taiwan’s participation in regional economic integration an
TRANSCRIPT
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 11
Taiwan’s Participation in RegionalEconomic Integration- An Assess-ment, and the Outlook for the Future
Da-nien Liu
Director, Regional Development Study Center,Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research
Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to examine the prospects for
Taiwan’s participation in regional economic integration. The paper
begins by presenting an overview of regional economic integration
in different regions around the world. There is a clear trend towards
the emergence of three major regional blocs. If Taiwan is unable to
achieve a breakthrough in terms of securing greater participation in
regional economic integration, its economic competitiveness will be
steadily eroded. To escape from this situation, Taiwan will need to
focus on negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) that are based on
mutual benefit, and it must be prepared to implement market opening.
As regards the strategy for negotiating FTAs, it will be necessary for
Taiwan to draw up a comprehensive strategy for its participation in
regional economic integration, and to identify those industries that
are likely to be negatively impacted by an FTA so that the government
can communicate with firms in these industries in advance and formu-
late response strategies to minimize the negative impact. Taiwan also
needs to complete the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA) negotiations with China as rapidly as possible, to prevent
12 Prospect Journal No.11
the benefits from ECFA from being diluted, and must plan out a
strategy in advance for dealing with the mutual impact of ECFA and
the proposed FTAs between South Korea and China and between
Japan, South Korea and China. In industry, the emphasis needs to be
placed on expanding production, and on negotiating FTAs with
Taiwan’s main export markets. A secondary focus should be placed
on job creation, working to negotiate FTAs with Taiwan’s main
trading partners for trade in services. At the same time, it must be
recognized that FTAs are not a “magic bullet” for enhancing export
competitiveness; ongoing industrial development still depends on the
fundamentals.
Keywords: Regional Economic Integration, Free Trade Agreement,
ECFA, TPP, RCEP
I. Global Trends in Regional Economic Integration
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round trade talks
have sought to bring about a level of trade liberalization (in terms of
both depth and breadth) that would be the greatest ever achieved since
the WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
(GATT), was first initiated. Unfortunately, the sheer scale of the Doha
Round’s ambitions has prevented any significant progress from being
made. With trade liberalization at the global level having stalled, there
has been a worldwide upsurge in efforts to achieve regional economic
integration. According to statistics from the WTO’s Regional Trade
Agreements database, since 1995 the number of regional trade agree-
ments has grown from 34 to 245, an increase of 211 agreements.
There is thus a clear global trend towards participation in regional
economic integration.1
Jong-Wha Lee, Innwon Park & Kwanho Shin, “Proliferating Regional Trade
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 13
Three major regional trading blocs are gradually taking shape,
in Europe, the Americas, and Asia. Although the process of regional
integration began at a relatively late date in Asia, recently this process
has been speeding up. In Europe, the European Union (EU) is the
main focus of regional trade growth, while in the Americas the U.S.
continues to play a leading role in this respect. In Asia, the main
promoters of regional economic integration have been China, Japan,
South Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The current state of regional integration in each of these three main
regions is discussed separately below.
1. The European Union (EU)
In the past, the EU tended to focus mainly on promoting mul-
tilateral trade liberalization within the WTO framework, and did not
work actively to promote regional economic integration (its attention
was largely taken up with the process of EU expansion). While the
EU did sign a number of bilateral trade agreements, most of these
were signed with neighboring countries, with the aim of helping these
countries to achieve faster economic growth, and of promoting political
and economic stability within the region. In recent years, however,
with the stalling of the WTO Doha Round, the dramatic growth in
the number of regional trade agreements being signed around the
world has created a situation where the EU finds itself being “squeezed
Arrangements: Why and Whither?” The World Economy, Vol. 31, No. 12, De-
cember 2008, pp. 1525-1557; John Whalley, “Recent Regional Agreements:
Why So Many, Why So Much Variance in Form, Why Coming So Fast, and
Where Are They Headed?” The World Economy, Vol. 31, No. 4, April 2008,
pp. 517-532; Jo-Ann Crawford & Roberto V. Fiorentino, “The Changing
Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements,” Discussion Paper, No. 8, 2005, pp.
1-33, World Trade Organization, <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/
discussion_papers8_e.pdf>.
14 Prospect Journal No.11
out” of international trade. Recognizing that the path towards mul-
tilateral trade liberalization is currently blocked, the EU has begun
to adjust its foreign trade strategy, and is now working actively to
develop cross-regional alliances.
The “Global Europe” strategy formulated by the EU in 2006 in-
troduced the concept of the “new-generation FTA,” emphasizing the
need to make economic factors the main consideration when choosing
potential FTA partners.2 The main criteria are market potential and
degree of protectionism; the greater the market potential, and the
higher the level of protectionism that currently exists, the more likely
the EU is to target that country as a partner for an FTA. The economic
upheavals in Europe over the past few years have also led the EU to
adopt new policies to achieve economic and fiscal strengthening, and
to make economic considerations a major motivation for negotiating
FTAs; the aim is to use the dynamism of non-European economies
to revitalize the economies of Europe. The “Europe 2020” strategy
promulgated by the EU in 2010 reiterated the importance of the “new-
generation FTA” concept, and the need to actively seek FTAs with
other countries; it emphasized the need for cross-regional alliances
and a “Go East” strategy, focusing on the development of alliances
with Asian nations such as South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, India
and Japan. Participation in regional economic integration has thus
become a key element in the EU’s overall trade strategy.
While continuing to expand its own membership and strengthen
ties with non-EU countries in the Mediterranean region, the EU has
also signed FTAs with Chile, Mexico, South Africa, Peru, Colombia
European Commission, “Global Europe: competing in the World: A Contribution
to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy,” Trade - European Commission, 2006,
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf>.
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 15
and South Korea, all of which have already come into effect, and
has completed negotiations for FTAs with a group of Central American
nations, Singapore and Canada; the negotiations for the FTAs with
Singapore and Canada were finalized in 2013. Negotiations are still
underway regarding possible FTAs between the EU and the U.S.,
Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, India, ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation
Council, MERCOSUR, and the Andean Community. Particular at-
tention is being paid to the progress in the negotiations for the Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the U.S.
and the EU, and for the EU-Japan FTA; these are the agreements that
the EU will be focusing on most heavily in the near future.3
2. The U.S.
The U.S. is a long-standing advocate of multilateral trade li-be-
ralization, promoting liberalization within the WTO framework, and
in the past it showed limited enthusiasm for regional trade agreements.
However, when the GATT Uruguay Round, which was launched in
1986, began to stall, while at the same time the level of integration
within the EU continued to deepen, the U.S. began to demonstrate
more enthusiasm for regional economic integration. The U.S. approach
to trade negotiations is usually referred to as “competitive liberali-
zation,” with simultaneous promotion of liberalization through multiple
channels (bilateral, regional and multilateral), which the U.S. believes
can speed up the liberalization process and help to ensure U.S.
economic prosperity.
This competitive liberalization approach has put the U.S. in an
advantageous position when seeking to negotiate FTAs. Besides its
own economic might, the simultaneous pursuit of liberalization
To date, the EU has signed a total of 34 regional trade agreements.
16 Prospect Journal No.11
through multiple channels also helps to put the U.S. in a stronger
negotiating position. As shown in Table 1, the U.S. has established
FTAs with countries in the Americas, Asia, Africa and Oceania. Al-
though negotiations for an FTA with the EU are still ongoing, the
U.S. already possesses a global network of FTAs and cross-regional
alliances. The U.S. has thus been very effective in making its regional
integration strategy work.
Table 1: U.S. Participation in Regional Economic Integration
FTAs that are alreadyin effect
Israel, NAFTA (with Mexico and Canada), Jordan, Singapore, Chile,Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, CAFTA-DR (with the Dominican Re-public and four Central American nations), Oman, Peru, SouthKorea, Colombia, and Panama
FTAs that are currentlybeing negotiated
Malaysia, Thailand, Southern African Customs Union*, United ArabEmirates, Andean Community**, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)***,Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (TTIP)
Source: The present study.Notes:* The five member states include South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia.
** The four member states include Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia.***The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) was formed following the announcement
by the U.S. in 2008 that it would be joining the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Part-nership (TPSEP) grouping established on May 1, 2006 by Singapore, Brunei, NewZealand and Chile. Currently, a total of 12 nations are participating in the TPP negotiations.
Recently, the U.S. has been participating more actively in Asian
affairs. Besides announcing the “Pivot to Asia,” the U.S. has also
been lobbying Asian nations to join the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (TPP). The U.S. views the TPP as a path towards Asian
regional economic integration which will also provide diplomatic
and strategic benefits for the U.S. within the Asia Pacific region.
Currently, the TPP and the TTIP agreement with the EU are the main
focus of U.S. efforts in the regional economic integration sphere, and
since considerable progress has already been made in the TPP nego-
tiations, this is being prioritized over the TTIP. Currently, the TPP
has 12 member nations4, and it is anticipated that the negotiations
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 17
will be completed by 2014. The first round of talks regarding the
TTIP was held in July 2013; four rounds of talks have been held so
far, and the negotiations are due to be concluded in 2014.
3. Asia
Given the rapid pace of progress in regional economic integration
within the Asia region over the past few years, in the following
sections an overview of the overall state of regional economic inte-
gration within the region as a whole is followed by more detailed
examination of the situation in relation to key regional economies:
China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN.
A. Regional Overview
In the past, countries within the Asia region showed little en-
thusiasm for regional economic integration; the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA) is the only regional grouping that has been in existence
for some time. However, over the past few years more countries have
begun to seek participation in regional integration, and significant
progress has been made. As shown in Table 2, a total of 136 regional
trade agreements have already come into effect in the Asia region;
another 23 have been signed but not yet come into effect; 90 are still
at the negotiation stage, and 67 are under preliminary evaluation;
this gives a combined total of 315 agreements or potential agreements.
Of those FTAs that have already come into effect, Singapore has
signed the most, at 20 agreements, followed by Japan and India.
Thailand, China, South Korea and Malaysia have also all signed 10
or more such agreements.
These include New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Brunei, the U.S., Australia,
Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada and Japan.
18 Prospect Journal No.11
Table 2: Regional Trade Agreements Entered into by MajorAsia Pacific Economies (as of February 2014)
NationsFTAs Already
in Effect
FTAs Signedbut Not Yet in
Effect
FTAs atNegotiation
Stage
FTAs at Pre-liminary
EvaluationStage
Total
India 13 4 13 9 39
Singapore 20 1 7 4 32
South Korea 10 3 9 10 32
China 10 2 8 5 25
Malaysia 12 2 8 6 28
Japan 13 0 9 4 26
Thailand 11 4 5 7 27
Indonesia 7 2 7 6 22
Vietnam 8 1 6 4 19
Philippines 7 0 2 6 15
Taiwan 4 2 1 0 7
Hong Kong 3 1 1 0 5
Australia 9 1 8 2 20
New Zealand 9 0 5 4 18
Total 136 23 90 67 315
Source: The present study.Note: The data presented in this table is taken mainly from the individual countries’ FTA-
related websites. As a result, there is some degree of duplication; for example the FTAbetween Singapore and Japan, which has already come into effect, is included in thetotals for both Singapore and Japan, whereas the FTA between Singapore and the U.S.is included only in the Singapore total.
B. Participation of Major Asia Region Economies in RegionalEconomic Integration
(a). China
In the past few years, China has demonstrated unprecedented
enthusiasm for pursuing greater participation in international trade
affairs.5 Following the signing of the CEPA agreement with Hong
Kong in 2003, in 2004 China signed trade in goods, trade in services
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 19
and investment agreements with ASEAN; since then, China has grad-
ually negotiated FTAs with a considerable number of other countries,
and has been participating actively in regional economic integration.
As can be seen from Table 3, China has signed FTAs with countries
all over the world. The FTA that China signed with Iceland in 2013
was particularly significant, as this was China’s first FTA with a
European nation. It demonstrated that China is already in a position
to successfully negotiate FTAs with advanced economies.
Table 3: China’s Involvement in Regional Economic Integration
FTAs that are alreadyin effect
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA)*, Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN,Chile, Pakistan, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Costa Rica
FTAs that have beensigned but not yet comeinto effect
Iceland, Switzerland
Source: The present study.Note:* The signatories of the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) include Bangladesh, China,
India, South Korea and Sri Lanka.
China is currently focusing its attention on negotiating an FTA
with South Korea, an FTA with Japan and South Korea, and the Re-
gional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).6 However, be-
cause of historical and political reasons, China remains suspicious
of Japan, and has therefore been devoting most of its attention to ne-
gotiating the FTA with South Korea, and in the RCEP. Currently,
formal negotiations have already begun regarding the China-South
Korea FTA, and it is anticipated that negotiations may be completed
by 2014. With regard to the RCEP, four rounds of talks have already
Agata Antkiewicz & John Whalley, “China’s New Regional Trade Agreements,”
The World Economy, Vol. 28, No. 10, October 2005, pp. 1539-1557.
The 16 member states of the RCEP include ASEAN 10 countries, China, Japan,
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India.
20 Prospect Journal No.11
been completed. It is hoped that negotiations may be completed by
2015.
One point worth noting is that, whereas in the past China viewed
the U.S.-led TPP initiative as a competitive threat aimed at shoring
up U.S. influence in the Asia region (a view which led China to
launch the RCEP as a counterweight), following the news that Japan
would be seeking membership of the TPP, and the announcement
that the TPP would be instituting new trade rules, China’s attitude
towards the TPP has changed, and the Chinese government has an-
nounced that it is now studying the possibility of seeking TPP mem-
bership in the future.
(b). Japan
In its statements regarding the new policy measures being im-
plemented to revitalize the Japanese economy, the Japanese government
has announced that, in the future, it will be focusing on helping
Japanese companies to develop overseas markets, reinvigorating do-
mestic industry, and fostering the creation of new markets. At the
same time, Japan will be working actively to build a network of FTAs
with other countries. The target is for trade conducted within the TPP
framework and under the terms of the FTAs being negotiated between
Japan and the EU and between Japan, China and South Korea to
account for 70% of Japan’s total foreign trade by 2018. Japan is fully
aware that historical and political factors will ensure that progress
in the negotiation of the FTA with China and South Korea will be
slow, and will also affect negotiations in relation to the RCEP. Japan
is therefore prioritizing the TPP and the proposed FTA between Japan
and the EU, with the Japan-China-South Korea FTA and the RCEP
being put on the backburner for the time being. Japan’s participation
in regional economic integration is summarized in Table 4 below.
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 21
Table 4: Japan’s Involvement in Regional Economic Integration
FTAs that are alreadyin effect
Singapore, Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines, Chile, Thailand,Brunei, Indonesia, ASEAN, Vietnam, Switzerland, India, Peru
Source: The present study.
(c). South Korea
Following the inauguration of Park Geun-hye as President of
South Korea, in June 2013 South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry
and Energy announced a new foreign trade roadmap which would
involve a transformation in South Korea’s approach to negotiating
FTAs, with a shift towards emphasizing the benefits that FTAs can
provide in terms of strengthening South Korean industry and building
linkages between different sectors. The Ministry also announced that
the share of South Korea’s total foreign trade that takes place within
the framework of FTAs will rise from 35% in 2013 to 85% in 2023.
South Korea’s participation in regional economic integration is
summarized in Table 5. While South Korea has not yet become
involved in the TPP trade talks, it is already negotiating to sign an
FTA with China and another FTA with China and Japan, and to
become a member of the RCEP. FTAs signed between South Korea
and the U.S., the EU and ASEAN have already come into effect, and
South Korea already has FTAs with most of the major economies
within the TPP (Japan and Mexico are the only two major TPP
member economies with whom FTA negotiations have stalled). South
Korea has thus tended to take the view that joining the TPP would
not offer significant benefits for South Korea, and securing membership
of the TPP has not been a key priority for the country.
However, following the formal announcement that Japan would
22 Prospect Journal No.11
be participating in the 18th round of TPP negotiations, and China’s
announcement that it has begun to study the possibility of applying
for TPP membership, the changing international trade environment
has caused South Korea to rethink its stance towards the TPP. South
Korea has stated that it will be keeping a close eye on how the TPP
negotiations progress, and that it has begun exploratory, one-on-one
discussions with TPP member states. It can therefore be assumed
that it will only be a matter of time before South Korea joins the
TPP. Nevertheless, as South Korea has not yet made any formal an-
nouncement about seeking TPP membership, for the time being it is
likely to give priority to negotiating the FTA with China, followed
by the Japan-China-South Korea FTA, the RCEP, and FTAs with in-
dividual ASEAN member states including Indonesia, Vietnam and
Malaysia.
Table 5: South Korea’s Involvement in Regional EconomicIntegration
FTAs that are alreadyin effect
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), Chile, Singapore, EuropeanFree Trade Association (EFTA)*, ASEAN, India, EU, Peru, U.S.,Turkey
FTAs that have beensigned but not yet comeinto effect
Colombia, Australia, Canada
Source: The present study.Note: The four member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) include Switzerland,
Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.
(d). ASEAN
While continuing to intensify the level of integration within AS-
EAN, ASEAN has also been working actively to strengthen linkages
with other economies. Besides the many FTAs that ASEAN has
signed with individual countries, there has also been a major focus
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 23
on positioning ASEAN as the hub of larger groupings, with the aim
of making the “ASEAN + X” arrangement the mainstream model for
regional economic integration in East and Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s
FTAs with China, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand and India have
already come into effect; negotiations for an FTA with the EU have
been put on hold for the time being. The RCEP negotiations, which
involve the 10 ASEAN member states plus six other economies
(China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia and India) are
scheduled for completion in 2015.
According to the “Guiding Principles and Objectives for Ne-
gotiating the RCEP” promulgated by ASEAN, the RCEP will provide
for differing commitment levels to reflect disparities in economic
performance between member economies. Would-be members will
have the option of undertaking membership talks in a sequential
manner, through a single undertaking, or in some other form. Once
the negotiations between the initial 16 nations have been concluded,
an announcement will be made as to the terms under which other
economies can join. So far, four rounds of RCEP negotiations have
been held; the final round is scheduled for completion in 2015.
To summarize, the worldwide trend towards regional economic
integration continues to grow stronger. The process of regional econo-
mic integration has been most rapid in Asia, with most of the parti-
cipants being Asian economies (rather than economies located outside
the region). The trade agreements signed in the Asia region have em-
phasized market opening, industrial collaboration and trade facilitation,
supported by strict rules of origin, with the aim of strengthening the
regional division of labor between signatory economies and promoting
the integration of the regional supply chain.7 At the same time, there
Saori N. Katada & Mireya Solis, eds., Cross Regional Trade Agreements:
24 Prospect Journal No.11
is a trend towards a gradual expansion of the scale of integration,
with the formation of nascent trade blocks.
II. The History of Taiwan’s Efforts to Negotiate FTAs
Prior to securing membership of the WTO (under the name
“Chinese Taipei”), Taiwan did not make a proactive effort to negotiate
FTAs with other countries, partly because of concerns that this would
delay the securing of accession to the WTO, and partly because such
efforts would inevitably be obstructed by China. Taiwan’s key goal
during this period was to secure WTO membership as rapidly as
possible. It had originally been assumed that, following accession to
the WTO in 2002, Taiwan would be able to leverage its status as a
WTO member to develop overseas markets. However, the lack of
progress in the WTO Doha Round which began in 2002 meant that,
in the event, Taiwan was unable to make effective use of the WTO
platform in this way. At the same time, with multilateral trade libe-
ralization having stalled, countries throughout the world began to
abandon the multilateral approach and focus on bilateral trade agree-
ment and regional economic integration; the negotiating of FTAs
thus emerged as a key element in countries’ foreign trade policy.
With trade negotiations under the WTO framework having
reached an impasse, and with the number of FTAs growing rapidly,
Taiwan found itself in an increasingly disadvantageous position within
the global trade environment. Although Taiwan worked actively to
negotiate FTAs in an effort to avoid becoming marginalized, these
efforts were hampered by opposition from China. Over the period
2003-2008, the only FTAs that Taiwan succeeded in establishing
were with Central American countries that had formal diplomatic re-
Understanding Permeated Regionalism in East Asia (Berlin: Springer, 2008).
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 25
lations with Taiwan (Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador
and Honduras). These FTAs were mainly intended to serve diplomatic
ends; they did not create any significant economic benefits for Taiwan.
It was only after the thawing in “cross-strait” relations between
Taiwan and China in 2008, and the commencement of negotiations
for the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA) with China in 2009, that the obstacles to Taiwan’s negotiating
of FTAs with other countries grew less pronounced.8
In 2013, Taiwan secured some major breakthroughs in its efforts
to secure greater participation in regional economic integration. On
July 10, 2013, the Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic
Cooperation (ANZTEC) was signed, followed on November 7, 2013
by the signing of the Agreement between Singapore and the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic
Partnership (ASTEP). The signing of these FTAs with New Zealand
and Singapore represented a major step forward in terms of Taiwan’s
ability to successfully negotiate FTAs with countries other than those
with which it has formal diplomatic relations. However, given the
rapid pace of regional economic integration, Taiwan still has a long
way to go to catch up.
At a time when regional economic integration is progressing by
leaps and bounds throughout the world, Taiwan is still mired in the
controversy over the approval of the ECFA services trade agreement.
If Taiwan cannot achieve a significant breakthrough in its participation
in regional economic integration, its competitive advantage will be
Cyrus C. Y. Chu, ed.,《ECFA:開創兩岸互利雙贏新局面》(Taipei: Prospect
Foundation, 2009); Tain-jy Chen, ed.,《不能沒有 ECFA:東亞區域經濟整合
對臺灣的挑戰》(Taipei: Prospect Foundation, 2010).
26 Prospect Journal No.11
steadily eroded. Of the various regional economic integration agree-
ments, the ones that should be of most concern to Taiwan are the
TPP, the RCEP, the China-South Korea FTA, the China-Japan-South
Korea FTA, and the TTIP.
With the addition of Japan, the TPP now has 12 members or po-
tential members, making it the world’s largest FTA. Given the vigorous
direction provided by the U.S., it is anticipated that the TPP trade
negotiations may be completed in 2014. The TPP has created a kind
of domino effect, speeding up the progress made in the negotiation
of other FTAs. In particular, the negotiations under the framework
of the RCEP (which grew out of the “ASEAN Plus Six” concept,
and now has 16 member states), have been accelerated, and are sche-
duled for completion in 2015. What is even more worrying for Taiwan
is that the potential membership of the TPP continues to expand;
Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea are already considering
seeking membership, and even China, which had previously been
hostile to the TPP, has begun to evaluate the advisability of joining.
All of this will lead to increased pressure on Taiwan.
In the negotiations for the China-South Korea FTA, a total of
ten rounds of talks have been completed, and the two sides have
reached consensus on many issues; there is a strong possibility that
this FTA will be finalized in 2014. If, at that time, the ECFA agreement
on trade in goods has not been signed, then the competitiveness of
Taiwanese exports in the China market will be eroded. Negotiations
are also continuing between China, South Korea and Japan for the
signing of a three-way FTA. So far, four rounds of talks have been
held; preliminary proposals regarding tariff reductions have been ex-
changed, and discussions have been held regarding the scope of the
negotiations and the guiding principles on which they will be based.
The negotiations for the TTIP agreement between the U.S. and the
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 27
EU have also already completed four rounds of talks; the basic frame-
work for the negotiations has been put in place, and the goal has
been set of completing the negotiations by 2014.
The five FTAs referred to above involve a total of 48 countries,
which between them account for 92% of Taiwan’s exports. If these
five FTAs come into effect, Taiwan will find itself facing severe com-
petitive pressure. Given the emphasis in recent FTAs on market open-
ing, industrial collaboration and trade facilitation, with strict rules
of origin and efforts to strengthen the intra-regional division of labor
and supply chain integration, it can be anticipated that, not only will
these FTAs tend to “squeeze out” Taiwan from participation in intra-
regional trade, they will also have a negative impact on Taiwan’s
role within the global division of labor.
III. Taiwan’s Strategy for Negotiating FTAs
Currently, there is still considerable disagreement between the
government and the opposition in Taiwan regarding the value of the
ECFA agreement signed between Taiwan and China. However, there
is broad consensus regarding the need for Taiwan to seek to negotiate
FTAs with other countries so as to be able to develop overseas markets
more effectively. The question is, how should Taiwan go about this?
What approach should it take? Several aspects of these questions are
considered below.
1. Overall Approach: Emphasizing Mutual Benefit
Firstly, when Taiwan is considering which countries to seek
FTAs with, it should not think only in terms of what benefits the
FTA would create for Taiwan; it should also consider the FTA from
the perspective of the other country, and think about the positive
effects that the FTA could have for that country. Economic benefits
28 Prospect Journal No.11
are always the main incentive for negotiating a bilateral FTA, and
any country that opens up its domestic market pursuant to the terms
of an FTA may experience some degree of negative impact. It needs
to be made clear to the people of both countries the benefits market
opening will bring.
One of the biggest obstacles to the successful negotiation of
FTAs by Taiwan in the past has been the tendency for Taiwan to
think solely in terms of Taiwan’s own interests, and to make the
danger of Taiwan becoming economically marginalized the main jus-
tification for seeking an FTA; this kind of approach is not particularly
persuasive. For example, past efforts to explore the possibility of ne-
gotiating an FTA between Taiwan and the U.S. have failed to give
due weight to the fact that, when negotiating FTAs, the U.S. is bound
to prioritize its own interests above all, seeking to use FTAs to further
its own economic and other goals; the U.S. cannot be expected to be
particularly interested in the negative effects that not signing an FTA
would have on Taiwan. The reality of the situation is that, if Taiwan
continues to adopt a protectionist stance towards its agricultural
sector, to be cautious about opening up the manufacturing sector,
and to seek to avoid opening up the service sector, then neither the
U.S. nor any other country will have much incentive to want to
negotiate an FTA with Taiwan.
Examination of the current level of liberalization in Taiwan’s
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors shows that tariffs on industrial
products are already very low (averaging around 4%). This means
that, when negotiating an FTA with another country, even if Taiwan
offered to reduce all of its tariffs on industrial products, this would
have offer little practical benefit to the other country. However, there
are some product items where tariffs are still relatively high - such
as cars and processed foods - with respect to which Taiwan would
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 29
come under heavy pressure to make tariff cuts.
In the future, the main incentive for other countries to negotiate
an FTA with Taiwan would be to secure easier access to Taiwan’s
agricultural products markets and its service sector. Currently, all of
the countries with which Taiwan is seeking to negotiate FTAs - in-
cluding both developing nations such as the ASEAN member states
and advanced nations such as the U.S., the EU and Australia - are
major agricultural exporter nations. This means that Taiwan needs
to be prepared to allow a greater degree of market opening in its agri-
cultural sector.
As regards Taiwan’s service sector, while the service sector as
a whole has already been opened up to a considerable extent, there
are still segments where there are restrictions on the maximum per-
mitted foreign shareholding, or other barriers to entry. In a bilateral
FTA framework, these segments would need to be liberalized.
Besides market opening in particular sectors, future efforts by
Taiwan to negotiate FTAs (particularly FTAs with advanced economies)
would also necessitate structural reforms and liberalization with
respect to government procurement, pharmaceuticals approvals and
pricing, standard setting, environmental protection measures, and
competition policy, in order for the idea of an FTA with Taiwan to
be sufficiently appealing to the other country.
A further point is that the usual model for negotiating FTAs in-
volves first identifying all of the issues that need to be addressed,
and then using a process of negotiation to determine which items
can be excepted from liberalization. This is significantly different
from Taiwan’s experience with ECFA, where Taiwan was able to
specify in advance a list of areas that were not open to liberalization
30 Prospect Journal No.11
(including agricultural products) before going on to discuss other
issues. Taiwan will need to adjust its approach in this respect.
In the past, Taiwan’s un-readiness to implement market opening
led some other countries to take the view that Taiwan was simply
trying to use FTAs as a tool for securing greater freedom of action
on the international sage, or to feel that “Taiwan is only interested
in negotiating FTAs, not in actually signing them.” If Taiwan is
serious about wanting to participate more actively in regional economic
integration, it needs to be psychologically prepared to implement
large-scale market opening.
2. Strategies for Establishing FTAs
A. Formulating an overall strategy for participation in regionaleconomic integration
In the future, with the impact of the formation of regional trade
blocs as a result of the TPP, RCEP and TTIP agreements, Taiwan’s
freedom of action in the international trade sphere will be even more
constrained than it is at present. Besides drawing up a timetable for
securing membership of the TPP, Taiwan also needs to formulate
concrete strategies and action plans in relation to joining the RCEP,
and responding to the impact of the TTIP and other major FTAs.
B. Engaging in consultation at an early stage, and formulatingresponse measures, with respect to those industries that willbe negatively impacted by FTAs
The China-South Korea FTA and the TPP agreement are likely
to be signed in 2014. It is also possible the China-Japan-South Korea
FTA and the RCEP will be signed and come into effect in 2015 (and
that the TPP will come into effect in 2015). Taiwan needs to formulate
response measures to help those industries that may be affected by
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 31
these agreements, and to keep companies in these industries informed
of the latest developments by strengthening communication with in-
dustry.
The TPP in particular will not only affect Taiwan’s exports; in
the future, the TPP can be expected to play a leading role in setting
the new “rules of the game” in international trade, particularly with
respect to certification standards, intellectual property rights, labor
rights protection, treatment of agricultural products, and other measures
that affect what goes on inside a country’s own borders. Significant
changes can be anticipated. Even if Taiwan is unable to secure mem-
bership of the TPP in the near future, the government should still be
undertaking preparatory research and analysis to ensure that Taiwan
is ready and prepared to secure membership at a later date.
C. Taiwan should complete the ECFA negotiations as soon aspossible, to prevent the benefits from ECFA from being diluted
The government should try to complete the remaining ECFA
negotiations as rapidly as possible. China is Taiwan’s largest export
market; both South Korea and Japan are major competitors for Taiwan.
If Taiwan is unable to secure first-mover advantage in the Chinese
market, the negative impact on Taiwan will be severe. ECFA needs
to be brought into full effect before the signing of the China-South
Korea FTA and the China-Japan-South Korea FTA, and the earlier
the better, otherwise much of the potential benefit from ECFA will
be lost. Not only will Taiwanese exports to China become less com-
petitive, Taiwan’s ability to attract foreign investment may also be
negatively impacted.
32 Prospect Journal No.11
D. Taiwan needs to formulate response strategies in advance inrelation to the potential interaction between the China-SouthKorea FTA, the China-Japan-South Korea FTA, and ECFA
There is a high degree of overlap between the China-South Korea
FTA, the China-Japan-South Korea FTA, and ECFA. China is Taiwan’s
largest export market, while South Korea is a major competitor with
Taiwan in the petrochemical, machinery and IT sectors. If progress
in the ECFA negotiations lags behinds the China-South Korea FTA
and China-Japan-South Korea FTA, then this could have a severe
negative impact on Taiwan. Taiwan needs to formulate negotiating
strategies in advance with regard to the interaction between the China-
South Korea FTA, the China-Japan-South Korea FTA, and ECFA.
For example, with regard to those product items in which competition
between Taiwan and South Korea is particularly intense, Taiwan
should insist that China open up its markets to Taiwanese to a greater
extent than to South Korean products.
3. The Issues for Industry
A. Taiwan should be working actively to secure FTAs with itsmajor export markets, with the aim of boosting production
Viewed in terms of Taiwan’s macroeconomic growth, the signing
of FTAs with Taiwan’s major export markets - such as the EU, AS-
EAN, Japan and the U.S.- would have the biggest positive impact
on GDP growth and in terms of boosting manufacturing output. It
would also do most to help reduce Taiwan’s over-reliance on exports
to China. Viewed strictly in terms of the macroeconomic benefits to
Taiwan, therefore, Taiwan’s first priority - after completing the
ECFA negotiations - should be to seek FTAs with the EU, ASEAN,
Japan and the U.S.; securing membership of the TPP and RCEP
should help Taiwan to achieve this goal.
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 33
B. From the perspective of job creation, Taiwan should be workingto negotiate FTAs with its main trading partners for trade inservices
As the service sector now creates far more jobs than manufac-
turing, if Taiwan wants to exploit FTAs to create new jobs within
Taiwan, then it should seek to focus on negotiating FTAs with the
countries with which it has the largest volume of trade in services,
such as the U.S., the EU, and Japan.
C. FTAs are not a “magic bullet” for boosting export competi-tiveness; Taiwan needs to get the fundamentals of industrialdevelopment right as well
Although, as in other countries, the signing of FTAs will change
the structure of Taiwan’s production, imports and exports, funda-
mentally speaking FTAs cannot be expected to have a dramatic impact
on the international competitiveness of Taiwan’s exports, that is to
say, Taiwan cannot expect that FTAs alone will make industries that
lack international competitiveness suddenly be able to compete ef-
fectively in international markets. At best, FTAs can stimulate a re-
allocation of resources that helps to enhance overall labor productivity.
The government’s goal in promoting the signing of FTAs should be
limited to helping Taiwan’s business enterprises to compete on a
level playing field with foreign companies. If Taiwan wants to enhance
the overall competitiveness of its industries and its exports, it will
need to focus on strengthening R&D, upgrading technology, developing
strong brands and the like.
4. Service Sector Development
Besides promoting the development of strong brands in the
service industries, Taiwan also needs to give more weight to promotion
of service sector development within its overall economic policy.
34 Prospect Journal No.11
Service sector market opening has become a core element in FTAs.
In the past, Taiwan’s economic growth was driven largely by the
manufacturing sector development. Even though the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the service sector had already surpassed that of
the manufacturing sector by the early 1980s, the promotion of de-
velopment in the service sector continued to receive less attention
from the government than development of the manufacturing sector.
By the late 1990s, Taiwan was starting to face intensifying competition
from emerging economies, and its competitive advantage in manu-
facturing was under threat; the manufacturing-focused economic de-
velopment strategy on which Taiwan had relied for so many years
was called into question. In order to keep pace with the changing
times, and with the transformation that has taken place in Taiwan’s
industrial structure, in recent years the Taiwanese government has
gradually moved away from the industrial policy it followed in the
past, which emphasized manufacturing at the expense of the services
sector, and has begun to formulate new policies aimed at fostering
service sector development. In particular, Taiwan needs to focus on
promoting adoption of technology and internationalization in the
service industries, in line with the government’s policy of “promoting
servitization of manufacturing, e-enablement of service industries,
internationalization, and specialization of traditional industries.”
IV. Conclusions
Faced with the growing trend towards regional economic integ-
ration, countries throughout the world have accepted the need for
liberalization. For example, South Korea has lost its fear of market
opening, and is in fact hoping to leverage FTAs to develop global
markets. According to South Korea’s recently announced new foreign
trade development strategy, in the future, besides the FTA that is cur-
rently being negotiated with China, South Korea will also be seeking
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 35
to negotiate FTAs with ASEAN member nations Indonesia, Vietnam
and Malaysia, and with other emerging economies. The South Korean
government has set a target of having exports to countries with which
South Korea has an FTA account for 85% of the country’s total
exports by 2023. By then, South Korea will have built up a compre-
hensive network of FTAs, and Taiwan will be facing severe competition
from its rival. In Japan, the third of “three arrows” growth strategies
announced by the Japanese government includes market opening,
structural refor ms and the promotion of FTAs as key elements in
the strategy. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has stated that
market opening is needed to enable Japanese firms to benefit from
liberalization, so that the Japanese economy as a whole can be re-
vitalized.
China is also working actively to expand its network of FTAs.
Besides encouraging Chinese corporations to expand overseas, the
Chinese government has established the China (Shanghai) Pilot
Free Trade Zone, to serve as a test-bed for full-scale liberalization.
Several Asian nations whose markets are significantly less open
than Taiwan’s - such as Malaysia and Vietnam - have already
joined the TPP, and have accepted the need for greater liberalization.
By comparison with the determination to implement market
opening that is being displayed by other East Asian and Southeast
Asian nations, Taiwan’s progress in securing greater participation in
regional economic integration has been slow, and attitudes in Taiwan
also lag behind. There is still considerable opposition to liberalization
within Taiwan. There is a widespread attitude that Taiwan should be
able to expand into international markets without having to open up
its own domestic market. Fear of China has also tended to slow the
pace of liberalization. Taking the negotiations over the ECFA service
trade agreement as an example, the extent of the market opening that
36 Prospect Journal No.11
Taiwan would implement with respect to China is no greater than
that currently implemented with respect to other foreign countries,
and significantly less pronounced than would be required under the
terms of most FTAs. If even this type of limited market opening
sparks panic over the potential loss of millions of jobs and the idea
that it will cause serious harm to Taiwan’s economy, then how can
Taiwan expect to compete effectively in global markets in the future?
Liberalization is already an unstoppable global trend. If Taiwan
continues to resist market opening and drag its feet, then it cannot
expect to have any success in negotiating FTAs with other countries.
No other country is going to be interested in negotiating an FTA with
a nation that holds to protectionist, blinkered attitudes.
Faced with the incoming tide of regional economic integration,
if Taiwan cannot achieve a significant breakthrough, it risks becoming
the biggest loser from integration within the East Asia region. Given
the steady intensification of economic integration both within East
Asia and globally, Taiwan needs to start working actively to explore
opportunities for negotiating FTAs with other countries (including
completing the ECFA negotiations with China), in order to leverage
market opening to maintain Taiwan’s competitiveness. At the same
time, Taiwan needs to move away from a production-oriented mindset
to a market-oriented mindset, to overcome the obstacles to continued
growth that the export-oriented economic growth strategy of the past
has created. Taiwan also needs to abandon its traditional emphasis
on manufacturing at the expense of the service sector, and work
actively to develop its service industries, so as to stimulate the
beginning of a new era of rapid economic growth.
Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Economic Integration - An Assessment, and the Outlook for the Future 37
References
English
Books
Katada, Saori N. & Mireya Solis, eds., 2008. Cross Regional Trade
Agreements: Understanding Permeated Regionalism in East
Asia. Berlin: Springer.
Journal Articles
Antkiewicz, Agata & John Whalley, 2005/10. “China’s New Regional
Trade Agreements,” The World Economy, Vol. 28, No. 10, pp.
1539-1557.
Lee, Jong-Wha, Innwon Park & Kwanho Shin, 2008/12. “Proliferating
Regional Trade Arrangements: Why and Whither?” The World
Economy, Vol. 31, No. 12, pp. 1525-1557.
Whalley, John, 2008/4. “Recent Regional Agreements: Why So Many,
Why So Much Variance in Form, Why Coming So Fast, and
Where Are They Headed?” The World Economy, Vol. 31, No.
4, pp. 517-532.
Online Resources
Crawford, Jo-Ann & Roberto V. Fiorentino, 2005. “The Changing
Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements,” Discussion Paper,
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European Commission, 2006. “Global Europe: competing in the
World: A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy,”
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docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf>.