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Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015
98
Africa or Morocco? A Historical
Perspective on the Resolution of the
Contrived Stalemate over the Western
Sahara Decolonization Process
Emmanuel Nwafor MORDI①
(Department of History & International Studies,
Delta State University, Nigeria)
Abstract: The stalemated decolonization process in Africa’s last
colony, Western Sahara, was investigated in its historical context.
Deploying the critical-analytic methodology of contemporary history
and examining available sources on the subject, the paper posits the
Saharawi right to self-determination and independence, within the
framework of the UN Charter as a non-self-governing territory which
is not in dispute. It concludes that the stalemate is Morocco’s
contrivance to further its dream of a “Greater Morocco”, and that the
reactivation of Saharawi armed struggle, complemented with
diplomatic efforts under the strategic leadership of the African Union,
would present the United Nations with a choice between Africa and
Morocco, and reinvest the world body with the political will for its
early resolution.
① Dr. Emmanuel Nwafor MORDI, Department of History & International Studies, Delta State University, Nigeria. This is a revised version of paper presented at the International Conference on the Decolonization of Western Sahara on the Theme “Towards the Liberation of the Last Colony in Africa” organized by the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), held at the Shehu Musa Yar’ Adua Conference Centre, Abuja, June 2-4, 2015.
Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate
over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process
99
Key Words: Decolonization Process; Greater Morocco Strategy;
Diplomatic Solidarity; Contemporary History; African Nationalism;
Maghreb Studies
I. Introduction
It has been three decades after its admission into the full
membership of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the
African Union which also made its president one of the continental
body’s eight vice presidents in the Saharawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR), since 1984, remains a nation in search of statehood.
It thus finds itself in the paradox of an independent country which
continues to bear the unenviable appellation of Africa’s last colony.
Western Sahara was the Spanish colonial territory of Spanish West
Africa, later known as Spanish Sahara which was gravely neglected.
For many of the colonial periods, from 1884 to the 1960s, it was “not
under the de facto control of the Spanish administration”. Nor was it
controlled by Morocco. The evidence shows that the Saharawi,
bellicose people who fiercely defended their independence, earned the
respect of their Spanish colonizers as “a minefield of explosive people,
distrustful and ready to fight” (Martin, S., 2010:24-29).This readiness
to fight for their independence was brought to bear in 1976, after
Morocco, capitalizing on the weakness of the Spanish colonial power,
occupied the Saharawi territory and annexed it. The Saharawi
proclaimed an independent Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR), led by a government-in-exile. The formation of a
government-in-exile in 1976 was a signal that the Saharawi had
crossed the Rubicon in their struggle, and that SADR could only
materialize as the homeland of the “refugee nation” whose leaders,
recognizing the transient nature of their current status have sought to
transform camp life in Tindouf, Algeria into a symbol of the Saharawi
state and of their capacity to manage their affairs independently.
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015
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So much has been written on the Western Sahara conflict, yet, the
impasse over the conduct of the UN sanctioned referendum on the
self-determination of the territory which has been the major
preoccupation of the world body since 1992, remains an albatross.
Indeed, opinions are divided on the interpretation of the conflict and
the most viable and enduring approach to its resolution. For instance,
Darbouche sees what appeared to be some movements around the
‘frozen’ conflict in Western Sahara early in 2007 (Darbouche, H., 2007:
I), while Zoubir insists that the reality of the conflict is that “it now
belongs to the category of ‘forgotten’ or ‘frozen’ conflicts” (Zoubir, Y.,
2010: 85). Such categorizations, however, tend to ignore or at best
down play the continued exertions of the thousands of ethnic
Saharawi through sustained defiance campaigns against Moroccan
occupation, termed an intifada or ‘shaking off,’ which climaxed in 2005.
Stephen and Mundy are of the view that such “desert uprising
represents a dramatic turning point in the Saharawi people’s struggle
for national self-determination”, being “a new asymmetric resistance
strategy between talking and killing has refocused international
attention on a conflict that has destabilized this important
geo-strategic region for three decades” (Stephen, M. & Mundy, J., 2006:
1-2). Thus Mordi suggests that the conflict is better appreciated in the
context of the principle of Saharawi struggle for national
self-determination which guarantees the subject people the liberty to
“freely decide where they want to belong via a referendum organized
by the United Nations” (Mordi, E., 2015: 10), even though the principle
does not explain why the issue remains unresolved. Daadaoui,
therefore, posits that “the self-determination theory and practice are
unable to account for the intricate nature of the conflict” because they
deemphasize the colonial legacy, as well as the issue of the identity of
the indigenous Western Saharawi. What is suggested, then, is a
rethink “of the prevalent UN’s views on identity and indigenousness
apart from its rigid legalistic and positivist framework”. The paper
highlights that “Morocco has historical claims to the territory”, and
Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate
over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process
101
its attempt to deconstruct the structure and reality of SADR, and
question the Saharawi right to self-determination on the grounds that
“it legitimizes colonial structures that were imposed in the first place”,
making it an apologia for Moroccan intransigence. This is especially
true, given its spurious assertion that Saharawi identity dates only to
1975, “when Morocco annexed the territory”. An identity which
further spuriously claimed is difficult to determine with accuracy, as it
“has been shaped and influenced by its interaction with the more
urban and less nomadic Moroccan society since 1975”(Daadaoui, M.,
2008: 143-44, 152-54).
On this part, Epstein emphasizes the “unresolved situation” of the
complexity surrounding the issue of the legal status of the Western
Sahara, the Saharawi right to self-determination and the “legitimate
expansion to include human rights and national resource protection”.
This could give rise to the failure of the UN to implement a free and
fair referendum to resolve the stalemate over the Saharawi conflict,
which would have crippled “the credibility of the current international
legal system and the UN’s role within it” (Epstein, P., 2009: 108).
However, reducing the fundamental issue of the Saharawi
independence aspiration to a mere legality and credibility contest
trivializes a life and death struggle that has lingered and defied the
world for over four decades. Indeed, as Theofilopoulou aptly notes,
the Saharawi continued reference to legality does not advance its
cause because “If the issue were to be resolved based on legal
arguments, this would have happened” (Theofilopoulou, A., 2013: 5).
Given this background, it is clearly a historical appreciation of the
issues that have stalled the UN’s exercise of its simple mandate to
conduct a mere referendum for less than half a million people,
occupying a territory of 266,000 square kilometers, the size of New
Zealand, or three-fifths the area of Sweden (Leite, P., 2006: 12), which
holds the key to a resolution of the Western Sahara impasse. This
paper, therefore, sets out to examine the issues in their historical
context, by deploying the critical-analytic method of contemporary
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015
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history to interrogate the available, relevant sources on the subject and
to point the way out of the quagmire. It argues that the conflict has
been resolved up to the point of identifying the conduct of a
referendum for the identified Saharawi, based on the UN’
decolonization principle of self-determination as a result of the cease
fire approved by the world body in 1991.
The issue of referendum was facilitated by the ruling of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1975, which acknowledged
historic connections between Morocco and the Western Sahara, but
dismissed Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the territory as
untenable. Although the ICJ’s advisory opinion had been given at the
instance of Morocco which had sought its adjudication on the matter,
and did not reject the ruling, the Kingdom of Morocco in defiance of
the ruling invaded the territory in 1975, with 350,000 Moroccans. It
subsequently consolidated its occupation through the construction of
a 2,700 kilometer warfare wall, guarded by over 120,000 soldiers,
maintained at huge costs of about $1million per day (Campbell, P.,
2003:47-50; Mordi, E., 2015), thereby taking physical possession of
two-thirds of Western Sahara. Thus Morocco’s refusal of the matter
to the ICJ was a ploy to buy time to stall the half-hearted move of
Spain, the colonial power to grant independence to the Saharawi
people, who in 1973, had formally embarked on their struggle for
independence. The Saharawi launched their national liberation war,
and made giant strides until the UN effected a cease –fire between the
two warring parties, in order to facilitate the organization of a
mutually agreed referendum which would advance the
non-self-governing territory on its way to self-determination and
independence (Mordi, E., 2015). The efforts to resolve the issue must,
therefore, focus mainly on the MINURSO mandate and dismantling
the impediments to the discharge of that mandate, if the UN is to
remain a credible, relevant and viable world body with respect to
decolonization, of which it is provided with a rich tradition.
Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate
over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process
103
II. Issues in the Deadlocked Referendum on the Saharawi
Self-Determination
At the core of the deadlock over the issue of self-determination for
the existing Saharawi state, which has already been a member of the
African Union for over 30 years, is the UN’s abandonment of its
responsibility to organize an overdue referendum through its Mission
for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara
(MINURSO). It can be conceived that two unequally endowed
brothers are at each other’s throat, who mutually refer to their
powerful father for resolution in line with his own laid down
procedure, in which their dispute over a parcel of land flowing
literally with milk and honey, abandoned in a disorderly manner by a
fleeing former owner that refused to hand it over to the legally
acclaimed rightful owner. That would have the matter referred back to
them with a plea to provide him with the framework of its amicable
resolution. To be sure, when the UN in April 1991, resolved to set up
MINURSO to conduct a referendum mutually agreed by Morocco and
SADR, there was no provision that both parties should, in turn, begin
to guide MINURSO on the exercise of its clearly defined mandate, or
that the UN should submit its instrument to the interpretation of the
two parties.
On August 30, 1988, both the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente
Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamray de Rio de Oro
(POLISARIO) mutually in principle agreed on the proposals for the
OAU-UNO organized referendum for self-determination of the people
of Western Sahara, to allow them to choose either independence or
integration with Morocco. The plan had proposed by MINURSO,
containing that civilians, police and the military were assigned tasks
that would culminate in the referendum; a ceasefire, and a subsequent
exchange of prisoners of war (POWS), reduction of Moroccan military
presence in the territory, and restriction of the combatants of both
parties to designated areas in the territory. These were to be followed
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015
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by the proclamation of amnesty and by the release of POLISARIO
political prisoners from Morocco, as well as suspension of all laws and
regulations which could impede the conduct of a free and fair
referendum. A general amnesty and release of all refugees, including
those outside the territory wishing to return after the UN had
established their right to vote, were to follow. The UN Secretary
General was proposed also to appoint his special representative,
empowered to exercise sole and exclusive authority on all issues
related to the conduct of the referendum, including MINURSO. The
UN was shared the responsibility for the maintenance of law and
order by the settlement plan which also stipulated that the cooperation
of the two parties and their neighbors was fundamental for
MINURSO’s impartial, effective and successful execution of its
mandate. These proposals which were based on earlier OAU
proposals became effective on April 29, 1991, when the UN Security
Council approved them. UN Secretary General appreciated his pivotal
role in the onerous responsibility and affirmed that “The two parties,
namely the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO,shall
recognize in the settlement proposals that sole and exclusive
responsibility is for the organization and conduct of the referendum is
vested in the United Nations” (Security Council, 1991: 4, par.9).
In effect, the UN was expected to be guided by its own timelines
of 20-26 weeks within which was to conclude and proclaim the result
of the referendum. MINURSO was established with the approval of
the settlement plan, but any optimism that its prompt establishment
signaled the UN’s intention to speedily concluded that the SADR case
turned out to be misplaced. It took the world body 68 weeks from
April 29, 1990 to September 6, 1991 to achieve a ceasefire between the
warring parties, followed by the resignation of Johannes Manz, the
UN Special Envoy, who mandated to lead MINURSO to conduct the
approved referendum. The Secretary General capped it all by
proposing the postponement of the referendum. As it is well known,
whereas the population to participate in the referendum had ab initio
Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate
over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process
105
been agreed to be those who captured in the 1974 election conducted
by the departing colonial power, the UN decided, on the insistence of
its Secretary General, to change the eligibility criteria, ostensibly to
extend voting rights to refugees who had fled from the denials
imposed by colonial domination. It had proposed to delete the names
of the dead and to include those whose names were omitted from the
1974 census, a tall order indeed. Nothing that was done subsequently
to insert names, including that applicants previously rejected by the
Identification Commission could be acceptable to the Kingdom of
Morocco, which, in April 2007, rejected independence as a possible
outcome of self-determination for the Saharawi, instead, sought to
impose its own decision of integration of the Saharawi into an
“autonomous region” within Morocco whose indivisibility and
sovereignty were non-negotiable (Mordi, E., 2015).
The evidence suggests that autonomy as a solution to disputes
involving minority groups and indigenous peoples is not new, and
has been adopted worldwide since 1900s but with limited success,
either as a temporary or permanent solution to decolonization cases.
In Africa, autonomy as a solution to self-determination cases has been
an unmitigated failure in Eritrea, and South Sudan, for instance, which
forcibly broke out of autocratic states into which it was forcibly
integrated. In effect, as in the Saharawi case with Morocco, “autonomy
in autocracy” is unworkable. The autocracy of the Moroccan
monarchy cannot provide a fertile ground on which Saharawi
autonomy can sprout and grow. Indeed, successful autonomy
arrangements are dependent on democracy both within the
autonomous region and the state in which it is located that grants
autonomy (Khakee, A., 2011:2-3). There is no evidence, despite its new
constitution of 2011, that Morocco is inclined to resolve the Western
Sahara conflict by democratic means (Theofilopoulou, A., 2012).The
admission of the new Moroccan King, Muhammad VI in 2000 that
“Morocco has a lot to do in terms of democracy” (Campbell, P.,
2003:48), mirrors the difficulty of the democratic culture emerging and
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015
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taking root in a society steeped in monarchical culture and tradition.
Morocco’s opposition to a referendum for the Saharawi is a reflection
of its deeply rooted anti-democratic culture, which saw opposition to
monarchical rule brutally suppressed between 1972 and 1999, through
arrests, kidnapping, disappearance, torture and murder of opponents
of the king (Campbell, P., 2003:41). Rather than rebuke Morocco for
frustrating the organization of the referendum, the UN surrendered its
mandate as it sought to pamper the kingdom, calling on both parties
to engage in direct negotiations without preconditions, so as to
guarantee a mutually acceptable political solution, with
self-determination for the Saharawi as its outcome. In fact, the
Kingdom of Morocco further rejected referendum as a means of
achieving self-determination for the Saharawi. How did the UN expect
two unequal powers pursuing mutually exclusive goals of territorial
aggrandizement on one hand, and independence on the other to arrive
at a mutually acceptable settlement through direct negotiations in
which the world body initially assigned that responsibility would play
the role of a biased spectator?
The answer is clear. By political solution the UN was engaging in
a double-speak of accepting the Moroccan position that Western
Sahara was an integral part of a “Greater Morocco”. As the
International Crisis Group (2007) aptly observed, the UN tacitly
abandoned its earlier position based on the principle of
self-determination, but by showing the ability to arbitrate in the
dispute, it merely encouraged the two parties to look up to it as if
having a favor to dispense in the final determination of the issue. The
tendency manifested early at the beginning of UN’s involvement with
the organization of a referendum in Western Sahara in the form of
confusion, delays, and resignation of the UN Secretary General’s
Personal Envoy who was saddled with the responsibility of ensuring
its success. This pattern was followed by successive personal envoys,
who demonstrated an inclination towards upholding Morocco’s view
of the conflict, and the strategy for resolving it, against the
Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate
over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process
107
actualization of Saharawi independent statehood. In fact, officers and
institutions charged with the onerous task of assisting to midwife the
Saharawi state succumbed to Morocco’s blockages, and thereby
“created a pattern that the Secretariat was unwilling or unable to
break” (Theofilopoulou, A., 2013:2). This was a clear demonstration of
the failure of political will on the part of the world body, which
continued to prove impotent in the face of Moroccan government’s
blatant refusal to cooperate with the process of the UN approved
referendum. The failure of the Security Council to “impose its binding
arbitration at Morocco’s expense” undermined MINURSO and its
capacity to conduct any referendum (Theofilopoulou, A., 2013: 5). The
world body and its involvement in the Western Sahara have thus
become discredited.
The question that readily comes to mind is, why the UN Security
Council is so incapacitated to implement its plans on Western Sahara,
and why Morocco so bent on holding on to the territory and
apparently had its way? The reasons are not far-fetched. Firstly, as the
Urhobo of Nigeria would say, when a juju, or traditional guardian
deity loses its potency, its votaries serve it with ordinary water.
Similarly, the POLISARIO Front seems to have lost its fire power, and
is waiting on the world to grant it independence on a platter of
political solution. Conversely, Morocco feels that it has won the war
and has no need to negotiate any political solution that does not
confirm the political reality on ground of a defeated POLISARIO and
the incorporation of the SADR into its Saharan Provinces. As James
Baker puts it:
This is a really low intensity, and low-level dispute. Look, there’s no
enforcement action on the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco has won the
war. She’s in possession. Why should she agree to anything? And so she
is disinclined to do so. Nevertheless, there’s one very good reason why she
should, because she will never receive the imprimatur of international
legitimacy for her occupation of the territory unless she works out some
arrangements that are blessed by the Security Council, or acceptable to
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015
108
the other party. That’s why we work so hard on the idea of an initial
autonomy arrangement with self-government and then a referendum at
the end of the test, which is the requirement of the Security Council for
self- determination (Mordi, E., 2015: 9).
In fact, the Security Council is focused on making Morocco
autonomous for the Saharawi and their eventual incorporation into a
“Greater Morocco” acceptable to the POLISARIO.
Secondly, major powers, either as permanent members of the UN
Security Council or on the world stage, could have played decisive
roles in bringing about the resolution of the conflict in favor of the
established tradition which could further enhance the credibility of the
UN and peaceful resolution of conflicts but have strangely lost their
nerves to do so. Boukhars suggests that such powers, including the
United States and most “Western governments, fear the possibility of
another weak state, almost the size of Britain, appearing in an area
already afflicted by many fragile or failing states”. Therefore, “they
wish that the disputed territory remains in Moroccan” (Boukhars, A.,
2013: 1). Given the volatility of the region and its proximity to
southern Europe, they would seem to be comfortable with
coordinating ceasefire in the Western Sahara rather than provoke
Morocco and risk the outbreak of renewed fighting, or face the
prospects of independence for the SADR which has no major military
capability to ensure security, even within its borders (Theofilopoulou,
A., 2006). This position has become the trump card of the Kingdom of
Morocco whose officials seize every opportunity to trumpet for all to
hear that “There is no room for a failed state in the region”, which
“will fall into the hands of extremists” (Morris, L., 2013:2). The claim
should, therefore, be taken with a pinch of salt. On the contrary, it is
Morocco that needs to cling to its hold on Western Sahara to ensure its
stability, the absence of which can turn into a failed state that would
compromise the stability of Northwest Africa.
Thirdly, economic interests are also a major contributory factor in
the impasse over the Western Sahara crisis. In fact, the prospects of
Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate
over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process
109
benefits from the rich phosphate and fishery resources of the Western
Sahara, including recent prospects of oil exploitation, have always in
line with Spanish, French, Moroccan, and even Russian interests in the
territory (Mordi, E., 2015), and hold an attraction to other European
Union States which are anxious to have their fishing activities off the
coast of Western Sahara legalized (Ghettas, G., 2010). In particular,
Morocco is focused on its control of a major chunk of the phosphate
mines of the Western Sahara not only to boost its income, but also to
place it in an advantage position to determine the global price of the
world’s largest reserves of phosphate over which it has about 40% of
exports in the world (Eiran, E., 2008: 23).There is evidence too, that the
Moroccan King Mohammed VI, as well as some well placed Moroccan
conglomerates and French multinationals own giant agribusinesses in
the occupied areas of Western Sahara which produce tomatoes,
unethically labeled product of Morocco , and sell them in Britain by
Tesco and Morrisons, thriving supermarkets. Morocco thus
unethically gains from tax breaks from the tomatoes produced in an
occupied territory (Black, I., 2015:1).Wealth from these sources boosts
Moroccan intransigence, facilitates the dispensing of royal patronage
to the clients of the monarchy and helps to sustain the patriotic
sentiments of Moroccans over their attachment to the Western Sahara,
termed the goose that lays the golden eggs.
Fourth, there are issues of strategic interests influencing policy
decisions and inclinations of the major powers which hold the
leverage to speedily end the crisis if they choose to pull it. Morocco is
a valuable ally of the United States of America with centuries-old
relationships, dating back to 1787, when the US signed its oldest peace
treaty with the ancient kingdom, which is a major beneficiary of
American aid in Africa and the Arab world. The kingdom sits astride
the Mediterranean Sea, the entrance to Northwest Africa and hosts
transit facilities for US’ rapid deployment force at its air bases in the
region, affording the US Air Force refueling, as well as landing and
over flight privileges. In addition, Morocco which was a US trusted
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015
110
ally in the Cold War era and during America’s invasion of Iraq,
continues to enjoy US confidence as a major ally in the latter’s
anti-terrorism war, providing the US with intelligence information on
the activities of Islamists, and helping to facilitate policy in the Middle
East, including ironically the US democratic reform agenda in the
Arab world (Campbell, P., 2003; Mordi, E., 2015). This partly explains
US’ volte- face in its proposal to the Security Council that MINURSO
be empowered to monitor human rights in the Moroccan occupied
Saharawi territory as a protest, when Morocco cancelled a scheduled
joint military exercise between the two countries (Morris, L., 2013).
Fifth, it is an irony and also an explanation of the lingering
impasse that the US should prefer a monarchy which withdrew its
membership of OAU in 1984, and remains, till date, a non member of
the African Union to the larger continental body whose members,
including Nigeria and South Africa, two stabilizing democracies that
support the SADR, a member of the African Union. It was the OAU’s
resolution AHG 104 that had laid the foundation of the current UN
attempts to conduct a peaceful and fair referendum in the Western
Sahara, preconditioned on a ceasefire, direct negotiations and the
prevalence of an enabling environment to bring it about.
Subsequently, the AU has tended to conform to the UN actions
over the Western Sahara, expressing its “support to the UN efforts to
overcome the impasse in the peace process”, including all relevant UN
Security Council resolutions calling for direct negotiations between
the two parties, with the object of “achieving a just, lasting and
mutually acceptable political solution.” The AU adopted the position
that such a course of action had the potential to culminate in “the
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, in the context of
arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the UN
Charter” by exercising their right to choose between independence
and their integration into the Kingdom of Morocco. The communiqué
of its Peace and Security Council 496th meeting held in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia on March 27, 2015, however, showed the continental body’s
Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate
over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process
111
“deep concern” over “the failure to achieve the expected results” in
the process of decolonization in the Western Sahara, “four decades
after the onset of the conflict and 50 years after the decision of
decolonization”. The AU therefore expressed “the urgency of renewed
efforts to overcome the current impasse”. Accordingly, the Council of
the AU, while appealing for coordinated and enhanced international
action towards the early organization of the referendum on the
self-determination of the Sahrawi, urged the UN Security Council “to
make all necessary efforts to ensure progress in the search for a
solution to the conflict”, considering the principles and purposes of
the UN Charter (African Union, 2015:2). Thus rather than follow the
course of its seeming ultimatum to the logical presentation of a clear
option to the Security Council to make a choice between Africa and
the intransigent Morocco, the AU tended to relapse to its diplomatic
ritual of kowtowing. Needless to stress, this ritual has not yielded the
desired result of the Western Saharawi independence since 1984, when
the Kingdom of Morocco withdrew its membership of the continental
body.
When, therefore, the UN Security Council met on April 29, 2015,
it roundly ignored the AU Peace and Security Council communiqué in
its resolution 2218. Instead, it performed the ritual of reaffirming all
failed resolutions on the Western Sahara ,dating back to 2007,
including its worn cliché about “a just, lasting, and mutually
acceptable political solution”, as well as Morocco’s discredited 2007
autonomy proposals, in which resolution 2218 singled out to extol as
“serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward
towards resolution”. Even though the Special Envoy was inactive
during the end of the year , resolution 2218 affirmed full support for
him and “his work in facilitating negotiations between the parties”,
meanwhile, as had become the tradition, renewing the mandate of
MINURSO for one year, ending on April 30, 2016 (Security Council
S/RES/2218; what’s in Blue).
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015
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III. Towards a Historical Resolution of the Stalemate
The impression, and, in fact, the reality of the UN implementation
of its self determination program on Western Sahara is that the
exercise is a charade, programmed to fail, and the stalemate contrived.
Its objective is not conscientiously focused on the decolonization of
Africa’s last colony. The singling out of Moroccan actions, which have
only stalled the steady movement of the Saharawi to their palpably
demonstrated preference for independence and adulation, instead of
condemnation of the world body shutting out the African voice on the
issue, is a clear affirmation of our contention. When the UN Security
Council met on April 30, 2015, the African voice was shut out, even
though the AU Peace and Security Council had requested that the AU
Special Envoy for the Western Sahara, former Mozambican President
Joaquim Chissano who was allowed to address the body on AU’s
position on the current status of the Western Sahara. Such an action
failed to reflect years of efforts and spirit of the strategic partnership
on the conflict between the two bodies which had paved the way for
the self determination process since 1991. It also ignores the urgency of
“an enhanced international engagement”, including a close
partnership between AU-UN to bring about an early resolution of the
issue of independence for the Saharawi, which has been stalemated for
over four decades (African Union PSC/PR/Comm.2 (DIII)).
The current manifestation of the UN is a fair reflection of its
history in the movement of African peoples to independence after the
Second World War. To be sure, the UN General Assembly through its
Resolution 1514(xv) of 1960 provided both the political impetus and
legal justification and canopy for African colonies to intensify their
struggles for independence, at a time when 17 African countries were
independent. The resolution promulgated the “Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”,
proclaiming the entitlement of affected non-self- governing territories
to self-determination and independence (Wikipedia). The evidence
Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate
over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process
113
shows, however, that it was the principle of international
accountability enshrined in chapters XI-XIII of the UN Charter that
imposed certain obligations on the colonial powers. Specifically,
Articles 73 and 74 of chapter XI, or “Declarations Regarding Non-
Self-Governing Territories” charged them “to ensure, with due to
respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political,
economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment,
and their protection against abuses”; as well as “to develop
self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their
free political institutions...” Colonial authorities did not provide the
political information required of them incidental to the above.
However, by insisting on the periodic provision of such information,
“the UN showed an interest in the building up of national forces that
were ultimately to undermine the basis of colonialism”, even though it
thereby merely provided a favorable environment that accelerated a
decolonization process which had already been set in motion (Aluko,
O., 1974:624-625).
Indeed, the UN Charter and chapters therein, as well as
resolutions cannot guarantee the Saharawi their independent
statehood, and personal wellbeing. As Santos demonstrates with
respect to Portuguese colonies fighting for national liberation, the UN
could not compel Portugal to implement the principle of
self-determination and independence. However, in the face of lack of
cooperation with Portugal, the appropriate UN committee on
decolonization embarked on a valid engagement in the issue, which
put the liberation movements in a favorable position to combine
armed struggle with positive discussion on independence with the
colonial power (Santos, A., 2012: 254-56). The problem with current
handling of the Saharawi self-determination issue is that it vests an
individual, rather than a Security Council committee with the
responsibility. Such individuals, various personal envoys of the UN
Secretary General have been easily pressured to resign, thereby
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015
114
further complicating the issue.
With respect to human rights , it is clear that in spite of Articles 73
and 74 of chapter XI of the UN Charter which predate the Saharawi
conflict, not even the Security Council could take its initiative to
enquire into the socio-economic advancement of over 160,000
Saharawi who live in refugee camps, or under the circumstances of the
human rights abuses suffered by those in the occupied territories,
where they were imprisoned, and tortured by Moroccan authorities
(Abdelaziz, M. & Orback, J., 2010), who also had many others tried
and sentenced to long prison terms by military courts on the basis of
confessions obtained under tortured, disappeared , or extra
judicially murdered (All-Party Parliamentary Group, 2014) . A study
of human rights and decolonization in UN Trust Territories has
recently found that the colonized were fooled into thinking that the
UN watches over the entire world. Activists among the subject
peoples had to invoke human rights as a weapon to de-legitimize
colonial domination, thereby deploying the human rights was a
weapon in their arsenal of liberation strategy. In doing this, however,
they took their cue from the UN Charter, guided by their belief in the
world body “as an arbiter of world affairs” (Terretta, M., 2012:332-33).
Otherwise, the UN’s inability to uphold the legal, moral and ethical
principles enshrined in its guiding documents would breed
widespread disappointment in the world body, and diminish the
importance attached to the human rights weapon in the nationalist
movement. The current tone on human rights abuses is thus a
welcome addition to the strategy of criminalizing and de-legitimizing
Moroccan colonial domination of the Western Sahara, but
empowering MINURSO to monitor human rights abuses in the
occupied territory , even if the body has the will and capacity to
deliver, it cannot bring about the resolution of the conflict. At best, it
will scratch in the surface the effect rather than the cause of the
impasse, and in no way alter fundamentally the underlying dynamics
of the conflict (Soler, R., 2011). The goal of the Saharawi struggle is
Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate
over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process
115
independence, not human rights in which the Kingdom of Morocco
equally denies its own citizens.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the UN, being an omnibus
body has its own limitations, but it cannot repudiate its principles,
which could guide the decolonization process. The right to
self-determination and independence is inalienable, but it is fought by
the affected group who enlist the support of world opinion, as is
happened in the African case, of the African Union and its members,
collectively and individually. The Kingdom of Morocco enjoys an
advantage in the conflict because it controls 80% of the disputed
territory, and is settling Moroccans inside the territory with the hope
of outnumbering and outflanking the indigenous Saharawi. The
ultimate objective is to weaken the resolve of the Saharawi, and
present their autonomy within a Greater Morocco as a fait accompli.
Saharawi national resistance must therefore be reawakened, militarily
and diplomatically, and the African Union has a pivotal role to play in
the renewed struggle. The Saharawi have history on their side. The
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union,
while Morocco is not. The Saharawi right to self-determination and
independence is widely recognized, and the two issues in the principle
are better stated pari passu; independence as the goal of the Saharawi
struggle should never be in doubt. Besides, perhaps from France,
nobody recognizes Moroccan pretensions to historic ownership of any
centimeter of Saharawi territory.
At this point, it is necessary to stress that the African Union along
with its member states, which lays the foundation and has been the
sustaining force of Saharawi advance to nationhood, should provide
its traditional leadership and supportive role to break the stalemate,
which has been contrived by Morocco to an early end. Strategic
leadership should take the form of a fundamental, policy position to
offer the UN a choice between the African continent and the Kingdom
of Morocco on an early resolution of the Saharawi question. This is the
logical follow of the communiqué of the 496th meeting of the AU Peace
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015
116
and Security Committee. AU and indeed, other African nations’
support, solid and unequivocal support for the early organization of
the Saharawi referendum will mark a turning point in the resolution
of the stalemate, and if needed to be determined by capacity
supplemented with the activation of the Saharawi military
engagements, It may be pertinent to recall that national liberation
movements in Lusophone countries, as well as southern Africa
benefited from a similar strategy. Mazrui notes that “broader
diplomatic support at the United Nations and in world politics”
achieved the two goals of eroding the legitimacy of white minority
rule and increasing the legitimacy of those engaged in armed struggle
against white rule. It was such demonstration of support and
solidarity that denied the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia of
much needed British support, and dissuaded the United States from
remaining with the status quo in southern Africa. The same show of
solidarity and resolve pressured France to end its arms dealings and
trading with apartheid South Africa provided the UN with the much
needed political will to impose an arms embargo on the apartheid
enclave in 1977 (Mazrui, A., 1981).
IV. Conclusion
The stalemated Western Sahara decolonization process can be
adequately understood and appreciated when examined in its
historical context. It is a case for self-determination and independence
by a non-self-governing territory which the UN Charter recognizes
that will have to be decided by the Saharawi through a free and fair
referendum. The process has already been set in motion by the body
charged with the responsibility. Morocco’s intransigence in defiance of
the ICJ advisory opinion and relevant UN and AU resolutions due to
its illegal annexation of 80% of Saharawi territory is sustained by UN’s
lack of political will and self-centered calculations of the major powers.
The UN Charter and resolutions lack the wherewithal to confer
Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate
over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process
117
independence with the Saharawi who must resume armed struggle,
supplemented with diplomatic action. With the solidarity and support
of the AU and other African states, in a strategic cooperation to isolate
Morocco, if criminalized and delegitimized its occupation of and
activities in the Western Sahara, the contrived impasse would end.
The independence of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)
which has been in a state of suspended animation would thus be
proclaimed by the UN Organization which could have rediscovered
its political will to act.
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