tati doyle comp116 12/6/17 · tati doyle comp116 12/6/17 twitter bots and russian plots: preventing...
TRANSCRIPT
1
TatiDoyleCOMP11612/6/17
TwitterBotsandRussianPlots:PreventingaReoccurrenceoftheRussianInfluenceCampaign
ontheUSElection
AbstractThispaperexaminespotentialmethodstopreventarepeatoftheRussiangovernment’sinterferenceintheUnitedStates’(US)electionontherelationsbetweenthetwonations.
VladimirPutinorderedaninfluencecampaigntoundermineUSdemocracyandharmHillaryClinton’schancesofelection.Thiscampaigncombinedcovertintelligenceoperations,paidsocialmediausers,andstate-fundedmedia.AlthoughitisimpossibletopinpointwhatexactlyledtoDonaldTrump’selection,arecentinvestigationhasshownthatupto150millionAmericanswereexposedtoRussian-createdcontentonFacebookalone,makingupoverhalfofthe
Americanseligibletovote(LeeandKent).Inordertopreventforeigninfluencefromaffectingtheoutcomeofanotherelection,itisimportantthattheUStightenitsrestrictionsonwhocanplacepoliticaladvertisementsandthatboththegovernmentandpoliticalcampaignsupgradetheircybersecuritymeasures.Intheprivatesector,thecompanieswhoseproductswereusedtospreadRussianpropagandashouldpreventfakeaccountsfrombeingcreatedaswellasincrease
transparencyregardingadvertisements.
Introduction
TheadventofsocialmediaandtheInternethasfundamentallychangedpolitical
campaigning.Before,thepubliconlyhadaccesstoTV,radio,andfriendsandfamily.Itwas
difficulttoreachmillionsofpeopleatonce,andTVadswereveryclearlysponsored–theyare
evenrequiredtostatewhopaidfortheadvertisementattheend.Today,theaverageuser
spendsovertwohoursadayonsocialmedia(Mander).Thecontentonsocialmediaoften
comesfromunknownsources,ex.tweetsthathavebeenretweetedorFacebookads.Thismass
exposuretoinformationhascreatedanewplayingfieldforpoliticalcampaignswhere
informationaboutacandidatequicklygoes“viral”–oftenregardlessoftheveracityofthe
information.Thenatureofsocialmediahascreatedaworldinwhichfakenewscanspread
rapidly.TheRussiangovernmenttookadvantageofsocialmediaandusedbothpaidadsand
2
fakeuserstospreadfalseinformationaboutcandidatesandcreateafalseimpressionofpeers’
opinions.Beyondsocialmedia,Russiaalsotookadvantageoflackofattentiontocybersecurity
issues,suchasweakpasswordsandlackofawarenessabouttacticssuchasspearphishing.For
example,byexploitingavulnerabilityinanonlinevotingregistrationformfield,nearly90,00
Illinoisvoterrecordswerecompromisedandtherewasatleastonesuccessfulattemptto
modifyvoterinformation(Calabresi).Althoughtheinfluenceofthesestrategiesisnot
completelyquantifiable,itappearstobesignificant–enoughsothattheCIAreleaseda
declassifiedreportdetailingtheknownextentofRussianactions.Inthewakeoftheemergence
ofthisinformation,theUSgovernmentistakingadeep-diveintohowtoregulatetechnology
companiesaswellasitsowncybersecurity.
ToTheCommunity
Althoughcybersecurityisgenerallyassociatedwith“hacking”andahighlevelof
technicalknowledge,socialengineeringisakeypartofmanycyberattacks.AlthoughtheUS’
weakcybersecurityiswellknown,the2016electionrevealedanewvulnerabilitytosocial
engineering(Whittaker).TheRussianinfluencecampaignisanexampleofacombinedstrategy
ofusingbothtechnicalknowledge(ex.gainingaccessvoterrecords)andsocialengineering(ex.
creatinganti-HillaryClintongroupsonFacebook).Influencinganation’spoliticsisoneofthe
highestformsofinfluencethatcanbewielded,andcouldbeusedtounderminethesecurityof
anentirenation.Politicallyweaponizedsocialengineeringisakeycybersecurityissue.Thus,is
imperativethatweaddresssocialengineering,itseffects,andhowtocombat“blackhat”social
engineering.
3
Background
AftertheColdWarandthefalloftheBerlinwall,Russiawasextremelyweak.Itwentfrom
beingadominantsuperpowertoscramblingtomakeendsmeet.Duringthattime,theWest
prosperedandexpanded,creatingaperceivedlinkagebetweentheWest’sprosperityand
Russia’sfailure.Afteritsrecoveryandsubsequenteconomicsuccessintheearly2000s,
VladimirPutinemergedasastrongleaderdeterminedtoputRussiabackinitsplaceonthe
globalstagewhereithadonceplayedacentralrole.ThegovernmentnarrativeinRussiaisanti-
American,andtheUSisportrayedascontinuallyattemptingtoundermineRussia’sprosperity
andsecurity.Russiathereforeseesitsactionsascorrectingpastwrongsandcombating
Westernencroachment(Rumer).
Russia’smilitary,whilesignificantlylargerandmoreadvancedthanmanyofitsneighbors,
remainsweakincomparisontoNATO’sforces(Meakins).Sinceitlacksthehardpowerto
directlycompetewithWesternpowers,ithasturnedtoalternativestrategiestoincreaseits
security.Unlikeademocraticsystemofgovernment,therearenochecksonwhatRussia’s
governmentofficialscando.Furthermore,theRussiangovernmentdoesnotseemtobe
concernedwithitsinternationalordomesticreputationandcanthusactextremelyboldly
(Rumer).TheinfluencecampaignontheUSelectionwasanexampleofabrazentacticthatwas
lowincostandhighinimpact–itwasfinanciallycheap,instilleddistrustintheAmerican
politicalsystem,andheightenedexistingdivisionsbetweenAmericans.
TheWorkingsoftheInfluenceCampaign
4
Russia’sinfluencecampaignwasamulti-prongedstrategythatmadeuseofspear
phishing,paidads/trollsonsocialmedia,andstate-sponsorednewsoutletRussiaToday,orRT.
Spearphishingis“anemailtargetedataspecificindividualordepartmentwithinan
organizationthatappearstobefromatrustedsource”–91%ofcyberattacksbeginwithaspear
phishingemail(TrendMicoqtd.byKnowBe4).Spearphishingisoneofthemostnotorious
attacksthatemployssocialengineering–peopleoftendon’tthinktwiceaboutclickingonalink
ifitcomesfromwhattheyconsideratrustedsource.Inoneincident,Russianactorssentemails
toemployeesofaUSelectionsoftwarecompanyfromtheemailaddress
noreplyautomaticservice@gmail.comthatincludedaspoofedGoogleAlertemail,whichwould
redirecttheusertoamaliciousdomain.Itislikelythatatleastoneaccountwascompromised.
Inanotherincident,[email protected]
usernamesettobethepreviouslytargetedUScompany.Theythenemailed122people
associatedwithlocalgovernmentorganizationswithaWorddocumentcontainingamalicious
script(Coleetal).Thesendingofadocument/programthatseemsrelevantorusefulwhile
concealinganattackagainsttheenduseriscalleda“Trojanhorse”.Althoughit’sunclearwhat
thescriptdid,theNSAreporttheorizesitallowedtheattackertomaintainpersistentaccessto
thecomputers(Coleetal).
ThistypeofattackwasmostlikelythereasonthatRussianactorswereabletogain
accesstovoterdatabasesandevenattempttoalterthem(Dent).JohnPodesta,HillaryClinton’s
campaignchairman,wasthesubjectofaninfamousspearphishingattack.Thisparticularattack
resultedinhisaccountbeingcompromisedandpotentiallyinthecompromiseofthe
DemocraticNationalConvention(DNC)databasethatledto10yearsofHillaryClinton’semails
5
beingpublishedonWikiLeaks,whichhadanextremelyharmfuleffectonhercredibility
(Vaas).Theuseofspearphishingasatacticwasevidentlyhighlysuccessful,giventheamountof
informationRussianactorswereabletoobtainandstrategicallyrelease.Thesuccessofthese
attacksdemonstratedalackofcybersecurityaccountabilityinourgovernmentandpolitical
partyinstitutions.AlthoughspearphishingislikelynottheonlytechniqueusedbyRussian
actorstogainaccesstosystems,itistheonlypubliclydocumentedmethodthusfar.
Beyondtheuseofspearphishing,whichisawell-knowntechnique,Russianactors
utilizedsocialmediatoinfluencepoliticsinanunprecedentedway.Theymadeuseofbothtroll
farms,whichareorganizationsthatemploypeopletooperatenumeroussocialmediaaccounts
tocreateafalseimpressionofawidely-heldopinion,andpaidadstargetedatdifferent
demographics.Belowaretwoexamplesofadsthatwereplaced:
Figure1
6
Figure2
Purposelyopposingcontentwasposted,apparentlytoincreasecontroversyoverissues.For
example,thisadcondemnspolicebrutality:
Figure3
7
WhilethisoneindicatesthatBlackLivesMatter(acivilgroupagainstpolicebrutality)waskilling
policeofficers:
Figure4
EmployeesoftheRussiantrollfarmcalledthe“InternetResearchAgency”postedsocial
mediacontentsimilartotheaboveadsfocusingondivisivesocialissuesintheUS,suchascivil
rights.Theyevenwentsofarastoorganizebothananti-Islamandpro-Islamprotestinthe
samelocationatthesametime,presumablytoratchetuptensionsbetweenthetwogroups
(Bertrand).Beyondthat,theypostedpoliticalcontentthatappearedtobeauthoredbyother
Americancitizensorlocalnewsoutlets,usingTwitterusernameslike“OaklandOnline”and
“PatriotBlake”(Collinsetal).
8
ThepaidadsthatRussiaemployedtargeteddivisivesocialissuesaswell,withcontent
spanningtopicsfromimmigrationtoguncontrol.Theirargumentsfellonbothsides,butwere
largelyaimedatheighteningtensionsonpoliticalissuesandincreasinganationaldivideover
policy.AlthoughstatisticshavenotyetemergedonwhatpercentageofadstargetedHillary
Clinton,theanecdotalevidencethathasemergedthusfarsupportsthehypothesisthatads
referencingHillaryClintonlargelycastherasevilandadsreferencingDonaldTrumplargelycast
himasafixforabrokensystem(Shane).SomeadsevenusedBernieSanders’quotesasa
rallyingcallagainstClinton.Boththetrollfarmsandthepaidadswereapparentlyintendedto
increasenationaldivisionoverhot-buttonissuesaswellasincreasenegativesentimentabout
Clinton.
RussiaalsousedthetraditionalmediaoutletofRussiaToday,rebrandedasRT,topush
theKremlin’sagendaandunderminefaithintheUSpoliticalprocess.RTrepeatedtheideathat
theUSelectionprocesswasundemocraticandcouldnotbetrusted.Theoutletalsoheavily
criticizedHillaryClintonwhilepraisingDonaldTrump.Althoughtheoutletattemptstoframe
itselfasaUSnewsoutlet,itisinfactaKremlin-controlledorganization(IntelligenceCommunity
Assessment).
Betweenthestrategicuseofspearphishingtoobtainkeyinformation,theuseoftrollfarms
andpaidadsonsocialmediatoinfluencepublicopinion,andtheKremlin-backedagenda
posingasaUSnewsoutlet,Russiawasabletoconductahighlysuccessfulinfluencecampaign
onUSpolitics.Thiscampaignincreasednationaldivision,instilledpublicdoubtinAmerican
democracy,andmayhaveswayedtheresultoftheUSelection.Allthreeoftheseconsequences
9
aregrave,anditisimperativethattheUStakealonghardlookatbothitsprivateandpublic
sectors.
HowtoPreventAReoccurrence
Inordertoaddressthesecurityrisksthatthisinfluencecampaign–andthethreatofit
happeningagain–posestotheUS,severalactionareasmustbeaddressed.First,theUS
governmentmustcomprehensivelyoverhaulitscybersecurity.Currently,only41%ofuser
accountsat23civilianagenciesrequiresecurecredentialstoaccessagencysystemsandtheUS
hassufferedaseriesofembarrassinghacksbyforeignagents(GAOqtd.byGardnerandCoons).
Thesestatisticsrepresentanembarrassinglylowbarforthesecurityoffederalagencies.For
starters,governmentagenciesshouldatleastrequiresecurecredentialsaswellasimplement
twofactorauthentication,createmandatedstandardsforpasswordsecurity,andask
employeestochangetheirpasswordsregularly.Additionally,allgovernmentemployeesshould
betrainedonsecurityrisksandhowtolookoutforthem–humanerroristhetopcauseof
securitybreaches(Rosenbachetal).Thesetypesofregulationswouldlargelypreventspear
phishingattacksandhelpkeepgovernmentdatasecure.
Thesestepswouldbehighincostandveryslowtoimplement;governmentagenciesare
notoriouslyresistanttochange,especiallywithregardstotechnology.However,theUS
government’sevidentlackofattentiontocybersecurityisarguablyoneofthegreatestsecurity
threatscurrentlyfacingthenation.Therefore,itisimperativethatcybersecurityissuesare
addresseddespitethehighcostintimeandmoney.Beyondcredentialregulations,authority
overcybersecurityissuesshouldbecondensedintoasingularagency.TheUSCyberCommand,
orCYBERCOM,shouldbeseparatedfromtheNationalSecurityAgency(NSA).Itselevationtoa
10
unifiedcombatantcommandisthestepintherightdirection,andJamesMattisisalready
consideringseparatingCYBERCOMfromtheNSA(GaramoneandFerdinando).Althoughthis
measureinvolvesmoreredtape,itisnecessaryinordertoaddressarapidlychangingandmore
threateningInternetlandscape.TheUSalsoneedstopassacomprehensivecybersecuritybill
addressingcybercrimeandnew,Internet-basedthreatsthathaveariseninthepastcouple
decades.Althoughthisbillwilllikelytakealongtimetodraftandbevotedintolaw,theprocess
ofcreatingitshouldstartnow.
Besides,itisnotonlythefederalgovernmentthatneedstooverhaulitscybersecurity
practices;HillaryClinton’spoliticalcampaignaswellastheDemocraticNationalConvention
sufferedthemostsignificantdatabreachesoftheelectioncycle.Attheveryleast,campaigns
shouldmovetraintheirstaffonbestpractices,movetheirdatatothecloud,requiretwofactor
authentication,implementpasswordstandards,andplanforsecuritybreaches(Rosenbachet
al).Havinganetworkintrusionsystem,suchasaCanary,isalsoagoodidea(TheGrugq).Hillary
Clinton’sleakedemails,publishedbyWikiLeaks,hadanextremelynegativeeffectonpublic
perceptionofherasacandidatebecausetheyremindedthepublicthatshefailedtousea
secureemailserver.Additionally,mediaoutletswereabletousequotesfromherpersonal
emailstoportrayherhowevertheywanted.Takingstepstomitigatethethreatofcampaign
databreachescanpreventpartiesfromstealing(andpossiblysubsequentlyreleasing)datato
furtherapoliticalobjective.
TheUSalsoneedstocommittopaperballotsandscrapelectronicvotingforthe
moment.TherewasevidencethatvoterdatawasalteredinIllinois–althoughnovoting
recordswereknowntobemodified,futureattackscouldhavesuchconsequences.Current
11
electronicvotingsystemsarecurrentlytooinsecure–theyrunonoutdatedtechnologythatis
susceptibletomalware(Barrett).Luckily,mostvotingsystemsstillrunonpaperballots,butthe
commitmenttonottakingvotingdigitalmustbereaffirmedandelectronicvotingshouldbe
phasedout.
TheUSCongressshouldtakethestepofoutlawingforeigners(nonUScitizens)from
givingmoneytosponsorpoliticaladsonsocialmediaplatforms.Thislawisalreadyineffectfor
normaladvertisementsontheradioortelevision(Ingram).Sincesocialmediaisanewformof
media,thesamerulesshouldapplytosocialmedia.However,implementingsuchregulations
willbeextremelychallenging.Itisunclearwhatconstitutesa“politicalad”;isanadvertisement
aboutimmigrationthatimplicitlyreferencesacurrentelectoraldebatepolitical?Whataboutan
advertisementdiscussingfreespeech?Furthermore,ifasocialmediacompanyonlyrequires
officialcampaignorganizationstodiscloseadvertisementfunding,anyactorcouldstillplaceads
thataffecttheoutcomeofacampaignwithoutbeingassociatedwithacampaign.
AsofDecember2017,thereisabillinCongressrequiringdigitalplatformswithover1
millionuserstologelection-relatedcommunicationsbyanyactorspendingover$10,000on
politicalads.However,accordingtoIssieLapowskyofWired,“Settingathresholdof$10,000
alsoallowsanyonetodevelopmultipleFacebookpages,buy$9,999ofadstopromotetheir
cause,andremainunnoticed.”Furthermore,onecouldcreateafakenewssiteandpromotethe
postsofthatsite,havingasimilareffect.Althoughpagesreportedtobepostingfakecontent
aresupposedlybanned,thatdoesn’tpreventthecontentfromspreadinginitially(Lapowsky).
FacebookandTwitterareextremelylarge–Facebookhas1.9billionusersandTwitterhas328
million–makingthemextremelydifficulttoregulate.Despitethesechallenges,itiscertainly
12
worthputtingsomesortoflimitonforeignagentsbuyingpoliticalads,ifonlytoslowtheir
spread.Socialmediaplatformsshouldalsoberequiredtodisclosewhopurchaseswhat
advertisementsaswellaswhatadvertisementsarebeingshown,inordertoincrease
transparencyaroundtheissue.
Itisalsotheresponsibilityofsocialmediaplatformstopreventthecreationoffake
accounts.CreationofasocialmediaaccountonTwitterorFacebookshouldrequiresomelevel
ofidentityverificationtostopthespreadoftrollfarmsandtheirapparentlysignificant
influence.
The2016electionisthebiggestwake-upcalltheUShasfacedinregardstocybersecurity.
Despitenumerousembarrassinghacks,theUShasfailedtoreformitscybersecurity.
Additionally,thepotentialimpactofsocialmediaonthepoliticalsystemwasmassively
underestimated.Takingstepstopreventareoccurrenceofwhathappenedin2016isonlythe
beginningofwhatshouldbeacomprehensivelookatnationalsecurityinthecybersphere.
Conclusion
Ultimately,itisclearthattheUShadseveralkeyvulnerabilitiesthatalloweditscitizens
tofallvictimtotheRussianinfluencecampaign,whichwashighlycoordinatedandeffective.
Thehopeofaddressingthesevulnerabilitiesthroughacybersecurityupgradeonthepartof
boththeUSgovernmentandpoliticalcampaigns,regulationofsocialmediaplatforms,anda
commitmenttopapervotingisatleastastepontherightpath.Enactingthesemeasureswill
makethenationmoresecureandsetthestageforfuturereformsofthisnature,wherethe
focusisoncybersecurity.However,it’sunclearwhattheramificationsoftheseproposalsmight
13
be.Governmentregulationsonsocialmediaplatformswouldbethefirstoftheirkind,andit’s
unclearwhattheywouldmeanforfreespeechandhowmuchtheywouldblurthelinebetween
thepublicandprivatesector.Regardingidentityverificationforthecreationofsocialmedia
accounts,therearesomewhomightbeadverselyaffectedbythisrequirement.Peoplesuchas
refugeeswhonolongerpossessidentitydocumentsorpeopleoftransgenderidentitieswhose
government-issuedidentitiesmaydifferfromtheiridentitiesmightbeunabletoaccesssocial
networksifsucharequirementwereinstituted.Atthecostofkeepingoursocialnetworks
more“secure”,whodoweunwittinglyexclude?Andevenifallofthesesuggestedmeasures
weretaken,theycannotpossiblybetheend-all-be-allofwaystopreventaforeignbodyfrom
interferingintheUSelectionprocess.JudgingbyRussia’sstrategicuseofalternative
(nonmilitary)methodsofinfluencingtheinternationalsystem,the2016electionissurelynot
theendoftheirattemptstodestabilizeandundermineAmericandemocracy.Althoughwe
can’tknowwhatmightcomenext,it’slikelytobeequallyasunprecedented.
14
WorksCitedBarrett,Brian.“America'sElectronicVotingMachinesAreSittingDucks.”Wired,CondeNast,3June
2017,www.wired.com/2016/08/americas-voting-machines-arent-ready-election/.Bertrand,Natasha.“RussiaOrganized2SidesofaTexasProtestandEncouraged'BothSidestoBattle
intheStreets'.”BusinessInsider,BusinessInsider,1Nov.2017,www.businessinsider.com/russia-trolls-senate-intelligence-committee-hearing-2017-11.
Calabresi,Massimo.“RussianHackingonElectionMoreWidespreadThanReported.”Time,Time,22June2017,time.com/4828306/russian-hacking-election-widespread-private-data/.
Cole,Matthew,etal.“NSAReportonRussiaSpearphishing.”TheIntercept,TheIntercept,5June2017,www.documentcloud.org/documents/3766950-NSA-Report-on-Russia-Spearphishing.html.
Collins,Ben,etal.“HouseDropsMotherlodeofRussianPropaganda.”TheDailyBeast,TheDailyBeastCompany,1Nov.2017,www.thedailybeast.com/house-democrats-release-all-known-russian-troll-farm-facebook-ads-and-twitter-accounts.
Dent,Steve.“Report:RussiaHackedElectionSystemsin39USStates.”Engadget,26Oct.2017,www.engadget.com/2017/06/13/report-russia-hacked-election-systems-in-39-us-states/.
Figure1,Figure2,Figure3,Figure4.Shane,Scott.“TheseAretheAdsRussiaBoughtonFacebookin2016.”TheNewYorkTimes,TheNewYorkTimes,1Nov.2017,www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/us/politics/russia-2016-election-facebook.html?_r=0.
Garamone,Jim,andLisaFerdinando.“DoDInitiatesProcesstoElevateU.S.CyberCommandtoUnifiedCombata.”U.S.DEPARTMENTOFDEFENSE,18Aug.2017,www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1283326/dod-initiates-process-to-elevate-us-cyber-command-to-unified-combatant-command/.
Gardner,Cory,andChrisCoons.“Senators:RussiaAttackShowsU.S.CybersecurityIsTooWeak.”Time,Time,17Jan.2017,time.com/4636236/senators-cybersecurity-russia/.
TheGrugq.“CampaignInformationSecurity–theGrugq–Medium.”Medium,Medium,20Nov.2017,medium.com/@thegrugq/campaign-information-security-ff6ac49966e1.
Ingram,David.“OnlineAdsOfferLegalOptionforU.S.ElectionMeddling.”Reuters,ThomsonReuters,12July2017,www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-facebook/online-ads-offer-legal-option-for-u-s-election-meddling-idUSKBN19Y01P.
IntelligenceCommunityAssessment.“AssessingRussianActivitiesandIntentionsinRecentUSElections.”OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
KnowBe4.“SpearPhishing.”KnowBe4,www.knowbe4.com/spear-phishing/.Lapowsky,Issie.“WhyItWon'tBeEasyforFacebooktoRegulatePoliticalAds.”Wired,CondeNast,22
Sept.2017,www.wired.com/story/why-facebook-will-struggle-to-regulate-political-ads/.Lee,CarolE.,andJoLingKent.“FacebookSaysRussian-BackedElectionContentReached126Million
Americans.”NBCNews.com,NBCUniversalNewsGroup,30Oct.2017,www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/russian-backed-election-content-reached-126-million-americans-facebook-says-n815791.
Mander,Jason.“SocialMediaUsageRisesTo2+HoursPerDay|GlobalWebIndex.”GlobalWebIndexBlog,16May2017,blog.globalwebindex.net/chart-of-the-day/daily-time-spent-on-social-networks/.
15
Meakins,Joss.“WhyRussiaIsFarLessThreateningthanItSeems.”TheWashingtonPost,WPCompany,8Mar.2017,www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/08/why-russia-is-far-less-threatening-than-it-seems/.
Rosenbach,Eric,etal.“TheCybersecurityCampaignPlaybook.”HarvardKennedySchoolBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs,www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Playbook%201.3.pdf.
Sparks,Daniel.“Top10SocialNetworks:HowManyUsersAreonEach?”TheMotleyFool,TheMotleyFool,30Mar.2017,www.fool.com/investing/2017/03/30/top-10-social-networks-how-many-users-are-on-each.aspx.
Timberg,Craig,etal.“RussianAds,NowPubliclyReleased,ShowSophisticationofInfluenceCampaign.”TheWashingtonPost,WPCompany,1Nov.2017,www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/russian-ads-now-publicly-released-show-sophistication-of-influence-campaign/2017/11/01/d26aead2-bf1b-11e7-8444-a0d4f04b89eb_story.html.
Vaas,Lisa.“DNCChiefPodestaLedtoPhishingLink‘ThankstoaTypo.’”NakedSecurity,16Dec.2016,nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/12/16/dnc-chief-podesta-led-to-phishing-link-thanks-to-a-typo/.
Volz,Dustin,andDavidIngram.“FacebookSaysSomeRussianAdsduringU.S.ElectionPromotedLiveEvents.”Reuters,ThomsonReuters,12Sept.2017,www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-propaganda/facebook-says-some-russian-ads-during-u-s-election-promoted-live-events-idUSKCN1BN2VG.
Whittaker,Zack.“USGovernmentWeakeronCybersecuritythanAnyOtherMajorIndustry.”ZDNet,ZDNet,14Apr.2016,www.zdnet.com/article/us-government-worse-at-cybersecurity-than-any-other-major-industry/.