Cody Brasher

10/25/12

Mexican Govt. & Politics

Term Paper

MEXICO’S STATE CAPACITY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Mexico’s most pressing threat to democracy is not transnational organized crime; it is

not even poverty, corruption, or violence. The largest threat to democracy in Mexico is not the

grave issues that it is faces, in and of themselves; it is its ability to respond to these issues

effectively and efficiently. The capacity of a state refers to the ability of the state, using

available resources, to effectively address and resolve an issue. The United Nations’ Convention

against Transnational Organized Crime (also referred to as “the Palermo Convention,” or simply

“the Convention”), written in 2000, is the United Nations’ primary document which addresses

definitions of transnational organized crime and components and conditions for combating it.1

The Convention outlines the means that states should utilize in their efforts to combat

effectively transnational organized crime. The Convention, however, does not address a state’s

capacity to carry out these efforts and meet these criteria.

In this paper, I am going to discuss Mexico’s capacity to combat one particular issue that

it faces, transnational organized crime, by observing its efforts to comply with international

conditions set by the United Nations’ Palermo Convention to combat this global epidemic. In

the foreword of the Palermo Convention, former Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Kofi A.

Annan declares:

Brasher 1

Criminal groups have wasted no time in embracing today’s globalized economy

and the sophisticated technology that goes with it. But our efforts to combat

them have remained up to now very fragmented and our weapons almost

obsolete. The Convention gives us a new tool to address the scourge of crime as

a global problem. With enhanced international cooperation, we can have a real

impact on the ability of international criminals to operate successfully and can

help citizens everywhere in their often bitter struggle for safety and dignity in

their homes and communities.2

I argue that Mr. Annan’s assertion is absolutely correct. With international compliance and

unified efforts, transnational organized crime can be combated; however, not necessarily

defeated. More than a positive attitude and cooperation is needed—the capacity is needed.

Unless Mexico first addresses its insufficient capacity to deal with organized crime, Mexico’s

efforts will be in vain—transnational organized crime will prevail and be the ultimate demise of

quality democracy in Mexico.

OVERVIEW OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Transnational organized crime is the most imminent threat to peace and stability in

Mexico. Organized crime goes far beyond typical, “petty” crime and has at times had the ability

to render entire governments helpless. According to Illicit Trafficking by Kelly, Maghan, and

Serio, “Credible threats of violence and the capacity to enforce these threats, coupled with the

ability the neutralize law enforcement, are among the defining features of organized criminal

groups that distinguish them from ordinary street gangs and criminal entrepreneurs.”3

Transnational organized crime, as defined by the United Nations’ Convention against Brasher

2

Transnational Organized Crime, is a “serious crime . . . where the offence is transnational in

nature and involves an organized criminal group.”4 Within this definition, a serious crime is

defined as an offence that merits “a maximum deprivation of liberty [for] at least four years.”5

Furthermore, transnational includes offences committed in, involving (in preparation, planning,

direction, or control), or affecting multiple states. Finally, an organized criminal group is defined

as “a structured group of three or more persons . . . with the aim of committing one or more

serious crimes . . . in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material

benefit.”6 The United Nations’ Convention against Transnational Organized Crime addresses

three particular types of organized crime in three protocols—trafficking in persons, smuggling

of migrants, and illicit trafficking in and manufacturing of arms—all of which pose threats to

Mexico’s stability and quality of democracy. I would also like to add trafficking in drugs to the

discussion, in addition to the three protocols of the Palermo Convention.

FACETS OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Trafficking in persons is the first protocol of the Palermo Convention, a display of its

importance in the international arena. A publication from the United Nations High

Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) states that trafficking in persons is “ranked as the fastest

growing criminal enterprise in the world.”7 Due to difficulties in defining and classifying cases of

human trafficking, estimate of victims vary; but the United States Department of State

estimates that as many as twenty-seven million victims, worldwide, entrapped by “modern-day

slavery.”8 According to the Convention, trafficking in persons includes the use of force—or

other forms of coercion, fraud, deception, or abduction—to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor,

Brasher 3

or receive persons for the purposes of exploitation. According to the US Department of State

Trafficking in Persons Report 2012, “Mexico is a large source, transit, and destination country

for men, women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor.”9 Among Mexico’s

most vulnerable groups for being trafficked are women, children, indigenous peoples, and

undocumented migrants. A large number of these victims are migrants who are traversing

Mexico on their way to the United States. These people are often lured with “fraudulent

employment opportunities” and are most often subjected to forced labor (ranging from

domestic servitude, to recruiting child soldiers, to serving as hit-men) and prostitution or some

other form of sexual exploitation.

The smuggling of migrants is addressed in the second protocol of the Palermo

Convention and is one that greatly affects Mexico. Smuggling of migrants is defined as “the

procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of

the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a

permanent resident.”10 The smuggling of migrants differs from trafficking in persons in that

migrants have consented to being smuggled in order to obtain illegal entry into a state;

however, in the case that the migrant revokes his or her consent, but is still being forcefully

held by the smuggler, he or she has become a victim of trafficking.11 Migrants and the people

most vulnerable to human trafficking show a strong resemblance in socio-demographic

characteristics, a connection that is particularly prominent in Mexico. Due to the vastness of

the US-Mexico border, being the most heavily traversed border worldwide, Mexico contains

one of the most widely utilized migration routes in the world—from southern Central America

to the United States. Many of these migrants employ smugglers to help them get there, and it Brasher

4

is common for these smuggling agreements to devolve into cases of human trafficking.12 The

smugglers, often referred to as coyotes, to obtain illegal entry into another state erodes the

sovereignty of that state and, due to the “untraceable” nature of human smuggling, poses a

great potential threat to the migrants being smuggled.

Illicit trafficking in and manufacturing of arms is addressed by the final protocol of the

UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. According to the Palermo Convention,

illicit arms trafficking has “harmful effects of those activities on the security of each State,

region and the world as a whole, endangering the well-being of peoples, their social and

economic development and their right to live in peace.”13 Trafficking in arms currently rivals

trafficking in persons for the second largest global criminal activity (second only to drug-

trafficking).14 Mexican citizens are constitutionally permitted to bear arms; however, the

regulations are very strict and there is only one legal provider of arms—the Mexican army.

Most of Mexico’s illicit arms trade is with the United States, an estimated ninety percent of

Mexico’s illicit arms come from the US—the world’s largest arms producer.15

A paper on transnational organized crime would seemingly not be complete without

mention of the drug trade. The illicit trafficking of drugs is currently the world’s largest

transnational criminal activity.16 Unfortunately, in many minds, the term narcotics has become

synonymous with Latin America, which produces practically all of the global supply of cocaine.

Further, the world’s largest consumers of cocaine are North America (particularly the United

States) and Europe.17 The drug market in Latin America is a $60 billion “industry.”18 In order to

get the demanded cocaine from the producer to the supplier; it must be trafficked from

Brasher 5

producing regions of South America (the Andean region), across Central America, to its

destinations in North America and Europe. While Mexico does not play a greatly significant role

in the production of narcotics, specifically cocaine, the country (with its large landmass,

proximity to the United States, and long border that it shares with the United State) has

become an extremely desirable region to transnational criminal organizations for trafficking in

drugs. In 2008, 309 tons of cocaine departed from the Andean region. Out of the 865 metric

tons of cocaine produced in the Andean region, only an estimated 165 tons arrived and was

consumed in the United States.19 This sixty billion dollar market creates an enormous amount

of incentive to ensure that the cocaine successfully arrives at its destination—resulting in

desperation and a rise in violent crime.

As we can see, in recent decades Mexico has become a magnet for transnational

criminal activities. All three forms of transnational organized crime addressed in the Palermo

Convention (along with narcotics trafficking, not addressed by the Convention) have devastated

Mexico and, in some cases, left it utterly powerless. One of the major aspects of transnational

organized crime that makes it so difficult to combat is the interconnectedness of all facets of it.

Nora Hamilton, author of Mexico: Political, Social, and Economic Evolution, states,

There are few issues in which Mexico and the United States are more

thoroughly intertwined than the drug trade. Mexico is the major foreign

supplier of drugs to the United States . . . and, by extension, the source of funds

fueling the drug trade. Ninety percent of the cocaine that comes to the United

States comes from Mexico . . . while [ninety] percent of the weapons that fuel

the escalating drug violence come from the United States.20

Brasher 6

Although Mexico has made recent efforts to address the crises that arise from transnational

organized crime, it has not yet been able to fully comply with the conditions set forth by the

Palermo Convention.

ADDRESSING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN VIEW OF THE PALERMO CONVENTION:

EFFORTS AND FAILURES

Transnational organized crime has bedeviled the hemisphere for decades and has all but

defined US relations with Mexico and the rest of Latin America. National policies have

attempted unilateral efforts to diminish the effects of transnational organized crime, generally

to no avail. Mr. Kofi A. Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, declared:

If crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement. If the rule of law is

undermined not only in one country, but in many, then those who defend it

cannot limit themselves to purely national means. If [they] seek to exploit the

openness and opportunities of globalization for their purposes, then we must

exploit those very same factors . . . They take advantage of the open borders,

free markets and technological advances that bring so many benefits to the

world’s people. They thrive in countries with weak institutions, and they show

no scruple about resorting to intimidation or violence . . . They are powerful . . .

but they are not invincible.21

International agreements, such as the Palermo Convention, have provoked concerted efforts to

counteract transnational organized crime. Mexico, who has signed the treaty in 2000 and

ratified its protocols in 2003, is obligated under international law and bound by its own

constitution to comply with the conditions of the Convention.22 General conditions set by the

Brasher 7

Palermo Convention to combat this hemispheric issue are: the criminalization of the

participation in an organized criminal group, laundering of revenue earned from criminal

activities, corruption, and obstruction of justice; measures to combat money laundering (such

as bank regulations and cash transfer monitoring); prosecution of criminal activities and

international cooperation in the confiscation of equipment, property, or revenue from criminal

activities; establishing jurisdiction amongst law enforcement; participating in extradition when

needed; mutual legal assistance; protection of victims and witnesses; and international

cooperation in join investigations, criminal proceedings, law enforcement activities, information

exchange.23

The Palermo Convention gives the following conditions for combating trafficking in

persons: criminalization of trafficking; providing assistance to and protection of victims; either

allowing victims of trafficking to stay in the receiving country or ensuring their safe return;

instituting preventative measures and securing borders; information exchange; security,

control, legitimacy, and validity of identification documents. Dr. Cicero-Domínguez of the

Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights states that legislative

reformation is needed in Mexico in order to comply with the provisions of the Convention for

combating trafficking in persons “not only because there is no federal law or code instructing

local and state authorities to observe [them], but also because it creates new categories of

crimes currently absent in the national legislation.”24 Dr. Cicero-Domínguez points out several

other faults in the Mexican judicial and legislative systems which prevent full compliance with

the Convention and, ultimately, the ability of the Convention to have any substantial effect

against transnational organized crime. Brasher

8

Mexican legislation does not have an official definition of trafficking in persons. The

only definition concerning this matter in Mexican legislation is of “trafficking of persons and

sexual pandering” (or pimping). This prevents any persons being trafficked for purposes other

than sexual exploitation, such as slavery or forced labor, from being considered victims of

trafficking. Mexico lacks comprehensive anti-trafficking laws and a “universal strategy to

protect trafficking victims.”25 The full sharing of certain types of information (for example,

information related to the deportation of criminals) between the US and Mexico also poses an

issue. According to Dr. Dr. Cicero-Domínguez, some sources indicate that there may be as

many as 250,000 criminal aliens currently on the path for deportation after serving their

sentences. The government of Mexico claims that it is not given enough warning prior to the

arrival of the convicted deportees, and they are often incapable of accommodating them.

Oftentimes they are simply deported to unfamiliar towns and sent on their way—now

unemployable and unable to be successfully reintegrated into society without assistance. They

then turn to transnational criminal organizations and trafficking for direction and “purpose.”26

According to the 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report, the United States has stated that

the government of Mexico is not in full compliance with the minimum standards set to assist

states in the elimination of trafficking in persons; although, the government has made recent

strides in an effort to address this issue. Recently, Mexico has made constitutional reforms in

regards to trafficking—on both the local and national levels. Mexico has also made an attempt

to increase conviction rate for traffickers—convicting fourteen in the past year. However,

Mexico’s trafficking issue is much larger than this and the number of investigations,

prosecutions, convictions, and sentences still remains extremely low when viewed through the Brasher

9

scope of the enormity of the situation. Government funding for victims also remained lower

than the necessary amount needed to address this issue properly. Mexican officials have

agreed that human trafficking is a grave issue; however, it is sometimes seen that government

officials have been tolerant toward, and occasionally even acted in compliance with,

traffickers.27

The protocol on the smuggling of migrants provides conditions for effective

counteraction similar to the conditions set for combating trafficking in persons, and the

institutional failures of Mexico to address smuggling of migrants are similar to the failures to

address trafficking in humans. According to Illicit Trafficking,

Although most Central American governments are strengthening their antidrug

efforts, they appear to be less rigorous in dealing with the problem of [migrant]

smuggling through their countries . . . Nearly 500,000 U.S.-bound migrants are

estimated to move through Mexico . . . handled by several hundred

independent smugglers who cooperate in loosely linked networks . . .28

The once consented to smuggling process often turns awry when, after reaching their

destinations, the smugglers exploit the migrants being smuggled—forcing them into slavery,

providing them with unjust wages for labor, forcing them into beggary or prostitution,

etcetera.29

As stated previously, a large portion of the illicit arms in Mexico come from the US—the

estimated provider for as much as ninety percent of illicit arms in Mexico. Lisa Guaqueta of the

Institute for Policy Studies has given three reasons for Mexico’s inability to cease participation

Brasher 10

in the illicit arms trade: widespread and deep-seated corruption, lack of information sharing

between US and Mexican customs and immigration, and the absence of a Spanish version of

eTrace—the tracking program used by the US to locate firearms. 30 The conditions of the

Convention require that signatory states engage in the international exchange of information

and criminalization to combat transnational organized crime—neither of which can be done

while not addressing corruption and fully participating in information-sharing.

EFFECTS OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME ON DEMOCRACY: INEQUALITY, CRIME, AND CORRUPTION

These four types of transnational organized crime have produced by-products of severe

economic inequality, violent crime, and rampant corruption—factors that virulently unravel the

social fabric of Mexico and threaten to topple stability and weaken the quality of democracy in

Mexico. All of these side-effects of transnational organized crime threaten to destabilize

democratic institutions in Mexico. With democratic politics and authoritarian security,

remnants of Mexican authoritarianism still exist. Mexico, as a relatively young democracy, has

not yet consolidated a strong democracy, which puts the legitimacy of its institutions at even

greater risk.

The effects that transnational organized crime has on democracy are rather complex

and circular in nature. With increasing violence, the people of Mexico would theoretically turn

to the government to provide safety and national security. However, corruption and the lack of

security capacity in Mexico prevent any effective action against the violence. Corruption

prevents the population of Mexico from being able to place trust in the government. If the

government is incapable of curbing violence—and it could be trusted to do so, even if it were

Brasher 11

capable—where can the people turn? At least under authoritarianism the government could

control the violence; and so the threat of authoritarian reversion, back by popular demand,

remains. The factor that is most widely believed to cause an increase in crime, more so than

raw poverty, is a severely inequitable distribution of wealth. Dr. Terry Karl, in the Journal of

Democracy, claims that:

. . .the danger to democracy lies not only, or even primarily, in these dramatic

events, for extreme income inequality has a far more insidious impact on the

way democratic institutions actually operate . . . the failure of democratic

institutions to function properly weakens their legitimacy in the eyes of their

citizens.31

Tension between classes is intensified even more when the class lines fall along ethnic lines,

which tends to be the case in southern Mexico—especially near the border region of

Guatemala and Mexico.32 This results in far greater instances of traffickers from northern

Mexico exploiting workers, peasants, and migrants from southern Mexico and Guatemala.33

Severe inequalities provide a platform upon which revolutionary sentiments may arise.

Creating an “Us versus Them” society, those who are being deprived of the possibility for

economic advancement (which often makes up the majority) have no choice but to band

together to have their voices heard—exacerbating the vulnerability of the situation and

revolutionary tendencies. Corruption foments this condition, enabling the consolidation of

wealth within the most powerful and encouraging further corruption.

Brasher 12

As previously mentioned, it is all too common in Mexico for the Mexican elites—

including political, judicial (along with local law enforcement), and legislative officials—to be

swayed by political or financial influence—also known as corruption. Corruption has been a

long-standing “institution” within Mexico, at times even defining the political process (such as

during the Pax Pri-ista). Margaret Beare describes corruption as “a hijacking of criminal justice,

as well as of wider governmental and financial institutions, to meet political and strategic

ends.”34 Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perception Index ranks Mexico three out

of ten for transparency—placing it among the world’s most corrupt countries.35 Rampant and

systemic corruption serves as an incubator for the continuation and escalation of transnational

organized crime. Crime thrives in societies in which the political and/or judicial systems can be

manipulated to foster the needs of criminal organizations.

The presence of corruption and the inequitable distribution of wealth are significant

causes for widespread crime in Mexico. A study of the United Nations Office on Crime and

Drugs found:

. . . The distribution of wealth in a society is actually more significant than raw

poverty in predicting violence levels. It has been argued that stark wealth

disparities provide criminals with both a justification (addressing social injustice)

and an opportunity (wealth to steal) for their activities, as well as generating

‘expressive violence.’36

Mexico has had difficulty providing sufficient law enforcement, judiciaries, and correctional

facilities; furthermore, judges and law enforcement officials in Mexico often fall prey to

Brasher 13

financial and political influence.37 Murder rates in Mexico have significantly increased in the

past decade. In 2011 Mexico had a murder rate of twenty per one hundred thousand people, in

comparison to the United States’ homicide rate of only five per one hundred thousand.38 The

estimated number of cartel-related deaths in 2011 in Mexico is at least seventeen thousand.

Ciudad Juarez was Mexico’s deadliest city in 2010, with over three thousand deaths.39 Some of

the most recent statistics released by the Mexican government reveal that there were 47,515

cartel-related deaths between December 1, 2006 and September 30, 2011, with over twelve

thousand of these occurring in the first nine months of 2011 alone.40

Such colossal violence has prompted the United States Department of State to issue a

travel warning to citizens wishing to travel to Mexico. The travel warning describes

transnational organized criminal activity—such as homicide, shoot-outs, kidnapping, carjacking

and highway robbery—that may pose a threat to travelers. Shoot-outs have become common

occurrences near the US-Mexico border as conflict between trafficking organizations and law

enforcement has increased. Kidnappings, carjacking, and highway robberies have become

common for travelers throughout Mexico. Assassination attempts on Mexican authorities and

cartel leaders alike have also greatly increased.41 As a result of the increased cartel violence,

many border towns have transitioned into ghost towns. Between 1980 and 2010, the migration

rate from Mexico, and the rest of Latin America as well, to the United States nearly tripled.

WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

In order to argue whether or not an issue is truly a threat to quality democracy, we must

set conditions as to what quality democracy looks like. Democracy, as defined by the Merriam-

Brasher 14

Webster dictionary, is government by the people.42 The United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime stated, “The most basic obligation of the state is to ensure the security of its citizenry . . .

Perceived lawlessness can even provoke a nostalgia for authoritarian rule.”43 Studies from the

UNODC have found, “The people of Central America are becoming more and more vocal in their

demands that something be done. [They] are close to sacrificing hard won gains in democracy

in order to purchase a little safety.”44

Democracy is rule by the people. When the people lose the ability to influence the

government, and when the government loses the ability to control basic functions of

government—such as territorial integrity and security of the people—the people may become

disenchanted with democracy. Much of Latin America is showing strong propensity for

displeasure in their governments and democracy in general. This destabilizes and delegitimizes

democracy, making the institution extremely vulnerable. Mexico currently has a strong

approval rating for democracy. Eighty percent of Mexicans believe that democracy is the best

form of government.45 However, that could change with time if Mexico is not able to manage

properly the ill-effects of transnational organized crime.

Moreover, quality democracy includes many aspects. A quality democracy must first

and foremost provide safety for its citizens. This does not mean that every single citizen is

completely safe at all times; however, in general the population must feel safe. They must feel

as if the government is taking the appropriate measures to attend to any safety and security

challenges that it faces. Many Mexican citizens do not. Each year, thousands of Mexican

citizens flee their country to illegally enter and seek safety and refuge to the north, in the

Brasher 15

United States. The state does not have full control over its borders. Traffickers can relatively

easily move drugs and people in and out of the southern border, while moving drugs and arms

in and out of the northern border.

Secondly, a quality democracy must have effective institutions. Mexico, as a result of

transnational organized crime and its side-effects, does not. The judicial system has proven

completely ineffective when fighting transnational organized crime, often falling prey to

corruption and bribery. Very few cases of trafficking are prosecuted each year. Mexico’s

security apparatus has also proven to be ineffective. The neglect to better equip and fully

utilize local law enforcement has often left security in the hands of the Mexican military. This

results in questions of jurisdiction and accusations of widespread human rights abuses.

Thirdly, in a quality democracy, the citizens must feel that the government is working for

them and that they are able to influence the government. This is not the case in Mexico. A

large portion of Mexican citizens do not feel that the government works for people like them,

but to accomplish its own selfish agenda and work for the desires of the elites. They feel that

the government is too corrupt and that they are not able to influence the democracy or

decisions of the government. A large portion of Mexico is part of the “have-nots” and they feel

powerless to have their voices heard.

Transnational organized crime and Mexico’s incapacity to deal with it is preventing

Mexico from further engaging in quality democracy. Corruption, crime, and inequality create a

chasm, a great disconnect, between the people and the government, as well as within the

government and its institutions. Mexico’s citizens are losing faith in the government’s

Brasher 16

capability, as well as its willingness, to resolve these issues with good governance and

transparency.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: SUGGESTIONS FOR MOVING FORWARD

Looking at this situation from a glance, it may seem hopeless. As previously stated, the

effects of transnational organized crime are complex, intensely intertwined, and circular.

Organized crime breeds crime, which breeds corruption, which breeds income inequality, which

breeds corruption, which breeds crime. When it is unclear what begets what, how can we

combat it? Where do we even begin to try? Mexico is currently incapable of combating the

problem of transnational organized crime—along with its side effects of systemic corruption,

rampant crime, and endemic income inequality—effectively because it has not addressed the

core issues of insufficient capacity. Until the government is able to do this, these side effects

which threaten to topple the democracy in Mexico will continue to escalate.

The country is in desperate need of legislative reform to enable the proper functioning

of the judiciary and law enforcement. The judicial system is not strong enough to carry out all

of the trials and convictions necessary. The national police force, many of which are controlled

by corruption and in compliance with criminals, does not have the power to counteract

transnational criminal organizations, even if they wanted to. Politicians and policy-makers are

also often controlled, influenced, or coerced by transnational criminal organizations.

Brasher 17

So, is that it; is that the end of the story for Mexico? For now, possibly; but it does not

have to remain that way. Mexico cannot combat the effects of transnational organized crime

(poverty, crime, and corruption) without first addressing its infrastructural and institutional

inadequacies to do so. Mexico needs to reassess and reform its legislative, judicial (including

security and law enforcement apparatuses), and executive (politicians and policy-makers)

branches.

Let us first take a look at the legislative system and the failures that it faces. As

discussed earlier, there must first be official, comprehensive, particular definitions of both

trafficking in humans and smuggling in migrants. Mexico must instate comprehensive anti-

trafficking laws and further legislation which assists victims of trafficking and smuggling.

Funding for preventive programs (such as the National Program to Prevent and Combat

Trafficking in Persons), and for victims’ shelters, needs to be greatly increased. The government

of Mexico needs to pay particular attention to reintegrating criminals into society, helping them

to use their skills for good and not for ill. Communication and information-sharing between the

United States and Mexico will also have to increase, so that both countries can work together

to solve this issue that plagues the both of them. The state should increase collaboration with

nongovernmental organizations to assist with the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of

victims.

In regards to reforming the judiciary, law enforcement and security apparatuses, Mexico

needs to continue to increase investigations for trafficking and smuggling offenses, prosecuting

and punishing offenders when found guilty, at both federal and state levels.46 Law enforcement

Brasher 18

of Mexico and the United States should work more closely and openly, especially in regions

near the border of Mexico and the United States, to enhance investigative and prosecutorial

efforts. Mexico also needs to focus on enhancing victim identification procedures; ensure

physical protection for witnesses and victims testifying against, or coming forth with

information about, traffickers; and increase the effectiveness of specialized units which respond

to trafficking cases.47 Finally, judges need to be more professionalized and well-trained in the

areas of human trafficking and migrant smuggling, including in victim treatment and

identification.48

Political officials and policy-makers must continue creating and enhancing legislation

preventing trafficking and smuggling, as well as assisting victims of trafficking and smuggling.

Coordination between federal, state, and local authorities needs to be strengthened and

communication needs to be increased. Officials need to be held accountable for the

prosecution and conviction of trafficking and smuggling offenders, not allowing for corruption

to go unnoticed. Policy-makers need to ensure the increased funding for training law

enforcement, as well as for more adequate treatment of victims. Officials need to recognize

trafficking as an international issue and work to deal with it as such.

In conclusion, by first addressing the capacity of the state to handle transnational

organized crime, Mexico can effectively combat transnational organized and its effects. The

state of Mexico has ranks second in Latin America in terms of both overall GDP and GDP per

capita.49 Mexico is fully able to address these shortcomings that it faces and the areas in which

its capacity is lacking. The question is not whether or not Mexico has the ability to overcome

Brasher 19

this challenge; it is whether or not Mexico will choose to look within itself and first address its

own shortcomings before attempting to defeat transnational organized crime. Mexico will not

be able to successfully defeat the transnational organized crime that ravages it and threatens

its democracy and stability without first enhancing and addressing the inadequacies of its

capacity.

Brasher 20

Brasher 21

1 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention). Last modified 2004. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/ TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf> (Accessed October 24, 2012)2 Ibid.3 Robert Kelly, Jess Maghan, and Joseph Serio, Illicit Trafficking: A Reference Handbook, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2005), 3.4 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention). Last modified 2004. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/ TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf> (Accessed October 24, 2012)5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Human trafficking in Mexico and neighbouring countries: a review of protection approaches, 1 June 2012, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f0ee55f2.html> (Accessed November 1, 2012).8 United States Department of State. 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report – Introductory Material. Last modified June 28, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192587.pdf> (Accessed October 28, 2012).9 United States Department of State. 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report – Mexico. Last modified June 28, 2011. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e12ee5f2d.html> (Accessed October 28, 2012).10 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention). Last modified 2004. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/ Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf> (Accessed October 24, 2012)11 Salvador A. Cicero-Domínguez. Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights. Vol. 2, Issue 4. Dec 2005. “Assessing the U.S.-Mexico Fight against Human Trafficking and Smuggling: Unintended Results of U.S. Immigration Policy.” <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v4/n2/2/> (Accessed November 2, 2010).12 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Human trafficking in Mexico and neighbouring countries: a review of protection approaches, 1 June 2012, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f0ee55f2.html> (Accessed November 1, 2012).13 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention). Last modified 2004. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/ TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf> (Accessed October 24, 2012)14 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Human trafficking in Mexico and neighbouring countries: a review of protection approaches, 1 June 2012, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f0ee55f2.html> (Accessed November 1, 2012).15 Guaqueta, Lisa. The Institute for Policy Studies. Foreign Policy in Focus. “Arms Trafficking at the US-Mexico Border.” March 26, 2010. <http://www.fpif.org/articles/arms_trafficking_at_the_us-mexico_border> (Accessed November 1, 2012).16 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Human trafficking in Mexico and neighbouring countries: a review of protection approaches, 1 June 2012, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f0ee55f2.html> (Accessed November 1, 2012).17 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. "World Drug Report 2010". Last modified June 23, 2010. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/ World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf> (Accessed October 25, 2012). 18 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. “Crime and Development in Central America Caught in the Crossfire.” Last modified May 2007. <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Central%20America%20Study.pdf> (Accessed October 26, 2012).19 Ibid.20 Hamilton, Nora. Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Evolution. “U.S.-Mexico Relations: Current Issues.” pg. 264.21 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention). Last modified 2004. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/ TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf> (Accessed October 24, 2012).22 Salvador A. Cicero-Domínguez. Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights. Vol. 4, Issue 2. Dec 2005. “Assessing the U.S.-Mexico Fight against Human Trafficking and Smuggling: Unintended Results of U.S. Immigration Policy.” <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v4/n2/2/> (Accessed November 2, 2010).

23 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention). Last modified 2004. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/ TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf> (Accessed October 24, 2012).24 Salvador A. Cicero-Domínguez. Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights. Vol. 2, Issue 4. Dec 2005. “Assessing the U.S.-Mexico Fight against Human Trafficking and Smuggling: Unintended Results of U.S. Immigration Policy.” <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v4/n2/2/> (Accessed November 2, 2010).25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 United States Department of State. 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report – Mexico. Last modified June 28, 2011. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e12ee5f2d.html> (Accessed October 28, 2012).28 Robert Kelly, Jess Maghan, and Joseph Serio, Illicit Trafficking: A Reference Handbook, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2005), 3.29 Salvador A. Cicero-Domínguez. Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights. Vol. 2, Issue 4. Dec 2005. “Assessing the U.S.-Mexico Fight against Human Trafficking and Smuggling: Unintended Results of U.S. Immigration Policy.” <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v4/n2/2/> (Accessed November 2, 2010).30 Guaqueta, Lisa. The Institute for Policy Studies. Foreign Policy in Focus. “Arms Trafficking at the US-Mexico Border.” March 26, 2010. <http://www.fpif.org/articles/arms_trafficking_at_the_us-mexico_border> (Accessed November 1, 2012).31 Terry Lynn Karl. Journal of Democracy. “Economic Inequality and Democratic Instability”. National Endowment for Democracy and the Johns Hopkins University Press. (2000) 149-156.32 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. “Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire.” Last modified May 2007. <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Central%20America%20Study.pdf> (Accessed October 29, 2012).33 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Human trafficking in Mexico and neighbouring countries: a review of protection approaches, 1 June 2012, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f0ee55f2.html> (Accessed November 1, 2012).34 Margaret Beare, Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption, (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2003), chap. 1.35 Transparency International. 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index. “Results.” <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/ results/> (Accessed October 25, 2012).36 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. “Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire.” Last modified May 2007. <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Central%20America%20Study.pdf> (Accessed October 29, 2012).37 Ibid.38 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. “2011 Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Contexts, Data.” Last modified 2011. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/ Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf> (Accessed October 29, 2012).39 Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Mexico’s Drug Cartels”. Last modified January 24, 2012. <http://www.stratfor.com/image/mexicos-drug-cartels> (Accessed October 29, 2012).40 United States Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Travel Warning- Mexico”. Last updated February 8, 2012. <http://travel.state.gov/travel/ cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5665.html> (Accessed November 6, 2012). 41 Ibid.42 Merriam-Webster Dictionary. “Democracy”. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democracy> (Accessed October 23, 2012).43 United Nations. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. “Crime and Development in Central America Caught in the Crossfire.” Last modified May 2007. <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Central%20America%20Study.pdf> (Accessed October 25, 2012).44 Ibid.45 Andrew Selee, and Jacqueline Peschard, Mexico's Democratic Challenges: Politics, Government, and Society, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010), chap. 1.46 Ibid.47 Ibid.48 United States Department of State. 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report – Mexico. Last modified June 28, 2011. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e12ee5f2d.html> (Accessed October 28, 2012).

49 International Monetary Fund (IMF). “2005 ICP Regional Summary: Latin America and the Carribbean.” (Accessed November 6, 2012.