in 1947. The two

countries have fought three wars against each other, while the struggle for attaining the

right of self-determination, which was being carried out peacefully in the political arena,

has been transformed into an armed resistance movement for the lats14 years. Tension

between the two countries is unlikely to diminish without an amicable resolution of the

conflict17. India is defying the United Nations resolutions that call for holding a

plebiscite under UN auspices to determine “the final disposition of the state of Jammu

and Kashmir.” It is in violations of these resolution and its own commitments that India is

continuing its unjust occupation of Kashmir, justifying its actions on various grounds. In

1947, when their leaders were demanding division of provinces on a communal basis,

they claimed Kashmir for strategic reasons. Now they argue that since they believe in

secularism, Kashmir should be theirs, as its accession to Pakistan would have a domino

effect in other provinces that face ethnic unrest.18

Pakistan views India’s continued occupation of Kashmir as a threat to its security.

The strategic northern areas and the vital railroad of Pakistan, linking Lahore-Islamabad-

Peshawar, would be both under constant threat from India if it held Kashmir. All the

rivers flowing into Pakistan originate in Kashmir. “The shutting off of water supplies to

16 Muntzra Nazir, “The political and Strategic Dimensions in Indo-Pakistan Relations (1988-

2004)”, Pakistan vision, vol. 5, No. 2, December 2004, p. 21.

17 An IPS Study, “Pakistan-China relations in the 21st Century: Regional situation, security, economic and trade cooperation”, Policy perspective, vol. 1, No. 1, April 2004, p. 7018

? Noor ul Haq, “Pakistan and the Indian quest for hegemony 1947-2003”, IPRI Journal, vol. III,

No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 28.


the canals leading to Pakistan in 1948 was indicative of the damage that India could

inflict upon Pakistan.”19

The Kashmir dispute is a legacy of the hasty British departure from the Indian

subcontinent after dividing it into two. Till that time it has remained unresolved. It has

kept Pakistan and India divided and has largely influenced the international outlook of

the two countries. It has been a major cause of the armed conflicts between India and

Pakistan. In fact this particular dispute has hampered all the efforts of both states to

normalize their relations. Until it is settled, the threat of war is bound to persist, which

cannot help in improving the relations of the two countries. This issue has infected their

relations so seriously that it is responsible for the failure to reach an agreement on any

other major issue and weakened the pace of any normalization process between the two

countries. Both nations have unfortunately continued to look at the issue in an emotional

rather than a rational and realistic manner.

In recent years the Kashmir issue has gained considerable importance. It is

perceived as a potential spark that could lead to an explosive situation in the region.

According to the recent history, Kashmir was a predominantly Muslim state with a Hindu

ruler, who, against the wishes of Muslim majority, decided to accede to India, at the time

of partition of the subcontinent. The decisions lead to the ‘insurgency’ that resulted into a

war between India and Pakistan in 1947. The cease fire was established through UN

intervention, calling for holding the plebiscite, which was never held. Since then, it has

been the most outstanding dispute between India and Pakistan.20

Pakistan has consistently maintained that Kashmir is the ‘core’ problem between

the two countries and until this issue is resolved, all the attempts to bring normalcy in

their relations will be fruitless. Both the parties have remained largely inflexible in their

positions. Even, mediatory efforts by some friendly countries have proved fruitless.

Despite the failure of the earlier bilateral efforts, many more were made by Pakistan to

resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations that all were frustrated by Indian

19 Ibid., p. 29.

20 Muntzra Nazir, “The political and Strategic dimensions in Indo-Pakistan Relations(1988-

2004)”, Pakistan Vision, vol. 5, No. 2, December 2004, p. 38.


intransigence. Motivated by is secular ideology and concern that allowing one territory to

leave would cause a “chain of secessionists efforts”, India has tried a variety of strategies

to keep Kashmir in the fold. Article 370 of the Indian’s constitution gave the state of

Jammu and Kashmir a “special status” with greater autonomy than other federal units.

However, from the mid-1960s onwards, India sought to integrate Jammu and Kashmir

more tightly into the rest of the country. These efforts may have provoked Pakistan in

1965, causing the outbreak of a second war between the two countries.21 Despite the

failure of the earlier bilateral efforts, many more were made by Pakistan to resolve the

dispute through bilateral negotiations that were all frustrated by Indian intransigence.

Thus, Kashmir dispute proved to be the single most important cause for the deadlock and

tension in the relations of between India and Pakistan. Infact, the two Indo-Pak wars

1948, 1965 and a mini war the ‘Kargil conflict 1999’ have been fought over this conflict

and the energies of the two countries have been greatly consumed over the tension

generated by this issue. The struggle for freedom that the people of Kashmir have been

engage in for sixty years was initially referred to by India as an “insurgency”; later, as

“militancy”; now it is referred to as “terrorism”. All these terms are used to mislead

international opinion and to disguise the fact of the continued forcible Indian occupation

of Kashmir.22

(4) India’s Hegemonic Design and Pakistan: It is inevitable for peace and security of

the region that all countries in it respect each other’s sovereignty and freedom. The

enmity between India and Pakistan goes back to 1947, when the new state of Pakistan

was created despite the intense opposition of the Indian National Congress (INC). Later,

the INC accepted Pakistan in the hope that it would seek reunion with the rest of India.

The Mahasabha voiced the claim that “India is one and indivisible and there will never be

21T.V. Paul, “At the heart of the: irredentism and Kashmir”, in T.V. Paul(edited), The Indian-Pakistan conflict An enduring rivalry. (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, November 2005), p.215. 22

? Noor ul Haq, “Pakistan and the Indian quest for hegemony 1947-2003”, IPRI Journal, vol. III,

No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 29.


peace unless and until the separated areas are brought back into the Indian Union and

made integral part thereof.23

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who became the first Prime Minister of India, had

already told General Frank Messervy, General-Officer Commanding, Northern Command

India, that his “deliberate plan would be to allow Jinnah to have his Pakistan and then to

make thing so difficult for theme that they would have to come on their bended knees and

ask to be allowed back into India”. It is therefore not surprising that, immediately after

partition, Jinnah complained to the Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff, Lord Ismay, that events

such as the influx of refugees, etc., showed that the Indians were determined to strangle

Pakistan at birth.24The ancient concept of Akhand Bharat is further strengthened by the

Hindu belief that they are the inheritors of British imperialism east of Suez. It is in

pursuance of this policy that India used its armed forces to occupy territories that did not

accede or belong to it. “The most alarming development was India’s resort to arm to

settle the accession of three princely states: Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir,” writes

G. W. Choudhry.25

Giving this history, it become easy to understand the India’s sense of superiority

and its assertions and designs for hegemony in the South Asian region. India’s diplomatic

and military behavior shows a trend, which has moved India away from Nehrvian belief

that India could enjoy international influence as military weak status quo states; while

post Nehruvian India defines its destiny as a strong territorial regional power in the

international sphere. India’s structural advantage in South Asia engenders in her an

attitude and policy of dominance in the region. This has been encapsulated in what has

come to be known as the “India Doctrine”. Bhabani Sen Gupta, a leading Indian scholar,

has specified the parameters of this doctrine. He writes that India will not tolerate

external intervention in a conflict situation in any South Asian country if the intervention

has any implicit or explicit anti-Indian implication. No South Asian government must,

23 Ibid., p.23-24.

24 Ibid., p.24.

25 Ibid., p.24-25.


therefore, ask for military assistance with any anti-Indian basis from any country…If a

south Asian country genuinely needs external help to deal with a serious internal conflict

or an intolerable threat to a government legitimacy established, it should ask help from a

number of neighboring countries including India. The exclusion of India from such a

contingency will be consider to be an anti-Indian move on the part of the government

concer.26”

From the above, it is clear that the primary objective of the India Doctrine is to

obtain the acceptance of India’s status as the dominant regional power in south Asia,

from regional states as well as from the major external powers. The India Doctrine was

first applied in the case of Sri Lanka in 1987 when the Indian Air force had violated Sri

Lankan air space in support of Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents. It was followed by an Indo-

Sri Lanka accord which had virtually allowed Indian military intervention. After Sri

Lanka, Indian intervention was witnessed in the Maldives in 1988. Apparently India had

intervened to put down a coup, but informed circles indicated that all this was engineered

by India itself. In 1989, India had imposed a virtual blocked on Nepal and this was

followed by a deadlock over the renewal of trade and transit treaties. Nepal wanted to

sign these treaties separately but India insisted on turning them into one treaty. As a

matter of fact, it was an action against Nepal’s acquisition of arms from China in 1988-

89, including some anti-aircraft guns.27 In all these instances, India employed political,

military and economic power to assert its domination in the region. The efforts is to get

an acceptance for what Ashok Kapur has termed an Indo-Centric power structure in

South Asia.28

Viewed in this perspective, it becomes clear that India’s role has always reflected

hegemonic designs in the region. Even at present India is extremely busy in arms buildup.

26 Mohammad Humayun Kabir, “Regional Security in south Asia: A Bangladesh Perspective”,

BIISS Journal, vol. 23, No. 2, April 2002, p. 126.

27 Colonel (Retd) Ghulam Sarwar, “South Asian Security Perspective”, Pakistan Defence Review,

vol. 7, No. 2, Winter 1995, p. 165.

28 Ibid.


Though its preparations appear to be aimed at Pakistan, the fact is that they are not

‘Pakistan specific’. Moreover, India’s attitude towards all of its neighbors reflects its

hegemonic plans. To ensure peace and stability in the region in the presence of

hegemonic designs of a big country has been a really bug challenge.29

The rivalry between India and Pakistan intensified when India began to assert its

role as the hegemonic power in the region; Pakistan, though accepted India as a

significant role player in the region, sought to resist its attempts for domination.

Consequently, at the most of the time Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India has been

reactive. Being a weak state, Pakistan tends to balance its alliance relationship with

multilateral diplomacy. It is backed by a comparable increase in its defense capability on

the one hand and nuclear capability on the other. All this is intended to ensure a rough

balance of power vis-à-vis India.30

Pakistan’s principal political objective consists mainly of resisting India’s natural

dominance in order to preserve both its physical security and its decisional autonomy. Its

derivative military objectives include defending its territorial integrity vis-à-vis India- an

issue of great importance given Pakistan’s experience in 1971- and securing the

outstanding disputed territories, which mainly center on wresting Kashmir from Indian

“occupation”.31

The competitive nature of these objectives ordinarily implies the existence of a

security dilemma in which each state, arming itself for purely defensive reasons,

inadvertently threatens the security of the other. In the indo-Pakistani case, however ,the

security dilemma becomes even more vicious and intractable because of the relative

superiority of India. Indian attempts at maintaining such superiority only reinforce the

Pakistan perception of India as being willfully determined to “undo” the historic partition

29 An IPS Study, “Pakistan-China relations in the 21st Century: regional situation, security,

economic and trade cooperation”, Policy Perspective, vol. 1, No. 1, April 2004, p. 70.

30 Colonel (Retd) Ghulam Sarwar, “South Asian Security Perspective”, Pakistan Defence Review,

vol. 7, No. 2, Winter 1995, p. 167-68.

31 WWW.google.com/ Stability in South Asia/wikipedia/encyclopedia.htm



of the subcontinent and, by implication, to terminate the existence of Pakistan itself as an

independent political entity. 32

(5) Role of External Factors in Indo-Pak Relations: Third party’s involvement has

always played an important role in relations between India and Pakistan from the very

beginning.

The international security system unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, creates security or

insecurity for particular countries. Often there are attempts made by the great powers to

maintain asymmetries in the distribution of military and economic power and to create

technological and legal condominiums to enshrine the rights of great powers. This has

been amply manifested in USA’s dual containment policy in respect of Pakistan and

India.33 External factors are really affecting the India-Pakistan relations since their

independence. The South Asian subcontinent has been the sight of fierce historical

competition during the last half century. There have been some political developments of

serious international concern since the 1950s.

The Indo-Pak hostility become encompassed into the larger cold war

confrontation, when Pakistan facing the security dilemma, joined the US-sponsored

military pacts i.e. South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty

Organization (CENTO) in 1950s. India already tilted towards the Soviet Union because,

her policy of non-alignment fitted in the Soviet objective of checking the growing power

of the US military alliances. These alliances have a direct impact on the Indo-Pak ties.

The most important phase so far started after the 9/11 attack on the U.S soil, after which ,

the U.S policy makers realized the importance of South Asia once again in their “global

war on terror (GWT). Now the U.S administration focused its attention on South Asia,

with a key objective to find partners in their war on terrorism.

The deepening US-India strategic relationship, particularly in nuclear field as a

cause of concern for the regional security. Pakistan needs to gauge and closely monitor

32 Ibid.

33 Colonel Najam uz Zafar, “Vision of a Peaceful South Asia Efficacy and Options for Pakistan”,

NDC Journal, selected papers written by members of the courses at the National Defense College

Islamabad, 2001, p. 3.


the US objectives in this backdrop. The US-Indian deal, through strengthening India,

could further impose Indian hegemony in South Asia. So far, Pakistan had tried to play

the role of a balancer in South Asia. This role, to some extent, did dilute Indian

hegemony in the South Asian region. Unless the US took into account the military,

political, economic and societal nature of the region, its strategic partnership with India

could aggravate the smaller countries concerns vis-à-vis the hegemonic power─ India.

This would imply that if it was based on Indian security interests alone, the partnership

would give a free hand to India vis-à-vis the smaller South Asian states.34

Pakistan was afraid that the US-Indian partnership could disturb Pakistan’s

strategic relationship with India which would, in turn, impact on Pakistan’s role of a

balancer in South Asia. Any further increase in the strategic gap in conventional forces

between India and Pakistan therefore would disturb the balance of power in South Asia in

India’s favour. According to Agha Shahi the US declaration in March 2005 to help India

become a “major world power in the 21st century” would enable India to project its power

in its “neighborhood and beyond”. Agha Shahi rightly pointed out that the agreement

ignore the “maintenance of strategic balance in South Asia”.35

In the Pakistan-India context, for the first time external powers have directly

impacted the security dynamics between these two states, on a number of counts. In a

contradictory move, the US is upsetting the stability of the nuclear deterrence in South

Asia by committing to supplying India with Missile defense system and other state of the

art weapons technology – all of which directly undermines Pakistan’s stated policy of

minimum nuclear deterrence and nuclear restraint. That is why Pakistan has expressed

concerns over the Phlcon sale to India since this directly destabilizes the strategic nuclear

balance established in South Asia.36 The US-India relationship directly impinges on the

34 Dr. Mavara Inayat, “US-Indian Strategic Parternership: Implications for Asia and Beyond”,

Regional Studies, vol.XXIV, NO. 2, Spring 2006, p. 27.

35 Ibid., 28.

36 Shireen M. Mazari and Fazal-ur-Rahman, “South Asian Security: International Context”,

Policy perspective, vol. 3,No. 1, January-June 2006, p. 19-20.


US-Pakistan relationship because of the defence aspects whereby the transfer of certain

weapons system to India impacts on the security threat perceptions of Pakistan. With the

prospects of the transfer of the Arrow system also to India, clearly the deterrence will be

move to higher level of armaments being held by both sides.37

Pakistan and other nations of South Asia are much more open to external

influence, partly because they are smaller but also they look at the external world as a

counterweight to the overwhelming presence of India. Pakistan is naturally inclined to

resist India political dominance, by diplomacy when possible but by force if necessary.

The stage is thus set for continued rivalry between the two states.

Even though China geographically is not considered to be the part of South Asia,

Beijing is an important factor in security calculations of South Asia. The uncertain

triangular between India-Pakistan-china is also contributing to the tensions between India

and Pakistan. The legacy of distrust and conflict, the unresolved border issues, and the

plurality of perceptions and options consider by decision-makers in each country added to

the tension and complexity of the region.38The tension between India and Pakistan

highlighted the long shadows that Asia’s rising power, China, cost on the Indian

subcontinent. Though the roots of India-Pakistan animosity are deep-seated in religion,

history, and the politics of revenge- and thus predate India- China hostility- china’s

strategists recognized the enduring nature of the India- Pakistan enmity and exploit it to

Beijing’s advantage. In fact, Beijing has long been the most important player in the India-

Pakistan-China triangular relationship. Since the Indo-China border war of 1962, China

has align itself with Pakistan and made heavy strategic and economic investments in that

country to keep the common enemy, India under strategic pressure.39

37 Ibid., p.20-21.

38 Colonel Najam uz Zafar, “Vision of a Peaceful South Asia Efficacy and Options for Pakistan”,

NDC Journal, selected papers written by members of the courses at the National Defense College

Islamabad, 2001, p.1.

39WWW.google.com/ The china factor in the India-Pakistan conflict/Wikipedia/encyclopedia.com



In the triangular power balance game, the south Asian military balance of power

is neither pro- India nor pro- Pakistan; it has always been pro- China. And Beijing will

take all means possible, including war, to ensure that the regional power balance does not

tilt in India’s favour. Even in the absence of war, Pakistan hopes to continue to reap

significant military and economic payoffs not only from the intensifying Sino-Indian

geopolitical rivalry in Southern Asia but also from what many believes is the coming

show down between China and the United States, which will further increase the

significance of China’s strategic ties with Pakistan.40

Has the South Asian security framework benefited from these external

interventions? At one level, yes. The active interest of the international community in

pushing for peace in South Asia has had a positive impact on the major South Asian

players. However, the military relationship between the US and India has added a new

dimension to Pakistan’s security equation –thereby aggravating its security perceptions.

Taking some of the central factors of the Indo-US defence agreement one by one, fallout

for Pakistan can be assessed more clearly. The most important, both in the short term and

long term, is the Indo-US agreement to cooperate on missile defence (MD). Acquisition

of missile defence capability by India directly destabilizes the nuclear deterrence in South

Asia as well as undermining Pakistan’s doctrine of minimum deterrence and nuclear

restrain. To sustain a credible deterrence Pakistan will have to begin multiplying its

missiles and warheads very soon –as well as deploying its nuclear arsenal in a scattered

fashion into the interior of the country.41

Along with the role of great powers in the South Asian region, there are some

other potent powers /elements that are really disturbing the peace between India and

Pakistan. There are some groups and organizations who do not want the normalcy and

peaceful relations between the two countries. Through different terrorist activities in both

countries they generate the tensions, distrust and misperceptions on both sides. The

terrorist attack on Indian parliament by militants in December 2001 really reflects such a

40 Ibid.

41 Shireen M. Mazari and Fazal-ur-Rahman, “South Asian Security: International Context”,

Policy Perspective, vol.3, No.1, January-June 2006, p.22.


situations. India, immediacy after the attack blamed Pakistan for it and vowed to retaliate.

Despite Pakistan’s categorical condemnation of the attack, it mobilized all of its forces

(land, marine and air) and deployed them on the Pakistani border. Indian strike corps,

armoured divisions, brigades and entire artillery were moved for major offensives against

Pakistan. The belligerent posture including the withdrawal of its high commissioner from

Islamabad was adopted by India. All ties of contact and communication like air, rail and

road serves between the two countries were also severed. Pakistan with some reservation,

responded in the same way. The deployment of one million troops by both sides to their

shared borders heightened the tension in the region.42 The terrorist attack on Indian

railways on August 2006 Mumbai have again damaged the pace of peace process

between the two countries. Pakistan was ready to extend help to catch the culprits but

India rebuke Pakistani offers and instead began a series of allegations against Pakistan

accusing her of not doing enough against terrorist organization based in Pakistan.43 The

current terrorist attack on Taj Mehal hotel in Mumbai really reflects the role of such

elements.

As the death toll in Mumbai continue to steadily climb and is about to cross 200

innocents lives, India is overwhelmed by waves of sorrow and anger. The government

pointing its finger at Pakistan as the base from where, the Fidyeen staged their carefully

planned attack. Islamabad, of course, stubbornly rejects all imputations of involvement in

the terrorist attack. The point is, the India-Pakistan adversarial relationship with its

undercurrents of mutual suspicion and bristling with countless animosities bordering on

hostility, is so delicately poised at any given moment that it does not need more than a

few hours to degenerate into a conflict situation on account of a misstep or two on either

side, even when it is camouflaged in veneers of cordiality as it has been during the past

three to four years.

42 Muntzra Nazir, “The political and Strategic Dimensions in Indo-Pakistan Relations (1988-

2004)”, Pakistan vision, vol.5, No.2, December 2004, p.36.

43 Dr. Qalb-i-Abid, “South Asia: Challenges and prospects”, Pakistan vision, vol.7, No.1, July

2006, p.197.


How can this rivalry come to an end?

India and Pakistan can learn much from the erstwhile Cold War. The United

States and the USSR wasted about fort years before coming to the conclusion that

they could not afford to be enemies.

Both India and Pakistan should learn from history. Through the centuries, the

subcontinent was attacked and dominated by outside forces, i.e. the Aryans,

Persians, Greeks, Sakas, Arabs, Turks and British. These invasions were made

possible by the lack of unity amongst the people of the subcontinent.

Both India and Pakistan should learn from the European example: the European

states have, historically, fought amongst themselves; now they are endeavoring to

forge some kind of unity on the basis of equality. Since 1871, French foreign

policy was dominated by ensuring its security against her powerful neighbour,

Germany. The two countries fought over the territories of Alsace Lorraine and

Saar for almost a century, but eventually resolved their disputes amicably and

established cordial relations. Nuclear weapons have brought an end to fighting in

Western Europe. Similarly, these weapons can help India and in maintaining

peace. Nuclearization demands maturity and responsibility.44

India should realized that it can no longer pursue hegemonic or supremacist

policies because of the world becoming a global village with little space for

regional overlords. Seeking cover of the US doctrine of pre- emption, countries

like India “are behaving more unilaterally”. This is a dangerous omen for peace.

The alternative course is for all in the region to co-operate with each other. India,

being the biggest country, should “take the initiative to call for and work jointly

with all the other states to make this region ‘a zone of peace’.45

South Asia is a strategically important region of the world. If its leaders show

maturity and wisdom, it can benefit immensely and establish its prominent place

in the global village. It must be realized that peace and security are in the supreme

44 Noor ul Haq, “Pakistan and the Indian guest for hegemony 1947-2003”, IPRI Journal, vol.III,

No.2, summer 2003, p.41.

45 Ibid.


interest of both India and Pakistan, and that to achieve peace and security , the

resolution of all outstanding issue- including the Kashmir dispute – is essential.

If both India and Pakistan behave irresponsibly and do not demonstrate the

necessary maturity, outside powers are likely to benefit at the expense of both

countries. They will play the Indian or Pakistani card at will to further their

objectives and interests. The strategic and economic interests of both states could

be better served if they pursue a policy of peace and friendship towards each

other.

Accept the idea that security of one cannot be at the expense of another, but

achieved only through joint efforts.

Kashmir issue has been a bone of contention between Pakistan and India since

their independence in 1947. Tension between the two countries is unlikely to

diminish without an amicable resolution of the conflict. Instead of playing the

blame game, both countries should choose the path of peace and remove cause of

the insurgency in Kashmir.

Conclusion

The relations between Pakistan and India remained ‘tensed’, despite the long

attempts at improvement. The present conflict between India and Pakistan is not a new

phenomenon, but it is the legacy of the past. From the very beginning, the relations

between the two countries are marked by conflict and discord; mutual distrust and

suspicions. There were also brief periods when these relations could be described as

normal and cordial. However, this was an exception rather than a normal practice in these

bilateral relations. Both stats have followed a “swing” model of relationship, where the

pendulum of the relationships swings from one end to the other. .

Being the two power full states of the region, the whole peace, security and

stability of south Asia primarily depends on the status of relations between the two

antagonists. This hostile relationship has immensely affected the security environment in

the region. Due to a qualitative change from conventional to nuclear, economic sanctions

and embargoes, the perimeters of competition between the two rivals could result in

domestic destabilization, and hardships in both states, economic as well as political and


security challenges. Analysts believe that conflict between the two states is of a

protracted nature, leaving behind little opportunities for peaceful coexistence.

A realization is needed on both sides that peace and security are in the supreme

national interest of both India and Pakistan, and that to achieve peace and security, the

resolution of all bilateral issue – including the Kashmir dispute, is essential. Both sides

should realized that the Kashmir issue, in the background of Nuclearization, military

imbalance, and mutual distrust on each other carries with it the threat of a major

conventional conflict or possible nuclear exchange in the region. To decrease the

possibility of war and promote peace in the region, consistent, engaged, activist and

multi- layered diplomatic strategy is needed from both sides. Moreover, the world

community should continue its efforts to resolve the conflicts between the two countries.

It should also encourage the efforts to strengthen the civil democratic societies in both

countries, which could help weaken the extremist elements on both sides.


term paper india-pakistan_relations_an_enduring_rivalry

Education

indiapakistan relations

indianpakistan rivalry

bilateral relations

theories of enduring

separation of east pakistan

indopak relations

hope of india

unending conflict