technical issues and characterization for fuel

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s HNF-5338-FP Revision 0 Technical Issues and Characterization for Fuel and Sludge in Hanford K Basins Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management Project Hanford Management Contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract OE-AC06-96RLl3200 P.O. Box 1000 Richland, Washington Fluor Hanford Copyright License By acceptsncB of this article. the publisher endlor recipient acknowledges the US. Government’s right to retain B nonexclusive, royalty-free license in and to any copyright coveting this paper. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited

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s HNF-5338-FP Revision 0

Technical Issues and Characterization for Fuel and Sludge in Hanford K Basins

Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management

Project Hanford Management Contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract OE-AC06-96RLl3200

P.O. Box 1000 Richland, Washington

Fluor Hanford

Copyright License By acceptsncB of this article. the publisher endlor recipient acknowledges the U S . Government’s right to retain B nonexclusive, royalty-free license in and to any copyright coveting this paper.

Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited

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8. Document Number HNF- 5 3 3 8 - FP C. Title

TECHNICAL ISSUES AND CHARACTERIZATION FOR FUEL AND SLUDGE IN "FORD K BASINS

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TECHNICAL ISSUES A N D CHARACTERIZATION FOR FUEL AND SLUDGE IN HANFORD X BASINS

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H N F-5338-FP Revision 0

Technical Issues and Characterization for Fuel and Sludge in Hanford K

6. Makenas

R. Baker A. Pitner R. Sexton D. Trimble Fluor Hanford. Inc

J. Abrefah P. Bredt

Fluor Hanford. Inc

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Date Published June 2000

Prepared for'the U.S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management

Fluor Hanford P.O. Box 1000 Richland, Washington

Copyright License By acceptance of this article, the publisher andlor recipient acknowledges the US. Government's right to retain a nonexclusive. royalty-free license in and to any copyright covering this paper.

Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited

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LEGAL DISCLAIMER This repolt was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors. subcontractors or their employees. makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or any third party's use or the resuns of such use of any information, apparatus, product. or process disclosed. or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference hereln to any specific commercial product. process, or servlce by trade name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement. recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

This report has been reproduced from the best available copy.

Printed in the United %le3 of Amtics

TECHNICAL ISSUES AND CHARACTERIZATION FOR FUEL AND SLUDGE IN HANFORD K BASINS

Bruce Makenas, Rich Sexton, Ron Baker, AI Pitner, Dennis Trirnble Fluor Hanford Inc. Box 1000, Richland, Wa. 99352 (509) 376-5441,376-9682 316-5 109,376-9539,316-8373

ABSTRACT

Technical Issues for the interim dry storage of N Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) are discussed. Characterization &la from fuel, to support resolution of these issues, are reviewed and nen results for the oxidation of fuel in a moist atmosphere and the drying of whole fuel elements are presented. Characterization of associated K basin sludge is also discussed in light of a newly adopted disposal pathnay.

I. INTRODUCTION

The two water-filled Hanford K Basins (K East and K West) contain approximately 200,000 uranium metal N Reactor fuel elements (2100 metric tons heavy metal) and 50 cubic meters of sludge. l l i e fuel is stored in double-barrel canisters and clad with a zirconium alloy. The Hanford SNF Project will retrieve N Reactor fuel from undenvater storage, clean <and re-package the fiiel in containers that will hold more than six metric tons of fuel each, dry the fuel, and transfer the containers to interim storage. The container, a Multi-Canister @erpack (MCO), will accept baskets of hiel elements and baskets of fuel scrap (pieces greater than 0.25 inch diameter). Sludge (pnrticulate less than 0.25 inch dinmeter) is the result of tlie corrosion of exposed hrel, the corrosion of structural and canister materials, as \vel1 :IS the accunuulation of sand ,and debris. Dispos:il pntlis for the hiel xnd sludge x e summnrized in a companion paper

11. TECHNICAL ISSUES FOR FUEL

I

A number of technical issues arose nhile the project was defining the hiel handling and w i n g process, 'and while developing tlie safety basis for these operations. Uncertainties included:

John Abrefah, Paul Bredt Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Box 999, Richland, Wa., 99352 (509) 373-0921 316-3171

- How much hie1 surface (available for oxidation) would be exposed on fuel elements m d scrap in the MCO?

' - H o n much scrap \vould be created in the fiiel handling and washing process and what would it look like'? At what rates would osidation reactions occur during the process? How much particulate would remain on the fuel after cleaning:) Hon. much water vould remain in the particulate after wing '?

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-

-

The SNF Project approached these technical issues by defining assuniptions that were clearly defensible in support of the safety basis, and by defining design basis assumptions that were in the range of actual expectations. Ezrtremely conservative safety margins were assigned to safety-related systems when the value of any critical fuel parameter \vas based upon limited data. In some cases, t v o sets of assumptions were used for safety basis calculations. For example, exposed fuel surface area is beneficial when calculating the mitigation of oxygen build-up in the IvlCO, but detrimental when considering heat generation from oxidation during vacuum drying. Thus, safev basis calculations se re done assunung no surface area for some oxygen calculations. and assuming surface area values many times higher d im expected for thermal calculations.

Many of the technical issues \vere inter-related and required in t ep t ion of information being gained from hiel chnracterization (dscussed in detail bclow). process design and equipment design. Resolution o l Iechnicd issues norni;illy rested on forni;il calculations (that were subjected to a thorough peer review) and contributed to a very robust %$et? basis, without imposing unattainable constraints on the process design.

Some of the major technical issucs addressed by the project were:

- Uranium Osidation Rates: Behavior of the fuel was compared to literature data and a rate enhancenicnt factor was applied to sxfety basis calcul:itions to account for uncertainties.

- Oxygcn Gettering: Thermal modeling dcmonstrated that Uic worst case MCO would not produce an oqgen Icvel in the MCO above the lower flammability limit during 40 )T;ICS of d n , passivc storage.

- Alununum Hydroxide: Good quality data w a s produced that enabled a statistical analysis to determine a bounding value for alununum hydroxide cladding coating at a 99% coifidencc level.

- MCO Monitoring: MCO monitoring during interim storage is not considered part of the safety basis of the SNF project. However, monitoring 4 to 6 MCO's for temperature, prcssure. and gas composition for up to 2 years will be performed. Installation of high-pressure detection capability, to be utilized for all MCO's during 40 years of interim storage, also is pl'anned.

- Cold Vacuum Dying (CVD) water removal test: Drying conditions were identified for the fuel drying process that ensure Uuit free water in each MCO will be reduced to less tlian 200 grams after drying.

Amount of Scrap and Number of Scrap Baskets: While the typical MCO is cspected to contain no inore U i a n one scrap basket, calculations were performed to sliom that placing two scrap baskets nitliin onc MCO falls within the safcty basis.

11. CHARACTERlZATION OF FUEL

-

Characterization of fuel ' bas been performed in support of the safety basis for interim storage as well as to address specific issues (discussed above) which have arisen during the design of fuel lmdling equipment and storage facilities. Exmination of the fuel has progressed from initial scrcciiing

csaiiiinations of a large number of clenients in the basins ' to cxaininiition of small samplcs in the hboratory to ascertain very specific properties pertaining to particular issues (Tablc I). Since the fucl in K East Basin is i n open-top canisters, the initial in-basin visual cxanunations (Figure I ) consisted of vicwing all accessiblc elements from the top end without handling. T h i s \%is followed by the lifting of a statistically significant number of fuel cleincnts for a full Icngtli csainination. For elements i n K West Basin, \\here canisters ;ire scalcd. a numbcr of canisters \ r e x snmplcd for gas and liquid to cliariicterize the amount of fuel corrosion through knowledge of the r;rdioiiuclide rele;ise ;ind of the volume of hydrogen generation. Selected canisters wcrc then opened for ful l lcnglli visual esamination of fucl elements.

Underwater nie;isurement of coating thickness on cladding outer surfaces was also performed, as were tests of coating adherence to cladding. Testing emphasized the aluminum bydroside fuel element coatings which have inore potential to be a source of water during iiiterim storage thim immium-based and iron-based coatings that were also obsewed. The aluminum hydroside coating was found exclusively on fuel elements that were stored in sealed water- filled aluiiunum canisters residing in K Wcst basin. Forty-five elements were. examined resulting in 21 1 measurements of thickness utilizing an undenvater eddy current probe. Coating thickness (Figure 2) ranged from negligible to 0.15 mm (0.006 inch).

Experience in retrieval and handling of fuel was gained by the successful shipment of a number of damaged and undamaged elements to bot cells for detailed esmiination. Close up esaniination of dluilagc to the fuel as well a s other nondestructive examinations and metallography were subsequently performed. Siilall samples from these fuel elements were utilized in a compact furnace and i n n Thenno-Graviinetric Analysis (TGA) instrument to address a number of fuel-related issues, including oxidation in dry atiiiospberes ', ignition ', hydrogen inventory, and drying characteristics. Most recently N Reactor iuel samples l m e been utilized to measure oxidation rates i n moist licliunl gas. These cxperiinents were performed to bettcr undcrstand the rates which would occur during the actunl CVD process which will include tlic addition of helium during the drying cycle. Oxidation rates measured for irradiated and unirradiiited samples lie essentially at the lower 95 pcrcciit coilfidcnce bound;iry of the set of data found in the litcratiire for onirradiated uranium (Figure 3). Although lhe low rates measured licrc nuiy be duc to the presence of molecular osygen

in the reacting moisture, they do illustratc that rates liiglier than litcraturc values arc probably not to be expected during the drying process.

Samples of cladding coatings were scraped from fuel elements i n ;I hot cell’ and analyzed. Bcsidcs iron hydroxides (fonnd on elements in sealed staiidess stccl canisters) and uranium hydrates (found on elements from open canistcrs), tlircc different crystnllographic xirinnts of aluminuoi hydroxide \Yere identified in coating material. L V m r emissions froni thc liydroxidcs w r c studied as a function of tcmpcraturc utilizing the TGA. Distinct weight climgcs attributcd to tlrc decomposition of the various types of alununum hydroxide can be scen in Figure 4.

A large instninientcd furnace hiis most recently been used to subject cntire fuel elements to tlie drying process that is cnvisioncd to prepare N Reactor fuel for interim storage. Onc element from K East basin and seven from K West basin mere subjected to high tcniperatiires and vacuiim conditions to reniovc water. Water and hydrogen emissions, as wcll as total pressure, were mcasured (Figure 5 ) . In-basin d:iniage to the fuel elements, prior to drying, liiid ranged from simple fracture at the element axial midpoint to severe end-cap breaches combined with fiiel loss. Drying under conditions hpical of CVD removed between I O ml and 30 nil of free water from each element. Subsequent Iuglier temperature vacuum drying (to drive off residiul constituents) showed that between 1 g and 3 g of water remained in the elements ‘after CVD. An element with tlic translucent alununum hydroxide coating rclcased 1.7 g of w t c r from the coating which is consistent with theoretical and other experimental deternunations of hydroxide water content. Tlie :ni~oiint of water remaining after CVD appears to be rclativcly insensitive to die extent of in- basin fuel damage oncc tlicre has been at least some evidence of cladding breach and fuel degradation. Tlie liigliest temperaturcs tliat tlic elements were subjected to (approxiniatcly 400C) resulted in clwnges to the surriice coatings (such as spillling of oside after tlie dcliydration of hydroxide) and opening of cracks. Ch:ungcs in tlie appearance of cracks arc attributed to oxidition of the underlying fuel inaterial witli tlic forination of niorc voluminous oxides. hleasnrable quaitities of rcleased fission gasses were detected by a down-stre;im inass spectrometer in two of tlic liirnacc nuis. The amount of fission gas released agreed \villi tliat expected for the range of plausible burnups and amounts of in- lurnace corrosion attributed to t l ~ c fuel. Quantities of hydrogen were also rclcased becuuse of oxidation by

water and decomposition of hydrides, with thc latter bcing the most significant contributor. Individual liydrogcn release peaks were analyzed and the qinntitics of decomposing uraniuni hydride were infcrrcd. The aniount of accessiblc hydride ranged from 0.5 to Wg. Hydride content \xis higlicst for an clcincnt with intact end-caps and cxtcnsive axial cracking. This is consistent widi ruct;illographic obscnations tllnt hydrides are often concentrated in n:urou hicl cracks ahelid of an oxidc intcrfxc where w t c r docs not pcnetrate cfticieiitly.

111. CHARACTERIZATION OF SLUDGE

Clix:ictcriwtion of sludse has proceeded tlirough a series of campaigns to providc definition of the sludge from different bisin locations and to recover suflicient sludge to feed process definition for an increasingly finn disposal path (Table 2). Increusingly sophisticated sampling equipment was designed and deployed :IS the mdiation levels encountered and tlie target voluriies of recovered sludgc both increased. Whereas early studies recovered a few hundred nll of sludge from one basin location, the new equipment recovered liter quantities from a much wider area. Previously reported analyses *,’ of this sludge focused on data necessary for ncceptancc of the material at the Hmford waste taiks. for trcntnicnt of the sludge prior to deposition in tlic tanks l o or for transformation into grouted solid waste. However, the currently adopted path is now interin1 storage of sludge at tlie H d o r d T-Plant (a large canyon often utilized for decontaiiunating cqnipment). Interiiii storage will be followed by processing of sludge a s mixed transuranic waste. Tlicrcforc die enipliasis of datn acquisition has also changed. Current analyses focus on properties that ‘affect tlic kmspoflation and long term stability of containcrizcd sludgc. Thcsc include gas generation rates, shear strength (mliich idluences gas entrapnient), density, and the identification of energetic reactions.

G i s gencr;ition from sludge has been characterized as ii function of temperature (Figure 6) and as a fiinction of rcsident location i.e. froin fuel canisters or from the basin floor (Figure 7). Canister sludge produces far more gas. in tlie form of hydrogen. tliiin floor sludge prim:uily because of thc higlicr metallic uranium (or uranium hydride) content of canistcr sludge and its resultant propensity to react \villi water. For floor sludge, carbon dioxide is a principal component of tlic genmled gas and is pcrliaps the result of reactions i v i t l i organic materials,

such as ion exchange resin bcads, uliicli are mixed in with tlic otlicr sludge componcnts. The accumulated hydrogen and fission gasses, as wcll as calorimetry

at Fluor Hanford hot cells and at tlic Hanford K Basins.

data froin acid dissolution studies, Itavc indicated up References to 17 WI% uraniuin nietal in sludge on a dn. particle basis (9.2 J\V!A) on :I w t basis).

Rcccnt slicar strength measurenients have indiciitcd that the sludge can indeed support thc foriliation of large bubbles which could foster a discontinuous release of gas from stored sludge. Dry pirticlc dcnsity nieastireiiieiits have clearly shown that tlic snxillest pirticlcs in sludgc (<250 micro-m in di;uncter) arc the densest component of sludge. Future work will include characterization of sludge tlicmial conductivity , dctcrniinntion of lcacliing rates of hawdous tiiet31s, and adiabatic calorinietry to sliow the effcct of sudden lieat input to a storngc caiustcr.

Sludgc has also becn used in drying studies to infer the bchavior of water released from the particulate which niay accoinpmy tlic fuel elements into interim storage. Such pnrticulate is often hydrated and is thus a source of Ivatcr (and ultimately hydrogen) during storagc. Sludge recovered from R Basin fucl canisters was run in t l i e TGA instrumcnt I ' to give both tlie tempcr;iturcs of hydrate decomposition and t l i e kinetics of the water evolution. More recent TGA runs liave been made utilizing small atnolints of sliidge recovered from bcneath t l ie surface of damaged cladding. These results l lave proved to be difficult to interpret because of the competition between weight decreases from witer loss and weight gains from die oxidation of a I;ugc fraction of metallic uranium found in this kind of sludgc.

IV. Conclusion

As a result of tecluucal issue rcsolution, only a limited iuiioniit of redesign of the project's process and equipment was required. Tlic ch;u;icteriwtion of N Reactor spcnt fuel has contributed lo the resolution of a number of tlic issues and utilized :I variety of cxpcriaiictittal tccluiiqiies. CharacterizXion of sludge has revealed the diversit). of tlic vxious hpes of pirtlculate found in tlic K Basins and has provided a basis to dcfinc tlie current patli for d~sposal.

Aclmowledgement

This work was funded by tlie United States Depirtnient of Encrgy. It \vas only possible tluough tlic efforts of a liugc number of skilled and dedicated people at the Pacific Nortliwest Natioixil Laboratory,

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8.

P. G. Loscoe, et. al.. Oven~iew ofspent Fuel at Hnnjord, Am. Nucl. Soc.. DOE SNF and Fissilc Matcrial M:tnagetiicnt 4"'Topical Mttg, San Diego, California (Junc 2000).

L. A. Lawrence, B. J. bklkenas, R. P. Omberg, S. C. Marsclinm, and J. Abrefali, Chnrncterizotion of Hnln,$ord N Reactor Spent Fire1 andAssociated Sliidge, Spectrum lntl Topical on Nuclcar and Hazardous Waste, Seattle. Waslungton (Septeniber 1996).

A. L. Pitner, In Situ Chnrncterization of Hao,?ford K Bosins Fuel, DOE SNF and Fissile Mat1 Management 3d Topical Mttg, p. 247, Ani. Nucl. SOC., Clwleston,' South Carolina (Septcnber 199s).

J. Abrefah, et.al.. Conditioning nnd hfelnllogrnphic Exnniinntions of SNF from Hnnford S l e K Basins, DOE SNF and Fissile Mat1 Management 2"" Topical Mttg, p. 337, Am. Nucl. SOC., Reno NV (June 1996).

J. Abrefah, H.C. Biichaian, and S.C. Mnrsclmian, Oxidntion Kinelics of Hanford K- Bnsin SNFin DtyAir, DOE SNF and Fissile Miterial Managenient, 3d Topical Mttg, p. 279, Am. Nucl. SOC., Clxuleston, South Carolina (September 19%).

J. Abrcfah, F. Huang. S . Marsclaman, W. Gny, and W. Gerry, Ignition Testing on Small Sniirplcs ofN-Reactor Fitel, DOE SNF and Fissile Material Mumagenient 3d Topical Mttg, p. 281, Ani. Nucl. SOC., Charleston, South Carolina (September 199s).

A. P. Pitner a i d B.J. Milkenas, Sufnce and Siibsirrjace Depo.sit.r on lrmdioted N Reactor Fuel Stored in the Hnnford K Basins, DOE SNF and Fissile Material Management 3d Topical Mug. p. 249, Ani.Nucl. SOC., Charleston, South Carolinli (September 1998).

R. B. Bakcr, B. I. Makenas, and R. P. Omberg, Snnipling and Analysis oJSlri&elge/roni HoifordK Enst Bnsin, DOE SNF and Fissile Material Man:tgement 2"d topical Mttg, p.217, Am. Nucl. SOC., Reno, Nevada (June 1996).

9. B. J. Makenas, P.J. Bredt and R. B. Baker, Exaniinafion ofsludge from Hanford K Basin Cunisfers, DOE S N F and Fissile Material Management 3dTopical Mttg. p. 251, Am. Nucl. SOC., Charleston, South Carolina (September 1998).

PR Bredt et. al., Studies of Chemical Processing of K Basins Sludge. Proc. of Waste Manageiiient '00, Tuscon AZ (February 2000)

10.

11. J. Abrefah,H.C. BuclimanandS.C. Marschman, Thermal Decomposition Kinetics of Hanford K Basin Canistcr Sludge Hydrates, DOE SNF and Fissile Materials Management 3d Topical Mttg, p.257, Ani. Nucl. SOC., Charleston SC (September 1998).

Table 1. Surnrnq of N Reactor Fucl Examinations

Table 2. Sumnixy of I; Basin Sludge Sampling Campaigns

Figure 1. A canister of N Reactor Fuel in tlie K East Basin. Inner iuid outer elcmcnts arc slionn Elenwits are up to 26 inclics long .and 2.5 inches i n dianieter. Note the corrosion product resulting from a damaged endcap.

0 1 2 I 1 5 6

Coatin: Thickness in Rlils Figure 2. S u m m i q of all positive data from Edd! Current Measurementsfor Aluminum H!droxide Coatings on N Reactor Fuel Eleincnts.

Ill T(K) 6 5 ; 500 430

1 5 2 0 2 5 30 1 5

1000 i T (10001K)

Figlire 3. Moist Oxidation Rate Dnt;i from K West Basin SNF sainples and from unirradiated ur.mium (literature) with Fitted Least Squares Lines.

Initial Sample Weight. 220.5 mg

lCCC 1200 ,400 ?do0 0 1 3 0 4:0 600 1130

n n e (M,nU!eS)

Figure 4. D+g ora Sainplc of Clnddmg Coating (Aluniiiiiiiii Hydroxide) in a TGA Instniinent. Weight losses are the result of\\ater evolulion.

b a

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-

-

-

.- I

0 2000 4000 6000

1200

-1w0, L

800 t e -eo0 : e

3

P 400 5

C - 0

zoo

-0

Elapsed Time (minutes) Elapsed Time (mlnutes)

Figure 5 . Results from Vacuum Drying of Whole N Reactor Fuel Elements a,) without visible cladding coating and b.) with obvious Aluminum Hydroxide coating

0 5w ioao 1500 20w

Figure 6. Total Gas Generation from K East Basin Canister Sludge in Reaction Vessels at 40, 60 and 80C. Samples were sieved to exclude particles less than 230 microns in diameter.

0 100 Floor Slldge I 0 000 u

o 200 4w €00 800 iooa 1200 im i600 is00

Time, h

Figure 7. Total Gas Generation froui K East Basin Canister and Floor Sludge at 8OC. Samples were sieved to exclude particles less tim 250 nucrons in dinmeter.