teleology and intentionality: a challenge to the
TRANSCRIPT
Teleology and Intentionality:
A Challenge to the Deflationary View
By Benjamin W. Jarvis
A.B. Harvard University, 2002
A. M. Brown University, 2005
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island
May, 2010
ii
This dissertation by Benjamin W. Jarvis is accepted in its present form by the
Department of Philosophy as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree
in Doctor of Philosophy
Date___________________ Signature__________________________________
Richard Heck, Jr., Advisor
Recommended to the Graduate Council
Date___________________ Signature__________________________________
Christopher Hill, Reader
Date___________________ Signature__________________________________
Joshua Schechter, Reader
Approved by the Graduate School
Date___________________ Signature_________________________________
Sheila Bonde, Dean of the Graduate School
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CURRICULUM VITAE
for
Benjamin W. Jarvis
Birth Place: Provo, UT Birth Date: April 1, 1978
Education
Brown University (2003-2010) Ph.D. Philosophy, expected 2010. A.M. Philosophy, 2005.
Harvard University (1996-2002 A.B. Philosophy, Magna Cum Laude, 2002.
Positions
Arché Scholar (Fall 2009), Arché Philosophical Research Centre, University of St. Andrews
Honors and Awards
Brown University: Manning (Dissertation) Fellowship 2007-2008. Summer Fellowship 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. First Year Fellowship 2003-2004
Harvard University: Thomas T. Hoopes Prize, (May) 2002, Awarded for Outstanding Thesis “Transworld Identity’s Counterpart” (advisor James Pryor). John Harvard Scholar 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002.
Publications
“Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction” (with Jonathan Ichikawa) Philosophical Studies, 142.2 (2009).
Presentations
“Experiences as Mere Enablers,” Arché Philosophical Methodology Conference (University of St. Andrews),
April 25-27, 2009. “The Instrumental Value of Truth and the Utility of Belief-Desire Psychology,” Southwest Graduate Conference (Arizona State University), March 21, 2009. “Representation and Function,” Arché (University of St. Andrews), March 19, 2008. “Assertion and Knowledge upon Knowledge,” Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Philosophy Conference, March 8-9, 2008.
Teaching Experience
Instructor of Record, Brown University: Philosophy 11, The Nature of Fiction, Fall 2008.
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Philosophy 4, Reason and Religion, Fall 2006. Philosophy 903, Skepticism, Summer 2006, 2007, and 2008.
Teaching Assistant, Brown University: Philosophy 3, Knowledge and Skepticism, Felicia Nimue Ackerman, Fall 2004. Philosophy 36, Early Modern Philosophy, Justin Broackes, Spring 2005.
Grader, Brown University: Philosophy 164, The Nature of Morality, James Dreier, Spring 2007.
Professional Experience
Editorial Assistant (under Pauline Jacobson), Linguistics and Philosophy, 2006-2007.
Editorial Assistant (under Ernest Sosa), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Spring 2006.
Research Assistant to Felicia Nimue Ackerman, Fall 2005.
Research Assistant to Justin Broackes, Spring 2009. Conference Organizer (with Eoin Ryan), Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference, October 14-15, 2005
Coordinator, Philosophy Graduate Forum, Brown University, 2006-2007.
Committee Member, Philosophy Graduate Forum, Brown University, 2004-2007.
Participant, Informal Aesthetics Discussion Group, Brown University, Spring 2009.
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
Of all my intellectual debts, my greatest is to Richard Heck, who shepherded me not only as a
graduate student at Brown, but also as an undergraduate at Harvard. I am very grateful for
Richard’s thoughtful criticism and advice these last ten years. I hope to continue to benefit from
them for many years to come.
I am also grateful to the other members of my committee, Chris Hill and Josh Schechter.
The course Chris taught on concepts has turned out to be the most influential course I took as a
graduate student. I regret not having taken more of his courses. I greatly appreciate Chris for
his sharp criticisms (which I have learned to take as a sign of concern and respect) as well as his
passion for the subject. I likewise appreciate Josh both for his profound insights as well as his
nimble critiques. In addition to being a good mentor, Josh has become a good friend.
I have benefited from a great number of past and present members of the Brown
faculty, but there are a few others that stand out: Jaegwon Kim, Ernie Sosa, Jamie Dreier, Doug
Kutach, James van Cleve, and Polly Jacobson. I would like to thank my undergraduate advisor,
Jim Pryor, not only for stewarding my intellectual development during that period, but also for
teaching me how to write a philosophy paper.
I would be remiss if I failed to mention the graduate students I have met at Brown, who
have greatly contributed to my social life as well as my education. Of the graduate students I
met while I was at Brown, Jonathan Ichikawa has been most influential on my development as a
philosopher. I have greatly valued his friendship and collaboration.
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Of course, no graduate student at Brown has been more important to me than my wife,
Katherine. I will always be grateful to Brown University (and to philosophy) for bringing us
together. I am most grateful for her love and her support of my academic endeavors.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Introduction, p. 1
Chapter One, p. 3
Chapter Two, p. 59
Chapter Three, p. 88
Chapter Four, p. 118
Concluding Thoughts, p. 158
References, p. 160
1
INTRODUCTION:
This work is an extended argument for a particular theory of intentionality—what I call the
“teleological theory of intentional representation” (TTIR). According to TTIR, beliefs and desires
are cognitive states with representational jobs, where having representational jobs of the
requisite sort involves being subject to particular representational norms. TTIR contrasts with
non-teleological theories of intentionality—including deflationary theories of content—
according to which intentional properties (having a particular attitude and content) are merely a
matter of having the right collection of dispositional properties (which generally are not
constitutive of teleological properties).
This monograph is composed of four chapters. I spend most of the first two chapters
differentiating TTIR from its competitors. For instance, one of the distinguishing features of TTIR
is the prominent role it gives to truth and satisfaction conditions in the theory of intentionality.
Of course, no sensible theorist would deny that beliefs (and their immediate kin) have truth
conditions while desires (and their immediate kin) have satisfaction conditions. This admission,
however, falls well short of assuring truth and satisfaction conditions any prominent role in the
theory of intentional states. Truth and satisfaction conditions are too easy to come by with the
addition of a deflationary theory of truth; moreover, a deflationary theory of truth does not put
any constraint on the theory of intentional states. According to TTIR, truth and satisfaction
conditions must correspond to genuinely normative correctness conditions. This thesis
substantially constrains the supervenience relations between intentional properties (of attitude
2
and content) and underlying dispositional properties. In Chapter Two, I argue that TTIR
motivates rejecting a deflationary theory of truth.
In Chapter One, I not only explain in great detail what the teleological theory of
intentional representation is, I contrast it with its clearest competitor: deflationary theories of
content. In so doing, I show what is at issue between these two types of theories of
intentionality, and at the end of the chapter, I suggest how what’s at issue might be settled. I
spend the rest of the dissertation arguing on behalf of TTIR.
The case in favor of TTIR is conclusive for two reasons. First, as I point out at the end of
Chapter One, a commitment to TTIR is effectively a commitment to the idea that belief-desire
psychology advantages a subject by producing cognitive states with representational jobs. In
other words, an advocate of TTIR ought to be able to argue that beliefs and desires only succeed
in reliably getting a subject around the world by acting as states with representational jobs
ought to. Thus, if TTIR is true, it should be the case that reliably producing and retaining beliefs
that are true and thereby reliably satisfying desires is essential to the utility of belief-desire
psychology. In Chapter Three, I argue that this is so—a belief-desire psychology is useful only to
the extent that it is producing and retaining true beliefs so as to regularly satisfy desires that are
closely aligned to the subject’s antecedent interests. Second, as I also suggest at the end of
Chapter One, deflationary theories of content must be accompanied by an adequate theory of
attitudes. In Chapter Four, I show that any adequate theory of attitudes vindicates TTIR.
Part of making the case in favor of TTIR involves indicating how the teleological aspect
of TTIR might turn out to be naturalism friendly. In Chapters Three and Four, I also show that
once we can understand how creatures come to have interests, it is fairly straightforward to see
how the cognitive architecture of creatures can have the telos of producing and retaining
representations.
1
CHAPTER ONE:
Deflationary Theories of Content and the Teleological Theory
of Intentional Representation
§1: Introduction
This chapter is a work in philosophical taxonomy. In particular, it is a taxonomy of philosophical
theories of the intentional.
For my purposes, a mental state is intentional only if it is an attitude with a content.
(Beliefs and desires are paradigm intentional states. Perceptual states do not count as
intentional even if they have content.) Consequently, a philosophical theory of the intentional
has two different components, a theory of attitudes and a theory of content. A theory of
attitudes is a theory that, among other things, explains what makes some particular intentional
state a belief, say, rather than, say, a desire. A theory of content is a theory that, among other
things, explains what makes some particular intentional state, one of Winston Churchill's beliefs,
for example, have the content that it does, e.g. that the Iron Curtain had descended, rather than
some other content, e.g. that the Berlin Wall would fall.
Without question, there are major disagreements among theories of content (and
consequently among theories of attitude). The primary purpose of this chapter is to make some
of those disagreements plain.
2
This chapter follows up on Hartry Field's “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content.”1
In that paper, Field attempts to make a distinction between two views on content. According to
one, “inflationist,” view, “truth conditions play an extremely central role in semantics and the
theory of mind.”2 On the other, “deflationist,” view truth conditions are not so central. Far
more central to the theory of content is various aspects of a sentence's “use.”
Unfortunately, what it is for truth conditions rather than “use” to play the “central” role
in the theory of content (and vice-versa) is far from clear. For my part, I am not satisfied that
Field has made this difference adequately perspicuous. I believe the crucial distinction here is
one between those theories of content that adopt what I call the teleological theory of
intentional representation (TTIR) and those do not. Throughout §2, I will attempt to clarify this
distinction. In §3, I will show that deflationists are committed to reject TTIR.
While I think that the TTIR distinction is the (relevantly) crucial distinction between
those theories that do and do not take truth conditions as central, I am not at all convinced that
it is the distinction between inflationary (or “inflationist”) and deflationary (or “deflationist”)
theories of content (DTCs). DTCs have other distinguishing features in addition to rejecting TTIR.
I will attempt to explain DTCs in §4.
§2: The Teleological Theory of Intentional Representation
§2.1: Principal Theses of TTIR
The teleological theory of intentional representation (TTIR) is easy enough to state:
(TTIR) Principal intentional states— most certainly beliefs and desires—are robust mental representations.3
1 Field (1994) reprinted in Field (2001). 2 Ibid, 104. 3 By saying “most certainly beliefs and desires,” I presuppose that belief-desire psychology is core to a theory of intentional states.
3
TTIR is compatible with the thesis that all intentional states are mental representations, but it
allows that some intentional states are not.4 Whatever exceptions there may be, an adherent of
TTIR will likely insist that a subject can only have these intentional states if he is antecedently
capable of having robust mental representations. Henceforth, I will ignore the hedge against
possible exceptions and use “intentional states” to refer only to those of a “principal” sort.
To understand TTIR we must understand what it is for something to be a robust mental
representation. An intentional state is a robust mental representation if and only if the
representational properties of the intentional state play an important role in differentiating its
intentional aspects, i.e. its attitude and content. Thus, TTIR commits us to two supplementary
theses.
The first relates to the content of an intentional state:
(First Supplementary) Something is an intentional state with content that p partly in virtue of representing that p and representing nothing stronger than that p.
According to this first thesis, the content of intentional states is largely (although perhaps not
entirely) a matter of what the intentional state is (representationally) about.
The second relates to the attitude of an intentional state:
(Second Supplementary) An intentional state is of a particular attitude kind, e.g. a belief, desire, etc. at least partly in virtue of the kind of representation it is (as opposed to what it represents).
According to this second thesis, different attitude kinds are closely tied with different ways of
representing.5 So, for instance, to believe is to represent in a maplike way while to desire is to
4 Possible exceptions might be the intentional state of having .7 credence towards the proposition that Churchill was a good painter or that of merely entertaining the proposition that Churchill was a good painter. Thanks to David Christensen for his discussion here. 5 When I say that beliefs represent in a “maplike” way, I don't intend to be entering the debate between potential adherents of TTIR over how mental representations are structured syntactically, i.e. whether
4
represent more as a blueprint does. Thus, as a map about the streets of Chicago reflects the
way that the streets of Chicago are, so, in a way, does a belief about the streets of Chicago.
Likewise, as a blueprint about the streets of Chicago projects a way for the streets of Chicago to
be, so, in a way, does a desire about the streets of Chicago. Moreover, according to this second
thesis, it is at least partly because of these differences in representation that beliefs are beliefs
and desires are desires. For instance, a belief about the streets of Chicago is distinguished from
a desire about the streets of Chicago precisely because latter does not reflect, but rather
projects vis-à-vis the streets of Chicago.
Very likely, representational properties are not brute or primitive properties. In other
words, states and objects likely have representational properties in virtue of having other (more
fundamental) properties. Consequently, TTIR is, very likely, an incomplete theory of
intentionality for it does nothing to explain how it is that people might (or might not) come to
be in states that have the representational properties TTIR says are requisite for intentional
states. Unless he is an eliminativist regarding the intentional (i.e. unless he claims there are no
intentional states), an adherent of TTIR needs to show how psychological states could have the
(more fundamental) properties underlying mental representation. One of the primary
differences between various non-eliminativist theories of intentionality that endorse TTIR is the
way in which the theories attempt to discharge this burden.6
they are structured syntactically like map/pictures/graphs rather than like sentences or vice-versa. See Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), Chapters 10-11. 6 One might, for example, try to discharge this burden using principally inference, e.g. Block (1986), Peacocke (1992), information, e.g. Fodor (1987), (1990), (1994), (1998), natural selection, e.g. Millikan (1989), or facts about learning, cf. Dretske (1986) (both reprinted in Stich and Warfield (1994)).
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§2.2: The Basics of Representation
To understand better the explanatory burden of TTIR, we must first understand better the
nature of representation. I know of no way to develop an adequate theory of representation
unless it is to consider paradigm cases.
Consider, then, a map of Chicago. The city of Chicago might be organized in many
different ways. Some of the ways are compatible with our map. Other of the ways are
incompatible with the map. A blueprint of Chicago works much the same way. Some of the
ways Chicago might be organized are compatible with a given blueprint of Chicago. Other ways
are not.
Suppose every way compatible with a map/blueprint is one in which Chicago borders a
lake. In this case, our map/blueprint represents that Chicago borders a lake. The converse is
also true. Suppose our map/blueprint represents that Chicago borders a lake. Then, it must be
that a way Chicago might be organized is compatible with our map/blueprint only if it is one in
which Chicago borders a lake.
This example projects. Thus, any representation divides some space of possibilities.
Any representation is such that individual possibilities in this space will be compatible or
incompatible. Moreover, it appears that what makes something a representation is precisely
that it divides some space of possibilities into those that are compatible and those that are
incompatible. If some piece of paper divides ways that Chicago might be organized into sets of
compatible and incompatible, then this piece of paper is a representation of Chicago.
If beliefs and desires are mental representations, then they divvy up possible scenarios
into those that are compatible and those that are incompatible. For a possible scenario to be
compatible with a belief, the belief must be correct when evaluated with respect to that
possible scenario. For a possible scenario to be incompatible with a belief, the belief must be
6
incorrect when evaluated with respect to that possible scenario. For a possible scenario to be
compatible with a desire, the possible scenario must be correct when evaluated with respect to
that desire. (In other words, the scenario must be one in which things have worked out in
accordance with the desire.) For a possible scenario to be incompatible with a desire, the
possible scenario must be incorrect when evaluated with respect to that desire. (In other
words, the scenario must be one in which things have not worked out in accordance with the
desire.) The difference between beliefs and desires on this count corresponds to a difference in
direction of fit. For maplike representations, the representations are supposed to fit the world.
For blueprintlike representations, the world is supposed to come to fit the representations.
According to (First Supplementary), any possible belief or desire with content that p
represents that p and nothing stronger. As we have seen in our map/blueprint of Chicago
example, to represent that p is to divide the space of possibilities in a certain way. Thus,
possible beliefs that p represent that p and nothing stronger if and only if the following criterion
is met:
(Norm of Belief) Beliefs that p are correct relative to any arbitrary scenario if and only if in that scenario, p.
Likewise, desires that p represent that p and nothing stronger if and only if the following
criterion is met:
(Norm of Desire) Any arbitrary scenario is correct relative to desires that p if and only if in that scenario, p.7
7 Although an intuitive understanding of (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) is easy enough, there are reasons to worry that they are not acceptable because the content mentioned/named on the left-hand side of the biconditional is used on the right-hand side. One might think that we could get around this problem by using truth on the right-hand side of the biconditional in its role as a device of generalization. However, on a theory of truth that I am sympathetic to according to which truth is a normative property applying to contents just in case they are correctly believable (or in case the actual world is correct relative to a desire with that content), this revision makes (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) viciously circular.
To assure that (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) have the right substance, either we have to introduce for technical purposes a non-normative, deflationary notion of truth, or we have to use
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TTIR is committed to defending (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire).8 It will likewise be
committed to defending analogous norms for many other intentional states.
To clarify (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire), we would need to understand further
what a (possible) scenario is.9 The adherent of TTIR is not committed to ontological realism
about scenarios, or for that matter, any particular view on modality, so long as one can make
sense of talk of possible scenarios.10 Most pressing for the adherent of TTIR is not the question
of what (if anything) possible scenarios are, but how finely scenarios are individuated. The grain
of scenario individuation, after all, determines the grain of representation.
Beliefs and desires can be about any aspect of the world, where the “world” includes
everything that is. Presumably, then, possible scenarios are individuated at least as fine-grained
as possible states of the world, i.e. the metaphysical possibilities.11 Perhaps, possible scenarios
are individuated more fine-grained still if it is possible to coherently represent the world in ways
substitutional quantification. I see no insuperable obstacle for either approach. For some discussion about problems with the latter, cf. Kaplan (1968). Either approach must contend with the semantic paradoxes, but we must contend with them in any case. See Horwich (1990), 40-2 and Hill (2002), Chapter 6.
At any rate, I will ignore the difficulties that arise in properly formulating (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire). So far as I can see, the fundamental underlying challenges, i.e. the semantic paradoxes, afflict all parties to the debate. Putting forward a proper formulation of (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) is no more difficult than putting forward a proper deflationary theory of truth. 8 I presuppose (again) that an advocate of TTIR is committed to belief-desire psychology is core to a theory of intentional states. 9 It's worth pausing here to acknowledge that I am favoring one important tradition that emphasizes the importance of truth conditions over another. Stalnaker (1984) and Lewis (1986) are exemplars of the “possible worlds” tradition I am favoring. Davidson (1984) is the father of the other tradition. I favor the former over the latter because of the Foster-Soames problem that plagues the latter view. See Foster (1976) and Soames (1992). Higginbotham (1992) attempts to save the Davidson tradition by claiming the T-theory that is the correct theory of content for a natural language is the one speakers must have knowledge of to be competent. It is not obvious to me how this suggestion can help when we are thinking about the content of intentional states. We cannot suppose that thinkers must antecedently have knowledge (and ipso facto intentional states with content) for them to have intentional states with a given content. Perhaps the Davidsonian program can be salvaged, but I reserve some doubts. Thanks to Richard Heck for his helpful discussion here. 10 See, for instance, Schiffer (2003) for some discussion on this point 11 See Stalnaker (1984) and Lewis (1986).
8
that it (metaphysically) could not be.12 Another of the primary differences between those who
adopt TTIR comes in differences in opinion over how finely the possible scenarios relevant to
mental representation are to be individuated. I will not adjudicate that debate here.
(Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) show that a commitment to robust mental
representation involves a commitment to correctness conditions. The correctness conditions of
a belief are co-extensive with the truth conditions for that belief; perhaps correctness conditions
just are truth conditions. (More on this point shortly.) I would suggest that the important
tradition within philosophy of language/mind that emphasizes the centrality of truth conditions
stems from an underlying commitment (or at least attraction) to TTIR.13
§2.3: Is TTIR cheap?
(Norm of Belief) looks very much like (Truth Conditions):
(Truth Conditions) Beliefs that p are true relative to any arbitrary scenario if and only if in that scenario, p.
What's more, (Truth Conditions) appears platitudinous. Consequently, it appears platitudinous
that beliefs are robust mental representations.
A similar situation arises with desires. One might be inclined to think that (Norm of
Desire) is synonymous with (Satisfaction Conditions):
(Satisfaction Conditions) Desires that p are satisfied relative to any arbitrary scenario if and only if in that scenario, p.
Moreover, (Satisfaction Conditions) appears to be platitudinous as well. Consequently, it
appears platitudinous that desires are robust mental representations. Is any prima facie
plausible theory of intentionality committed to TTIR?
12 See Soames (2005), 331-333. 13 See Field (1994) reprinted in Field (2001), 104-7.
9
No. Consider a deflationary theory of truth-satisfaction. Such a theory will be
committed to (Truth Conditions) and (Satisfaction Conditions). However, on such a theory, truth
and satisfaction do not have a normative aspect.14 Most deflationary theorists about truth are
fairly clear on that point,15 but it is easy enough to see that many doctrines they typically
embrace lead to that conclusion whether explicitly embraced or not. For instance, deflationary
theorists often say that in ascribing truth to a content/sentence one does little more than using
the content/sentence itself;16 truth is merely a device of generalization.17 However, if to ascribe
truth to a content/sentence was to evaluate a hypothetical belief with that content/the content
of that sentence, it would appear to ascribe truth would not be to do little more than using the
content/sentence itself.
Because on a deflationary theory of truth and satisfaction do not have a normative
aspect, a deflationary theorist of truth/satisfaction will not necessarily be committed to (Norm
of Belief) and (Norm of Desire). If a deflationary theory of truth/satisfaction is true, neither
(Truth Conditions) entails (Norm of Belief), nor (Satisfaction Conditions) entails (Norm of Desire).
Both (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) are genuine norms. (Norm of Belief) entails that a
belief that p is not as it ought to be relative to any scenario that is not a p-scenario. Thus, it
entails one ought have a belief that p only if p. (Norm of Desire) entails that any scenario that is
not a p-scenario is not as it ought to be relative to a desire that p.18 Thus, it entails that things
have not gone well for a desire that p if it is not actually the case that p. On a deflationary
14 I do not count Crispin Wright's minimalist theory of truth as among the deflationary theories of truth. See Wright (1992). 15 See Horwich (1998), 184-95, Horwich (2005), 104-34, Horwich (2006), and Field (2001), 121. 16 Field (2001), 105-6, 151-2. 17 Horwich (1990), 2-3, 31-33. 18 Thus, Boghossian (2005) overlooks the possibility of a norm for desire because he fails to take into account the difference between beliefs and desires in direction of fit.
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theory of truth/satisfaction, (Truth Conditions) and (Satisfaction Conditions) do not entail any
ought statements.
My contention is that representation brings in “oughts.” Shortly, I will defend that
contention. Before I do, however, it's worth noting that under a different non-deflationary
theory of truth/satisfaction whereon truth and satisfaction do have a normative aspect, (Truth
Conditions) and (Satisfaction Conditions) would be sufficient to establish TTIR (at least restricted
to beliefs and desires) because, of course, they would be equivalent to (Norm of Belief) and
(Norm of Desire) respectively. In effect, the success of a non-eliminativist adherent of TTIR
hinges on the availability of a non-deflationary theory of truth/satisfaction.19
§2.4: Representation and Normativity, Part I
In §2.3, I contended that representation has a normative aspect. Challenging my contention,
someone might ask the following question:
• Why is it not enough to qualify as a representation that something divides the space of possibilities in such a way that we can make sense of correspondence between it and the world?
My challenger, no doubt, assumes that there is not (essentially) a normative aspect to dividing
the space of possibilities in such a way that we can make sense of correspondence between it
and the world. For now, I will grant that assumption; I will argue against it in §2.5.
My challenger's question concerns the nature of representation. As I have already said,
I know of no way of addressing such questions about the nature of representation unless it be
considering paradigm cases of representation. Thus, I will turn back to examples.
Suppose that Winston Churchill paints a landscape that unbeknowst to him
“corresponds” in visual likeness exactly (and uniquely) with a valley in southeast China. I
19 See Chapter Two.
11
contend that even if through resemblance Churchill's painting “divides” the space of possibilities
so that perhaps we can make sense of “correspondence” between the painting and the valley in
southeast China, the painting is certainly not a representation of the valley in southeast China.
Representation requires more.
Following Hilary Putnam,20 one might suggest that what's missing here is a causal
explanation of the correspondence relation. This suggestion proves unhelpful. Consider
another example. Various scenes from The Lord of the Rings movies “correspond” quite well
with the landscapes of New Zealand where the movies were filmed (or so I would assume).
These scenes from the movies, however, do not represent the landscapes of New Zealand.21
Despite the caused “correspondence” with landscapes of New Zealand, the scenes from The
Lord of the Rings movies represent the landscape of Middle Earth. Representation is not a
matter of caused “correspondence.”
In fact, as those familiar with the “chain problem” of the so-called “causal theory of
reference” should quickly be able to see, there is at least one principled reason why a causal
theory of representation will fail.22 If there is a relation of “correspondence” between world
state A and world state B facilitated through a causal chain running from A to B, there's very
likely to be a relation of “correspondence” between world state C and world state B, where
world state C is another link of the causal chain that runs from A to B. Thus, “correspondence”
with a causal explanation cannot be sufficient for representation. We can see this principled
20 Putnam (1981), Chapter 1. 21 We might, of course, use scenes from the movies as a representation of the landscapes of New Zealand. Due to our (intentional) use, perhaps they might thereby become representations of New Zealand. Of course, if so, I would argue the same could be said of Churchill's painting in the previous example. Once the “correspondence” relation between the painting and the valley was discovered, there would be nothing stopping us from (intentionally) using the painting (or copies of it) as a representation of the valley (i.e. by showing people what the contours of the valley look like using the depiction in the painting), and through our (intentional) use, I suspect the painting may well become a representation of the valley even when it wasn't one before. 22 For more on the “chain problem” see Prinz (2002), 240. The causal theory of reference traces back to Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1972).
12
problem by way of a whimsical example. Suppose that Don Juan, the great seducer, unwittingly
seduces his sister who conceives. By a veritable (albeit nomologically possible) miracle, her child
is a genetic duplicate of Don Juan. (Don Juan) Junior grows up to become the subject of a
famous (realist) portrait due entirely to his natural good looks. The famous (realist) portrait
corresponds exactly not only to Junior, but to Don Juan. Moreover, there is a causal chain
between Don Juan and the portrait, which causally explains the “correspondence.”
Nonetheless, the portrait represents Junior, not Don Juan. (One might complain that the causal
chain running from Don Juan to the portrait isn't sufficiently regular or usual, but it doesn't take
long to see that that feature is merely incidental to this particular example; the chain problem
survives.)
While causal links may, in many paradigm cases, be a necessary condition for
representation, it is only because a creator, designer, or producer must be in causal contact with
something in order to make an object that represents it. What fundamentally matters for
representation in paradigm cases is neither correspondence nor caused correspondence, but
how, given the beliefs, desires, and intentions of the creators, designers, producers, and users,
objects are supposed to match up with the world.
Suppose Warren Buffett commissions a painter to create a (realist rather than surrealist)
portrait of him. We might well suppose that the commissioned portrait turns out not to look
exactly like Warren Buffett. Perhaps the painter became convinced that he would be paid
better if he made the Warren Buffett in the painting slightly better looking than Warren Buffett
actually is. Nonetheless, despite the lack of “correspondence,” there's no problem in supposing
that the portrait represents Warren Buffett as he is rather than representing Warren Buffett if
he were better looking. What matters here is how the portrait is to be evaluated. Realist
portraits representing Warren Buffett as he actually visually appears are supposed to look a
13
certain way (at least qua realist portrait representing Warren Buffett as he actually visually
appears). It is the fact that the portrait ought (qua realist portrait) to look a certain way that
makes it represent Warren Buffett. Assuming the portrait represents Warren Buffett, then it is
not how it ought to be (qua realist portrait) if it depicts a man resembling Warren Buffett, but
slightly better looking than him. Although we might not say that such a favorable depiction
constituted a bad realist portrait, we would certainly say it was not perfectly good or exactly
right. To return to the language of “correctness,” we should say in this case that the portrait was
not correct, at least in the details. We would not generally hesitate in this assessment even if
we acknowledge the painter's overriding reasons, given his financial incentives and an
indifference as to artistic integrity, make it the case that he ought to have painted the portrait
just as he has with all of the inaccuracies.
My contention is that representation comes with “oughts.” The “ought” in play here is
not a moral or pragmatic “ought.” It is an “ought” that arises from having a certain
representational purpose, teleology, or function—the purpose, teleology, or function of
corresponding in a specified way. Representational “oughts” are a sort of teleological or
functional ought. The fact that a realist portrait ought to look a certain way is akin to the fact
that a chair ought not fall apart when sat upon. It is likewise akin to the fact that a goalie ought
to block shots on goal and dancers of the waltz ought not step on each others’ feet. These
normative facts arise because realist portraits, chairs, goalies, and dancers of the waltz are
objects and people with certain functions or purposes.
Generally, things and people come to have certain functions due to the relevant agents’
intentions.23 Thus, in paradigm cases, representational “oughts” come to apply to
representations, such as paintings, in virtue of the artist’s intentions. (We also apply
23 Obviously, they couldn't originally have come to apply to intentional states in this way. Cf. §2.8.
14
representational “oughts” to the states of various human artifacts designed to detect some
property or other. These “oughts” analogously come to apply to the states of these detectors in
virtue of the intentions of the designer or user of the artifact.)24 A painting that is a portrait of
Warren Buffett ought to reflect the physical characteristics of Warren Buffett because the
artist’s intent was that the painting be evaluated according to whether it does. The artist’s
intent can endow his creation with the purpose of “corresponding” to something. This purpose
of “corresponding” gives rise to the “ought” of representation.
§2.5: Representation and Normativity, Part II
In §2.4, I conceded, for the sake of argument, that the normative aspect of representation isn't
essential to dividing the space of possibilities in such a way that we can make sense of
correspondence between it and the world. Here I want to strengthen my argument for the
conclusion that representation has a normative aspect by taking back that concession. If we can
make sense of correspondence, normativity is already in play. Cases in which it appears
otherwise are illusory.
Of course, prominent philosophers have been convinced otherwise. Consider this quote
from Fred Dretske:
...failing (or succeeding) in corresponding to the facts is, as far as I can see, a straightforward factual matter. Nothing normative about it. An arrow (on a sign, say) can point to Chicago or away from Chicago. There is a difference here, yes, but the difference is not normative. Aside from our purposes in putting the sign there or in using the sign as a guide, there is nothing right or wrong, nothing that is supposed-to-be or supposed-not-to-be, about an arrow pointing to Chicago.25
24 Dretske is famous for such examples. See, for instance, Dretske (1986) reprinted in Stich and Warfield (1994), Dretske (1988), and Dretske (2000a), 203-4. 25 Dretske (2000b) in Dretske (2000a), 247.
15
While perhaps prima facie compelling, I believe Dretske's remarks (and others like his) are
misguided. Consider the vectors beginning at the tail of the arrow and passing through the
arrow's head. It is, no doubt, an entirely factual matter whether some such vector (roughly)
ends in Chicago. If this fact settles the matter of whether the arrow “points” to Chicago, then
without question the matter is entirely factual. (Of course, in saying that the arrow “points” to
Chicago, Dretske might have meant that the arrow represents that Chicago is in a certain
direction. However, if so, it is no longer obvious that the arrow's pointing to Chicago is entirely
a factual matter.)26 However, I see no reason to conclude, merely on this basis, that the arrow
corresponds with the facts. Until we know that the arrow was supposed to point to Chicago
(rather than, say, Milwaukee), we can't say whether the arrow corresponds with the facts or
not. Unless the normative facts of representation have been fixed, we can't make sense of
correspondence.
In many cases, we are fooled into thinking we can make sense of correspondence
because we confuse it with resemblance or structural resemblance.27 Winston Churchill's
painting may well resemble the visual likeness of a valley in southeast China taken in from a
certain perspective, but the painting does not correspond to the valley (or at least not in the
relevant sense). Confusion can arise because we often use resemblance as a measure of
correspondence. Nonetheless, the two can evidently come apart. Consider a decent painting
representing the Yangtze River Valley and the negative of a photograph taken of the same
valley. Because the negative of the photograph inverts the color spectrum, the painting may
well better resemble the visual likeness of the Yangtze River Valley from a certain perspective
26 The cogency of Dretske's remarks likely trades on this equivocation on “pointing.” 27 I would be willing to concede that there is a sense of “correspondence” in which it just means resemblance or even structural resemblance. In this latter sense of “correspondence,” we might say that the details of the painting correspond with the features of the valley. Henceforth, I will only use correspondence in the relevant sense, that is, correspondence as it relates to representation.
16
even though the negative of the photograph better corresponds with the visual likeness of the
Yangtze River Valley from that very same perspective. A digital photograph of the Yangtze River
Valley can produce data on a disk that corresponds quite well with the Yangtze River Valley even
though it doesn't resemble a visual likeness of the Yangtze River Valley in the slightest.
Resemblance is incidental to correspondence. Correspondence is a matter of lining up as they
ought to. It can be that they ought to line up so as to resemble, but it need not be.
No doubt there is structural resemblance in many cases of correspondence, but
structural resemblance is easy to come by, and generally not indicative of correspondence.28
Similarity in structure without correspondence is the rule, not the exception. Structural
resemblance only indicates correspondence when it's a structural resemblance that's supposed
to exist.
Against my line of thinking, it is sometimes suggested that we can make sense of beliefs
corresponding to the world merely because beliefs are the sorts of things that can be true or
false where being true/false need not have a normative aspect. Consider the antecedent part of
the Dretske passage quoted above:
Beliefs and judgments must either be true or false, yes, but there is nothing normative about truth and falsity. What makes a judgment false (true) is the fact that it fails (or succeeds) in corresponding to the facts, and failing (or succeeding) in corresponding to the facts is, as far as I can see, a straightforward factual matter.29
Underlying these remarks is the thought that the content of a belief “naturally” divides the
space of possibilities into those possibilities in which the content is true and those in which it is
false. The suggestion is that we need not think this division along the lines of truth conditions
has anything to do with normativity so long as there is “nothing normative about truth and
28 Cf. Lewis (1984). 29 Dretske (2000b) in Dretske (2000a), 242.
17
falsity.” Dretske's thought, I take it, is that this division is enough to make sense of a belief
corresponding to whatever possibility is actual.
Let's say that an intentional state “semantically corresponds” to the world just in case
the content of that state is true.30 In the quoted passage, Dretske suggests, in effect, that
semantic correspondence is, essentially, a type of genuine correspondence. I disagree. Rather,
semantic correspondence is analogous to resemblance; it can come apart from correspondence
even if it often goes along with it. Assume for the moment that TTIR is true. Now consider
someone's disbelief of the urban legends surrounding Area 54, where disbelief is the state of
rejecting something as true. Given TTIR, this disbelief corresponds to world only if it does not
semantically correspond to the world. That's because, given TTIR and a reasonable theory of
disbelief, disbeliefs ought to have contents that are false. If semantic correspondence lines up
with correspondence in the case of belief, it's only because beliefs with true contents are the
correct beliefs. Contents, in and of themselves, do not correspond to the world. “Semantic
correspondence” is something of a misnomer. One has to do something with the content—
something that brings in norms of correctness—before correspondence comes into play.
In any case, unless truth conditions coincide with normatively loaded correctness
conditions, I have my doubts as to how relevantly “natural” a division of the space of
possibilities along the lines of truth conditions is for any given content. We might associate the
content of an intentional state with the set of possible scenarios in which the content is true,
but what's so special about associating that particular set rather than some other? Unless truth
indicates something substantial about the intentional state, e.g. that things have gone well vis-à-
vis that state or the state is correct/incorrect, I see no special reason to associate with the
content the set of possible scenarios in which the content is true rather than some other set.
30 I borrow the term “semantic correspondence” from Hill (2002), 39 who uses it slightly differently.
18
Let truth* conditions be some permutation of truth conditions.31 Why not associate a content
with its truth* conditions?
One might complain that truth* conditions are far more arbitrary than truth conditions
in that when we use contents, we divide the space of possibilities along the lines of truth
conditions rather than truth* conditions. However, this complaint would be misguided. Using
contents divides the space of possibilities along the lines of truth conditions if we, for instance,
assert contents, i.e. present them as true, but not if we assert* contents, i.e. present them as
true*. (We might have need to assert* if we were speaking in code.) When we use contents
assertively*, we divide the space of possibilities along the lines of truth conditions*.
As a matter of fact, we should keep in mind that there may be no reason to associate
sets of possible scenarios with contents at all. Consider Hartry Field's suggestion:
What is mostly relevant to sets of possible worlds as objects of mental states is their structural interrelations: the fact that they form a Boolean algebra. Consequently, any other other Boolean algebra that was sufficiently large to make the psychological distinctions we need would do just as well for most psychological purposes; for most purposes at least, there is no need to think of the atomic elements of the algebra as possible worlds; they could be anything at all. For instance, they could just be numbers.32
Field may be wrong in thinking that what is mostly relevant in our theory of content is the
“structural interrelations” between contents. Perhaps it matters in some way that contents are
intimately associated with normatively loaded correctness conditions. (If TTIR is true, it does
matter.) Barring that possibility, however, it is difficult to see why any particular association of
possibilities with a content should be important. If Field is right, i.e. we might do just as well
using numbers, it can't be that any particular division of the relevant space of possible scenarios
is especially “natural.”
31 See Stich (1993), Chapter 5 and Williamson (2007), Chapter 8. 32 Field (1986) reprinted in Field (2001), 89.
19
Genuine correspondence is not the natural by-product of truth on any theory of truth.
Genuine correspondence is what happens when world and representation are correctly aligned.
To set down the conditions for (normatively loaded) correct alignment just is to divide the space
of possibilities in the requisite way for representation, and vice-versa. There's no
representation without normatively loaded correctness conditions because there's no real
requisite division of the space of possibilities without normatively loaded correctness
conditions.
§2.6: First Objection to the Normativity of Correctness
Many philosophers find it difficult to challenge the proposition that beliefs are correct when and
because their contents are true. What they find harder to accept is that the correctness of
beliefs is genuinely normative.
Some argue that the correctness of beliefs does not produce even pro tanto practical
normative reasons. Perhaps the fact that some statement I might make would be incorrect,
doesn't give me even a pro tanto practical normative reason not to make the statement.
Analogously, perhaps the fact that some belief I might have would be incorrect, doesn't given
me even a pro tanto practical normative reason to avoid that belief (whether I can or not). That
my belief would be incorrect only offers a pro tanto practical normative reason not to have the
belief if, in addition, I desire not to have beliefs that are incorrect. On the basis of the
conclusion that correctness does not produce even pro tanto practical normative reasons, some
philosophers infer that the correctness at play is not genuinely normative.33
33 See Papineau (1999) and Hattiangadi (2006).
20
This conclusion would seem to run afoul of much that I have advocated in the last few
subsections. Whether it really runs afoul turns on what it is meant by “genuinely normative.”34
One might think that a “genuine norm” is an applicable binding prescription that one
can't felicitously beg-off and thereby treat as irrelevant to one's course of action, most
especially if one admits that the norm is applicable. We would have trouble understanding
someone making a sincere judgment whose content was “genuinely normative” in this sense if
they do not have any even pro tanto motivation to comply with the judged norm.35
Say that a norm is regulative if and only if it is “genuinely normative” in the sense just
discussed. (Thus, sincerely judging that a regulative norm is true is difficult to reconcile with a
lack of motivation to comply with the norm. Perhaps that combination is even impossible.) If
the would-be incorrectness doesn't offer even a pro tanto practical normative reason not to
have a belief (even when one admits to the would-be incorrectness), then it seems that the
corresponding correctness isn't regulative.
I am not particularly concerned with whether representational correctness is regulative.
In fact, I would be willing to concede that it isn't. When I say that representational correctness
is “genuinely normative,” I mean to contrast “genuine norms” with “conditional pseudo-norms”
and any other pseudo-norms where normative language can be paraphrased away. Here are
some examples of conditional pseudo-norms:
(1) If one’s aim is to harass the neighbors, one ought to play music loudly. (2) If we’re playing according to tournament rules, then we aren’t permitted to end the game in a tie. (3) If one's overriding goal is to win the lottery, then one ought to buy a lottery ticket.
34 I want to acknowledge Jamie Dreier for comments that helped me improve this subsection substantially. (Obviously, he is not responsible for any errors and confusions that remain.) 35 Norms are “genuinely normative” in this sense if they give us “internal” rather than “external” reasons. See Williams (1981) and Korsgaard (1986) republished in Darwall et. al (1997).
21
It's not clear that these examples say anything above and beyond what we might say in purely
descriptive terms. (1*)-(3*) might serve as adequate replacements for the examples above:
(1*) An effective means for harassing the neighbors is playing music loudly. (2*) It's against tournament rules to end the game in a tie. (3*) Buying a lottery ticket is necessary for winning the lottery ticket.
These replacements neither use evidently normative language/concepts nor seem to entail any
other statement that uses evidently normative language/concepts. To the extent that (1*)-(3*)
are adequate paraphrases, we have reason to believe that (1)-(3) are actually descriptive facts
rather than genuine norms.
To judge that a pseudo-norm is true is merely to evaluate something with respect to
some considered standard or end without actually embracing the standard or end. When I
judge that is (1) true, I merely evaluate playing music loudly with respect to the end of harassing
the neighbors; I do not embrace the end of harassing the neighbors. When I judge some
particular fork isn't constituted how a chair ought to be constituted, I am evaluating this fork
with respect to chair standards, but I am not embracing the chair standard for it. Because in
both cases I do not embracing any standard, the “ought” is inessential to the content of these
judgments. I am not making genuinely normative judgments.
In contrast, judgments about representational correctness and, more generally,
teleological/functional “oughts” are genuinely normative. Judging that a teleological/functional
ought statement is true requires embracing the standard or end. When I judge that some
particular piece of furniture ought not fall apart when sat on (because it is a chair), I am
embracing a standard for that piece of furniture in its role of chair. I am not merely evaluating
the item according to the chair standard; I am taking this standard to apply to the item (in a way
22
I did not do with the fork). As a result, the teleological/functional “ought” cannot be
paraphrased away.
Even still, we need not conclude that teleological/functional “oughts” and are
regulative. We can draw a distinction between those genuine norms that are regulative and
those that aren't. To make a genuine normative judgment is to embrace a standard for
something (perhaps even oneself). To make a regulative normative judgment is to embrace a
standard for oneself qua agent.36 One need not do the latter to do the former. Genuine norms
are not necessarily regulative.
Consider winning.37 What distinguishes the conditions for winning from the conditions
for losing is not some descriptive fact about the conditions. The conditions that a participant
wins some game can be the very conditions upon which he would lose were he playing
another—the misère—game. What differentiates winning from losing is the fact that winning is
prescribed and losing is proscribed. Indeed, what settles that I am now playing chess, where
winning is checkmating the opponent and losing is being checkmated, rather than playing
misère chess, where winning is being checkmated and losing is checkmating the opponent, is
the fact that, in some sense, I have committed myself to checkmate my opponent, and thus,
that I am under a genuine norm to do so. Thus, the fact that I am playing chess is genuinely
normative. Whether I am playing chess or misère chess, it is true that it follows from the rules
of chess that I ought now to checkmate my opponent, but only when I am playing chess is it the
case that I am actually under a prescription to do so.
Nonetheless, the fact that I am playing chess so that I have committed myself to
checkmate my opponent, doesn’t obviously give me even a pro tanto practical normative reason
to win independent of any desire I might have. As I see it, to commit oneself to checkmate
36 Cf. Korsgaard (1996), 100-3. 37 I draw on Dummett (1959) reprinted in Dummett (1978) here.
23
one’s opponent merely amounts to one submitting to be evaluated positively just in case one
checkmates the opponent; I can do as much without desiring to checkmate the opponent.
Suppose I want to play chess with my little sister to make her happy because I know it would
make her happy if I let her win at chess. There’s no tension in this desire. I don’t have to think
about having to weigh my reason for making my sister happy against what will be my
commitment to checkmate her if we play chess. (The following is absurd: “I feel so bad! I
wanted to let her win initially, but in playing chess I realized I took on a commitment to win that
outweighed my desire to make her happy. Once we started playing, I was obligated to win;
there was nothing I could do.”) If I have no independent desire to win, and no independent
reason to prevent her from winning (because, for instance, I think letting her win is bad for her),
even the slightest proclivity to let her win is (motivating) reason enough to do so. My
commitment to winning is of no consideration whatsoever—it merely involves my agreeing on
conditions for (overt or tacit) approbation, not an intention to seek that approbation. As I see it,
the genuine norm to checkmate does not create any even pro tanto independently practical
normative reasons for action. So far as I can tell, there’s nothing obviously incoherent about
wholeheartedly throwing a game. The genuinely normative fact that I ought to checkmate my
opponent is “constitutive” of my playing chess, but it is not regulative.
So it (probably) is with representational correctness (and teleological/functional
“oughts” generally). What makes a (realist) portrait of Warren Buffett a representation of his
visual appearance rather than just some picture that looks like him is the commitment the artist
takes on that the painting match up with Warren Buffett’s visual appearance. The painting is
thereby under a genuine norm to match up with Warren Buffett; it is correct in its depiction if it
does, and incorrect to the extent that it doesn’t. To say that the portrait is correct in its
depiction of Warren Buffett cannot just be to say that the painting adheres to the standards of
24
matching up for a painting of Warren Buffett’s visual likeness, for the latter would be also be
true of fifth century Persian painting depicting a man who is, as it turns out, a perfect Warren
Buffett look-a-like, even though that painting is quite obviously not correct in its depiction of
Warren Buffett (because it does not depict Warren Buffett). Ascriptions of what would be
correct are not covertly descriptive, i.e. subject to a descriptive paraphrase, but rather genuinely
normative. Moreover, so far as I can see, an artist may well take on a commitment to assure a
certain resemblance without intending to assure that resemblance merely by agreeing that his
work is to be evaluated positively according to how well resemblance is achieved. (A close
parallel may be helpful here: someone can contract to do something he does not intend to do so
long as he is willing to accept the consequences for failing to live up to the contract.) So far as I
can tell, it makes no difference that these norms do not provide the artist even a pro tanto
practical normative reason to depict Warren Buffett as he actually is. If the artist has no
independent reason to aspire to accuracy and thinks he will be better paid if he paints Warren
Buffett as slightly better looking than he actually is, the artist has no practical normative reason
whatsoever not to depict Warren Buffett as slightly better looking than he actually is.
Nonetheless, qua realist portrait the painting that depicts Warren Buffett as better looking than
he actually is, is not as it ought to be, and it is this very fact that makes it a painting of Warren
Buffett rather than a painting of Warren Buffett slightly-better-looking-than-he-actually-is.
Once we see that the distinction between regulative and non-regulative norms is not
the same as the distinction between genuine norms and pseudo-norms, there's no reason to
conclude that representational correctness isn't genuinely normative even if we concede that
representational correctness (and functional/teleological “oughts” more generally) isn't/(aren't)
regulative.
25
§2.7: Second Objection to the Normativity of Correctness
I have also seen it argued that correctness cannot generally be genuinely normative because
genuine normativity requires capability (“ought” implies “can”) and we cannot always bring
about correct states of affairs.38 This argument is also mistaken, and likewise probably trades on
confusing being “genuinely normative” in the relevant sense with being regulative. Not all
genuine norms require capability.39 When I play chess with Deep Blue, in some sense, I am
under a prescription to checkmate the computer/computer program. That’s because, as already
discussed, to play a game is to take on the prescription to achieve the conditions for winning
that game and the conditions for winning in chess just are that one has checkmated the
opponent. Nonetheless, it’s probably true that I’m not capable of checkmating Deep Blue. (I'm
assuming that if I disable the program/computer, I no longer count as playing Deep Blue.)
Analogously, although I may not be capable of painting Warren Buffett with any accuracy
whatsoever, any (realist) portraiture I paint of him still ought to resemble his actual likeness.
Even if it is the product of my best effort, a portrait of Warren Buffett may still be an incorrect
representation. This is not merely to say that the realist portrait is not up to the standards of
(realist) portraiture for the (realist) portrait is a (realist) portrait in virtue of the fact that the
standards of portraiture actually apply.
§2.8: Explaining Representational Correctness
At this point, it's time to return to the task of understanding the explanatory burden of TTIR
discussed initially at the end of §2.1. We will accomplish this task by considering an analogy
with the moral.
38 See Hattiangadi (2006). 39 For that matter, it's contentious whether all regulative norms require capability.
26
Suppose that I say that John’s actions were wrong. You may felicitously ask me for an
explanation of the wrongness of John’s actions. (“In virtue of what were his actions wrong?”)
To this inquiry, I will cite or at least allude to certain natural properties of his actions. (“They led
to the pain and suffering of his family.”) You expect an answer of this sort to your question. The
natural/descriptive properties of John’s actions should account for their wrongness because the
moral strongly supervenes on the natural/descriptive.40 An action has certain moral properties
because it has certain natural/descriptive properties.
If you are a hedonistic utilitarian, you believe that there is some correct way to
systematize the connection between moral properties, i.e. what one ought to do, and the
supervened upon natural/descriptive properties, i.e. what produces most happiness and the
least pain. Even if you believe that the connection between moral properties and
natural/descriptive properties cannot be systematized so as to give necessary and sufficient
conditions for right and wrong acts—even if you accept some version of “moral particularism” -
you should at least believe that there are complex clusters of natural/descriptive properties that
in various combinations typically fix whether acts are right or wrong.41 Right and wrong acts
often have descriptive properties in common even if there isn’t some one descriptive property
all and only right (or wrong) actions have in common.
40 One of the first to note the supervenience of moral/normative properties on natural/descriptive properties was Hare (1952), 145. For discussion of strong supervenience, see Kim (1984) and Kim (1987) reprinted in Kim (1993). A-properties strongly supervene on B-properties if and only if for any possible worlds wj and wk and any objects x in wj and y in wk, if x in wj has the same B-properties as y in wk, then x in wj has the same A-properties as y in wk. 41 The view that the connections between moral rightness/wrongness and the strongly supervened upon natural/descriptive properties cannot be systematized is weaker than moral particularism. (Moral particularism implies that view, but not vice-versa.) Rossian generalism is compatible with that view, but incompatible with moral particularism. Moral particularism entails that there are not even systematic connections between pro tanto moral rightness/wrongness and the natural/descriptive. See Hooker (2000) and Crisp (2000) in Hooker and Little (2000) for discussion on this point. See the essays in Hooker and Little (2000) as well as Dancy (1999), Sinnott-Armstrong (1999), and McDowell (1979) reprinted in McDowell (1998) for some discussions related to moral particularism.
27
Why should even a moral particularist believe so? Any plausible moral theory should
allow that sometimes we can reliably distinguish right from wrong acts. However, without some
general connections between the moral and the natural/descriptive—even if these connections
are not strict or systematic –there would be no way to recognize particular actions as right or
wrong.42 Direct perception, for instance, requires causal regularities between the perceived
properties and the perceptual states. If right (or wrong) acts don’t have some
natural/descriptive properties in common that can cause perceptual states of a particular type, I
don’t see how rightness (or wrongness) can be perceived. Of course, moral properties might be
indirectly perceived. We might categorize acts as right or wrong on the basis of what we can
infer from the natural/descriptive properties we do directly perceive. This process of
categorization, however, must rely on noting features that right or wrong acts have in
common.43 Thus, reliable categorization presupposes that there are general connections
between moral properties and the natural/descriptive properties they supervene on as well.
In §2.3-2.7, I argue that representational properties, e.g. the property of representing
that p, apply if and only if functional/teleological norms are in play. These
functional/teleological norms are genuinely normative (like moral properties) even if
(presumably unlike moral properties) these norms are not regulative. We should expect that
functional/teleological normative properties necessary and sufficient for representational
properties strongly supervene on natural/descriptive properties just as moral properties do. So,
suppose that I say that the map of Chicago in my hands is incorrect. You may felicitously ask me
42 Jackson, Pettit, and Smith (2000) in Hooker and Little (2000) cite similar considerations in arguing that moral particularism is untenable. I am not sure about their stronger conclusion. For my purposes, a much weaker conclusion will do. 43 It’s useful here to consider the dominant theories of categorization in the contemporary cognitive science literature, the prototype theory and the exemplar theory. See Murphy (2002), Chapter 2. According to both theories, people rely on the “family resemblance” of objects in the same category to categorize them. (The theories are distinguished by how people rely on “family resemblance.”) If objects share “family resemblance,” however, they must have underlying features in common.
28
for an explanation of the incorrectness of the map (just as you asked me for an explanation of
John’s action). So, you ask me, “In virtue of what is the map incorrect?” As a thorough response
to this inquiry, I could point out that the conventions of map making establish that the
orientation of the lines on the map match the orientation of the streets of Chicago. I answer,
“This paper was manufactured so that the lines would correspond in a certain way to the streets
of Chicago and they clearly don’t.” As with actions and rightness and wrongness, a
representation is correct or incorrect because it has certain natural/descriptive properties.44
Now, there may be a correct way to systematize the connection between normative
properties necessary and sufficient for representation and natural/descriptive. (Perhaps
something comes to represent with a certain content in virtue of somebody using it for the
purpose of representing with that content. If one can give a naturalistic/descriptive
characterization of what it is to use something for the purpose of representing, perhaps there is
a correct way to systematize the connection between norms of representing and the
natural/descriptive.) Nonetheless, even if one can’t give necessary and sufficient
natural/descriptive conditions for norms of representation to apply, one would expect, as with
the moral, that there are complex clusters of natural/descriptive properties that in various
combinations help to fix whether, for instance, a representation is correct or incorrect. As with
moral properties, if there were not such clusters, it would be hard to account for how we are
able to recognize instances of representing this or that. Any plausible account of
representational properties must explain how we sometimes reliably recognize them. (And we
do, just consider maps.) To perceive (either directly or indirectly) representational properties,
these properties must have natural/descriptive features in common. There must be general
44 I'm assuming, of course, that we can understand the intentional states behind the map making in naturalistic, descriptive terms.
29
connections between the realm of representation and the realm of natural/descriptive
properties.
The strong supervenience of norms for representation on the natural/descriptive sheds
light on my suggestion at the end of §2.1 that representational properties require an
“explanation” or, in other words, that the natural/descriptive has to account for them. The
required “explanation” involves pointing to the natural/descriptive properties that the
normative properties of representation strongly supervene on. Effectively, to explain the norms
of representation, one has to show that there are natural/descriptive properties such that it
follows from the correct theory of how normative properties of representation strongly
supervene on the natural/descriptive that the norms of representation apply. As I’ve just
pointed out, the “correct theory” here need not be systematic, but that doesn’t mean one can
cite or allude to just any natural/descriptive properties in order to “explain” some norms of
representation. Any putative “explanation” is subject to challenge on the ground that it
presupposes an incorrect theory of supervenience. Moreover, in giving an “explanation” one
should expect to be able to explain the common ground that these natural/descriptive
properties have with other relevant natural/descriptive properties nontrivially included in the
supervenience base.
This is, of course, analogous to the situation with moral properties. If I explain the
wrongness of John’s action by pointing to the pain and suffering of his family, I presuppose that,
at the very least, pain and suffering of at least certain people is a relevant to the rightness and
wrongness of actions in general. Moreover, even if the relevance of pain and suffering can’t be
strictly systematized, I ought to be able to point to ceteris paribus generalizations as to its
relevance, e.g. if an action causes pain and suffering avoidable at little cost to the agent, it is
wrong ceteris paribus.
30
§2.9: Discharging the Explanatory Burden of TTIR
What might the advocate of TTIR point to in order to show that the norms of representation
requisite for robust mental representation are accounted for? First and foremost he might look
at “use” properties.45
One sort of “use” property is conceptual/computational role. Presumably, subjects
come to be in intentional states in virtue of being in internal cognitive states. An internal
cognitive state of a subject has a particular conceptual/computational role in virtue of having
some particular inferential connections with other internal cognitive states of the subject.
Internal cognitive states are inferentially connected when the subject is disposed to move
(ceteris paribus) from one internal cognitive state to another. Perhaps, one can explain the
representational properties of intentional states in part by considering the
conceptual/computational role of those internal cognitive states that correspond to intentional
states.
In addition to or even instead of looking at causal connections between internal states,
an advocate of TTIR might look at another sort of “use” property for the requisite explanation of
robust mental representation; he might look at causal connections between internal cognitive
states and the environment in order to explain the norms of representation he is committed to.
A subject will be disposed to come into particular internal cognitive states given his
environment. In coming to be disposed in this way, internal cognitive states come to indicate
particular properties in the environment. What the internal cognitive states corresponding to
an intentional state indicate may well help account for what the intentional state represents.
45 When it comes to “use” properties, I mean to include any dispositional property that an advocate of conceptual role semantics (broadly construed so as to include informational semantics, see Greenberg and Harman (2006)) might deploy in his theory of content.
31
Similarly, the changes that a subject in particular internal cognitive states is disposed to make
may help account for what corresponding intentional states represent as well.46
Unfortunately, if we restrict “use” properties to only these descriptive properties that
we can understand naturalistically, the prospect of giving the requisite explanation for
vindicating a non-eliminativist TTIR entirely by citing “use” properties appears diminished.
“Use” properties are dispositional properties of internal cognitive states, but whether things are
as they ought to be (representationally) vis-à-vis internal cognitive states and the corresponding
intentional states, may not be merely a matter of how things are disposed to be. So much has
been clear ever since Kripke-Wittgenstein.47 To quote an (in)famous passage on his central
example '68+57= ?':
The dispositionalist gives a descriptive account of this relation: if '+' meant addition, then I will answer '125'. But this is not the proper account of the relation, which is normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I meant addition by '+', I will answer '125', but that, if I intend to accord with my past meaning of '+', I should answer '125'. Computational error, finiteness of my capacity, and other disturbing factors may lead me not to be disposed to respond as I should, but if so, I have not acted in accordance with my intentions.48
Although Kripke makes the point about meaning of natural language, his point is perhaps even
clearer when we apply it to the content of intentional states where speakers intentions
regarding sincerity and sameness of meaning are irrelevant. Given TTIR, a belief that sixty-eight
plus fifty-seven equals one hundred fifteen is a state that is correct in some arbitrary possible
scenario if and only if in that scenario, sixty-eight plus fifty-seven equals one hundred fifteen.
Nonetheless, a belief that sixty-eight plus fifty-seven equals one hundred fifteen may or may not
46 In my presentation, I have favored a two-factored conceptual role theory, see Block (1986) reprinted in Stich and Warfield (1994), but I do not thereby mean to exclude thinking about “use” properties as long-armed conceptual role properties. See Harman (1987) reprinted in Harman (1999). 47 Kripke (1982). 48 Ibid, 37.
32
be a state that the subject is disposed to come to only if in his scenario, sixty-eight plus fifty-
seven equals one hundred fifteen. There is an open question whether the subject's dispositions
will respect what is correct. In this way, we can see a gap between what a subject is disposed to
do and what he would be correct in doing.
The basic problem is straightforward: doing something regularly doesn't usually make it
correct. In the face of this problem, a non-eliminativist advocate of TTIR with a naturalistic bend
might be tempted to back away from the claim that representation has a normative aspect.
After all, dispositional “use” properties might account for representational properties if
representational properties were also merely dispositional.49
Despite the temptation, moving away from the claim that representation has a
normative aspect is not a good option for anyone serious about understanding beliefs and
desires on the model of representation. Representation that we see in paradigm cases, e.g.
maps and blueprints, does have a normative aspect. Allowing that beliefs and desires might
“represent” in a way so different from paradigm cases of representation undermines the whole
point of trying to think of them as similar to the paradigm cases. Moreover, a theory of
representation according to which beliefs/desires represent merely by having truth/satisfaction
conditions, is a theory of representation on which TTIR puts no significant constraint on the
theory of intentional states at all. Even a theory of the intentional armed solely with a
deflationary theory of truth/satisfaction would vindicate TTIR if all that's required for TTIR is that
beliefs/desires have truth/satisfaction conditions.
49 See also Block (2007), 24. In my opinion, much of the post-Kripkenstein literature on the normativity of truth/meaning arises from the tension between an underlying folk psychological commitment to TTIR and the theoretical difficulties Kripke raises. For exemplars from the literature, see McDowell (1984) reprinted in McDowell (1998), Boghossian (1989), Millikan (1990), Wright (1992), Gibbard (1994), Papineau (1999), Tanney (1999), Lynch (2004), Boghossian (2005), and Wedgwood (2007) among many others.
33
As I pointed out in §2.3, everyone is likely to agree that a state must have
truth/satisfaction conditions in order to be intentional. This agreed upon fact must place a
nontrivial constraint on the theory of the intentional if truth/satisfaction conditions are to play a
central role in that theory. Introducing normatively loaded correctness conditions coinciding
with truth/satisfaction conditions shows why there would be a nontrivial constraint. As we saw
in §2.8, there should be some regularities (even if they are not strict) in the supervenience of
normatively loaded correctness on the natural/descriptive. Because correctness coincides with
truth/satisfaction conditions, natural/descriptive properties must account for truth/satisfaction
in the same way it accounts for correctness. In other words, there should be regularities (even if
they are not strict) in the supervenience of truth/satisfaction on the natural/descriptive. A
theory of the intentional with normatively loaded correctness conditions must respect this
nontrivial constraint involving truth/satisfaction.
Without postulating normatively loaded correctness conditions, it's not at all clear that
truth/satisfaction conditions put any constraint on the theory of the intentional. If we can tell a
story about what it is for a state to be a belief/desire that p, we can always use the (Truth
Conditions) and (Satisfaction Conditions) platitudes to explain how the state comes to have the
truth/satisfaction conditions it does. There has to be more to a theory of truth/satisfaction than
(Truth Conditions)/(Satisfaction Conditions) if truth/satisfaction is going to constrain the way we
tell the story. Without normatively loaded correctness conditions, I suspect we will be
hardpressed to point to some feature of truth/satisfaction that will provide such a constraint,
particularly if I am right in thinking that correspondence (in any useful, robust sense)
presupposes representation with a normative aspect.
34
If advocates of TTIR cannot back away from the claim that representation has a
normative aspect, how should they confront the Kripke-Wittgenstein problem of normativity?50
Three routes are most obvious. First, one can claim pace Kripke-Wittgenstein that in the
relevant cases doing something regularly enough can make it correct.51 Second, one can turn to
the developed literature that addresses the problem by looking at natural selection.52 Third,
pace §2.8, one can deny that representational properties strongly supervene on the
natural/descriptive.53
I am not convinced that these three are the only routes.
The Kripke-Wittgenstein problem of normativity emerges because of an important
difference between paradigm cases of representation on one hand and beliefs and desires on
the other. Typically, norms of correctness come to apply to maps in virtue of the intentional
states, e.g. beliefs, desires, and intentions, of mapmakers and map users. Obviously, norms of
correctness do not come to apply to intentional states in virtue of other intentional states. But,
are we so convinced that norms of correctness always come to apply to maps directly in virtue
of intentional states?
Suppose we constructed an unintelligent machine to clean the streets of Chicago. In
order to facilitate the machine’s work, we insert into the machine a map of the streets of
Chicago, which the machine uses both to find its way around and to assure that all the streets
are clean. For some time, the machine we designed uses the map of the streets of Chicago to
50 The Kripke-Wittgenstein problem of normativity should be separated from the Kripke-Wittgenstein problem of indeterminacy. The normative-descriptive gap is one problem, but even if there weren't a normative-descriptive gap, there would still be the issue of whether, for example, our dispositions settle that '+' means plus in light of our computational capacities and our dispositions to make errors. 51 Unless I misunderstand him, Peacocke (1992), Chapter 5 effectively embraces this view. 52 See, for instance, Millikan (1990) reprinted in Millikan (1993). 53 See Boghossian (1989).
35
efficiently clean the streets. Then, lo and behold, there is a quantum miracle.54 The map we
inserted disappears; our street cleaning machine suddenly becomes considerably less effective.
Fortunately for the denizens of Chicago, another unrelated quantum miracle occurs shortly after
the first. A molecule per molecule duplicate of the map we originally inserted in the machine
appears right where that map disappeared. As a result, our street cleaning machine immediately
becomes effective again. It effectively uses the new molecule for molecule duplicate as a map
of Chicago in fulfilling the purpose we designed it for: cleaning the streets of Chicago.
Is the molecule per molecule duplicate also a map of Chicago? I think it is. Yet, no
person intended for it to be so. This map of the streets of Chicago is a map because some
machine uses it as a map effectively enough to fulfill its pre-existing purpose of cleaning the
streets. The machine does not use the map intentionally. (We are assuming that the machine
does not have intentional states.) Intentional states only come into the story indirectly in giving
the machine the purpose of cleaning the streets.
Humans have needs—to eat, to drink, to avoid pain, in avoid injury, to socialize, to have
sex, to survive, etc. At least some of these needs are not the by-product of cognitive
sophistication. Perhaps, we use some of our internal cognitive states as robust mental
representations effectively enough to help us in fulfilling these antecedent needs. We do not
use our internal cognitive states intentionally in order to help us in fulfilling these needs, but
given the previous example, I do not see that so much is required for these internal cognitive
states to be robust mental representations. So far as I can tell, what is required is that we are,
somewhat effectively, putting them to use for a prior existing purpose, not that we are
intentionally doing so.
54 Cf. Davidson (1987) reprinted in Davidson (2001b) and Dretske (1995), Chapter 5.
36
Thinking that representation has a normative aspect does not obviously bankrupt an
advocate of TTIR who seeks a naturalistic theory of the intentional while rejecting eliminativism
about intentional states. There are prospects for paying down the explanatory debt. On the
other hand, rejecting that representation has a normative aspect threatens to trivialize TTIR and
undercut the centrality of truth conditions in a theory of the intentional. Unless robust mental
representation has a normative aspect, TTIR is not a significant constraint on a theory of the
intentional.
§2.10: Inferentialism and TTIR
When it comes to philosophical taxonomy of theories of the intentional, a division is frequently
made between inferentialist or conceptual role theories of content on one hand and
informational and teleological theories of content on the other.55 One might think this division
coincides with a division between theories against TTIR and theories for it, but one would be
mistaken.
A straightforward inferentialist theory of content claims that at least some inferential
connections are essential to contents so that being in a state with a given content requires being
in a corresponding internal cognitive state with certain inferential commitments or dispositions.
(A less straightforward inferentialist theory of content claims that similarity of inferential role is
essential to contents.) On informational and teleological theories of content, no inferential
connections are essential to being in a state with a certain content so long as the corresponding
internal cognitive state is tracking well enough whether the content are true. On informational
theories, having content is a matter of “carrying information” where “carrying information” is
understood (roughly) in terms of nomic covariation.
55 See footnote 8.
37
It's not my project in this paper to lay out the differences between these sorts of views,
except to the extent that it helps clarify the theses of TTIR and deflationary theories of content
(DTCs). To that end, I merely point out that inferentialism is not incompatible with TTIR.
Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts defends a quintessential inferentialist theory of
content, but his theory embraces TTIR.56 The views are compatible so long as one accepts a
“determination theory” that allows one to explain correctness conditions in terms of inferential
role.57
It may be possible to hold an informational theory of content that does not accept TTIR
if the relevant notion of “carrying information” does not have a normative aspect.
§3 Dissidents to TTIR
§3.1: Motivation
It can seem crazy to deny TTIR. After all, (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) can seem
platitudinous. Perhaps it even seems obvious that beliefs have (normatively loaded) correctness
conditions that coincide with their truth conditions. Perhaps it seems likewise obvious that
desires are plans with conditions for correct realization that coincide with their satisfaction
conditions.
We have already seem, however, that TTIR does place a significant constraint on the
theory of the intentional. Normatively loaded correctness conditions must be accounted for
through general regularities with the supervened upon natural/descriptive properties. Prima
facie, we can't be sure normatively loaded correctness conditions requisite for beliefs and
desires to exist on TTIR are actually accounted for. If not, what then?
56 See Peacocke (1992). 57 Ibid, 17-20, 133-43.
38
Option one: We could become eliminativists with respect to the intentional. If we insist
that beliefs and desires are robust mental representations, and we see that the
natural/descriptive does not account for robust mental representations, then we ought to
conclude there are no beliefs and desires. Option two: We could reject the thesis that beliefs
and desires are robust mental representations. If we are convinced that there are beliefs and
desires, then the fact that robust mental representation is not accounted for will lead us to the
conclusion that beliefs and desires were not what those attracted to TTIR might initially have
thought.
As we shall see in §3.2-3.4, those who accept DTCs are among those who take option
two, rejecting TTIR. They are skeptical about doing the work required to show that beliefs and
desires are robust mental representations, but even so they do not think we need to be
skeptical with regards to the existence of beliefs and desires. In showing that DTCs are generally
committed to rejecting TTIR, I will focus my attention on the two prominent deflationists, Hartry
Field and Paul Horwich.58
For the rest of this paper, it will be helpful, on occasion, to talk in terms of Mentalese, so
that to have an intentional state with content that p is to have an attitude towards a token
sentence of Mentalese with content that p. Thus, for example, to believe that p is to belief-box
a token sentence of Mentalese S with content that p. I will adopt this terminology in part
because both major deflationists do.59
Nonetheless, in using this terminology, I want to minimize any substantive
commitments imported into the discussion. The terminology itself only commits one to thinking
that being in an intentional state involves being in a state that is a particular attitude (belief,
58 Field (2001), Chapters 4-5. Horwich (1998) and Horwich (2005). Perhaps Schiffer (2003) should also count as a DTC. 59 Field (2001), 109. Horwich (2005), 8, 183-5.
39
desire, imagining, etc.) and that has a particular content, but nothing more, so far as I can see.
After all, speaking in terms of Mentalese does not presuppose that there is any way to
individuate sentences-types of Mentalese other than according to the content they express in
different contexts. Moreover, it does not commit one to thinking that sentences of Mentalese
have syntactic constituents, much less, syntactic constituents that have semantic values.60
§3.2: Against Normativity of Truth and Content
To see that DTCs are committed to rejecting TTIR it is sufficient to note their opinion regarding
normativity and content.
Horwich introduces his comments on the normativity of language use in this way:
I shall not be denying that language is pervaded with normativity—with oughts and ought nots. But I think these phenomena can be explained without having to suppose that truth and meaning are intrinsically normative notions. What I shall be arguing, in other words, is that the evident normativity of language can give no reason to reject wholly non-normative accounts of those notions—accounts such as the deflationary theory of truth and the use theory of meaning.61
He goes on to show that we have pragmatic reasons to believe the truth.62 He notes that we
may have moral reasons to tell the truth.63 He accepts that truth might well be valued for its
own sake.64 What he consistently denies is that the normativity at work is wholly inherent to
meaning, content, or truth so that we need to account for it in our theory of what meaning,
content, and truth are.65
60 Cf. Boghossian (1989), 514. Cf. Rescorla (forthcoming). 61 Horwich (1998), 184. 62 See Horwich (1998), 190-1 and (Horwich (2005), 117. 63 Horwich (1998), 186. 64 See Horwich (2006). 65 Horwich (2005), 104-106
40
An analogy here can be useful for understanding Horwich's position.66 People have
pragmatic, moral, and perhaps even noninstrumental reasons to abstain from causing pain, but
we need not think that understanding what pain is requires understanding the pragmatic, moral,
or noninstrumental reasons to abstain from causing it. A theory of what pain is might be true
and complete without a discussion of reasons or obligations.
In a similar way, Horwich believes that a theory of meaning, content, or truth can be
complete without a discussion of anything normative. What it is for a psychological state to
have a given content can be explained without invoking normative notions. Thinking as much is
compatible with thinking that many normative facts may arise from considerations about
meaning, content, and truth in the same way that normative facts may arise from
considerations about pain.
Although not quite so explicit on the subject of normativity and content, Field
apparently shares the view that although there are norms related to truth, they are not
particularly central to the theory of truth or the theory of content. Field explicitly says the
following on the subject:
... there is no difficulty in desiring that all one’s beliefs be disquotationally true; and not only can each of us desire such things, there can be a general practice of badgering others into having such desires. Isn’t this enough for there being a ‘norm’ of asserting and believing the truth?67
The subtext of the quoted passage is clear. There may be norms connected to believing the
truth, but these norms are not a central part of the theory of the intentional.
As we have already seen in §2.8-2.9, norms can, without question, get in the way of
understanding intentional states naturalistically if they do play a central role in the theory of the
intentional. Nonetheless, rejecting that norms play a central role in the correct theory of the
66 Cf. Ibid, 109. 67 Field (2001), 121.
41
intentional cuts directly against TTIR. On TTIR, what makes a content that very content is partly
a matter of what intentional states with that content represent. On TTIR, contents are
intrinsically representational, and representing is a matter of having normatively loaded
correctness conditions. Consequently, Horwich and Field cannot eschew normativity from the
theory of truth and content without eschewing TTIR altogether.
§3.3: Extreme Content Particularism
A primary feature of Horwich’s view is that content merely (strongly) supervenes on “use”
properties. Thus, although “use” properties constitute having a particular content, the
particular content some internal cognitive state has cannot be “read off” of its “use”
properties.68 According to Horwich, one cannot give necessary and sufficient conditions for
some arbitrary content that p. At best, one can only begin to list individually what “use”
properties are required for an internal cognitive state to have this or that content.
The thesis of mere supervenience is not necessarily antithetical to TTIR.69 Consider
David Lewis’s view whereby content is assigned holistically so as to assure a best fit between
“use” and natural properties. Because one has to consider the “use” properties of all internal
cognitive states, and moreover, consult the hierarchy of “naturnalness” in order to assign
content, there’s no chance one will be able to “read off” an internal state's content from its
“use” properties. On Lewis’s view, content merely (strongly) supervenes on “use.”
Nonetheless, there's no insurmountable difficulty in interpreting Lewis’s view as a version of
68 See Horwich (1995) reprinted in Horwich (2004), 67-85 for discussion on “reading off.” See also Horwich (2005), 66-69. The phrase “reading off” comes originally from Kripke (1982), 29. On his commitment to content particularism, see Horwich (1998), 21-7 and Horwich (2005), 32-5, 61-84. 69 Perhaps I should say his sketch of a view as he says very little about what decides when the fit is best. See Lewis (1984).
42
TTIR whereon content is intrinsically representational. On Lewis's view contents are sets of
possible worlds corresponding to truth/correct-believability conditions.70
What is antithetical to TTIR is the thesis that nothing general can be said about the
connection between having a particular content and having certain “use” properties. As a
pointed out in §2.8, although the supervenience connections between representational
properties and “use” need not be systematic or strict, they do need to be somewhat general in
order for the theory of representation to be plausible. Thus, if one accepts that having content
is closely tied to having certain representational properties, there will be a limit to how extreme
one’s particularism regarding the supervenience connections between content and “use”
properties can be.
One often gets the impression, reading Horwich, that his particularism in this regard
breaks that limit; he appears to think that there is absolutely nothing that we can say concerning
the connections between content and “use” other than, of course, that content strongly
supervenes on “use.” In this vein, he says that his theory “does indeed violate the commonly
assumed requirement that there be explanations of the links between given meaning-
constituting properties and given meanings.” He goes on to say that “this requirement is
misconceived; so our violation is not objectionable.”71 However, assuming that contents are
intrinsically representational, the requirement that there be explanations of the links between
given content-constituting properties and given contents is not misconceived, as I pointed out in
§2.8. Inasmuch as he commits himself to the position that the requirement is misconceived,
Horwich commits himself to rejecting TTIR.
70 As another example, it's worth considering Davidson who embraces both a theory of content whereon truth conditions play a pivotal role and anomalous monism. See Davidson (1984), Davidson (1990), and Davidson (1970) reprinted in Davidson (1980). 71 Horwich (2005), 66.
43
§3.4: Primacy of Translation
Many philosophers including Hartry Field would agree that proper translation respects content.
If one token sentence (of Mentalese) properly (enough) translates another token sentence, then
the contents of the two sentences are (at least roughly) the same. Moreover, if the contents of
the two sentences are (at least roughly) the same, then the two sentences have (approximately)
the same truth conditions, so that (nearly) any scenario in which one sentence is true, the other
sentence is true as well.
Where Field has disagreed with many philosophers is with regard to the explanation of
the agreed upon fact that proper translation respects content. Many philosophers think that it
is at least partly because one token sentence has the same content as another that the former
properly translates the latter. Moreover, many philosophers will think that one token sentence
has the same content as another at least partly because the two have the same truth conditions.
Thus, that two token sentences have the same truth conditions explains, at least in part, why a
translation is proper.
Field is inclined to think, on the contrary, that it is entirely because one token sentence
properly translates another that the latter has the same content as the former (relative to some
particular interests of translation).72 Field thinks that one token sentence has the same truth
conditions as another (relative to some particular interests of translation) because the two have
the same content (relative to some particular interests of translation).73 Thus, that one
sentence properly translates another (relative to some particular interests of translation)
72 It is an important feature of Field's view that which translations are proper may well depend on the interests of the translator. Field is open to the possibility that there is no absolute relation of having the same content as. I am largely ignoring this feature of the view because I do not think it is a feature of deflationary theories of content considered broadly. I will come back to consider the feature in §4.3. 73 See Field (2001), 147-152, 167-169.
44
explains why the latter has the truth conditions of the former (relative to some particular
interests of translation).
This dispute appears plain enough until we realize that all parties might well agree that
“use” properties of token sentences of Mentalese ultimately underlie proper translation, having
the same content, and having the same truth conditions. Is it so obvious what's at stake?74
Understanding Field's opponent as an advocate of TTIR can help to clarify what's at
stake. Given TTIR, that two token sentences have the same truth conditions implies that the
two have the same conditions for correct belief-boxability. Moreover, two token sentences
have the same representational properties in virtue of having the same conditions for correct
belief-boxability, and given TTIR, two token sentences have the same content partly because
they have the same representational properties. Two token sentences cannot have the same
representational properties in virtue of facts about proper translation (even if both
representational properties and proper translation are at least partly a matter of having a
certain “use” broadly construed) because translation facts (facts about which token sentences
properly translates which) do not settle whether a token sentence has some particular
representational properties. Thus, the advocate of TTIR cannot say that it is entirely because
one token sentence properly translates another that the latter has the same content as the
former. He must say that truth/correctness conditions at least partly explains sameness of
content, which, in turn, at least partly explains proper translation.
In reversing the order of explanation, Field is committed to denying TTIR. This is not to
say that any opponent of Field's primacy of proper translation view is an advocate of TTIR.
There might be other ways to show that content is explanatorily prior to proper translation.
74 Thanks to Josh Schechter for pushing this point.
45
Claiming that sameness of truth conditions partly explains sameness of content,
however, requires holding some view central to the nature of truth beyond the (Truth
Conditions) platitude. Unless it involves accepting that there are conditions for correct belief-
boxability coinciding with the truth conditions of token sentences (and hence TTIR), it's hard to
say what this view would be. (Assuming the principal conclusion of §2.5 is correct, a
correspondence theory of truth would involve the introduction of normatively loaded
correctness conditions.)
§3.5: Other Dissidents of TTIR
DTCs are committed to denying TTIR, but does denying TTIR commit one to a DTC?
No. There are other dissidents of TTIR.
We can see as much by considering a straightforward verificationist theory of content
(SfV).75 Motivating the adherent of SfV is the concern that TTIR postulates correctness
conditions for beliefs that far outstrip the functioning of those states.76 The adherent of SfV
finds it compelling that a person shows that he takes his belief to be correct in a situation by
having the belief in that sort of situation. Moreover, he thinks that the only fact available to fix
that a person's belief is correct in a situation is that the person would show in that situation that
he took his belief to be correct. Consequently, he concludes, the only situations that beliefs are
correct relative to are not possible scenarios, i.e. ways the world might be in and of itself, but
rather possible experiences a person might have; the only correctness conditions around
coincide with conditions of verification.
75 See many of the essays of Dummett (1993) for an elaboration of the sort of verificationist view I have in mind. 76 See Dummett (1993), 74-84.
46
In this way, a straightforward verificationism contrasts with a sophisticated
verificationism.77 A sophisticated verificationism might allow that beliefs are correct relative to
possible scenarios, i.e. ways the world might be, but would claim that there are epistemic
constraints on possible scenarios. Thus, ways the world might be cannot outstrip what we could
ultimately discover at the end of rational inquiry. A sophisticated verificationism does not
mandate the rejection of (Norm of Belief), but rather finds a verificationist interpretation of it.
As a result, sophisticated verificationism is really a somewhat unusual variant of TTIR.
SfV calls for the revision of not only (Norm of Belief), but (Truth Conditions). (SfV
appears unacceptable partly because it calls for these revisions.) An adherent of SfV may well
claim that talk of possible scenarios, i.e ways the world might be, does not make any sense
ultimately. SfV rejects TTIR. SfV calls to replace TTIR-style truth conditions with verificationist
truth conditions.
Note, however, that SfV is not a DTC.
Why wouldn't we categorize SfV as a DTC? There seem to be at least two reasons not
to. These two reasons give us some insight into what makes for a DTC:
First, SfV is largely motivated by a commitment to a systematic accounting of content
facts. Identifying content with verification conditions allows one to “read off” the content of a
belief from facts about the situations in which the belief would be formed; given that
identification, one can give necessary and sufficient conditions for a belief to have a given
content in terms of situations in which the belief would be formed. In this sense, identifying
content with verification conditions appears to allow for a systematic accounting of content. It
is for this very reason (perhaps among others) that the SfVer takes verification conditions as
preferable to TTIR truth conditions.
77 For examples of sophisticated verificationism, see Putnam (1981) and Wright (1992).
47
DTCs, on the other hand, embrace an anti-systematic spirit. So much is clear in
Horwich's case from the discussion in §3.3. However, in suggesting that a DTC does not permit
“anything that could plausibly constitute a reduction of truth conditions” to play a central role in
the theory of content, Field effectively embraces this spirit as well.78 As I understand Field's
criterion, any theory where truth conditions can be “read off” “use” properties is not a DTC.
Presumably, that goes for verificationist truth conditions as well.
Second, SfV rejects a deflationary theory of truth.79 He is happy to accept the idea that
truth has a normative aspect along with any concomitant explanatory burdens. However, he
proposes we need to understand truth conditions as verificationist truth conditions rather than
as the advocate of TTIR understands them.
A DTC, on the other hand, proposes that we meet the demands of explaining truth
conditions of intentional states by adopting a deflationary theory of truth.
§4: Deflationary Theories of Content
§4.1: Features of a DTC
At this point, we have uncovered several important features of DTCs:
(Anti-TTIR) DTCs reject the teleological theory of intentional representation. (§3) (Anti-Normativity) No normative notions play a role in a DTC. (§3.2) (Anti-Systematicity) DTCs reject systematic connections between content/truth conditions and supervened upon natural/descriptive properties. (§3.3 and §3.5) (DTT) DTCs meet the demands of explaining the truth/satisfaction conditions of intentional states by adopting a deflationary theory of truth. (§3.5)
78 See Field (2001), 108. 79 See Dummett (1959) reprinted in Dummett (1978).
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A prototypical DTC has these features, and the features are suggestive of why DTCs might be
properly thought of as a stripped-down, deflationary theories of content. However, these
features tell us more about what a DTC isn't, then what it is. In §4.2, I want to sketch a more
elucidating account of DTCs. In §4.2-4.4, I will elaborate further on that sketch. In §4.5-4.7, I
will point out how the account laid out explains the four features listed here.
§4.2: Principal Theses of a DTC
A DTC has two principal theses. The first principal thesis is positive:
(Use) A token sentence of Mentalese, S, has the same content as a token sentence of Mentalese, S* if and only if A*'s use of S* (in some way) serves as proxy for A's use of S (in that same way) where A* and A are (possibly distinct) subjects.80
Two points of clarification are in order:
First: Ways to use a sentence of Mentalese include belief-boxing, desire-boxing,
imagine-boxing, etc. Thus, (Use) says that a sentence S has the same content as a sentence S* if
only if A*'s belief-boxing of S* serves as proxy for A's belief-boxing of S, A*'s desire-boxing of S*
serves as a proxy for A's desire-boxing of S, A*'s imagine-boxing of S* serves as proxy for A's
imagine-boxing of S, etc.
Second: A*'s use of a token sentence of Mentalese, S*, (in some way) “serves as proxy”
for A's use of another token sentence, S, (in that same way) if and only if A*'s using of S* and A's
using of S helps/hinders in getting around in the world in the same way. In other words, serving
proxy is entirely a pragmatic matter. (We will come back to elaborate on this point of
clarification in §4.3.)
The second principal thesis of a DTC is negative:
80 “Serving proxy” is my own term. Cf. §4.3.
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(Minimalism) There is nothing to say about content other than (Use). In particular, no further fact about content explains (Use).
(Minimalism) is the thesis that distinguishes a DTC from any other theory of content.
After all, an advocate of TTIR would (likely) accept that (Use) is true (assuming it's clear
that talk of Mentalese isn't ipso facto smuggling in anything unwanted). What distinguishes an
advocate of TTIR from an advocate of a DTC is that the former would want to give an
explanation of (Use). That's because he would be inclined to say that what matters for the most
part in getting around in the world in the same way is having the same mental representations.
Thus, using one sentence might well serve as proxy for using another when it makes no
difference to the resulting mental representations. But according to TTIR, if two sentences have
the same content, then they do make for the same mental representations. So, more basic facts
about representation and the theory of content help explain why (Use) is true.
In accepting (Minimalism), someone holding a DTC intends to reject the TTIR
explanation of (Use). That explanation depends on saying something else more basic about
content, namely, associating content with representation. On a DTC, any explanation of (Use) is
rejected. (Use) isn't (even partly) to be explained by more basic fundamentals of the theory of
content; rather, (Use) is the basic fundamentals of the theory of content. Having the same
content just is a matter of “serving proxy.”
§4.3: Serving Proxy
This last point brings us back to what “serving proxy” is. As I suggested before, “serving proxy”
is a pragmatic matter; it's a matter of making the same difference in getting around. Obviously,
if S* is identical to S, then using S* rather than S makes no significant difference in getting
around. So a token sentence has the same content as itself. However, anyone peddling a
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theory that says that having-the-same-content relation is the being-identical-to relation
(restricted to sentences of Mentalese) isn't peddling a theory of content so much as a syntactic
theory of mind.81 A DTC better say that using a sentence can serve proxy for using another
distinct sentence.
And it can. When one considers whether a use of S* serves proxy for a use of S, it is
intended that one take into account the (non-normative) “use” properties (broadly construed)
of S* and S. So, for instance, one takes into account the computational/conceptual role of S*
and S. How does computational/conceptual role come into play? Suppose that S* and S are
syntactically distinct, and we are considering whether A's use of S* serves as proxy for A's use of
S. Suppose, though, that S* and S are equivalent with respect to computational/conceptual
role.82 It will make no difference whether A uses S* or A uses S. Thus, S has the same content as
S*.
Of course, computational/conceptual role isn't the only thing that matters. Consider
Winston on Earth and his counterpart Twinston on Twin Earth. S* may have the same exact
computational/conceptual role for Winston as S has for Twinston. Nonetheless, if the stuff in
the environments on Earth and Twin Earth respectively is different in fundamental nature, using
S* won't be helping/hindering Winston in the same way that using S will be helping hindering
Twinston. That's because using S* helps/hinders Winston in dealing with the stuff on Earth
while using S helps/hinders Twinston in dealing with the stuff on Twin Earth. S does not have
the same content as S* because the two differ with respect to their indication relations.83
81 See Stich (1983). 82 For this example, I assume that it is possible for sentences to be syntactically distinct even if they have the same computational/conceptual role. That assumption likely requires importing a substantive language of thought hypothesis. 83 Hence, DTCs can accommodate the “externalist” aspects of content. See Kripke (1972), Putnam (1975), Horwich (1998), Chapter 5, and Field (2001), 117-9.
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One might hold reservations generally about whether, for two distinct subjects A* and
A, it's ever the case that A*'s use of S* helps/hinders in getting around precisely in the same way
as A's use of S. If there are any differences in inferential connections or indication relations,
then how can it be that A*'s use of S* helps/hinders precisely in the same way as A's use of S?
These worries might cause an adherent of a DTC to say that what matters is whether A*'s use of
S* helps/hinders in getting around roughly in the same way as A's use of S. What counts as
roughly getting around in the same way? Perhaps, it depends on what aspects of getting around
are most salient. On certain occasions, some particular inferential connections might matter
more than others. On other occasions, causal relations with the environment might be more
important than computational/conceptual role. Having the same content might be interest-
relative; whether two sentences are correctly judged to have the same content might rest on
the practical interests of the person making the judgment. If having the same content is
interest-relative, maybe it's not ultimately even a symmetric or transitive relation.
Field makes just these (radical) suggestions,84 but adopting these proposals is not
required to hold a DTC. Horwich, for instance, does not adopt them. On his view, we can isolate
the inferential connections and indication relations that are basic and explanatory in the use of
primitive constituents of Mentalese;85 call these isolated “use” properties, the “basic long-
armed conceptual role.” Then, we can say that A*'s use of S* helps/hinders in getting around
precisely in the same way as A's use of S if and only if S* and S are constructed in the same way
from primitive constituents of Mentalese with the same basic long-armed conceptual role.
DTCs have many of the same options for confronting Quinean worries about
interpersonal synonymy that inflationary theories of content do.86 The advocate of a DTC can
84 Field (2001), 169-71. 85 Horwich (1998), 44-6. 86 See Quine (1953), Quine (1960), and Fodor and Lepore (1992).
52
propose a way to make some principled analytic/synthetic distinction, isolating those inferential
connections and indication relations that are content constituting, i.e. that matter for
determining whether using a sentence serves proxy for using another, from those that aren't.
(Horwich takes this route.) Alternatively, the advocate of a DTC can rely principally on (non-
normative) informational relations just as Fodor does in order to avoid having to make a
principled analytic/synthetic distinction.87 DTCs need not adopt the radical position Field
suggests. As a result, we should distinguish this radical position from the position of DTCs
considered broadly.
§4.4: Deflationary Propositions
Whether there are, among what other abstract objects there might be, propositions, i.e. reified
contents that sentences with content express, in addition to token sentences with a particular
content, is a matter of great debate even among inflationists.88 Accepting a DTC does nothing to
settle this debate so long as one is willing to be open-minded about what propositions are.89
On a DTC that countenances propositions, propositions are abstractions from token
sentences that serve proxy for one another. Thus, one comes to stand in a relation to
propositions by deploying one of a class of possible token sentences that serve proxy for one
another, i.e. help/hinder in getting around the world in the same way.
Although deflationary propositions essentially have truth/satisfaction conditions,
truth/satisfaction conditions can tell us nothing about the nature of deflationary propositions.
Rather, deflationary propositions tell us about the nature of truth/satisfaction conditions. If
truth/satisfaction conditions told us about the nature of deflationary propositions, then, in
87 Cf. Fodor (1990), Fodor and Lepore (1992), and Fodor (1998). 88 See Davidson (1968) reprinted in Davidson (1984) and Loar (1981), 29-31. 89 See Field (2001), 165-71.
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violation of (Minimalism), we would have to explain coming to stand in a relation to a
proposition, i.e. having a token sentence with a certain content, in terms of coming to have a
token sentence with certain truth/satisfaction conditions. Obviously, then, deflationary
propositions are not intrinsically representational. It would be misleading to use, for instance,
sets of possible worlds to stand for deflationary propositions.
One of the differences between Field and Horwich is that Horwich is clearly comfortable
with countenancing propositions while Field is not. His discomfort with propositions forces Field
to say, perhaps awkwardly, that having a particular content is a matter of properly translating to
a token sentence that I can use to express that content. Field's primacy of translation thesis is
the combination of his discomfort with propositions and his adopting the primary theses of a
DTC. The primacy of translation thesis is, in fact, not essential to DTCs. An adherent of a DTC
(like Horwich), can suggest that a translation is proper because two sentences express the same
proposition. As with Field's other Quinean qualms, it's important to keep his ontological
scruples separate from his commitment to a DTC.
§4.5: Naturalism on the Cheap?
On a DTC, having some particular content is a matter of helping/hindering a person in getting
around when used in a particular way. Thus, sentences of Mentalese have content wholly in
virtue of their dispositional properties. So much should be clear from our discussion of “serving
proxy” in §4.2. “Serving proxy” was explained in terms of non-normative “use” properties.90 As
a result, there should be no difficulty in reconciling a DTC with naturalism so long as there is no
difficulty in understanding what it is to use a sentence of Mentalese, i.e. belief-box it, desire-box
90 This reliance on non-normative properties differentiates DTCs from cousin “use” views such as Brandom (2000). See Horwich (2005), 126-34.
54
it, etc., naturalistically. Someone attracted to a DTC is likely to be so partly in virtue of his
commitment to naturalism.
An adherent of a DTC restricts the “use” properties to dispositional/causal properties
that figure into his account in order to embrace (Anti-Normativity) so that his theory will
obviously unproblematic when conjoined with naturalism. In embracing (Anti-Normativity),
DTCs must also embrace (Anti-TTIR).
§4.6: DTCs and Deflationary Theories of Truth/Satisfaction
An adherent of a DTC will accept that (Truth Conditions) and (Satisfaction Conditions) are
platitudinous. However, he cannot accept that there is a deep explanation for how a token
sentence of Mentalese comes to have the truth/satisfaction conditions that it does. If (Truth
Conditions)/(Satisfaction Conditions) is true, then a use of a token sentence, S, of Mentalese
cannot be a belief/desire that p unless it has the right sort of truth/satisfaction conditions. If a
use of S cannot be a belief/desire that p unless it has the right sort of truth/satisfaction
conditions and there is a deep explanation of how S comes to have the truth/satisfaction
conditions that p, then pace (Minimalism), S does not have the content that p merely in virtue of
the fact that using it helps/hinders in getting around in a particular way. To determine whether
S has the content that p, we would have to consider whether the deep explanation was in place
of S's truth/satisfaction conditions that p in addition to considering the dispositional properties
of S that tell us what sentences serve proxy for it.
Thus, DTCs must claim that truth/satisfaction conditions are transparent, i.e. that there
is no deep explanation of them. Because having correctness conditions would require a deep
explanation, DTCs must reject the thesis that truth/satisfaction conditions have a normative
aspect. Because they are committed to the transparency and non-normativity of
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truth/satisfaction conditions, DTCs must accept (DTT). Deflationary theories of
truth/satisfaction come in two varieties depending on whether propositions or token sentences
are the principal truth/satisfaction bearers. A DTC may accept either a propositional or a
sentential deflationary theory of truth so long as token sentences have truth/satisfaction
conditions that p merely in virtue of having content that p.
It is partly because he accepts a deflationary theory of truth/satisfaction, that we can
understand an adherent of a DTC claim to put “use” rather than truth/satisfaction conditions in
the central role of the theory of content. On a deflationary theory of truth, truth is merely a
device for using contents—truth/satisfaction conditions tells us nothing about them.
§4.7: Against Systematicity
Systematic connections between content and “use” properties or truth conditions and “use”
properties runs afoul of (Minimalism). The existence of significant regularities in the way
content or truth conditions supervene on “use” properties implies that there is more to say
about content than just (Use). More importantly, it suggests (although does not imply) that
(Use) has some explanation. It could easily be the case that the “use” properties that fix
whether a sentence has such-and-such content also help explain why somebody using a
sentence with such-and-such content will get around the world in such-and-such a way.
(Minimalism) explains why (Anti-Systematicity) is a feature of DTCs.
Prima facie, we can imagine borderline cases where it is unclear whether connections
between content/truth conditions and supervened upon “use” properties are systematic
enough to cause problems for (Minimalism). These borderline cases show that the distinction
between inflationary and deflationary theories of content is not sharp.91
91 Field (2001), 107.
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§5: Conclusion
In this paper, I have primarily been concerned with making the distinction between TTIR
and DTCs rather than how to address the dispute between the two positions. In concluding, I
turn now briefly towards the question of how to address that dispute (partly because I think
tackling that question can further clarify the distinction between the two positions).
To begin with, there is a question about which theory (if any) we should adopt as the
default. Field proposes that we accept “methodological deflationism,” i.e. that we take on a
DTC as a working hypothesis only giving it up if we see that it cannot do the explanatory work
required from an acceptable theory of content.92 This proposal contrasts with the investigations
of a large number of theorists who take TTIR as their starting point. Going forward, should we
privilege one view over the other?
I don't see that either view is the “neutral” position. Both TTIR and DTCs carry serious
theoretical commitments. To embrace TTIR is to take on a certain explanatory burden that can
only be satisfied if there are systematic connections between content properties and
supervened upon “use” properties. To endorse a DTC is to disavow that there are such
systematic connections. Prior to investigation, I see no reason to have any particular view about
whether there are significant regularities in the way content supervenes on “use.”
Consequently, I see no reason to adopt any particular theory as the default view.
Nonetheless, Field may be right in suggesting that we look first at what explanatory
work is required of a theory of content in order to settle the issue. The dispute between TTIR
and DTCs would be settled if the advocate of TTIR could show that (Use) has an explanation. If
we could say, generally, why believing, desiring, etc. that p gets a person around in the world in
a certain way, we would have more to say about content than just (Use). Moreover, if we could
92 Field (2001), 119.
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show that what fixes that believing, desiring, etc. that p gets a person around in the world in a
certain way also fixes that these states are robust mental representations, we would be able to
show that TTIR is true. Going forward, it would be helpful if the advocate of TTIR could point to
reasons for thinking that facts about content should explain (Use). Moreover, it would be
helpful to understand what robustly representing (or properties concomitant with robustly
representing) does for subjects in getting them around. Showing that having robust
representations (directly or indirectly) serves a practical purpose for subjects may well be key to
showing how it is that subjects come to have robust representations. (Consider our discussion
from §2.8.) In other words, it may be that the most efficient way to settle the explanatory
burden of TTIR is to answer Field's challenge by pointing to the pragmatic upshot of robustly
representing.
That said, there is another route to challenging DTCs. DTCs largely focus on the theory
of content, but, in order to be successful, DTCs must have an accompanying theory of attitudes.
The theory of content and the theory of attitudes are essentially interconnected. Ultimately,
attitude and content must be defined together; it is central to the theory of content that
contents are the sorts of things attitudes are had towards just as it is central to the theory of
attitudes that attitudes are the sorts of things had towards contents. Notice that (Norm of
Belief) and (Norm of Desire) are as important to the theory of attitudes as they are to the theory
of content; thus, rejecting them calls as much for a replacement regarding the theory of
attitudes as it does regarding the theory of content. Moreover, understanding (Use) requires
having an antecedent theory of attitudes. If the inflationist can show that there is no
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replacement deflationary theory of attitudes to be had, then he can show that DTCs are
bankrupt.93
93 I would like to thank Richard Heck, Christopher Hill, Joshua Schechter, Jamie Dreier, Jaegwon Kim, Jonathan Ichikawa, and Michael Lynch for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Part of this chapter was presented at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St. Andrews in the spring of 2008. I would like to acknowledge members of the audience, particularly Crispin Wright, Jessica Brown, Herman Cappelen, and Martin Smith, for the profitable discussion on that occasion.
59
CHAPTER TWO:
Deflationary Theories of Truth and the Teleological Theory of
Intentional Representation
§1: Introduction
In recent years it has become increasingly clear that among the most foundational questions
about the nature of truth is the question of whether truth has much of a nature at all.94
According to deflationary theories of truth, the fundamental facts about truth are exhausted by
whatever is required to have the effect of using a truth bearer by mentioning it. Although
deflationary theories of truth remain controversial, they have gained strong supporters.95
Among the foundational questions in the theory of intentionality is, “To what extent are
intentional states representational?” According to the teleological theory of intentional
representation (TTIR), intentional agents make their way in the world by using states that are
very much like maps and blueprints.96 More precisely, according to TTIR, principal intentional
states, e. g. beliefs and desires, are robust mental representations.97 While not unchallenged,
the teleological theory of representation is compelling.
Taken individually thorough-going deflationism about truth and TTIR can both seem very
plausible. Nonetheless, in this paper, I argue that they are incompatible. An argument of this
sort is significant for a variety of reasons. Perhaps most superficially, it helps us to see that it is
94 I have an odd sense that I might be quoting here even though I don't remember the source. If so, I apologize to the original author. 95 Horwich (1990), Field (1994), Soames (1999), and Hill (2002) just to name a few. 96 Cf. footnote 5. 97 Cf. Chapter One, §2.1.
60
not coincidental that thorough-going deflationists about truth like Hartry Field and Paul Horwich
end up endorsing a view of content that rejects the teleological theory of intentional
representation (TTIR).98 More importantly, such an argument illuminates the criticism
frequently made against deflationary theories of truth that such theories are at odds with truth
conditional theories of content. I argued last chapter that truth conditional theories of content
by and large just are theories that adopt TTIR; hence, if deflationary theories of truth are at odds
with TTIR, then they are at odds with truth conditional theories of content. Perhaps even more
importantly, an argument of this sort shows that philosophers who claim that deflationary
theories of truth are “obvious and philosophically innocuous” are mistaken (or, in the event they
are not adopting a thorough-going deflationism, misleading).99
A few words about the structure of this paper: I first cover deflationism about truth (§2)
and deflationary theories of content and their principal competitor, TTIR (§3). In §4, I develop
my principal argument. Explaining the representational aspects of intentional states in
accordance with TTIR requires a substantial theory of correctness or correctness-conditions. I
show that theory can serve as an adequate non-deflationary theory of truth.
In §5-6, I elucidate this argument by laying out the two different ways in which an
advocate of TTIR might go about discharging the explanatory debt of her theory. In so doing, I
show that whatever way the adherent of TTIR goes about discharging this debt, the result is, as
was suggested in §4, inconsistent with a thorough-going deflationism about truth. In §7-8, I
review the major points of the paper and make some concluding remarks.
Since I focus on mental content (as opposed to the content of token sentences of
natural language), I will frame the discussion in terms of Mentalese. I will assume that having an
intentional state with content that p is having an attitude towards a token sentence of
98 See Field (1994), Horwich (1998), Field (2001), and Horwich (2005). Cf. Chapter One. 99 Soames (1999), 251.
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Mentalese.100 (Thus, to believe that p is to belief-box a token sentence of Mentalese S with
content that p.)101
§2: Deflationary Theories of Truth
Roughly, a deflationary theory of truth is one that takes instances of some version of the T-
schema as a complete and a priori theory of truth.102 The effect of taking some version of the T-
schema as a complete and a priori theory of truth is twofold. First, the property of truth is not
fundamentally normative. Second, the property of truth is transparent.103
To claim that truth is not fundamentally normative is to claim that a truth bearer's being
true (platitudinously) entails nothing about what ought or ought not to be done with the truth
bearer. A deflationist about truth can concede—even as a matter of metaphysical necessity—
that one ought (in some sense) to believe only truths. He cannot concede that this norm follows
100 As I suggested in Chapter One, nothing hangs on this assumption. For my argument, it would make no difference whether there were any way to individuate sentences-types of Mentalese other than according to their content. (In particular, I am not committed to what Michael Rescorla calls (in works in progress) “the formal conception of psychological processes” (FCP). FCP claims that “psychological processes are not sensitive to semantic properties of mental representations.”) Nor would it make any difference whether Mentalese sentences had (proper) syntactic constituents with semantic values, or for that matter, whether they had syntactic constituents at all. (It also makes no difference whether Mentalese sentences have “logical” rather than “geometric” structure. See Rescorla (forthcoming).) My argument requires the premise that having an intentional state is being in a state of a particular attitude type (belief, desire, imagining, etc.) that has a particular content, but it requires nothing more, so far as I can see. Cf. Boghossian (1989), 514. 101 I take full advantage of the belief-box metaphor frequently attributed in the literature to Stephen Schiffer. 102 The T-schema is (roughly) taken to be a “complete” theory not in the sense that it implies every fact about truth, but in the sense that it covers all the fundamental facts about truth. I say “roughly” for at least three reasons. First, a deflationist might think that he needed something slightly stronger than the individual instances of the T-schema in order to account for generalizations involving truth. See Soames (1999), 247 and Hill (2002). Second, the T-schema might need to be restricted in order to avoid the semantic paradoxes. See Horwich (1990), 41 and Field (2008). Finally, a deflationist might harbor doubts about a principled a priori/a posteriori distinction, in which case he is likely to think that the epistemological status of the T-schema is similar to that of basic logical truths. For our purposes, we can ignore these complications; we will omit the “roughly.” 103 I adapt the use of the term 'transparent' from Gupta (1993) reprinted in Armour-Garb and Beall (2005), 202.
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(platitudinously) by itself from the theory of truth. Whatever (even metaphysically necessary)
normative consequences truth might have, they do not stem from the nature of truth.
The transparency of truth manifests both metaphysically and conceptually. In the first
place, to claim that truth is transparent is to claim that there is no deep metaphysical
explanation of what makes a truth bearer have the truth-conditions it does. (Compare: There is
a deep metaphysical explanation of what makes some substance water because we can explain
why it is water in terms of the chemical composition of the substance. The more fundamental
facts about chemical composition account for a particular substance's being water.) A deep
metaphysical explanation would be a serious supplement to the T-schema, and therefore is
incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. Claiming that truth is transparent also typically
commits one to thinking that truth is not suitable for carrying explanatory weight. Thus, if truth
is transparent, the fact that the proposition that snow is white is true cannot explain anything
more than the fact that snow is white can.
To the extent that truth is transparent, there is no substantial story to tell about how
people come to grasp the truth-conditions of a truth bearer by grasping some significantly more
superficial aspect of truth. Anybody mastering the concept of truth will accept the T-schema,
which gives the truth-conditions for truth bearers.104 Typically, there is a further conceptual
aspect to transparency; the deflationist about truth will typically claim that to say that a truth
bearer is true is to do little more than one would do by using the truth bearer itself. (The “little
more” here is to commit oneself to the existence of a truth bearer.) Thus, in spirit, the property
of truth is redundant. It is not redundant in practice because, for a variety of reasons, one may
104 A deflationist about truth can allow that those with mastery of the concept of truth infer the T-schema by using substitutional quantification or something similar. The T-schema doesn't have to be among the most basic principles someone with a mastery of the concept of truth accepts so long as it follows fairly plainly from these more basic principles. See Hill (2002).
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not always be able to use the truth bearers in question.105 The concept of truth allows us to, as
it were, “indirectly” use the truth bearers in question on these occasions by asserting that these
truth bearers are true. According to deflationists, this feature of the concept of truth exhausts
its utility.
For purposes of clarity, we should distinguish two versions of deflationism.
Propositional deflationists take propositions as the fundamental bearers of truth so that the
theory of truth is exhausted by (PTS):106
(PTS) The proposition that p is true iff p
Sentential deflationists take token sentences107 as the fundamental truth bearers so that the
theory of truth is exhausted by (STS):108
(STS) S is true iff p
where the right-hand side of the biconditional uses the sentence (or an appropriate translation
thereof) named by ‘S’.
105 See Horwich (1990), 31-33. For instance, when I assert that what John says is true, I may not be a position to assert what John says instead because I may not know exactly what John says. Also, when I assert that the instances of the induction schema for Peano arithmetic are true, I cannot assert instead the instances of the induction schema as there are infinitely many of them. (Quine in particular emphasized the usefulness of `true' for making generalizations. See Field (2001), 119-123, for some discussion.) 106 See Horwich (1990) and Hill (2002). 107 For my purposes, a token sentence is a sentence of Mentalese considered in some context. 108 See Field (1994) and Field (2001).
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Some have thought that the difference between these versions is vast in that the
sentential view may force one to adopt a deflationary theory of content, while the propositional
version of deflationism does not.109 I do not think that the difference between these two
versions of deflationism about truth is significant in the end, but in order to avoid confusion, I
will treat them separately.
Over the last twenty years, deflationary theories of truth have become very prominent.
Their rise in popularity is due both to the difficulties of more traditional theories and to the
successes of deflationism's proponents in showing that, even when truth makes an appearance
in the formulation of philosophical problems and theories, it is only for the purpose of using
truth bearers indirectly. For instance, the debate between realists and anti-realists is sometimes
framed as a debate about whether propositions (or sentences) can be true independent of
whether or not they can be verified. However, it is quite plausible that the role of truth in this
debate is merely to allow us to indirectly use a number of propositions (or sentences) at once.
We can frame the debate for any particular proposition (or sentence) without making reference
to truth. For instance, we can ask whether there can be an odd number of stars independent of
whether it could be verified that there is an odd number of stars.110
109 See Heck (2004), 319-320. Heck suggests that although Soames is a deflationist, he is not committed to the Field’s view because although he accepts deflationism about propositional truth, he does not endorse a deflationary construal of content. 110 See Soames (1999), 32-9.
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§3: Theories of Content
In Chapter One, I carefully explained both the teleological theory of intentional representation
(TTIR) and deflationary theories of content (DTCs). I will quickly review my characterization of
these two views here.
According to the TTIR, intentional states are robust mental representations, and thus
the content of such attitudes is differentiated according to their representational properties. On
TTIR, an intentional state has content that p only if it represents that p.111 Acceptance of TTIR is
not unusual. Anyone who accepts that propositions are sets of possible worlds or Russellian
structures of objects and properties is likely to be friendly to the view. Many Fregeans will be
friendly to TTIR as well.
The advocate of a DTC112 denies that intentional states have these robust
representational properties.113 We can understand this contrast by explaining why someone
would make this denial.
TTIR promotes understanding intentional states on the model of maps, blueprints,
pictures, and other paradigm instances of representation. As a result, TTIR incurs an
explanatory debt not easily discharged. Paradigm instances show that representation has a
normative aspect. A painting may match the visual likeness of Warren Buffett more or less well,
but what makes the painting a representation of Warren Buffett is not the degree to which it
matches his likeness, but rather whether the painting is supposed to match his likeness.
111 Furthermore, it has propositional content that p only if, if it represents that q, then the proposition that p entails (at least metaphysically) that q. Note that these are merely necessary conditions. Someone accepting TTIR need not think that propositional content is exhausted by its representational properties. 112 See Field (1994), Horwich (1998), Field (2001), and Horwich (2005). 113 This denial is obviously compatible with the claim that intentional states are representations of a sort, so long as, for example, differences in representation do not necessarily amount to differences in contents.
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Representation presupposes that certain standards of evaluation are in force. X represents Y
because a certain correspondence between X and Y ought to hold.
According to TTIR, beliefs that p represent that p. Given, in addition, that beliefs
represent reflectively (as maps do), TTIR is committed to (Norm of Belief) as a constitutive norm:
(Norm of Belief) Beliefs that p are correct (qua belief) relative to some (arbitrary) scenario iff that scenario is such that p.
Correctness here is genuinely normative because representation is genuinely normative. If a
belief is correct, it is as it ought (qua representation) to be.114 This is not to say that it is
warranted.
According to TTIR, desires that p also represent that p. Given, in addition, that desires
represent projectively (as blueprints do), TTIR is also committed to (Norm of Desire) as a
constitutive norm:
(Norm of Desire) Relative to some (arbitrary) scenario things have gone well regarding desires that p (qua desires) iff in that scenario, p.115
Again, (Norm of Desire) is a genuine norm because representation is genuinely normative.
There is an important upshot to accepting (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire). If
these standards of evaluation must be in force to have intentional states (as on TTIR), and,
114 Of course, it is frequently argued that correctness is not genuinely normative. See Boghossian (1989), Papineau (1999), Boghossian (2005), Hattiangadi (2006), Rey (2007), and Glüer and Wikforss (2009). In my “Deflationary Theories of Content and Representation” I argue otherwise. I am not alone in disagreeing. See Dummett (1959) reprinted in Dummett (1978), Wright (1992), Tanney (1999), Wedgwood (2007a), and Wedgwood (2007b). For my purposes, I will assume what I have attempted to establish elsewhere—that correctness is genuinely normative. 115 Thus, pace Boghossian (2005), there are standards of evaluation applicable to desires as well. Perhaps Boghossian overlooks that representations can be like blueprints instead of like maps.
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moreover, intentional states are natural, physical states, there must be an explanation of the
standards of evaluation in terms of the natural, physical states that constitute intentional states.
What sort of explanation is required? A correct application of moral standards of
evaluation requires the existence of metaphysically supporting explanations. Aaron’s turning in
this very paper on Kant is morally wrong because he copied it from the internet. Any action is
morally wrong by virtue of its having certain relevant natural and descriptive properties. Even if
moral properties do not reduce to descriptive properties, moral properties strongly supervene
on and are realized by descriptive properties. Thinking that an action is morally wrong commits
one to the existence of an explanation: one must think that there are some descriptive
properties that account for the moral wrongness of the action. These descriptive properties
must be properties generally relevant to moral wrongness. There may be no strict general
theory—no exceptionless non-massively-disjunctive generalizations—of how the moral
supervenes on the descriptive. Still, at the very least there should be ceteris paribus
generalizations. (Else, how could we recognize when moral properties apply by apprehending
natural, descriptive properties in the supervenience base as we so obviously do?) Natural and
descriptive properties account for moral properties in accordance with these generalizations.
The standards of evaluation constitutive of representational properties should also
strongly supervene on descriptive properties. Thus, thinking that a belief that p is correct
commits one to the existence of an explanation—one must think that there are descriptive
properties that account for the correctness of the belief. The existence of this explanation does
not entail that there is a reduction of representational properties to descriptive properties.
There may be no strict general theory of how the representational supervenes on the
descriptive. However, if there is no strict general theory of how representational properties
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supervene on descriptive properties, there must at least be ceteris paribus generalizations.116
(How could one recognize representational properties by apprehending natural, descriptive
properties in the supervenience base otherwise?) Natural and descriptive properties account
for representational properties in accordance with these generalizations. Advocates of a DTC
forego an explanation of robust representational properties by foregoing robust representation
in their theory of intentionality.
§4: Sketching the Argument
At this point, we're in a position to draw out the tension between TTIR and deflationism about
truth. In this section, I present the argument in sketch.
Before I do, a word about terminology. There will come a point in §6 when it will be
important to make a distinction between whether we're talking about truth and belief as it
applies to propositions on the one hand or to sentences on the other. However, by and large,
what applies in one case will apply in the other. Rather than saying the same thing in both the
propositional and sentential cases, I'll talk in terms of “truth” and “belief” and just leave it
unspecified whether this is propositional or sentential truth, or belief as a relation that applies
to propositions or as a relation that applies to sentences. When I want to restrict the discussion
to the propositional or sentential case, I'll make that explicit. Thus, when I want to talk only
about propositional truth and the believing or the believability of a proposition, I will say so.
Likewise, when I want to talk only about sentential truth and the belief-boxing or belief-
boxability of a sentence, I will also say so.
116 Cf. Chapter One, §2.8.
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With that clarification in mind, let's move to the argument.117 An advocate of TTIR is
committed to (Norm of Belief). Any reasonable theorist about truth is committed to:
(Truth Conditions) Beliefs that p are true relative to some (arbitrary) scenario iff in that scenario, p.
Because instances of (Norm of Belief) and (Truth Conditions) are obviously necessary truths, any
advocate of TTIR is committed to the following equivalence:
(Equivalence) Necessarily, beliefs that p are correct (qua belief) relative to some (arbitrary) scenario iff they are true relative to that scenario.
Given TTIR, truth (relative to a scenario) is obviously necessarily co-extensive with correct
believability (relative to that same scenario). (Remember, this is not a triviality because
correctness is normative.)
As explained last section, an adherent of TTIR owes an account of correct belief. Due to
the supervenience of standards of evaluation on the descriptive, natural, descriptive properties
account for the correctness or incorrectness of individuals’ psychological states. Moreover,
natural, descriptive properties don’t account for representational correctness haphazardly. As
discussed in §3, there are some regularities in the supervenience. Consequently, one might
expect a theory of correctness that explains, in general, what makes individuals’ psychological
states correct or incorrect. For instance, one might think there should be some robust natural,
descriptive property (e. g. correspondence) that accounts for the correctness or incorrectness.
Alternatively, one might expect a theory of correctness-conditions that explains, in general,
what makes individuals’ psychological states have the particular correctness-conditions they do
117 Rattan (2005) argues in a similar spirit that a deflationary theory of truth is only genuinely viable given a deflationary theory of content. I will not try to draw the connections between his argument and mine.
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(e. g. because of conceptual role). (More on the distinction between theories of correctness and
theories of correctness-conditions in §5 and §6.)
Given that truth and correct believability are necessarily co-extensive (relative to any
scenario), nothing prevents the adherent of TTIR from giving the theory of correctness required
by her view as her theory of truth. Why shouldn’t she? Note, though, that a theory of correct
believability does not qualify as a deflationary theory of truth. An adequate theory of correct
believability explains in general the correctness, or correctness-conditions, of individuals’
psychological states in terms of other natural and descriptive properties. Consequently, unlike
deflationary truth, correctness does not appear to be suitably transparent. Moreover,
deflationary truth, unlike correct believability, is not normative.
Of course, the adherent of TTIR might opt to give as her theory of truth, not her account
of correct believability, but a deflationary account. Even if truth and correct believability are
necessarily co-extensive (relative to any scenario), we can still draw a distinction between them.
An advocate of TTIR can say that truth is a transparent property, which we have a grasp on
merely by accepting some form of the T-schema even while maintaining that what makes a
truth bearer correctly believable requires some much deeper explanation.118
So, an adherent of TTIR might distinguish her theory of truth from her theory of correct
believability. She might give separate accounts where she could give one. She might say that we 118 I am working with a thin concept of property where there's a distinct property for every distinct concept. Even if we are generally more concerned about properties in some (metaphysically) thicker sense, whereon properties are not merely differentiated by our theories about them, the important point here is that an advocate of TTIR can differentiate between the theories of correct believability and deflationary truth. This is true even if the fact that each theory is about something necessarily-coextensive with what the other theory is about establishes that, in some thick metaphysical sense, there is only one property. Obviously two different theories can both be about the same thick property without any incompatibility. Furthermore, there’s nothing strange about the thick property of truth being transparent on one mode of presentation, and not transparent when picked out another way, any more than it’s strange that the thick property of being water is obviously the property of being the actual watery stuff on one mode of presentation and not so obviously when it is picked out as stuff composed primarily of H2O.
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have two properties not one. But why? Why not offer just one theory of truth and correctness?
What do we need a deflationary theory of truth for, if our view about content already commits
us to a theory of correct believability? What about our concept of truth requires us to give a
deflationary theory of truth, especially if TTIR is, as some have suggested, the common sense
view?
The case for deflationism about truth is most compelling when there isn’t any
alternative. After all, any viable theory of truth will be committed to the idea that some version
of the T-schema is not only correct, but somehow platitudinous.119 That much is sufficient for a
theory of truth—including a theory of correct believability—to do the work that a deflationary
theory of truth can do. So long as people generally accept the T-schema, they will be able to
ascribe truth to a truth bearer as proxy for asserting it and vice-versa, and thus be able to use
truth to make generalizations, etc.120 The most persuasive argument for deflationism about
truth, then, is that we don't need a thicker concept of truth. However, if TTIR is right, we do
need, in effect, a thicker concept of truth, precisely because, given the nature of intentional
states, we need a substantive theory of correct believability.
A thorough-going deflationist asserts there isn’t an alternative to deflationism about
truth; we don't need—and can't have—anything thicker than a deflationary concept of truth.
According to the thorough-going deflationist, not only is truth transparent and non-normative,
there is nothing necessarily co-extensive with truth (relative to any scenario) that isn’t also just
as transparent and just as non-normative. A thorough-going deflationist, then, cannot accept
TTIR.
119 See Gupta (1993). 120 For a good, detailed discussion of this point, see Heck (2004), 223-228.
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I take this argument to be conclusive. However, there's benefit to be had in examining
the argument more carefully. In the face of this argument, skepticism about the possibility of a
general, substantial theory of truth and correctness might lead one to reject TTIR. This rejection
would be too quick. To understand how there might be room for TTIR, it helps to distinguish
carefully between theories of truth and correctness and theories of truth- and correctness-
conditions. Even if there is no substantial theory of truth and correctness, there might still be a
substantial theory of truth- and correctness-conditions, and the latter can be sufficient for TTIR.
The absence of a general, substantive theory of truth does not pave the way for deflationary
theories of truth; general substantive theories of truth-conditions are also incompatible with
deflationism about truth.121 To understand fully the commitments of deflationism about truth,
it is helpful to understand the two different ways an advocate of TTIR can discharge her
explanatory debt.
§5: Common Property Explanations (CPE)
§5.1: The Basics of CPEs
I have claimed that the advocate of TTIR has an explanatory debt to discharge vis-à-vis correct
belief, and moreover that discharging this debt is inconsistent with thorough-going deflationism
about truth. I also suggested that an adherent of TTIR might discharge her explanatory debt in
two different ways—via a theory of correctness or via a theory of correctness-conditions. In this
subsection, I discuss a theory of correctness before raising some difficulties for it in the next
subsection. In §6, we will consider the distinct possibility of a theory of correctness-conditions.
121 Among deflationists, Field is most aware of this fact. From the onset, he has presented his deflationary views about truth and content as a package. See Field (1994).
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The explanatory debt of TTIR would be discharged if its advocate could show that truth
bearers are correctly believable in virtue of their having some single deeply explanatory not-
massively-disjunctive descriptive (DEND) property, e. g. (if there were such a thing) structural
resemblance between truth bearer and world, and not correctly believable in virtue of their
failing to have that property. Explaining correct believability along these lines is analogous to
explaining the particular moral badness of greedy actions by pointing to some underlying
descriptive property that all and only greedy actions have in common.122 When it comes to the
moral badness of greedy actions, the existence of this sort of explanation is plausible because
greedy actions genuinely have things in common, e. g. a disregard for others' concerns, that
non-greedy actions do not. In other words, it is only because there does seem to be a not-
massively-disjunctive descriptive property underlying greedy actions, that an explanation of
moral badness by this property seems viable. For completely analogous reasons, in order for
there to be an analogous explanation of correct believability, the explaining descriptive property
needs to be not-massively-disjunctive in order to carry the explanatory weight. That a
proposition has the property of either being the proposition that snow is white and such that
snow is white or being the proposition that grass is green and such that grass is green, etc.
presumably cannot explain why that proposition is correctly believable. Having that property
does not constitute having anything genuinely in common, and thus cannot explain why two
propositions are both correctly believed.
Someone attracted to traditional correspondence theories of truth might find
compelling the view that correct believability is explained by some common property; a
122 See Lynch (2004).
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traditional correspondence theorist might argue that the correctness of a belief was to be
explained in virtue of the belief's having some fleshed out property of correspondence.123
As a variation on this position, the adherent of TTIR might believe that truth bearers are
to be divided up into domains, e. g., the domains of moral propositions (or sentences), of
observational propositions (or sentences), etc., according to what the truth bearers are about.
Given a proper division, an adherent of TTIR might believe that, for any particular domain, there
is some single DEND property such that a truth bearer from that domain is correctly believed in
virtue of having that property and not correctly believed in virtue of failing to have that
property. This view might appeal to someone attracted to pluralism about truth.124
If some such approach to explaining correctness is successful, a problem for
deflationism about truth clearly emerges. If one can explain correct believability in terms of, for
instance, robust correspondence, why shouldn’t one offer robust correspondence as a theory of
truth? (This is just a more specific instance of the point I made in §4.)
Of course, no one can force someone committed to a correspondence theory of
correctness to accept a correspondence theory of truth. One might accept a correspondence
theory of correctness and a deflationary theory of truth, but with what motivation?
123 In Chapter One, I argued that correspondence is the by-product of representation. If so, the advocate of TTIR cannot look to correspondence in order to explain representation because representation explains correspondence. 124 Wright (1992) advocates pluralism about truth. Lynch (2009) argues for another version of pluralism about truth, which allows simultaneously that truth is a single, unified functional property.
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§5.2: Challenges to CPEs
Why might this general strategy of explaining correct believability for some (nontrivial) domain
of truth bearers through a common DEND property fail to work?
One of the main motivations behind deflationary theories of truth just is the intuition
that there is no common DEND property that all and only the true truth bearers in any nontrivial
domain, e. g. moral domain, observational domain, etc., have. A Mentalese counterpart of
‘Snow is white’ is true in virtue of snow's being white while a Mentalese counterpart of ‘Grass is
green’ is true in virtue of something entirely different—namely, grass's being green. In some
sense, there can be no one theory of truth; each truth bearer requires a different theory. What
these individual theories have in common is the same form, which the T-schema manifests.
Thus, deflationists about truth are maniacal pluralists. Unless truth bearers are or have the very
same content, they belong to different “domains” requiring different theories of truth.
There is something very plausible about this claim. (I accept it myself.) Of course, if
there is no common DEND property that all and only true truth bearers in any nontrivial domain
have in common, there is no common DEND property that all and only correctly believable truth
bearers in any nontrivial domain have in common either. After all, truth and correct
believability are necessarily co-extensive (relative to any scenario). Consequently, if the
deflationist about truth is right, then we will not be able to explain correct believability in any
nontrivial domain, e. g., the moral domain, observational domain, etc., by pointing to a common
DEND property of all and only correctly believable truth bearers in that domain.
In conversation, I have found that people find maniacal pluralism more plausible in the
case of sentences than in the case of propositions. They are tempted to think that, although
there is no DEND property that all and only true sentences in any nontrivial domain have in
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common, there still might be, for every nontrivial domain of propositions, some DEND property
that all and only true propositions from that domain have in common. One might use these
properties to explain why propositions from various nontrivial domains are correctly
believable.125
However prevalent this temptation, it is very difficult to see how we could coherently be
maniacal pluralists about sentential truth but not about propositional truth. There is, after all, a
tight relationship between sentential and propositional truth. Sentences are true if the
propositions they express are true, and propositions are true if the sentences that express them
are true. If what fundamentally makes particular token sentences true varies according to the
proposition expressed, then it stands to reason that what fundamentally makes particular
propositions true varies according to what proposition it is. Maniacal pluralism about
propositional truth appears intimately tied up with maniacal pluralism about sentential truth.
(The converse is also likely to be true for completely analogous reasons.)
§6: Determination Theories
§6.1 Another Option
We have seen that accepting maniacal pluralism about truth requires accepting maniacal
pluralism about correct believability. Thus, accepting maniacal pluralism is incompatible with a
substantial, general theory of correctness.
125 Obviously, these properties must be relational. Whether the proposition that snow is white is true depends on the snow (and thus can’t be intrinsic), while whether the proposition that grass is green is true depends not on the snow, but on the grass (and thus can’t be intrinsic either). Clearly the idea must be that for nontrivial domains, there is some deeply explanatory non-disjunctive descriptive relational property that all true and only true propositions from that domain have in common.
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Accepting maniacal pluralism, however, does not require abandoning TTIR. One can
endorse the position that there are no general explanations of the correct believability of truth
bearers without compromising on the explanation of correct and incorrect believing requisite
for an adequate version of TTIR.
How? Instead of offering a general explanation of what makes for correct believability,
one offers a general explanation of when token sentences of Mentalese have the particular
conditions of correct (or incorrect) belief-boxability that they do. Instead of having a general
theory of correctness, one has a general theory of correctness-conditions.
Following Christopher Peacocke, we might call this general explanation of conditions of
correct belief-boxability a “determination theory” because it shows how natural and descriptive
properties like conceptual role determine certain conditions of correct belief-boxability.126
Subsequently, one explains the correct belief-boxability of particular token sentences of
Mentalese by pointing, first, to the general explanation of how token sentences come to have
particular conditions of correct belief-boxability and, second, to the fulfillment of those
conditions. Thus, the descriptive states of affairs that make sentences correctly belief-boxable
have nothing generally in common, but all sentences are correctly belief-boxable in virtue of
some such state of affairs obtaining.127
To understand this suggestion more thoroughly, consider an analogy to games. Winning
is a normative property. Thus, given the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive,
whether a participant wins must be accounted for with natural and descriptive facts.
126 See Peacocke (1992), 17-21. It’s worth saying that (unlike Peacocke (1992)) I am not assuming that an adequate determination theory shows how conditions of correct belief-boxability are computable from the relevant natural/descriptive properties. It may be enough for adequacy that the determination theory merely points to ceteris paribus regularities in how the relevant natural/descriptive properties account for conditions of correct belief-boxability. 127 See Gupta (2003), 660 where a similar idea is discussed about truth.
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Nevertheless, there is no general explanation of what makes a person or team the winner on
some occasion—what state of affairs accounts for winning varies according to the game the
person or team is participating in. In this respect, an analogous maniacal pluralism with respect
to winning seems very plausible. Nonetheless, we can still account for how particular people
and teams win in natural and descriptive terms. Why? One can offer a general explanation of
how people or teams become participants of some (rather than some other) game, and hence
subject to some (rather than some other) conditions for winning. Pointing to the fulfillment of
those conditions, one can subsequently explain how individuals win.
Maniacal pluralism about correct belief-boxability says that there are no general
regularities as to how correct belief-boxability itself supervenes on descriptive properties. In
light of what I suggested in §3—that there must be regularities about how representational
properties supervene on the descriptive—this might seem problematic for TTIR. Nonetheless,
there’s no problem for TTIR so long as there are regularities as to how the conditions for correct
belief-boxability of token sentences supervene on descriptive properties. Having certain
conditions for correct belief-boxability just amounts to having a certain representational
property. Consequently, if there are regularities as to how conditions of correct belief-boxability
supervene, then there are regularities as to how representational properties supervene as well.
Even if the advocate of TTIR adopts a general theory of correctness conditions for
sentences rather a general theory of correctness, the arguments from §4 still apply. Assume
that there is some general explanation of how token sentences of Mentalese come to have the
conditions of correct belief-boxability that they do. What is the motivation, now, for sentential
deflationism about truth? Why wouldn’t we just lift the general explanation of how token
sentences of Mentalese come to have the particular conditions of correct belief-boxability that
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they do and turn it into a general explanation of how token sentences of Mentalese come to
have the truth-conditions that they do? After all, there’s nothing stopping us giving a
determination theory for sentential truth along the exact same lines as the determination
theory for correct belief-boxability; sentential truth and correct belief-boxability are necessarily
co-extensive (relative to any scenario). Why wouldn’t we, as theorists about sentential truth,
identify sentential truth (relative to a scenario) with correct belief-boxability (relative to that
same scenario)?
Doing so, of course, involves rejecting sentential deflationism about truth. After all, one
will accept that for any sentence, there is a deep explanation of its particular truth-conditions.
Thus, sentential truth isn’t transparent. I won’t insist that there isn’t any motivation for
separating our theories of sentential truth and correct belief-boxability (although I don’t know
what the motivation is supposed to be), but the sentential deflationist about truth who also
endorses TTIR owes us an account of it.
Regardless, one can immediately see why accepting a thorough-going sentential
deflationism about truth commits one to denying TTIR. A thorough-going sentential deflationist
will deny that there is even a viable theory of truth available according to which truth isn’t
transparent. Suppose for argument’s sake that the view that gives the account of correct belief-
boxability conditions as its account of truth-conditions is less well motivated than I think;
nonetheless, that view is a(n) (albeit less well-motivated) alternative account to sentential
deflationism about truth. Why? There is a property, correct belief-boxability that is both
necessarily co-extensive with truth (relative to any scenario) and not transparent.
Consequently, if TTIR is true and, consequently, there is a general account of correct belief-
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boxability conditions (even if there isn’t a general account of correct belief-boxability),
thorough-going sentential deflationism about truth is false.
§6.2: Maniacal Pluralism, Determination Theories, and Propositional Deflationism
Last subsection, we saw how maniacal pluralism and TTIR jointly bear on sentential deflationism
about truth. In this subsection, I will explore how they jointly bear on propositional deflationism
about truth.
According to TTIR, propositions are differentiated at least in part according to their
representational properties.128 Put another way, propositions can be distinguished from each
other partly by their conditions for correct belief. Two propositions are different if one is
correctly believed relative to some scenario while the other is not correctly believed relative to
that same scenario.
In this respect, propositions differ from token sentences of Mentalese. Sentences of
Mentalese are distinguished by their physical characteristics. They have their conditions of
correct belief-boxability only contingently. Propositions, on the other hand, have (or are) their
conditions of correct believability essentially.129 Moreover, anybody who understands exactly
which proposition some proposition is must understand the conditions under which the
proposition is correctly believed. Thus, while it makes sense that there should be a deep
explanation of the conditions of correct belief-boxability for token sentences of Mentalese,
there can be no deep explanation of the conditions of correct believability for propositions.
128 Of course, the advocate of a DTC will disagree; on his theory, propositions are merely that which sentences with certain “use” properties express. 129 Henceforth, I will not be careful about whether propositions merely have or in fact are their conditions of correct believability.
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Of course, that propositions have their conditions of correct believability essentially and
self-evidently does not obviously require us to the conclude that correct believability is a
transparent property of propositions in the way that propositional deflationists about truth
typically claim that truth is transparent. Part of truth’s purported transparency is that one says
little more than that snow is white when one says that the proposition that snow is white is
true. That the proposition that snow is white is correctly believable may well imply that snow is
white and vice-versa, but it is not obvious that one says little more than that snow is white when
one says that the proposition that snow is white is correctly believable, and vice-versa. In
claiming that snow is white, one says something about snow; in claiming that the proposition
that snow is white is correctly believable, one evaluates a hypothetical belief that snow is white.
The property of correct believability does not seem to be redundant even in spirit.
Putting that concern aside, let us grant for a moment that because propositions have
their conditions of correct believability essentially and self-evidently, the advocate of TTIR
should concede that correctly believability is a transparent property. Suppose also that we have
accepted maniacal pluralism about propositional correct believability, so that there is no general
explanation of what makes a proposition correctly believable. Finally, suppose that we offer as
our theory of propositional truth, the following: necessarily, a proposition is true relative to
some scenario if and only if it is correctly believed relative to that scenario. Are we not now led
to a propositional deflationism about truth?
No. On a deflationary theory of truth, truth is not normative. Correct believability,
however, is normative. Consequently, a theory of propositional truth according to which
propositional truth just is correct believability is not a deflationary theory of truth.
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That correct believability is normative is not an inconsequential fact. If propositions are
differentiated according to their conditions of correct believability, token sentences will be
differentiated by their conditions of correct belief-boxability according to the propositions they
express. Otherwise, to belief-box a token sentence expressing a proposition would not
necessarily be to believe that proposition. As we’ve discussed, because correctness supervenes
on descriptive properties, showing that token sentences have certain conditions of correct
belief-boxability requires a determination theory of some generality. One must be able to
explain in general how a token sentence comes to have some (rather than some other)
conditions for correct belief-boxability even if the generalizations aren’t strict. Not everyone
feels so committed to a determination theory of this sort though.130
Thus, there is good reason to think that an account of propositional truth according to
which propositional truth is normative is not a deflationary theory of truth, even if both truth
and correct believability are transparent. Deflationists about truth typically claim that the
nature of truth provides no constraint on a theory of content (or a theory of anything else).
However, because correctness is normative, conditions of correct believability do provide a
constraint on a theory of content by requiring an adequate determination theory. If truth is
exactly like correct believability in this respect, truth-conditions will likewise put a constraint on
the theory of content by requiring an adequate determination theory. Consequently, a theory
of truth according to which truth just is correct believability does not seem to qualify as a
propositional deflationary theory of truth.
Of course, one could accept that there is this normative property of correct believability
that is necessarily co-extensive (relative to any scenario) with truth and yet reject that truth is
130 Paul Horwich, for instance, has explicitly challenged that commitment. See Horwich (1995) reprinted in Horwich (2004). See also Horwich (1998), 65-8 and chapters 3 and 4 of Horwich (2005).
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normative. In this way, one might maintain a propositional deflationism about truth while
accepting both maniacal pluralism and TTIR. However, as I've continued to say, an advocate of
this sort of position owes us an explanation for his creative accounting; he gives two theories,
one of correct believability, the other of truth, where he could give one.
Even if motivation for that view is forthcoming, a thorough-going propositional
deflationism is obviously false as there is a property necessarily co-extensive with propositional
truth (relative to any scenario) that, even if transparent, is also normative.
§7: Review
In §4, I sketched an argument to the conclusion that two independently plausible views,
thorough-going deflationism about truth and TTIR, are inconsistent. Let us review that
argument.
TTIR commits one to the existence of conditions of correct believability. Moreover,
given obvious constraints on the theory of correct believability and the theory of truth, truth
relative to some scenario is necessarily co-extensive with correct believability relative to that
scenario. Barring any forthcoming countervailing consideration, this straightforward
consequence of her theoretical commitments ought to move the adherent of TTIR to conclude
that correct believability and truth (relative to any scenario) are not different properties.
However, there are constraints on the theory of correct believability that stem from the
fact that correctness is normative. Given any plausible theory of the supervenience of the
normative on the natural and descriptive, natural and descriptive properties must account for
correct believability in systematic ways. Of course, if truth just is correct believability, truth
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must be accounted for in systematic ways as well. Consequently, on the supposition that TTIR is
true and truth is identified with correct believability, deflationism about truth—which rejects
that truth must be so accounted for—must be false.
We can see how that this argument goes through by considering the two ways in which
natural and descriptive properties might adequately account for correct believability. In §5, I
discussed one such way. We expect some (complex) natural, descriptive explanatory property
to account for the moral wrongness of greedy actions. We might analogously expect that some
(complex) natural, descriptive explanatory property to account for the correct believability, at
least when truth bearers are restricted to a certain domain. Thus, truth bearers from a certain
domain might be correctly believable in virtue of having this complex natural, descriptive
explanatory property. If so, then, if truth just is correct believability, truth bearers are true in
virtue of having this complex natural, descriptive property. This resulting theory of truth is not
deflationary.
In §6, I discuss the other way natural and descriptive properties might adequately
account for correct believability. We have no reason to think that there is any one natural or
descriptive property (no matter how complex) that accounts for the property of winning.
Participants in different games win under different conditions. Moreover, there is no deep
explanation for why a game has the conditions for winning that it does—not only does a game
have its winning conditions essentially, anyone who understands which game some game is
must know what the conditions for winning are. Nonetheless, we can account for person’s
winning by offering a general explanation for how a person comes to be subject to certain
winning conditions, and then pointing to the fact that in a particular case, those winning
conditions were fulfilled. Analogously, even if there is no deep explanation for why a
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proposition has the conditions of correct believability that it does, we can still offer an account
of a token sentence’s being correctly belief-boxed by offering a determination theory, and then
pointing to the fact that in this particular case, the conditions determined for correct belief-
boxing were fulfilled.
This sort of account of correct belief-boxability conditions satisfies the constraint that
supervenience of the normative on the descriptive be systematic. Moreover, if sentential truth
just is correct belief-boxability, this sort of account of correct-boxability conditions refutes
sentential deflationism, for sentential truth will not be transparent. Of course, even if
propositional truth just is correct believability, we might allow (if we are generous) that
propositional truth counts as transparent. Nonetheless, if propositional truth just is correct
believability, propositional deflationism about truth is false because truth is normative.
As I have pointed out several times, the inconsistency between TTIR and both
propositional and sentential deflationism about truth can be avoided if one is willing to hold
separate theories about necessarily co-extensive properties: correct (propositional) believability
and correct belief-boxability on the one hand, and propositional truth and sentential truth on
the other. Nothing prevents one from steadfastly holding that either propositional or sentential
truth is both robustly transparent and not normative even while holding that there are these
other non-deflationary, but necessarily co-extensive properties, correct (propositional)
believability and correct belief-boxability. Although I wonder at the motivation for this position,
some philosophers appear committed to it.131
131 Scott Soames may be such a person. In Soames (1999), 228-262, he advocates propositional deflationism about truth. Nonetheless, he does not seem adverse to the idea that language/thought may be fraught with “oughts.” See Soames (1999), 29. These “oughts” may well correspond to the standards of evaluation required for TTIR. More importantly, on Soames’s neo-Russellian view of propositions, propositions are naturally understood as representing. See Soames (1987) reprinted in Salmon and
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Of course, the inconsistency between thorough-going deflationism about truth and TTIR
cannot be avoided. The mere existence of a property that is either fundamentally normative or
not transparent and that is also straightforwardly necessarily co-extensive with truth is enough
to refute thorough-going deflationism. As a thorough-going deflationism does entail that TTIR is
false, it is not surprising that deflationists about truth tend to adopt DTCs, TTIR's principal
competitor theories.
§8: Concluding Remarks
The inconsistency between thorough-going deflationism and TTIR is a substantial result. It’s not
uncommon for me to run into philosophers who seem to think that deflationism about truth is
inevitable, i. e., that there are no genuine alternatives to it. If deflationism about truth is
inevitable, though, then something like a DTC probably is as well. (Only if thorough-going
deflationism about truth is correct is deflationism about truth inevitable.) With thorough-going
deflationism about truth, however, one must abandon the notion that the property of being an
intentional state is constitutively representational—and yet many people are of the opinion that
the property of being a intentional state is constitutively representational. So far as I can tell,
TTIR remains a dominant view.
While the inconsistency between thorough-going deflationism and TTIR might initially
incline us to give up latter, I suspect this inclination is at least partly due to the perhaps
somewhat surprising but increasingly apparent plausibility—and even probability—of maniacal
pluralism about truth and our tendency to think that, given maniacal pluralism, only a
Soames (1989). For instance, the proposition consisting of the ordered pair of Scott Soames and the property of being a philosopher is naturally understood as representing that Scott Soames is a philosopher. Thus, his view on propositions fits most naturally with TTIR.
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deflationary theory of truth is possible. Whether or not I am right in suspecting that this
tendency exists, it is definitively mistaken to think that maniacal pluralism entails a deflationary
theory of truth. Although maniacal pluralism makes trouble for a substantive theory of truth, it
does not prove an obstacle to a substantive theory of truth-conditions. Moreover, a substantive
theory of truth-conditions can support TTIR at the expense of thorough-going deflationism
about truth. Consequently, accepting maniacal pluralism about truth does not necessarily put
one on the path to a deflationary theory of truth. Whether or not truth has much of a nature
ultimately depends on the nature of intentional states.132
132 Thanks to Richard Heck, Michael Lynch, Joshua Schechter, Christopher Hill, Jaegwon Kim, and Jamie Dreier for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE:
The Instrumental Value of Truth and the Utility of Belief-
Desire Psychology
§1 Introduction
Philosophers of many different stripes are inclined to take something like
(Norm of Belief*) as common ground:
(Norm of Belief*) Beliefs that p are (in some sense) correct relative to any arbitrary scenario if and only if in that scenario, p. Moreover, a belief that is correct (or incorrect) relative to the actual scenario is correct (or incorrect) simpliciter.
Even when we understand (Norm of Belief) as a genuine norm effectively prohibiting all and
only beliefs that are not true, (Norm of Belief) remains very plausible. A commitment to (Norm
of Belief) is only a commitment to the idea that avoiding false belief is valuable from an
epistemic perspective. (There may, of course, be other epistemic values in tension with (Norm
of Belief).) But why should we care whether our beliefs have value from an epistemic
perspective? What does it matter if beliefs are correct in this sense? In this chapter, I argue
that whatever intrinsic value epistemic value has, it also has instrumental value.133 Absent
defeaters, respecting (Norm of Belief) facilitates satisfying one's antecedent ends.
133 This is a very common sense view (Cf. Haack (1997)) although it is not without challengers (Cf. Stich (1993)).
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My purpose in defending this position, however, is not merely to vindicate common
sense. In §6, I will argue that the pragmatic utility of belief is tied to pragmatic utility of belief-
desire psychology more generally, and understanding the import of belief-desire psychology for
creatures such as ourselves is obviously of independent interest.
More significantly, I suspect that understanding the pragmatic utility of belief-desire
psychology will turn out to be central to understanding the nature of intentionality. I am
partisan to the view that intentional representation inherently has a normative aspectthat
intentional properties like being a belief, being a desire, having a particular content, etc.
constitutively involve having a genuinely teleological function that are intimately tied to
representational norms. Thus, I'm inclined to think that (Norm of Belief), for instance, does not
merely state a necessary normative fact concerning belief, but rather a norm that is partly
constitutive of being a belief with content that p. This initially plausible but somewhat
controversial view is often opposed precisely because it can be difficult to fathom how these
norms and teleological functions arise.134 I conjecture that any adequate answer to this
question must take advantage of the fact that absent special defeating conditions, intentional
states have pragmatic utility for the subject only if they are acting like representations are
supposed to. In this way, teleological function and representational norms might derive from
pragmatic norms, and understanding the pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology might turn
out to be central to understanding the nature of intentionality. I will say a few more things
about this idea at the end of this chapter.
A quick summary of the chapter up until that point: In the next two sections, I will raise
an example to help frame and subsequently clarify the question “Why have true beliefs?”, which
I will be tackling throughout the rest of the paper. In §4, I will explain why I think there ought to
134 Cf. Block (2007), 24.
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be an answer to that question before attempting to give the answer in §5-10. In §5, I will lay out
the general strategy for answering the question, and in §6, I will explain why answering the
question requires thinking about the pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology generally. In
§7-10, I will show how the usefulness of belief-desire psychology hinges on beliefs being true
before addressing objections in §11 and summarizing the conclusion in §12.
§2: Why not Tarot?
How might one disrespect (Norm of Belief)? Explicitly disregarding what is true in belief
formation is rather difficult. It requires not believing something when one has come to believe
that it is true. Given the inferential role of true, doing as much with complete generality may
not be altogether possible. We find it difficult to imagine someone who regularly will not bring
himself to believe something that he believes to be true.
This exercise does not show that (Norm of Belief) is trivially respected. There are other
ways to flout (Norm of Belief). More specifically, even if one always believes something when
they believe it to be true (and vice-versa), one can effectively flout (Norm of Belief) by engaging
in belief forming methods that are apparently not reliable, and hence prone to produce beliefs
that, by (Norm of Belief), are incorrect.
We generally think people who flout (Norm of Belief) in this way are at a practical
disadvantage. For purposes of illustration, consider Hector, an inveterate tarot card reader. On
the basis of his readings, Hector makes various predictions. For a period of time, Hector kept
track of the success ratio of these predictions. He now recognizes that, during that period of
time at least, his tarot card readings were not a source of reliable prediction. Nonetheless,
because he is so superstitious, Hector continues use predictions he's made on the basis of the
cards. Indeed, on the basis of a tarot card reading, Hector has formed the belief that the Greedy
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Bank Corporation (XGBC) stock will rise. Today, he is putting much of his life's savings into a
“special” opportunity to buy shares of XGBC.
Hector is not respecting (Norm of Belief). Not only is the mechanism by which he
formed the belief that XGBC will rise is unreliable and thereby prone to produce beliefs that are
not true, Hector is in a position to know as much. By (Norm of Belief), beliefs that are not true
are incorrect and hence to be avoided, at least when it is feasible for a cognizer to do so. Hector
could avoid many beliefs that are not true if only he were to cease deploying his unreliable
method of forming beliefs on the basis of tarot card readings. By using that method of forming
beliefs, he is disrespecting (Norm of Belief).
Suppose that a friend, Dylan, catches Hector in the process of buying up shares of XGBC,
and discovers that Hector is doing it on the basis of his tarot card reading. Dylan is likely to
disapprove of what Hector is doing largely because in following this course of action, Hector is
likely to lose his shirt. Dylan will take it that Hector's propensity to form false beliefs is a
practical disadvantage to him. But can Dylan defend his position? Suppose that, rather than
admitting that he is a compulsive tarot card reader in need of cognitive rehabilitation, Hector
becomes defensive. “What's so important about having true beliefs anyways?” he says. How
should Dylan answer?
§3: Clarifying the Question
Note that the question Dylan ought to answer is not “Why should we care about having true
beliefs?”. That question might be answered by explaining what is valuable about true belief, but
it is not a question of primary import precisely because agents do not generally directly
influence their belief formation by caring in the sense of desiring to form beliefs in some
particular way or other. Belief formation is not routed through the intentional motivational
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system. Although they are sometimes formed by way of deliberation, beliefs are not formed
through a process of instrumental reasoning. (Even though they are mental acts rather than
mental states, the same could be said of judgments.) We intentionally improve our belief
formation in the way that we intentionally grow flowers. Making flowers grow is not something
we can do directly; we can bring it about only by cultivating the flowers, i.e. understanding the
conditions under which they grow and creating just those conditions. Likewise, we can only
improve our belief formation by thinking about ourselves third-personally as a sort of biological
machine that changes and responds to different sorts of conditions, and then creating the
conditions that will elicit the sort of changes and responses we want. These points strongly
suggest that the question we ought to answer regarding how best to form beliefs is most
fundamentally a question about how we as intentional agents might optimally be designed
rather than a question about how we as intentional agents ought to be motivated or even how
we ought to act. This is not to say that the answer to the first question may turn out to have
ramifications for the latter two, but merely to point out what is likely to be the priority between
the questions.
Even if there were no such priority, there are certain advantages to understanding
Hector's question from the standpoint of a cognitive designer rather than the standpoint of an
epistemic agent; we avoid certain difficult questions regarding, for instance, the nature of
epistemic responsibility and blameworthiness and how to reconcile doxastic deliberation with
doxastic involuntarism. For all of these reasons, I will understand Dylan to be tackling the
question from the standpoint of the cognitive designer.
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§4: A Bad Answer
An answer that does not address the instrumental value of true beliefs is not likely to be
particularly satisfactory. It feels unsatisfactory for Dylan to merely insist that (Norm of Belief) is
true or even insist that it is necessarily true. Even supposing Dylan could bully Hector into
accepting that (Norm of Belief) is true, Hector might just become resentful. “What's so great
about being a believer if it implies there are more things that one's supposed to do?” he might
wonder. “Why couldn't I just be a less cognitively sophisticated creature like an amoeba?
Maybe if I do enough drugs, I can become less cognitively sophisticated and get rid of these
dreadful beliefs and the stupid accompanying norms. . . “
Of course, that the dogmatic answer would be unsatisfactory is no clear indication that
it is not appropriate. As with truths outside the normative realm, when it comes to norms there
has to be an end to explanations somewhere even if this end feels unsatisfactory. When it
comes to certain basic moral principles, for instance, it may be a mistake to ask why we ought to
follow them, i.e., to ask for an explanation of their truth, as tempting as it may be to do so.135 It
is plausible that these basic moral principles do not derive their authority from other norms, and
thus, that they have no explanation. Is (Norm of Belief) like that? People may non-
instrumentally value true beliefs, and perhaps they are right to do so. Perhaps true belief is
intrinsically to-be-valued.
Even if it is, Hector's resentful reply to a dogmatic answer shows why the dogmatic
answer must be incomplete. It can make sense to resent our moral obligations when they
become especially onerous, but resenting our obligation to believe truly only rarely makes sense
even when that obligation is difficult to fulfill.136 There are, of course, occasions when pursuing
135 Cf. Pritchard (1912). 136 This is not to say that it might make perfect sense to resent that this obligation is difficult to fulfill.
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truth can get one into trouble, for example, when one is surrounded by intolerant, close-minded
peers, but by and large, trouble comes not from pursuing truth, but failing to do so. Merely
insisting that being a believer comes with an obligation to believe truly fails to point out that
being a believer is independently advantageous precisely because it opens the possibility of true
belief. To give a full and complete answer to Hector, Dylan needs to point out the
(independent) pragmatic utility of being a believer.
§5: Truth as Instrumentally Valuable
More precisely, Dylan must explain how true beliefs are instrumental to satisfying antecedent
ends (at least in the long run and absent defeaters). Antecedent ends are ends that are
conceptually and metaphysically prior to belief-desire psychology, e. g. survival and pain
avoidance; they are our ends, but not due to our status as intentional agents with beliefs and
desires. If Dylan can show him that true beliefs are instrumental so that the cognitive
sophistication of belief-desire psychology advantages a creature, Hector will not only see why he
as a believer should have true beliefs, he will be in a position to rationally embrace being a
believer. Is it the case that true beliefs promote antecedent ends? Of course, true beliefs are
not always pragmatic. Hector's belief that the convenience store will be open when he arrives
may be true, but if there is an armed robbery shortly after he arrives, that belief may not, in the
end, facilitate his survival. After all, had he not had the belief that the convenience store would
be open when he arrived, he may not have gone to the convenience store. Had he had the
belief that the convenience store would not be open when he arrived, he certainly would not
have gone to the convenience store. Obviously, had he not gone to the convenience store, he
would not have been in mortal peril when the armed robbery occurred shortly after he arrived.
In this case, the pragmatic belief, i.e. a belief that serves Hector's antecedent ends, is a false
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belief, not a true one. Of course, Hector would have been served equally as well, pragmatically,
if he had had, in addition to his true belief that the convenience store will be open when he
arrives, the true belief that there will shortly be an armed robbery at that convenience store.
True beliefs won't fail to be pragmatic when they are supported by other relevant beliefs that
are true and relevant desires that are good. The problem is that a person can fail to have the
relevant supporting true beliefs. They can also fail to have relevant supporting desires that are
good. In these sorts of cases, true beliefs are not pragmatic.
In and of itself, however, this result need not worry Dylan. That a pragmatic belief need
not be true does not entail that true beliefs do not facilitate the satisfaction of antecedent ends.
In the same way that certain strategies may facilitate winning a game, e. g. Texas Hold'em, even
when following these strategies are neither sufficient nor strictly required for winning, so having
true beliefs may facilitate satisfying antecedent ends even though true beliefs are neither
sufficient nor strictly required for doing so. Pointing out that pursuing true beliefs is the ideal
strategy (absent defeaters) for pursuing pragmatic beliefs should be enough to defuse Hector
(assuming he responds to Dylan rationally, which may or may not be a safe assumption). The
relevant question, then, is whether pursuing true beliefs (rather than some other alternative)
best promotes a subject's antecedent ends.
§6: Is Instrumental Reasoning the Key?
Let us consider some initial considerations in favor of the true-belief strategy.
Generally, true instrumental beliefs do promote the satisfaction of the desires they are
instrumental to. If bringing it about that p is one of the basic intentional actions a person can
carry out, a person's belief that if p, then q and desire that q can partly (causally) explain a
person's bringing it about that p. (I say partly in the first place because the person might well
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choose to some other means to try to bring q about.) In the event that this belief is true, the
person will have also brought it about that q.137
Nonetheless, in marshalling these considerations for the conclusion that beliefs
promote the antecedent ends of the subject, we come upon one major obstacle. Promoting the
satisfaction of desires may or may not lead to promoting antecedent ends. To use a previous
example, promoting the satisfaction of Hector's desire to pick up some things at the
convenience store will not promote his antecedent ends if the satisfaction of that desire puts
him in the middle of an armed robbery. The satisfaction of explicitly suicidal desires may
likewise not promote antecedent ends. It appears, then, the question “What strategy of belief
formation would promote the antecedent ends of the subject?” cannot be answered
independent of knowing how closely aligned the motivational system is to the subject's
antecedent ends. If there has to be a joint, coordinated strategy of belief/desire formation in
order to effectively pursue a subject's antecedent ends, isn't possible that truth might not be
what's pragmatic for beliefs when desires are bad?
The take home lesson of this major obstacle is that the utility of beliefs can only be
properly understood through understanding the utility of belief-desire psychology considered as
a whole.138
§7: The Utility of Belief-Desire Psychology
What does the addition of a belief-desire psychology do for a subject? Without question, a
belief-desire psychology can help a subject make advantageous changes to his environment.
However, a belief-desire psychology is not required for a subject to make advantageous changes
137 Cf. Horwich (1998), 190-2 and Horwich (2006). 138 I take it that this point motivates the comment in Harman (1991) that “it is easy to see how [Stich’s] arguments against caring about whether one’s beliefs are true can be converted into an argument against caring that one’s desires come true.”
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to his environment. In fact, under certain circumstances, subjects are better odeploying some
other mechanism to make these changes. When Hector trips, he finds that his hands extend out
from his body to prevent his head from meeting the pavement. This motion is not one that
Hector carries out intentionally. While he does desire (generally) that his head not meet the
pavement, his hands do not extend out from his body on these occasions because of this desire
and the belief (which he has in retrospect if at all) that putting his hands out in that sort of way
would help prevent his head from meeting the pavement. The behavior Hector exhibits is
reflexive, not intentional. Even complex reflexive behavior does not require belief-desire
psychology.
Using reflex mechanisms can be an effective way for a subject to make advantageous
changes in the environment. In many cases, reflex mechanisms are far more effective than
belief-desire psychology would be. The processing required to intentionally put one's hands out
to break one's fall probably takes too much time for belief-desire psychology to be useful.
Reflex behavior has far more pragmatic utility in that sort of circumstance. When a detectable
condition, C, is (1) very commonplace, and the way to deal with C is plain or (2) only somewhat
commonplace, but responding with a particular behavior is paramount, a creature is far better
off if he is built to anticipate facing C with a reflex mechanism that produces the advantageous
behavior in C. Alternatively, if the creature can't be built with the reflex mechanism, he would
be well off to be built such that he develops such reflex mechanisms through conditioning.
Responding to C via a belief-desire psychology is likely to be less efficient when it comes to the
time and energy expended.
Belief-desire psychology is far more useful for subjects in cases where a variety of
conditions they can easily detect do not call for any particular behavior taken individually, but
only taken collectively. These are cases, for example, in which it is useful to synthesize
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information coming from different sources. Moreover, these are cases that are not
commonplace enough to (practically) warrant having a “hardwired” rote behavioral response,
nor, typically, are they common enough to have developed a conditioned behavioral response
to them. Belief-desire psychology is useful in novel cases where differences in present
conditions are significant enough from those faced previously so as to call for new behaviors or
procedures. Whereas reflex mechanisms give you speed in responding to the environment,
belief-desire psychology gives you flexibility in responding to the environment. Reflex
mechanisms are excellent, but only of use in specific common conditions; belief-desire
psychology is fair, but of use in confronting many different conditions. To illustrate the sorts of
situation in which belief-desire psychology is useful, consider the bare details of a charming
anecdote from P. G. Wodehouse:139
Jeeves is in a quandary. His master, Bertie Wooster, is engaged to Honoria Glossop. Unfortunately, marrying Honoria Glossop furthers neither the interests of Bertie, nor Jeeves. Evidently, Bertie is afraid of confrontation and cannot manage breaking the engagement of his own accord. Sir Roderick Glossop, a psychiatrist and Honoria's father, is coming over to Bertie's for lunch. Before he arrives, Bertie's cousins stop with a friend to ask whether they might find assistance in stowing several stolen items, including cats, a fish, and Sir Roderick Glossop's hat. Jeeves invites Bertie's cousins and their friend to leave these items at Bertie's flat without telling Bertie anything about it. When Sir Roderick discovers these stolen items, he eventually comes to believe that Bertie is not right in the head and, consequently, Bertie's engagement to Honoria Glossop is broken.
It was not by luck that Jeeves facilitated the break-up of Bertie's engagement. Furthermore,
while a reflex mechanism that had Jeeves bring the cats, fish, and Sir Roderick Glossop's hat into
Bertie's at in precisely the conditions he did would have successfully facilitated the break-up of
Bertie's engagement, having a reflex mechanism of that sort is not practical given how unlikely it
is for those very conditions to arise. It is not practical to have built-in reflex mechanisms for
139 Wodehouse (1953).
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every outlandish contingency, and yet it is useful to have means to respond to a wide variety of
outlandish contingencies. A solution to this problem is belief-desire psychology. It was not a
reflex that lead Jeeves to the behavior that ultimately facilitated his and his master's antecedent
ends, but rather his beliefs and desires. Although belief-desire psychology requires heavy duty
cognitive machinery, it can serve well creatures who are likely to confront some of a broad
range of detectable, but complex conditions each of which optimally requires a different
behavioral response.
How can belief-desire psychology help someone like Jeeves? To respond reliably with
adeptness to a plethora of specific situations, Jeeves needs the internal cognitive motivational
states that select specific behaviors to be appropriately tied to his ends considered more
broadly. The way to accomplish the connection is straightforward enough: one just needs a
little instrumental reasoning. Jeeves has core desires to further his principal antecedent ends
generally. Jeeves has instrumental beliefs that tell him how to satisfy those general desires.
These core desires and instrumental beliefs cause new, more specific desires. These new
specific desires combine with further instrumental beliefs to cause even more specific desires.
These newer even more specific desires combine with further instrumental beliefs. . . etc.
Eventually, the specific desires Jeeves forms will be specific enough so as to select for and cause
specific behaviors that Jeeves is capable of exhibiting. Selected behaviors will, ceteris paribus,
further Jeeves antecedent ends so long as 1) his original core desires were closely aligned with
his antecedent ends, and 2) his instrumental beliefs were true. We can see how this process
helped Jeeves specifically in the foregoing example. Jeeves has a core desire to fulfill his basic
needs, e.g. having food, clothes, shelter, etc. If Jeeves has an instrumental belief that being well
employed will facilitate his basic needs, Jeeves will come to have the more specific desire to be
well employed. If Jeeves believes that Bertie's marrying Honoria Glossop will prove an obstacle
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to his being well employed, Jeeves will come to desire that Bertie not marry Honoria Glossop. If
Jeeves believes that Sir Roderick Glossop's thinking poorly of Bertie will most easily prevent
Bertie from marrying Honoria Glossop (without endangering Jeeve's employment), Jeeves will
come to desire that Sir Roderick Glossop think poorly of Bertie. Finally, if Jeeves believes that
stowing stolen items in Bertie's apartment without Bertie's knowledge will facilitate Sir Roderick
Glossop thinking poorly of Bertie, Jeeves will come desire to stow stolen items in Bertie's
apartment without Bertie's knowledge. This last desire is one that, on the occasion of Bertie's
cousins and their friend coming to the door, Jeeves is capable of carrying out—and so he does.
Jeeves's exhibiting that particular behavior for those particular circumstances is no accident; it's
the product of his initial desires and beliefs and the process of instrumental reasoning.
Moreover, it's no accident that Jeeves's behavior is advantageous to the specific
situation he's in. His behavior is guaranteed to further his antecedent ends ceteris paribus so
long as his original core desire is to further those ends and his instrumental beliefs are true.
Furthermore, there's every reason to think that Jeeves can generally have true instrumental
beliefs so long as his belief forming and sustaining faculties reliably produce true beliefs.
Consequently, so long as Jeeves's core desires are closely aligned with his antecedent ends,
there's every reason to think that he will be able to respond reliably to very unusual
circumstances in optimally advantageous ways.
§8: Dual Process Theories and the Emergence of Belief-Desire
Psychology
The distinction I have drawn between reex mechanisms and belief-desire psychology coincides
with—and hence is supported by—a distinction that cognitive scientists have independently
postulated in order to understand empirical results concerning human reasoning. Because the
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cognitive scientists' theory so nicely complements my own proposal, it's worth reviewing it
briefly here.140
According to dual process accounts of reasoning, there are two cognitive systems
involved in human processing, aptly named “System 1” and “System 2”. System 1 is perhaps not
so much a system as a set of autonomous modules; System 1 processing is parallel, fast, and at
least largely subpersonal. The paradigms of System 1 processing are associative reasoning on
the basis of similarity to prototypes or exemplars and the use of heuristics. System 1 is
postulated to explain (among other things) the conjunction fallacy whereby a conjunction is
judged (per impossible) to be less probable than one its conjuncts precisely because the
occurrence of the conjunct is closer to the subject's stereotype of the situation.
System 2 is serial, slow, and more taxing for the subject to deploy. Unlike System 1,
System 2 reasoning proceeds relatively abstractly, and hence, is not closely tied to what is
reasoned about. Hypothetical reasoning and causal modeling are considered paradigmatic
System 2 processes, as is formal rule-based reasoning such as deduction or explicit statistical or
probabilistic inference. System 2 processing is systematic, and hence, sensitive to constraints of
coherence. It is sometimes suggested that System 2 is uniquely human (or at least more fully
developed in humans) while System 1 evolved earlier, and hence is shared with other animals.141
Systems 1 and 2 complement each other roughly in accordance with the division of
labor I set out for reflex mechanisms and belief-desire psychology last section. This is not an
accident, of course. What I have called reflex mechanisms is far more inclusive than System 1; I
140 See, for instance, Sloman (1996), Evans (2003), Stanovich (2004), and Stanovich (2009). 141 The claim that System 2 is uniquely human seems to me unlikely to be true. As I understand it, System 2 processing would include perceptual simulation used to evaluate the prospects of different decisions. For some discussion of perceptual simulation, see Prinz (2002), 150-2. It seems very likely to me that some non-human animals are capable of such simulation, and hence, are capable of some sort of System 2 processing. Thus even if intentionality is closely tied to System 2 processing as I suggest, it nonetheless seems likely to me that some non-human animals have intentional states—at the very least proto-beliefs and proto-desires—even if they do not have concepts and the content of these states is not so finely-individuated so as to be adequately expressed using language.
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would include reflexive response dependent behavior—whether or not it involves cognitive
processing—as among the products of reflex mechanisms. Nonetheless, at least much of
System 1 should also count as reflex mechanisms. System 1 processes information largely by
way of “rules of thumb” rather than deploying some sort of tacit theory of the world. Behavior
that is ultimately governed by heuristic processing of this sort without any sort of systematic
oversight is paradigmatically behavior I would attribute to reflex mechanisms rather than belief-
desire psychology.142
In proposing that the pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology comes in its flexibility
in dealing with novel situations, I am effectively suggesting that emergence of belief-desire
psychology—and indeed intentionality—is closely tied to the development of System 2 cognitive
processing. Associative processing (for instance on the basis of subjective similarity) does not,
so far as I can tell, require or entail having mental states that are determinately about anything.
To be sure, System 1 processes and stores information (in Dretske's sense), but processing and
storing information is not the same as processing and storing representations. Mental
representation is more fine-grained than information; it is the product of (at least sometimes)
systematically adhering to strict coherence constraints—i.e., System 2 processing—rather than
merely according with loose (and sometimes contradictory) “rules of thumb”—i.e., System 1
processing.143 Sensitivity to strict coherence constraints is a prerequisite for both tacitly and
explicitly appreciating the nuances of what sort of experiences would be evidence for what
conclusion in light of the possibility of various sorts of evidential defeat. Appreciating these
nuances of evidence allows a subject to deal with situations that are either exceptions to the
ceteris paribus heuristics incorporated into System 1 or not covered by them at all; a belief-
142 Cf. Brandom (2000). 143 For this reason, much of the work on the so-called “disjunction problem” is largely misguided. There’s no particular reason to think that the visual system of a frog snapping at flies is representing anything particularly determinate. Snapping at flies is quite apparently the product of a reflex mechanism.
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desire psychology arises precisely when a subject is able to appreciate the nuances of evidence
in this way.
As I will discuss later on, it is precisely a failure to appreciate the distinction between
System 1 and System 2 processes and moreover, the intimate connection between System 2 and
intentionality, that leads some to reject true belief as instrumentally valuable.
§9: The Reliability of Belief-Desire Psychology
In §7, I argued that the pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology comes in allowing subjects
to respond reliably to specific circumstances with advantageous behaviors. Understanding the
pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology now puts us in a position to revisit the issues raised
in §6. Using Jeeves as my example, I have already pointed out that having behavior produced by
good core desires (i.e. desires closely tied to antecedent ends) and true instrumental beliefs is
sufficient for subjects to respond advantageously to specific circumstances. Quite clearly,
though, having behavior produced by good core desires and true instrumental beliefs is not
necessary for subjects to respond advantageously to specific circumstances. Suppose that
Jeeves was not a genius, but a borderline schizophrenic. If Jeeves had had a desire to liberate
frogs from oppression and, furthermore, a belief that stowing stolen items in Bertie's apartment
without Bertie's knowledge facilitated liberating frogs from oppression, he would have acted to
his advantage just as he in fact did. How then does the utility of belief-desire psychology
demand a stategy of pursuing true beliefs and good desires?
The utility of belief-desire psychology comes in allowing subjects to respond reliably to
specific circumstances with advantageous behaviors. Not only is having behavior produced by
good core desires and true instrumental beliefs sufficient to guarantee that it will be tailored so
as to advantageous for specific circumstances, but given that such behavior production is
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sufficient for advantage, we can explain how someone might reliably respond advantageously.
To do so, all we need is an explanation for how a subject can 1) start with a finite number of
core desires and 2) have faculties that can reliably produce true instrumental beliefs. There's
every reason to think such an explanation is forthcoming.
What is not forthcoming is an explanation for how core desires that aren't good and
instrumental beliefs that aren't true might reliably lead to advantageous behavior in a wide
variety of specific circumstances. There are only two sorts of explanations for occasions when
bad core desires or false instrumental beliefs produce advantageous behavior. The first
explanation is that the subject was just plain lucky to have desires and beliefs on that occasion
that led to the advantageous behavior. So, for example, if Jeeves were a lunatic, he might just
happen to have a desire to liberate frogs from oppression and a belief that stowing stolen items
in Bertie's apartment without Bertie's knowledge facilitated liberating frogs from oppression
exactly in the specific circumstances when that belief-desire pair would lead him to doing
something useful. However, if that is the explanation of Jeeves's advantageous response,
there's clearly no reason to think that in general, Jeeves will respond to circumstances
advantageously.
The second explanation is that the subject had the desires and beliefs that he did on
that occasion, not merely because he was lucky, but due to a reflex mechanism. It might be that
being in the kind of condition that Jeeves was in triggered a crazy belief-desire pair that led to
advantageous behavior. In this case, it is no accident that Jeeves behaves advantageously.
However, there's also no reason to think that Jeeves's belief-desire psychology will help him
deal advantageously with a wide variety of specific circumstances with any regularity.
As we saw in the last two sections, that's just not what reflex mechanisms do. Reflex
mechanisms are only tailored to particular conditions.
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What about a third explanation according to which “crazy” belief-desire pairs—that is to
say, belief-desire pairs where the desires are wholly unconnected to the antecedent ends of the
subject and the beliefs wholly unconnected to truth—arise systematically so as to produce
advantageous behavior in a wide variety of specific circumstances? The only way crazy belief-
desire pairs might arise systematically so as to produce advantageous behavior is if their
emergence depended both on the antecedent ends of the subject, and the information the
subject tracks and stores about his specific circumstances. Effectively, this dependence requires
that the subject with systematically crazy belief-desire pairs have, not just a similar internal
functional organization, but a long-armed nomological functional organization very much like
the long-armed nomological functional organization of a rational person.144 The problem is that
if the subject has a long-armed nomological functional organization very much like the long-
armed nomological functional organization of a rational person, the former's emerging belief-
desire pairs can't possibly be crazy!
We might imagine that a Blockhead-Jeeves who behaves just as Jeeves does without
having beliefs and desires.145 However, Blockhead-Jeeves does not have the same long-armed
nomological functional organization as Jeeves does. (Blockhead Jeeves doesn't engage in
theoretical or instrumental reasoning. Rather than a belief-desire psychology, Blockhead-Jeeves
effectively has a very large number of reflex mechanisms—one for every circumstance Jeeves
might possibly find himself in.)146 We're considering not Blockhead-Jeeves, but Duplicate-
Jeeves. The causal network between Duplicate-Jeeves's (possible) internal cognitive states is
isomorphic to the causal network between Jeeves's (possible) internal (content bearing)
cognitive states; moreover, the causal networks are both hooked up to the environment in the
144 For discussion of long-armed functional role, see Harman (1987). 145 Cf. Block (1981) and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), 114-122. 146 Reflex mechanisms can always replace belief-desire psychology if the circumstances the subject will find himself in can be anticipated. See §11.2.
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same way. It's difficult to understand how, despite this match, the internal cognitive states of
Duplicate-Jeeves could have totally different contents than the corresponding internal cognitive
states of Jeeves. Indeed, even if Duplicate-Jeeves and Jeeves have different cognitive
architectures underlying their respective causal networks, it still couldn't be that while Jeeves is
coming to have a desire that Sir Roderick Glossop think poorly of Bertie and a belief that stowing
stolen items in Bertie's apartment without Bertie's knowledge will facilitate Sir Roderick Glossop
thinking poorly of Bertie, Duplicate-Jeeves would be coming to have a desire and a belief with
the same long-arm causal role as Jeeves's desire and belief, but with entirely different contents
so as to constitute a crazy belief-desire pair. Any plausible theory of content must say that
Duplicate-Jeeves has the same belief-desire pair as Jeeves. To claim otherwise is to deny that
content strongly supervenes on the (long-armed) dispositional properties of the internal
cognitive states of the subject.
The upshot is that crazy belief-desire pairs can't arise systematically so as to produce
advantageous behavior in a wide variety of specific circumstances.147 And yet, belief-desire
psychology only has any special utility if belief-desire pairs do arise systematically so as to
produce advantageous behavior in a wide variety of specific circumstances. Consequently,
pragmatic demands on a belief-desire psychology require that belief-desire pairs not be crazy. In
other words, pragmatic demands require that desires be good, i.e. closely aligned with the
antecedent ends of the subject, and that beliefs be true.
In §6, I pointed to the possibility that instrumental reasoning might explain why the
optimal strategy (absent defeaters) for forming pragmatic beliefs is forming true beliefs. Finally,
147 This is compatible with the claim that there might be some way besides having a belief-desire psychology (or being a Blockhead) to systematically produce advantageous behavior in a wide variety of circumstances. That said, I am skeptical as to whether there is in fact some other way. It seems to me that any non-Blockhead cognitive architecture that systematically produced advantageous behavior in a wide variety of specific circumstances would have the functional organization to qualify ipso facto as a belief-desire psychology.
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we're in a position to see why instrumental reasoning does explain as much. A process of
instrumental reasoning is key to explaining the utility of belief-desire psychology because it can
explain how antecedent ends considered generally can be appropriately tied to behaviors
tailored to individual circumstances. In order for this process to be reliably successful, core
desires have to be good and instrumental beliefs have to be true.
It's worth pointing out that, on the explanation given, we avoid the major obstacle I
raised at the end of §6. The fact that true instrumental beliefs don't lead to advantageous
results when someone has some bad core desires at work doesn't show that truth isn't always
the optimal strategy (absent defeaters) for instrumental belief. True instrumental beliefs might
not help someone when they combine with bad core desires, but belief-desire psychology is of
no utility generally when bad core desires are at work. That's not to say that miscellaneous
beliefs might not combine with bad core desires to the subject’s benefit; it's only to say that
there's systematic way for him to benefit from having beliefs when the relevant core desires are
bad. Any reliability he has in doing what's advantageous is achieved via reflex mechanisms; in
theory, these reflex mechanisms do not require belief-desire psychology.
§10: Generalizing to Non-Instrumental Beliefs
There is nothing contingent about the fact that the utility of belief-desire psychology requires
that core desires be good and instrumental beliefs be true (absent defeaters). Necessarily, the
added utility of belief-desire psychology for a subject is that it allows him to reliably respond
advantageously to a diversity of circumstances. Moreover, I used no contingent facts in
concluding that using belief-desire psychology for this pragmatic end requires good core desires
and true instrumental beliefs (absent defeaters). Pragmatic demands on belief-desire
psychology inherently generate an (instrumental) ideal for core desires that they be good and an
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ideal for instrumental beliefs that they be true. Goodness and truth respectively are the means
to a pragmatic ends.
Quite clearly, though, the only reliable way to assure that instrumental beliefs are true is
to assure that beliefs are true generally. Instrumental beliefs are most likely to be true when
they fit into a system of beliefs that is reliably grounded by perceptual faculties, reliably
maintained by memory faculties, and coherent due to reliable theoretical reasoning faculties.
The ideal for instrumental beliefs that they be true thus extends to an ideal that beliefs be true
generally. The truth of confirmation holism implies that any belief might ultimately have an
impact on instrumental reasoning. In theory, any belief might affect an instrumental belief; the
way to assure that this affection is likely to be advantageous is to make sure beliefs are true and
cognitive mechanisms facilitating interaction preserve truth.
§11: Objections
At this point, I have made my case for the conclusion that true belief is instrumentally valuable,
or more specifically that the added pragmatic utility of having beliefs for a creature hinges
crucially on being constructed so as to reliably form beliefs that are true in the absence of
specific reasons for doing otherwise. In making my case, I have not explicitly addressed the
principal concerns raised in the literature for thinking that truth might not be the optimal
strategy (absent defeaters) to advance a creature's antecedent ends.148 I rectify that omission in
this section.
148 The objections considered here are very prominent in Stich (1993).
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§11.1: True Versus True*
Objection: Even if we are assuming that a subject's desires are closely aligned with his
antecedent ends, the fact that true instrumental beliefs promote the satisfaction of desires (that
the beliefs are instrumental to) may not show that these true instrumental beliefs generally
facilitate the most important antecedent ends of the subject. Returning to a previous example,
Hector's true belief that the convenience store will be open when he arrives promotes the
satisfaction of his desire to pick up some things at the convenience store, but by landing him in
the middle of an armed robbery it does not faciliate his survival. So far as facilitating his survival
is concerned, he would be much better off if he were pursuing true* beliefs rather than true
beliefs, where a belief is true* just in case it is the belief that the convenience store will be open
when he arrives and the belief is false or it is any other belief and the belief is true.149 If, as a
believer, Hector were pursuing truth*, he might not have formed the belief that the
convenience store will be open when he arrives, and consequently, he might be in a better
position to survive.
It's worth emphasizing here that rejecting true belief as the optimal pragmatic strategy
does not require that we think that pursuing false beliefs generally best promotes the
antecedent needs and interests of the subject. The question is not whether it would be best for
the subject to pursue false beliefs, but whether it might be best for him to pursue some
particular sort of false beliefs.
Reply: Without question, there will be occasions when core desires are good, instrumental
beliefs are true, and still instrumental reasoning leads to behaviors that turn out not to
promote, all things considered, the subject's antecedent ends. Consider again the case of Hector
at the convenience store. As far as I can see, Hector need not have had any false beliefs to have
149 Cf. Stich (1993), Chapter 5.
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put himself in this bad situation. He need not have falsely believed, for instance, that he would
not find himself in an armed robbery in order to think that it would facilitate his interests to go
to the store; it would have been enough for him to believe truly that trips to the convenience
store are very frequently safe.
Sometimes good core desires and true instrumental beliefs don't keep you out of bad
situations; that's the (sad) fact of the matter. The relevant question is, for instance, whether
good* core desires and true* beliefs do better. They plainly don't. It might be that in his specific
situation, the winds of chance blew, and, as it turns out, pursuing truth* would have served
Hector better. However, truth* doesn't reliably serve subjects better. The winds of chance
might have blown differently after all. It might just as easily have been the case that going to
the convenience store at that particular time prevented him from getting mugged at gunpoint
while going home. In that sort of situation, he is much better off for having pursued truth rather
than truth*.
More importantly, barring anything strange from the winds of chance, Hector will have
been better off for having good core desires and true beliefs. His good desires and true beliefs
generally would have put him in a position to pick up some useful things at the convenience
store. Good* desires and true* beliefs don't do that for him. Consequently, goodness and truth
more reliably produce behavior that works to his advantage than goodness* and truth*. That's
enough to show that the pragmatic strategy (absent defeaters) is not to pursue goodness* and
truth*, but goodness and truth.
§11.2: True Versus True* Revisited
Objection: You haven't really tackled the hard cases. Suppose Hector is constructed such that if
he believed he were as incapable as he actually is, he would become depressed and suicidal.
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Indeed, we might suppose that in general, people would respond poorly were they to assess
their own abilities correctly rather than maintain an inflated view of themselves. (I understand
that this supposition is probably true in fact.) Surely, we don't want to say that the optimal
strategy for facilitating antecedent ends in these cases involves pursuing true beliefs regarding
one's own capabilities. Surely, these cases show that, from a pragmatic perspective, some sort
of truth* is a better target than truth.
Reply: Obviously if Hector has reason to think that he would become depressed and suicidal if
he discovered (or only thought he had discovered) that he was very incapable, he would have a
pragmatic reason to avoid believing that he was very incapable (however he might) even if it
were the truth. Likewise if Hector's designer—say Mother Naturehad reason to think he would
become depressed and suicidal if he discovered (or thought he discovered) that he was very
incapable, she would likewise have a pragmatic reason to design him so as to not pursue the
truth on this point (whatever it might be). (Apparently, Mother Nature may have done just
that.) Neither of these cases is a threat to the position I have defended because I have allowed
for the possibility of defeaters. If, from the cognitive design standpoint, there is some special
reason to think that believing in a way that is not guided by what is true will lead to fortuitous
results, then the believing truths strategy may well be defeated.
What I have intended to argue is that absent any special reason, believing truths in the
optimal strategy (from a cognitive design standpoint). Cases in which there are special reasons
for anyone who might act in the role of the cognitive designer (including the subject himself) are
therefore not counterexamples to my conclusion.
It's worth pointing out that to the extent that someone acting in the role of cognitive
designer can anticipate the very cases that the creature under design will encounter, he will
have special reasons that defeat the true belief strategy. At the limit, where all crucial cases can
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be anticipated, the need for belief-desire psychology in order to facilitate antecedent ends is
completely obviated.
§11.3: The Risks of Reliability
Objection: There are times when the reliability of cognitive faculties vis-à-vis truth can
(apparently) stand in the way of the subject's antecedent ends rather than promote them (even
when the subject's desires are closely aligned with his antecedent ends). Although reliable
faculties might produce a system of beliefs that are largely true, which might, in turn, assure
that the preponderance of a subject's instrumental beliefs are true, and thereby promote the
satisfaction of certain desires, which, might then forward the subject's antecedent ends, under
altogether run-of-the-mill circumstances, the reliability of faculties might, all things considered,
inhibit the promotion of the subject's antecedent ends by failing to produce the relevant true
instrumental belief because it might be false.150 Someone who, when in a dangerous
neighborhood, all too easily forms beliefs that they are in danger may be more likely to form the
belief that they are in danger at the critical time when they are, in fact, in danger. Thus,
pursuing a strategy where a number of false beliefs are formed may actually promote
someone's antecedent ends, e.g. survival.
Reply: Despite apparent examples to the contrary, I see no reason to conclude that the
reliability of cognitive faculties vis-à-vis truth can ever stand in the way of the subject's reliably
promoting his antecedent ends even when the subject's desires are closely aligned with his
antecedent ends. This is the very sort of objection that becomes considerably less pressing once
we remember the division of labor between reflex mechanisms and belief-desire psychology
discussed in §7-8.
150 Cf. Stich (1993), Chapter 3 and Sober (1981).
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Let us return to the example of someone who, when in a dangerous neighborhood, all
too easily forms beliefs that they are in danger may be more likely to form the belief that they
are in danger at the critical time when they are, in fact, in danger. Without question, rather
than having a predilection for false beliefs that he is in danger, this person would do much
better to have a reflex mechanism in place that causes him to respond as if he were in danger
when he detects a strong enough possibility of danger. Beliefs and desires aren't really very
pragmatic at all in this sort of situation. When you detect a reasonable possibility of danger,
don't bother to form any beliefs or run through some process of instrumental reasoning (you
can do that later), just get the hell out of there! (In fact, people may well have just this sort of
mechanism in place. That might well explain why we can feel endangered even when we know
we're perfectly safe.) Training is far more useful in these sorts of cases than having any sort of
beliefs or belief forming mechanisms. Belief-desire psychology is not well suited to these cases.
As a result, my inclination is to think that we shouldn't conclude anything from these cases
about what sort of belief forming strategy furthers pragmatic ends.
That said, I don't see that someone with only true beliefs is at a competitive
disadvantage to a counterpart with a predilection for false beliefs about danger. We might well
expect him to do just as well as his counterpart, a person with a long-standing, well-engrained
true belief that acting as if they are in danger upon merely detecting the strong possibility that
they might be in danger will facilitate their survival and well-being.
§12: Preliminary Conclusion
With these objections met, we're now in a position to conclusively answer Hector on Dylan's
behalf. Why ought Hector pursue cognitive rehabilitation? Hector ought to pursue cognitive
rehabilitation because he's going to end up in the poor house if he goes on making investment
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choices on the basis of tarot card readings! Don't put your money into Greedy Bank Corporation
unless it's on the basis of some reliable indicator that suggests you won't lose your shirt!
Moreover, Hector ought to be grateful for his cognitive sophistication because it allows
him to respond to a diversity of circumstances in advantageous ways. As a believer, he can
evaluate the prospects for investment on a case-by-case basis, keeping his own personal
circumstances and portfolio in mind. This ability puts him in a far better position to succeed
financially than he would be otherwise—but only if he's reliably believing the truth!
§13: Implications for the Teleological Theory of Intentional
Representation
We're also now in a position to return to the issues I raised in the introduction concerning the
nature of intentionality. According to the teleological theory of intentional representation
(TTIR), intentional representation is analogous to artifactual representation, i.e. the sort of
representation exhibited by maps and blueprints.
A map has its representational properties in virtue of having a particular teleological
function. This teleological function is intimately connected to genuine norms of correctness.
Thus, some piece of paper is a map of Eugene, Oregon because it has a particular teleological
function, and hence it is correct only if it corresponds to Eugene, Oregon in some specified way.
The way it has to correspond in order to be correct coincides with the content of the map.
Moreover, it is the fact that the piece of paper is supposed to correspond that fixes that the
piece is a map at all—were it the case that Eugene, Oregon was supposed to correspond to the
piece of paper instead the piece of paper would be not a map, but a city plan of some sort.
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According to TTIR, beliefs have their representational properties in the same way as maps do.
Some cognitive state is a belief because it has a particular teleological function that is intimately
connected to genuine norms of correctness.
Thus, a cognitive state is a belief with content that p at least partly because the state is
correct (in some sense or other) if and only if the actual world is such that p. The content of the
cognitive state is fixed by the conditions under which the fit between state and world is correct.
The attitude of the cognitive state is fixed as a belief at least partly by the fact that the state is
supposed to match the actual world rather than it being the case (for instance) that the actual
world is supposed to come to match the state.
Although TTIR has a great deal of initial plausibility, an immediate objection to TTIR
arises from an obvious disanalogy between artifacts and intentional states. In the case of
artifactual representation, artifacts paradigmatically come to have their teleological functions in
virtue of the intentional states of designers and users of those artifacts. By and large, a map is
supposed to correspond because human intentional agents evaluate it—i.e. take approving or
disapproving attitudes towards it—according to whether it does. The idea that intentional
states have their teleological functions in the same way—in virtue of other intentional states—
would very quickly lead to a nasty vicious regress.
This result would be rather disheartening to the advocate of TTIR if all teleological
functions traced back to intentionality. Fortunately for the advocate of TTIR, there are very
good reasons to reject that view.151 It is far more plausible to allow that there are cases in which
some state or object has a teleological function in part because fulfilling that teleological
function facilitates bringing about some antecedent good.152 Obviously, it will not do to accept
that any object or state that happens to bring about a good thereby has a teleological function;
151 Cf. Bedau (1990). 152 Cf. Bedau (1992).
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a man who walks in front of the assassin's bullet by chance does not have the teleological
function of saving the President even if that is an antecedent good he is bringing about. We
must insist that the dispositional property of a state or object facilitating the antecedent good
be at least partly explained or sustained by the fact that it so facilitates. This sort of non-
accidentality condition rules out cases in which antecedent goods are brought about
accidentally as instances of teleological function. Nonetheless, it allows for instances of
teleological function that are not strictly tied to pre-existing intentional states.
Indeed, this sort of understanding of teleological function opens the door to TTIR in light
of the results of this chapter. For instance, given that being in particular a true belief inherently
facilitates antecedent ends, it is very possible that any possible arbitrary belief that p has the
teleological function of representing that p in a way that is supposed to match the actual world.
To establish this conclusion, we merely need to show how the tendency of beliefs to be true—
i.e., the fact that belief forming mechanisms produce true beliefs not necessarily always, but at
least often enough—is always explained or made true by the very fact that producing true
beliefs facilitates the subject's antecedent ends.
One way to try to accomplish this task is to follow very roughly in the footsteps of the
traditional teleosemanticist; one could attempt to give an explanation of how the replication of
such belief forming mechanisms (through biological reproduction) depends at least somewhat
on whether they facilitated the subject's antecedent ends by producing beliefs that were true.153
This explanation operates at the level of types—particular beliefs derive their teleological
function from the teleological function of the type of biological mechanism that produced them.
Alternatively, one could attempt to fulfill the non-accidentality condition at the level of
tokens, so that Hector's particular beliefs have the teleological function they do because his
153 Cf. Millikan (1984) and (1993).
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token cognitive architecture has a teleological function of producing true beliefs. On this view,
Hector's particular cognitive architecture has the teleological function of producing true beliefs
because the disposition of his very cognitive architecture to produce true beliefs is partly
sustained by that it produces true beliefs. More specifically, by facilitating Hector's antecedent
ends via forming true beliefs, the cognitive architecture underlying his belief-desire psychology
preserves and maintains its own functioning. (The view just sketched is the one I prefer.)
However, the non-accidentality condition for teleological function is met, the advocate
of TTIR must antecedently establish that the pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology is tied
up with acting in accordance with representational norms. In other words, the advocate of TTIR
needs to be entitled to the very conclusions I have established in this paper in order to move
forward.154
154 I would like to thank Richard Heck and Joshua Schechter for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Part of this chapter was presented to the Brown Philosophy Graduate Forum and the Southwest Graduate Conference at Arizona State University. Several of the participants at those events made very helpful comments, including Randall Rose, Sean Aas, Derek Bowman, and Jeff Watson.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
Attitudes, Representation, and Function
§1: Introduction
§1.1: Theories of Intentional States
A theory of intentional states, e.g. beliefs and desires, has two components: a theory of
attitudes and a theory of content. A theory of attitudes tells us when a state is of a particular
attitude kind, e.g. a belief, a desire, etc. A theory of content tells us when a state of a particular
attitude kind has some particular content. These two theories are, of course, intertwined. They
work together to make perspicacious the functioning of a person's psychology. The content of a
psychological state tells us something about the functioning of a subject, but until we know the
attitude kind of that state, the story is incomplete. We must know the attitude kind of a
psychological state so as to know what a subject is doing with a particular content.
Theories of content receive far more attention in contemporary philosophical literature
than theories of attitude. The commonly deployed “box” metaphor (i.e. to believe that p is to
belief-box a Mentalese sentence with content that p) often obfuscates the need for a
substantial theory of attitudes. However, any theory of content must have a complementary
theory of attitude. We can't make sense of psychological states having particular contents
unless we have something to say about what psychological states with particular contents do. A
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theory of attitudes just is a story about what (non-perceptual) psychological states with
particular contents do.
§1.2: The Teleological Theory of Intentional Representation
One high-level theory of intentional states with both a theory of content and a complementary
theory of attitude is the teleological theory of intentional representation (TTIR). In earlier
chapters, I have laid out TTIR in great detail; to put it succinctly, though, TTIR is the theory that
(principal) intentional states—e.g., beliefs and desires—represent teleologically just as
artifacts—maps and blueprints, for instance—that are representational do. According to TTIR, a
psychological state with content that p represents that p (and nothing stronger). Moreover,
according to TTIR, an intentional state is of the particular attitude kind that it is partly in virtue
of representing in the way that it does, e.g. whether it represents like a map rather than like a
blueprint. TTIR is a high-level theory because representational properties, e.g. representing that
p and representing like a map rather than like a blueprint, are high-level properties, which other
more basic properties, e.g. conceptual role, must account for.
If beliefs are robust mental representations, then instances of (Norm of Belief) will be
not only true, but an important component of the theory of intentionality:
(Norm of Belief) Beliefs that p are correct relative to any arbitrary scenario if and only if in that scenario, p.
Likewise, if desires are robust mental representations, then instances of (Norm of Desire) will be
true:
(Norm of Desire) Any arbitrary scenario is correct relative to desires that p if and only if in that scenario, p.
Parallel norms will apply for any other intentional states that are robust mental representations.
The (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) guarantee that a belief that p and desire that p will
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divide the space of possible scenarios so as to represent that p. However, these norms also tell
us about what sorts of states beliefs and desires are; they tell us about direction of fit. (Norm of
Belief) tells us that when there are discrepancies between a scenario and a belief, it is the belief
that is incorrect relative to the scenario. Thus, beliefs are reflective or maplike representations.
(Norm of Desire) tells us that when there are discrepancies, it is the scenario that's incorrect
relative to the desire. Thus, desires are projective or blueprintlike representations. In this way,
(Norm of Belief), (Norm of Desire), and other parallel norms are as much a constraint on a
theory of attitudes as they are on the theory of content.
(Norm of Belief), (Norm of Desire), and other parallel norms are genuine norms. Thus,
for instance, to say that a belief is incorrect is to say that it is not how it ought to be on some
particular dimension. Likewise, (Desire-Norm) entails that when it comes to a desire that p, any
scenario that is not a p-scenario is not what ought to be the case. To say as much is not, of
course, to say that desiring that p makes it the case that things ought to be such that p tout
court. Perhaps some desires that p are bad because no one's interest is served in scenarios that
aren't p-scenarios. Nonetheless, according to (Norm of Desire), when it comes to desires that p,
things haven't worked out if a not-p-scenario turns out to be the case. (Norm of Desire) entails
that as far as the desire is concerned, this situation is one in which things are supposed to be
otherwise. A scenario is a correct realization of a hypothetical desire if and only if the content of
the desire turns out to be true in that scenario.
(Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) are genuine norms because representation—at
least understood on the paradigm of artifactual representation—has a normative aspect.
Something is a reflective representation only if it ought to reflect some way a world (broadly
considered) is. Likewise, something is a projective representation only if it projects a way the
world ought to match up with. The (genuine) normativity here is teleological. In general,
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representations are states and objects with a purpose; they are states and objects that aspire to
certain ideals. If beliefs and desires are robust representations in accordance with TTIR, they
are no different. According to (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire), beliefs and desires alike
are states that ideally maintain a correspondence with the world. Some ideal inherent to being
a belief demands that beliefs be true. Some ideal inherent to being a desire demands that
desires be satisfied.
§1.3: Deflationary Opponents of TTIR
TTIR is not the only theory of intentional states. According to TTIR, intentional states are
constitutively normative. Thus, to think that some particular cognitive state is a belief or a
desire is to be committed to thinking that certain constitutive norms apply regarding that
cognitive state. Not everyone accepts that beliefs and desires are constitutively normative in
this way.
In particular, deflationary theorists of content don't. They reject that contents are at
least partly characterized by their conditions of correctness. To be sure, they agree that
contents inherently have truth or satisfaction conditions, but they insist these are not
normatively loaded correctness conditions. Rather, these are deflationary truth or satisfaction
conditions. A thorough-going deflationism about truth prescinds from the possibility of TTIR.
Thorough-going deflationists about truth must reject (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) as
part of the theory of intentionality. Consequently, thorough-going deflationists must reject the
(Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) as even a partial theory of attitudes. Beliefs are not states
that inherently aspire to the ideal of truth. Desires are not states that inherently aspire to the
ideal of satisfaction.
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So what is it for a state to be a belief or desire? Deflationary theorists do not say much
on the matter. They have worked out a stripped down theory of content. On this theory of
content, there is little else to say about content than the platitude that two token sentences of
Mentalese have the same content when “boxing” the sentences makes for getting around the
world in (roughly?) the same way. But what is it to “box” a sentence of Mentalese? What is it
to “belief-box” versus “desire-box”? What is the deflationary theory of attitudes?
§1.4: Conclusion to the Introduction
In this chapter, I will argue that there are significant obstacles to constructing an alternative to
the TTIR theory of attitudes. The most plausible functionalist theory of beliefs and desires will
introduce inherent ideals for beliefs and desires in a way that inherently generates a truth ideal
for beliefs and satisfaction ideal for desires. As functionalism is the most plausible theory of
attitudes, this result strongly suggests that TTIR is true.
The rest of the chapter will proceed as follows: In §2, I will present a challenge to the
most commonly held functionalist theories of attitudes. In §3, I will explain how another sort of
functionalist theory is far more likely to be our common folk theory of attitudes. In §5-6, I
discuss how this other theory supports TTIR before returning to discuss the initial sort of
competitor functionalist theory again in §8. A brief conclusion follows in §9.
§2: Nomological Functionalism
§2.1: A Problem for Nomological Functionalism
The “box” metaphor strongly suggests that prominent deflationary opponents of TTIR intend to
give a functionalist account of attitudes. Explicit remarks confirm this suggestion. Paul Horwich
takes a position on what it is to be a belief when he says “believing a proposition is a matter of
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relying on it in theoretical or practical inference.” 155 Horwich's position is unclear; it is not
obvious how theoretical and practical inferences are to be distinguished from other types of
inference.156 Nonetheless, Horwich's reliance on inference in his sketch of an account for belief
shows that he thinks being a belief has to do with inferential or functional role. Horwich (at
least apparently) commits himself to a functionalist account of belief.
Of course, so much is not surprising. Functionalism about attitudes is the dominant
position in the philosophical literature.157 (Accepting a functionalist account of belief and desire
does not commit one to adopting a (pure) functionalist account of content. One can accept that
being a belief rather than a desire is entirely a matter of the way an internal cognitive state is
used without accepting that differences in an internal cognitive state's conceptual/functional
role correspond to differences in content.)158 It is overwhelmingly plausible that if any theory of
attitudes is correct at all, something like the functionalist theory is.159 Functionalism about
belief and desire is the view that being a belief and being a desire are functional properties.
Functional properties (for my purposes) are theoretically defined properties.160 More precisely,
something comes to have a functional property because it plays or ought to play some particular
role specified in a theory. That our terms ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are defined by way of a theory is
155 Horwich (2005), 119. 156 One might have thought, for instance, that theoretical inferences were distinguished from others because they were inferences involving just beliefs. 157 See, for instance, Loar (1981), Shoemaker (1984), Kim (1996), and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007). Consider also recent accounts of belief: Velleman (2000), Chapter 11, Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), Boghossian (2005), Steglich-Petersen (2006), and Wedgwood (2007a). 158 Cf. Fodor and Lepore (1992), 127. In addition, accepting functionalism about attitudes or content does not require accepting functionalism about the mind generally. 159 I don't mean to rule out instrumentalist/interpretationist accounts, which are very much like functionalism save the existential commitments to a particular functional organization. See Dennett (1981), Davidson (1984), and Williamson (2007), Chapter 8. 160 I am thinking of functional properties more narrowly than one might think of them. One might think of nomological functional properties as macroscopic properties that supervene on underlying causal properties whether they can be defined as part of a finitely expressible theory or not.
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hard to deny; we don’t, after all, directly observe beliefs and desires—at least not in others.
What we observe is behavior, and we use a theory of attitudes to explain that behavior.
If an object or state ought to play some particular role specified in the theory, then the
object or state has a “teleofunctional” property. If an object or state in fact plays some
particular role specified in a theory, then the object or state has what we might call a
“nomological functional” property. (The Lewis-Ramsey method can be used either to define
teleofunctional properties or nomological functional properties. 161 The difference is in whether
the Ramsified theory is a theory of how things are supposed to be or a theory of how they in
fact are.) From what I can tell, most functionalists about attitudes are nomological
functionalists. They claim, for instance, that some state is a belief if and only if it is disposed to
act in a certain way. Despite its popularity, however, nomological functionalism about attitudes
has deep problems.
To see so, consider a simple nomological functionalist account of belief according to
which some state is a belief if and only if it is (causally) regulated so as to be true.162 On this
simple regulative account of belief, being a belief is a matter of being produced and sustained by
cognitive mechanisms that are truth-conducive. As an initial complaint, we might point out that
there may well be other intentional states, e.g. suspecting, that are regulated so as to be true.
Let us put this complaint aside, though, to focus on another problem that points to a serious
issue with nomological functionalist accounts of attitudes generally.
The problem is straightforward: beliefs aren't, in strict generality, even weakly regulated
so as to be true. Many beliefs are produced and sustained by cognitive mechanisms that are
wholly unreliable. What’s more, matters do not seem to improve significantly on this score even
when beliefs are consciously considered in light of the evidence. Without question, there have
161 Lewis (1970). 162 Cf. Velleman (2000), Chapter 11 and Steglich-Petersen (2006).
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been some superstitious individuals who held superstitious beliefs so firmly that they
consciously held onto them even when confronted with serious evidence to the contrary. And
the superstitious are only the beginning of the problem. There are ideologues and delusional
individuals of all varieties to consider.
What's more, well-known studies in cognitive science demonstrate that many of the
cognitive mechanisms regulating belief are not particularly truth-conducive. Consider the well
documented “confirmation bias” whereby people ignore evidence contrary to their already held
views.163 Because of the confirmation bias, people are very likely to retain their beliefs—even
wholly unwarranted beliefs. The confirmation bias is very strong. To quickly review a very
famous experiment: two groups of students were asked for their views on capital
punishment.164 They were then exposed to the same papers on capital punishment and asked
again about their views. Because they had the same evidence presented to them, one might
expect convergence in opinion. In fact, the result was polarization; in general, those who had
been in favor of capital punishment were more in favor of it, and those who had been against it
were more against it.
Convergence is what one might expect if one were assuming that humans were highly
rational. What has become increasingly clear from research, however, is that humans are only
just rational enough. In addition to the confirmation basis, it is also widely known that people
do not reason well on the basis of deduction.165 Cognitive scientists suggest that, in general,
people deploy a quick and dirty method of reasoning that is somewhat unreliable; only when
there is sufficient time and attention do people’s inferences respect deductive validity, and even
163 Wason (1960). 164 Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979). 165 See, for example, Schroyens and Schaeken (2003).
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then, not so well.166 People are also notoriously bad at probabilistic reasoning. There is the
prominent gambler’s fallacy, whereby people ignore the independence of chance events.167
There is also the conjunctive fallacy, whereby people believe that specific events conforming to
a stereotype are more probable than the general events that subsume them.168
In light of the confirmation bias and other human rational failings, it would be
somewhat surprising if every single actual belief were ultimately subject to truth-regulating
cognitive mechanisms. It seems far more likely that there are many actual beliefs—even
deliberately reflected upon beliefs—that are never subject to any genuine check vis-à-vis their
truth.169 (Of course, as we are theorizing about what it is in virtue of which some possible state
is a belief, it matters only that it is possible that there are such beliefs. Pointing out that there
are actually such beliefs is just a useful heuristic.)
Obviously, this is a problem for the simple regulative account of belief under
consideration, but why does it point to a serious issue for nomological functionalist accounts of
attitudes considered generally? The simple regulative account of belief can seem plausible at
least initially because the usual belief is ceteris paribus regulated so as to be true. At its heart,
the problem for this account of belief is that even if the usual belief ceteris paribus acts in a
certain way, there are clear examples of beliefs that ceteris paribus do not act in that way. To
ignore these examples is to turn a blind eye to the possibility and even prevalence of certain
kinds of rational failings.170
This sort of problem recurs for many nomological functionalist accounts of attitudes.
Why? It recurs because what is most central to beliefs—and other intentional states—is their
166 Cf. Evans (2003). 167 Tversky and Kahneman (1971) and (1974). 168 Tversky and Kahneman (1983). 169 Cf. Rey (2007). 170 Cf. Williamson (2007), Chapter 4.
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rational roles, not their causal roles. Most of us can agree that, as a matter of rationality, beliefs
ought to be inferentially connected with other beliefs through theoretical reasoning, ought to
be inferentially connected with desires through means-ends reasoning, and ought to be
inferentially connected in the requisite ways with perceptual states. The difficulty with trying to
characterize beliefs and other intentional states in terms of their causal roles is that, plainly,
causal links need not always line up exactly with these rational links, and that is, of course,
because people can fail to be rational. Even if the usual belief that p ceteris paribus exhibits
some rational role (which, incidentally, may or may not be true depending on the content), it’s
almost certainly the case that there are some outlier possible token beliefs that p that do not
exhibit that rational role even ceteris paribus. A person doesn’t have to function even very
rationally to have beliefs.171 The same could be said for desires or any other intentional state.
Of course, if a creature fails to meet any rational constraints, we may rightly say that
they have no intentional states. However, people can fail to meet local rational constraints, and
in such cases, they may well have beliefs or other intentional states with causal roles that do not
line up with the corresponding rational role. What’s more, they can fail to be rational in ever so
many ways; many local rational failures are possible, so long as the causal roles of most of a
person’s intentional states line up well enough with what it would be rational for them to
infer.172 The result is that there is no obvious way to account for the possible ways the causal
role of belief can deviate from its rational role.
§2.2: A Fix for the Problem?
One way to deal with this problem is to abandon a strictly functionalist theory of attitude and
move to a theory that uses causal roles as paradigms of the attitude kind. For example, even if
171 Again, see Williamson (2007) and Rey (2007). 172 Cf. Williamson (2007).
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beliefs aren't universally regulated so as to be true, typical beliefs are, so we can identify beliefs
as those mental states that are of the same kind as these typical beliefs.
There are at least two reasons to be dissatisfied with this sort of move. First, it's not
certain that even human beliefs ordinarily belong to some underlying natural kind that
distinguishes them from other mental states. It may be that the neural structures that underlie
beliefs might also serve other functions if appropriately arranged to do so. (Just because a
capacitor can be used to store energy doesn't mean that it can't also be used to represent
information.)
Second, identifying beliefs with some underlying natural kind undermines the possibility
that beliefs are multiply realizable. The resulting chauvinism is a heavy cost as we are prima
facie inclined to make judgments about whether a possible subject has intentional states
without consideration for the particular kind of substances that realize those intentional
states.173
§3: The Common Folk Theory
In my view, that the rational (rather than causal) role of a state is most important in fixing
whether it is a belief, desire, etc. strongly suggests that a teleofunctionalism is far better
equipped to serve as an adequate theory of attitudes than a nomological functionalism. At a
minimum, our identification of psychological states by their rational roles shows that the
common tacit folk theory of attitudes whereby we come to grasp what it is to be a belief, desire,
etc. is very likely to be a teleological theory. (A tacit folk theory is a theory that accords with the
recognitional and inferential patterns of the folk. Obviously, in suggesting that the folk have a
173 Cf. Block (2007), Part I.
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tacit theory of psychology, I am not suggesting that people embrace that theory explicitly.)174
Plainly, we have a much better understanding of what beliefs, desires, etc. are supposed to do
than we have of what they, in fact, do. To the extent that being a belief, being a desire, etc. are
properly defined by our common tacit folk theory, the correct theory of attitudes must be a
teleofunctionalism.
Why should our common tacit folk theory address how psychological states are
supposed to act? Wouldn't it be far more useful to have a theory of how psychological states do
act? Surprising as this result might be, I think it likely that a teleofunctionalist theory of
attitudes is far more useful than a nomological functionalist theory of attitudes would be. The
difficulty with nomological functionalist theories of psychology generally is that the functioning
of ordinary people is not particularly systematic. Frequently, people are peculiar; often, we
cannot generalize on the behavior of individuals. A teleofunctionalist theory of attitudes gives
us the best combination of flexibility, predictive power, and ease of use.
To see that teleofunctionalist theories are easier to master and use is fairly
straightforward. Understanding what intentional states are supposed to do generally is far
easier than understanding what they in fact do. A theory of what intentional states do in fact do
has to take into account all sorts of factors that a teleofunctionalist theory of psychology can
ignore.
Teleofunctionalist theories can also give us significant predictive power. Having a
theory about how intentional states are supposed to function does not prevent us from making
useful predictions so long as in a plethora of cases we can assume that intentional states will act
as they are supposed to. I submit that we are entitled generally to make that assumption in the
absence of reasons to think otherwise. Moreover, even when it doesn't do exactly what it is
174 Cf. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), Chapter 3.
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supposed to do, knowing what an intentional state is supposed to do (ideally) can give us
significant insight into what it will do, especially as we expand our understanding of the causal
mechanisms underlying rational and irrational behavior. For instance, knowing how beliefs are
supposed to respond to reasons can help me predict how a delusional person's beliefs will
respond to reasons. Thus, a person who does not want to believe his spouse is cheating on him
will respond to the available reasons he has so as to form beliefs that support the belief that his
spouse is not cheating on him.
Finally, teleofunctionalist theories of attitudes are far more flexible than their
nomological functionalist counterparts. A teleofunctionalist theory of attitudes allows us to
categorize even wayward psychological states as beliefs, desires, etc. so long as they fit into a
system of states that functions well enough like an ideally rational system of beliefs, desires, etc.
This categorization allows us to make us to make useful predictions. Often, there are
regularities in the ways these wayward intentional states depart from rational norms. Although
superstitious beliefs do not act as beliefs ought to, nonetheless, they depart from rationality in
regular and predictable ways.
When it comes to functionalist folk theories, teleofunctionalist theories are the rule
rather than the exception. In fact, we might be surprised if our functionalist folk theory of
attitudes were not teleological. Paradigm functionalist properties, e.g. being a mousetrap, being
a carburetor, being a coffee maker, etc., are teleofunctionalist properties.175 Something can be
a mousetrap even if it doesn't, in fact, trap mice. A mousetrap need not be a good mousetrap; it
can be a bad mousetrap. Malfunctioning mousetraps continue to be mousetraps.
Malfunctioning beliefs and desires can continue to be beliefs and desires. Consequently, it
should not be surprising that being a belief and being a desire are teleofunctionalist properties.
175 Cf. Millikan (1993), Chapter 2.
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Does our common tacit folk theory of attitudes properly define what it is to be a belief,
desire, etc.? Even if we ordinarily categorize cognitive states as beliefs, desires, etc. according
to how those states ought to behave, need we think that cognitive states are beliefs, desires,
etc. in virtue of how they ought to behave? Obviously, the common tacit folk theory of
psychology may have some indeterminancies and misconceptions; it may require revisions.
However, these revisions cannot be too extensive, else the result is a theory not of belief and
desire, but of something else entirely.176 For this reason, showing that teleofunctionalism about
attitudes is the folk theory should be prima facie evidence that teleofunctionalism about
attitudes is true.177
§4: The Telos of Belief
§4.1: An Introduction to Telos
A teleofunctionalist theory of attitudes works in favor of TTIR. According to TTIR, any (principal)
intentional state has a telos such that it represents robustly. To evaluate whether TTIR is true,
we need to consider what, on the correct teleofunctionalist account of belief and desire, the
telos of belief and desire might be. In §4-6, I will argue that any plausible teleofunctionalist
account of belief and desire vindicates TTIR.
Before we proceed, it may be helpful to consider more closely what a telos is generally.
The telos of a mousetrap is to catch mice. That's not because all mousetraps catch mice, but
because good or successful mousetraps catch mice when there are mice to be caught. To say
that a mousetrap is a good or successful mousetrap is not, of course, to say that it is good
simpliciter. To say that a mousetrap is a good mousetrap is to say that it is how mousetraps
176 Cf. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), Chapter 5. 177 Eliminativism about attitudes in compatible with the truth of teleofunctionalism about attitudes, so the possibility of the former does not impugn the possibility of the latter.
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ought (teleologically) to be (qua mousetraps). It is not to say, in addition, that having
mousetraps that are as mousetraps (teleologically) ought to be is a good thing. A lover of mice
can agree that something is a good mousetrap while thinking that it is also an evil and horrible
thing. Nuclear weapons may be good qua weapons of mass destruction, but they are not good
tout court. When we say that something is a good or successful F, we are evaluating it as it
stands to some ideal—an ideal whose realization may not be ideal simpliciter. When we know
what it is to be a good or successful F, when we know how F-s ought to be qua F-s, when we
know what the pinnacle of being an F is, that's when we have uncovered the telos of F-ness.
§4.2: Truth as the Telos of Belief
It certainly makes perfectly good sense to ask what a good belief is. Moreover, although good
beliefs may frequently be good tout court, we need not think they are always so to think that
they are good beliefs. We can judge that a belief is a good belief (qua belief) while judging that
the world is a worse place because of that belief. Qua believers, we ought to aspire to good
beliefs, and yet it is a further and even substantive question whether we ought qua moral
agents aspire to good beliefs.
So what is a good belief? No one answer seems absolutely definitive.178 A number of
epistemic and pragmatic properties come to mind. A good belief is true. A good belief is
warranted. A good belief is knowledge. A good belief gets you around the world successfully.
Our tacit folk theory may not be univocal when it comes to what a good belief is. Nonetheless,
these various ideals are interrelated. In arguing for TTIR, it doesn't matter which of these
alternatives is the telos of belief so long as that telos inherently generates an ideal of truth so as
178 I myself feel some attraction (at least sometimes) towards a pluralist stance. There are a number of epistemic ideals for beliefs that are not necessarily in competition with one another. Cf. Sosa (2007), Chapter 4.
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to uphold (Norm of Belief). Obviously, the most straightforward way this might happen is if the
telos of belief was truth, i.e. if a good belief is a true belief.
Why think that the telos of belief is truth? At the very least, it seems very plausible that
we should say a true belief is a successful belief (and a false belief an unsuccessful one).
Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that, in at least some sense, truth is the aim of belief.179
If we understand this truism teleologically so as to say that beliefs are supposed to or
ought qua beliefs be true, then at least one direction of (Norm of Belief) seems to fall out
immediately. If beliefs that p ought to be true, then they are correct relative to an arbitrary
scenario only if in that scenario, p. Moreover, if a good belief is a successful belief and a belief is
a successful belief merely in virtue of being true, then a belief that p is good qua belief relative
to an arbitrary scenario in which p. I take it so much is enough to establish the other direction
of (Norm of Belief): that beliefs that p are correct relative to an arbitrary scenario if in that
scenario, p. It follows that beliefs are robust (mental) representations.
§4.3: Knowledge as the Telos of Belief
Some true beliefs seem faulty qua beliefs. Someone who bets their life savings in a game of
roulette because they firmly believe the ball will land on the number thirty-three is (probably)
foolish (qua doxastic agent) even if, as it turns out, the ball lands on the number thirty-three.
Very plausibly, a good belief is a belief one can act on the basis of. Considerations of these sorts
lead some to think that even if a true belief is ipso facto a successful belief, a true belief isn't
ipso facto a good belief. Perhaps, a better candidate for good belief is knowledge. Knowledge,
after all, does seem to be the pinnacle of belief. A person's belief constitutes knowledge only
when everything has gone as it ideally ought to for a belief: only when the world cooperates
179 Cf. Velleman (2000), Chapter 11, Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), Boghossian (2005), Steglich-Petersen (2006), and Wedgwood (2007).
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with a person's epistemic competency to yield a belief that in virtue of being true is (at least in
some sense) successful.
The view that knowledge is the apotheosis of belief qua belief is consonant with much
of the contemporary literature that emphasizes the importance of knowledge. It does not entail
Timothy Williamson’s thesis that knowledge is a mental state, but it is certainly compatible with
it.180 The view does require thinking of belief and knowledge as intimately connected, and
moreover as theoretically “on a par.” Accepting the view commits one to thinking that we
understand what belief is through understanding what knowledge is and vice-versa, so that our
apprehension of both belief and knowledge comes from apprehending one theory for both.
Those who find Williamson’s view that knowledge is the norm of assertion compelling
should also have some affinity for the view that knowledge is the apotheosis of belief.181 After
all, there is a somewhat appealing way of conceiving of belief as a sort of an inner assertion that
is always sincere; indeed, the language of thought hypothesis takes this conception of belief
very seriously. Alternatively, one can think of assertion as the outwards expression of belief.
Either way the connection between the two views becomes clear. As a good assertion is the
expression of knowledge, so a good belief just is knowledge itself.
Among the requirements for knowledge is factivity.182 Whether a belief meets the
factivity requirement for knowledge is not generally of matter of its etiology. It depends,
generally, on the states of the world outside the believer. We can evaluate whether a
hypothetical belief that p meets the factivity requirement in a possible scenario merely by
considering whether the possible scenario itself is such that p. Thus, assuming a belief is a good
belief if and only if it is knowledge, a belief is a good belief only if it is true. If knowledge is the
180 See Williamson (2000). 181 Ibid, Chapter 11. 182 Shope (2002).
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telos of belief, a belief that has fulfilled its telos is a true belief. Given that knowledge is the
telos of belief, a belief is ipso facto not a good belief if it is not true. That much is enough for
one direction of (Norm of Belief). For a belief to meet its knowledge ideal relative to some
possible scenario, the belief must be true. Hence, for an arbitrary scenario, a belief that p is
correct relative to that scenario only if in that scenario, p.
What about the other direction? If knowledge is, in some sense, the norm of belief,
then beliefs that aren't knowledge are, in some sense, not as they ought to be qua beliefs even
if they are true. So does the other direction of (Norm of Belief) fail?
I think not. Consider a few analogous examples. If the ideal for an Olympic swimmer is
to win a gold medal, and part of winning the gold medal is getting into the pool at a particular
time and place, then not only does the Olympic swimmer act incorrectly if he fails to get into the
pool at that time and place. In fact, he correctly gets into the pool at that time and place even if
he doesn't go onto win the gold medal. If the ideal for cars involves transporting people with
the key to (certain kinds of) places they want to go, and the engine of a car turning over is a part
of accomplishing that task, then not only does a car function incorrectly when the engine does
not turn over, it functions correctly when the engine does turn over, even if the car then goes on
to malfunction in some other way. Likewise, if the ideal of belief is that it be knowledge and
part of what it is to be knowledge is to be true, then not only is a belief incorrect when it fails to
be true, it is correct when it is true even if the belief doesn't additionally constitute knowledge.
It is significant that there is a tight connection between knowledge and truth. A subject
pursues knowledge by pursuing truth; moreover this connection between knowledge and truth
is inherent, not accidental. Because pursuit of knowledge directly involves (and, in fact, just is)
the pursuit of truth, an ideal of knowledge thereby inherently generates an ideal of truth.
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Consequently, the view that the telos of belief is knowledge establishes both directions of
(Norm of Belief), and thereby vindicates TTIR (restricted to belief).
§4.4: Warrant as the Telos of Belief
One might think that, in some sense, success is incidental to the ideal of belief; good beliefs
aren't necessarily successful beliefs. Thus, a good belief is a reasonable belief. The world may
cooperate so as to make a reasonable belief a true belief or knowledge. However, one might
think that even if the world doesn't cooperate so that the belief isn't successful in this regard,
the belief can still be reasonable and ipso facto how a belief (qua belief) ought to be. Thus,
although it would be ideal for beliefs if the world cooperates, whether the world cooperates or
not does not change whether a belief has met its ideal. If this line of thought is somewhat
compelling, perhaps warrant is the principal telos of belief.
Does warrant as the telos of belief undermine (Norm of Belief)? If a belief can be as it
ought to be qua belief without being true, doesn't that show that a belief can, in some sense, be
correct (qua belief) even without being true? Perhaps in some sense. However, that does not
show that there is not some other sense in which any belief that fails to be true is incorrect.
After all, it is very plausible that there is a close tie between warrant and truth.183 Some
argue that, at least for certain sorts of contents, being true is a matter of being warranted at the
end of inquiry.184 Others insist that warrant generally is to be explained, at least partly, as what
is conducive, in some way or other, to truth. No matter which way the order of explanation
flows, however, almost everybody can agree that warranted beliefs are apt to be true, i.e.
warranted beliefs are true in typical or perhaps ideal conditions when the world cooperates.
This connection between warrant and truth is enough to sustain (Norm of Belief).
183 Cf. Conee (1992). 184 Cf. Wright (1992).
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To see why, suppose for a moment that my ideal chess game is not one in which I
necessarily win, but rather one in which I play well. If playing well is my principal goal when I
play chess, then if I am acting rationally, I cannot help but to try to win the games of chess I play.
My goal of playing well at chess compels another goal of winning chess. Why? To have played
well at chess just is to play in a way that would likely result in a win against opponents of up to a
certain skill level. To try to play well on a particular occasion, then, just is to try to win. If it's
not the case that winning a game of chess is, to my mind, a success, then having played well at
chess can't be, to my mind, desirable. In this way, a norm to play well at chess inherently
generates (or perhaps presupposes) a norm to win.
An analogous situation arises with warrant and truth on the very plausible assumption
that to have a warranted belief just is to have a belief that is apt to be true. On that assumption,
beliefs aspiring warrant requires beliefs aspiring to true. What's more, on that assumption, if
truth did not, in some sense, mark a belief's being successful and hence correct, warrant could
not mark, in any sense, a belief's being good. Thus, on that assumption, even if the ideal belief
is merely a warranted belief, the warrant norm will inherently generate (or perhaps presuppose)
a norm of truth.
(Of course, one can reject the assumption that warrant is closely tied to truth. One
might suggest, rather, that warranted beliefs are pragmatic beliefs. It remains to be seen how
TTIR fares on the view that the telos of beliefs is pragmatic. I will discuss that issue in §6.)
§5: The Telos of Desire
Up to this point, we have discussed plausible views on the telos of belief. What about our
teleofunctionalist account of desire? Do we have the same sorts of reasons for adopting a
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teleofunctionalist account of desire as we do for adopting a teleofunctionalist account of belief?
I think so.
When we lose focus and become distracted, we can fail to do what we desired to do and
could have done even though we had no countervailing desire to do otherwise. This sort of
situation represents a failure of practical rationality. When it comes to certain desires, e.g.
desiring to finish a paper, it may be that these rational failures are more common than
successes. Without desiring to do so, a person may lose focus every time he tries to write. This
person may lose focus merely because his desire to write did not provide him with motivational
force enough to overcome his apathy.
The desires (at least, as we talk about them in quotidian life) are not subject to the same
coherence constraints as beliefs; there is nothing wrong with someone who has conflicting
desires. In this respect, desires more closely parallel intuitions than they do beliefs. However,
all things considered desires that ultimately explain our actions do seem to be subject to the
same coherence constraints as beliefs. Someone who intentionally undermines his own efforts
exhibits a sort of practical irrationality. A person torn by competing religious and worldly desires
can exhibit this sort of practical irrationality. His behavior may well demonstrate a pattern in
which he regularly acts intentionally out of worldly desires in a way that undermines the
religious desires regularly behind his intentional action on other occasions, and vice-versa. The
best explanation of this behavior may well be that (at least given the person's beliefs) he has a
total set of desires that are incoherent, and, depending on the occasion, only some of the total
set are occurrent or active. This explanation is entirely analogous to the explanation we might
give of somebody with inconsistent beliefs who, for instance, regularly acts as if she believes in
ghosts on some occasions, but regularly disavows the existence of ghosts on others.
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Desires, like beliefs, have a rational role. Moreover, just as with belief, the rational role
of desire is far more central to it than the causal role. Desires can fail to execute their rational
roles just as beliefs can. The fact that a state does not execute the rational role of a desire (or all
things considered desire) does not imply that the state is not a desire. What apparently matters
for being a desire is whether a state is supposed to execute the rational role of a desire, not
whether it in fact does. Thus, teleofunctionalism seems as appropriate for desire as it does for
belief.
So, what is the telos of desire? It is truistic that the aim of desire is satisfaction. A
satisfied desire is a desire that has been successful, whether by skill or chance. So much may
well be enough to establish that satisfaction is, in fact, the telos of desire. Thus, in any arbitrary
scenario, things are as they ought to be for a hypothetical desire (qua desire) if and only if the
desire has come to be satisfied in that scenario. This would be enough to establish (Norm of
Desire).
The view that satisfaction is the telos of desire parallels the view that truth is the telos
of belief. Thus, as we considered alternatives to the latter view, so we might consider parallel
alternatives to the former. As one might be tempted to think that the pinnacle of belief is when
a combination of epistemic competency and favorable conditions in the world assure truth, so
one might be tempted to think that the pinnacle of desire is when a combination of practical
competency and favorable conditions in the world assure satisfaction. To be tempted by the
latter view is to be tempted by a view for desire analogous to the knowledge-telos view for
belief. As one might be tempted to think that the ideal belief is a belief that is apt to be true
whether or not the world cooperates to make it true, so one might be tempted to think that the
ideal desire is one that is apt to be satisfied whether or not the world cooperates to make it
satisfied. To be tempted by the latter view is to be tempted by a view for desire analogous to
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the warrant-telos view for belief. I won't attempt to thoroughly develop or canvass these
alternatives. For my purposes, it's enough to point out that if the alternatives for belief
vindicate TTIR restricted to belief, these parallel alternatives for desire are likely to vindicate
TTIR restricted to desire for entirely analogous reasons.
Many people would say that a desire is a good desire if its satisfaction promotes some
moral or practical good. We might try to develop this thought into a view on the telos of desire:
desires are good qua desires if and only if their satisfaction promotes the good (tout court).
However, this view would be incomplete without the accompanying view that desires are states
that aim at satisfaction. It's only because desires aim at satisfaction that good desires are ones
whose satisfaction promotes the good (tout court). (If (counterpossibly) desires aimed at
dissatisfaction, then good desires would be ones whose dissatisfaction promoted the good.)
The complete view, then, has to be that desires are good qua desires if and only if when they
are successful they promote the good (tout court), and, furthermore, desires are successful (qua
desires) if and only if they are satisfied. The latter part of this complete view is enough to
establish (Norm of Desire), and hence, vindicate TTIR restricted to desires.
§6: A Pragmatic Teleofunctional Theory of Intentionality?
In §4-5, I discussed several possible views on the telos of belief and desire. For belief, these
views advocated as the telos various epistemic ideals revolving around truth. For desire, these
view advocated as the telos ideals revolving around satisfaction. I have provided reasons for
thinking that all of these views are friendly to TTIR. On all of these views beliefs and desires are
supposed to act like, and hence are, robust representations. Of course, while they are initially
plausible, these views do not exhaust the possibilities. Another plausible alternative is that the
teloi of beliefs and desires are principally pragmatic ideals: something is a belief or desire
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because of the particular pragmatic utility that state is supposed to have for the subject. How
does TTIR fare on this alternative?
It is a dictum of common sense that the basic antecedent ends—surviving, avoiding
pain, having a full belly, engaging in fulfilling sexual activity etc.—are best furthered when
desires that are core to the subject's motivational system are both aligned with these
antecedent ends (rather than being self-destructive for instance) and come to be subsequently
satisfied.185 It is equally sensible to think that the satisfaction of these desires is most likely to
be achieved by having, in particular, true beliefs that interact with core desires via instrumental
reasoning to form instrumental desires that, when satisfied, satisfy the former core desires.
Obviously, there will be occasions when a subject's interests are best served by having false
beliefs (e.g., when someone is offered substantial resources for believing something false);
nonetheless, it seems nearly platitudinous that the optimal belief forming strategy from a
pragmatic standpoint involves forming true beliefs absent circumstances in which the strategy is
explicitly defeated. It is very plausible to think, then, that the particular pragmatic utility of
having a belief-desire psychology comes in satisfying desires by having true beliefs. Last
chapter, I clarified and gave an extensive defense of this thesis. I will take it for granted here.
The upshot of this thesis is a vindication of TTIR even on the alternative view where the
teloi of beliefs and desires are principally pragmatic. Even if something is a belief principally
because of the particular pragmatic utility that state is supposed to have rather than because of
any sort of epistemic aim the state is supposed to fulfill, a derivative norm of truth inherently
arises given the pragmatic utility that beliefs are supposed to have. A similar point might be
made about desire.
185 Cf. Haack (1997).
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§7: The Naturalist Objection
§7.1: An Obstacle for Teleofunctionalism
A principal obstacle for teleofunctionalism about attitudes is how the view comports with
naturalism. If to be a belief is to have a certain telos (and likewise for desire), how could beliefs
and desires come to be at all? More specifically, how can internally cognitive states naturally—
rather than magically or artificially due to the actions of some other rational agent—come to
have the telos of belief or the telos of desire? It runs against our naturalistic scruples that a
state could have the telos of, say, a belief merely as a brute fact. There must be some
explanation of this property in terms of more fundamental properties. Moreover, we ought to
be able to understand these more fundamental properties in naturalistic terms.
There is no reason to think that we would necessarily have a problem explaining
teleofunctional properties generally. Assuming we can give a naturalistic explanation for
intentional states, we offer a naturalistic explanation of how an object comes to have the
teleofunctional property of being a mousetrap by pointing to the intentional states of the
designers and users of the mousetrap. This sort of explanation will not work, however, for
explaining how a state could come to have the teleofunctional property of being a belief, desire,
etc. because this sort of explanation assumes antecendently a naturalistic explanation for
intentional states.
In Chapter One and Three, I have alluded to one possible solution to this problem. If a
creature's parts or states work even approximately in a way that ideally serves (conceptually)
antecendent ends, these parts or states can come to have the telos of working just in that way.
Thus, for instance, if a creature has a heart that (at least typically) pumps blood, and pumping
blood optimally serves a(n) (conceptually) antecedent need the creature has for survival, the
creature's heart can come to have the telos of pumping blood (if the right sort of non-
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accidentality condition is met). Likewise, if humans have internal cognitive states that (at least
typically) act like representations, and acting like a representations optimally serves
(conceptually) antecedent ends that humans in fact have, e.g. survival, socialization, sex, pain-
avoidance, etc., then these internal cognitive states can come to have the telos of representing.
It seems very plausible to me that humans do have antecedent ends, i.e., ends that do not arise
from having cognitively sophisticated states like beliefs and desires. (Thinking otherwise greatly
over-intellectualizes what it is to have ends or interests.) Thus, I see no problem, in principle,
with thinking that being a belief and being a desire are teleofunctional properties. In this
section, I will begin to develop a more complete response of this sort on behalf of TTIR.
§7.2: A Broader Theory of Teleology
Mentalism about teleology is the view that all teleological properties of objects arise from the
intentional states of designers and users of those objects.186 Mentalism is a doctrine that seems
initially very plausible if only because paradigm instances of teloi involving artifacts do seem to
depend on pre-existing intentional states. TTIR, which suggests that intentional representation
is analogous to artifactual representation, can make people very nervous for that reason.
Fortunately for TTIR, mentalism ought to be rejected. Putative counterexamples to
mentalism usually come from biology. For example, in his attack on mentalism, Mark Bedau
suggests that the tendency of fish to school has the telos of avoiding predators.187 People have
come to accept many of these counterexamples as genuine instances of teleology at least partly
because they tend to see natural selection as playing the role of the designer in these cases;
thus, it is thought, these putative counterexamples from biology maintain an appropriate
parallel with paradigm artifactual instances of teleology where the role of the designer is played
186 Cf. Bedau (1990). 187 Ibid.
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by intentional agents.188 In this way, even though mentalism about teleology is rejected, a
prerequisite of design is retained. This putative design prerequisite, however, should likewise
be rejected. Objects need not be designed to have teleological properties. If it is suitably co-
opted, a sturdy stick can come to be a walking stick—it can come to have the teleological
property of helping one keep one's balance—even though the stick was clearly not designed to
do so.189 In the right circumstances, the use of a state or object in a certain way can be
sufficient for its having a particular telos. Design is not a central feature of teleology. The
requirements that people have (pre)supposed to be necessary for teleological properties to
arise are far too stringent to be plausible.
Of course, we don't want to say that something has the telos of being F just because it is
F and its being F achieves some good—and not just because having the telos of being F doesn't
require being F at all. (Remember, a mousetrap doesn't have to be disposed to catch mice even
under ideal circumstances to have the telos to do so.) Even if the rain beneficially causes crops
to grow, clearly it doesn't have the telos to do so. The benefit of the rain's falling is incidental to
its falling—whether the rain falls or not is at all explained by the fact that it would be beneficial
(for us) for it to fall. In this way, the beneficial effects of the rain falling appear to be
“accidental”; this accidentality is sufficient to disqualify the rain's falling as teleological.
Nonetheless, the non-accidentality condition for teleology can be met without pre-
existing intentionality or design. Consider the following case:
On some tropical island there is a tribe of people relatively isolated from modern society. This tribe regularly keeps torches burning throughout their village at night so as to ward off evil spirits. The torches are not causally efficacious at warding off corporeal demons. All of the deaths in the village that have been attributed to demons are actually cases of a fast acting lethal disease. These cases came to look like incidents of violence due to the aggressive nocturnal scavengers that live on the
188 Cf. Kitcher (1993) and Plantinga (1993). 189 Cf. Allen and Bekoff (1995).
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island and immediately descend on the recently deceased tribesmen at night. The lethal disease is more commonly found in local populations of lower primates (where is it slower acting and less lethal), and it is spread by insects that are active only at night. The smoke from the torches keeps away insects that spread the disease, which reinforces the tribe’s practice of keeping torches lit.
Upon understanding the situation, it would be very natural for an anthropologist visiting this
tribe to conclude that while the torches in this community may well have the purpose of
warding off demons when lit, it also has the job of preventing infection from the lethal disease
when lit. Indeed, there is even a temptation to say that this is the real job of the torches
because the practice of keeping the torches burning is causally responsive not to corporeal
demons, but to the presence of the disease. (Obviously, that the torches this particular telos is
not due to the beliefs, desires, and intentions of the tribesmen. The tribesmen completely
misunderstand why the practice serves their good.) In order for the torches to have the job of
preventing infection when lit it’s enough for the torches to serve some (pro tanto) good by
preventing the spread of infection of this disease when lit and for the fact that the torches
persist to be counterfactually dependent on the fact that when lit, they serve this good in this
way. This counterfactual dependence is enough to meet the non-accidentality condition.
Moving to psychology, we find it perfectly natural to ascribe teleological properties
when it is not altogether clear whether intentional states are involved or not. It is natural, for
instance, to think that insecure Amber’s incessant flirting has the job getting her attention. It
may be that insecure Amber subconsciously intends to get attention by flirting, but this
explanation is somewhat speculative. It is far more likely that she engages in unremitting
coquetry because this behavior was reinforced by the way that it made her feel. The fact that
her behavior regularly produces a pro tanto good for her conditions her to continue behaving in
this fashion. No intervening beliefs, desires, and intentions are required in this causal chain,
which is, in and of itself, enough to meet the non-accidentality condition so that Amber’s
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flirtatious behavior has a teleological property. The non-accidentality condition for teleology
can be met when properties of an object or state are causally sensitive to what is good, whether
or not this causal sensitivity is the product of intentional action or anything that closely
resembles design. Although it is systematically maintained, Amber’s behavioral disposition
arose entirely accidentally. The mechanisms of operant conditioning at work provide the fertile
ground necessary for developing and maintaining this behavioral disposition, but providing the
fertile ground hardly constitutes designing.
Abstracting from the particulars of Amber's case, we can say that a dispositional
property to bring some state of affairs about coincides with a teleological property to do so in
cases where developing or maintaining that dispositional property has depended or currently
depends on whether the dispositional property is beneficial. This sufficient condition for
teleology allows for the possibility of teleology without pre-existing intentional states or some
sort of process of design, and therefore makes room for TTIR.
§7.3: Must Biology Subsume Intentional Psychology?
How should the proponent of TTIR and intentional psychology develop his position in light of a
broader theory of teleology? The tendency has been to do so by seizing on the process of
natural selection.190 Thus, humans continue to exhibit the type of cognitive architecture
required for intentional psychology because having this cognitive architecture is more
successful; if the cognitive architecture is more successful precisely because it produced
cognitive states that act often enough act like representations, then TTIR and intentional
psychology are jointly vindicated.
190 Cf. Millikan (1984), (1993), and many of the essays of Ariew, Cummins, and Perlman (2002).
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There are at least a couple of reasons to be displeased with alleged vindications of this
sort (even if they don't ultimately prove to be fatal to the general idea):
First, biological function may not be genuinely teleological. “Success” in biology is
measured by whether there is reproduction, but there's no particularly good reason for thinking
that reproduction is a genuine good for any creature. (Are humans or any other creature
genuinely better off merely for having reproduced?) Biological “success” is perhaps most
plausibly understood as a metaphor; it can be useful to think of biological organisms as engaged
in a game with the end of reproduction even if reproduction is not generally the end of any
particular biological organism. Thus, while maintaining cognitive architecture through
generations is dependent on reproductive success it may not be thereby sensitive to what is
genuinely good, and hence, may fail to be genuinely teleological.191
In fact, biological function (or at least one sort of biological function) may turn out to be
a non-teleological species of etiological function. Roughly speaking, some type of dispositional
property to φ coincides with an etiological function to φ if the current exhibiting of that type of
disposition depends on past exhibitings, i.e. if the current existence of a token of that type
depends on the existence of past tokens.192 There are reasons to think that teleological and
etiological function are not the same. Career setbacks have a tendency to replicate because
they make resumés look worse and they impede the development of career skills. Certainly, we
don't want to say that the telos of career setbacks is to make resumés look worse and impede
the development of career skills.
Obviously, to say that biological function is not generally teleological is not to say that
some instances of biological function may coincide with teleological function, but merely to say
that they need not coincide. (The heart example in the introduction of this section may well be
191 Cf. Bedau (1991). 192 Cf. Wright (1973).
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a case in which biological function and teleological function coincide even if they do not do so
generally.)
Second, the biological function of the cognitive architecture underlying belief-desire
psychology is not conceptually tied up with representation.193 It is conceptually possible (even if
unlikely) that our ancestors successfully reproduced not because their cognitive architecture
produced cognitive states that often enough act like representations, but because their
cognitive architecture made them immune to a particularly fatal disease. Indeed, we can even
imagine that, due to this immunity, our ancestors successfully competed against biological
cousins whose cognitive architecture produced a causal network of cognitive states that far
better approximated a rational network of mental representations than our own causal
networks of cognitive states do. If immunity to some disease was the dominant cause of the
propagation of our cognitive architecture, then the biological function of our cognitive
architecture may have little to do with producing mental representations.
It's hard to believe that the vindication of intentional psychology ultimately rests on
what exactly happened to our ancestors.194 However, accepting TTIR while maintaining a
commitment to explain how teleological properties arose through natural selection would seem
to hold intentional psychology hostage to particulars in the history of evolutionary biology in
just this way.
(This point is, of course, directly related to the questions about Swampman. The
infamous Swampman is an atom for atom duplicate of a normal human being whose comes to
exist by sheer chance.195 There are strong intuitions that Swampman can eventually have beliefs
193 See, for example, Block (2007), 24, and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), 211-212. 194 Dretske (1995), Chapter 5 and Millikan (1993) give spirited defenses of the idea that history matters to representational content, but, in my view, their defense involves an unacceptable assault on the methodology behind philosophical thought experiments. Cf. Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009). 195 Cf. Davidson (1987).
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and desires even if not immediately after he comes to exist. In effect, these are intuitions that
intentional psychology is autonomous from evolutionary biology, which are obviously in tension
with the evolutionary view on intentionality under consideration.)
It may be that none of these reasons for suspicion are ultimately conclusive reasons to
reject natural selection as jointly vindicating TTIR and intentional psychology, but they are
enough to make one uncomfortable enough to consider alternatives to that joint position.
Does a commitment to TTIR and realism about intentional psychology require a
commitment to a natural selection story? I don't think it does. The actual functioning of any
person's cognitive architecture is clearly causally sensitive to whether the person's antecedent
ends are being met. Obviously, if the person dies (generally not in the interest of the person),
then the cognitive architecture ceases to function as it did. More generally, though, if the
person is hungry, tired, in tremendous pain, emotionally distressed, socially isolated, or sexually
deprived, the functioning is also affected. In fact, the ability of people to form cognitive states
that act like rationally constrained mental representations is generally inhibited when the
person's antecedent ends are not being met; people who are hungry, tired, in tremendous pain,
emotionally distressed, socially isolated, sexually deprived, or dead are not especially good at
being rational. A cognitive architecture that advances the antecedent ends of the subject
maintains its disposition to form cognitive states that act like rationally constrained mental
representations. Assuming that the cognitive architecture does generally facilitate meeting
antecedent ends by forming cognitive states that act like rationally constrained mental
representations, sufficient conditions are met for the cognitive architecture to have the telos of
forming cognitive states that act like rationally constrained mental representations. Moreover,
the formed cognitive states derivatively have the telos of acting like rationally constrained
mental representations. To have that telos is, of course, just to be a rationally constrained
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mental representation. In this way, TTIR and intentional psychology might thereby be jointly
vindicated without any reference to natural selection. The normativity of intentionality can
stem directly from independent sources of value for the subject without drawing on
evolutionary biology.
§7.4: The Problem of Antecedent Ends
There are at least two reasons why the proposal just sketched might offend a philosopher's
sensibilities.
To begin with, one might worry that there are no ends for subjects that are conceptually
and metaphysically antecedent to intentionality; all value is, in some way or other, dependent
on intentionality. Thus, antecedent normativity is not available to ground the teleological
representation of intentional states in the manner I suggested.
In direct opposition to the intuition behind this position, I am inclined to think that the
most basic interests of creatures are much more closely tied to the existence of affective mental
states—pain, pleasure, and primitive emotions—than they are tied to the existence of
intentional states. (This is not to say that facts about a creature's basic well-being are
exhaustively fixed by the sorts of affective mental states it has; it is merely to suggest that
responding to real or imagined scenarios affectively is a prerequisite for having basic interests in
the way the world turns out.) While there are theories of affective states that attempt to
explain their nature in intentional terms, I am inclined to think that these theories have over-
intellectualized affect. The affective states of intentional agents may be content laden—once
introduced, intentionality may infect all sorts of phenomenal states from sensory states to pain
to emotions—but I see no particularly good reason to think that affective states of these sorts
are essentially intentional with fine-grained representational content. (Even if an emotion of
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anger represents some sort of particular offense to an intentional agent, it need not represent
anything determinate to a non-intentional creature.) The intentionality of belief-desire
psychology is relatively cognitively sophisticated, and not a general requirement for cognition.
Associative processing—assimilating objects, scenarios, and events to prototypes or exemplars,
for instance—does not seem to require intentionality; I don't see why having affective states—
that, for instance, trigger fight or flight responses—should require intentionality either. That
some disease has effectively removed the possibility of having higher-level cognitive functioning
required to have beliefs and desires would not convince me that some newborn was not in pain,
and hence, continued to have a stake in how the world was.
Indeed, the idea that natural intentionality (as opposed to artificially designed
intentionality) is ontologically dependent on affect gains some support from examples.
Supposing that the causal connections between various geological states of a planet are
isomorphic to the links of an ideal belief-desire psychology does not generally yield the intuition
that the planet exhibits intentionality.196 Why? I suspect we fail to see any genuinely
teleological relationships between the geological states because the causal connections
between geological states fail to serve any good. If we suppose as part of a children's tale that
the planet has feelings that are served by these causal connections, we are more inclined to see
the causal workings of the planet as manifestations of intelligence.
A second worry related to the first concerns the extent to which the sketched proposal
fails to resolve the naturalistic puzzle we began this section with. Even if you accept that
normative aspect of teleological representation might derive from the way the functioning of
cognitive architecture is maintained precisely by advancing the subject's antecedent ends, still
there is some normativity that has been left unexplained. Where do these antecedent ends
196 Cf. Block (1978).
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come from? Although I have not given a detailed answer to this question, I have given some
indication where to begin—by considering the nature of affective states and their connection to
value. Of course, one can always fret that in making this suggestion I am merely pushing
Brentano's problem onto someone else, but I take the reduction of Brentano's problem to the
problem of understanding affective states and their connection to value naturalistically to
constitute genuine progress. After all, any naturalism that can't accomodate affective states
and their phenomenological character or the basic interests of minded creatures is not very
plausible. If we come to see that naturalism cannot afford this much, we ought to reject
naturalism. We ought to be more confident that we have affective states and interests than we
are about naturalism.
§8: Nomological Functionalism Reconsidered
I have spent the last several sections discussing the various plausible teleofunctionalist accounts
of belief and desire. On all of these accounts, beliefs and desires turn out to be robust
representations in accordance with TTIR. Moreover, last section, I established that in positing
that intentional states like belief and desire have a telos, teleofunctionalist accounts are not
committing any obvious sins against naturalism. The ideals requisite for robust representation
inherently fall out of the usefulness of belief-desire psychology in furthering the (conceptually)
antecedent ends of subjects. Consequently, so long as we can understand naturalistically how
survival, for instance, might antecedently be in the interest of subjects, we can understand how
beliefs and desires could have the purpose of robustly representing.
In light of the difficulties, pointed to in §2 in developing an adequate nomological
functionalist account of attitudes, these results make a strong case for teleofunctionalism.
Likewise, in and of themselves, they work against intentional theories (for example, deflationary
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theories of content) that deny TTIR. My purpose in this section is to strengthen the case against
these intentional theories by more thoroughly evaluating the prospects for a nomological
functionalist theory of attitudes.
After all, one might worry that I dismissed nomological functionalism too quickly on the
basis of concerns raised in §2. Perhaps even a simple revision to the basic regularity account of
belief might suffice to yield a plausible theory of belief. While beliefs that are not causally
regulated so as to be true might be possible, surely it is not possible that a whole system of
beliefs might fail to be regulated so as to be true. Consequently, why could we not offer an
account of belief according to which to be a belief is roughly to be part of a network of states
that are regulated so as to be true? This account of belief may need to deal with the possibility
that other attitudes besides belief might be part of a network so regulated, but assuming that is
a manageable problem, what's wrong with a nomological functionalism of this sort?
Once again the problem is thinking that causal properties can do the work rationality. If
we define what it is to be part of the network of states according to rational links between
states, this account stands a chance. However, if being part of a network of states is supposed
to be a nomological property, I don't see how this account is going to work. All sorts of non-
belief states can be linked causally to belief networks in all sorts of ways. If that were not so,
wishful thinking would not be possible.
Any account of attitudes that does not introduce ideals for being a belief or being a
desire will not do. However, there are ways to introduce ideals where these ideals are not
normative. For instance, the ideals introduced for gases by the ideal gas law are not normative
ideals. Rather, they are merely idealizations. Perhaps, some state is a belief that p because its
causal role similar enough to the causal role of an idealized belief that p. What is an idealized
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belief that p? Presumably, it is a state that acts exactly in accordance with the rational role of a
belief that p. 197
Unless we can make out more precisely what it is for the causal role to be “similar
enough” it will be hard to test the adequacy of this sort of theory. However, there are two
important reasons to prefer teleofunctionalism nonetheless.
First, there is an important difference between non-normative ideals that emerge from
idealizations—such as the ideal gas laws—and the ideals of belief-desire psychology. Non-
normative idealizing involves making simplifying assumptions about the natural phenomenon
under consideration. These simplifying assumptions give us some understanding of the scope of
the idealization. For instance, the idealization that yields the ideal gas laws involves thinking of
gases as point size particles. At high pressures where the volume of the gas particles is no
longer insignificant relative to the occupied space, this simplifying assumption is no longer good.
As a result, we don't expect the ideal gas laws to hold under these conditions.
When it comes to the ideals of belief-desire psychology, there are no simplifying
assumptions that reveal when precisely the ideals apply. (Obviously, the ideals apply when
subjects are rational—but that's just to say that they apply when they apply.) The absence of
simplifying assumptions strongly indicates that what we have here is not a nomological model
precisely because the model by itself gives us no resources to make predications. To be able to
make predictions, we need to know, for example, the conditions under which a belief-desire
psychology would tend to persist. Obviously, persistence occurs when these cognitive states
generally serve the ends of the subject—when they aid in keeping the subject alive and well.
Thus, we ought to expect greater conformity to the ideals of belief-desire psychology in those
cases that are most immediately relevant to keeping subjects alive and well.
197 Cf. Shoemaker 1984, Chapter 12, Horwich (1998), and Horwich (2005).
155
What this exercise shows is that in order to make predictions using the ideals of belief-
desire psychology, we ultimately need to make reference to what belief-desire psychology is
good for. To do that, however, is just to walk down the road to teleofunctionalism. The
teleology of belief-desire psychology just emerges from the fact that it is good for something.
Second, everyone ought to agree that beliefs and other intentional states are subject to
genuine norms of rationality. On a teleofunctionalist theory of attitudes, explaining how these
genuine norms come into play is prior to explaining how it is that an internal cognitive state
could be of a particular attitude kind. On a theory of the sort now under consideration,
explaining how it is that an internal cognitive state could be of a particular attitude kind is prior
to explaining how these genuine norms come into play. So, for instance, on a teleofunctionalist
account of belief, a state is a belief (that p) because it is supposed to be a certain way. On the
sorts of competitor accounts under consideration, a state is supposed to be a certain way
because it is a belief (that p).
To insist that being of a particular attitude kind is explanatorily prior to genuine norms
of rationality is to insist that the theory of rationality is supplemental to and wholly separate
from the theory of intentional states.198 To my mind, the problem with the competitor theories
now under consideration is that, although they insist that the theory of rationality is
supplemental to and wholly separate from the theory of intentional states, they also say that
being of a particular attitude kind involves being disposed to approximately follow the genuine
norms of the theory of rationality. For my part, I find it difficult to motivate the idea that the
theory of rationality is supplemental to and wholly separate from the theory of intentional
states if, in fact, being of a particular attitude kind involves being disposed to approximately
follow the genuine norms of the theory of rationality. I would expect there to be an explanation
198 Cf. Horwich (2005).
156
of this obvious connection between the theory of rationality and the theory of intentional
states. If being of a particular attitude kind involves being disposed to approximately follow the
genuine norms of a theory of rationality, then quite probably, the theory of rationality is
intimately tied up with the theory of intentional states. We ought to look first to see whether a
theory that postulates a tie between the theory of rationality and the theory of intentional
states succeeds.
Of course, we might have to retreat to a theory where the theory of rationality is
supplemental to and wholly separate from the theory of intentional states if we can't find a
viable theory that explains the obvious connection. However, we can find such a theory. A
viable teleofunctionalist theory of attitudes can explain why being of a particular attitude kind
involves being disposed to approximately follow the genuine norms of the theory of rationality.
Being of a particular attitude kind involves being disposed to approximately follow the genuine
norms of the theory of rationality because being of a particular attitude kind involves having the
teleological purpose of following the genuine norms, e.g. truth and satisfaction, of the theory of
rationality. The latter is explanatory because states come to have the teleological purpose of
following the genuine norms of the theory of rationality in virtue of furthering the antecedent
ends of subjects by being disposed to approximately follow the genuine norms of the theory of
rationality. It is by acting like representations, i.e. pursuing the rational aims of truth and
satisfaction, that beliefs and desires further the antecedent ends of subjects.
To my mind, a successful teleofunctionalism about attitudes closes the door on
nomological functionalism.199 As the common folk theory of attitudes (See §3),
199 I am understanding nomological functionalism as the view that the property of being of a certain attitude kind not only strongly supervenes (and is constituted by) underlying causal properties, but also that it is a property that can be theoretically defined in terms of those causal properties. The former weaker view may well turn out to be compatible with teleological functionalism depending on whether
157
teleofunctionalism ought to be the default position. It ought to be revised only if it cannot be
successfully made out.
§9: Conclusion
Functionalism is not the only sort of theory of attitudes one might reasonably have. One might,
for instance, adopt an instrumentalist or interpretationist theory of attitudes according to which
someone has beliefs and desires if and only if in light of a reasonable principle of charity or
humanity, they can be interpreted as having robust mental representations. I will not try to
adjudicate whether that sort of position counts as embracing TTIR, but it seems rather unlikely
that the position will turn out to be friendly to deflationary theories of content. (In addition,
these theories are less palatable because they reject robust realism about intentional states. If
it turned out that deflationary theories of content are committed to these theories, so much the
worse for them.)
In fact, it seems unlikely to me that any theory of attitudes will be friendly to
deflationary theories of content. Although I have not canvassed all the possibilities, showing
that functionalist theories are not likely to be compatible is a very good start.200
being a creature with interests is a property that strongly supervenes on causal properties. Thanks to Joshua Schechter for raising this issue. 200 Special thanks to Richard Heck, Christopher Hill, and Joshua Schechter for their discussion and comments. Part of this chapter was presented at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St. Andrews in the spring of 2008. I would like to acknowledge members of the audience, particularly Crispin Wright, Jessica Brown, Herman Cappelen, and Martin Smith, for the profitable discussion on that occasion.
158
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS:
§1: Continuing to Make the Case for the Teleological Theory of
Intentional Representation
Although Chapters Three and Four make a conclusive case for teleological theory of intentional
representation, Chapter Three in particular might be expanded upon to strengthen the case.
In Chapter Three, I show that belief-desire psychology is useful only to the extent that
the subject reliably forms true beliefs so that instrumental reasoning reliably satisfies good core
desires. The utility of belief-desire psychology thus presupposes that a subject can reliably form
true beliefs. In ongoing work, I argue that reliably forming true beliefs requires that beliefs
function as if they have genuine correctness conditions in accordance with TTIR; in light of
confirmation holism, it is very difficult to understand how subjects could reliably form true
beliefs except via a tacit grasp of what the belief has the job of representing. In this way, the
utility of belief-desire psychology vindicates TTIR twice over. The fact that belief-desire
psychology only has utility to the extent that true beliefs are formed reliably shows that TTIR
must be true. The fact that true beliefs can be formed reliably only if the subject is treating
them like representations further indicates that TTIR must be true.
159
§2: Looking Forward
Two issues raised in Chapter Four deserve further attention. In §7, I show how
teleological properties need not depend on antecedent intentionality. The explanation I gave
there can be used to show how non-intentional rule following is possible. Doing so is a project
for future work.
In §8, I effectively argue that the teleological theory of intentional representation is
superior to alternatives because the former is better able to explain why there ought to be
points of connection between the theory of intentionality and the theory of rationality. Further
substantiating this claim requires showing much more carefully how (teleological) norms of
representation relate to norms of rationality. I hope to tackle that project at some point in the
near future.
160
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