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Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection AGENDA

NFPA 502 First Draft Meeting October 3-5, 2017

8 AM-5 PM Crowne Plaza Redondo Beach & Marina

Redondo Beach, CA

1. Call to order. Tony Marino, Chair.

2. Introductions and Update of Committee Roster. (Attachment A)

3. Approval of Minutes from Second Draft Meeting on Oct. 20-22, 2015. (Attachment B)

4. Staff Liaison Report

a. Review Annual 2019 Revision Cycle (Attachment C)

b. Committee Membership Update (Attachment D) c. Revision Process Review

5. Review and Act on all 124 Public Inputs on NFPA 502. (Attachment E)

Task Groups assigned to review Public inputs:

a. Minimum fire protection and life safety requirements (Chapter 7)

b. Standpipes (Chapter 4)

c. Non-hazardous materials and limited combustible materials (section 4.8, A.4.8)

d. Protection of structural elements, impact on fire safety and tenability for tunnels

with FFFS (Sections 7.3, 9.3, 9.6, 11.4, A.7.3) e. Emergency exit doors/egress (Sections 7.16, A.7.16)

6. Task Group Reports.

a. Annex material for autonomous/semi-autonomous vehicles

b. IAN20 New Revision

c. Update of Annex G - Electric vehicle fire hazards and alternative fuels

d. Design fires and critical velocity

e. Occupancy of tunnels when fire and life safety systems are not working

f. Noise criteria g. QRA/Engineering analysis

7. Additional Items. a. Proposals from Gary English (Attachment F)

8. Schedule Next Meeting. (Second Draft meeting in the A2019 cycle must be between

May 9, 2018 and November 7, 2018).

9. Adjournment.

ATTACHMENT A

Address List No PhoneRoad Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection ROA-AAA

Janna E. Shapiro08/29/2017

ROA-AAA

Antonino Marino

ChairPort Authority of New York & New Jersey4 World Trade Center150 Greenwich Street, 20th FloorNew York, NY 10007

U 10/27/2009ROA-AAA

Jarrod Alston

PrincipalArup955 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02139-3180Alternate: David Barber

SE 10/23/2013

ROA-AAA

Ian E. Barry

PrincipalIEB Consulting Ltd.25 Abbeycroft CloseAstley, Manchester, M29 7TJ United KingdomAlternate: John Celentano

SE 4/3/2003ROA-AAA

David L. Bergner

PrincipalMonte Vista Associates, LLC.4024 East Elmwood StreetMesa, AZ 85205

SE 11/30/2016

ROA-AAA

Cornelis Kees Both

PrincipalPRTC Fire LaboratoryBormstraat 24Antwerp, Tisselt, 2830 Belgium

RT 10/29/2012ROA-AAA

Francesco Colella

PrincipalExponent, Inc.9 Strathmore RoadNatick, MA 01760-2418Alternate: Nicolas Ponchaut

SE 08/11/2014

ROA-AAA

William G. Connell

PrincipalPB Americas, Inc.75 Arlington StreetBoston, MA 02116Alternate: Daniel T. Dirgins

SE 10/10/1997ROA-AAA

James S. Conrad

PrincipalRSCC Wire & Cable66 Mountain Laurel DriveTolland, CT 06084-2276Alternate: Robert Schmidt

M 3/15/2007

ROA-AAA

John A. Dalton

PrincipalGCP-Applied Technologies62 Whittemore AvenueCambridge, MA 02140

M 8/9/2011ROA-AAA

Alexandre Debs

PrincipalMinistere Des Transports Du Quebec380, rue Saint-Antoine Ouest, 2nd FloorBureau 2010, P.O. Box 353Montreal, QC H2Y 3X7 Canada

E 10/20/2010

ROA-AAA

Arnold Dix

PrincipalSchool Medicine, UWSLawyer/Scientist16 Sherman CourtBerwick, VIC 3806 Australia

C 3/21/2006ROA-AAA

Michael F. Fitzpatrick

PrincipalMassachusetts Department of Transportion6 Tracy CircleWilmington, MA 01887-3071

E 10/20/2010

ROA-AAA

Russell P. Fleming

PrincipalNortheast Fire Suppression Associates, LLC157 School StreetPO Box 435Keene, NH 03431International Fire Sprinkler Association, Ltd.Alternate: Alan Brinson

M 08/17/2017ROA-AAA

Norris Harvey

PrincipalMott MacDonald50 Oneida AvenueSelden, NY 11784-3736Alternate: Iain N. R. Bowman

SE 08/11/2014

1



ROA-AAA

Jason P. Huczek

PrincipalSouthwest Research Institute6220 Culebra Road, Building 143San Antonio, TX 78238-5166Alternate: Marc L. Janssens

RT 7/23/2008ROA-AAA

Haukur Ingason

PrincipalSP Technical Research Institute of SwedenBrinellgatan 4Boras, SE-50115 SwedenAlternate: Anders Lönnermark

RT 8/5/2009

ROA-AAA

Ahmed Kashef

PrincipalNational Research Council of Canada1200 Montreal Road, Building M59Ottawa, ON K1A 0R6 Canada

RT 7/23/2008ROA-AAA

Joseph Kroboth, III

PrincipalLoudoun County VA101 Blue Seal DriveLeesburg, VA 20175

U 4/5/2001

ROA-AAA

Max Lakkonen

PrincipalInstitute for Applied Fire Safety ResearchPankstrasse 8-10, Haus ABerlin DE, 13127 Germany

RT 3/7/2013ROA-AAA

Igor Y. Maevski

PrincipalJacobs EngineeringTwo Penn Plaza, Suite 0603New York, NY 10121

SE 4/15/2004

ROA-AAA

Zachary L. Magnone

PrincipalTyco Fire Protection Products1467 Elmwood AvenueCranston, RI 02910Alternate: Robert M. Cordell

M 07/29/2013ROA-AAA

Maurice M. Pilette

PrincipalMechanical Designs Ltd.67 Chouteau AvenueFramingham, MA 01701-4259Alternate: Gary L. English

SE 1/1/1991

ROA-AAA

David M. Plotkin

PrincipalAECOMTunnel Ventilation Group125 Broad Street, Suite 1500New York, NY 10004-2400Alternate: Nader Shahcheraghi

SE 8/9/2011ROA-AAA

Tomas Rakovec

PrincipalEfectis NederlandBrandpuntlaan Zuid 16BleiswijkZuid-Holland, 2665 NZ The NetherlandsAlternate: Pascal Coget

RT 08/03/2016

ROA-AAA

Carl H. Rivkin

PrincipalNational Renewable Energy Laboratory15013 Denver West ParkwayGolden, CO 80401-3111

U 11/30/2016ROA-AAA

Ana Ruiz

PrincipalTD&T LLCC/ Ríos Rosas, 44AMadrid, 28010 SpainMetro Malaga

U 10/29/2012

ROA-AAA

Blake M. Shugarman

PrincipalUL LLC333 Pfingsten RoadNorthbrook, IL 60062-2096Alternate: Luke C. Woods


Dirk K. Sprakel

PrincipalFOGTEC Fire Protection GmbH & Co KGSchanzenstrasse 19AKoln, 51063 Germany

M 3/15/2007

2



ROA-AAA

Peter J. Sturm

PrincipalGraz University of TechnologyInffeldgasse 21AGraz, 8010 Austria


Rene van den Bosch

PrincipalPromat BV The NetherlandsBinnenhof 10Krimpen aan den IJssel, 2926RA The NetherlandsAlternate: Paul W. Sparrow

M 4/15/2004

ROA-AAA

William Ventura

PrincipalFDNY263 Walker AvenueEast Patchogue, NY 11772Alternate: Kevin P. Harrison

E 08/17/2017ROA-AAA

Hadi Wijaya

PrincipalLand Transport Authority, Singapore1 Hampshire RoadBlock 10, Level 3, MES DivisionSingapore, 219428 SingaporeAlternate: Eric Mun Kit Cheong

U 08/17/2017

ROA-AAA

David Barber

AlternateArup1120 Connecticut Avenue, NWSuite 1110Washington, DC 20036-3902Principal: Jarrod Alston


Iain N. R. Bowman

AlternateMott MacDonald Canada Ltd.550 Burrard Street, Suite 1888Bentall 5Vancouver, BC V6C 0A3 CanadaPrincipal: Norris Harvey

SE 08/11/2014

ROA-AAA

Alan Brinson

AlternateEuropean Fire Sprinkler Network70 Upper Richmond RoadLondon, SW15 2RP United KingdomInternational Fire Sprinkler Association, Ltd.Principal: Russell P. Fleming

M 4/14/2005ROA-AAA

John Celentano

AlternateCH2M Hill Consulting EngineersOldmains Cottage, SanquharDumgrieshire, DG4 6LB ScotlandPrincipal: Ian E. Barry

SE 12/08/2015

ROA-AAA

Eric Mun Kit Cheong

AlternateLand Transport Authority, Singapore1 Hampshire RoadBlock 10, Level 1, Systems SpecialistsSingapore, 219428 SingaporePrincipal: Hadi Wijaya

U 08/17/2017ROA-AAA

Pascal Coget

AlternateEfectis Nederland BVBrandpuntlaan Zuid 16Bleiswijk, ZH 2665 NZ The NetherlandsPrincipal: Tomas Rakovec

RT 04/04/2017

ROA-AAA

Robert M. Cordell

AlternateJohnson Controls, Inc.1467 Elmwood AvenueCranston, RI 02910Tyco Fire Protection ProductsPrincipal: Zachary L. Magnone

M 08/17/2017ROA-AAA

Daniel T. Dirgins

AlternatePB Americas, Inc.75 Arlington Street, 9th FloorBoston, MA 02116Principal: William G. Connell

SE 3/15/2007

3



ROA-AAA

Gary L. English

AlternateUnderground Command And Safety23415 67 Lane South WestVashon, WA 98070Principal: Maurice M. Pilette


Kevin P. Harrison

AlternateFire Department City of New York71 Mount Salem RoadPort Jervis, NY 12771Fire Department City of New YorkPrincipal: William Ventura

E 08/09/2012

ROA-AAA

Marc L. Janssens

AlternateSouthwest Research InstituteFire Technology6220 Culebra Road, Building 143San Antonio, TX 78238-5166Principal: Jason P. Huczek

RT 7/23/2008ROA-AAA

Anders Lönnermark

AlternateSP Fire TechnologyBox 857Brinellgatan 4Borås, SE-50115 SwedenPrincipal: Haukur Ingason

RT 10/29/2012

ROA-AAA

Nicolas Ponchaut

AlternateExponent, Inc.9 Strathmore RoadNatick, MA 01760-2418Principal: Francesco Colella


Robert Schmidt

AlternateRSCC Wire & Cable LLC20 Bradley Park RoadEast Granby, CT 06026-9789Principal: James S. Conrad

M 04/04/2017

ROA-AAA

Nader Shahcheraghi

AlternateAECOM2101 Webster Street, Suite 1000Oakland, CA 94612-3060Principal: David M. Plotkin

SE 8/9/2011ROA-AAA

Paul W. Sparrow

AlternatePromat UKSterling Centre, Eastern RoadBracknell, Berkshire, RG12 2TD United KingdomPrincipal: Rene van den Bosch

M 03/05/2012

ROA-AAA

Luke C. Woods

AlternateUL LLC146 Nathaniel DriveWhitinsville, MA 01588-1070Principal: Blake M. Shugarman


Arthur G. Bendelius

Member EmeritusA&G Consultants, Inc.11391 Big CanoeBig Canoe, GA 30143-5108

SE 4/1/1993

ROA-AAA

Janna E. Shapiro

Staff LiaisonNational Fire Protection Association1 Batterymarch ParkQuincy, MA 02169-7471

4/20/2017

4

ATTACHMENT .

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Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection

NFPA 502 Second Draft Meeting (Annual 2016)

Meeting Minutes

Sheraton Suites Hotel

Dallas, TX

October 20, 21, & 22, 2015

1. Commencement

Meeting was called to order at 8:15AM on Tuesday October 20, 2015.

2. Introductions

The following members and guests were in attendance:

Name Representing

Members Present

Bill Connell, Chair Parsons Brinckerhoff

Kees Both Self

Adrian Cheong Wah Onn Land Transport Authority, Singapore

James Conrad RSCC Wire & Cable

John Dalton WR Grace

Arnold Dix UWS School Medicine

Chad Duffy NFPA 502 Staff Liaison

Norris Harvey Hatch Mott MacDonald

Jason Huczek Southwest Research Institute

Haukur Ingason SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden

Igor Maevski Jacobs Engineering

Antonio Marino Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

David Plotkin AECOM

Ana Ruiz TD&T LLC

Blake Shugarman UL LLC

Peter Sturm Graz University of Technology

Anthony Tedesco Fire Department City of New York

Rene van den Bosch Promat BV The Netherlands

Alternates Present

David Barber Arup

Iain Bowman Hatch Mott MacDonald

Daniel Dirgins Parsons Brinckerhoff

Gary English Seattle Fire Department

Tim Gian van der Waat van Gulik Efectis Nederland BV

Paul Sparrow Promat BV The Netherlands

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Guests Present

Erich Cheong Mun Kit Land Transport Authority, Singapore

Larry DeGraff Promat USA

Max Lakkonen IFAB

William Bergeson (part time) FHWA

3. Introductory Comments (Chairman)

a. Meeting Agenda- The agenda was accepted without comment.

b. The Chairman noted that the goal of the meeting is to review and act upon all of the

public comments, and the second draft committee proposals generated by the various

work groups.

c. The Chairman gave an update regarding membership of the committee, introduced

new members and alternates, and announced recent member resignations.

4. NFPA Staff Liaison Comments (Chad Duffy)

Chad Duffy discussed various administrative issues including:

a. Reminded members about the revisions to NFPA’s code development process

including the meeting format procedures and protocols.

b. Reminded members to check their contact info and update it if necessary.

c. Reminded members that no new material can be introduced after the First Draft

meeting.

d. Urged all members and alternates to return completed ballots.

e. Reviewed the timeline of milestones for the A2016 Revision Cycle which will result

in the publishing of a 2017 edition of Standard 502.

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5. Approval of Meeting Minutes from First Draft Meeting held on December 2-4, 2014.

Meeting minutes were approved without comment.

6. NFPA Code Fund Initiative –

Amanda Kimball of NFPA provided a presentation (via phone) regarding the status of the

NFPA Code Fund Initiative. (See Item 21.)

7. NFPA Resiliency and Emergency Preparedness Workshop Status-

The Chairman indicated that he will be attending this workshop in December and that it

potentially may have some topics/items that the committee may consider for the next

cycle.

8. Act on Public Comments for NFPA 502

The committee reviewed and acted on all Public Comments (2, 3 & 4).

9. PIARC WG4 FFFS in Road Tunnels: Current Practices & Recommendations

Norris Harvey provided an update on recent activities of this PIARC Working Group.

10. WG Report – Annex E Water Based FFFS in Road Tunnels

The Annex E working group provided updated text consideration in Annex E.

11. WG Report – Structural Fire Protection

The structural fire protection working group provided updated text consideration in

Chapter 7 and Chapter 7 Annex Material.

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12. Meeting adjourned at 4:30 PM October 20, 2015

13. Meeting resumed at 8:15 AM October 21, 2015

14. WG Report – Chapter 6 Bridges and Elevated Highways

The bridge and elevated highways working group provided updated text consideration in


15. WG Report – Chapter 4 Engineering Analysis

The engineering analysis working group provided updated text for consideration in


16. WG Report – Proposed Annex for Automatic Fire Detection

The automatic fire detection annex working group provided updated text consideration in

a new annex section on this topic.


18. Meeting resumed at 8:15 AM October 22, 2015

19. WG Report – Annex D Critical Velocity Equation

The critical velocity equation working group provided updated text consideration in

Annex D.

20. WG Report – Wayfinding Lighting

The wayfinding lighting working group provided updated text consideration in Annex A.

21. National Fire Protection Research Foundation – Committee Research Proposal

The committee discussed a potential Research Proposal developed by Gary English to

submit to the NFPRF Code Fund Initiative, The research would be focused on the Impact

of Fixed Fire Fighting Systems on Road Tunnel Resilience, Ventilation, and Other

Systems. It was noted that a correlating research program has been developed for

proposal within ASHRAE. Igor Maeveski presented the proposal developed by

ASHRAE’s TC 5.9 Enclosed Vehicular Facilities which would focus on the interaction of

tunnel ventilation performance with an active fixed fire suppression system. ASHRAE is

seeking sponsorship partners for this effort. The proposal is due for submission on

December 4, 2015. It was agreed to be in the best interests of the research to consider

combining these two proposals and seeking the possibility of combining potential

funding sources such as ASHRAE, NFPRF and possibly FHWA (ASSHTO T-20). A

Working Group consisting of Maeveski, English, Connell, Kashef, Duffy and Bill

Bergeson of FHWA will pursue this opportunity.

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22. WG Report – Chapter 4 Engineering Analysis, further discussions

The engineering analysis working group provided updated text for consideration in


23. WG Report – Proposed Annex B Material for Sound Levels

The sound levels working group provided updated text for consideration in Annex B.

24. ASHRAE TC 5.9 & NFPA Joint Research Proposal


ATTACHMENT C

Annual 2019 Revision Cycle

Process Stage Process Step Dates for TCDates for TC

with CC

Public InputStage (First Draft)

Public Input Closing Date* 6/28/2017 6/28/2017

Final Date for TC First Draft Meeting 12/06/2017 9/06/2017

Posting of First Draft and TC Ballot 1/24/2018 10/18/2017

Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot 2/14/2018 11/08/2017

Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot - recirc 2/21/2018 11/15/2017

Posting of First Draft for CC Meeting 11/22/2017

Final date for CC First Draft Meeting 1/03/2018

Posting of First Draft and CC Ballot 1/24/2018

Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot 2/14/2018

Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot - recirc 2/21/2018

Post First Draft Report for Public Comment 2/28/2018 2/28/2018

Comment Stage(Second Draft)

Public Comment Closing Date* 5/09/2018 5/09/2018

Notice Published on Consent Standards (Standards that received no Comments)Note: Date varies and determined via TC ballot.

Appeal Closing Date for Consent Standards (Standards that received no Comments)

Final date for TC Second Draft Meeting 11/07/2018 8/01/2018

Posting of Second Draft and TC Ballot 12/19/2018 9/12/2018

Final date for Receipt of TC Second Draft ballot 1/09/2019 10/03/2018

Final date for receipt of TC Second Draft ballot - recirc 1/16/2019 10/10/2018

Posting of Second Draft for CC Meeting 10/17/2018

Final date for CC Second Draft Meeting 11/28/2018

Posting of Second Draft for CC Ballot 12/19/2018

Final date for Receipt of CC Second Draft ballot 1/09/2019

Final date for Receipt of CC Second Draft ballot - recirc 1/16/2019

Post Second Draft Report for NITMAM Review 1/23/2019 1/23/2019

Tech SessionPreparation (&

Issuance)

Notice of Intent to Make a Motion (NITMAM) Closing Date 2/20/2019 2/20/2019

Posting of Certified Amending Motions (CAMs) and Consent Standards 4/03/2019 4/03/2019

Appeal Closing Date for Consent Standards 4/18/2019 4/18/2019

SC Issuance Date for Consent Standards 4/28/2019 4/28/2019

Tech Session Association Meeting for Standards with CAMs 6/20/2019 6/20/2019

Appeals andIssuance

Appeal Closing Date for Standards with CAMs 7/10/2019 7/10/2019

SC Issuance Date for Standards with CAMs 8/07/2019 8/07/2019

TC = Technical Committee or PanelCC = Correlating Committee

As of 4/12/2017

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NFPA

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ATTACHMENT D

Percentage SummaryRoad Tunnel and Highway Fire ProtectionROA-AAA

Class Voting Number Percent

08/30/2017

C 1 3%

E 3 9%

M 6 19%

RT 7 22%

SE 10 31%

U 5 16%

32Total Voting Number

ATTACHMENT E

Public Input No. 61-NFPA 502-2017 [ Global Input ]

NFPA 502: 2017 - page 502-3

The Committee scope lists explicitly: "road tunnels, air-right structures, bridges and limited accesshighways". Further in the document, similar lists are mentioned (e.g. clause 1.1.1), apparently notfully aligned with this list. The recommendation is to align these lists as follows:

"road tunnels, air-right structures, bridges, road ways depressed highways, elevatedhighways and limited access highways"

The rationale is that in doing so, any confusion about which specific structure is includedor excluded for a specific clause is avoided.

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input

The Committee scope as mentioned on page 502-3 and e.g. clause 1.1.1 appear not to match in terms of the list of structures envisaged affected by NFPA 502. THsi may lead to confusion or mis-interpretation as to if and when certain clauses apply to e.g. road- and depressed highways.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Cornelis Both

Organization: PRTC Fire Laboratory

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Tue Jun 06 09:20:39 EDT 2017

National Fire Protection Association Report http://submittals.nfpa.org/TerraViewWeb/ContentFetcher?commentPara...

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Public Input No. 62-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. 1.5 [Excluding any Sub-Sections] ]

Nothing in this standard is intended to prevent the use of systems, methods, or devices of equivalent orsuperior quality, strength, fire resistance, effectiveness, durability, reliability, and safety over thoseprescribed by this standard, provided sufficient technical data demonstrates that the applied method,material or device is equivalent to, or superior to, the requirements of this standard with respect to fireperformance and safety.


Adding the (three) comma's may facilitate reading.




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:



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Public Input No. 63-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. 1.5.2 ]

1.5.2

The system, method, material, or device shall be approved for the intended purpose.


Adding "material", aligns 1.5.2. with the list in 1.5.




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:



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2.3.1 ASTM Publications.

ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959.

ASTM E84, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, 2015a 2017 .

ASTM E119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, 2015 2017 .

ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750°C,2012 2016a .

ASTM E2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Tube Furnace with a Cone-shapedAirflow Stabilizer, at 750°C, 2012 2016 .


Date updates


Submitter Full Name: Marcelo Hirschler

Organization: GBH International

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Fri Jun 23 15:48:23 EDT 2017


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2.3.2 BSI Publications.

British Standards Institute, 389 Chiswick High Road, London, W4 4AL, United Kingdom.

BS 476-4, Fire Tests on Building Materials and Structures, Part 4: Non-Combustibility Test for Materials ,1970, Corrigendum, 2014.


This referenced test standard is being proposed to be deleted from the body of the standard by an associated public input.

Related Public Inputs for This Document

Related Input Relationship

Public Input No. 79-NFPA 502-2017 [New Section after A.7.3.3(2)]

Public Input No. 78-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. 7.3.4]





Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:



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2.3.4 Efectis Publications.

Efectis Group, 320 Walnut St. #504, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Nederland, Brandpuntlaan 16, 2665 NZ,Bleiswijk, The Netherlands, www.efectis.com.

2008- Efectis-R0695, “Fire Testing Procedure for Concrete Tunnel Linings,” 2008 Linings” .


The previous address in Philadephia is not valid any more. Therefore, the actual address in the Netherlands is proposed.


Submitter Full Name: Tomas Rakovec

Organization: Efectis Nederland

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Mon Jun 26 08:49:12 EDT 2017


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2.3.5 FHWA Publications.

Federal Highway Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, DC 20590.

Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), 2012.

National Tunnel Inspection Standards , 2015

Tunnel Operations, Maintenance, Inspection, and Evaluation (TOMIE) Manual , FHW-HIF-15, July, 2015


New mandatory regulations governing inspection of tunnel fire & life safety systems - see also proposed new material for Chapter 15.


Submitter Full Name: Iain Bowman

Organization: Mott MacDonald Canada Ltd.

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Fri Apr 21 18:36:40 EDT 2017


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2.3.7 ISO Publications.

International Organization for Standardization, Central Secretariat, BIBC II, 8, Chemin de Blandonnet, CP401, 1214 Vernier, Geneva, Switzerland.

ISO 1182, Reaction to fire tests for products — Non-combustibility test , 2010.


This referenced test standard is being proposed to be deleted from the body of the standard by an associated public input.









Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:



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2.3.10 UL Publications.

Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.

ANSI/UL 1685, Vertical-Tray Fire-Propagation and Smoke-Release Test for Electrical and Optical-FiberCables, 2007, revised 2010 2015 .

UL 1724, Outline of Investigation for Fire Tests for Electrical Circuit Protective Systems, 2006.

ANSI/UL 2196, Tests for Fire Resistive Cables, 2012.


Up Date Standards


Submitter Full Name: Kelly Nicolello

Organization: UL LLC

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Thu Jun 22 15:13:30 EDT 2017


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Public Input No. 8-NFPA 502-2016 [ New Section after 3.3.10 ]

(Add new definitions for Catagory X, A, B, C and D Road Tunnels)


Section 7.2 discusses Category X, A, B, C and D tunnels. These terms should be defined terms in Chapter 3 in order to bring clarity to the use of these terms. Right now, the user is left to guess if the only criteria for a Category X tunnel is if the tunnel is less than 300 feet. That might be the case. However, it becomes highly confusing for Categories B, C and D. Category B, C and D have the same application in 7.2, by saying "all provisions of this standard shall apply." So, if "all provisions of this standard shall apply", why are we differentiating between tunnel types? The user is left to wondering if there is other criteria to classifying a tunnel as to Category, other than the length application language in section 7.2. (Is there other industry criteria that establishes tunnel categories?) Providing definitions for each tunnel type in Chapter 3 will provide significant clarity to the standard.

This proponent did not provide definition language for Chapter 3 as I don't know if the criteria for tunnel Category classification is just the distances in 7.2 or if there is other criteria that should be specified.


Submitter Full Name: Anthony Apfelbeck

Organization: Altamonte Springs Building/Fire Safety Division

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Fri Oct 28 10:27:22 EDT 2016


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TITLE OF NEW CONTENT

3.3.14 Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA)

A systematic process for calculating and comparing benefits and costs for a project, decision orGovernment Policy compared against the operational risk levels referenced in section 3.5.59. The analysisshall consider reducing the risk to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) without compromise to theSafety Integrity Level (SIL) referenced in the Engineering Analysis.


This Definition is added for clarity and reference to proposed additions to the standard with respect to QRA and CBA under public proposals made by the submitter,


Submitter Full Name: Ian Barry

Organization: Ieb Consulting Ltd

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Wed May 31 12:42:58 EDT 2017


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3.3.17 Design Fire

A fire, or set of fires, adequately described in terms of location and size, heat and smoke release rates, tobe taken in consideration for the assessment of one or more (combined) mitigation measures, as relevant tothis standard.


The standard uses the term design fire, and design fire scenario, but a definition appears missing.




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:



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3.3.18 Design Fire Size

Design Fire Size is the Peak Heat Release Rate (HRR) in MW resulting from a fire related incident in thefacility. The Design Fire Size for any facility shall be calculated using a Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA)referenced in 3.3.51 and form part of the Engineering Analysis referenced in 4.3.1


A new definition added to this section for use as a reference for other proposals made by the submitter with regard to the posed QRA and CBA additions to the standard.




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:



13 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


3.3.29 Fire Suppression.

The Sharply reducing the heat release rate of a fire and preventing its regrowth by means of direct andsufficient application of a water-based extinguishing agent to a fire at a level such that open flaming isarrested; however, a deep-seated fire will require additional steps to assure total extinguishment waterthrough the fire plume to the burning fuel surface .


Fire suppression has a broader definition than resulting from the application of a water-based extinguishing agent. Further, the deep-seated fire should be identified as a shielded fire that prevents direct water application. The statement with "require additional steps to assure total extinguishment" is explanatory material that is not really part of the definition.

The proposed definition comes from NFPA 13 and captures the meaning of "Fire Suppression" much better. Recommend that this definition is adopted.


Submitter Full Name: Norris Harvey

Organization: Mott MacDonald

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Wed Dec 14 07:14:00 EST 2016


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3.3.31 Heat Release Rate.

The rate at which heat energy is generated by burning expressed as MW or Btu/s . [101, 2015]


Should be clarified by the unit. More consistent with the fire growth rate definition in 3.3.28


Submitter Full Name: Haukur Ingason

Organization: RISE (former SP Technical Research Institut)

Affilliation: RISE Fire Research

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Submittal Date: Wed Jun 28 07:12:31 EDT 2017


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3.3.49 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

A formalized specialist method for calculating the facility's Operational Risk shall form part of theEngineering Analysis as referenced in 4.3.1 of this standard and be used to assess the Design Fire Size forthe particular facility. The QRA shall take into consideration, group, individual and environmental risk levelsfor comparison with the governing risk criteria.


This definition is proposed to be added to the section for reference with proposals on QRA submitted by the proposer.




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3.3.54 Safety Integrity Level (SIL)

Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is defined as a relative level of risk-reduction provided by a safety function of asystem. SIL is a measurement of performance or reliability required for any safety critical system such asVentilation, Fixed Water-Based Fire-Fighting Systems, Incident Detection Systems, Public AddressSystems, etc.


This definition is added for reference to to clarify other proposals on QRA and CBA submitted by the proposer.




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(Extract the System Class Types for Standpipe Systems definitions from NFPA 14)


NFPA 502 references Class I, Class II and Class III standpipe systems in numerous locations. However, those terms are undefined in the standard. These terms should be extracted from NFPA 14 and placed in the definitions chapter of NFPA 502 for clarity and usability.




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3.3.x Design Fire

A set of conditions that defines the fire development and spread of fire within and between vehicles. It isexpressed in MWs and can vary with time or given as a single value (size).


The use of the Word design fire is found throughout the document. There is no definiton found for it. Some times it say design fire and sometime design fire size. This may clarify the difference, i.e. when one say design fire "size" it is not a time dependent value.



Public Input No. 105-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. 6.3.2.1]


Submitter FullName:

Haukur Ingason

Organization:RISE Research Institutes of Sweden (former SP TechnicalResearch Institut)


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3.3.58 Tenable Environment.

In a road tunnel, an An environment that permits evacuation or rescue, or both, of occupants for a specificperiod of time.


The tenable environment is relevant in principle to all facilities, not only a (road) tunnel.




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Public Input No. 21-NFPA 502-2016 [ Section No. 4.1 ]

4.1 * Characteristics of Fire Protection.

The level of fire protection necessary for the entire facility shall be achieved by implementing therequirements of this standard for each subsystem and coordinating the use of these systems .


The title "Characteristics of Fire Protection" is not accurate as characteristics are not contained in this paragraph. The achievement of fire protection is not only a function of having the systems, but also integrating the systems into a complete response.

It is possible that this section belongs under Section 1.3 instead of at this location.




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4.2.1 Standpipe Installations in Tunnels Under Construction.

4.2.1.1*

Where required by the authority having jurisdiction, a temporary or permanent Class II or III standpipesystem shall be installed and tested in tunnels under construction in accordance with NFPA 241, NFPA 14,and NFPA 25.

4.2.1.1.1

A The temporary standpipe system shall be installed before the tunnel has exceeded a length of 61 m(200 ft) beyond any access shaft or portal.

4.2.1.1.2

The temporary standpipe system shall be extended as the work progresses to within 61 m (200 ft) of themost remote portion of the tunnel.

4.2.1.1.3

Standpipes shall be sized for water flow and pressure at the outlet, based on the predicted fire load and thestandpipe classification type (II, III) in accordance with NFPA 14.

4.2.1.1.4 An operational permanent standpipe system, installed as required in 7.2, shall be permitted to beutilized to satisfy the provisions of section 4.2.1.1.


The current language in 4.2.1.1 appears to give the AHJ unlimited authority to require a new permanent standpipe system even when one is not required by section 7.2. This proponent does not believe that is the intent of this section but it is the intent to allow a permanent standpipe, that is otherwise required, to qualify as meeting the requirements of this section. Deleting the "or permanent" and adding a new 4.2.1.1.4 permitting a permanent standpipe to meet this requirement, clarifies the intent.




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Public Input No. 3-NFPA 502-2016 [ Section No. 4.2.1.1 [Excluding any Sub-Sections] ]

4.2.1.1 Where required by the authority having jurisdiction, a temporary or permanent Class II Class I or IIIstandpipe system shall be installed and tested in tunnels under construction in accordance with NFPA 241,NFPA 14, and NFPA 25.


It is unclear why a Class I standpipe would be excluded from this standard. Class I is for FD use only and in many situations, that would be the appropriate level of protection. However, the current Class II allowance should be deleted. Class II is only for small hose lines utilized mainly by occupants but not typically by the FD. It is unclear why we would want to ever specify a Class II system.

Since Chapter 10 only references Class I systems, the proponent of this PI would not object to changing this section to only allow Class I systems as opposed to Class I and Class III.



Public Input No. 5-NFPA 502-2016 [Section No. 4.2.1.1.3]




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Public Input No. 5-NFPA 502-2016 [ Section No. 4.2.1.1.3 ]

4.2.1.1.3

Standpipes shall be sized for water flow and pressure at the outlet, based on the predicted fire load and thestandpipe classification type (II, III) in accordance with NFPA 14.


As in PI 3, it is unclear why a Class I standpipe system would be excluded and a Class II system would be included. Deleting the specific reference to Class Type seems to be the best solution to ensure usability and intent. The specific Class Type allowed is addressed in the other sections of the code.



Public Input No. 3-NFPA 502-2016 [Section No. 4.2.1.1 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]

Addresses a similarissue




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4.3.1*


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Regardless of the length of the facility, at a minimum, the following factors shall be considered as part of aholistic multidisciplinary engineering analysis of the fire protection and life safety requirements for thefacilities covered by this standard:

(1) New facility or alteration of a facility

(2) Transportation modes using the facility

(3) Anticipated traffic or changes to traffic mix and volume

(4) Restricted vehicle access and egress

(5) Fire emergencies ranging from minor incidents to major catastrophes

(6) Potential fire emergencies including but not limited to the following:

(a) At one or more locations inside or on the facility

(b) In close proximity to the facility

(c) At facilities a long distance from emergency response facilities

(7) Exposure of emergency systems and structures to elevated temperatures

(8) Traffic congestion and control requirements during emergencies

(9) Fire protection features, including but not limited to the following:

(10) Fire alarm and detection systems

(11) Standpipe systems

(12) Water-based fire-fighting systems

(13) Ventilation systems

(14) Emergency communications systems

(15) Protection of structural elements

(16) Facility components, including emergency systems

(17) Evacuation and rescue requirements

(18) Emergency response time

(19) Emergency vehicle access points

(20) Emergency communications to appropriate agencies

(21) Facility location such as urban or rural (risk level and response capacity)

(22) Physical dimensions, number of traffic lanes, and roadway geometry, gradient and the provision ofemergency lanes

(23) Natural factors, including prevailing wind and pressure conditions

(24) Anticipated cargo

(25) Impact to buildings or landmarks near or on top of the facility

(26) Impacts to the facility from external conditions and/or incidents

(27) Traffic operating mode (unidirectional, bidirectional, switchable, or reversible)

(28) Method of facility operation:

(29) Manual or Automatic Operation

(30) Facility managed by a Control Center

(31) Facility has its own dedicated rescue services

(32) Distribution of Emergency Exits or Cross-passages at the facility

(33) Assessment of the facility's safety level by reviewing the resilience of the installed Fire and Life SafetySystems. The assessment should be performed to assess the functional safety of each system


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individually and collectively. The approach universally used is described in IEC Standard 61508

4.3.1.2 In the event that the engineering analysis is used to justify a deviation from or a reduction in theMandatory Requirements, the resulting safety level and availability of the deviated requirements shall be atleast equivalent to the safety level and availability achieved by the application of the MandatoryRequirements.

4.3.1.3 The relative importance of life safety, fire fighter safety and economic impact in the safety level andavailability of any safety critical system shall be defined based on the output from the engineering analysisand shall include the requirements of the facility stakeholder and the AHJ.

4.3.1.4 The equivalence referred to in 4.3.1.2 and the relative importance referred to in 4.3.1.3 shall besupported by means of a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) supported by a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA).

4.3.1.5 For all Road Tunnel Categories, a QRA and CBA shall be MR's


The submitter has proposed additional considerations that should be taken into account in an engineering analysis. Modified text is proposed to (3) with additional text added in (22), (23) and (24). The submitter also adds sub paragraphs 4.3.1.2, 4.3.1.3, 4.3.1.4 and 4.3.1.5 in support of consideration to Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) and added text in support of the committee's desire for the inclusion of QRA to be considered as part of the engineering analysis in the 2017 edition of the standard.




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4.3.2.1

In the case the characterisation of the facility results in multiple classifications, the most onerous shall apply.


Applying the NFPA 502 has resulted in some odd occassions in discussion on the characterisation: depressed highway or a tunnel? This discussion could easily be avoided by declaring that both defintions might apply, and thus that the most onerous one is selected with respect to the design of the safety features.




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4.5 Emergency Communications.

Emergency communications, where required by the authority having jurisdiction AHJ , shall be provided bythe installation of outdoor-type telephone boxes, coded alarm telegraph stations, radio transmitters, or otherapproved devices that meet the following requirements:

(1) They shall be made conspicuous by means of indicating lights or other approved methods.

(2) They shall be identified by a readily visible number plate or other approved device.

(3) They shall be posted with instructions for use by motorists.

(4) They shall be located in approved locations so that motorists can park vehicles clear of the travellanes.

(5) Emergency communication devices shall be protected from physical damage from vehicle impact.

(6) Emergency communication devices shall be connected to an approved constantly attended location.


There is no consistency in the document how the word authority having jurisdiction or AHJ is used. Better to use AHJ in the entire document as defined by 3.2.2. Needs to be changed as several places. Best to leave this to the NFPA editor to change in different places.




Affilliation: RISE

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4.8 Noncombustible Material. Non-hazardous material

4.8.1 Materials applied in a tunnel shall not itself be a hazard during the use of the tunnel and shall notitself become a hazard during fire.

4.8.1 2 * A material that complies with any one of the following shall be considered a noncombustiblematerial:

(1)

(2) The material is reported as passing ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in aVertical Tube Furnace at 750°C.

(3) The material is reported as complying with the pass/fail criteria of ASTM E136 when tested inaccordance with the test method and procedure in ASTM E2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior ofMaterials in a Tube Furnace with a Cone-shaped Airflow Stabilizer, at 750°C.

[5000:7.1.4.1.1]

4.8.2 3 Where the term limited-combustible is used in this standard, it shall also include the termnoncombustible . [ 5000: 7.1.4.1.2]

4.8.4 Materials applied in a tunnel shall comply with the most onerous pass/fail criteria related to therelease of toxic gasses during fire, according to EN 45545-2 (Railway applications - Fire protection onrailway vehicles - Part 2: Requirements for fire behaviour of materials and components), or otherinternational recognized standard.

4.8.5 Fire protection materials, where provided, shall not cause corrosive effects on steel components in atunnel during normal operation, according to standard ASTM B117-16 (Standard Practice for OperatingSalt Spray (Fog) Apparatus) and ASTM G109-07 (Standard Test Method for Determining Effects ofChemical Admixtures on Corrosion of Embedded Steel Reinforcement in Concrete Exposed to ChlorideEnvironments).


(i) Rationale to change title of paragraph: When adding clauses on corrosion and toxicity, the term "noncombustible" no longer encompasses all items addressed in this paragraph. A more fitting description is proposed by "non hazardous".(ii) Rationale to add clause 4.8.4:Life safety in tunnels depends predominantly on safe evacuation conditions. This implies limited smoke emission (linked to visibility) as well as limited exposure to toxic gasses. It is recognized that in most cases, the majority of the smoke and hence the toxicity is related to the fire load itself, nevertheless, the tunnel (and its lining) should not contribute to the toxicity risk. Specific construction materials, potentially used as tunnel lining, are known to emit toxic gases, already at relatively low exposure temperatures (200-600 C), posing risk to evacuees and emergency responders at distances otherwise deemed as safe from the fire. (iii) Rationale to add clause 4.8.5:In the general building industry, the use of certain common building materials may result in detrimental corrosive effects of leaching Chloride ions on steel components in a tunnel. This holds especiallyin high humidity environments, negatively impacting on the long term durability of thecompleted tunnel facility. Reference: ITA Working Group 6 Maintenance and Repair, Structural Fire Protection For Road Tunnels, April 2017.




* The material, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn,support combustion, or release flammable vapors, when subjected to fire or heat.


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32 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


4.8.2 *

Where the term limited-combustible is used in this standard, it shall also include the term noncombustible.[5000:7.1.4.1.2]


There is nothing in this standard that explains what is a limited combustible material. The information recently added to NFPA 101 and 5000 is proposed to be added to the annex.





Public Input No. 75-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. N.1.1]




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4.9.1

Attachments to the structure that penetrate a passive fire protection system shall not adversely affect thethermal performance of the system. An appropriate FEM heat transfer analysis shall be performed toevaluate the heat penetration through the protection system. The material thermal properties shall bedetermined and validated based on representative fire tests.


This proposed text describes a method that can be used to evaluate/calculate the heat penetration through a fire protection system in case of a fire (i.e. quantify the concrete temperarure increase in degree Celcius/Fahrenheit), e.g. through a steel anchor or a lighting/ventilation fixing.




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4.10 Plans and Approvals

4.10.1 Plans for a new road tunnel, bridge or limited access highway shall be submitted to the AHJ forreview and approval prior to construction commencing.

4.10.1.1 The AHJ is authorized to approve a deferred submittal of plans for large projects when the designdocuments are not complete at the time of construction commencing.

4.10.2. Plans for an existing road tunnel, bridge or limited access highway that is proposed to undergo analteration affecting the fire protection features addressed in this standard shall be submitted to the AHJ forreview and approval prior to construction commencing.

4.10.2.1 The AHJ is authorized to approve a deferred submittal of plans for large projects when the designdocuments are not complete at the time of construction commencing.


Currently, NFPA 502 does not provided any provisions for a plan review or approval by the AHJ that is reviewing for compliance with this standard. The document should require submittal of plans to the AHJ and review to ensure compliance is achieved and change orders to kept to a minimum once construction commences. The proposed language in this PI addresses this concern for both new and existing facilities undergoing a modification. The PI also takes into consideration that a complete set of design documents may not always be available at the time of construction for larger scale projects.



Organization: Altamonte Springs Building/Fire Safefy Division

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5.4.1

Acceptable means shall be included within the design of the limited access highway to protect structures inaccordance with this standard to achieve the following:

(1) Support fire fighter accessability

(2) Mitigate structural damage from fire to prevent progressive structural collapse

(3) Minimize economic impact


more consistent with the text in 6.3.1.1 and 7.3.1



Organization: RISE - SP Technical Research Institut


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5.4.3 Joint between structural elements

An analysis shall be performed on joints of non-conventional (and non-rigid) connections, (example:elastomer, plastic gaskets with low melting temperature etc.) since these details of non-concrete and non-steel materials may have lower critical temperature.


The current version of the standard does not deal with this topic of connections that may have significantly lower "critical" temperature than the main concrete (or steel). Therefore, this topic shall be also assessed.




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5.6 * Standpipe, Fire Hydrants . (Reserved) , and Water Supply.

5.6.1 Availability. Where fire hydrants or other water supply points are available on roads or otherdevelopments that are adjacent to a limited access highway, standpipes, access holes in walls or otherapprove arrangements shall be provided to facilitate access to the fire hydrant or water supply fromthe limited access highway.

5.6.1.1 Fire hydran ts and other water supply points shall be considered adjacent to a limited accesshighway when they can be accessed within 800' of the limited access highway right-of-way.

5.6.1.2 When hydrants or water supply points are available adjacent to the limited access highway inaccordance with section 5.6.1, standpipes, access holes in walls or other approved arrangements shall beprovided to access the fire hydrant or water supply points at intervals not exceed 1600' along the limitedaccess highway.


Currently, NFPA 502 provides the designer, contractor and AHJ no direction with respect to considerations for water supply availability on limited access roadways. This PI provides some reasonable provisions to ensure that the ability to access surrounding existing water supplies is considered in the design of a limited access highway. This consideration ensures that existing water supplies within 800' feet are identified and access to those existing water supply sources is provided on the limited access highways. This can be a simple as providing access holes at intervals in sound barrier walls so a hose line can be run through the wall. The 800' length is used as a threshold as most engine companies have the ability to lay out at least 1,000' of hose.




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Submittal Date: Thu Sep 29 07:20:39 EDT 2016


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6.2.1

For bridges or elevated highways less than 300 m (1000 ft) in length the purpose of this standard, bridgesand elevated highways shall be classified on the basis of their location in rural or other areas, their lengthand their occupancy (traffic) level.

Depending on this classification , the provisions of this chapter shall not apply.

rural locatrion occupancy / traffic level length (in m) above which provision apply

n high 300

n low 1000

y high 1000

y low infinite


By adding the "risk-matrix" the clause is more in line with the characterisation as provided for tunnels (in 7.2).




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6.3.1.2 For suspension (including cable stay) bridges, the below structural elements shall beprotected such that the temperature of these structural elements shall not exceed 250°C (482°F)

(1) The connection of the cable to the road deck,

(2) The cables up to an evaluation of 10 meters (32,8 ft) above the road deck.

Additional Proposed Changes

File Name Description Approved

6.3.1.2_bridges.docx


Rationale: the load bearing capacity of suspension bridges depends upon the structural integrity of the cables (and their connections to the bridge deck, as well as the towers). Fire scenarios including those resulting in reaching critical temperature levels of the cables, should be addressed. Without further (engineering) analysis (reference: case cable-stay bridge: Galecopper bridge, Nieuwegein, NL and case suspension bridge, Lillebaelt, DK), conservative assumptions are:- That cables will have reached a critical level (above which loss of strength and stiffness cause premature failure, and/or unacceptable (permanent) deformations) at 250 C. - Temperature levels at elevation of 10 m and more above the bridge deck are reduced to levels considered safe.




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NFPA 502 – 2020 Edition Proposal for additional clause: 6.3.1.2 For suspension (including cable stay) bridges, the below structural elements shall be protected such that the temperature of these structural elements shall not exceed 250°C (482°F) (1) The connection of the cable to the road deck, (2) The cables up to an evaluation of 10 meters (32,8 ft) above the road deck. Rationale: the load bearing capacity of suspension bridges depends upon the structural integrity of the cables (and their connections to the bridge deck, as well as the towers). Fire scenarios including those resulting in reaching critical temperature levels of the cables, should be addressed. Without further (engineering) analysis (reference: case cable-stay bridge: Galecopper bridge, Nieuwegein, NL and case suspension bridge, Lillebaelt, DK), conservative assumptions are:

- That cables will have reached a critical level (above which loss of strength and stiffness cause premature failure, and/or unacceptable (permanent) deformations) at 250 C.

- Temperature levels at elevation of 10 m and more above the bridge deck are reduced to levels considered safe.

Figure 1 Galecopper cable-stay bridge, Nieuwegein, the Netherlands

Figure 2 Lillebaelt suspension bridge, Danmark

Public Input No. 105-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. 6.3.2.1 ]

6.3.2.1

The design fire size and heat release rate produced by a A design fire for vehicle(s) shall be used todesign a bridge or elevated highway.


Change in order to simplify. In Public Input 101 a new definition is given which should cover this.



Public Input No. 101-NFPA 502-2017 [New Section after 3.3.58]





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7.1.2 *

For road tunnels that include either passive fire protection or fixed water-based fire-fighting systems, orboth, the impact of these systems during a fire on the protection of structural elemnens, the tenableenvironment within the tunnel and the tunnel ventilation system shall be evaluated.


improve the consistency in the document, refer to 9.2.1 as an example




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For the purpose of this standard, factors described in Section 4.3.1 shall dictate fire protection and fire lifesafety requirements. The minimum fire protection and

firelife safety requirements, based on main tunnel

lengthparameters characterizing the fire risks , are categorized

as follows: Category X — Wherebelow. Four main tunnel parameters characterizing the risks are defined by:

Tunnel length: 4 ranges of length are defined as “less than 90 m (300 ft)”, “equal or less than 300 m(1000 ft)”, “equal or less than 1000 m (3280 ft)” and “more than 1000 m (3280 ft)”.

Traffic density: 20000 vehicles per day are used as criteria (1 heavy vehicle is considered equal to 5vehicles). Less than 20000 vehicles per day is low traffic and more than 20000 vehicles per day ishigh traffic.

Traffic flow: Uni and bidirectional

Neighbouring conditions: the tunnel is considered as with high environmental risk (HER) when thetunnel is under building or important structure or undersea, otherwise the tunnel is defined as withlow environment risk (LER).

(1) Category X: Where the tunnel length is less than 90 m (

300 ft

(2) 300 ft ), an engineering analysis shall be performed in accordance with Section 4.3.1 , an evaluationof the protection of structural elements shall be conducted in accordance with

7

(3) Section 7 .3 , and traffic control systems shall be installed in accordance with the requirements of

Section

(4) Section 7.6 .

(5) Category A

—

(6) : Where the tunnel length is

90 m (300 ft) or greater

(7) equal or less than 300 m (1000 ft) with low environmental risk , an engineering analysis shall beperformed in accordance with Section 4.3.1 , an evaluation of the protection of structural elementsshall be conducted in accordance with Section 7.3 , and a standpipe system and traffic controlsystems shall be installed in accordance with the requirements of

Chapter

(8) Chapter 10 and

Section

(9) Section 7.6

.

(10)

(11) Category B

—

(12) : Where tunnel length

equals or exceeds 240 m (800 ft) and where the maximum distance from any point within the tunnel to apoint of safety exceeds 120 m (400 ft)

(13) is equal or less than 1000 m (3280 ft) with low traffic density and low environmental risk andunidirectional traffic , all provisions of this standard shall apply unless noted otherwise in thisdocument.

(14) Category C

—


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(15) : Where

the

(16) tunnel length

equals or exceeds 300 m (1000 ft)

(17) is equal or less than 1000 m (3280 ft) with high traffic density or high environmental risk or bidirectionaltraffic , all provisions of this standard shall apply unless noted otherwise in this document.

(18) Category D

—

(19) : Where

the

(20) tunnel length

equals or

(21) exceeds 1000 m (

3280 ft)

(22) 3280 ft) and the risk parameters are at any value , all provisions of this standard shall apply.

On any other consideration of risk, the AHJ can request any upgrade of the category. The tunnel ownermay require a higher category taking into account the eventual strategic importance and impact on theregional economy.

Category

Tunnelparameter

X A B C D

Tunnel length< 90 m

(300 ft)≤ 300 m (1000 ft)

≤ 1000 m

(3280 ft)

≤ 1000 m

(3280 ft)

> 1000 m

(3280 ft)

and and and and and

Traffic density L/H L/H L H L/H

and and and or and

Traffic flow Uni-/Bidirectional Uni-/Bi directional Unidirectional Bidirectional Uni-/Bidirectional

and and and or and

Neighbouringconditions

LER/HER LER LER HER LER/HER


The current categories are based only on the tunnel length that is not enough to appreciate the level of the risks in a tunnel. In relation with the table of requirements A.7.2, a new way of categorizing the tunnel is proposed taking into account main parameters of the tunnel risk.




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Public Input No. 88-NFPA 502-2017 [ New Section after 7.3 ]

7.3.5 Compartmentation

No fire situation may result in any collapse of the structure above the tunnel. The design of thecompartmentation between the tunnel and other buildings or structure (adjacent or above) shall avoid thefire and smoke propagation to the adjacent or above structure.


The surrounding environment of the tunnel shall be considered when assessing the tunnel safety. This proposal prescribes this.




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7.3.2*

The structure shall be capable of withstanding the temperature exposure represented by theRijkswaterstaat (RWS) time-temperature curve or other , or the ISO time-temperature curve where fittedwith an appropriate FFFS, or another recognized standard time-temperature curve that is acceptable to theAHJ, following an engineering analysis as required in Chapter 4.


A FFFS will reduce temperatures in a tunnel and may extinguish the fire. The structure will therefore not experience the extreme temperatures represented by the RWS curve, which corresponds to a worst-case scenario. The ISO curve still represents an extreme event and would only be relevant in such a tunnel should the FFFS fail and the fire be a worst-case scenario. This is an extremely unlikely event and in many tunnels the extra cost of preparing for it may not be justifiable. A combination of FFFS and structural fire protection designed to the ISO curve offers two independent means of structural fire protection and is therefore a more robust solution than increasing the level of either. Research by Ingason and Li presented at the 2014 tunnel symposium in Graz supports this approach.


Submitter Full Name: Alan Brinson

Organization: European Fire Sprinkler Network

Affilliation: International Fire Sprinkler Association

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Submittal Date: Tue May 02 07:24:55 EDT 2017


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7.3.3

During a 120-minute period of fire exposure or other standardized fire exposure times that is acceptable forAHJ , the following failure criteria shall be satisfied:

(1) Regardless of the material the primary structural element is made of, irreversible damage anddeformation leading to progressive structural collapse shall be prevented.

(2)


the proposal makes it more consistent with the text in 7.3.2





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* Tunnels with concrete structural elements shall be designed such that fire-induced spalling, whichleads to progressive structural collapse, is prevented.


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7.3.4 *

Structural fire protection material, where provided, shall satisfy the following performance criteria:

(1) Tunnel structural elements shall be protected to achieve the following for concrete:

(2) The concrete is protected such that fire-induced spalling is prevented.

(3) The temperature of the concrete surface does not exceed 380°C (716°F).

(4) The temperature of the steel reinforcement within the concrete [assuming a minimum cover of25 mm (1 in.)] does not exceed 250°C (482°F).

(5) Tunnel structural elements shall be protected to achieve the following for steel or cast iron:

(a) The lining temperature will not exceed 300°C (572°F).

(6) The material shall be noncombustible in accordance with ASTM E136, Standard Test Method forBehavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750°C, or by complying with internationallyaccepted criteria acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction when tested in accordance with ASTME2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Tube Furnace with a Cone-shaped AirflowStabilizer, at 750ºC ; ISO 1182, Reaction to fire tests for products — Non-combustibility test; or BS476-4, Non-Combustibility, Part 4: Non-combustibility test for materials. section 4.8 .

(7) The material shall have a minimum melting temperature of 1350ºC (2462ºF).

(8) The material shall meet the fire protection requirements with less than 5 percent humidity by weightand when fully saturated with water, in accordance with the approved time-temperature curve.


There are no "internationally accepted criteria acceptable" associated with non-combustibility. This standard should simply reference the criteria in section 4.8. Otherwise the results will not be consistent because the pass/fail criteria for all the tests other than ASTM E136 are not in the standard. Moreover, BS 476-4 has not been updated since 1970 and is no longer in use. Both European Union regulations and International Maritime Regulations have pass/fail criteria for non-combustibility based on ISO 1182 but they are different from each other. ASTM E2652 was developed by the ASTM E05 fire standards committee (in an agreement between ASTM and ISO) in order to incorporate it into ASTM E136 (it is ASTM E136 procedure B) and it is based on ISO 1182 but has no pass/fail criteria of its own, which is why it is included in section 4.8 with the appropriate wording.

The best way to handle this is by an annex note, as proposed in the associated public input is to comment that other tests exist.









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51 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.4.2

Tunnels described in categories B, C, and D without 24-hour supervision shall have an automatic firedetection system in accordance with 7.4.7.


In the option for only human monitoring; if the human monitor must leave the station then the suppression system might not be activated in time. An automatic system with a human override is a more desirable system configuration.



Public Input No. 137-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. M.1]


Submitter Full Name: Robert Cordell

Organization: Johnson Controls

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52 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.4.6 Manual Fire Alarm Boxes.

7.4.6.1

Manual fire alarm boxes mounted in NEMA Enclosure Type 4 (IP 65) or equivalent boxes shall be installedat intervals of not more than 90 m (300 ft) and at all cross-passages and means of egress from the tunnel.

7.4.6.2

The manual fire alarm boxes shall be accessible to the public and the tunnel personnel.

7.4.6.3

The location of the manual fire alarm boxes shall be approved.

7.4.6.4

The alarm shall indicate the location of the manual fire alarm boxes at the monitoring station.

7.4.6.5

The system shall be installed, inspected, and maintained in compliance with NFPA 72 .


Manual Fire Alarm Boxes are an old technology. Austroads report stated that they have not been used by motorists. Emergency communication systems, such as emergency phones could be used for manual fire notification. Manual Fire Alarm Boxes are additional maintenance items.


Submitter Full Name: Igor Maevski

Organization: Jacobs Engineering

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Submittal Date: Fri Mar 31 11:53:16 EDT 2017


53 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.4.7.2

Where a fire detection system is installed in accordance with the requirements of 7.4.7.1 , signals for thepurpose of evacuation and relocation of occupants shall not be required.


This language appears to be contradictory to Annex language found in A.7.16.6.3 which discusses the benefits of wayfinding lighting. Suggest deletion of this section.




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Submittal Date: Fri Dec 16 07:22:20 EST 2016


54 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.6.2

Road tunnels longer than 240 m (800 ft) shall described in categories B, C, and D shall be provided withmeans to stop traffic from entering the direct approaches to the tunnel, to control traffic within the tunnel,and to clear traffic downstream of the fire site following activation of a fire alarm within the tunnel. Thefollowing requirements shall apply:

(1) Direct approaches to the tunnel shall be closed following activation of a fire alarm within the tunnel.Approaches shall be closed in such a manner that responding emergency vehicles are not impeded intransit to the fire site.

(2) Traffic within the tunnel approaching (upstream of) the fire site shall be stopped prior to the fire siteuntil it is safe to proceed as determined by the incident commander.

(3)

(4) Operation shall be returned to normal as determined by the incident commander.


This PI revises the section to be consistent with the classifications under 7.2 and the other descriptions of application in 7.4.. Tunnels longer than 800 feet would be a Category B, C or D.




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* Means shall be provided downstream of an incident site to expedite the flow of vehicles from thetunnel. If it is not possible to provide such means under all traffic conditions, then the tunnel shall beprotected by a fixed water-based fire-fighting system or other suitable means to establish a tenableenvironment to permit safe evacuation and emergency services access.


55 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.7 Fire Apparatus.

Annex

(Reserved)

A.7.7 Annex K provides additional information on fire apparatus for road tunnels.


A reference to annex K is inappropriate for the core text of a standard and is inconsistent with the Manual of Style. Relocating this informational note to Annex A as a pointer to K accomplishes the objectives.




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56 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.13 Alternative Fuels. (Reserved)

A.7.13 Annex G provides additional information on alternative fuels.


A reference to annex text is inappropriate for inclusion in the core text and is inconsistent with the Manual of Style. Relocating this language to annex A, pointing to Annex G, accomplishes the objective of a pointer.




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57 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 108-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. 7.14.1 [Excluding any Sub-Sections] ]

Fire size, growth rate, and smoke generated shall smoke release rate shall be permitted to be reducedwhere an engineering analysis can show that the pool size of the combustible or flammable liquid can belimited by proper design of the roadway cross slope, the roadway grade, the drainage inlets, and thedrainage conveyance pipe or trough.


the Word smoke generated can be replaced by the words smoke release rate as defined in 3.3.55





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58 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.16.5.5 *

Emergency exit door assemblies shall be 11⁄2 hour rated, based on the design fire described in Chapter 11,and shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 80, and tested in accordance with NFPA 252 .


This adds testing requirements for Emergency Exit Doors. Exit doors are critical element of tunnel FLS system and shall be tested. NFPA 252 is a Standard Method of Fire Tests of Door Assembly




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59 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.16.5.5*

Emergency exit door assemblies shall be 11⁄2 hour rated, based on the design fire described inChapter 11 7.3.2 , and shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 80.


The reference to Chapter 11 appears wrong, since no relevant design fires are defined in that chapter. The proposal is to replace the reference to include 7.3.2.




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60 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.16.5.5*

Emergency exit door assemblies shall be 1 1 ⁄ 2 hour rated , based on the design fire described inChapter 11 Section 7.3.2 , and shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 80.


The current requirement in this chapter (reference to the design fire given in Chapter 11) does not comply with the fire scenario that is used for the protection of structural elements (Chapter 7.3.2). Therefore, this proposal aligns the fire scenarios in order to have the same scenario for both the structural elements and for the emergency exit door assemblies. The fire resistance period shall be based on the fire scenario and not fixed on 1 and half hour.




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61 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.16.5.8

Emergency exit doors shall be self-closing door systems and shall not rely on external power. Durability ofthe self-closing door systems shall be justified.


Assessment of the durability of the self-closing door assemblies is not required in the current version, therefore this change has been proposed.




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62 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.16.6.2*

Spacing between exits for protection of tunnel occupants shall not exceed 300 m (1000 ft). Requiredspacing shall be determined by consideration, as a minimum, of the following factors:

(1) Category, including types and classes of tunnels

(2) Design fire locations, size and fire/smoke development

(3) Egress analysis

(4) Fire life safety systems analyses to provide tenable environment in tunnel in accordance with 7.16.2(This includes type and operation of tunnel ventilation, detection, fire protection, and control systems.)

(5) Traffic management system

(6) Emergency response plan

(7) Consideration of uncertainties of people's behavior during a fire event and of those who are unable toself-rescue


The proposed changes would bring the clause more in line with 4.3.1.




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63 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.16.6.4

The emergency exits shall be separated from the tunnel by a minimum of a 2-hour fire-rated constructionenclosure, rated based on the design fire described in Chapter 11 . Section 7.3.2 .


The current requirement in this section (reference to the design fire given in Chapter 11) does not comply with the fire scenario that is used for the protection of structural elements (Section 7.3.2). Therefore, this proposal aligns the fire scenarios in order to have the same scenario for the emergency exits, for the emergency exit door assemblies (Section 7.16.5.5) and for the structural elements and .




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64 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


7.18. Tunnel Emergency Education. Where required by the AHJ for category C or D tunnels, the tunneloperator shall impliment an approved motorist education program on how to properly react in case ofemergencies in the tunnel.

A.7.18 Tunnel emergency education can consist of raido, TV, brochures, signage, public safetymessages or other means. A suggested brochure is shown in figure A.XXX.

(Insert Tunnel Safety Brochure from Figure L.1)


For large tunnels, motorist education should be a basic component of the standard and should be expected to be provided by the tunnel operator. This PI moves the concept in Annex L to the core text with need Annex A language on this issue.

A related PI has been submitted to delete Annex L.



Public Input No. 14-NFPA 502-2016 [Chapter L]




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65 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


9.2.1

The goal of a fixed water-based fire-fighting system shall be to slow, stop, or reverse the rate of fire growthor heat release rate or otherwise mitigate the impact of fire to improve tenability for tunnel occupantsduring a fire condition, enhance the ability of first responders to aid in evacuation and engage in manualfire-fighting activities, and/or protect the major structural elements of a tunnel.


the Words does not comply fully with 3.3.28. Also reversing the rate of fire growth sounds contradicting, how can it grow when it is reversing from growing?. The Word heat release rate gives more complete description.




Affilliation: RISE

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66 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


9.3.4 Impact on Other Safety Measures.

9.3.4.1

For the sizing of the emergency ventilation system in accordance with Section 11.4 , the effect of the fixedwater-based fire-fighting system shall be taken into account.

9.3.4.2

For protection of structural elements, the applicable provisions of Section 7.3 shall apply unless evidenceof the performance of the required structural fire protection by a fixed water-based fire-fighting system isprovided and approved by the AHJ.


Strike 9.3.4 based on the Dallas research proposal for testing of WBFFS in combination with ventilation systems. Clearly the need for such research reveals that the interaction of these systems has not been tested nor validated. The committee should not accommodate such analysis nor put the problem on the desk of the AHJ. Pending the outcome of this or other research this clause should be omitted.


Submitter Full Name: Rene van den Bosch

Organization: Promat BV The Netherlands

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Submittal Date: Thu May 11 05:23:54 EDT 2017


67 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


9.3.4.2

For protection of structural elements, the applicable provisions of Section 7.3 shall apply unless evidenceof the performance of the required structural fire protection by a fixed water-based fire-fighting system isprovided and approved by the AHJ that is supported by a fire risk based engineering analysis as referencein 4 .3.1 which replaces the structural fire protection requirement by a Fixed Water Based Fire FightingSystem.


The proposed additional text is intended to clarify the requirement for the undertaking of an Engineering Analysis to assist the AHJ with the acceptance (or otherwise) for the proposed replacement of a structural fire protection system with a Fixed Water-Based Fire-Fighting System. The current text does not clarify how the AHJ can make this decision.




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68 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


9.3.4.2

For protection of structural elements, the applicable provisions of Section 7.3 shall apply unless evidenceof the performance of the required structural fire protection by a fixed water-based fire-fighting system isprovided and approved by the AHJ.


The proposal is to remove Section 9.3.4 completely as it is superfluous based on 9.6.1. that contains a more elaborate description of the impact of WBFFS on other safety measures.




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69 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


9.6.1 *

When a fixed water-based fire-fighting system is included in the design of a road tunnel, the impact of thissystem on other measures that are part of the overall safety concept shall be evaluated. At a minimum, thisevaluation shall address the following:

(1) Impact on drainage requirements

(2) Impact on tenability, including the following:

(3) Increase in humidity

(4) Reduction (if any) in stratification and visibility

(5) Integration with other tunnel systems, including the following:

(6) Fire detection and alarm system

(7) Tunnel ventilation system

(8) Traffic control and monitoring systems

(9) Visible emergency alarm notification

(10) Protection of structural elements

(11) Incident command structure and procedures, including the following:

(12) Procedures for tunnel operators

(13) Procedures for first responders

(14) Tactical fire-fighting procedures

(15) Protection and reliability of the fixed, water-based, fire-fighting system, including the following:

(16) Impact events

(17) Seismic events

(18) Redundancy requirements

(19) Ongoing system maintenance, periodic testing, and service requirements


valid of 9.6.1 (3) and a new text to (e). This additional bullit point is necessary in order to maintain the consistency with for example 9.3.4.2





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71 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


9.6.1*

When a fixed water-based fire-fighting system is included in the design of a road tunnel, the impact of thissystem on other measures that are part of the overall safety concept shall be evaluated. At a minimum, thisevaluation shall address the following:

(1) Impact on drainage requirements

(2) Impact on tenability, including the following:

(3) Increase in humidity

(4) Reduction (if any) in stratification and visibility

(5) Integration with other tunnel systems, including the following:

(6) Fire detection and alarm system

(7) Tunnel ventilation system

(8) Structural fire protection

(9) Traffic control and monitoring systems

(10) Visible emergency alarm notification

(11) Incident command structure and procedures, including the following:

(12) Procedures for tunnel operators

(13) Procedures for first responders

(14) Tactical fire-fighting procedures

(15) Protection and reliability of the fixed, water-based, fire-fighting system, including the following:

(16) Impact events

(17) Seismic events

(18) Redundancy requirements

(19) Ongoing system maintenance, periodic testing, and service requirements


The impact of the WBFFS on the structural fire protection shall be evaluated as well.




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72 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM



73 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 6-NFPA 502-2016 [ Chapter 10 ]

Chapter 10 Standpipe Standpipes and Water Supply for Standpipes

10.1 Standpipe Systems.

10.1.1

Standpipe systems shall be designed and installed as Class I systems in accordance with NFPA 14, exceptas modified by this standard.

10.1.2

Standpipe systems shall be inspected and maintained in accordance with NFPA 25.

10.1.3

Standpipe systems shall be either wet or dry, depending on the climatic conditions, the fill times, therequirements of the authority having jurisdiction, or any combination thereof.

10.1.4 Areas Subject to Freezing.

10.1.4.1

Where wet standpipes are required in areas subject to freezing conditions, the water shall be heated andcirculated.

10.1.4.2

All piping and fittings that are exposed to freezing conditions shall be heat-traced and insulated.

10.1.4.3

Heat trace material shall be listed for the intended purpose and supervised for power loss.

10.1.5*

Dry standpipe systems shall be installed in a manner so that the water is delivered to all hose connectionson the system in 10 minutes or less.

10.1.6

Combination air relief–vacuum valves shall be installed at each high point on the system.

10.2 Water Supply for Standpipe Systems .

10.2.1

Wet standpipe systems (automatic or semiautomatic) shall be connected to an approved water supply thatis capable of supplying the system demand for a minimum of 1 hour.

10.2.2

Dry standpipe systems shall have an approved water supply that is capable of supplying the systemdemand for a minimum of 1 hour.

10.2.3

Acceptable water supplies shall include the following:

(1) Municipal or privately owned waterworks systems that have adequate pressure and flow rate and alevel of integrity acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction

(2) Automatic or manually controlled fire pumps that are connected to an approved water source

(3) Pressure-type or gravity-type storage tanks that are installed, inspected, and maintained inaccordance with NFPA 22

10.3 Fire Department Connections for Standpipe Systems .


74 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

10.3.1

Fire department connections shall be of the threaded two-way or three-way type or shall consist of aminimum 100 mm (4 in.) quick-connect coupling that is accessible.

10.3.2

Each independent standpipe system shall have a minimum of two fire department connections that areremotely located from each other.

10.3.3

Fire department connections shall be protected from vehicular damage by means of bollards or otherapproved barriers.

10.3.4

Fire department connection locations shall be approved and shall be coordinated with emergency accessand response locations.

10.4 Hose Connections for Standpipe Systems .

10.4.1

Hose connections shall be spaced so that no location on the protected roadway is more than 45 m (150 ft)from the hose connection.

10.4.2*

Hose connection spacing shall not exceed 85 m (275 ft).

10.4.3

Hose connections shall be located so that they are conspicuous and convenient but still reasonablyprotected from damage by errant vehicles or vandals.

10.4.4

Hose connections shall have 65 mm (2 1⁄2 in.) external threads in accordance with NFPA 1963 and theauthority having jurisdiction.

10.4.5

Hose connections shall be equipped with caps to protect hose threads.

10.5 Fire Pumps for Standpipe Systems .

Fire pumps shall be installed, inspected, and maintained in accordance with NFPA 20.

10.6 Identification Signs for Standpipe Systems .

10.6.1

Identification signage for standpipe systems and components shall be approved by and developed withinput from the authority having jurisdiction.

10.6.2

Identification signage shall, as a minimum, identify the name and limits of the roadway that is served.

10.6.3

Identification signage shall be conspicuous and shall be affixed to, or immediately adjacent to, firedepartment connections and each roadway hose connection.


The current title of Chapter 10 and the layout of the subsections is somewhat misleading. With the title being "Standpipe and Water Supply" it leads the user to believe that there are two separate issues addressed in Chapter 10 that stand alone....Standpipes and then Water Supply. That is not the case. A reading of Chapter 10 subsections 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5 and 10.6 appears to show intent that those sections only apply to the water supply, FDC, hose connections, fire pumps and identification signs that are components of a standpipe system. One would not go to Chapter 10 just to look for guidance on "water supplies." The change to the chapter title and subsection titles proposed by this PI clarifies the intended application of Chapter 10 to just "Standpipes and Water Supplies for Standpipes", which is the intent of this chapter.


75 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM




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76 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.1.2

Emergency ventilation shall be required in tunnels exceeding 1000 m (3280 ft). In case of bidirectionaltunnels, longitudinal ventilation shall not be used for tunnels lenghts over 1500 m, unless traffic volumes donot reach 1000 vehicles per lane in peak hours.


The NFPA 502 does not include any requirement considering the limitations of longitudinal ventilation for bidirectional tunnels. Actually the standard does not take into consideration whether the tunnels are unidirectional or bidirectional, when stting the requirements for tunnel ventilation.With my input I would like to suggest that longitudinal ventilation may be a good solution for unidirectional tunnles and "not too long" bidirectional tunnels. For long bidirectional tunnel should not be acceptable.


Submitter Full Name: Cesar Garcia

Organization: TEKIA INGENIEROS S.A.

Affilliation: TEKIA INGENIEROS S.A.

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77 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.1.6

Emergency ventilation systems and all associated equipment shall be designed to meet minimumventilation requirements under all anticipated environmental and climatic conditions for the facility.


Recent experiences demonstrate that designers may ignore basic environmental and climatic issues, leading to issues with performance of the constructed facility. This text would require designers to give proper consideration to these factors during the design stage of a project.




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78 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.1.5

Emergency ventilation shall be sized to meet minimum ventilation requirements with one exhaust fan / orone group of jet fans out of service or shall provide operational measures to ensure that life safety is notcompromised with one exhaust fan / or one group of jet fans out of service.


failure of group of jet fans



Public Input No. 115-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. 11.4 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]



Submitter FullName:

Petr Pospisil

Organization: IP Engineering

Affilliation:actually working for many European Road Administrations (Swiss,Austrian, Czech, etc.), experience from > 100 tunnel ventilation projectsworldwide

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79 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.1.5

Emergency ventilation shall be sized to meet minimum ventilation requirements with one fan (or more fansin case of mounting on side by side) out of service or shall provide operational measures to ensure that lifesafety is not compromised with one fan fan (or more fans in case of mounting on side by side) out ofservice.


This proposal describes better a situation when the fans are installed side by side.




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80 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.2.3

In tunnels with bidirectional traffic where motorists can be on both sides of the fire site, the followingobjectives shall be met:

(1) Smoke stratification shall not be disturbed.

(2) Longitudinal air velocity shall be kept at low magnitudes. The target velocity is approx. 1.2 m/s, to beachieved withing 180 s after fire alarm.

(3) The flow should not be reversed, except in the vicinity of the portals

(4) For that, a closed-loop control, based on minimum 3 reliable flow measurements, is required.

(5) Smoke extraction, provided as a point extraction system through controllable dampers in ceilingopenings or high openings along the tunnel wall(s) is effective and shall be considered, particularlywhen it can be used for normal operation ventilation .

(6) Line extraction (exhaust semitransversal ventilation) are not allowed.

(7) With smoke extraction, the longitudinal air velocity must be controlled too. The target velocities fromboth sides to the extraction point should be approx. equal, definded by the exhaust capacity, to beachieved withing 180 s after fire alarm.


Dynamic achievement of desired state is critical(Standard in European road tunnels, e.g. Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic etc.)

Smoke extraction must be better specified: only point extraction + control of longitudinal airflow






Public Input No. 119-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. 11.3]







Public Input No. 127-NFPA 502-2017 [New Section after 11.8.1]

Public Input No. 128-NFPA 502-2017 [Chapter D]

Public Input No. 129-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. J.4.1]

Public Input No. 130-NFPA 502-2017 [New Section after J.3.4]

Public Input No. 131-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. I.3]

Public Input No. 132-NFPA 502-2017 [Sections I.4.2, I.4.3]



81 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


Submitter Full Name: Petr Pospisil

Organization: [ Not Specified ]

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82 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.2.4*

In tunnels with unidirectional traffic where motorists are likely to be located upstream of the fire site, thefollowing objectives shall be met:

(1) Maximize the exhaust rate in the ventilation zone that contains the fire and minimize the amount ofoutside air that is introduced by a transverse system.

Create a longitudinal airflow in the direction of traffic flow by operating the upstream ventilation zone(s)in maximum supply and the downstream ventilation zone(s) in maximum exhaust.

(2) Longitudinal systems

(3)

(4) Avoid disruption of the smoke layer initially by not operating jet fans that are located near the fire site.Operate fans that are farthest away from the site first.

Transverse or reversible semitransverse systems

(5)

(a) Same as in tunnels with bidirectional traffic / congestions, but the target flow velocity in thetunnel shozld be approx. 2 m/s

(6) Transverse or reversible semitransverse systems shall not be allowed in tunnels with unidirectionaltraffic where motorists are likely to be located upstream of the fire site

(little probability of congestion)


Achieving critical velocity may destroy smoke layering and endanger people downstream of the fire (there always may be some)

Exhaust systems (transversal) can increase the risk in case of fire, because flow direction upstream of the fire may be reversed !

semitransversal systems are not useful for tunnel ventilation applications !








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* Prevent backlayering by producing a longitudinal air velocity that is calculated on the basis ofcritical velocity in the direction of traffic flow.


83 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

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84 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.3 Design Objectives.

The design objectives of the emergency ventilation system shall be to control, to extract, or to control andextract smoke and heated gases as follows:

(1) A stream of noncontaminated air is provided to motorists in path(s) of egress in accordance with theanticipated emergency response plan (see Annex C).

(2) Longitudinal airflow rates are produced to prevent backlayering of smoke at defined target velocities ina path of egress away from a fire (see Annex D).


Avoiding backlayering should not be a goal, at least not in the self rescue phase, because it could deteriorate tenable conditions !








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85 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


The design of the emergency ventilation system shall be based on a fire scenario having different firescenarios with a defined heat release rates, smoke release rates, and carbon monoxide release rates, allvarying as a function of time rate . The selection of the fire scenario shall consider the operational risks thatare associated with the types of vehicles expected to use the tunnel. The fire scenario scenarios shallconsider fire fires at a location locations where the most stringent ventilation system performancerequirement is requirements are anticipated by an engineering analysis.

Most important is to take into account different meteorological boundary conditions, and the influence oftraffic. The emergency ventilation should be designed to achieve the desired state, regarding flow velocitiesin the tunnel, within max. 180 seconds from fire alarm.


Dynamic layout is essential to achieve the ventilation goals within appropriate time. The first minutes are most important for self rescue of people,

HRR to calculate buouancy and temperatures, other factors are not necessary for a simple design. Maybe for more detailed risk analysis, but not for ventilation design !






Public Input No. 119-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. 11.3]





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86 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.4.2*

The selection of the design fire size (heat release rate) shall consider the types of vehicles that areexpected to use the tunnel and whether the tunnel is fitted with a FFFS .


A FFFS reduces fire heat release rate and this should be reflected in the design guidance for emergency ventilation systems. In practice this is already done and it is time for NFPA 502 to catch up with that.





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87 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.4.3 *

Failure or loss of availability of emergency ventilation equipment ventilation system shall be considered.


consistent with rest of text, see for example 11.2.1





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88 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.4.3*

Failure or loss of availability of emergency ventilation equipment shall be considered by providingappropriate redundancy .


specify more in detail








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89 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


Tunnel ventilation fans, their motors, and all components critical to the operation of the system during a fireemergency that can be exposed to elevated temperatures from the fire shall be designed to remainoperational for a minimum of 1 hour at a temperature of 250°C (482°F).

Any support devices for heavy equipment suspended within the tunnel must be capable of maintaing itssupport during a fire emergency for not less than 2 hours.


Requirement for tunnel ventilation fans and all components to be designed to remain operational for a minimum of 1 hr at a temperature of 250 C is interpreted as jet fans supports shall meet the same requirement. However while the jet fan is disabled due to high temperature its supports shall keep it in place during evacuation and fire fighting operation. Supports could be exposed to significantly higher temperatures and with no FFFS may see the time-temperature curves discussed in Section 7.3




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90 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


Tunnel ventilation fans, their motors, and all components critical to the operation of the system during a fireemergency that can be exposed to elevated temperatures from the fire shall be designed to remainoperational for a minimum of 1 hour at a temperature of 250°C (482°F) and to remain operational for aminimum of 2 hours at a temperature of 400 °C (752 °F) for road tunnel categories B, C and D .


The design temperature of 250 °C during 1 hour is not representative for a tunnel with high risks, where the required temperature shall be higher and the period longer.




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91 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.5.3 *

The design of ventilation systems where fans can be directly exposed to a fire shall incorporate fanredundancy.


omit, is written in 11.1.5







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92 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.5.4

The emergency ventilation system shall be capable of reaching full operational mode the desired state,rearding airflow velocities in the tunnel, within a maximum of 180 seconds of activation / after fire alarm .


what counts is the situation in the tunnel - first minutes are crucial for self rescue







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93 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.5.5

Reversible fans shall be capable of completing full rotational reversal within 90 seconds.


omit - 11.5.4 is defining the goal for reversing jet fans.reversible supply / exhaust fans should not be allowed.







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94 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.5.6

Discharge and outlet openings for emergency fans shall be positioned away from tunnel portals and anysupply air intake openings to prevent recirculation.


smoke recirculation to portal may be a problem, in case of extraction in the tunnel







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95 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


11.5.7

Where separation is not possible, intake openings shall be protected by other approved means or devicessupervised by smoke detectors to prevent smoke from re-entering the system.


smoke detectors are essential







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96 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


All dampers, actuators, and accessories that are exposed to the elevated exhaust airstream from theroadway fire shall be designed to remain fully operational in an airstream temperature of 250°C (482°F) forat least 1 hour 1 hour and t o remain fully operational in an airstream temperature of 400 °C (752 °F) for atleast 2 hours for road tunnel categories B, C and D .


The design temperature of 250 °C during 1 hour is not representative for a tunnel with high risks, where the required temperature shall be higher and the period longer.




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97 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


Sound attenuators that are located in the elevated airstream from the roadway, such as those used insemitransverse exhaust systems and fully transverse exhaust ducts, shall be capable of withstanding anairstream temperature of 250°C (482°F) and 400 °C (752 °F) for at least 2 hours for road tunnel categoriesB, C and D .


The design temperature of 250 °C is not representative for a tunnel with high risks, where the required temperature shall be higher and the period longer.




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98 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


Control of Longitudinal Airflow

To achieve the target airflow velocities, a decentralized control system, based on local devices for eachgroup of fans, may be applied as a turn-key system which works independently from the SCADA. Localdevices typically include controllers, VSD, evaluation of flow measurements, switchgear and communicationinterface.


Reliable flow control, which can be previously tested. Achievement of goals is in the responsability of the provider.







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99 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


12.2.1.3

All cables and conductors used in road tunnels shall be resistant to the spread of fire and shall havereduced smoke emissions by one of the following methods:

(1) Wires and cables listed as having fire-resistant and low smoke-producing characteristics, by having acable char height of not greater than 1.5 m (4.9 ft) when measured from the lower edge of the burner

face, a total smoke release over the 20-minute test period no greater than 150 m2, and a peak smoke

release rate of no greater than 0.40 m2/s, when tested as a minimum in accordance with either theIEEE 1202 method described in ANSI/UL 1685, Vertical-Tray Fire-Propagation and Smoke-ReleaseTest for Electrical and Optical-Fiber Cables, or the CSA FT4, Vertical Flame Test, per CSAC22.2 No. 0.3, Test Methods for Electrical Wires and Cables.

(2) Wires and cables listed as having fire-resistant and low smoke-producing characteristics, by having aflame travel distance that does not exceed 1.5 m (4.9 ft), generating a maximum peak optical density ofsmoke of 0.5 and a maximum average optical density of smoke of 0.15 when tested , as a minimum inaccordance with the methods described in NFPA 262 or in CSA FT6, Horizontal Flame and SmokeTest, per CSA C22.2 No. 0.3.

(3) Wires and cables tested to equivalent internationally recognized standards approved by the AHJ.


The words "as a minimum" are meaningless and give the impression that there is another option to test in the referenced test methods. The added words introduce confusion. Item 3 already gives the ahj latitude to choose any test they want. The testing in items 1 and 2 must be fully in accordance with the actual test standard.




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100 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


12.3.2

Raceways, equipment, and supports installed in a road tunnel and ancillary areas shall comply with thefollowing:

(1) Exposed raceways, equipment, and supports with combustible outer coverings or coatings shall emitless than 2 percent acid gas when tested in accordance with MIL-DTL-24643C, or with an approved,equivalent, internationally recognized standard.

(2) Nonmetallic conduits shall be permitted when covered with a minimum of 100 mm (4 in.) concretewhen approved. All conduit ends inside of pull boxes and junction boxes shall be firestopped.

(3) Nonmetallic raceways used in road tunnels shall meet a flame spread index not exceeding 25 and asmoke developed index not exceeding 50 when tested in accordance with ASTM E84 and arenoncombustible per 4 . 8


The requirement of noncombustible is inconsistent with the requirement for testing to ASTM E84. There is no point in testing via ASTM E84 if the material is noncombustible and therefore the reference to section 4.8 needs to be deleted.




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101 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


(The TC needs to provide greater specificity as to what rules and regulations need to be put in placeunder 14.1.1 . The current language of 14.1.1 is too vague.)

14.1.1 *

The authority having jurisdiction shall adopt rules and regulations that apply to the transportation ofregulated and unregulated cargoes.


The current language in this section is exceedingly vague. It provides no guidance to the AHJ at all as to what the rules and regulations need to address under this section. (As an example: Does this section mean all tunnels, limited access roadways and bridges need to have regulation or just certain ones? Does it apply only to tunnels or all facilities? If it applies to only certain facilities, what are the parameters that create that applicability?) What rules and regulations should be considered covering what particular issues of risk is not even defined. Are we directing the AHJ to regulate quantities of materials, types of materials or routes? In addition, how those decisions should be made and what should or should not be allowed based on best practices considerations is not addressed in the core text or the annex. The TC needs to expand the guidance in this area if they expect the AHJ to be able to make rules and regulations based on valid risk assessment. The NFPA Manual of Style actually prohibits the type of wording that is currently in this section as it is vague and unenforceable. Section 2.2.2.1 of the MOS states "The main text of codes and standards shall no contain references or requirements that are unenforceable and vague." I would also suggest some example annex material be included from jurisdictions that have actually adopted these types of rule and regulations so the AHJ can see by example what the intent of the TC is regarding this section.




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14.1. 3 1.1 *

Development of such regulations shall address the following:

(1) Population density

(2) Type of highway

(3) Types and quantities of hazardous materials

(4) Emergency response capabilities

(5) Results of consultation with affected persons

(6) Exposure and other risk factors

(7) Terrain considerations

(8) Continuity of routes

(9) Alternative routes

(10) Effects on commerce

(11) Delays in transportation

(12) Climatic conditions

(13) Congestion and accident history


The language in this section is actually a modifier to section 14.1.1. Therefore, it should be a subsection to 14.1.1 and not a stand-alone section of 14.1.3.




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103 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


15.1.1

Fire protection, life safety, emergency ventilation, communication, traffic control, and electrical systemsshall be inspected and tested for operational readiness and performance in accordance with the frequencyrequirements of the National Tunnel Inspection Standards, the TOMIE Manual, and applicable NFPAstandards or in accordance with 15.1.2.


New mandatory regulatory requirements for tunnel inspections should be referenced in Chapter 15.




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104 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 70-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. A.3.3.5 ]

A.3.3.5 Backlayering.

See Figure A.3.3.5(a) through Figure A.3.3.5(c).

Figure A.3.3.5(a) Tunnel Fire Without Ventilation and Zero Percent Grade.

Figure A.3.3.5(b) Insufficiently Ventilated Tunnel Fire Resulting in Backlayering.

Figure A.3.3.5(c) Tunnel Fire Sufficiently Ventilated to Prevent Backlayering.



Figure_A.3.3.5._b_revised.docx


Revise Figure A.3.3.3.5.(b) to show back-layering.




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106 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Backlayering


A.3.3.22 Engineering Analysis.

A written report of that documents the analysis that recommends the engineering analysis should besubmitted to the Authority Having Jurisdiction. The written report should recommend the fire protectionmethod(s) that provides will provide a level of fire safety commensurate with this standard is submitted tothe authority having jurisdiction.


Revision of text to clarify intent. Also reference to AHJ should be capitalized as Authority Having Jurisdiction is a defined term in Chapter 3.




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107 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


A.4.3.1

The engineering analysis should be used to guide the decision process by the stakeholders and the AHJ forimplementation of specific fire protection and life safety requirements.The SFPE Engineering Guide toPerformance-Based Fire Protection, 2nd edition provides a process for a performance-based analysis.

The engineering analysis can, for some facilities, involve conducting risk analysis. A risk analysis is ananalysis of potential hazards and the consequential risks imposed by those hazards on the facility. Riskanalysis should be conducted as an adjunct to, and not a substitute for, qualified professional judgment.The content and the results of the risk analysis can be included in the emergency response plandocumentation submitted to the AHJ. Risk analysis can also include a quantification of risks which can beused to inform a performance-based approach to safety.

Guidance and background documentation for risk assessment can be found in the following documents:

(1) Directive 2004/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on minimumsafety requirements for tunnels in the Trans-European Road Network

(2) OECD/PIARC QRA Model (http://www.piarc.org/en/knowledge-base/road-tunnels/gram_software/)

(3) NFPA 550, Guide to the Fire Safety Concepts Tree

(4) NFPA 551, Guide for the Evaluation of Fire Risk Assessments

(5) PIARC 2012, Current Practice for Risk Evaluation for Road Tunnels

(6) Risk Analysis: From the Garden of Eden to its Seven Most Deadly Sins

(7) SFPE Engineering Guide Fire Risk Assessment, 2006


The SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire Protection provides designers with a framework that is suggested in Section 4.3 Additionally, the SFPE Risk Assessment Guide is an excellent source of information on how to complete a fire risk assessment suggested in 4.3.1.


Submitter Full Name: Chris Jelenewicz

Organization: SFPE

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108 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


A.4.3.1

The engineering analysis should be used to guide the decision process by the stakeholders and the AHJ forimplementation of specific fire protection and life safety requirements.

The engineering analysis can, for some facilities, involve conducting risk analysis. A risk analysis is ananalysis of potential hazards and the consequential risks imposed by those hazards on the facility and itsoccupants . Risk analysis should be conducted as an adjunct to, and not a substitute for, qualifiedprofessional judgment. The content and the results of the risk analysis can be included in the emergencyresponse plan documentation submitted to the AHJ. Risk analysis can also include a quantification of riskswhich can be used to inform a performance-based approach to safety.

Guidance and background documentation for risk assessment can be found in the following documents:

(1) Directive 2004/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on minimumsafety requirements for tunnels in the Trans-European Road Network

(2) OECD/PIARC QRA Model (http://www.piarc.org/en/knowledge-base/road-tunnels/gram_software/)

(3) NFPA 550, Guide to the Fire Safety Concepts Tree

(4) NFPA 551, Guide for the Evaluation of Fire Risk Assessments

(5) PIARC 2012, Current Practice for Risk Evaluation for Road Tunnels

(6) Risk Analysis: From the Garden of Eden to its Seven Most Deadly Sins


The tunnel occupants are exposed to risk from the hazards. They need to be included in the modified sentence, as per proposed change.




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109 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 74-NFPA 502-2017 [ New Section after A.4.8.1(1) ]

A.4.8.2 Limited combustible material

A material should be considered a limited-combustible material where one of the following is met:

(1) The conditions of A.4.8.2.1 and A.4.8.2.2 , and the conditions of either A.4.8.2.3 or A.4.8.2.4are met.

(2) The conditions of A.4.8.2.5 are met.

A.4.8.2.1

The material should not comply with the requirements for noncombustible material in accordance with 4.8.

A.4.8.2.2

The material, in the form in which it is used, should exhibit a potential heat value not exceeding 3500 Btu/lb(8141 kJ/kg) where tested in accordance with NFPA 259 .

A.4.8.2.3

The material should have the structural base of a noncombustible material with a surfacing not exceeding a

thickness of 1 ⁄ 8 in. (3.2 mm) where the surfacing exhibits a flame spread index not greater than 50 whentested in accordance with ASTM E84, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics ofBuilding Materials , or ANSI/UL 723, Standard for Test for Surface Burning Characteristics of BuildingMaterials .

A.4.8.2.4

The material should be composed of materials that, in the form and thickness used, neither exhibit a flamespread index greater than 25 nor evidence of continued progressive combustion when tested in accordancewith ASTM E84, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, orANSI/UL 723, Standard for Test for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, and should beof such composition that all surfaces that would be exposed by cutting through the material on any planewould neither exhibit a flame spread index greater than 25 nor exhibit evidence of continued progressivecombustion when tested in accordance with ASTM E84 or ANSI/UL 723.

A.4.8.2.5 Materials should be considered limited-combustible materials where tested in accordance withASTM E2965, Standard Test Method for Determination of Low Levels of Heat Release Rate forMaterials and Products Using an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter, at an incident heat flux of 75

kW/m 2 for a 20-minute exposure and both of the following conditions are met:

(1) The peak heat release rate should not exceed 150 kW/m 2 for longer than 10 seconds.

(2) The total heat released should not exceed 8 MJ/m 2 .


NFPA 502 uses the term limited combustible materials but does not describe what it is. The language proposed comes from NFPA 101, 2018 edition, revised for use in an annex. This needs to be associated with adding the referenced standards into the NFPA 502 annex on referenced publications.






110 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 75-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. N.1.1]

Public Input No. 76-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. N.1.2.5]




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111 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


A.7.1.1

Additional information for engineering analysis can be found in NCHRP Synthesis 415: Design Fires inRoad Tunnels. The document is primarily a literature review and includes chapters with the following titles:Tunnel Safety Projects, Tenable Environment, Significant Fire Incidents in Road Tunnels, Combined UseRoadways, Fire Tests, Analytical Fire Modeling, Design for Tunnel Fires, Compilations of Design Guidance,Standards and Regulations, Design Fire Scenario for Fire Modeling, Fixed Water-Based Fire Suppressionand Its Impact on Design Fire Size, Effects of Various Ventilation Conditions, Tunnel Geometry, andStructural and Non-Structural Tunnel Components on Design Fire Characteristics, as well as a summary ofa survey from which results were compiled.

A second source of tunnel fire characteristics is available in the PIARC report, Design Fire Characteristicsfor Road Tunnels. This document discusses design fires, other publications, and smoke managementimplications, and has appendix language relative to practices adopted in other countries, fire tests, and realfire experiences.

Chapter 88 "Fires in Vehicle Tunnels" of the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 5th editionreviews p ublished experimental research related to design fires for vehicle tunnels.


The scenario of a large vehicle fire remains one of the most troublesome issues for designers of tunnels. Chapter 88 of the SFPE Handbook provides a review of the experimental data related to design fires and would be helpful for designers who are asked to establish design fires for a performance-based design.



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112 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 98-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. A.7.2 ]


113 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

A.7.2


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The categorizing of road tunnels is also influenced by their level of traffic congestion as evidenced by thetunnel’s peak hourly traffic count, as shown in Figure A.7.2. These minimum requirements, which are fullydescribed within this standard, are summarized in Table A.7.2, as a reference guide to assist in the searchfor requirements listed elsewhere in this standard.

Figure A.7.2 Urban and Rural Tunnel Categories.

Table A.7.2 Minimum Road Tunnel Fire Protection Reference Guide

Road Tunnel Categories

Fire Protection SystemsNFPA 502Sections

X

[See7.2(1).]

A

[See7.2(2).]

B

[See7.2(3).]

C

[See7.2(4).]

D

[See7.2(5).]

Engineering Analysis

Engineering analysis 4.3.1 MR MR MR MR MR

Fire Protection of Structural

Elementsa

Fire protection of structuralelements 7.3 MR MR MR MR MR

Fire Detection

Detection, identification, andlocation of fire in tunnel 7.4 — — MR MR MR

Manual fire alarm boxes 7.4.6 — — MR MR MR

CCTV systemsb 7.4.3 — — CMR CMR CMR

Automatic fire detection

systemsb 7.4.7 — — CMR CMR CMR

Fire alarm control panel 7.4.8 — — MR MR MR

Emergency Communications Systemsc

Emergency communicationssystems 4.5/7.5 CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR

Traffic Control

Stop traffic approaching tunnelportal 7.6.1 MR MR MR MR MR


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Road Tunnel Categories

Fire Protection SystemsNFPA 502Sections

X

[See7.2(1).]

A

[See7.2(2).]

B

[See7.2(3).]

C

[See7.2(4).]

D

[See7.2(5).]

Stop traffic from enteringtunnel's direct approaches 7.6.2 — — MR MR MR

Fire Protection

Fire apparatusd 7.7 — — — — —

Fire standpipe 7.8/10.1 — MR MR MR MR

Water supply 7.8/10.2 — MR MR MR MR

Fire department connections 10.3 — MR MR MR MR

Hose connections 10.4 — MR MR MR MR

Fire pumpse 10.5 — CMR CMR CMR CMR

Portable fire extinguishers 7.9 — — MR MR MR

Fixed water-based fire-fighting

systemsf 7.10/9.0 — — — CMR CMR

Emergency ventilation systemg 7.11/11.0 — — CMR CMR MR

Tunnel drainage systemh 7.12 — CMR MR MR MR

Hydrocarbon detectionh 7.12.7 — CMR MR MR MR

Flammable and combustible

environmental hazardsi 7.15 — — CMR CMR CMR

Means of Egress

Emergency egress 7.16.1.1 — — MR MR MR

Exit identification 7.16.1.2 — — MR MR MR

Tenable environment 7.16.2 — — MR MR MR

Walking surface 7.16.4 — — MR MR MR

Emergency exit doors 7.16.5 — — MR MR MR

Emergency exits (includes

cross-passageways)j 7.16.6 — — MR MR MR

Electrical Systemsk

General 12.1 — CMR MR MR MR

Emergency power 12.4 — CMR MR MR MR

Emergency lighting 12.6 — CMR MR MR MR

Exit signs 12.6.8 — CMR MR MR MR

Security plan 12.7 — CMR MR MR MR

Emergency Response Plan

Emergency response plan 13.3 MR MR MR MR MR

MR: Mandatory requirement (3.3.37). CMR: Conditionally mandatory requirement (3.3.37.1).

Note: The purpose of Table A.7.2 is to provide guidance in locating minimum road tunnel fire protectionrequirements contained within this standard. If there is any conflict between the requirements defined in thestandard text and this table, the standard text must always govern.

aDetermination of requirements in accordance with Section 7.3.

bDetermination of requirements in accordance with Section 7.4.

cDetermination of requirements in accordance with Sections 4.5 and 7.5.


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dNot mandatory to be at tunnel; however, they must be near to minimize response time.

eIf required, must follow Section 10.5.

fIf installed, must follow Section 7.10 and Chapter 9.

gSection 11.1 allows engineering analysis to determine requirements.

hIf required, must follow Section 7.12.

iDetermination of requirements in accordance with 7.16.2.

jEmergency exit spacing must be supported by an egress analysis in accordance with 7.16.6.

kIf required, must follow Chapter 12.



Figure_A.7.2.xlsxAdapted and actual Figure A.7.2 provided that the road tunnel categories have been changed accordingly (based on the previous public input regarding Section 7.2)


If the the road tunnel categories have been changed according to the previous public input proposal regarding Section 7.2, the current Figure A.7.2 shall be adapted as well.




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length of the taverage daily traffic

90 10

90 100000

90 10

300 10

300 100000

300 10

1000 10

1000 100000

1000 20000

10000 20000

10

100

1000

10000

100000

10 100 1000 10000average daily traffic

length of the tunnel (m)

A B C

D

X

Public Input No. 116-NFPA 502-2017 [ New Section after A.7.2.1 ]

A.7.3

SFPE S.01 Standard on Calculating Fire Exposures to Structures provides requirements for methods thatcalculate the thermal boundary conditions to a structure resulting from a fully developed fire. SFPES.02 Engineering Standard on Calculation Methods to Predict the Thermal Performance of Structural andFire Resistive Assemblies provides requirements for the development and use of methods that predict thethermal response of structures.


The design of structural fire resistance requires three major steps: (1) determination of the thermal exposure to a structure resulting from a fire; (2) determination of the temperature history within the structure, or portion thereof; and (3) determination of the structural response. SFPE S.01 provides the requirements for Step 1 and SFPE S.02 provides the requirements for Step 2.



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A.7.3.2


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Any passive fire protection material should satisfy the following performance criteria:

(1) Be resistant to freezing and thawing and follow STUVA Guidelines; BS EN 12467, Fibre-cement flatsheets. Product specification and test methods; or ASTM C666, Standard Test Method for Resistanceof Concrete to Rapid Freezing and Thawing

(2) Withstand dynamic suction and pressure loads; 3 kPa (12 in. w.g.) to 5 kPa (20 in. w.g.) depending ontraffic type, cross section, speed limits; amount of cycles to be determined based on traffic volume

(3) Withstand both hot and cold thermal shock from fire exposure and hose streams

(4) Meet all applicable health and safety standards

(5) Not itself become a hazard during a fire

(6) Be resistant to water ingress; follow BS EN 492, Fibre-cement slates and fittings. Product specificationand test methods

The time-temperature development is shown in Table A.7.3.2(a) and in Figure A.7.3.2(a).

Table A.7.3.2(a) Furnace Temperatures

Time

(min)

Temperature

ºC ºF

0 20 68

3 890 1634

5 1140 2084

10 1200 2192

30 1300 2372

60 1350 2462

90 1300 2372

120 1200 2192

An engineering analysis for the purposes of determining the appropriate time-temperature curve shouldconsider the following:

(1) Tunnel geometry

(2) Types of vehicles anticipated

(3) Types of cargoes

(4) Expected traffic conditions

(5) Fire mitigation measure(s)

(6) Reliability and availability of fire mitigation measure(s)

Figure A.7.3.2(a) RWS Time-Temperature Curve.


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The RWS fire curve represents of actual tunnel fires for various combustibles but not necessarilyhazardous materials or flammable liquids. This fire curve was initially developed during extensive testingconducted by the Dutch Ministry of Transport (Rijkswaterstaat, RWS) in cooperation with the NetherlandsOrganization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) in the late 1970s, and later proven in full-scale fire testsin the Runehamar tunnel tests in Norway in September 2003, conducted as part of the European Union(EU)–funded research project, Cost-Effective Sustainable and Innovative Upgrading Methods for FireSafety in Existing Tunnels (UPTUN), in association with SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden and theNorwegian Fire Research Laboratory (SINTEF/NBL).

As shown in Table A.7.3.2(b), four tests were carried out on fire loads of nonhazardous materials usingtimber or plastic, furniture, mattresses, and cardboard cartons containing plastic cups.

Table A.7.3.2(b) Fire Test Data Data (see Ingason and Lönnermark)

Test

Time from

Ignition to

Peak HRR

(min)

Linear Fire Growth Rate (R-Linear Regression Coefficient)

(MW/min)

Peak HRR

(MW)

Estimated HRR from

Laboratory Tests

(No Target /

Inclusive Target)

(MW)

1 18.5 20.

5

1 (0.

997

996 )

200 (average) 186/217

201.9

2 14.

3

1

29

26 .

0

3 (0.

991


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992 )

158 (average) 167/195

156.6

3 10.

4

0

17

16 .

0

4 (0.998)

124

118 .

9

6

—

4 7.

7

4

5–70

17

16 .

7

9 (0.996)

70

66 .

5

4

79/95

All tests produced time-temperature developments partly in line with the RWS curve as shown in FigureA.7.3.2(b).

Figure A.7.3.2(b) Test Fire Curves (see Lönnermark and Ingson) .


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All fires produced heat release rates of between 70 between 66 MW for cardboard cartons containingplastic cups and 203 202 MW for timber/plastic pallets.

Figure A.7.3.2(c) depicts the T1 Fire Test curve in comparison to various accepted time-temperaturecurves.

Figure A.7.3.2(c) Various Time-Temperature Curves and Fire Test Curve (see Lönnermark andIngason) .

The

RWS requirements are adopted internationally as a realistic design fire curve that represents typical tunnelfires.The

level of fire resistance of structures and the emergency time/temperature certification of equipment shouldbe proven by testing or reference to previous testing.

Fire test reports are based on the following requirements:

(1) Concrete slabs used for the application of passive fire protection materials for fire testing purposeshave dimensions of at least 1400 mm × 1400 mm (55 in. × 55 in.) and a nominal thickness of 150 mm(6 in.).

(2) The exposed surface is approximately 1200 mm × 1200 mm (47 in. × 47 in.).

(3) The passive fire protection material is fixed to the concrete slab using the same fixation material(anchors, wire mesh, etc.) as will be used during the actual installation in the tunnel.

(4) In the case of board protection, a minimum of one joint in between two panels should be created, tojudge if any thermal leaks would occur in a real fire in the tunnel.


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(5) In the case of spray materials, the number of applications (number of layers) should be registeredwhen preparing the test specimen. This number of layers should be considered when the spraymaterial is applied in a real tunnel.

(6) Temperatures are recorded by K-type thermocouples in the following locations:

(7) At the interface between the concrete and the passive fire protection material

(8) At the bottom of the reinforcement

(9) On the nonexposed face of the concrete slab

For an example test procedure to assess the spalling and the thermal protection of a concretestructure, see Efectis-R0695, “Fire Testing Procedure for Concrete Tunnel Linings.”

The installation of passive fire protection materials should be done with anchors having the followingproperties:

(1) The diameter should be limited to a maximum of 6 mm ( 1 ⁄ 4 in.) to reduce the heat sink effect throughthe steel anchor into the concrete. Larger diameter anchors can create a spalling effect on theconcrete.

(2) The use of high grade stainless steel anchors is recommended.

(3) If necessary, a washer should be used to avoid a pull-through effect when the system is exposed todynamic loads.

(4) The anchors should be suitable for use in the tension zone of concrete (cracked concrete).

(5) The anchors should be suitable for use under dynamic loads.


No time-temperature curves represent actual fires in tunnels/vehicles/materials. These curves only gives a level of possible/potential gas temperature exposure to a Construction for purpose of design or testing. Deleting the proposed text makes it more balanced.

There is a need to correct table A.7.3.2 (b) as it is not correct. Also the correct reference should be given in N1.2.20 Other publications "Ingason, H. and A. Lönnermark, Heat Release Rates from Heavy Goods Vehicle Trailers in Tunnels. Fire Safety Journal, 2005. 40: p. 646-668." and "Lönnermark, A. and H. Ingason, Gas Temperatures in Heavy Goods Vehicle Fires in Tunnels. Fire Safety Journal, 2005. 40: p. 506-527."





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125 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM



126 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

A.7.3.2


127 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Any passive fire protection material should satisfy the following performance criteria:

(1) Be resistant to freezing and thawing and follow STUVA Guidelines; BS EN 12467, Fibre-cement flatsheets. Product specification and test methods; or ASTM C666, Standard Test Method for Resistanceof Concrete to Rapid Freezing and Thawing

(2) Withstand dynamic suction and pressure loads; 3 kPa (12 in. w.g.) to 5 kPa (20 in. w.g.) depending ontraffic type, cross section, speed limits; amount of cycles to be determined based on traffic volume

(3) Withstand both hot and cold thermal shock from fire exposure and hose streams

(4) Meet all applicable health and safety standards

(5) Not itself become a hazard during a fire

(6) Be resistant to water ingress; follow BS EN 492, Fibre-cement slates and fittings. Product specificationand test methods

The time-temperature development for the RWS curve is shown in Table A.? 7.3.2(a) and in FigureA.7.3.2(a). The time-temperature development for the ISO curve is shown in Figure A.7.3.2(c)

Table A.7.3.2(a) Furnace Temperatures

Time

(min)

Temperature

ºC ºF

0 20 68

3 890 1634

5 1140 2084

10 1200 2192

30 1300 2372

60 1350 2462

90 1300 2372

120 1200 2192

An engineering analysis for the purposes of determining the appropriate time-temperature curve shouldconsider the following:

(1) Tunnel geometry

(2) Types of vehicles anticipated

(3) Types of cargoes

(4) Expected traffic conditions

(5) Fire mitigation measure(s)

(6) Reliability and availability of fire mitigation measure(s)

Figure A.7.3.2(a) RWS Time-Temperature Curve.


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The RWS fire curve represents of actual tunnel fires for various combustibles but not necessarily hazardousmaterials or flammable liquids. This fire curve was initially developed during extensive testing conducted bythe Dutch Ministry of Transport (Rijkswaterstaat, RWS) in cooperation with the Netherlands Organization forApplied Scientific Research (TNO) in the late 1970s, and later proven in full-scale fire tests in theRunehamar tunnel tests in Norway in September 2003, conducted as part of the European Union (EU)–funded research project, Cost-Effective Sustainable and Innovative Upgrading Methods for Fire Safety inExisting Tunnels (UPTUN), in association with SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden and theNorwegian Fire Research Laboratory (SINTEF/NBL).

As shown in Table A.7.3.2(b), four tests were carried out on fire loads of nonhazardous materials usingtimber or plastic, furniture, mattresses, and cardboard cartons containing plastic cups.

Table A.7.3.2(b) Fire Test Data

Test

Timefrom

Ignitionto

PeakHRR

(min)

Linear Fire Growth Rate (R-Linear RegressionCoefficient)

(MW/min)

Peak HRR

(MW)

Estimated HRRfrom

Laboratory Tests

(No Target /

Inclusive Target)

(MW)

1 18.5 20.5 (0.997)200

(average) 186/217

2 14.3 29.0 (0.991)158

(average) 167/195

3 10.4 17.0 (0.998) 124.9 —

4 7.7

5–70

17.7 (0.996)

70.5 79/95

All tests produced time-temperature developments in line with the RWS curve as shown in FigureA.7.3.2(b).

Figure A.7.3.2(b) Test Fire Curves.

All fires produced heat release rates of between 70 MW for cardboard cartons containing plastic cups and203 MW for timber/plastic pallets.

Figure A.7.3.2(c) depicts the T1 Fire Test curve in comparison to various accepted time-temperaturecurves.


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Figure A.7.3.2(c) Various Time-Temperature Curves and Fire Test Curve.

The RWS requirements are adopted internationally as a realistic design fire curve that represents typicaltunnel fires in the absence of a FFFS .

The level of fire resistance of structures and the emergency time/temperature certification of equipmentshould be proven by testing or reference to previous testing.

Fire test reports are based on the following requirements:

(1) Concrete slabs used for the application of passive fire protection materials for fire testing purposeshave dimensions of at least 1400 mm × 1400 mm (55 in. × 55 in.) and a nominal thickness of 150 mm(6 in.).

(2) The exposed surface is approximately 1200 mm × 1200 mm (47 in. × 47 in.).

(3) The passive fire protection material is fixed to the concrete slab using the same fixation material(anchors, wire mesh, etc.) as will be used during the actual installation in the tunnel.

(4) In the case of board protection, a minimum of one joint in between two panels should be created, tojudge if any thermal leaks would occur in a real fire in the tunnel.

(5) In the case of spray materials, the number of applications (number of layers) should be registeredwhen preparing the test specimen. This number of layers should be considered when the spraymaterial is applied in a real tunnel.

(6) Temperatures are recorded by K-type thermocouples in the following locations:

(7) At the interface between the concrete and the passive fire protection material

(8) At the bottom of the reinforcement

(9) On the nonexposed face of the concrete slab

For an example test procedure to assess the spalling and the thermal protection of a concretestructure, see Efectis-R0695, “Fire Testing Procedure for Concrete Tunnel Linings.”

The installation of passive fire protection materials should be done with anchors having the followingproperties:

(1) The diameter should be limited to a maximum of 6 mm (1⁄4 in.) to reduce the heat sink effect throughthe steel anchor into the concrete. Larger diameter anchors can create a spalling effect on theconcrete.

(2) The use of high grade stainless steel anchors is recommended.

(3) If necessary, a washer should be used to avoid a pull-through effect when the system is exposed todynamic loads.

(4) The anchors should be suitable for use in the tension zone of concrete (cracked concrete).

(5) The anchors should be suitable for use under dynamic loads.


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The structural fire protection annex material currently does not consider the benefits of a FFFS. This proposal clarifies that the RWS curve is suitable for a tunnel without a FFFS. In a tunnel fitted with a FFFS, temperatures will not reach the levels dictated by the RWS curve. Installing structural fire protection to the level needed to withstand the RWS curve may not be justifiable, since it would only be needed if the FFFS fails and the fire is a worst-case scenario. This is an extremely unlikely event. The combination of two independent structural fire protection measures (FFFS and ISO-level passive protection) is more robust than strengthening either. Research presented by Ingason at the 2014 tunnel symposium in Graz supports the use of the ISO curve in most tunnels protected with a FFFS.





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131 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 79-NFPA 502-2017 [ New Section after A.7.3.3(2) ]

A.7.3.4 See A.3.3.41 for information on other tests that exist for assessing noncombustibility. The only one ofthe referenced noncombustibility standards that includes acceptance criteria is ASTM E136 and all the testsprovide results that are not identical to each other.


Adding the pointer to an earlier annex note and explains both that ASTM E136 is the only noncombustibility test with acceptance criteria and that the results of all the tests are significantly different from each other.









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132 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 39-NFPA 502-2017 [ New Section after A.7.4.7.7 ]

A7.4.8

For facilities where 24-hour supervision and an associated supervisory control and data acquisition(SCADA) system are present and required to operate facility systems as part of an integrated emergencyresponse system (traffic control, electronic signs, signals, CCTV, emergency communications systemsetc.), the Fire Alarm Control Panel (FACP) design should include two-way interfacing with the SCADAsystem to permit automated responses from an integrated facility control system. The number of datapoints imported and exported to and from the FACP and the SCADA should be sufficient to provideeffective notifications, alarms and status conditions between SCADA and the FACP, to facilitateimplementation of optimized responses to these alarms and conditions and to permit necessary operationand coordination of facility emergency response systems from a single interface.

Where fixed water-based fire-fighting systems (FFFS) are provided, if these are under the control of theFACP, the interface should allow SCADA to instruct the FACP to initiate deployment of the FFFS.


Recent project experiences highlight an issue whereby the designer may fail to allow for adequate input/output between the FACP and the SCADA, resulting in (i) a need for operators to monitor two HMI screens independently (increasing and complicating their workload unnecessarily), and (ii) potential introduction of delays in responding to fire emergencies.

The proposed annex material would provide guidance on integrating the disparate systems to provide a more efficient overall operation of the tunnel safety systems.




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133 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


A.7.12.4

Examples of combustible materials that should not be used in drainage systems include plastic pipes of anykind, including polyvinyl chloride (PVC), polybutylene or polyethylene, or fiberglass pipes.

Drainage system materials should also be chemically inert in the presence of hazardous orflammable/combustible liquids.


Proposed test provides guidance on preventing damage to the drainage system as a result of a hazmat spill.




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134 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 41-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. A.7.16.1.2 ]

A.7.16.1.2

Consideration should be given to the height of the sign above the walking surface (e.g., raised walkway orcurbed walkway) as it affects visibility during a fire emergency.

Active directional signage, i.e. signage that can be controlled by the OCC to preferentially direct evacuatingpersons to use a specific egress direction or route, may be considered.


Active directional signage is now being installed in European road tunnels. The option of using such technology should be introduce as guidance to the standard.




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135 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM


A.7.16.2

The duration of the evacuation phase may be affected by travel distances to emergency exits. Foradditional information on tenable environments in road tunnels, see Annex B and Chapter 61 " Visibility andHuman Behavior in Fire Smoke,” Chapter 62 “Combustion Toxicity,” and Chapter 63 “Assessment ofHazards to Occupants from Smoke, Toxic Gases, and Heat,” of the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection

Engineering, 5 th edition, 2016 .


Chapters 61, 61 and 63 of the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering provides additional information for designers who are in the process of estimating tenability.



Organization: SFPE

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136 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 34-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. A.7.16.6.1 ]

A.7.16.6.1

The primary purpose of emergency exits is to minimize exposure of the evacuating vehicle occupants to anuntenable environment and to provide emergency response access and minimize response time.

Emergency exit designs should include elements to reduce the severity of vehicle impacts with the exitstructure, so as to minimize the risk to tunnel users in event of accident. These may include suchmeasures as angled "chamfer" structures which minimize the risk of head-on vehicle impacts and promotethe probability of a glancing impact in event of vehicular impact. See the figure for an example. The blackarrow indicated direction of traffic.



anti-crash-feature-sketch-5.jpg

Schematic showing a type of impact mitigation "Chamfer" design for an emergency exit


Additional advisory material to improve the safety of emergency exit design.




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137 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM



138 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

A.11.4.1


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Experimental fire heat release rates (HRR) and representative HRR Representative HRR that correspondto various vehicle types are provided in Table A.11.4.1. Experimental HRR are given in the first and lastcolumns, obtained from fire tests carried out in various full-scale tunnels or fire laboratories. Therepresentative HRR given column are suggested as typical design fire sizes without fixed water-based fire-fighting systems. HRR in the second column are suggested as typical design fire sizes without fixed withwater-based fire-fighting systems.

Table A.11.4.1 Fire Data for Typical Vehicles

Vehicles

Experimental HRR Representative HRR

without FFFSRepresentative

HRR

ExperimenHRR with

fixed watebased

firefightinsystems w

FFFS

Peak HRR

(MW)

Time toPeakHRR

(min)

Peak HRR

(MW)

Timeto

PeakHRR

(min)

Peak HRR

(MW)Timto Peak

HRR

(min)

Passengercar

5–10 5 0–54 a 10 5 10 — —

Multiplepassengercar

10–20 10–55 b 15 20 5 10–15 g 10 35 g

Bus 25–34 c 30 7–14 15 30 15 20 g,h —

Heavygoods truck 20–200 d 7–48 e 150 15 50 15–90 g 15 10–30 g

Flammable/

combustibleliquidtanker

200–300 300 – 100 300 – 10–200 f

Notes:

(1) The designer should consider the rate of fire development (peak heat release rates may be reachedwithin 10 minutes), the number of vehicles that could be involved in the fire, and the potential for the fire tospread from one vehicle to another.

(2) Temperatures directly above the fire can be expected to be as high as 1000°C to 1400°C (1832°F to2552°F).

(3) The heat release rate may be greater than in the table if more than one vehicle is involved.

(4) A design fire curve should be developed to satisfy each specific engineering objective in the designprocess (e.g., fire and life safety, structural protection).

(5) A catastrophic fire event within the tunnel can result in a fire size with a larger heat release rate thanthat shown in the table.

(6) If a fixed water-based firefighting system is installed in accordance with Chapter 9, the AHJ can reducethe values as in Table A.11.4.1 for HRR for design purposes based on an engineering analysis and full-scale fire tests. Items to consider in doing this are the following:

(a) Activation time (time from start of fire to steady state, full flow discharge of fixed water-based firefightingsystem)


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(b) Resilience

(c) Reliability

a Experiments show that 60 percent of the tested individual passenger cars reach peak HRR within20 minutes and 83 percent within 30 minutes.

b Experiments show that 70 percent of the tested multiple passenger cars reach peak HRR within30 minutes.

c Very few tests have been done with buses, but real fires indicate that these experimental values can behigher.

d The range of peak HRR and the rate of fire growth are affected by the type and amount of cargo and thecontainer type protecting the cargo. All types of covers of the cargo will delay the fire growth rate. The peakHRR is determined by the fire exposed surface area of the cargo. For most solid cargo materials it varies

from 0.1 MW/m 2 for wood to 0.5 MW/m 2 for plastics. In experiments involving 14 tests, in 85 percent ofthe tested cases the peak HRR was equal to or less than 130 MW, and in 70 percent of the tested casesthe peak HRR was equal to or less than 70 MW.

e Experiments show that 85 percent of the tested truck loads reached peak HRR within 20 minutes.

f Scientific test data with large pool fires is limited, but fixed water-based firefighting systems with foamadditives (AFFF) are known to improve the performance of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems.

g The experimental tests of fixed water-based firefighting systems show different HRR measurementsdepending on system type, fire scenario, activation time, fuels, and ventilation strategies. These are typicalvalues measured in various test programs including water mist and water spray deluge systems.

h This value is based on convective HRR only. All other values are based on total HRR. Therefore, the totalHRR can be anticipated to be higher than this value.

Cheong, M. K., W. O. Cheong, K. W. Leong, A. D. Lemaire, L. M. Noordijk, “Heat Release Rates of HeavyGoods Vehicle Fire in Tunnels,” BHR Group, Barcelona, 2013.

Guigas, X., A. Weatherill, C. Bouteloup, and V. Wetzif, “Dynamic fire spreading and water mist tests for theA86 East tunnel – description of the test set up and overview of the water mist tests Taylor & FrancisGroup, London, 2005.

Ingason, H. and A. Lönnermark, “Heat Release in Tunnel Fires: A Summary,” Handbook of Tunnel FireSafety, 2nd edition, 2012.

Ingason, H., Y. Z. Li, and A. Lönnermark, Tunnel Fire Dynamics, Springer, 2015

Lakkonen, M., A. Feltmann, and D. Sprakel, “Comparison of Deluge and Water Mist Systems from aPerformance and Practical Point of View,” Graz, Austria, 2014.

SOLIT2- Safety of Life in Tunnels Research project, SOLIT Research Consortium, Germany, 2012.

Each engineering objective should have an appropriate design fire curve adapted to take into accountproject-specific factors and the presence of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems directly relating to theengineering objective to be achieved, and these can include the following:

(1) Tunnel geometry, including aspect ratio (height, width, and cross-sectional profile)

(2) Traffic and vehicle type characteristics such as percentage of heavy goods vehicles, fire load, fuelcontainment, fuel type, geometric configuration of the vehicle, body material type, existence of vehiclefire suppression system, and vehicle mix

(3) Tunnel operational philosophy such as bidirectional flow and congestion management

(4) Fire protection systems

(5) Fire properties and characteristics

(6) Environmental conditions

The design fire is not necessarily the worst fire that can occur. Engineering judgment should be used toestablish the probability of occurrence and the ability to achieve practical solutions. Therefore, differentdesign scenarios are often used for various safety systems.


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Full-scale fire tests with FFFS have shown that the convective heat release rate may be reduced to 30% of that without FFFS. A paper by Ingason presented at the 2014 tunnel symposium in Graz reviews this research. For sprinkler or water spray deluge systems these results were achieved with a water application density of 10 mm/min. Watermist systems differ greatly and need to be tested at full-scale to demonstrate their effect on HRR.





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142 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM



143 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

A.11.4.1


144 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Experimental fire heat release rates (HRR) and representative HRR that correspond to various vehicletypes are provided in Table A.11.4.1. Experimental HRR are given in the first and last columns, obtainedfrom fire tests carried out in various full-scale tunnels or fire laboratories. The representative HRR given inthe second column are suggested as typical design fire sizes without fixed water-based fire-fightingsystems.

Table A.11.4.1 Fire Data for Typical Vehicles

Vehicles

Experimental HRR Representative

HRR

Experimental HRR with fixedwater-based firefighting

systems

PeakHRR

(MW)

Time toPeak HRR

(min)

PeakHRR

(MW)

Time toPeak HRR

(min)

Peak HRR

(MW)

Time to PeakHRR

(min)

Passenger car 5–10 0–54a 8 5 10 — —

Multiplepassenger car

10–20 10–55b 15 20 10–15g 35g

Bus 25–34c 7–14 30 15 20g,h —

Heavy goodstruck 20–200d 7–48e 150 15 15–90g 10–30g

Flammable/

combustibleliquid tanker

200–300 – 300 – 10–200f

Notes:

(1) The designer should consider the rate of fire development (peak heat release rates may be reachedwithin 10 minutes), the number of vehicles that could be involved in the fire, and the potential for the fire tospread from one vehicle to another.

(2) Temperatures directly above the fire can be expected to be as high as 1000°C to 1400°C (1832°F to2552°F).

(3) The heat release rate may be greater than in the table if more than one vehicle is involved.

(4) A design fire curve should be developed to satisfy each specific engineering objective in the designprocess (e.g., fire and life safety, structural protection).

(5) A catastrophic fire event within the tunnel can result in a fire size with a larger heat release rate thanthat shown in the table.

(6) If a fixed water-based firefighting system is installed in accordance with Chapter 9, the AHJ can reducethe values for HRR for design purposes based on an engineering analysis and full-scale fire tests. Items toconsider in doing this are the following:

(a) Activation time (time from start of fire to steady state, full flow discharge of fixed water-based firefightingsystem)

(b) Resilience

(c) Reliability

aExperiments show that 60 percent of the tested individual passenger cars reach peak HRR within20 minutes and 83 percent within 30 minutes.

bExperiments show that 70 percent of the tested multiple passenger cars reach peak HRR within30 minutes.

cVery few tests have been done with buses, but real fires indicate that these experimental values can behigher.


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dThe range of peak HRR and the rate of fire growth are affected by the type and amount of cargo and thecontainer type protecting the cargo. All types of covers of the cargo will delay the fire growth rate. The peakHRR is determined by the fire exposed surface area of the cargo. For most solid cargo materials it varies

from 0.1 MW/m2 for wood to 0.5 MW/m2 for plastics. In experiments involving 14 tests, in 85 percent of thetested cases the peak HRR was equal to or less than 130 MW, and in 70 percent of the tested cases thepeak HRR was equal to or less than 70 MW.

eExperiments show that 85 percent of the tested truck loads reached peak HRR within 20 minutes.

fScientific test data with large pool fires is limited, but fixed water-based firefighting systems with foamadditives (AFFF) are known to improve the performance of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems.

gThe experimental tests of fixed water-based firefighting systems show different HRR measurementsdepending on system type, fire scenario, activation time, fuels, and ventilation strategies. These are typicalvalues measured in various test programs including water mist and water spray deluge systems.

hThis value is based on convective HRR only. All other values are based on total HRR. Therefore, the totalHRR can be anticipated to be higher than this value.

Cheong, M. K., W. O. Cheong, K. W. Leong, A. D. Lemaire, L. M. Noordijk, “Heat Release Rates of HeavyGoods Vehicle Fire in Tunnels,” BHR Group, Barcelona, 2013.

Guigas, X., A. Weatherill, C. Bouteloup, and V. Wetzif, “Dynamic fire spreading and water mist tests for theA86 East tunnel – description of the test set up and overview of the water mist tests Taylor & FrancisGroup, London, 2005.

Ingason, H. and A. Lönnermark, “Heat Release in Tunnel Fires: A Summary,” Handbook of Tunnel FireSafety, 2nd edition, 2012.

Ingason, H., Y. Z. Li, and A. Lönnermark, Tunnel Fire Dynamics, Springer, 2015

Lakkonen, M., A. Feltmann, and D. Sprakel, “Comparison of Deluge and Water Mist Systems from aPerformance and Practical Point of View,” Graz, Austria, 2014.

SOLIT2- Safety of Life in Tunnels Research project, SOLIT Research Consortium, Germany, 2012.

Each engineering objective should have an appropriate design fire curve adapted to take into accountproject-specific factors and the presence of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems directly relating to theengineering objective to be achieved, and these can include the following:

(1) Tunnel geometry, including aspect ratio (height, width, and cross-sectional profile)

(2) Traffic and vehicle type characteristics such as percentage of heavy goods vehicles, fire load, fuelcontainment, fuel type, geometric configuration of the vehicle, body material type, existence of vehiclefire suppression system, and vehicle mix

(3) Tunnel operational philosophy such as bidirectional flow and congestion management

(4) Fire protection systems

(5) Fire properties and characteristics

(6) Environmental conditions

The design fire is not necessarily the worst fire that can occur. Engineering judgment should be used toestablish the probability of occurrence and the ability to achieve practical solutions. Therefore, differentdesign scenarios are often used for various safety systems.


Different cars fire tests were performed at the end of 90’s, and in 2000 by Efectis, while new tests were performed by BRE (UK) in 2010. These last one confirmed the data from Efectis. The analysis of the car market shows that the market can be divided in 5 categories from the smallest to the biggest. The categories 1 to 3 represents 80 % of the car market. The car fire tests demonstrated that a design fire curve of the category 3 has a HRR peak at about 8 MW.



146 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM



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147 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 128-NFPA 502-2017 [ Chapter D ]

Annex D Critical Velocity Calculations

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informationalpurposes only.

Critical velocity may be a design criterium, e.g. for the access of fire fighters, but it should not be anoperational requirement during self rescue phase !


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D.1 General.

The simultaneous solution of the following equations, by iteration, determines the critical velocity. Thecritical velocity, Vc, is the minimum steady-state velocity of the ventilation air moving toward a fire that is

necessary to prevent backlayering.

[D.1]

where:

Vc = critical velocity [m/sec (fpm)]

K1 = Froude number factor, Fr-1⁄3(see Table D.1)

Kg = grade factor (see Figure D.1)

g = acceleration caused by gravity [m/sec2 (ft/sec2)]

H = height of duct or tunnel at the fire site [m (ft)]

Q = heat fire is adding directly to air at the fire site [kW (Btu/sec)]

ρ = average density of the approach (upstream) air [kg/m3 (lb/ft3)]

Cp = specific heat of air [kJ/kg K (Btu/lb°R)]

A = area perpendicular to the flow [m2 (ft2)]

Tf = average temperature of the fire site gases [K (°R)]

T = temperature of the approach air [K (°R)]

Figure D.1 provides the grade factor for (Kg) in equation D.1.

Figure D.1 Grade Factor for Determining Critical Velocity.

Equation D.1 is based on research founded on theoretical work performed in the late 1950s (Thomas,1958) and correlated by large scale tests in the mid-1990s (see Annex H). The equation previously used aconstant K1 value equal to 0.606. Later research on critical velocity (see, for example, Li et al., Wu and

Bakar, and Oka and Atkinson), suggests that a refinement of K1 values as shown in Table D.1 is desired for

heat release rates (HRRs) lower than or equal to 100 MW.

Table D.1 A Range of K1 Values That Apply for Various HRRs

Q (MW) K1

>100 0.606

90 0.62

70 0.64

50 0.68

30 0.74

<10 0.87


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Critical velocity is overrated. Why not allow for some backlayering ?







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150 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

Public Input No. 126-NFPA 502-2017 [ New Section after D.1 ]

D.2 Criticl velocity according to new research



D.2_Critical_velocity_according_to_new_research.docxDocument to be introduced into the standard as alternative method for D.1


Revisiting this discussion from the last cycle on D.1. The last cycle improved D.1, but today there is new availble research which can fully replace equation D.1. Here this proposal is put into the text as alternative method, in order to make it possible for those what need more accurate equations to calculate the critical velocity.





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151 of 172 7/12/17, 3:30 PM

D.1 General.

The critical velocity can be calculated according to the following equation (see Li and Ingason):

1/12 *1/3 * 1/4*

* 1/4

0.81 0.15

0.43 0.15c

c

Q Quu

gH Q

(D.1)

where

*1/2 5/2

o p o

QQ

c T g H , W

H

and where:

A tunnel cross‐sectional area (m2)

cp thermal capacity of air (kJ/kg﹒K)

g gravitational acceleration (m/s2)

H tunnel height (m)

Q heat release rate (kW)

uc critical velocity (m/s)

uc* dimensionless critical velocity

W tunnel width (m)

Q* dimensionless heat release rate

Public Input No. 59-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. E.3 [Excluding any Sub-Sections] ]

NFPA 502 has included material regarding fixed water-based fire-fighting systems (formerly called sprinklersystems) since the 1998 edition. This material had been contained in a separate annex in each edition sincethen.

The World Road Association, PIARC, addressed the subject of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems(formerly called sprinkler systems) in road tunnels in the reports presented at the World Road Congressesheld in Sydney (1983), Brussels (1987), and Montreal (1995). In addition, the subject of fixed fire-fightingsystems was addressed in PIARC’s technical reports titled Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels ,Systems and Equipment for Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels , and Road Tunnels: An Assessmentof Fixed Fire-Fighting Systems .

No European country currently installs fixed water-based fire-fighting systems in road tunnels on a regularbasis. In some road tunnels in Europe, fixed fire suppression systems have been used for special purposes.Catastrophic road tunnel fires have encouraged a re-evaluation of these systems for use in future roadtunnels in Europe. Below is a list of tunnels in Europe that currently have fixed water-based fire-fightingsystems installed:

(1) Austria

(2) Mona Lisa Tunnel

(3) Felbertauern Tunnel

(4) France: A86 Tunnel

(5) Italy: Brennero Tunnel

(6) The Netherlands: Roermond Tunnel

(7) Norway

(8) Válreng Tunnel

(9) Fløyfjell Tunnel

(10) Spain

(11) M30 Tunnels

(12) Vielha Tunnel

(13) Sweden:

(14) Stockholm Ringroad Tunnels

(15) Tegelbacken Tunnel


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(16) United Kingdom

(17) Dartford Tunnels

(18) Heathrow Tunnel

(19) New Tyne Crossing

Tests on fixed water-based fire-fighting systems have recently been conducted by France, the Netherlands,and UPTUN and SOLIT.

In Australia, deluge-type fixed water-based fire-fighting systems are installed in all major urban roadtunnels. It is the Australian view that it is more likely that small fires could — if not suppressed — developmore often into large (and uncontrollable) fires, particularly since this type of fire development is moretypical than the occurrence of instantaneously large fires. Below is a list of road tunnels in Australia thathave fixed water-based fire-fighting systems installed:

(1) Sydney Harbour Tunnel

(2) M5 East Tunnel

(3) Lanecove Tunnel

(4) Eastern Distributor

(5) City Link Tunnel

(6) Graham Farmer Tunnel

(7) M4 Tunnel

(8) Adelaide Hills Tunnel

(9) Mitchham/Frankstone Tunnel

(10) North/South Busway Tunnel

(11) North/South Tunnel

Fixed water-based fire-fighting systems have been installed in road tunnels for more than four decades inJapan. The decision for a specific tunnel project has to be based on the Japanese safety standards. InJapan, fixed water-based fire suppression systems are required in all tunnels longer than 10,000 m(32,808 ft) and in shorter tunnels longer than 3000 m (9843 ft) with heavy traffic.

Six road tunnels in North America are equipped with fixed water-based fire-fighting systems: the BatteryStreet Tunnel, the I-90 First Hill Mercer Island Tunnel, the Mt. Baker Ridge Tunnel, and the I-5 Tunnel, all inSeattle, Washington; the Central Artery North Area (CANA) Route 1 Tunnel in Boston, Massachusetts; andthe George Massey Tunnel in Vancouver, British Columbia.

The decision to provide fixed water-based fire-fighting systems in these tunnels was motivated primarily bythe fact that these tunnels were planned to be operated to allow the unescorted passage of vehiclescarrying hazardous materials as cargo. See Table E.3 .

Table E.3 Road Tunnel Fixed Water-Based Fire-Fighting Systems in North America

Tunnel Location Route Opened to

Traffic Length Bores/

Lanes Fixed Fire Suppression System Type System Zones m ft Battery Street Seattle,Washington SR99 1952 671 2200 2/4 Deluge water 14 I-90 First Hill Mercer Island Seattle, Washington I-90 1989 914 3000 3/8 Deluge foam 37 Mt. Baker Ridge Seattle, Washington I-90 1989 1067 3500 3/8 Delugefoam 50 CANA Northbound Boston, Massachusetts U.S. 1 1990 470 1540 1/3 Deluge foam 15 CANASouthbound Boston, Massachusetts U.S. 1 1990 275 900 1/3 Deluge foam 9 I-5 Tunnel Seattle, WashingtonI-5 1988 167 547 1/12 Deluge foam 9 George Massey Tunnel Vancouver, British


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Columbia 99 1959 630 2067 2/4 Sprinkler

system N/A


This kind of information should not be listed in a standard. The standard should not be a library database of projects. If anything, the document should be balanced in the use of safety measures in tunnels (ventilation, lighting, escape doors, signage, detection etc.)


Submitter Full Name: Rene van den Bosch

Organization: Promat BV The Netherlands

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Public Input No. 16-NFPA 502-2016 [ Section No. E.5.4 ]

E.5.4

In an examination of the effectiveness of sprinklers during fire suppression in tunnel incidents, theauthorities in the Netherlands conducted a series of fire tests with sprinklers in the Benelux tunnel. The testtunnel was an operating road tunnel, 9.8 m (32 ft) wide and 5.1 m (17 ft) high. Various fire scenarios wereused to simulate stationary vehicle fires, including a van loaded with wood cribs, a high a heavy goodsvehicle (HGV) fire loaded with wood pallets, and an aluminum truck cabin loaded with wood cribs. No liquidfuel fire was used in the tests. The fire size in the test program ranged from 15 MW to 40 MW. Two sprinklerzones were installed in the test tunnel. The length of Zone I was 17.5 m (57.4 ft) and Zone II was 20 m

(66 ft) long. The discharged water quantity was 12.5 mm/min (.5 in. 31 gpm /min ft 2 ). Activation time of thesprinklers in the tests ranged from 6 min to 22 min after ignition of the fire source. In order to focus on thestudy of the air cooling and steam formation generated by sprinklers, the mechanical longitudinal ventilationin the tunnel was not activated during tests. The air speed in the tunnel was approximately 0–1 m/s (0–197fpm) in three tests, and approximately 3 m/s (590 fpm) in one test.

For all tests, the air temperature upstream and downstream of the fire decreased from approximately250–350°C (482–662°F) to 20–30°C (68–86°F) in a very short period of time after sprinkler activation,which prevented the fire spread from one vehicle to others. The smoke layer was disturbed with theactivation of the sprinklers, and visibility was almost entirely obstructed. It took 5 to 15 min to improvevisibility. No significant steam formation and no deflagration were observed in the test program.


high goods vehicle (HGV) should be corrected to say "heavy goods vehicle (HGV)

The conversion of mm/min to in./min is inconsistent with sections E.5.1 and E.5.3 which convert to gpm/ft2. Table 11.2.3.1.1 in NFPA 13 uses gpm/ft2, so recommend to change text for uniformity within document and to reflect practice in other standards.




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Public Input No. 17-NFPA 502-2016 [ Section No. E.5.5 ]

E.5.5

One example for the use of water-based fighting for tunnel protection is to use foam additives to protectagainst possible flammable liquid fuel or chemical fires. The feasibility of the use of foam–water sprinklersystems against pool fires was investigated in large-scale fire tests conducted in the Memorial Tunnel.Diesel pool fires with heat release rates of 10, 20, 50, and 100 MW were used in the test program. The

water density with foam additives (3% 3%25 AFFF) ranged from 2.4 mm/min (0.1 in./min 06 gpm/ft 2 ) to

3.8 mm/min (0.15 in. 10 gpm /min ft 2 ). It was reported that the fires were extinguished in less than 30 s inall four tests. The effectiveness of the deluge foam-water sprinkler system was not affected by alongitudinal ventilation velocity of 4.2 m/s (827 fpm). No details on the changes in air temperature, smokedistribution, and steam generation during suppression were reported.


Inconsistencies with the conversion of mm/min to I-P units exist within the document. Changed conversion to align with other text and the example found in Figure 11.2.3.1.1 of NFPA 13.




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Public Input No. 135-NFPA 502-2017 [ Chapter G ]

Annex G Alternative Fuels


G.1 General.

Most vehicles currently used in the United States are powered by either spark-ignited engines (gasoline) orcompression-ignited engines (diesel). Vehicles that use alternative fuels such as compressed natural gas(CNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LP-Gas), and liquefied natural gas (LNG) are entering the vehiclepopulation, but the percentage of such vehicles is still not large enough to significantly influence the designof road tunnel ventilation with regard to vehicle emissions. However, it is possible that growing concernsregarding the safety of some alternative-fuel vehicles that operate within road tunnels will affect the fire-related life safety design aspects of highway tunnels. See Chapter 11 for requirements for road tunnelventilation during fire emergencies.

There are a number of standard requirements for these types of systems, and the requirements derivefrom existing requirements for storage and transport of CNG tanks.

The creation of accepted consensus-based standards for hydrogen tanks is an ongoing process. However,there are current international draft standards available, which provide some insight to what will berequired outside the U.S. in the near future.

In the U.S., the primary standards used are FMVSS 304, Compressed Natural Gas Fuel ContainerIntegrity, and ANSI NGV2, American National Standard for Natural Gas Vehicle Containers. Both of thesestandards were developed for the approval of compressed natural gas. It is currently being investigatedwhether FMVSS 304 can be used for hydrogen fuel tanks. In addition, an ANSI HGV standard is underdevelopment, which will mirror the NGV standard, but incorporate specific tests for hydrogen gas vehiclecontainers and system components.

The tests in both of these standards include full-scale fire tests of the containers and their pressure reliefdevices (PRDs), as well as component reliability testing, such as pressure cycling, impact resistance, droptests, and hydrostatic burst testing. In addition to the required tests, a quality-control system is required tobe administered by an independent third party to ensure that the fuel system components aremanufactured in the same manner as when they were approved through testing. Further, the fuel systemwould be listed and labeled, such that it would be easily recognizable to an AHJ as having met theserequirements.

In the long run, it should be feasible for regulators to only allow vehicles that carry an approved listing andlabel to travel through a road tunnel. In the short term, this is unrealistic, since the standards process isunder development and there is some level of controversy as to the minimum acceptable designparameters. As a result, in the short term, the decision will be in the hands of the AHJ as to the mitigationmeasures for dealing with alternative fuels in road tunnels.

Section G.2 provides some highlighted information about selected alternative fuels, Section G.3 providessome additional information about possible mitigation measures, and Section G.4 provides a briefdiscussion of applicable codes and standards, as well as recent research into the hazards of alternativefuels.

G.2 Alternative Fuels.


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It is evident that the use of vehicles powered by alternative fuels (i.e., fuels other than gasoline or diesel)will continue to increase. Of the potential alternative fuels, LP-Gas and hybrid electric currently are themost widely used. Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, thefollowing are considered potential alternative fuels:

(1) Methanol

(2) Hydrogen

(3) Ethanol

(4) Coal-derived liquids

(5) Propane

(6) Biological materials

(7) Natural gas

(8) Reformulated gasoline

(9) Electricity

(10) Clean diesel

The alternative fuels that are considered most viable in the near future are CNG, LP-Gas, LNG, methanol,hydrogen, and electric hybrid.

G.2.1 Compressed Natural Gas. (CNG)

CNG has some excellent physical and chemical properties that make it a safer automotive fuel thangasoline or LP-Gas, provided well-designed carrier systems and operational procedures are followed.Although CNG has a relatively high flammability limit, its flammability range is relatively narrow comparedto the ranges for other fuels.

In air at ambient conditions, a CNG volume of at least 5 percent is necessary to support continuous flamepropagation, compared to approximately 2 percent for LP-Gas and 1 percent for gasoline vapor. Therefore,considerable fuel leakage is necessary in order to render the mixture combustible. Furthermore, firesinvolving combustible mixtures of CNG are relatively easy to contain and extinguish.

Since natural gas is lighter than air, it normally dissipates harmlessly into the atmosphere instead ofpooling when a leak occurs. However, in a tunnel environment, such dissipation can lead to pockets of gasthat collect in the overhead structure. In addition, since natural gas can ignite only in the range of 5 percentto 15 percent volume of natural gas in air, leaks are not likely to ignite due to insufficient oxygen.

Another advantage of CNG is that its fueling system is one of the safest in existence. The rigorous storagerequirements and greater strength of CNG cylinders compared to those of gasoline contribute to thesuperior safety record of CNG automobiles.

An incident with a CNG-propelled bus in the Netherlands [Fire in a CNG bus (Brand in een aardgasbus,2012)] highlighted the issue and associated risk of possible jet fires as a consequence of the pressurerelease valve operation.

G.2.2 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LP-Gas).

There is a growing awareness of the economic advantages of using LP-Gas as a vehicular fuel. Theseadvantages include longer engine life, increased travel time between oil and oil filter changes, longer andbetter performance from spark plugs, nonpolluting exhaust emissions, and, in most cases, mileage that iscomparable to that of gasoline. LP-Gas is normally delivered as a liquid and can be stored at 38°C(100.4°F) on vehicles under a design pressure of 1624 kPa to 2154 kPa (250 psi to 312.5 psi). LP-Gas is anatural gas and petroleum derivative. One disadvantage is that it is costly to store because a pressurevessel is needed. Also, where LP-Gas is engulfed in a fire, a rapid increase in pressure can occur, even ifthe outside temperature is not excessive relative to the gas–vapor pressure characteristics. Rapidpressure increase can be mitigated by venting the excessive buildup through relief valves. In Australia asignificant proportion of the vehicle fleet uses LPG-powered vehicles. Alternative-powered vehicles aremarked by colored labels on their registration plates. No restrictions on use of such vehicles exist inAustralia. In Australia, the only impact on managing these vehicles is by alternative procedures for incidentresponse by emergency services.


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G.2.3 Methanol.

Currently, methanol is used primarily as a chemical feedstock for the production of chemical intermediatesand solvents. Under EPA restrictions, it is being used as a substitute for lead-based octane enhancers inthe form of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) and as a viable method for vehicle emission control. MTBEis not available as a fuel substitute but is used as a gasoline additive.

The hazards of methanol production, distribution, and use are comparable to those of gasoline. Unlikegasoline, however, methanol vapors in a fuel tank are explosive at normal ambient temperature. Saturatedvapors that are located above nondiluted methanol in an enclosed tank are explosive at 10°C to 43°C(50°F to 109.4°F). A methanol flame is invisible, so a colorant or gasoline needs to be added to enabledetection.

G.2.4 Hydrogen.

Hydrogen is one of the most attractive alternative fuels due to its clean-burning qualities, the abundantsource of availability, and the potential higher efficiency. Hydrogen can be used to power vehicles in theform of fuel cells or as replacement fuel in internal combustion engines. 2.2 lb (1 kg) hydrogen gas hasabout the same energy as 1 gallon gasoline. For an adequate driving range of 300 miles (450 km) or more,a light-duty fuel cell vehicle must carry 11 to 29 lb (5 to 13 kg) of hydrogen. Storage technologies currentlyunder development include high-pressure tanks for compressed hydrogen gas up to 70 MPa (10,000 psi),insulated tanks for cryogenic liquid hydrogen below -253°C (-423°F), and chemical bonding of hydrogenwith another material such as metal hydrides.

In comparison with gasoline, hydrogen has a much wider flammability range (4 percent to 75 percent byvolume) and detonability limit. The minimum ignition energy of hydrogen in air is about an order ofmagnitude (by a factor of 10) less than that of gasoline vapor. A static electric spark such as by the humanbody or from a vehicle tailpipe is sufficient to ignite hydrogen. As the density is only about 7 percent of air,hydrogen release in atmosphere usually results in rapid dispersion and mixing to a nonhazardousconcentration. However, accumulation of hydrogen in stagnant space that cannot be ventilated is a fire andexplosion hazard. A minimum separation distance from the ceiling or explosion proofing should beconsidered for such electrical equipment.

Gaseous hydrogen leak tends to be vertical and the flammability mixture be localized before being quicklydispersed; whereas liquid hydrogen leak may pool and spread similarly as gasoline, but at a much higherevaporation rate, which results in temperature decrease in surroundings and causes condensation ofwater vapor. Since hydrogen gas is invisible and odorless, on-board detection and incident shutoff systemmust be provided in fuel-cell vehicles. Similarly, emergency response to an incident involving hydrogenfuel leak or fire requires necessary training, such as recognizing the hydrogen tank, high-voltage battery,or ultracapacitor pack that may be present on the incident vehicle.

G.2.5 Electric Hybrid.

Executive Order 13423 signed in 2007 directed federal agencies to use plug-in hybrid electric vehicles(PHEVs) when their cost becomes comparable to non-PHEVs. PHEV combines the benefits of pureelectric and hybrid electric vehicles, which allows on-board energy storage device be charged either byplugging into the electric grid or through an auxiliary power unit (APU) using replenishable fuels includingcertain types of alternative fuels such as CNG or hydrogen. Hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) offer better fueleconomy and lower emission than vehicles using fossil fuels, while electricity produces zero tailpipeemission. Efficiency in energy storage, transmission, and conversion is critical regardless of electricvehicle types. Both battery EV and gasoline-electric HEV have been commercially available for a numberof years. Due to the introduction of electric drive, energy storage, and conversion system in the powertrain,one of the safety considerations is associated with the high-voltage system (e.g., 600 VDC) used for thepowertrain, such as electric shock and short-circuit; the other is the heat generated during battery chargingand discharging, which also tends to give off toxic fumes and hydrogen gas; another safety considerationis accidental spill of battery electrolyte. Note also that a number of materials used in the battery, such aslithium, could burn at very high temperature if ignited. These issues have long been recognized andaddressed in relevant SAE documents, for example, SAE J2344, Guidelines for Electric Vehicle Safety,and UL standards, including battery thermal management and monitoring, proper electrical insulation andstructural isolation of the battery compartment, and automatic disconnect for the energy storage system.Similarly, these have also been recognized for maintenance, training, and emergency response.


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G.3 Mitigation Measures.

As the use of alternative fuels in road vehicles increases, each road tunnel operating agency or AHJ mustdeal with the issue of whether to permit such vehicles to pass through the tunnel for which it is responsible.Most road tunnel agencies throughout the world do permit the passage of alternative-fuel vehicles.

The mitigation measures that can be taken by the road tunnel designer relate primarily to the ventilationsystem, which, in most circumstances, can provide sufficient air to dilute the escaped fuel to a level that isnonhazardous. It is necessary to establish a minimum level of ventilation to provide such dilution under allcircumstances. To ensure that the ventilation system provides adequate capacity to provide such dilutionunder all circumstances, the AHJ is responsible for evaluating each tunnel on a case-by-case basis, whichmight be handled by risk analysis, computer (zone, CFD, etc.) modeling, experimental testing, or all of theabove. This assessment should consider all relevant tunnel characteristics (i.e., tunnel length, cross-sectional area, etc.). Other measures include reducing or eliminating any irregular surfaces of the tunnelceiling or structure where a pocket of gas can collect and remain undiluted, thus posing a potentialexplosion hazard. Additional precautions can be taken by installing permanent alternative-fuel detectiondevices within tunnels at high points or within ceiling cavities as appropriate where escaped fuel canaccumulate.

The use of alternative-fuel vehicles within tunnels generates challenges that require resolution.Identification of alternative-fuel vehicles is critical in the development of personnel training and emergencyresponse procedures for accidents involving such vehicles. Specific emergency response procedures,precautions, and training requirements for each of the alternative-fuel vehicles must be prepared andincluded as part of the emergency response plan. A good example of this type of plan is referenced inCalifornia Fuel Cell Partnership – Emergency Response Guide: Fuel Cell Vehicles and Hydrogen FuelingStations.

Precautions must be taken by first responders to identify if the vehicle is powered by alternative fuels.Vehicle identification must consist of vehicle display graphics. An identification standard for each of thealternative fuels needs to be established. Emergency response personnel must be provided with trainingspecific to the alternative-fuel vehicle they are responding to and be provided with specialty responseequipment such as, but not limited to, self-contained breathing apparatus, high-voltage gloves, staticdissipative equipment, and infrared cameras to visualize a vehicle fire.

Additional precautions must be taken before attempting to rescue occupants from a disabled or damagedalternative-fuel vehicle or trying to remove a damaged vehicle. It is important to make sure that the systemis no longer running and that there are no indications of an alternative-fuel release. If extrication of apassenger is necessary, all precautions are to be taken into consideration and manufacturers' shutdownprocedures must be followed to ensure high-voltage lines or alternative-fuel (natural gas, hydrogen) linesare not cut.

G.4 Informational References.

Published research exists to help assess the relative hazard of specific alternative fuels (and fuel systems)and to help develop consensus safety standards for regulators. Subsection N.2.1 references several codesand standards used for alternative fuels as well as a few website resources for new standards indevelopment. Subsection N.2.2 contains a short list of published research in the area of alternative fuels.

This list of references represents a brief summary of some applicable documents, with some emphasis onhydrogen, as that seems to be the fastest growing technology. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Onthe other hand, it is meant to be a starting point for document users to understand some of the hazards ofalternative fuels, potential mitigation measures, as well as necessary future research.



Annex_G_NFPA_502_Public_Input_28_June2017_rev0_.docx NFPA 502 Revised Annex G


Annex G hydrogen information is out of date. There have been several codes and standards promulgated since this material was last updated that need to be discussed in the Annex. Additionally, there is a significant safety analysis of hydrogen releases in tunnels that needs to be incorporated into the Annex.


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Submitter Full Name: Carl Rivkin

Organization: National Renewable Energy Labo

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Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial

Annex G Revised

Annex G Alternative Fuels This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. G.1 General. Most vehicles currently used in the United States are powered by either spark-ignited engines (gasoline) or compression-ignited engines (diesel). Vehicles that use alternative fuels such as compressed natural gas (CNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LP-Gas), and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and arehydrogen are entering the vehicle population, but the percentage of such vehicles is still not large enough to significantly influence the design of road tunnel ventilation with regard to vehicle emissions. However, it is possible that growing concerns regarding the safety of some alternative-fuel vehicles that operate within road tunnels will affect the fire-related life safety design aspects of highway tunnels. See Chapter 11 for requirements for road tunnel ventilation during fire emergencies. There are a number of standard requirements for these types of systems, and the requirements derive from existing requirements for storage and transport of CNG tanks. The creation of accepted consensus-based standards for hydrogen tanks is is complete with the publication of ANSI HGV 2‐2014 ‐ Compressed hydrogen gas

vehicle fuel containersan ongoing process. However, there are current international draft standards available, which provide some insight to what will be required outside the U.S. in the near future. Additionally, Global Technical Regulation 13 has been published which provides requirements for fuel system safety. This document is in the process of being converted to hydrogen specific FMVSS. In the U.S., the primary standards used are FMVSS 304, Compressed Natural Gas Fuel Container Integrity, and ANSI NGV2, American National Standard for Natural Gas Vehicle Containers. Both of these standards were developed for the approval of compressed natural gas. It is currently being investigated whether FMVSS 304 can be used for hydrogen fuel tanks. The Global Technical Regulation (GTR) 13 for hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles provides component, subsystem and vehicle

Formatted: Font: Bold

Formatted: Font: (Default) Arialrequirements. This GTR is in the process of being converted to hydrogen specific FMVSS. In addition, an the ANSI HGV2 standard is under development, which will mirror the NGV standard, but incorporates specific tests for hydrogen gas vehicle containers and system components. The tests in both of these standardsANSI HGV2 and GTR include13 include full-scale fire tests of the containers and their pressure relief devices (PRDs), as well as component reliability testing, such as pressure cycling, impact resistance, drop tests, and hydrostatic burst testing. In addition to the required tests, a quality-control system is required to be administered by an independent third party to ensure that the fuel system components are manufactured in the same manner as when they were approved through testing. Further, the fuel system would be listed and labeled, such that it would be easily recognizable to an AHJ as having met these requirements. There are several Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEVs) powered by hydrogen commercially available in the US and other countries. These FCEVS comply with FMVSS requirements as well as the GTR 13 requirements. These vehicles are using public roadways, parking garages, bridges, and tunnels. AHJs have to make decisions about FCEV usage in specific infrastructure. The AHJ can make decisions about tunnel safety knowing that only FMVSS compliant vehicles will be traversing these tunnels. In the long run, it should be feasible for regulators to only allow vehicles that carry an approved listing and label to travel through a road tunnel. In the short term, this is unrealistic, since the standards process is under development and there is some level of controversy as to the minimum acceptable design parameters. As a result, in the short term, the decision will be in the hands of the AHJ as to the mitigation measures for dealing with alternative fuels in road tunnels. Section G.2 provides some highlighted information about selected alternative fuels, Section G.3 provides some additional information about possible mitigation measures, and Section G.4 provides a brief discussion of applicable codes and standards, as well as recent research into the hazards of alternative fuels. G.2 Alternative Fuels. It is evident that the use of vehicles powered by alternative fuels (i.e., fuels other than gasoline or diesel) will continue to increase. Of the potential alternative fuels, LP-Gas and hybrid electric currently are the most widely used. Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, the following are considered potential alternative fuels: (1) Methanol (2) Hydrogen (3) Ethanol (4) Coal-derived liquids

Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial(5) Propane (6) Biological materials (7) Natural gas (8) Reformulated gasoline (9) Electricity (10) Clean diesel The alternative fuels that are considered most viable in the near future are are CNG, LP-Gas, LNG, methanol, hydrogen, and electric hybrid. G.2.1 Compressed Natural Gas. (CNG) CNG has some excellent physical and chemical properties that make it a safer automotive fuel than gasoline or LP-Gas, provided well-designed carrier systems and operational procedures are followed. Although CNG has a relatively high flammability limit, its flammability range is relatively narrow compared to the ranges for other fuels. In air at ambient conditions, a CNG volume of at least 5 percent is necessary to support continuous flame propagation, compared to approximately 2 percent for LP-Gas and 1 percent for gasoline vapor. Therefore, considerable fuel leakage is necessary in order to render the mixture combustible. Furthermore, fires involving combustible mixtures of CNG are relatively easy to contain and extinguish. Since natural gas is lighter than air, it normally dissipates harmlessly into the atmosphere instead of pooling when a leak occurs. However, in a tunnel environment, such dissipation canmay lead to pockets of gas that collect in the overhead structure if ventilation is not sufficient to dilute and exhaust the gas. In addition, since natural gas can ignite only in the range of 5 percent to 15 percent volume of natural gas in air, leaks are not likely to ignite due to insufficient oxygen. Another advantage of CNG is that its fueling system is one of the safest in existence. The rigorous storage requirements and greater strength of CNG cylinders compared to those of gasoline contribute to the superior safety record of CNG automobiles. An incident with a CNG-propelled bus in the Netherlands [Fire in a CNG bus (Brand in een aardgasbus, 2012)] highlighted the issue and associated risk of possible jet fires as a consequence of the pressure release valve operation. G.2.2 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LP-Gas). There is a growing awareness of the economic advantages of using LP-Gas as a vehicular fuel. These advantages include longer engine life, increased travel time between oil and oil filter changes, longer and better performance from spark plugs, nonpolluting exhaust emissions, and, in most cases, mileage that is comparable

Formatted: Font: (Default) Arialto that of gasoline. LP-Gas is normally delivered as a liquid and can be stored at 38°„C (100.4°„F) on vehicles under a design pressure of 1624 kPa to 2154 kPa (250 psi to 312.5 psi). LP-Gas is a natural gas and petroleum derivative. One disadvantage is ANNEX G 502-49 2017 Edition that it is costly to store because a pressure vessel is needed. Also, where LP-Gas is engulfed in a fire, a rapid increase in pressure can occur, even if the outside temperature is not excessive relative to the gas–vapor pressure characteristics. Rapid pressure increase can be mitigated by venting the excessive buildup through relief valves. In Australia a significant proportion of the vehicle fleet uses LPG-powered vehicles. Alternative-powered vehicles are marked by colored labels on their registration plates. No restrictions on use of such vehicles exist in Australia. In Australia, the only impact on managing these vehicles is by alternative procedures for incident response by emergency services. G.2.3 Methanol. Currently, methanol is used primarily as a chemical feedstock for the production of chemical intermediates and solvents. Under EPA restrictions, it is being used as a substitute for lead-based octane enhancers in the form of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) and as a viable method for vehicle emission control. MTBE is not available as a fuel substitute but is used as a gasoline additive. The hazards of methanol production, distribution, and use are comparable to those of gasoline. Unlike gasoline, however, methanol vapors in a fuel tank are explosive at normal ambient temperature. Saturated vapors that are located above nondiluted methanol in an enclosed tank are explosive at 10°„C to 43°„C (50°„F to 109.4°„F). A methanol flame is invisible, so a colorant or gasoline needs to be added to enable detection. G.2.4 Hydrogen. Introduction. Hydrogen is one of the most attractive alternative fuels due to its clean-burning qualitiesability to power PEM fuels cells (the fuel cell of choice in vehicles and the most commonly deployed stationary fuel cell applications), the abundant source of availability, and the potential higher efficiency in vehicles. Hydrogen can be used to power vehicles in the form of fuel cells or as replacement fuel in internal combustion engines. 2.2 lb (1 kg) hydrogen gas has about the same energy as 1 gallon gasoline. The first commercially deployed hydrogen powered vehicles employ fuel cells to convert hydrogen into electricity to power an electric motor. For an adequatea driving range of 300 miles (450 km) or more, a light-duty fuel cell vehicle must carry approximately 5 kg11 to 29 lb (5 to 13 kg) of hydrogen. Commercially available Storage storage technologies currently


Formatted: Font: (Default) Arialunder development include high-pressure tanks for compressed hydrogen gas up to 70 MPa (10,000 psi), insulated tanks for cryogenic liquid hydrogen below −253°„C (−423°„F), and chemical bonding of hydrogen with another material such as metal hydrides. Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEVs) have evolved from a demonstration to commercial technology. Several OEMs now sell or lease FCEVs and networks of hydrogen fueling stations have been constructed on both US coasts with plans to provide fueling service to the entire country. This deployment of FCEVs requires that they be able to utilize existing infrastructure including tunnels and bridges. Physical properties. In comparison with gasoline, hydrogen has a much wider flammability range (4 percent to 75 percent by volume) and detonability explosive limit. The minimum ignition energy of hydrogen in air is about an order of magnitude (by a factor of 10) less than that of gasoline vapor. A static electric spark such as by the human body or from a vehicle tailpipe is sufficient to ignite hydrogen. As the density is only about 7 percent of air, hydrogen release in atmosphere usually results in rapid dispersion and mixing to a nonhazardous concentration. However, accumulation of hydrogen in stagnant space that cannot be ventilated is a fire and explosion hazard. A minimum separation distance from the ceiling or explosion proofing should be considered for such electrical equipment. Hydrogen behavior compared to other fuels. Table G.2.4.1 Comparative Properties of Hydrogen and Fuels provides more information on hydrogen properties relative to other alternative fuels and gasoline. -

Hydrogen Analysis Resource Center: Comparative Properties of Hydrogen and Fuels Properties Notes/Sources Units Hydrogen [1] Methane [1] Propane [1] Methanol [1] Ethanol [1] Gasoline [2Chemical Formula H2 CH4 C3H8 CH3OH C2H5OH CxHy (x = 4 Molecular Weight [a, b] 2.02 16.04 44.1 32.04 46.07 100 - 105 Density (NTP) [3, a, c] kg/m3 0.0838 0.668 1.87 791 789 751 lb/ft3 0.00523 0.0417 0.116 49.4 49.3 46.9 Viscosity (NTP) [3, a, b] g/cm-sec 8.81 x 10-5 1.10 x 10-4 8.012 x 10-5 9.18 x 10-3 0.0119 0.0037 - 0.0 lb/ft-sec 5.92 x 10-6 7.41 x 10-6 5.384 x 10-6 6.17 x 10-4 7.99 x 10-4 2.486 x 10-4

Normal Boiling Point [a, b] oC -253 -162 -42.1 64.5 78.5 27 - 225 oF -423 -259 -43.8 148 173.3 80 - 437 Vapor Specific Gravity (NTP) [3, a, d] air = 1 0.0696 0.555 1.55 N/A N/A 3.66 Flash Point [b, d] oC < -253 -188 -104 11 13 -43 oF < -423 -306 -155 52 55 -45 Flammability Range in Air [c, b, d] vol% 4.0 - 75.0 5.0 - 15.0 2.1 - 10.1 6.7 - 36.0 4.3 - 19 1.4 - 7.6 Auto Ignition Temperature in Air [b, d] oC 585 540 490 385 423 230 - 480

oF 1085 1003 914 723 793 450 - 900 Notes:




[1] Properties of the pure substance [2] Properties of a range of commercial grades

[3] NTP = 20 oC (68 oF) and 1 atmosphere

N/A - Not applicable

Sources: [a] NIST Chemistry WebBook. http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/

[b] "Alternatives to Traditional Transportation Fuels: An Overview." DOE/EIA-0585/O. Energy Information Administration. U.S. Department of Energy. Washington, DC.[c] Perry's Chemical Engineers' Handbook (7th Edition), 1997, McGraw-Hill.

[d] "Hydrogen Fuel Cell Engines and Related Technologies. Module 1: Hydrogen Properties." U.S. DOE. 2001, http://www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/tech_validation/pdfs/fcm01r0.pdf

Hydrogen release behavior in tunnels. Gaseous hydrogen leak tends to be move vertically and the flammability mixtureflammability mixture will be localized before being quickly dispersinged; whereas liquid hydrogen leak may pool and spread similarly as gasoline, but at a much higher evaporation rate, which results in temperature decrease in surroundings and causes condensation of water vapor. Since hydrogen gas is invisible and odorless, on-board detection and incident shutoff system must beare provided in fuel-cell vehicles. Sandia National Laboratories conducted a risk analysis and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model of a hydrogen vehicle Thermally Activated Pressure Relief Device (TPRD) release, the most probable release of hydrogen from a vehicle according to the risk analysis. The results of the report are included here. In this scenario, the hydrogen vehicle is inverted so the TPRD vent pipe is pointed upwards toward the ceiling of the tunnel. The tunnel analyzed is a category D classification, as defined by NFPA 502. Table G.2.4.2 Hydrogen Releases in Tunnels discusses key requirements from Chapter 7.

NFPA 502 Code Citation Results from Sandia National Laboratories Analysis

7.3.2 Temperature exposure represented by the Rijkswaterstaat curve

The temperatures from an ignited TPRD release are higher than the RWS curve for less than a minute. The heat release rate (HRR) equivalent was calculated for the RWS curve, based on a 200 MW fire curve from the Runehamar tunnel tests, which resulted in comparable temperatures to the RWS curve. The hydrogen car jet fire was calculated to have a peak heat release rate of around 75 MW, which did not exceed the 200 MW HRR


Formatted: Font: (Default) Arialvalue from the Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) in the Runehamar tests.

7.3.4.1 (1) (a) concrete protected from spalling

The CFD analysis of the TPRD release jet flame showed that conditions are present in a very localized area where spalling may occur. However, a hydrocarbon fire was also modeled in CFD and spalling conditions were also present.

7.3.4.1 (1) (b) surface of concrete does not exceed 380 C

The intent of this statement is to ensure significant spalling does not occur. As discussed in the justification for 7.3.4.1 (1) (1), localized spalling may occur in a hydrogen TPRD jet fire but the same would occur for a gasoline vehicle fire.

7.3.4.1 (1) (c) steel reinforcement within concrete does not exceed 250 C

The intent of this requirement is to ensure structural damage will not occur for the tunnel. A CFD analysis of a hydrogen TPRD jet fire on the concrete structure shows that the temperature is higher than 250 C, but not for more than 2 cm deep into the concrete panel. Greater than 4 cm deep, the concrete will remain at ambient temperature.

7.3.4.1 (2) (a) steel or iron structural elements lining temperature not to exceed 300 C

The intent of this statement is to ensure structural damage will not occur for the tunnel. A CFD analysis of a hydrogen TPRD jet fire on the steel structure showed a higher temperature (~300C) for the first few centimeters of steel but the temperature is at ambient 10 cm deep into the steel.


Figure G.2.1 Comparison of gasoline passenger vehicle, hydrogen vehicle, and diesel bus and the 200 MW curve. Emergency response. ESimilarly, emergency response to an incident involving hydrogen fuel leak or fire requires necessary training, such as recognizing the hydrogen tank, highvoltagehigh voltage battery, or ultracapacitorultra capacitor pack that may be present on the incident vehicle. The NFPA web site shown below provides specific emergency response information on commercially available FCEVs. The H2Tools website shown below provides training materials for emergency responders that can be used to prepare for incidents involving FCEVs. See the following sites for information on emergency response and emergency response training for FCEVs:

1. H2Tools-https://h2tools.org/content/training-materials 2. NFPA-http://www.nfpa.org/training-and-events/by-topic/alternative-fuel-vehicle-safety-

training G.2.5 Electric Hybrid. Executive Order 13423 signed in 2007 directed federal agencies to use plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) when their cost becomes comparable to non-PHEVs. PHEV combines the benefits of pure electric and hybrid electric vehicles, which allows on-board energy storage device be charged either by plugging into the electric grid or through an auxiliary power unit (APU) using replenishable fuels including certain types of alternative fuels such as CNG or hydrogen. Hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) offer better fuel economy and lower emission than vehicles using fossil fuels, while electricity

0

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Diesel Bus

Hydrogen Vehicle


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Formatted: Font: (Default) Arialproduces zero tailpipe emission. Efficiency in energy storage, transmission, and conversion is critical regardless of electric vehicle types. Both battery EV and gasoline-electric HEV have been commercially available for a number of years. Due to the introduction of electric drive, energy storage, and conversion system in the powertrain, one of the safety considerations is associated with the high-voltage system (e.g., 600 VDC) used for the powertrain, such as electric shock and short-circuit; the other is the heat generated during battery charging and discharging, which also tends to give off toxic fumes and hydrogen gas; another safety consideration is accidental spill of battery electrolyte. Note also that a number of materials used in the battery, such as lithium, could burn at very high temperature if ignited. These issues have long been recognized and addressed in relevant SAE documents, for example, SAE J2344, Guidelines for Electric Vehicle Safety, and UL standards, including battery thermal management and monitoring, proper electrical insulation and structural isolation of the battery compartment, and automatic disconnect for the energy storage system. Similarly, these have also been recognized for maintenance, training, and emergency response. G.3 Mitigation Measures. As the use of alternative fuels in road vehicles increases, each road tunnel operating agency or AHJ must deal with the issue of whether to permit such vehicles to pass through the tunnel for which it is responsible. Most road tunnel agencies throughout the world do permit the passage of alternative-fuel vehicles. The mitigation measures that can be taken by the road tunnel designer relate primarily to the ventilation system, which, in most circumstances, can provide sufficient air to dilute the escaped fuel to a level that is nonhazardous. It is necessary to establish a minimum level of ventilation to provide such dilution under all circumstances. To ensure that the ventilation system provides adequate capacity to provide such dilution under all circumstances, the AHJ is responsible for evaluating each tunnel on a case-by-case basis, which might be handled by risk analysis, computer (zone, CFD, etc.) modeling, experimental testing, or all of the above. This assessment should consider all relevant tunnel characteristics (i.e., tunnel length, cross-sectional area, etc.). Other measures include reducing or eliminating any irregular surfaces of the tunnel ceiling or structure where a pocket of gas can collect and remain undiluted, thus posing a potential explosion hazard. Additional precautions can be taken by installing permanent alternative-fuel detection devices within tunnels at high points

Formatted: Font: (Default) Arialor within ceiling cavities as appropriate where escaped fuel can accumulate. Copyright 2017 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Licensed, by agreement, for individual use and single download via NFCSS All Access on 01/06/2017 This document is for NFPA Committee use only by Carl Rivkin. No other reproduction or transmission in any form permitted without written permission of NFPA. For inquiries or to report unauthorized use, contact [email protected]. 502-50 ROAD TUNNELS, BRIDGES, AND OTHER LIMITED ACCESS HIGHWAYS 2017 Edition The use of alternative-fuel vehicles within tunnels generates challenges thatissues that require additional informationresolution. Identification of alternative fuel vehicles is critical in the development of personnel training and emergency response procedures for accidents involving such vehicles. Specific emergency response procedures, precautions, and training requirements for each of the alternative-fuel vehicles must be prepared and included as part of the emergency response plan. A good example of this type of plan is referenced in California Fuel Cell Partnership – Emergency Response Guide: Fuel Cell Vehicles and Hydrogen Fueling Stations. Precautions must be taken by first responders to identify if the vehicle is powered by alternative fuels. Vehicle identification must consist of vehicle display graphics. An identification standard for each of the alternative fuels needs to be established. Emergency response personnel must be provided with training specific to the alternative-fuel vehicle they are responding to and be provided with specialty response equipment such as, but not limited to, self-contained breathing apparatus, high-voltage gloves, static dissipative equipment, and infrared cameras to visualize a vehicle fire. Additional precautions must be taken before attempting to rescue occupants from a disabled or damaged alternative-fuel vehicle or trying to remove a damaged vehicle. It is important to make sure that the system is no longer running and that there are no indications of an alternative-fuel release. If extrication of a passenger is necessary, all precautions are to be taken into consideration and manufacturers' shutdown procedures must be followed to ensure high-voltage lines or alternative-fuel (natural gas, hydrogen) lines are not cut. G.4 Informational References. Published research exists to help assess the relative hazard of specific alternative fuels (and fuel systems) and to help develop consensus safety standards for regulators. Subsection N.2.1 references several codes and standards used for alternative fuels as well as a few website

Formatted: Font: (Default) Arialresources for new standards in development. Subsection N.2.2 contains a short list of published research in the area of alternative fuels. This list of references represents a brief summary of some applicable documents, with some emphasis on hydrogen, as that seems to be the fastest growing technology. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. On the other hand, it is meant to be a starting point for document users to understand some of the hazards of alternative fuels, potential mitigation measures, as well as necessary future research. Justification There have been several advances in codes and standards development and FCEV safety risk analysis regarding potential releases in tunnels since the last edition of NFPA 502 was promulgated. The annex material on hydrogen and FCEVs needs to be updated to reflect this new information. Sandia National Laboratories has produced a technical report that shows the detailed analysis that forms the basis for information in Table G2.4.1. This report is undergoing review and will be complete so that it can be referenced by the second draft meeting.


Public Input No. 131-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. I.3 ]

I.3 Transverse Ventilation Systems.

I.3.1

Transverse ventilation systems feature the uniform collection and/or distribution of air throughout the lengthof the tunnel roadway and can be of the full transverse or semitransverse type. In addition, semitransversesystems can be of the supply or exhaust type. [See Figure I.3.1(a) through Figure I.3.1(c).]

Figure I.3.1(a) Full Transverse Ventilation System.

Figure I.3.1(b) Semitransverse Supply Ventilation System.

Figure I.3.1(c) Semitransverse Exhaust Ventilation System.

I.3.1.1

Full transverse systems are equipped with supply and exhaust airducts throughout the length of the tunnelroadway [see Figure I.3.1(a)]. When a full transverse system is deployed, the majority of the pollutants orsmoke discharges through a stack or stacks, with a minor portion of the pollutants or smoke exiting throughthe portals. A full transverse ventilation system can be either balanced (exhaust equals supply) orunbalanced (exhaust is greater than supply).

I.3.1.2

Semitransverse systems are those that are equipped with only supply or exhaust elements. The exhaustfrom the tunnel is discharged at the portals [supply semitransverse, see Figure I.3.1(b) ] or throughexhaust stacks [exhaust semitransverse, see Figure I.3.1(c) ] . not useful for tunnel ventilation applications


semitransversal systems are not useful for tunnel applications, see Tunnel Ventilation Compendiumhttp://www.p-i.ch/cms/pages/books.php?lang=DE



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Public Input No. 132-NFPA 502-2017 [ Sections I.4.2, I.4.3 ]

Sections I.4.2, I.4.3

I.4.

2

In designing smoke extraction points, the effect of the “plugholing” phenomenon should be considered.Plugholing refers to a situation where the local smoke extraction volume rate exceeds the ability of thesmoke layer to replace the extracted smoke. This creates a hole through the smoke layer causing clean airto be exhausted, therefore reducing the efficiency of smoke extraction.

I.4.

3

Single point extraction systems

can

must be supported by longitudinal ventilation systems, such as jet fan systems, to counteract the wind atthe portal and direct smoke and heated gases along the tunnel and to an SPE opening as shown in FigureI.4.3 . In designing these systems, the effect of the longitudinal airflow velocity and the jet fan placementon the efficiency of SPE in extracting smoke should be considered. Excessive airflow velocity could disruptthe smoke layer stratification.

Figure I.4.3 Single Point Extraction with Jet Fan Longitudinal Ventilation Support.


plugholing may occure, but is not a problem in reality.concentraded extraction MUST be combined with means to control the longitudinal airflow.







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Public Input No. 15-NFPA 502-2016 [ Section No. J.3.2 ]

J.3.2 Emergency Incident Phases.

During an incident emergency, two phases should be considered in developing the emergency ventilationstrategies: “evacuation” and “fire control” phases. The evacuation phase involves both self-evacuation andassisted evacuation. For the duration of the self-evacuation, which starts after fire ignition and depends onthe awareness and reaction of tunnel users, the natural stratification of hot gases and smoke should bemaintained by ensuring zero longitudinal velocity in the fire zone where possible . The assisted evacuationstage begins with the arrival of emergency services at the site. Throughout the fire control phase, smokeand hot gases should be managed and controlled to ensure safe evacuations.


The statement "For the duration of the self-evacuation, which starts after fire ignition and depends on the awareness and reaction of tunnel users, the natural stratification of hot gases and smoke should be maintained by ensuring zero longitudinal velocity in the fire zone." is not always practical as most tunnel ventilation systems provide a tenable environment by creating a longitudinal velocity during the self evacuation period. While I agree with the concept of maintaining a stratified smoke layer, it is not always possible for short durations while the ventilation system gains control of the movement of smoke and hot gases.




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Public Input No. 130-NFPA 502-2017 [ New Section after J.3.4 ]

Control of Longitudinal Airflow

For smoke management, the control of longitudinal airflow in the tunnel is essential, both with purelongitudinal ventilation and with smoke extraction systems. The desired state, regarding airflow velocities inthe tunnel, must be achieved as quickly as possible from any boundary and initial conditions. For that, aclosed-loop control, based on realiable airflow measurements, is required. At least 3 independentmeasurements for each section are required for plausibility check.

To allow for an efficient and reliable control of longitudinal airflow, a decentralized control system, based onlocal devices for each group of fans, may be applied as a turn-key system which works independently fromthe SCADA. Local devices typically include controllers, VSD, evaluation of flow measurements, switchgearand communication interface. The responsibility for achievement of the requirements should be clearlyassigned to the provider of the airflow control.


in practice, neither requirements nor responsibilities are clear. With a previously tested arflow control as turnkey system, safety and reliability would be increased.







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Public Input No. 129-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. J.4.1 ]

J.4.1 Fire Detection.

Fire detection may occur by different means, including manual fire alarm boxes, closed-circuit television(CCTV) systems, or an automatic fire detection system based on smoke detectros or linear heat detection .The fire detection system will initiate the response to a fire emergency.


smoke detection is essential







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Public Input No. 100-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. J.5 ]

J.5 Commissioning, Training, Maintenance, and Testing.

The tunnel ventilation system is a critical life safety system; therefore proper commissioning, training,maintenance, and testing is vital to assess the ventilation system performance and to maximize itsreliability. A smoke test based on realistic car fire scenario should be performed for the verification of thedesign of the smoke control system, the installation (leakage, doors, dampers, fans with reversibility etc.),but also all the equipment included in the fire safety decision chain (detection, information to the controlroom of the operator, self-closing system, information to the user etc.). Measurements of flow rates for theverification of the design characteristics should be included for the reception.


Tests at reception of a new tunnel or after strong refurbishment are nowadays usual. They allow to verify the design and the installation. This is a mean that any owner or operator shall use before accepting the reception of the tunnel.




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Public Input No. 14-NFPA 502-2016 [ Chapter L ]

Annex L Motorist Education


L.1

The tunnel operator should consider implementing a program to educate the motorist and professionaldrivers on how to properly react in case of emergencies in the tunnel. Consideration should be given toradio and TV ads, brochures, and other means. A suggested brochure is shown in Figure L.1 .

Figure L.1 Example of Tunnel Safety Brochure.


This PI deletes the Annex L as the concept should be moved into the core text and Annex A via PI 13.



Public Input No. 13-NFPA 502-2016 [New Section after 7.17.7] Moves Annex L concept to core text.




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Public Input No. 137-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. M.1 ]

M.1 General.

This annex provides information on the use of automatic fire detection (AFD) systems in road tunnels. Thisannex does not include information on manual fire detection, such as pull stations or emergencytelephones.

Installation of AFD systems is becoming more common in road tunnels as a means for detecting a fire andidentifying the fire location. AFD is required in some tunnels without continuous 24-hour supervision.

AFD systems can do any or all of the following: detect a fire, identify the fire location, send a notificationsignal, and initiate activation of fire life safety systems.

Early detection, accurate identification of the fire location, rapid notification, and effective activation of firelife safety systems are essential due to potentially rapid loss of tenability. Each technology has its ownresponse time.


In the option for only human monitoring; if the human monitor must leave the station then the suppression system might not be activated in time. An automatic system with a human override is a more desirable system configuration.





Submitter Full Name: Robert Cordell

Organization: Johnson Controls

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Public Input No. 75-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. N.1.1 ]

N.1.1 NFPA Publications.

National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471.

NFPA 3, Recommended Practice for Commissioning of Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems, 2015edition.

NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 2015 edition.

NFPA 30A, Code for Motor Fuel Dispensing Facilities and Repair Garages, 2015 edition.

NFPA 70B, Recommended Practice for Electrical Equipment Maintenance, 2016 edition.

NFPA 72®, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 2016 edition.

NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code®, 2015 edition.

NFPA 170, Standard for Fire Safety and Emergency Symbols, 2015 edition.

NFPA 259, Standard Test Method for Potential Heat of Building Materials

NFPA 262, Standard Method of Test for Flame Travel and Smoke of Wires and Cables for Use in Air-Handling Spaces, 2015 edition.

NFPA 550, Guide to the Fire Safety Concepts Tree, 2012 edition.

NFPA 551, Guide for the Evaluation of Fire Risk Assessments, 2016 edition.

NFPA 730, Guide for Premises Security, 2014 edition.

NFPA 731, Standard for the Installation of Electronic Premises Security Systems, 2015 edition.

NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety, 2014edition.

NFPA 1600®, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity/Continuity ofOperations Programs, 2016 edition.


This standard was recommended for inclusion by a separate public input.








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Public Input No. 76-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. N.1.2.5 ]

N.1.2.5 ASTM Publications.

ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959.

ASTM C666/C666M , Standard Test Method for Resistance of Concrete to Rapid Freezing and Thawing,2015.

ASTM E84,Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, 2017.

ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750°C, 20122016a .

ASTM E580/E580M, Application Standard Practice for Installation of Ceiling Suspension Systems forAcoustical Tile and Lay-in Panels in Areas Subjectto Subject to Earthquake Ground Motions, 2014 2016 .

ASTM E2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Tube Furnace with a Cone-shapedAirflow Stabilizer, at 750°C, 2012 2016 .

ASTM E2965, Standard Test Method for Determination of Low Levels of Heat Release Rate for Materialsand Products Using an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter, 2017.


Date updates and addition of standards recommended in associated public input.







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ATTACHMENT F

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