2

3

[tableofcontents]:

[iacs2016:about...] 5

IACS2016COMMITTEES: 8LOCALORGANIZER: 10

[keynotespeakers] 13

[themesessions] 25

PEIRCEANCOGNITIVESEMIOTICS 27BLENDINGMULTIMODALINPUTS 36

[individualpapers] 45

[posters] 181

[practicalinformation] 185

4

5

[iacs2016:about...]

6

Cognitivesemioticsisthestudyofmeaning-makingwritlarge:inlanguageandbymeansofothersignvehicles,aswellasinperception,andinaction.Cognitivesemioticsinvestigatesthepropertiesofourmeaningfulinteractionswiththesurroundings–aswellasthoseofotheranimals–inalldomains,inthenaturalaswellasinthesocialworld.Itintegratesperspectives,methodsandinsightsfromcognitivescience,cognitivelinguisticsandsemiotics,placingsignsandsignuse(inthebroadestsense)intothewidercontextofcognitive,social,andneurobiologicalprocesses,usingexperimentalmethods,aswellasclassicaltextanalysisandtheoreticaldisquisitions.Cognitive Semiotics as a field of study deals with questionsconcerning the nature of meaning as well as the role ofconsciousness, theuniquecognitive featuresofhumanbeings, theinteractionofnatureandnurtureindevelopment,andtheinterplayof biological and cultural evolution in phylogeny. To answer thesequestions CS integrates methods and theories developed in thehumanandsocialsciencesaswellascognitivesciences.TheInternationalAssociationforCognitiveSemiotics(IACS,founded2013)aimsattheestablishmentofCognitiveSemioticsasthetrans-disciplinarystudyofmeaning.MoreinformationontheInternationalAssociationforCognitiveSemioticscanbefoundat:http://iacs.dkOneofthegoalsoftheIACSconferenceseriesistogathertogetherscholarsandscientistsinsemiotics,linguistics,philosophy,cognitivescience,psychologyandrelatedfields,whowishtosharetheirresearchonmeaningandcontributetheinterdisciplinarydialogue

7

Topicsoftheconferenceinclude(butarenotlimitedto):• Biologicalandculturalevolutionofhumancognitivespecificity• Cognitivelinguisticsandphenomenology• Communicationacrossculturalbarriers• Cross-speciescomparativesemiotics• Evolutionaryperspectivesonaltruism• Experimentalsemiotics• Iconicityinlanguageandothersemioticresources• Intersubjectivityandmimesisinevolutionanddevelopment• Multimodality• Narrativityacrossdifferentmedia• Semantictypologyandlinguisticrelativity• Semiosis(sense-making)insocialinteraction• Semioticandcognitivedevelopmentinchildren• Signuseandcognition• Signs,affordances,andothermeanings• Speechandgesture• Thecomparativesemioticsoficonicityandindexicality• TheevolutionoflanguageTheBoardoftheAssociation:• ToddOakley,CaseWesternReserveUniversity,President• JordanZlatev,LundUniversity,FormerPresident• KrystianTylén,AarhusUniversity,Treasurer• MonicaTamariz,UniversityofEdinburgh,Secretary• InesAdornetti,RomaTreUniversity,Member• JoâoQueiroz,FederalUniversityofJuizdeFora,Member• GoranSonesson,LundUniversity,Member• PiotrKonderak,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,PR

Officer

8

IACS2016Committees:TheInternationalOrganizingCommittee:• InesAdornetti,RomaTreUniversity• PiotrKonderak,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin• ToddOakley,CaseWesternReserveUniversity• JoâoQueiroz,FederalUniversityofJuizdeFora• GoranSonesson,LundUniversity• MonicaTamariz,UniversityofEdinburgh• KrystianTylén,AarhusUniversity• JordanZlatev,LundUniversityLocalOrganizingCommittee:• PiotrGiza,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversity• PiotrKonderak,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversity• MarcinKrawczyk,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversity• MonikaMalmon,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversity• KrzysztofRojek,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversitystudents:• KamilaAdamska(sociology)• ŁukaszBlechar(cognitivescience)• MajaFurtak(cognitivescience)• ArturGrabowski(cognitivescience)• JoannaKonstanty(cognitivescience)• BartoszLabut(cognitivescience)• ErykMaciejowski(PhDstudent,philosophy)• AnnaPawłasek(cognitivescience)• KamilSzymański(PhDstudent,cognitivescience)• BartoszZaprawa(cognitivescience)• KamilZieliński(cognitivescience)

9

ScientificCommittee:• InesAdornetti,RomaTreUniversity• ElisabethAhlsén,UniversityofGothenburg• JensAllwood,UniversityofGothenburg• RobertoBottini,UniversityofTrento• PeerBundgaard,AarhusUniversity• PeerChristensen,AarhusUniversity• ErikaCosentino,UniversityofBochum• FrancescoFerretti,RomaTreUniversity• PiotrGiza,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversity,Lublin• AdamGłaz,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversity,Lublin• HenrykKardela,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversity,Lublin• PiotrKonderak,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversity,Lublin• MarcinKrawczyk,MariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversity,Lublin• KaleviKull,UniversityofTartu• JonasNölle,AarhusUniversity• ToddOakley,CaseWesternReserveUniversity• JoelParthemore,UniversityofSkövde• EstherPascual,ZhejiangUniversity• JohanneStegePhilipsen,AarhusUniversity• JoaoQueiroz,FederalUniversityofJuizdeFora• VictorRosenthal,EHESSParis• GöranSonesson,LundUniversity• MarleneStaib,AarhusUniversity• MonicaTamariz,UniversityofEdinburgh• KristianTylén,AarhusUniversity• MortenTønnessen,UniversityofStavanger• SławomirWacewicz,NicolausCopernicusUniversityinToruń• JordanZlatev,LundUniversity• PrzemysławŻywiczyński,NicolausCopernicusUniversityinToruń

10

LocalOrganizer:MariaCurieSkłodowskaUniversity(UMCS)wasestablishedin1944attheinitiativeofprofessorHenrykRaabe,itsfirstRector.UMCSisone of the largest and most important universities in Poland.Currently thenumberofstudents isalmost36,000.Theuniversityhas302professors(157fullprofessors),231habilitateddoctors,826seniorlecturers,and1829teachersintotal.TheUniversity’sstructureembraces11faculties.Themostactiveandinfluentialare:theFacultyofBiologyandBiotechnology,theFacultyof Chemistry, The Faculty of Mathematics, Physics and ComputerScienceandtheFacultyofPhilosophyandSociology.The Facultyof Philosophyand Sociology and – in particular – theInstitute of Philosophy has its roots in the Chair of Logic andMethodology,whichwasestablishedtogetherwiththeUniveristy,in1944.ThefirstheadoftheChairwasprof.NarcyzŁubnicki.In1947theChairofPhilosophywasestablished.TodaytheFacultyconsistsoftwoinstitutes:InstituteofPhilosophyandInstituteofSociology.Thestructure of the Institute of Philosophy embraces 11 departmentsdoing research in: esthetics, ethics, ontology, epistemology, logic,philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, cognitivescience,methodologyofscience,culturalanthropology,philosophyofcultureandothers.TheCognitiveScienceBAandMAprogrammesarerealizedby theInstitute of Philosophy in cooperation with researchers from theInstitute of English, the Institute of Computer Science and theInstituteofPsychologyandwiththeparticipationofresearchersfromCenterforCognitiveSemiotics,LundUniversity,Sweden.Weoffer courses ingeneral cognitive science, i.e. inphilosophyof

11

mind, artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, neuroscience,cognitivelinguisticsandcognitivesemiotics,aswellasextracurricularcoursesdevoted to special problemsof cognitive science, someoftheminEnglish.Studentscanchoosebetweentwo"paths":• the„ArtificialIntelligenceandLogic”path• the„Sign,LanguageandCommunication”pathDetails:http://cognitivescience.umcs.lublin.pl

12

[co-organizers]

[patronage]

[support]

13

[keynotespeakers]

14

15

Monday,20thJune,9:30-10:30,AulaEvaJablonkajablonka[at]post.tau.ac.ilTelAvivUniversity,IsraelLanguage,imagination,andtheevolutionofautobiographical

memory

I suggest that the early stages of the evolution of symbolic,imagination-instructing language,whichoccurred in small cohesivesocial groups, led to the problem of distinguishing between thenarrated experiences of others and one’s personal, private pastexperiences.Humansmadenewtypesofmistakes,whicharesimilarto those observed in young childrenwhere “false” (misattributed)memory is common, and became open to new types of socialmanipulation. In these conditions, individuals with betterautobiographical memory had a selective advantage, and suchmemorydevelopedandevolvedthroughcultural,andpossiblyalsogenetic, selection. However, the flexibility allowed by imaginationwhichenabledforwardplanningandsophisticateddecision-making,meantthatmemorydistortions,althoughcontrolledandmoderatedby autobiographical memory, could not be totally eradicated. Anadditional form of memory control, through social and linguisticnorms,mayhavebeenemployedinsomespecialsocialconditions,andIinterpretthelanguageandthesocialnormsofthePirahãastheoutcomeofthecultural-evolutionarycontrolofmemorydistortions,andsuggestwaysoftestingsomespecificaspectsofthisthesis.

16

Monday,20thJune,17:30-18:30,AulaBruceMcConachiebamcco[at]pitt.eduUniversityofPittsburgh,USA

ImprovisingCommunicationinPleistocenePerformances

InhisessayforTheSocialOriginsofLanguage(2014),JordanZlateveffectivelysynthesizesmuchoftherelevantscholarshiponthetopicto argue that the co-evolution of human intersubjectivity andmorality preceded the emergence of symbolic language. My talkacceptstheoutlinesofZlatev’soverview,includinghisassumptionsabout multi-level selection and cultural group selection, andexaminestheperiodnearthebeginningofthenarrativehesketches,when hominin performances significantly departed from primateplay. Severalscholars, includingZlatev,haveadoptedaversionofMerlinDonald’smimesis toexplain thisbreakand Iagree that theability to imitatemusthavebeen important forearlyproto-humancommunication.Butbeforeagestureand/orasoundcouldbewidelycopied,thegroupofhunter-gatherersthat inventedthatparticularvisual-auralsignmusthaveprovisionallyaccepteditbeforethesigncould carry communicative value. My paper will introduce atheatrical-musical term to explain this process: improvisation. Inshort,IwillarguethatselectedbandsofHomoergaster,thespeciesfromwhichweevolved,improvisedtheirwaytowardthesharingandunderstanding of communicative intentions and meanings thateventuatedinperformancesofproto-languaging.Like theirancestorsamillionyearsago,professional improvactorsandmusicianstodayrelyonplayfulintersubjectivityandbehavioral

17

norms to shape their collective creations. Improvisers in both artformsdomore than exchange information; they generate aworldtogetherbased inmutual trust and cooperation. In otherwords,contemporaryimprovisersrequirethesamekindsofmirrorneuronsystems, joint attention abilities, and turn-takingmorality that ourproto-human ancestors likely began to practice during the earlyPleistoceneperiod.Alloparenting,thesharingofparentingresponsibilitiesamongtrustedothers, was likely a necessary first step to enable the kinds ofempathy and norms that facilitated communicative improvisingwithinbandsofourancestors.TheevidencepresentedbySarahHrdyinherMothersandOthers (2009) isquitepersuasiveregardingtheimportanceofalloparentingamongHomoergaster forthekindsoftrustandcooperationthatearlyimprovisersrequired.Iwillalsodrawon the impressive field work of Jerome Lewis, who details theevolutionary significance of play, the easy mixing of musical andgestural communicative codes, and the important morality of“reverse dominance” in the lives of contemporary hunter-gathers,theMbendjeleoftheCongo.Inadditiontopracticingafullysymboliclanguage, groups of these African pygmies continue to engage iniconicmodesofcommunicationtoperformwhatLewiscalls“spiritplays,” rituals of collective singing and dancing that employ asurprising amount of collective improvisation. These spirit plays,which involve a wide range of meanings and functions — fromlearningkeyskillsinhuntingandgatheringtorepresentingtheirsocialandspiritualhierarchies—areintendedtocharmthespiritsoftheforest.WhilerecognizingthatMbendjelecultureisfullymoderninmostrespects,Lewisreasonsthattheirmixedmodesoftraditionalcommunication probably offer clues to the proto-languagingpracticedbyPleistocenehuntergatherersinAfricaamillionyearsago.

18

Tuesday,21June,9:00-10:00,AulaSimonKirbysmkirby[at]gmail.comUniversityofEdinburgh,UnitedKingdom

TheEvolutionofLinguisticStructure:wherelearning,culture

andbiologymeet

Language is striking in its systematic structure at all levels ofdescription. By exhibiting combinatoriality and compositionality,eachutteranceinalanguagedoesnotstandalone,butratherexhibitsanetworkofdependenciesontheotherutterancesinthatlanguage.Wheredoesthisstructurecomefrom?Whyislanguagesystematic,andwhereelsemightweexpecttofindthiskindofsystematicityinnature?Inthistalk,Iwillproposeasimplehypothesisthatsystematicstructure is the inevitable result of a suite of behaviours beingtransmittedbyiteratedlearning.Iteratedlearningisamechanismofcultural evolution in which behaviours persist by being learnedthrough observation of that behaviour in another individual whoacquireditinthesameway.Iwillsurveyawiderangeoflabstudiesof iterated learning, in which the cultural evolution of sets ofbehaviours is experimentally recreated. These studies includeeverythingfromartificial languagelearningtasksandsignlanguageexperiments, to more abstract behaviours like sequence learning,and have recently even been extended to other species. I willconclude by suggesting that these cultural evolution experimentsprovide clear predictions about where we should expect to seestructureinbehaviour,andwhatformthatstructuremighttake.

19

Tuesday,21stJune,16:15-17:15,AulaFrederikStjernfeltstjern[at]hum.aau.dkAalborgUniversity,Denmark

PropositionsandCognition

Propositionsaretraditionallyacoresubjectoflogicandrarelyplaycenterstageincognition.This talk introduces and discusses the cognitive possibilities inPeirce’s alternative conception of propositions which is moreapplicabletocognitiveissuesthanthestandardlogictradition.AfteranexposéofthespecialfeaturesofPeirce’sdoctrineofpropositions,cognitive semiotic issues like diagrammatical reasoning, theintegration of multimodal representations and the propositionalstructureofdorsal-ventraldissociationinperceptionarediscussed.

20

Wednesday,22ndJune,9:00-10:00,AulaEstherPascualesther[at]estherpascual.comZhejiangUniversity,ChinaTheconversationalnatureoflanguage:Fromcognitionandgrammartoexpertcommunicationandlanguagepathology

Stemmingfromtheassumptionthatsocialinteractionisanessentialaspectofhumanexistence,Iarguethatthereisaconversationalbasisforthoughtandlanguage.Specifically,IdiscussthelatestresearchonwhatIcallfictiveinteraction(Pascual2002,2014),thatistheuseofthe frame of ordinary conversation as a means to structure: theconceptualization of reality (construing dance as a conversation),discourse(monologuesorganizedasdialogues),andgrammar(“whyme? attitude”). I suggest that fictive interaction is a fundamentalcognitivephenomenon,aubiquitousdiscourse-structuringdevise,apossibly universal linguistic construction, and an effectivecommunicativestrategyinbothexpertcommunicationandlanguagepathology. To support this claim, I present a cross-linguistic studyinvolvingawidevarietyofunrelatedlanguages(spokenandsigned,withandwithoutawrittencode)andmodesofcommunication(oral,written, visual). The communicative data discussed ranges fromliterature (and literary translation), legal argumentation in high-profilecriminaltrialsandmarketing(i.e.advertisementandbranding)to language pathology (i.e. conversations by adults suffering fromBroca’saphasiaandchildrenwithAutisticSpectrumDisorder).Ihopetoshowthattheintimaterelationbetweenlanguageandinteractionisreflectedincognition,discourse,andgrammar.

21

Wednesday,22ndJune,13:30-14:30,AulaTerrenceDeacondeacon[at]berkeley.eduUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,USA

Thesemioticbasisofuniversalgrammar

Symbolic reference and grammar are inextricably intertwined. Themost universal grammatical attributes that characterize humanlanguagesreflectsemioticconstraintsonsymbolcombinationsthatderive from the necessary dependency of symbolic reference onunderlyingiconicandindexicalmodesofreference.Thisdependencyisoftenbracketedfromconsiderationbyignoringthesemioticworkrequiredtoestablisha“conventional”correspondencerelationship.Thus, treating word reference as mere synchronic arbitrarycorrelation obscures its dependency on prior semiosis. Becausesymbolicreferenceismadepossiblebyrelationsbetweenthesemoreconstrained iconic and indexical relationships, the constraints ofthese lower-order forms are inherited by constraints on symbol-symbol relations, such as in affixes, phrases, sentences, etc. Thisimplies thatmany properties identified as language universals areintrinsictothesemioticconstraintsofsymboliccommunicationandarenotimposedfromanindependent(e.g.geneticorcultural)sourceof grammatical principles. The iconic and indexical constraintsunderlying grammar are discoveredpragmatically via successful orfailedreference,contrarytothe“povertyofthestimulus”claim,andirrespectiveofexplicitcorrectionofgrammarorsyntax.Thesebasicsemiotic constraints are initially learned prior to the beginning oflanguageacquisitionasinfantslearntocommunicategesturally,and

22

are subsequently transferred to communication using words. Theinitial discovery of these prelinguistic semiotic constraints issupportedbyevolvedhuman-specificpredispositions todirect andtrack theattentionalorientationofothers, suchas inpointingandgazefollowing.Impairmentsaffectingthesepredispositionsandtheability to acquire working knowledge of these basic semioticconstraintsmaybeafactorincertaindisturbancesofearlylanguageacquisition,suchasinautism.Fivemajor semiotic constraints contributing to universal grammarare:1.Recursivestructure(onlysymbolscanprovidenon-destructive[i.e.opaque]recursionacrosslogicaltypes;e.g.phrasallevels)2.Predicationstructure(symbolsmustbeboundtoindicesinordertorefer;thisbindingisitselfanindexicalfunction;theindexcanbeanextralinguisticsign)3. Transitivity and embedding constraints (indexicality depends onimmediatecorrelation and/or contiguity, and is transitive; this makes co-expression and adjacency the default and constrains long-distancedependencyrelations)4. Quantification (symbolized indexical operations require re-specificationwith respect to their individuation of reference sinceindices are intrinsically singular whereas symbols are intrinsicallygeneral).5. Iconism and long-distance indexical dependencies (the co-expression-contiguity constraint on indexical binding can beextended by feature-agreement between an index and the mostproximateagreeingobject,asingenderornumerositymarking).

23

This paper builds on arguments made in Deacon (2003 & 2012)providing examples of how these semiotic constraints are initiallydiscoveredininfancyandincorporatedintolanguageacquisition,andhow they can account for many of the most ubiquitous andineluctablegrammaticalfeaturesoflanguage.ReferencesDeacon,T.(2003)Universalgrammarandsemioticconstraints.InM.ChristiansenandS.Kirby(eds.)LanguageEvolution.OxfordUniversityPress.pp.111-139.Deacon, T. (2012) Beyond The Symbolic Species. In T. Schilhab, F.Stjernfeldt, and T. Deacon (eds.) The Symbolic Species Evolved,Springer,pp.9-38.

24

25

[themesessions]

26

27

[themesession1]Monday,10:45-12:45,room4FrancescoBellucci,bellucci.francesco[at]gmail.com(convener)TallinnUniversityofTechnology,EstoniaMartaCaravà,marta.carava[at]gmail.comUniversityofBologna,ItalyClaudiaCristalli,c.m.l.cristalli[at]gmail.comUniversityCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom

PeirceanCognitiveSemiotics(ThemeSession)Peirce declared inference to be “the essential function of the cognitivemind”andatthesametimethe“paramountsemioticrelation”(MS787,CP2.444),foranyreasoningconsistsininterpretingsigns(MS283,637,654).Notonlyisreasoningasignformaliter,orinitsessenceandform;itisalsoasignmaterialiter,orinitsexistenceandexpression.Formaliter,allthinkingisiconicandconsistsinthetransformationofsymbolsintoothersymbolsbymeans of icons (MS 293,MS 339, 1906). Thiswas, at bottom, Kant’sdoctrine: in order to be made object of thinking, a concept must beconstructedorschematizedeitherinpureimaginationoronpaper,wherethe “either…or” operates as parity principle and qualifies Kant as anextendedmindscientistantelitteram.PeircewentfurtherthanKant,andclaimedthatsinceallthinkingisinsigns(formaliter),thentheroyalwaytoa cognitive semiotics is to conceive themindas consisting in itsexternalmanifestations(materialiter)(MS292,MS637).Notonlyisthescienceofthinking best considered as a study of signs (MS L 75); it is also bestconductedasastudyofexternalsigns.The theme session here proposed will discuss the relevance of Peirce’ssemiotic ideas for contemporary cognitive semiotics. Caravà argues thatbothfirst-andsecond-generationcognitivescienceentertainatoonarrowconception of representation, and that Peirce’s own broader semioticnotion can contribute to overcome the limitations of both approaches.CristalliinvestigatestherelationshipsbetweenPeirce’sresearchesinlogic

28

andhisinterestsinstatisticsandexperimentalpsychology,andarguesthatcognitivesemiotics is thetheoretical frameworkwithinwhichpsychology(perception)andlogic(inference)canbereconciled.BelluccidiscussessomerecentapplicationsoftheExtendedMindhypothesistothestudyoflogicalandmathematicallanguages,andexaminesthemeritandthedemeritsofthisapproachfromaPeirceanpointofview.Theaimofthesession is toprovide arguments and analyses in support of the thesis that Peirce’ssemiotics is themostappropriate theoretical framework for thestudyofcognitiveprocesses.

*

Monday,10:45-11:15,room4MartaCaravà,marta.carava[at]gmail.comUniversityofBologna,Italy

ASemioticTurninCognitiveScience?Classical cognitivist accounts of thinking claim that internal symbolmanipulationandcomputationarenecessary(ifnotsufficient)conditionsfor cognitive behavior. Thus, according to these theories, a goodexplanationofhuman cognition canbeprovided if andonly if aprimaryepistemic role is given tomental representations,whichplay the roleofmediatorsbetweensensations(inputsfromtheworld)andactions(outputsdirected towards the world), both considered as non-cognitive events.Therefore, ifwhatcanbecalled“mind” is identifiedwiththinking,andingeneral with cognitive processes, and if these ones are supposed to beinternal(i.e.theyoughttobelocatedinourheads),themindcanbedefinedas the whole of internal representational processes which mirror theexternalworldbymeansoftheunconscioususeofsymbols.

Reactingtothisinternalistand“intellectualistic”pictureofcognitionandmind,secondgenerationcognitivescientiststrytoprovidealternativeexplanations,which,tosomeextent,couldbedefinedasanti-intellectualist

29

andexternalist, inasmuchas theyclaim that “externalities” (i.e.artifacts,actions, bodily movements, etc.) are enabling conditions to producecognition.Nevertheless,ifontheonehandnewparadigmswhichfallunderthe label “4 E cognition” seem to propose a unitary reaction to thecognitivists’ internalist faith -givingbirth to a sort of “pragmatic turn” incognitive science- on the other hand scholars who support Extended,Enactive, Embodied, Embedded andDistributed theories of cognition donotseemtoreachanagreementontheissueofrepresentation.Moreover,itseemstomethattheproblemofrepresentationwithinthetheoreticalframeof the “NewScienceofMind”doesnot concernonly a superficialdisagreementonitsepistemicnecessityorepistemicpower,butitseemstohavedeeperroots.Asamatteroffact,thenotionofrepresentationallthesetheories deal with still seems to fit the narrow description which firstgenerationcognitivistsgiveofit.Thus, theaimof this talk is to speculateonanotherandbroaderway tothink of representation, conceiving it in semiotic terms, namely as anelementofaformaltriadicrelationwhichcanactivelyproducecognitions,andwhoseembodimentisnotaprioridetermined.Thediscussionwillbelead by the analysis and the reinterpretation of some pivotal notions ofPeirceansemiotics,suchasthoseofinterpretantandsemiosis,inordertoproduceanintegrationamongthecognitivetheoriesexamined.ReferencesATÃ, Pedro, QUEIROZ, João (2014), Icon and Abduction: Situatedness in

Peircean Cognitive Semiotics, in MAGNANI, L. (a cura di), Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Theoretical andCognitiveIssues,Springer,Heidelberg/Berlin,pp.301-314.

AYDIN, C. (2015), “The artifactualmind: overcoming the ‘inside–outside’dualism in the extended mind thesis and recognizing thetechnological dimension of cognition”, in Phenomenology and theCognitiveSciences,n.14(1),pp.73-94.

BURKE, T. (2014), [J. R. Shook, T. Solymosi, Eds.,] “Extended Mind andRepresentation”, in Pragmatist Neurophilosophy. American

30

PhilosophyandtheBrain,NewYork/London,BloomsburyPublishing,pp.177-202.

BURKE,T. (2008),“(Anti)Realist ImplicationsofaPragmatistDual-ProcessActive-ExternalistTheoryofExperience”,inPhilosophiaScientiae,n.12(1),pp.187-211.

CLARK,A.(2008),SupersizingtheMind.Embodiment,ActionandCognitiveExtension,NewYork,OxfordUniversityPress.

CLARK, A. (1997), Being there: Putting Brain, Body andWorld TogetherAgain,Cambridge(MA),MITPress;ItaliantranslationDareCorpoallaMente,Milano,McGraw-Hill,1999.

CLARK,A.,CHALMERS,D.(1998),“TheExtendedMind”,inAnalysisn.58(1),pp.7-19.

DADDESIO,T. (1995),OnMindsandSymbols.TheRelevanceofCognitiveScienceforSemiotics,Berlin/NewYork,MoutondeGruyter.

ENGEL, A.K., MAYE, A., KURTHEN,M., KÖNING. P. (2013), “Where’s theaction? The pragmatic turn in cognitive science”, in Trends inCognitiveSciencen.17(5),pp.202-209.

GALLAGHER, S. (2014), “Pragmatic interventions into enactive andextendedconceptionsofcognition”,inPhilosophicalIssues,n.24.

GALLAGHER,S.(2009),“Philosophicalantecedentsofsituatedcognition”,in[Robbins, P., Aydede, M., Eds.] Cambridge Handbook of SituatedCognition,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.35-51.

HOUSER,N. (2011), [R.M.Calcaterra,Ed.,]“Actionandrepresentation inPeirce’s Pragmatism”, in New perspectives on Pragmatism andAnalyticPhilosophy,Amsterdam-NewYork,Rodopi,pp.61-70.

HURLEY,S.(2010),[R.Menary,Ed.,]“Thevarietiesofexternalism”,inTheExtendedMind,Cambridge(MA),MITPress,pp.100-153.

HUTCHINS,Edwin(1995),Cognitioninthewild,MITPress,Cambridge(MA).PEIRCE,C.S.WritingsofCharlesS.Peirce:AChronologicalEdition,Indiana

UniversityPress,Bloomington-Indianapolis.PEIRCE,C.S.(1931-1958),CollectedPapersofCharlesS.Peirce,[voll.I-VI,

Eds.C.Hartshorne,P.Weiss;voll.VII-VIII,ed.W.Burks,]Cambridge(MA),HarvardUniversityPress.

31

PEIRCE,C.S.(1967),CharlesSandersPeirce’smanuscripts;ROBINRichard,AnnotatedcatalogueofCharlesSandersPeirce,Amherst,UniversityofMassachussettsPress.

SHORT,T.L.(2004),[C.Misak,Ed.,]“ThedevelopmentofPeirce’sTheoryofSigns”,inTheCambridgeCompaniontoPeirce,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge(MA),pp.214-240.

SKAGESTAD,Peter(2004),Peirce'sSemeioticModeloftheMind,inMISAK,C. (a cura di), The Cambridge Companion to Peirce, CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge(MA),pp.241-256.

STEINER, P. (2013), “Pragmatism(s) and Cognitive Science: IntroductoryRemarks”,inIntellectica,n.60,pp.7-48.

STEINER,P.(2008),“Sciencescognitives,tournantpragmatiqueethorizonspragmatistes”,inTracés.RevuedeSciencesHumaines,n.15,pp.85-104.

TIERCELIN,C. (1995), [L.Haaparanta,S.Heinämaa,Ed.]“TherelevanceofPeirce’sSemiotic forContemporary Issues inCognitiveScience”, inActa Philosophica Fennica. Mind and cognition: philosophicalperspectivesoncognitivesciencesandartificialintelligence,vol.58,pp.37-73.

WILSON,R.(2010),“Meaningmakingandthemindoftheexternalist”, in[Ed. Menary, R.,] The extended mind, Cambridge (MA), The MITPress,pp.167-188.

*

Monday,11:15-11:45,room4ClaudiaCristalli,c.m.l.cristalli[at]gmail.comUniversityCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom

Logicmaterialiter.TherelevanceofpsychophysicsinPeirce’saccountofreasoning

ItisalmostacommonplaceinPeirce’sscholarshipthethesisthatPeircewas

32

nopsychologicalthinker,andthatheheldlogictobethe“artofreasoning”(1877:“TheFixationofBelief”EP1,p.109), i.e.,somethingthatmustbelearnedandpracticedratherthanderivedfromintrospection.However, ifreasoningisacriticaltaskthatisperformedintheworld,howcanapurelyformalsetoftoolsbeofanyhelpindevelopingit?Indeed,Peircedidnotprovideonlyaformalaccountofhislogic.Morethananyotherthinkerofhistime,herealizedthatstatisticsandthetheoryoferrorscouldleadtoanobjectivetreatmentofperception,andofhowweattribute relevance to stimuli. This fact has been acknowledged by IanHacking (1988: “Telepathy”, Isis), who however considers Peirce'sreflections on statistics and probability as something separate from hisdoctrineofpragmatism(2009:“OnNotBeingaPragmatist”,Misaked.,32-49).MycontributionwillshowthatPeirce'spragmatismandsemioticsmorebroadlyowealottohisreflectionsinstatistics,whichwereinturntriggeredby his activity at the US Geodetic and Coast Survey and his less knowninterestsinpsychologyandinpsychophysicalresearch(Peirce1883:“OntheflexureofPendulumSupports”,1885:“OnSmallDifferencesinSensation”,bothinWritings,v.4:515-528,v.5:122-135).IarguethatPeirceprovidesthekeyforapossibledistinctionbetweenanempirical and historical account of logical inference on one side and apsychologisticoneontheotherside.Whileapsychologisticapproachhastobe rejected,buildinga connectionbetween theempirical and the logicalstudyofinferencesisnecessaryalbeitdifficulttask:“philosophicalsciencesandpsychologywouldhaveeachtobebuiltupontheother”,Peirceclaims.“Theymustcollectivelyformanarch–or,rather,aSaturn’sring,foranarchhasthegroundtorestupon.”(CNIII,p.128-9).ThelogicofinferencethatPeircedevelopsmustthereforebeunderstoodinthelightofhisstrugglefor“puttinglogic[…]upontheundeniablefootingofscience”(1902:“PartsofCarnegieApplication”,inNewElem.ofMath.,v.4:14).Insofarpsychologicalresearch is, in Peirce's opinion, an inquiry about human experience, themissingpieceofthepuzzleiswhatshallcoverthedistancefromperceptiontojudgmentandtoscientificinference.Iproposethatcognitivesemioticscanofferthetheoreticalframeworkforthisenterpriseandbenefitfromits

33

results.*

Monday,11:45-12:15,room4FrancescoBellucci,bellucci.francesco[at]gmail.comTallinnUniversityofTechnology,Estonia

DiagramsasCognitiveTechnologiesBuilding on the Extended Mind hypothesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998), atheoreticalapproachhas recentlybeenproposedwhichconsiders formallanguages (among which diagrammatic formal languages) as cognitivetechnologies(Clark2006;DutilhNovaes2012;DeCruz&DeSmedt2013).This perspective offers interesting insights on diagrams as inferencetechnologies combiningboth illustrative andoperative roles. It is arguedthat certain purely perceptual and/or syntactical properties of diagramsplay a fundamental role for the cognitive process, and that differentpropertiesmayhavesignificantlydissimilarcognitiveimpact.Thequestionthusbecomesinterestingwhetherandhowdifferentsystemsofdiagramsdifferently participate in cognitive processes. Inwhat differentways andaccordingtowhatprinciplesnotationsanddiagramscanbeinstrumentsofinference?What are formal languages good for? The commonanswer isthat diagrams can be evaluated according to three basic parameters:expressivity (diagrams are isomorphic representations of their objects),iconicity (diagramsare iconicornatural representationsof theirobjects),and calculation (diagrams allow calculation being performed concerningtheirobjects).

AccordingtoCharlesS.Peirce,noneoftheseparametersisprimaryinitself.ForPeirce,adiagramisfirstandforemostaninstrumentoflogicalanalysis. If we are interested in formal languages “not only as(mathematical)objects as such,but rather in thebroaderpictureofhowformallanguagesareusedandtheimpacttheyhaveonpractices”(Dutilh

34

Novaes 2012, p. 52), then we can no longer ignore Peirce’s own basicparameterforthestudyofdiagrammaticreasoning,aswellastheusehemade of specific kinds of diagrams of his invention. For Peirce, the bestanalysis of the actions of the cognitivemind is through a diagrammaticsyntax (MSS485,669, L376),and thesystemofExistentialGraphs (EGs)was,accordingtohim,themostperfectsystemoflogicalrepresentationforanalyticpurposes:“thesystemofExistentialGraphsisdesignedtoaffordasortofgeometricalπαρασκευή,—ordiagram,—forlogicalanalysis,i.e.forillustratingandfacilitatingthesame”(MS300,p.34,1908).Thecognitiveimpact of a system of diagrams is to be evaluated on the basis of theiranalytic power. Algebra is more analytic than natural language, but theGraphs are more analytic than algebra (and, for that matter, of anyequivalentlyexpressivesystemoflogicrepresentationhithertoknown).ThemeritsofEGsdonoconsistintheirallowingmultiplereadings(Shin2002),nor in their functioningas instrumentsofcalculus (Shimojima1996).EGsare neither a lingua characteristica nor a calculus ratiocinator (as Fregethought his Begriffsschrift would be). Their chief merit consists in theirenablingustoanalyzethemovementofthemindinthought:“thesystemofexistentialgraphsisaroughandgeneralizeddiagramoftheMind”(MS498,1906)ReferencesClark,A.2006.MaterialSymbols.PhilosophicalPsychology19,291–307.Clark,A.,&Chalmers,D.1998.TheExtendedMind.Analysis58,10–23.De Cruz, H. & De Smedt, J. 2013. Mathematical Symbols as Epistemic

Actions.Synthese190,3-19.Dutilh Novaes, C. 2012. Formal Languages in Logic. A Philosophical and

CognitiveAnalysis.Cambridge:CambridgeUP.Peirce, C. S. 1867. Manuscripts in the Houghton Library of Harvard

University, as identified by Richard Robin,Annotated Catalogue ofthePapersofCharlesS.Peirce,Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1967.

35

Shin, S.-J.2002.The Iconic LogicofPeirce’sGraphs.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.

Shimojima,A.1996.OntheEfficacyofRepresentation.Dissertation,IndianaUniversity.

*

36

[themesession2]Monday,14:00-16:30,room4RafałAugustyn,augustyn.rafal[at]gmail.com(convener)AgnieszkaMierzwińska-Hajnos,agahaj[at]interia.pl(convener)JoannaJabłońska-Hood,hood.asia[at]gmail.comEwelinaPrażmo,ewelinaprazmo[at]gmail.comMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,PolandAgnieszkaLibura,agnieszka.libura[at]uni.wroc.plUniversityofWroclaw,Poland

Blendingmultimodalinputs(Themesession)It is widely recognised that using simultaneously various sensory stimulifacilitatescognitiveprocessingofinformation.Suchmultimodalprocessinghas a largely positive impact on human cognitive system: it raises ourattention,boostsourmemorycapacityandoftenengagesusemotionally.Thus,inthisthemesessionweundertaketoexaminethewayhowmultiplesensoryinputsparticipateintheprocessofmeaningconstruction(semiosis)andhow they influence it. In particular,weaimat looking intodifferentformsofmultimodalinputs(verbal,semiotic,visual,imageschematic,etc.)that are dynamically integrated together to produce a conceptual entitythat is both semiotically and semantically complex andwhichmay havevariousphysicalrepresentation(e.g.writtentext,verbalhumour,cartoon,poster,talk).

A methodological tool developed in cognitive science that can beusedforstudyingthisphenomenonisConceptualBlendingTheory,bothinthe form proposed by its founding fathers, Gilles Fauconnier and MarkTurner(2002)andasitsextensionselaboratedbyothercognitivelinguists(cf.BrandtandBrandt2005,OakleyandCoulson2008,Brandt2013,alsoPérez Sorbino 2014).Whether classic or revised, CBT discusses, first andforemost,themechanismsofconceptualintegrationunderstoodhereasabasicandsimultaneouslyverydynamicmentaloperationwhichallowsusto

37

accountformeaningsoftransientnatureexpressedintheformoftheso-calledmultimodalblendsbyvirtueoftracingandjuxtaposingelementsofinput spaces. It also facilitates the understanding of processes whichaccompany the conceptualisers whenever they attempt to decode suchblends.

In view of the above-mentioned considerations a few pertinentquestionsshouldbeposedduringourthemesession:a)Howdoinputsbelongingtodifferentperceptualdomainsinteractwith

oneanother?b)Itispossibletoassessthecontributionofindividualinputstotheactual

meaningofthemultimodalblend?c)Towhatextentdoesmultimodalblendinginfluencetheprocessof

meaningconstrual?Weclaimthattheproposedthemesessionwillcastanewlight

onthephenomenonofmultimodalconceptual integrationnotonlyfrom the perspective of cognitive studies upon language, but alsowith reference to other branches of science which deal with theaspectsofhumancognition.ReferencesBrandt, L. 2013. The Communicative Mind. A Linguistic Exploration of

Conceptual IntegrationandMeaningConstruction.Newcastleu.Tyne:CambridgeScholarsPublishing.

Brandt, L. & P. A. Brandt. 2005. “Making sense of a blend. A cognitive-semioticapproachtometaphor”.InRuizdeMendozaIbanez,F.J.(ed.)AnnualReviewofCognitiveLinguistics3.Amsterdam/Philadelphia:JohnBenjamins.216-249.

Fauconnier,G.&M.Turner.2002.TheWayWeThink:ConceptualBlendingandtheMind’sHiddenComplexities.NewYork:BasicBooks.

Oakley, T. & S. Coulson.2008. “Connecting the dots: Mental spaces andmetaphoriclanguageindiscourse”.InOakley,T.&A.Hougaard(eds.),Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction, 27–50. Amsterdam,Philadelphia:JohnBenjamins.

38

Pérez-Sobrino, P. 2014. “Multimodal cognitive operations in classicalmusic”.VigoInternationalJournalofAppliedLinguistics11,137-168.

*Monday,14:00-14:30,room4EwelinaPrażmo,ewelinaprazmo[at]gmail.comMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,PolandMeaningfulForms.CognitiveAnalysisoftheSemanticContribution

ofaFontTypetoaTextIn the light of the increasing application of conceptual integrationtheoryinthestudyofdynamicmeaningconstruction,weattempttoexamine its multimodal dimension. Conceptual integration theory(alsoknownasconceptualblendingtheory)isusefulinexplainingtheemergent meanings and associations. The process occurs at themorphological,lexicalandsyntacticlevelsaswellasacrossthem(e.g.themeaningconstructionofalexicalitemintegratedwithacertaingrammaticalaspect).Itcanusetheresourcesofone,aswellasseveraldifferent languages (e.g. linguistic hybridity). However, conceptualintegration may also explain meaning construction in multimodalcontexts. Itcanbringtogether language,music, image,gestureandsound.Inthepresentpaperweaccountfortheextrameaningsaddedtothemessageduetotheuseofacertainfonttype.Inordertodoso,weapplyFauconnierandTurner’sconceptualintegrationtheory(cf.FauconnierandTurner2002)aswellasForceville’snotionofthemultimodalmetaphor(cf.Forceville2008)tothestudyofmultimodalmeaning construction.We claim that the fontmay strengthen themessage,activateassociationsorevenaddextrasemanticvaluetothetext.Specifically,weexaminethepopularuseoftheHelveticafontinmarketing,advertisingandtheInternetaswellasotherfontsused

39

onsocialnetworkingsites(e.g.Twitter,Facebook).Thepresentpaperismaintained in thecognitive linguistics framework,makinguseofRonaldLangacker’scognitivegrammarparadigmanditsterminology(cf. Langacker 2008). We also espouse the cognitive semioticsperspectivebystudyingthelinguisticsigninitsentirety;theformandthemeaning.Conceptualintegrationprocessinrepresentedbytwoinputspacesfunctioningattwodistinctsignsystems.Inourstudythetwo different modes of perception are language and its graphicalrepresentationi.e.thefont.

*Monday,14:30-15:00,room4AgnieszkaLibura,agnieszka.libura[at]uni.wroc.plUniversityofWroclaw,PolandBlendingRefugeesProblem.AnAnalysisofHumorousConceptual

IntegrationTheaimofthispaperistoinvestigatethecomplex,multimodalinputsin blending processes underlying Polish cartoons, memes anddemotivators that relate to the problem of refugees andmigrantswhoarearrivinginEurope.First,thepaperfocusesontheinputsinthe form of a complex scenarios, such as fairy tales and culturalcustoms.Second,therecursiveblendsareanalyzedwhoseinputisanoutputofanotherconceptualintegration.Thestudyshowshowthefactual,emotional,axiologicalandcultural informationprovidedbyvarious multimodal inputs contributes to the process of thehumorousincongruityresolutionwhichis,inthecaseofhumor,thecoreofthemeaningconstructionprocess.

*

40

Monday,15:00-15:30,room4JoannaJabłońska-Hood,hood.asia[at]gmail.comMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,PolandMultimodalityanditsImpactontheNotionofLinguisticDisparity

thatCreatesHumourHumourmaybeaccountedforviaconceptualintegrationtheory(CITforshort)createdbyFauconnierandTurner.Thevastresearch intoboth comedy and CIT would suggest that blendingmay provide atoolkit with which to explain the intricacies of humour origin andinterpretation. However, what is needed at present is moreexperimentation into thenatureof inputswhichareblended, thusproviding uswith the incongruous and funny contents. Thiswouldcertainlybenefitcontemporaryhumourstudies,throwingmorelightonthenatureofthecomic,i.e.wecouldpreciselypinpointthekindof opposition that results in laughter. This presentation is going toprovide a starting point in such research, analysing the notion oflinguistic disparity within humour and specifically the impact thatmultimodality might bear on the incompatibility of input mentalspacesaswellasthemeaningofhumour.Theinitialhypothesisisthatmultimodalitywillenrichhumour;totheextentthatitwillstrengthenthecomiceffectsinparticular,butalso,subsequently,thelaughterofhumourreceiver.

*

41

Monday,15:30-16:00,room4AgnieszkaMierzwińska-Hajnos,agahaj[at]interia.plMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

Words,ImagesandBeyond:OnaMultimodalCharacterofConceptualBlendsAppearinginthe2015PolishPoliticalCampaign

PostersThe proposed presentation discusses amultimodal character of selectedpolitical campaign posters which accompanied the 2015 parliamentaryelectioninPoland.Sinceapivotaltaskofapoliticalposteristofamiliarizetheelectoratewithaparticularcandidate,andthusencourageapotentialvoter to supportagivenparty, theproponentsof suchposters reach forbothvisualandverbalmeansaswellasrecallotheraspects,e.g.culturalbackground, social status, or political bias to achieve the so-called‘ideologicalmobilization’(Sontag1999).Thus,tobecomeaneye-catchingand,firstandforemost,persuasivemedium,politicalcampaignpostersareoftenexpressedintheformofconceptualblendsconstructedonthebasisoffrequentlydisparateinputsspaces(FauconnierandTurner1998,2002).Inordertoarriveatasuccessfuldecodingofsuchblendsandaccountfortheir multimodal character, a revised six-space model of conceptualintegrationasdelineatedbyBrandtandBrandt(2005)willbeappliedintheproposedanalysis.

*

42

Monday,16:00-16:30,room4RafałAugustyn,augustyn.rafal[at]gmail.comMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

MultimodalityinScienceCommunication:HowtoCreateaSuccessfulBlend?

In recent years we have been witnessing unprecedented rise ofdifferent and creative forms of presentation aimed at popularisingknowledgepertainingtovirtuallyeveryscience fieldanddiscipline.Owingtomodernsocialmedia(YouTube,Vlogs,dedicatedwebsites)bothresearchersandlaysciencepopularisersusedifferentchannelsavailable and createmultimodal presentations (usingmainly visualandaural stimuli,but sometimes stimulatingalsoother senses)onstrictly scientific or science-related topics to attract attention ofdifferenttargetgroupsofreceivers.Sincethissciencecommunicationmovement, sometimes even falling under the category ofedutainment,enjoysconsiderablepopularitythereareevenspecialevents organised for this purpose (e.g. TED conferences, FameLabcompetition,etc.).Astheaimofsuchpresentationsistoattracttheattention of the audience, and the presenters usually have a verylimitedtimetotacklefrequentlyacomplexscientificissue,itrequiresgreat planning skills as to both the content and the form of thepresentation.With this is mind, the aim of this paper is, based on a selectedexamples of FameLab competition entries, to account for theinterplayofdifferent inputs in theprocessofmeaningconstrualasintended by the presenters. In particular, we will focus on theconceptualstageofmeaningconstrual,priortotheverbalrealisationof the message. To this end we will use Fauconnier and Turner’s

43

(2002) standardmodel of Conceptual Blending, aswell as its latermodifications(cf.Oakley&Coulson2008andBrandt2013)which,inour view, can give further insight into how inputs from variousmodalities are fused together to produce a semantically rich butsimultaneouslysuccinctblendthatcanbesubsequentlysuccessfullyunpackedbytheaudience.

*

44

45

[individualpapers]

46

47

[blending]Wednesday,10:30-11:00,room4TimAdamson,timothy.adamson[at]hawkeyecollege.eduHawkeyeCommunityCollege,USA

ConflationandtheEssenceofThinkingIn this talk I lay out some of the philosophical implications ofmetaphor/conceptual blending theories. I argue that these theories,althoughdifferentinsomerespects,pointtoasinglemodelofthinkingthatshouldbedevelopedasachallengetotraditionalmodelsandassumptions.Ever since Plato, with few exceptions, reason has been characterized interms of collecting and dividing, naming, defining, separating, andorganizing.Inotherwords—puttingeverythinginitsproperplace,amongitsproperkind,and in theproperorder. Thesemetaphorsare sodeeplyentrenched thatmuchof philosophy canbe viewed as debates over theprecise nature, origin, and method of such ordering, rather than aquestioningofthemetaphoritself.ConceptualmetaphortheoryandconceptualblendingtheorychallengethisPlatonicmodel, first,byexposing it asonemetaphoramongothers, andsecondbysuggestinganalternativeaccountofreasoning.Butwhatisthisalternative, and how does it stand against the model that Platoinaugurated?Isuggestthatthealternativehasnotbeensufficientlylaidoutand that it is best described as conflation. The essence ofmetaphoricalcognition/blending is a the conflation of things, understanding one asanother,thinkingoneasanother.Thinkingoperatesnotonlybydividingandseparating (Plato was not entirely wrong) but also by conflating things,confusingtheminwaysthatproducemeaning.Conflationisthecognitiveoperationthatunderlaysthe insightsofconceptualmetaphortheoryandconceptualblendingtheory.Conflation can be found at all levels of experience and meaning. AsMerleau-Pontyshowed,perceptioninvolvesaconflationofbodyfleshandworld.Thehandrevealstexturebecauseithasatexturethatcanreceiveothertextures.Metaphorrevealstheconflationattheheartofmeaning,as

48

abstractdomainsareworkedout,playedout, intermsofmoreconcrete,often bodily events. Conceptual blending theory tries to capture thisconflationthroughthenotionofblending,butitquicklytriestointerpretitin terms of discreet operations, elements, and rules. Such an accountobscures the conflation atwork. Ritual, too, depends on conflation. It ismetaphorintheflesh,ormetaphorreturningtoitscarnalroots.Inritualwethinkaboutsinandsalvation,sufferingand liberation,socialdivisionandharmony,bymoving,feeling,andactinginspecificways.Actionisconflatedwiththinking;thinkinghappensinaction.Thinkinghappensasaction.Isummarize(briefly)theseformsofconflationandoutlinethebasicnatureofconflationasamodelofthinkingattherootofcognitivelinguisticsinitsvariousforms.

*

[embodiment&situatedness]Tuesday,14:30-15:00,AulaDaniellaAguiar,daniella.aguiar[at]gmail.comFederalUniversityofUberlandia,BrazilPedroAtã,ata.pedro.1[at]gmail.comJoaoQueiroz,queirozj[at]gmail.comFederalUniversityofJuizdeFora,Brazil

Nicheexplorers:asituatedaccountofcreativityindanceandliterature

Artistic creativity has often been associated with mysterious or vaguelyformulated concepts such as “talent”, “intuition”, “inspiration” or“geniality”.Acommonviewisthatcreativitypossessesanunaccountableelement of subjectivity and cannot be understood. Differently,psychologicalapproachestocreativityhaveinvestigatedpersonalitytraits,cognitive abilities, emotional dispositions and the relation between"creative individuals" and social institutions. Those approaches areconsistent with internalist paradigms in cognitive science that regardcognition as the processing of internal, discrete and intentional units of

49

informationandinwhichtheroleofcontextandexternaltoolsissecondary.Inoppositiontosuchparadigms,SituatedandEmbodiedCognitiveSciencehasquestionedthelegitimacyofskinandskulltoserveascriteriaforthedemarcationoftheboundariesbetweenmindandtheworld.Thisapproachstressesthatthecapacitiesofmindareshapedbynon-biologicaltoolsforthinking and that decisive stages of cognitive processing can happenexternallytothebrain.We approach creativity not as an "ability" of individual minds, but asopportunitiesfornicheconstructionthroughtheexploitationofcognitiveartifacts(Clark,2006).Inourdescription,artisticcognitivenichesrepresentestablishedwaystoexploitavailablecognitiveartifactsthroughhighordersemioticdynamics, suchas in thenotionsofpoetic functionof language(Jakobson & Pomorska, 1988), or artworks as dichotomous artifacts(Pepperell,2015).Artisticcognitivenichesembedopportunitiesforculturalevolution, in a process of niche construction which involves thetransformationof“problemspaces”(Simon,1999).We exemplify our perspective with well-known cases in poetry andtheatrical dance. In dance, for instance, external artifacts constrain thedancers’ and choreographers’ actions in different levels. Techniques,presentation spaces, composition methods, softwares, dance shoes andmanyother resources, functionasboundaries forcreatingchoreographicpieces.Ourapproachissupportedbyexamplesindancehistory.Ineachofthem,theintroductionofartifactschangednotonlyhowtomakedance,but also the very concept of dance, opening opportunities for theexplorationofnewniches.ReferencesClark,A.(2006).Language,embodiment,andthecognitiveniche.TrendsinCognitiveSciences,v.10,8p.370-374.Jakobson,R.&Pomorska,K.(1988).Dialogues.MITPress.Simon,H.(1999).Problemsolving.InR.A.WilsonandF.C.Keil(Eds.),TheMITEncyclopediaoftheCognitiveSciences.TheMITPress,p.674.

50

Pepperell,R.(2015).Artworksasdichotomousobjects:implicationsforthescientificstudyofaestheticexperience.FrontiersinHumanNeuroscience,9.

*[communication]Tuesday,11:30-12:00,AulaJensAllwood,jens[at]ling.gu.seElisabethAhlsén,eliza[at]ling.gu.seUniversityofGothenburg,Sweden

Dimensionsofcontext.Classifyingapproachestothecontext

ofCommunicationThispaperanalyzestheconceptofcontext.Wesuggesttwowaysof

classifyingapproachestothecontextofcommunication:(i)Classifyingapproachesbasedonanumberofrelevantcontextual

dimensionsandcontextfociCommunication always involves at least three possible main focal

dimensionsforacontexttobethecontextof:(i)productionofinformation(byatleastonecommunicator),(ii)interpretationofinformation(byatleastoneothercommunicator)and(iii)interactionbetweenthecommunicators.Given the three suggested focal aspects of communication, we candistinguish at least the following further possible context foci in bothHuman-HumancommunicationandHuman-Computer interaction: (i)Thesocialactivity,(ii)Theparticipantsintheactivityweareinterestedin,(iii)The users of a computer supported system, (iv) The system, (v) Themessage(s), (vi) A particular contribution to communication, (vii) Aparticularlinguisticexpression,(viii)Aparticulargesture.

(ii) Classifying approaches based on the dimensions of Peirce’s

51

semioticsWe take as our point of departure the semiotic analysis of a sign

proposedbyPeirce,incombinationwiththecharacterizationoftheaspectsofasignsystem(syntax,semanticsandpragmatics),suggestedbyMorris.Using the threeelementsdistinguishedbyPeirce (representamen,objectandinterpretant),wecandistinguishthreeapproachestocontextandandpossiblecombinationsofthem.Weusethedependenceoftheconstitutionof a sign on a sign user (interpreter) to explore the general contextdimensionsofasign.

Wecannowdistinguishthreetypesofcontext:1.Thecontextoftherepresentamen–syntacticcontext2.Thecontextoftheobject–semanticcontext3.Thecontextoftheinterpretant–pragmaticcontext4.Combinationsofsyntactic,semanticandpragmaticcontextForexample,theinterpretantistheinterpretationgivenbytheuser

of a representamen. This interpretant links the representamenwith theobjectitrepresentsandwiththeinterpreter,i.e.theusersofasignandasignsystemareincludedandcreatethecontextoftheinterpretantandalsothecontextoftheusageoftheinterpretant.Thisisthepragmaticnotionofcontext,whichinvolvesthestudyofasignsysteminuse,wherecontextualfactorscanincludesyntactic,semanticcontextandfactorsmentionedinthefirstapproach

Buildingonthesetwowaysofclassifyingapproachestothecontextof communication,wepresentourownproposal forhow toanalyze themain relevant contextual dimensions influencing human interaction andcommunication

*

52

[coneptualization]Tuesday,15:30-16:00,room101MihailoAntović,mihailo.antovic[at]filfak.ni.ac.rsUniversityofNiš,Serbia

FromExpectationtoConcepts:TowardMultilevelGroundingin

MusicSemiotics

Thispaperproposesatheoryof“multi-levelgrounded”musicalsemantics.Its central thesis is that musical meanings are neither indeterministic,appearing and disappearing in real time in endless circles of vagueassociation,norstronglydependentonasingleandstableontology,suchasprebuiltinformationinherenttothemusicalform.Rather,theproposalisthatlinguisticdescriptionsofmusicaregroundedinahierarchicalsystemofsixcontextualconstraints,or“groundingboxes”,whichmotivatecross-domaincorrespondencesbetweenthemusicalmaterialandextramusicalreferents by providing “important contextual assumptions [...which]influence the way that meaning construction proceeds” (Coulson andOakley, 2005: 1517). To motivate the six proposed grounding levels, Iprovide a qualitative analysis based on the random sample of free-formdescriptions of six programmaticmusical pieces frommy group’s recentexperimental study (Antović, Stamenković&Figar, inpress).While somemusical scholars claim that any inherent musical meaning must begroundedinthephysicalresemblancebetweenthemusicalstructureandenvironmental sounds (variously labeled “imitation”, “iconic musicalmeaning”,“echoing”,or“musicalonomatopoeia”),ourdatarevealonlyanegligiblenumber,ofadditionallyratherdiversified,onomatopoeicmusicaldescriptions.Ratherthanpursuingthislineofthinking,Ilookforthebasisofthesemanticsofmusicinthewellpsychologicallycorroboratednotionofdisappointmentorsatisfactionofstructuralmusicalexpectancies.There,onlevelone, the firstglimpseofmeaningemerges fromdirectphysiologicalreactions,aswhenadisappointedexpectancyacceleratestheheartbeat,orasegmentofmusicisdescribedas“tense”.Onleveltwo,moreexplicitlycross-modal image-schematic structure begins to be constructed, e.g. a

53

“forceful”chord,“hopping”staccato,or“theflutterofwings”.Levelthreebuildsonsuchembodiedexpectanciesandimage-schematicstructureandprovidesthefirstglimpseof“connotation”,ascribingemotionalqualitiestothemusic,e.g.“resolutioninterspersedwithdespair”,whileonlevel-four,themeaningbecomes“conceptual”,relatingthemusictorichimagery,e.g.“amedieval battle”.On level five, conceptualmeaning interactswith an“elaborated cultural context”, motivating blended descriptions at theintersectionoftwoormoreconceptualdomains,e.g.whenthe“battle”isreplacedby“godscomingdownfromOlympus”.Levelsixhostsassociationsgroundedinpersonalexperience.Tosupporttheproposal,arepresentativeset of our participants’ verbal responses is analyzed, showing both theemergence of new conceptual content and the hierarchical nature ofgrounding.Indoingso,thecontributionattemptstoformallycapturetheoldparadoxofmusicalsemantics:thatmusicisfullofmeaning,yetthatthismeaning is highly underspecified, manifested in a potential rather thandefiniteform.ReferencesAntović,M.,Stamenković,D.,&Figar,V.(inpress).Associationofmeaninginprogrammusic:Oninherence,denotation,andonomatopoeia.MusicPerception,http://mp.ucpress.edu/Coulson,S.,&Oakley,T.(2005).Blendingandcodedmeaning:Literalandfigurativemeaningincognitivesemantics.JournalofPragmatics,37(10),1510-1536.

*

54

[multimodal]Monday,11:45-12:15,room201MaíraAvelar,mairavelar[at]gmail.comUniversidadeEstadualdoSudoestedaBahia,Brazil

Theemergenceofmultimodalmetaphorsinthepolitical-religious

discourse:acomparativeanalysis

Inthispaper,weaimtoanalyzetheemergenceofmultimodalmetaphorsin legislative sessions from the Brazilian House of Representatives,performedbytheso-called“DeputyPastors”thatbelongtotheEvangelicalBench, taking into consideration three variables: verbal, prosodic – thatbelongstotheauditorymodality–,andgestural–thatbelongstothevisualmodality. We intend to analyze the conceptual metaphors (Lakoff &Johnson 1980) that gradually emerge in the deputy’s discourses. Weassume thehypothesis that that themoreentrenched inour conceptualsystemthemetaphoricexpressionis,themoredifficultitistorecognizeitasmetaphoric.Ontheotherhand,thelessentrenchedinourconceptualsystem themetaphoric expression is, the easier it is to recognize it as ametaphoricexpression.Todemonstratetheemergenceofthemetaphorsin the threemodalitiesmentioned above, aswell as the relation amongthem, we have selected 3-minute scenes from two plenary sessions,belongingtotwodifferentdeputies,broadcastedandmadeavailablebyTVCâmara, the Brazilian House of Representatives TV channel. In order toperformouranalyses,wechoseourMultimodalSemioticBlendingmodel(Avelarinpress),anadaptationoftheCognitiveSemioticsModelproposedbyBrandt (2004)thatestablishesarchitectureofspacesprojectedbythesubjects in their interactions, which makes the cognitive processing ofblends possible. We intend to perform a comparative analysis of theemergenceofmultimodalmetaphors in thediscourseof the twochosenplenary sessions, specifically observing the multimodal metaphoricity inspeechandgesturecompounds(Müller&Cienki,2009),theemergenceofprosodyasabody-basedfeature(Auchlin2013),andthepragmaticuseofgesture families (Kendon 2004). Partial results confirmed our initial

55

hypothesesthatthemoreconventionalizedthemetaphorsare,themoredifficultitistorecognizethemetaphoricnatureoftheexpressions.Ontheother hand, the less conventional themetaphors are, the easier it is torecognize themetaphoric nature of the expressions, and, consequently,moregesturalandprosodicresourcesareusedfordrivingtheattentionofthelistenertowhatisbeingsaidoriconicallydepictedbythegestures.Afterperforming all the analyses, we intend to demonstrate how the verbal,prosodicandgesturalfeaturescaninteractinordertogeneratemultimodalmetaphors that canbemoreor less conventionalized, dependingon thecontextualenvironmentoftheiremergence.ReferencesAuchlin, A. (2013) “Prosodic Iconicity and Experiential Blending”. In : S.Hancil(Ed.)ProsodyandIconicity.Amsterdam:JohnBenjamins.Avelar,M(inpress)“TheemergenceofmultimodalmetaphorsinBrazilianpolitical-electoral debates: a comparative analysis of the 2010 and 2014second-roundpresidentialdebatesIn:Zlatev,J,Konderak,P&Sonesson,G(Eds).EstablishingCognitiveSemiotics.FrankfurtamMain:PeterLang.Brandt, P. (2004) Spaces, Domains, and Meaning: Essays in CognitiveSemiotics.Brussels:PeterLang.Grady, J., T. Oakley & S. Coulson (1999) “Blending and Metaphor”.In:Metaphorincognitivelinguistics,G.Steen&R.Gibbs(eds.).Philadelphia:JohnBenjamins,1999.Hougaard, A. (2008) “Compression in interaction”. In: T. Oakley & A.Hougaard (eds.) Metaphor in Discourse and Interaction.Amsterdam/Philadelphia:JohnBenjamins.Kendon, A. (2004) Gesture: visible action as utterance. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Lakoff,G.&M.Johnson(1980)Metaphorsweliveby.Chicago,London:TheUniversityofChicagoPress.Müller, C. & A. Cienki (2009) “Words, gestures, and beyond: Forms ofmultimodalmetaphorintheuseofspokenlanguage”.In,C.Forceville&E.

56

Urios-Aparisi(eds.).MultimodalMetaphors.Berlin,NewYork:MoutondeGruyter,p.297-328.

*

[conceptualization]Tuesday,10:30-11:00,room101MarcoBagli,marbagli[at]gmail.comUniversityofPerugia,Italy

Sweet,sweetlove:fromwildhoneytosemanticprototypesResearch in cognitive linguistics suggests that Sweet is the

prototypicalconcept in thesemanticdomainofTaste (Bagliforthcoming,Bagli inpreparation). Furthermore,whenSweet isusedmetaphorically itgenerally has a positivemeaning and is one of the taste termswith thehighest number of occurrences in English corpora (Bagli, under review).Moreover, human beings seem to have an almost universal penchanttowards sweet foods (Allsop and Miller 1996). The aim of the presentresearch is toprovidea theoreticalbackgroundto these linguistic resultsfromanevolutionaryperspective.

For millennia, the main sweetener accessible to primates washoney. Honey is one of themost energy-dense foods in nature (Skinner1991), andallegedlyplayeda crucial role inhominindiets and inhumanevolution (McGrew 2001, Crittenden 2011, Wrangham 2011, McLennan2015). Although the quantity consumed by hominins is still a matter ofdebate,modernhunter-gatherertribesadoptsomeforagingmethodsthatcould be reminiscent of those by early hominin tribes (Crittenden 2011,Marloweetal.2014).ParticularlyBoranpeoplefromKenya,amongothers,developedasymbioticrelationshipwithabird,thehoneyguide(indicatorindicator)thatliterallyguidesthemtothehoneycombinchangeofsomewax(IsackandReyer1989).Themostancientarchaeologicalevidenceofhoney foraging comes from the ToghwanaDam in Zimbabwe, anddatesback10,000years(Orians2014).However,earlyhomininsmayhavebeenexploitingwildbeehives longbefore this. Chimpanzeesuse stick tools to

57

extract both honey and larvae, and Hadza people from Tanzania do thesame,tothepointthat“oneisstruckbyhowsimilarthehoneypursuitisforchimpanzeesandhumans”(Marloweetal2014:126).OtherarchaeologicalfindingsfromEgyptandCretealsoshowthecentralityofhoneyinAncientsocieties.

Thepresentresearchlinkstogetherdifferentdisciplinestoaccountfor a linguistic phenomenon observed in previous research, namely theprototypicalityoftheconcept“sweet”inthedomainofTaste.Todoso,itconsiders the roleofhoneyconsumption inprimates’evolution: from itsenergy input to the techniques employed to forage it. I argue that thespeciallinguisticstatusoftheconcept“sweet”isbiologicallymotivated,andderivesfromanembodiedexperience:theimportanceandthecravingforhoneyinourdietsasprimates(Orians2014).

ReferencesAllsop,K.A.,&Miller,J.B.(1996).Honeyrevisited:areappraisalofhoneyinpre-industrialdiets.BritishJournalofNutrition,75,513-520.Bagli,M.(forthcoming).DefiningTasteinEnglishinformantcategorizationBagli,M.(inpreparation).PrototypicaltastesinEnglish.Bagli,M.(underreview).“Shakingoffsogoodawifeandsosweetalady”:Shakespeare’suseofTastewords.JournalofLiterarySemantics.Crittenden,A.N.(2011).TheImportanceofHoneyConsumptioninHumanEvolution.FoodandFoodways,19(4),257-273.Isack, H. A., & Reyer, H. U. (1989). Honeyguides and Honey Gatherers:InterspecificCommunicationinaSymbioticRelationship.Science,243,1343-1346.Marlowe,F.W.,Berbesque,J.C.,Wood,B.,Crittenden,A.N.,Porter,C.,&Mabulla,A.(2014).Honey,Hadza,hunter-gatherers,andhumanevolution.JournalofHumanEvolution,71,119-128.McGrew,W. C. (2001). The other faunivory: Primate insectivory and theearlyhumandiet. InC.B.S.a.H.T.Bunn (Ed.),MeatEatingandHumanEvolution.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

58

McLennan,M.R.(2015).Ishoneyafallbackfoodforwildchimpanzeesorjustasweettreat?AmericanJournalofPhysicalAnthropology,158(4),685-695.Orians, G. H. (2014). Snakes, Sunrises, and Shakespeare: How EvolutionShapesOurLovesandFears:UniversityofChicagoPress. Skinner,M.(1991).Beebroodconsumption:Analternativeexplanationforhypervitaminosis A in KNM-ER 1808 (Homo Erectus) from Koobi Fora,Kenya..JournalofHumanEvolution,20,493-503. Wrangham,R.W. (2011).HoneyandFire inHumanEvolution. InSept J.,PilbeamD.(Eds.),CastingtheNetWide:PapersinHonorofGlynnIsaacandhis approach to Human Origins Research. (pp. 146-167). Oxford: OxbowBooks.

*

[Peircean]Monday,16:00-16:30,room201TylerBennett,rogueborg[at]hotmail.comUniversityofTartu,Estonia

Semioticsforconceptualmetaphorandblending

DanesiandSebeok(2000)andO'NeillandBenyon(2015)writethatextanttheories of conceptualmetaphor and blending can benefit from amorenuanced understanding of Peircean semiotics, without however delvinginto thematurePeirceandoctrineof the signasdevelopedbyT.L. Short(2007)FrederikStjernfelt(2014),etal.Inadditiontobenefittingfromthedetailed Peircean taxonomies from 1903, the central principles of JuriLotman's semiotics (Lotman 1977; Kull 2015) show how conceptualmetaphorandblendingdependonlogicalcontradiction.Howdowedecidethatsourceandtargetdomainsinaconceptualareactuallyincompatible?Lotman's writings about inter-medial tropes provide answers to thesequestions and show that the diagrammatic exploration of creativity incognition has strong precursors in semiotics. The developed theory ofsemiotic conceptual metaphor and blending is applied to Lakoff and

59

Johnson's discussion of the conceptual metaphor "Time is Money" as a"metaform",aswellastoacombinedimageandcaptionfromKalleLasn'sMemeWars(2012)asanextendedmetaform,or"meta-symbol".ReferencesBennett,TylerJ.2016."ThesemioticlifecycleandTheSymbolicSpecies".SignSystemsStudies.UniversityofTartuPress.CP = Peirce, Charles. Collected Papers I-VIII. Hartshorn, C.; Weiss, P.; &Burks,A.(eds.)1931-1958.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.Danesi,MarcelandSebeok,Danesi2000.TheFormsofMeaning:ModelingSystemsTheoryandSystemsAnalysis.Berlin:MoutondeGruyter.Fauconnier,GillesandTurner,Mark2002.TheWayWeThink:ConceptualBlendingAndTheMind'sHiddenComplexities.BasicBooks:NewYork.Kull, Kalevi 2015. A semiotic theory of life: Lotman’s principles of theuniverseofthemind.GreenLetters.19:3,255-266Lakoff,GeorgeandJohnson,Mark1999.PhilosophyintheFlesh.NewYork:BasicBooks.Lasn, Kalle 2012.Meme Wars: The Creative Destruction of NeoclassicalEconomics.NewYork:PenguinBooks.Lotman,Juri.1977.TheStructureoftheArtisticText.AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress.O'Neill,ShalephJ.andBenyon,DavidR.2015."Extendingthesemioticsofembodied interaction to blended spaces". Human Technology: AnInterdisciplinaryJournalonHumansinICTEnvironments.Volume11(1):30–56.Stjernfelt, Frederik 2014. Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce'sDicisigns.Boston:DocentPress.Short, Thomas L. 2007. Peirce's Theory of Signs. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.

*

60

[langevo]Monday,16:00-16:30,AulaFabianBross,fabian.bross@ling.uni-stuttgart.deUniversityofStuttgart,Germany

TheOriginoftheHeadshakeTheaimofthistalkistopresentanexplanationforwhyheadshakesindicatenegationinmostculturesoftheworld.Thetheoreticalunderpinningsofthisexplanationlieinconceptionsofgroundedcognition,whichstatethatourcognitionreliesonmulti-modalrepresentationacquiredduringreal-worldexperiences (e.g., Barsalou 2008) and Hebbian learning (Hebb 1949).Equipped with these ideas, this presentation will elaborate on Darwin's(1872:273) observation that children inevitably shake their heads whensated,therebyestablishingaconnectionbetweenrejectionandtheheadgesture.Laterinlife,thesemanticsoftheheadshakeextendsfromrejectiontonegation.Ashumanbabiesareusuallyheldinthearmsofthecaretakertosupporttheweakneckmuscles,theonlywaytostopdrinkingisaheadshake.Whenthisactionisrepeatednumeroustimes,anassociationbetweenthebodilyexperience of shaking the head and refusal is established via Hebbianlearning.Mostnonhumanmammalsarefedwhenthemotheriseitherlyingontheside or standing. These animals therefore do not need to perform aheadshake to stop the feeding. The special posture of human babies incontrastmakesotherheadmovementsdifficult.Thissimpletheorypredictsthat(a)thesameconnectioncanbeestablishedinothermammalswhosemothersalsoholdtheirbabiesintheirarms,(b)blindhumansshouldalsodisplaythisbehavioureventhoughtheycannotobserveheadshakes,and(c)theheadshakeshouldbeagestureacquiredveryearlyinlife.Indeed,thereisevidencethatbonobos,whobreastfeedtheir babies while holding them in their arms, indicate refusal byheadshaking(Schneider,Call&Liebal2010).Prediction(b)issupportedbyhumanethologyresearchdemonstratingthatdeaf-and-blindbornchildren

61

alsorefusedislikedobjectsbyshakingtheirheads(Goodenough1932;Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1973). Finally, prediction (c) is supported by the fact that theheadshakeisoneoftheearliestgesturesinhumansandisinitiallyusedtoexpress refusal only (Guidetti 2005). In language acquisition, negativeexpressionsarealsoinitiallyusedtorefuseandonlylatertonegatemoregenerally(Stern&Stern1907:39f.;Dimroth2010).Thistalkwillalsodiscusswhythereareregionsintheworldwherenoheadshakeisusedarguingthattheconnectionbetweennegationandtheheadshakecanbeoverwrittenbyculture.ReferencesBarsalou, L. W. (2008): Grounded Cognition. In: Annual Review ofPsychology,59,617--45.Darwin, C. (1872): The Expression of the Emotions inMan and Animals.London:JohnMurray.Dimroth,C.(2010):TheAcquisitionofNegation.In:Horn,L.R.(eds.):TheExpressionofNegation.Berlin&NewYork:MoutondeGruyter,39-71.Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1973): The expressive behaviour of the deaf-and-blindborn. In: Von Cranach, M. & Vine, I. (eds.): Social communication andmovement.NewYork:Holt,Rinehart&Winston,163-194.Goodenough,F.L.(1932):Expressionsoftheemotionsinablind-deafchild.In:JournalofAbnormalandSocialPsychology,27(3),328-333.Guidetti, M. (2005): Yesor no?HowyoungFrenchchildrencombinegesturesandspeechtoagreeandrefuse.In:JournalofChildLanguage,32,911-924.Hebb,D.O.(1949):TheOrganizationofBehavior.NewYork&London.Schneider,C.,Call,J.&Liebal,K.(2010):DobonobossayNObyshakingtheirhead?In:Primates,51,199-202.Stern, C.& Stern,W. (1907):DieKindersprache. EinepsychologischeundsprachtheoretischeUntersuchung.Leipzig:JohannAmbrosiusBarth.

*

62

[phenomenology]Wednesday,11:30-12:00,room201GiselaBruche-Schulz,gibrushu[at]gmail.comIndependentScholar,Germany

MeaninginsystemsofcomplexityOnafeel,andfoundationalexperience

Thestartingpointofthispaperisaparticularsetofdata,createdby

agentswhowereunawareofdoingso.Fivedifferentgroupsofreadersreadaone-pagelongexcerptfromSaint-Exupéry’sLePetitPrinceinfivedifferentlanguages.Thedistributionoftheirresponsescorrelates,inallfivelanguages,withtheaspectualsemanticsofthetextthatreflectsitsforce-gestaltistdiagrammaticcore.Thisdiagrammaticcoreunderliestheproblem-solutionstructureanditswanting-to-knowsequences(Hoey2001,Propp1968[1928]).Thequestionaskedinthispaperconcernsthefactorthatmotivatestheparticulartypeofdirectednessofnon-consciousawareness.Whatisitthatismadevisiblebythedata,andbywhichroutedoesitoperate?

Thereadersseemtosignaltheactivationofanimpulsethatmotivatesthegivingandthewithholdingofaresponse.Thenon-consciousactivationoftheimpulsetoactpresumablyreliesoncoreemotionalaffectsthatare“definedinneuralterms”(Panksepp2005:32).Thesecoreemotionalaffectsthateffect,amongothers,awanting-and-seekingurge,seemtobethegistofthefeelthatdrivestheenergeticactionofhumansandothermammalians.Whenmediatedthrough“signs”feelingsarefirstinstants(Peirce1998[1908]).Theyattachtotheiconiccoreofthegestaltistrelation,mediatedbylanguage,ornon-languagemeans.Feelingsconfirm“whathappens”(Damasio1999).Howisthatdone?Intheuniverseofdiscourse,language-mediatedornot,thereisalwaysa“fieldof‘distinct

63

vision’oftheinterpreter[and]thetruthofthetrueconsistsinhisbeingsatisfiedwithit(Pietarinen2011,citingPeirce).”

Insum,aneuralunderlaygroundsanorganism’sstringofenergeticactionsthataredirectedtowardsagoal.Forattainingthisgoal,somediscerningrecognitionoftheobjectsofaseekingandawantingisguidedinthisveryprocessofrecognitionbytheepistemictooloftheforce-gestaltisticonof(diagrammatic)relations.Thisforce-gestaltistdiagrammaticcoreunderliestheproblem-solutionstructureofanarrativetext.Itisoneofthemostbasicepistemictools,bothgroundedin,shapedby,andshapingtheconceptualgestaltoffoundationalexperience,invokingthefeeloftheconceptualreal,andbringingforththesatisfactionofknowingit.Thedatapresentedinthispapertestifytothispicturebysuggestiveevidence.

References Damasio,Antonio1999.TheFeelingofWhatHappens.NewYork:HarcourtInc.Hoey,Michael2001.TextualInteraction.AnIntroductiontoWrittenDiscourseAnalysis.Routledge:London.Panksepp,Jaak2005.Affectiveconsciousness:Coreemotionalfeelingsinanimalsandhumans.ConsciousnessandCognition14.1:19-69.Peirce,CharlesS.1908.LetterstoLadyWelby.TheEssentialPeirce.2.BythePeirceEditionProject.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress1998.Pietarinen,Ahti-Veikko2011.MovingpicturesofthoughtII:Graphs,games,andpragmaticism’sproofs.Semiotica186–1/4:315-331.Propp,Vladimir1968[1927].MorphologyoftheFolktale.Austin:UniversityofTexasPress

*

64

[philosophy&cognition]Wednesday,12:00-12:30,room101AlgirdasBudrevicius,Algirdas.Budrevicius[at]kf.vu.ltVilniusUniversity,LithuaniaOntheAccountoftheNatureofMeaning:ApproachBasedonthe

InsightsintoAristotle’sandAquinas’TheoryofBeingandCognition

The nature ofmeaningwas claimed to be the central idea for cognitivesemiotics. The meaning, however, has many definitions in differentdomainsofscience.Inmodernsemiotics,thereareseveralapproachestodefinitionofmeaningdependingontheconsideredmodelofsign.Atleastfourbasictraditionsmaybesingledout:Saussureanapproachbasedontheideasofstructuralism;PeirceanapproachbasedonhisUniversalcategoriesof Being; Morris’ approach based on behaviorism, and Uexkuell’sbiosemiotic approach. Due to the diversity of approaches, the followingproblems should be considered: What are relations between theapproaches? Could they be united, that is, could a general theory ofmeaningbeproposed?Shoulditbeapplicableonlyforsemiotics,orshouldit be suitable for other domains of science aswell?What should be thecommongroundofthetheory?Avastscopeofresearchandthenumerousattempts ofmany scientists are needed to solve these problems. In thiscontribution,oneofsuchattemptsismade—theoutlinesoftheontologicalapproachtoanalysisofnatureofmeaningareproposed.ItisbasedontheinsightsintoAristotle’sandAquinas’ideasoncognition.Proposedaccountpresentsafurtherdevelopmentofauthor’sideasdescribedinhisrecentlypublishedbookSignandForm.ModelsofSignasHomomorphismBasedonSemiotic Insights into Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ Theory of Being andCognition.Theontologicalapproachisnotnewforsemiotics:PeircedefinedsignasoneofhisuniversalcategoriesofBeing(Thirdness);centuriesagobeforePeirce,PoinsotdefinedsignasaRelationalBeinginhisTractatusdeSignis.Theontologicalapproachprovidesthemostcommongroundforthetheory of meaning. In this contribution, Being is viewed in terms of

65

Aristotle’shylomorphismandhistheoryofcognition.MeaningisviewedasacomplexphenomenonanditisplacedintheframeworkofBeing.Itwillbeshownthatproposedapproachallowsconstructingasystemofmodelsofmeaning(directandindirectmeaning;symbolicmeaning;metaphoricalmeaning; discriminating meaning and sense). The approach also allowscreatingthemostbasicandnaturalclassificationofsigns(startingfromthenaturaldivisionofallsignsintomaterialandformal).Itissupposedfurtherthatduetoitsmostgeneral(ontological)ground,theproposedapproachhas a potential to unite other approaches to definition ofmeaning. Theargumentstogroundthisstatementwillbeprovided.

*

[experimental]Tuesday,14:00-14:30,room4HongjunChen,chenhj@dlut.edu.cnQiuyueLei,heidi0903@163.comDalianUniversityofTechnology,China

ContextualEffectsonMetaphorProcessingofChineseFour-CharacterIdioms:AnERPStudy

Metaphorisnotonlyalanguagephenomenon,butalsoawayofthinking.As a kindofmetaphoric linguistic expression, theChinese four-characteridioms have several features such as conventionality, inflexibility,figuration, etc. which stipulate the meanings of idioms. However, theultimate comprehension of metaphor relies on the contexts wheremetaphor occurs. But so far few studies have addressed the effects ofcontextsintheprocessingofmetaphor.ERPshavebeenwidelyusedintheresearchesofcognitivelinguisticsasithashigh temporal resolutionand isnoninvasive to thehumanbody.Thelinguistic stimuli used in this research are Chinese four-character idiomswhich can be interpreted both literally and metaphorically with highfamiliarity and semantic transparency. In the experimental design, eachidiom is put in three kinds of contexts including literal-bias context,

66

metaphorical-biascontextandunrelatedcontext.ThroughtheanalysisonN400evokedintheprocessingofidiomsindifferentcontexts,thepresentstudyaimstoexplorethecontextualeffectsonmetaphorprocessingandtoinvestigatethehemisphericdifferencesandthedegreeofactivationwhenprocessingtheliteralandmetaphoricalmeanings.TheERPresultsof theexperimentshowthatprocessing idioms in literal-bias contexts evokes larger grand average N400 amplitude when it iscompared to that in metaphorical-bias contexts. It proves that themetaphorical meanings of Chinese four-character idioms with highfamiliarityandsemantictransparencyareaccessedfirstly.Asforthedifferencesoftheactivatedregions,theresultsoftheexperimentshow that the right anterior part of the brain is more activated whenprocessing idioms in literal-bias contexts while both the left and rightanterior parts of the brain are involved when processing idioms inmetaphorical-bias contexts. The result also reflects that the further thesemanticdistanceis,themoreactivetherighthemisphereis.Inaword,thepresentstudyshowsthatforChinesefour-characteridiomswith high familiarity and semantic transparency, their metaphoricalmeaningsaresalientandactivatedautomaticallyuponencounter.Theyareunderstoodmorequickly,smoothlyandwithsmallereffortinmetaphorical-biascontextsthaninliteral-biascontexts.Therefore,themetaphorical-biascontextsfacilitatetheunderstandingofthemetaphoricalmeaningsoftheseidioms. The literal-bias contexts inhibit the understanding of their literalmeanings. With more effort, the nonsalient literal meanings would beactivatedwiththehelpoftheliteral-biascontexts.

*

67

[multimodal]Monday,10:45-11:15,room201ElżbietaChrzanowska-Kluczewska,elzbieta.chrzanowska-kluczewska[at]uj.edu.plJagiellonianUniversityinKrakow,Poland

VerbalandPictorialNarrativity–aCaseofIntermediality

Thepresentationintendstofocusonthoseaspectsofthevisualartsthatbear a storytellingpotential, on analogy to verbal texts.My interest liesmainlyinthefieldofartisticsemiotics,thatisinthosetextsproducedintheverbal and visual media that are marked with aesthetic qualities. Theattention will gomainly to figural painting due to its potential to showeventsasevolvingintime.Thus,Iintendtoconsiderthemannerinwhichnarrativization asawidely recognizedcognitivepropensityof thehumanmind to impose structure upon reality is applicable to pictorialrepresentationsandhowittakespartintheconstructionofvisualpossibleworlds/textworlds.The degree of storification/emplotment (White 1987), or in cognitiveparlance the impositionof the SOURCE-PATH-GOALpatternon scenarios(Lakoff1987,Johnson1987),relatedalsotothephenomenonoftellability(significance and newsworthiness of the story matter, cf. Labov 1972,Bruner1991),postulatedoriginallyforverbaltextsandextrapolatedontovisualnarratives,willdifferaccordingtothegenreofrepresentationandthe narration unit it exemplifies. Such units, on analogy to the unitssuggested for verbal texts, run incrementally from 1) narrative images(single scenes,with theoftenquotedPaleolithic “hunting incident” fromLascauxasoneof theearliestpiecesofpaintednarrative,cf.Bandietal.1961). They epitomize what in linguistics is known as implied scenarios(Langacker1987)andinliterarytheoryasminimalormicro-narration(Wolf2005,Filar2013).Nextcome2)narrative sequences (e.g.hagiographicalpaintings and Passion scenes in the tradition ofWestern and Orthodoxreligious iconography; painted and sculpted medieval retables; incontemporary European art for instance J. Duda-Gracz’s Passion series

68

“CzęstochowaGolgotha”orRobertDevriendt’s (2015-16)synecdochicallyfragmentedsequencesofminiatureoilpaintingsthatinvitetheviewertofillinthelacunaeinnarrationinthemannerclosetoreconstructingfilmicsequences. Narration culminates in 3) full-blownworlds (present in richpictorial cycles, e. g. M. Chagall’s oeuvre, cf. Chrzanowska-Kluczewskaforthcoming).Narrativity,almostautomatically,participates in the (re)constructionofapossibleworld/textworld(Eco1979/1994).Suchworldsupportsanartworkthatstrivestorendertemporalityandcausalityinitsownuniquemedium,inadditiontopresentingasetofindividualsandtheirconfigurations.Itcanbe claimed that visual worlds come into being at level 2) of narrativesequences.Themostcontroversial(fromthenarrativepointofview)level1,onanalogytonon-epicpoetry,issupportedbyscenesratherthanworldsproper.Inturn,seriesinthestyleofDuda-Graczproducehybridworlds,inwhichreligiousandreal-lifeelementsco-exist.Theconceptofatext-world,associated primarily with verbal texts, can thus find its extension toencompass fictionalorhybridworldsof thevisual arts.Hence, abroadly(semiotically)conceivedtext-worldmaybecomeanintegrationalcategoryuniting various artistic media. The discussion on the narratively-inducedworld-creatingpotentialoftextsrealizedinvariousartisticmediaandthemanner in which they are interpreted in perceptually and culturallyindividualizedcontextsintheprocessofconcretization/actualizationshouldbringtogetherphenomenological,cognitiveandsemioticstudiesonverbaland non-verbal art criticism (cf. Ingarden 1937/1973, Sonesson 1997,Crowther2009).An additionalmethodological issue is whether the “natural narratology”postulated by M. Fludernik (1996) for verbal fictional texts can beextrapolated onto pictorial figural texts. Specifically, an importantcognitively-orientedqueryiswhethertheinterpretersfacedwithpictorialnarrativity turn to so-called naturalization scripts (Culler 1975, Fludernik1996)thathavedirectrecoursetohumanexperiential(realworld)patterns,relatedto,amongothers,theinterpreters’embodiment,emotionalityanddependenceontheenvironment.Naturalizationscriptsarethe“reading”

69

strategies particularly useful in solving textual inconsistencies and inconstruingmorecompleteworldstories.ReferencesBandi, H.-G. et al. 1961. The Art of the Stone Age. New York: CrownPublishers.Bruner,J.1991.Thenarrativeconstructionofreality.CriticalInquiry18:1-21.Chrzanowska-Kluczewska,E.(forthcoming2016).Światymożliwewtekścieliterackimi“tekście”malarskim oraz ich niedookreślenie.Przyczyneksemiotycznydosemantykiświatówmożliwych[Possibleworldsinaliteraryandapictorial“text”andtheirunderdetermination.Asemioticcontribution to possible-worlds semantics]. In: Światy możliwe, ed. M.Stanisz.Rzeszów:WydawnictwoUR.Crowther, P. 2009. Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame).Stanford,Ca:StanfordUP.Culler,J.1975.StructuralistPoetics:Structuralism,LinguisticsandtheStudyofLiterature.London:Routledge.Devriendt, R. 2015-2016.Making Connections. Bruges: GroeningmusemandKrakow:theMOCAKMuseumofContemporaryArt.Eco,U.1979/1994.Lectorinfabula.Warszawa:PIW.Filar, D. 2013. Narracyjne aspekty językowego obrazu świata [Narrativeaspectsofthelinguisticworldview].Lublin:WydawnictwoUMCS.Fludernik,M.1996.Towardsa‘Natural’Narratology.London:Routledge.Ingarden, R. 1931/1973. The Literary Work of Art. Evanston, Il.:NorthwesternUniversityPress.Johnson, M. 1987. The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning,Imagination,andReason.Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress.Labov,W.1972.LanguageintheInnerCity.UniversityPark:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress.Lakoff, G. 1987.Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What CategoriesRevealabouttheMind.Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress.

70

Langacker,R.1987.FoundationsofCognitiveGrammar,Vol.I:TheoreticalPrerequisites.Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversityPress.Sonesson, G. 1997.Mute narratives: new issues in the study of pictorialtexts. In: Lagerroth, U.-B. et al. (eds.), Interart Poetics. Essays on theInterrelationsoftheArtsandMedia.Amsterdam:Rodopi.White,H.1987.TheContentoftheForm:NarrativeDiscourseandHistoricalRepresentation.Baltimore:JohnHopkinsUniversityPress.Wolf,W.2005.Pictorialnarrativity.In:Herman,D.etal.(eds.),RoutledgeEncyclopediaofNarrativeTheory.London,NewYork:Routledge.431-435.

*

[iconicity]Tuesday,11:30-12:00,room201PeterCoppin,pcoppin[at]faculty.ocadu.caOCADUniversityandTheUniversityofToronto,Canada“Artifactevolution”oftheaxiomaticmethodfroma“primordialsoupofpictures”(withimplicationsfor“visual”languagedesign)Although19thcenturymathematicianshavelargelyrejectedpictureproofsystems (Mumma, 2010), the diagrammatic reasoning community hasarguedfor25yearsthatpicturesarea“validformofreasoning”thatshouldgain legitimacy in mathematics and computer programming languagedesignbecausetheyaffordadvantagessuchasreducing“inferentialload”(Barwise&Etchemendy,1991)andoffering“freerides”(Shimojima,1996;Shimojima&Katagiri,2008).Nonetheless,pictureproofsystemshavenotgainedmainstreamsuccessineitherfield.Thissuggeststhatsomepropertyofpicturesmaynotafford (may impede) someaspectof communicationrequiredforeffectiveproofs.To explore the possibility that pictures may not afford certain types ofreasoning, I will discuss the “artifact evolution” (cf. Simon, 1993; Kirsh,2010)oftheaxiomaticmethodfroma“primordialsoup”ofpicturestoitscurrent,typicallysententialwrittenform.ByreviewinghowtheaxiomaticmethodofEuclid’sElementsemergedfromancientlandsurveyingpractices

71

that were more pictorial, I will argue that iconic properties of pictorialrepresentationswere suitable for conveying concrete structures (suchaslandformsduringsurveying)becauseoftheirabilitytorecruit lower levelperceptualprocessingcapabilities(Mandler,2006)developedtoperceive-actinaconcretephysicalworldcomposedofoccludedsurfacesandedges,and thereforepictorial propertiesmost effectively afford communicatingconcretestructures(Coppin,2014,2015,inpress).Althoughpicturescanbefoundinthemostancientcavepaintings,writingsystemsemergedlaterthanpictures,oftenfrompictographs.Theaxiomaticmethodemergedwithinsententialwritingsystemsevenlater,reachingitscurrent form at the time of Euclid.. In the presentation, I will present aperceptual-cognitive semiotic model that describes how symbolicpropertiesofgraphicrepresentationsconveyabstractconceptswithmorespecificity relative to pictorial properties (Coppin, 2014, 2015, in press).ThenIwillrecruitthismodeltoarguethatpicturesweretooconceptuallyambiguous to convey increasingly abstract/conceptual mathematicalconceptsthatemergedwhenmathematicswasformalizedduringthe19thcentury. As pressure for more conceptual certainty/specificity inrepresentation systems increased, the conceptual specificity of symbolicsententialrepresentationscausedsententialwritingsystemstoemergeasa“host”fortheaxiomaticmethod.IwillconcludebycomparingtheaboveaccounttoMumma’s(2010)defenseof Euclid’s picture proofs, and demonstrate that Mumma’s “co-exact”properties are akin to symbolicity (Coppin, 2014), whereas his “exact”propertiesareakinto iconicity.Thisfinalcomparisonwill (i)demonstratethe accuracy of Mumma’s argument, (ii) convert his terminology intocognitivesemioticterms,and(iii)usehis(valid)argumenttodemonstratewhy pictures have been unsuccessful inmathematics – or programminglanguages–throughouthumanhistory.ReferencesAvigad,J.,Dean,E.,&Mumma,J.(2009,December).AformalsystemforEuclid’selements.InReviewofsymboliclogic,2(4).doi:10.1017/S1755020309990098

72

Barwise,J.,&Etchemendy,J.(1991,February).Visualinformationandvalidreasoning.InVisualizationinteachingandlearningmathematics(pp.9–24).MathematicalAssociationofAmerica.Coppin,P.W.(2014).Perceptual-cognitivepropertiesofpictures,diagrams,andsentences:Towardascienceofvisualinformationdesign.(Doctoraldissertation).UniversityofToronto,Canada.Coppin,P.W.(2015).WhatisLostinTranslationfromVisualGraphicstoTextforAccessibility.InD.C.Noelle,R.Dale,A.S.Warlaumont,J.Yoshimi,T.Matlock,C.D.Jennings,P.P.Maglio(Eds.),Proceedingsofthe37thAnnualCognitiveScienceSociety(pp.447–452).Austin,TX:CognitiveScienceSociety.Coppin,P.W.,Li,A.,Carnevale,M.(inpress).IconicPropertiesareLostwhenTranslatingVisualGraphicstoTextforAccessibility.InJ.Zlatev,P.Konderak,G.Sonesson(Eds.),EstablishingCognitiveSemiotics.FrankfurtamMain:PeterLang.Kirsh,D.(2010).Explainingartifactevolution.InL.Malafouris&Renfrew,C.(Eds.)Thecognitivelifeofthings:recastingtheboundariesofthemind(pp.121–144).McDonaldInstituteforArchaeologicalResearch,Cambridge,UK:UniversityofCambridge.Mandler,J.M.(2006).Categorization,developmentof.InEncyclopediaofCognitiveScience.doi:10.1002/0470018860.s00516Mumma,J.(2006).Intuitionformalized:Ancientandmodernmethodsofproofinelementarygeometry.(Doctoraldissertation).CarnegieMellonUniversity,Pittsburgh,PA.Mumma,J.(2010).Proofs,pictures,andEuclid.InSynthese,175(2),255–287.doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9509-9Shimojima,A.(1996).Ontheefficacyofrepresentation.(Doctoraldissertation).IndianaUniversity,Bloomington,IN.Shimojima,A.&Katagiri,Y.(2008).AnEye-TrackingStudyofExploitationsofSpatialConstraintsinDiagrammaticReasoning.InG.Stapleton,Howse,J.,&Lee,J.(Eds.),DiagrammaticRepresentationandInference:5thInternationalConference,Diagrams2008,Herrsching,Germany,

73

September19–21,2008.Proceedings(pp.74–88).doi:10.1007/978-3-540-87730-1_10Simon,H.A.(1996).TheSciencesoftheArtificial(3rded.).Cambridge,MA:MITPress.

*Tuesday,15:00-15:30,room201CesarDiaz,cesara.diazr[at]utadeo.edu.coUniversidaddeBogotaJorgeTadeoLozano,Colombia

Anagentiveaccountofthe“commodestory”inQuentinTarantino’sReservoirDogs

There’s a broad semiotic literature pertaining the formal structure ofcomplexnarratives.However,althoughtherearealreadyseveralcognitiveapproachestocomplexor“unnatural”narratives,andtheyprovideatthesame time an overview of basic narrative comprehension and complexnarrative comprehension, there’s still no literature that accounts for theway that cognition handles different and overlapping levels of “reality”when we process and understand (or don’t understand) embeddednarrativesofthetypeknownasmiseenabîme.Formal accounts alone cannot explain this type of complex narrativecomprehension,andgivensomebasicfeaturesoftheprocessesinvolved,can even clash with cognitive theories in some respects. For instance,becauseofcognitiveprocessingconstraintsandotherfactorssuchasthestructureofmemory,narrativecomprehensionhappensonlineandtendsto economy, which seems to clash with the potentially “infinite”recursivenessofthesenarratives.Ontheotherhand,cognitiontendstocoherence,andcertaininstancesofmise en abîme tend to incoherence. Such is the case of the segment ofQuentin Tarantino’s film Reservoir Dogs that we intend to analyze: aflashbacksequencewithaseriesofstory-within-a-storystructures,andaclimaticscenewhereMr.Blonde,theprotagonist,istellingoutloudastory

74

inthespatialandtemporalsettingoftheeventsdepictedbythestoryitself,andtosomeminorcharactersthattakepart,butshouldn’tknowthestoryinthefirstplace.IintendtoexplainTarantino’sversionofmiseenabîmewiththecognitiveframeworkofNiño’sagentivesemiotics(Niño2015),becauseitsolvessomeof the inconsistencies posed by the Aarhus version of Fauconnier andTurner’sconceptualblendingtheory(Brandt2013):itgivesamorepreciseexplanationoftheroleofasenseofrealityinmeaning-making,itaccountsforthewaythatpurposelimitstheextentofmeaning-making;andfinally,it is not only a theory of cognition, but it also allows to account for thefeatures of semiotic items themselves in order to guide meaningconstructionandattribution.Butbeyondthat,IintendtoexplainReservoirDogsitself(oratleast,thesegmentanalyzed)asafictionalized“agentive”account of narrative production and comprehension, because of itsconstructionofcharactersasfictivenarrational(narrative+rational)agents;and because of its explanation of narration as enaction and“presentification”.

*[iconicity]Tuesday,11:00-11:30,room201LarsElleström,lars.ellestrom[at]lnu.seLinnæusUniversity,SwedenCross-modaliconicity:TheBridgebetweenImageandMetaphor

The capabilities to recognize what images represent and to understandcomplexmetaphors are vital for humans. Both rely on our fundamentalmentalresourcetoperceivesimilaritiesanddifferenceswithinthesamebutalsoacrossdifferentsensoryareasanddifferentcognitivedomains.Muchsuccessful research in several disciplines has been dedicated to in-depthinvestigations of these and related areas. Yet there are few attempts toformabroadaccountoftheessentialinterrelationsamongvariouswaysofconnecting perceptual and cognitive entities to each other through

75

resemblance.Thesemioticnotionoficonicityiswellsuitedforsuchatask.Iconicity is representation based on similarity, and cross-modal iconicity,whichisanextremelywidespreadphenomenon,shouldbeunderstoodasiconicity that crosses the borders of different kinds of material,spatiotemporal, and sensorial modes, and, furthermore, the borderbetween sensory structures and cognitive configurations. For instance, avisualentitymayresembleandthusiconicallyrepresentsomethingthatisauditoryorabstractlycognitive.Theaimofthispaperistosuggestageneraltheoretical framework for conceptualizing cross-modal iconicity andrelatingdifferentkindsofmono-modalandcross-modal iconicity toeachotherintermsofdegreesoficonicity.Morespecifically,theaimistopresenta conceptual model that makes it possible to bridge the alleged gapbetweenimageandmetaphorbywayofoutliningcross-modaliconicity.Itisarguedthatperceptionandconceptionofimagesandmetaphorsshouldbeunderstoodasthetwoextremesinacontinuumoficonicrepresentationwhere cross-modal iconicity bridges the apparent gap between mono-modal,sensory-basediconicityandcognitiveiconicity.Theargumentationisbasedonboththeoreticalandempiricalresearchfromdisciplinessuchassemiotics,psychology,cognitivescience,andneurology.

*

[intersubjectivity]Monday,12:15-12:45,AulaBarbaraFultner,fultner[at]denison.eduDenisonUniversity,USA&GoetheUniversityFrankfurt,Germany

TheRoleoftheImaginationinSemiosis

Mostaccountsofsemanticstendtobetoorationalisticorcognitivistandtofocusonproblemsofnormativityratherthancreativity. Phenomenologyoffersacorrectivebecauseofitsemphasisonembodimentandtheroleitaccordstotheimagination.Iarguethatlinguisticcompetenceandsemiosisrequirebothnormativityandcreativityandthatsemiosisisimaginative.Ibasemy argument on Kant’s schematism,Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and

76

Merleau-Ponty’s account of imagination. The turn to phenomenology isindispensableforprovidingaunifiedaccountoftheroleoftheimaginationinsemiosisandintersubjectivity.a)ForKant,theschematismisperformedbytheimaginationandmediatesbetween perception and conception; “seeing-as is the act ofschematization” (Tierney 1994). According to Tierney, “The schematismstructuresmeaningbymediatingbetweentheconcretelevelofperception(understood in thewidesenseto includenotmerelysensoryperception,but situational perception) and the abstract level of conception.” Just asLennon(2010)arguesthatimaginationmediatesbetweenperceptionandconception,Iarguethatitplaysaroleinsemiosisandinmediatingbetweeninterlocutors.Specifically,theimagination’sactof“seeing-as”playsakeyrolebecausereachingmutualunderstandingrequiresinterlocutorstohaveasenseofanother’sperspective.Theymustbeabletoseethingsotherwisethan from their own subjective point of view. Imagination is henceimportantforthedevelopmentofintersubjectivity.b)Gadamerdistinguishesbetweenanindividualisingandconventionalisingtendency in language. He rejects the assumption thatmeaning is purelycognitive,rational,ordenotative,distinctfromitsconativeorconnotativeaspects. For him, a semantics that explainsmeaning purely in terms ofsubstitutability and correspondence relations is limited. Whateverequivalence relations there are among expressions, they are “notunchangingmappings; rather they arise and atrophy, as the spirit of thetimes is reflected from one decade to the next in semantic change”(Gadamer 1999). Language is a living thing—a thing thatwe live; it is apractice.c)Languageshouldbeconceivedasnotonlyapractice,butanembodiedpractice. I thereforedrawonMerleau-Ponty’sembodiedaccountof theimaginationtofleshouti)howperspective-takingindialogueinvolvesactsofimagination(butisdistinctfromcontemporarysimulationtheory)andii)how the Gadamerian tension between individualization andconventionalization in semiosis is rooted in the “to and fro movementbetweenacquiredandcreativemodesofembodiment”(Steeves2001).

77

ReferencesGadamer,Hans-Georg.1999.“SemantikundHermeneutik,”inGesammelteWerke,vol.2.Tübingen:MohrSiebeck.Lennon,Kathleen.2010."Re-EnchantingtheWorld:TheRoleofImaginationinPerception."Philosophy:TheJournalOfTheRoyalInstituteOfPhilosophy85,no.333:375-389.Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris:Gallimard,1945.Merleau-Ponty,Maurice.LeVisibleetl’invisible.Steeves, James B. 2001. “The Virtual Body: Merleau-Ponty’s EarlyPhilosophyofImagination.”PhilosophyToday:370-380.Tierney,Nathan.ImaginationandEthicalIdeals.Albany:SUNYPress,1994.

*[semiotics&science]Tuesday,10:30-11:00,room301PiotrGiza,pgiza[at]bacon.umcs.lublin.plMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

SignUseandCognitioninAutomatedScientificDiscovery:AreComputersOnlySpecialKindsofSigns?

The paper aims to analyze Machine Discovery field from cognitive andsemiotic perspective. James Fetzer criticizes the paradigm, prevailing inCognitiveScience,thatcognitioniscomputationacrossrepresentations.Hearguesthatifcognitionistakentobeapurposive,meaningful,algorithmicproblem solving activity, then computers are incapable of cognition.Instead, they appear to be signs of a special kind, that can facilitatecomputationHeproposestheconceptionofmindsassemioticsystemsasan alternative paradigm for understandingmental phenomena, one thatseemstoovercomethedifficultiesofcomputationalism.Now,Iargue,thatwithcomputersystemsdealingwithscientificdiscovery,thematterisnotsosimpleasthat.Theallegedsuperiorityofhumansusing

78

signstostandforsomethingotherovercomputersbeingmerely“physicalsymbolsystems”or“automaticformalsystems”isonlyeasytoestablishineverydaylife,butbecomesfarfromobviouswhenscientificdiscoveryisatstake.Inscience,contrarytoeverydaylife,themeaningofsymbolsis,apartfromvery low-levelexperimental investigations,defined implicitlyby theway the symbols are used in explanatory theories or experimental lawsrelevanttothefield.Moreover, recent attempts to apply genetic programming to automaticgenerationofcognitivetheoriesseemtoshow,thatcomputersystemsarecapableofveryefficientproblemsolvingactivitywhichisneitherpurposivenor meaningful, nor algorithmic. This, I think, undermines Fetzer'sargument that computer systems are incapable of cognition becausecomputation across representations is bound to be a purposive,meaningful,algorithmicproblemsolvingactivity.References:Bridewell,W.,Langley,P.(2010):TwoKindsofKnowledgeinScientificDiscovery,TopicsinCognitiveScience,2,pp.36-52.Fetzer,J.(1997):ThinkingandComputing:ComputersasSpecialKindsofSigns,MindsandMachines,7,pp.345-364.Giza,P.(2002):AutomatedDiscoverySystemsandScientificRealism,MindsandMachines,22,pp.105-117.Lane,P.,Sozou,P.,Addis,M.,andGobet,F.(2014):Evolvingprocess-basedmodelsfrompsychologicaldatausinggeneticprogramming,in:R.Kibble(ed.),Proceedingsofthe50thAnniversaryConventionoftheAISB.Thagard,P.(2012):TheCognitiveScienceofScience,Cambridge,TheMITPress.

*

79

[communication]Tuesday,10:30-11:00,AulaRomanGodlewski,rogodlewski[at]wp.plIndependentResearcher,Poland

QuotingasPretendingaSigninLightofaGeneralTheoryofCommunication

TheAuthor’sintuitionclaims:I.Quotationgoesonbothinspeechandinwriting.II.Quotationrequiresthatthequotedmaterialispresentedinextenso.III.Translativequotationsareequallygoodasquotationsthatpreservethelanguageoftheoriginal.Thusthetaskistosearchforatheorythatfulfilsalltheseclaims.TheAuthorhas realized that in this aim it is necessary to broaden the commonparadigm of linguistic research, and to analyze carefully what an act ofcommunicationis.Theaimofthepresentationistosketchsomenewideasinthisdomain.Anactofcommunicationincludes:-Thesender’sintentiontoevokeagivencontentinagivenrecipient’smindwithagivenactivityingivencircumstances,-Thesender’ssignificantactivity,-Thesignificantcircumstances,- Knowing the significant details (activity and circumstances) by therecipient,-Theprocessofinterpretingthisknowledgebytherecipient,-Evocationoftheintendedcontentintherecipient’smind(understanding)upontheinterpretation.Theconceptofreferencemustbemeantbroadly.Everyactofmovingtherecipient’sattentionfromoneobjecttoanotherisanactofreference.In communication you employ significant objects. They are parts of thesender’sactivityorofthesignificantsurroundings.Someofthemrefertoothersignificantobjectsortogeneralities,andtheAuthorcallsthemsigns.Anobjectmayrefertoanotherby:

80

pointingtoit,beingitseffigy,beingitsassociative,beingitssymbolorbeingahint.Theobjectmaybe:-Asampleofthegenerality,-Anassociative:asampleofageneralitythattherecipientwouldprobablyassociatewiththegivenone,-Asymbolofthegivengenerality.AsasymboltheAuthormeansanobjectwhichcontentisestablishedbyacustomor convention.Havingobjects andgeneralities indicated you canpointtootherobjectsandgeneralitiesbythem.The crucial observation is that reference may exist only in an act ofcommunication,andthatisawholewhoseallthepartsarenecessaryandlackofoneofthemmakesthatthereisnocommunication,andnosigns.Thismeansthatquotationofasignemploysnot thesignbutmerely theshapeofit. Quotationisanactofemployinginextensoasampleofthesamekindastheobjectusedasthesigninacommunicationalactinordertorefertothecontentofthesign.

*

[representation]Tuesday,14:00-14:30,room201JamesD.Grayot,james.grayot[at]gmail.comErasmusUniversityRotterdam,TheNetherlandsMind-shapingandsocialcognition:implicationsfordebatesabout

mentalrepresentation There are two paradigms for interpreting folk-psychological practices.Proponents of the ‘mind-reading’ approach argue that the successfulrecognitionandattributionofothers’intentionalstatesisunderwrittenbyaprocessofmental representation—often (butnot always) this involvessome form of meta-representation (cf. Leslie & Frith 1987; Gopnik &Astington1988;Sterelny1998).Bycontrast,proponentsof‘mind-shaping’

81

(Zawidzki 2013; see also McGeer (2015)) argue that feats of strategiccoordinationandinterpersonalunderstandingdependnotupontheexplicitattributionofpropositional attitudes viameta-representations, butuponprocesses of regulative enculturation that utilize distributed and readilyavailablecognitivetechnologies. In short, the key difference between mind-reading and mind-shapinghypotheses is thatwheremind-reading tries toexplainhowoneindividual can ‘know’ the intentional stateof anotherby relyingon theirowncognitiveresources,mind-shapingsuggeststhatsocial-cognitionisanactiveprocess.Moreover, it suggests thatmany socio-cognitivepracticesevolvedpriortotheabilityofhumanstometa-represent.Inthisway,themind-shapingapproachdoesnotfallpreytothesameepistemicproblemsthat have plagued neo-Cartesian accounts of mind-reading foundthroughout the ‘theory of mind’ literature (cf. Davies & Stone 1995;Carruthers&Smith1996). Nevertheless,manyquestionsaboundconcerningwhichparadigmbetterexplainsthefoundationsoffolk-psychologicalpractice.Forinstance,assumingthatmind-shapinghypothesesarecorrectabouttheevolutionofsocial-cognition, it would seem that meta-representations are notnecessary to explain how people successfully coordinate and derivemeaning from their actions. According to Zawidzi (2013) mind-readinghypotheses are (mostly) superfluous given that complex and recursivereasoning is a rareoccurrence indaily life—very fewactions require theattribution of propositional attitudes. But this conclusion supposes thatearly humans did in rely on more direct forms of social-cognition, andfurther, that complex and recursive reasoningdoesn’t play an importantroleinstrategicreasoningtoday. Inwhatfollows,Iarguethatthemind-shapingapproachislimitedasanexplanatorytheoryofsocial-cognition:thisisbecause(1)itdoesnotdiscriminate what is uniquely false about different theories of mentalrepresentation in the mind-reading literature; (2) It identifies onlyprototypicalformsofsocial-cognitionthatdidnotdependondidnotrelyon meta-representations; and (3) It doesn’t rule out that meta-

82

representational abilities emerged for other purposes, thereby enablingabstractandcounter-factualreasoningweutilizetoday.TomotivateeachofthesepointsIdrawuponinterdisciplinarystudiesofstrategicreasoning(i.e. from experimental economics, developmental psychology, andcognitive neuroscience) to identifywheremind-shaping hypotheses out-performmind-reading ones; as such, the paper does not undermine themind-shapingapproachbutrefinesitsscopeofexplanation.ReferencesCarruthers, Peter, and Peter K. Smith, eds.Theories of theories ofmind.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996.Davies, Martin, and Tony Stone. "Folk psychology: The theory of minddebate."(1995).Gopnik, Alison, and Janet W. Astington. "Children's understanding ofrepresentationalchangeanditsrelationtotheunderstandingoffalsebeliefandtheappearance-realitydistinction."Childdevelopment(1988):26-37.Leslie,AlanM.,andUtaFrith."Metarepresentationandautism:Hownottoloseone'smarbles."Cognition27.3(1987):291-294.McGeer,Victoria."Mind-makingpractices:thesocialinfrastructureofself-knowingagencyandresponsibility."PhilosophicalExplorations18.2(2015):259-281.Sterelny,Kim."Intentionalagencyandthemetarepresentationhypothesis."Mind&language13.1(1998):11-28.Zawidzki, Tadeusz Wieslaw. Mindshaping: A new framework forunderstandinghumansocialcognition.MITPress,2013.

*

83

[communication]Tuesday,12:00-12:30,AulaMałgorzataHaładewicz-Grzelak,haladewicz[at]gmail.comPolitechnikaOpolska,PolandModalitiesofthesacrosphereinasemiotacticstudyofwayside

shrinesThepresentationtacklesthetopicofinterculturalvisualcommunicationinthe sacrosphere. I argue that to a large extent, signs and culturalphenomena in general undergo processes which can be captured byanalytical procedures devised for studying sound changes and soundoccurrencerestrictions.Iproposetonamethisperspective,couchedwithina larger meta-paradigm of linguistic semiotics (e.g. Wąsik 2014),‘semiotactics’. The term, first presented during the PLM conference in2009, is modelled on the perspective called ‘phonotactics’: a branch ofphonologyinvestigatingtherestrictionsonandthepossibilitiesofphonemecombinationsinlanguages(cf.e.g.Dziubalska-Kołaczyk‒Zielińska2011).Inthis sense, semiotactics denotes a branch of semiology investigating co-occurrencerestrictionsamongstsignsand,inalargersense,co-occurrencesamongst postulated sign constituents (see e.g. Haładewicz-Grzelak 2012,2014).ThestudydrawsondigitaldocumentationofwaysideshrinesandreligiousmarkersonchurchescollectedbytheauthorinvariousEuropeancountriesandinTurkey(2009-2015).Treatingthecollectedvisualmaterialasreligiousdiscourse, theanalysis traces the structuring,markedness, co-occurrencerestrictionsandimplicationalpreferencesofsemioticdistributionofsomereligious markers. In the first part of the talk I will present a proposedstructuring of the sacrosphere into threemodalities. Then I will analyzepermutationsofthebaseform,textuality,underspecificationandproposelinguisticinterpretationsintermsofbinaryandprivativeprimes.In the adopted perspective, wayside shrines in Poland are analyticallyinterpreted as a recessive sign (the existing ones are not eliminated,althoughnewonesarehardlyevererected),whilethesamemarkerine.g.

84

Greeceispreferentiallyaproductivesign,additionallypossessing[+locus][-active]feature.Ialsoconsiderseveralalternativeanalyticalprocedures.Thefirst, stillwithin the binarity perspective, consists of proposing a feature[vacuus],whichwouldresultinthecompilation[-active][-vacuus][-mobile]in Poland and e.g. Slovakia; in Broumovsko region: [-active][+vacuus] [-mobile]; in Greece: [+active][-vacuus][+mobilus]. In terms of recentlypopularprivative terminology (insteadofbinarity),we canpostulatee.g.locativity(L)asaprivativefeature,whichwillbemissinginforexample,theGreeksacrosphere.Thelatteranalyticalprocedurealsoinvolvesproposingthefeature[operandi].Intheprivativeanalysiswewouldthusobtainthefollowingrepresentations: Poland(L,O),Greece(A,O),Broumovsko(L).The third proposed procedure sets off not from activities but fromprocesses.ReferencesDziubalska-Kołaczyk,K.‒D.Zielińska.2011.“Universalphonotacticandmorphonotacticpreferencesinsecondlanguageacquisition”.[In:]Dziubalska-Kołaczyk,K.,M.WrembelandM.Kul(eds.).AchievementsandperspectivesinSLAofspeech:NewSounds2010.FrankfurtamMain:PeterLangVerlag,53-64.URL:http://wa.amu.edu.pl/kdk/sites/default/files/04_Dziubalska_Kolaczyk.pdfHaładewicz-Grzelak,M.2012.“Dynamicmodelingofvisualtexts:arelationalmodel”.Semiotica190.211-251.Haładewicz-Grzelak,M.2014.“ThesegmentationofphenomenologicalspaceinLicheńasanexampleofdoublebinds”.Semiotica(200-June).200:275–312.Waugh,L.“Markedandunmarked:Achoicebetweenunequalsinsemioticstructure”.Semiotica38-3/4(1982),299-318.Wąsik,Z.2014.Lecturesontheepistemologyofsemiotics.Wrocław:WydawnictwoWSFweWrocławiu.

*

85

[semiotics]Wednesday,11:30-12:00,AulaClaudioJulioRodríguezHiguera,higuera[at]ut.eeUniversityofTartu,Estonia

Top-downComplementarityintheStudyofBiosemiosis

Whiletheconceptionofanaturalizedsemioticsencompassesthebulkofpossibilitiesofsemiotics,theprocessofnaturalizingitscoreconceptsis,itwill be argued, a bottom-up a proposition. This seems to work as theheuristicsofbiosemiotics,understandingtheapplicationofsignrelationstosimpleorganismsandtyingthesemodelstohigherlevelsofcognitionacrossthespectrumoflivingbeings.However,theconnectionbetweendifferentpossiblelevelsisnoteasytoargueforexceptinthemostgeneralmanner,that is, by establishing that sign action occurs across said levels and isperpetuatedbybiologicalprocesses.If the enterprise of a naturalized semiotics is to concretize this point, itneedsnotonlyabottom-upmodel,butalsoatop-downcomplementarity,meaningthatitnecessitatesthestudyofhigherlevelsofcognitioninordertostreamlineitsmodelsacrossotherlevels.Thetheoreticalissuesatstake,however,makebothapproacheshardtobringtogether.Thispaperwilltalkabout the conflicts between both approaches and speculate on possiblesolutionsfromtheassumedbottom-upperspectivecommonintheTartu-Copenhagenschoolofbiosemioticsandthecomplementarityofferedbytheprogramofcognitivesemiotics.

*

[conceptualization]Tuesday,11:30-12:00,room101LinJinfeng,linjinfeng1990[at]163.comSaint-PetersburgStateUniversity,RussianFederation

Comparisonofconcepts[HUMAN][BODY][SOUL][SPIRIT]inRussianandChineselanguagepictureoftheworld

86

Thestudyofconceptsisoneofleadingresearchinmodernlinguisticsandsemiotics.Thisconceptmakesitpossibletoconsiderregularityoforiginofsign,language,consciousnessandculturefromnewposition.Inculturallinguistics concept summarize the relationship between language,consciousnessandculture.Asapartofculture,conceptreflectsfeatureofnaturalculture.Keywords:Concept,Human,Body,Soul,SpiritInRussianlanguagepictureoftheworldthepersonincludesbody,soulandspirit.Thebody isaphysical, sensory,perceptibleandexternalpart.Soul is totalityofour inner feelings,experiences,emotionsand thoughts(thetwomainqualities:thinkingandfeeling-mindandemotions).Spirit-inner man, expressed in terms of higher emotions and higher mentalabilities(manifestationofthespirit-conscienceissomethingthatconnectspeoplewithGod).

InChineselanguagepictureoftheworldsubjectiveandobjectivearenotseparated,orpresentedinalesstraditionalform.InChineseculturetheconceptof“soul”notonlyisspiritualsubstance,whichisapartoftheworldof man, his life, along with the subject. Chinese well-known poet andphilosopher Laozi fix following representations about spirit of people:shen(spirit of people)-spirit, gui(devil)-soul, spirit is associated with lightandgood, isman, is top; soul is evil anddarkness, iswoman, isbottom.Between light and darkness, top and bottom set virtuous relationshipDe(virtue).

ComparetheRussianlanguagepictureoftheworldwiththeChineselanguagepictureoftheworld,concepts[HUMAN],[BODY],[SOUL],[SPIRIT]existintwolanguagepictureoftheworld.IntraditionalChinesephilosophyconcept “heaven-human” and triad “heaven-earth-human” arefundamentalontologicalandcosmologicalstructure.Theyreflecttheviewthathuman isan important integralpartof thesinglebody,heart in thebody is the organ of all mental activity, heart thinks the world as acomprehensivebody.Soweknow,humanandbodyinChinaalwaysinthespotlight.InRussiansoulisgivenbyGod,thesoulisthelifeforceofmanandlivingbeing,itisthelife-givingbeginningtocontrolthebody,sosoul

87

and spirit are always fundamental component. This is a great differenceaboutconcept[HUMAN],[BODY],[SOUL],[SPIRIT]intwodifferentlanguagepictureoftheworld.

*

[language&vincinities]Monday,14:00-14:30,room101NiklasJohansson,niklas.johansson[at]ling.lu.seLundUniversity,Sweden

Soundsymbolicimplicationsfordeicticwordsasacognitively

fundamentalwordclass

Diessel (2014) suggested that demonstratives constitute a universal andperhapsfundamentalclassofwordsalongsidenounsandverbs,asthereisno evidence that demonstratives evolved from content words. Deicticpointingisoneofthemostbasiccommunicativedevicesinallculturesanddeicticwordsaresomeofthemostfrequentlyusedwordsingeneral,andunlike other closed class functionwords among the first words used bychildren (Diessel 2006). Basic description words (small/round/flat), basicnouns (mother/father) etc., crucial for describing the world in earlychildhood,areoftenaffectedbysoundsymbolism.Hence,heavyinfluenceofsoundsymbolismcouldactasanindicatorofthefundamentalnatureofconcepts (Imai & Kita 2014). And thus, the sound symbolic behavior ofdeictic words could demonstrate their potential role as one of thecornerstonesofhumanlanguage.Johansson(2014)selected56semanticoppositionalconceptsoccurringinmostlanguages.Thephoneticvaluesofthelexemesforeachconceptfrom75 sampled languages were quantified according to different phoneticparameters. Using cluster analyses based exclusively on phonologicalcomposition, the deictic concepts were all found to be very salient anddividedintothreedistinctgroups;EGO(speaker-related),THIS-THAT-YOU-HERE(hearer-related) and THERE (other/away-related). Johansson & Carling(2015) compared spatial demonstratives from 30 contemporary and

88

historical Indo-European languages with a reconstructed Proto-Indo-Europeandeicticsystem(Beekes1995).Althoughallofthelanguagesuseddifferent systems than the Proto-Indo-European, 70 % of the formscorrectlymappedhigher-frequencysoundstoproximalconceptsandlower-frequency sounds to distal concepts. Thus, sound symbolism wasreconstructedrepeatedly.Johansson&Zlatev(2013)investigatedpossiblemotivations for sound symbolism in spatial demonstratives within 101sampledlanguages.Sixdifferentpredictionsofphonemesmappedontotheproximal-distaldimensionwereformulated,basedon(a)semioticground(iconic, indexical or combined), (b) speaker-centeredness, hearer-centerednessorbothand(c)applicabilitytovowels,consonantsorboth.Theresultsshowedsignificantmotivatedratiosforthepredictionbasedonvowel-frequency, which incorporated iconic factors, indexical factors,speakerandhearer.The findings indicate that deictic words behave comparably to otherfundamentalconceptsbyusingsimilarsound-meaningmappings,whilealsodifferingastheyhavenofixeddenotations.Nounsandverbsmaybethetwomostclearlyuniversalwordclasses,butdeicticwordsgivethemtheiressential internal and external relationships. This grounding, evidentthrough sound symbolism, suggests that deictic words are a cognitivelyfundamentalgroupofwordsintheculturalevolutionoflanguage.ReferencesBeekes, R. S. P. (2011). Comparative Indo-European linguistics: an

introduction.2.,rev.ed.Amsterdam:JohnBenjaminsPub.Co.Diessel,H.(2006).Demonstratives, jointattention,andtheemergenceof

grammar.CognitiveLinguistics,17,463-89.Diessel, H. (2014). Demonstratives, frames of reference, and semantic

universalsofspace.LanguageandLinguisticsCompass,8/3,116-132.Imai,M.&Kita,S.(2014).Thesoundsymbolismbootstrappinghypothesis

for language acquisition and language evolution. PhilosophicalTransactionsoftheRoyalSocietyB:BiologicalSciences,369(1651).

89

Johansson, N. & Zlatev, J. (2013). Motivations for Sound Symbolism inSpatialDeixis:ATypologicalStudyof101languages.ThePublicJournalof Semiotics [Online], Vol 5, No 1. Available at:http://pjos.org/index.php/pjos/issue/view/1385

Johansson, N. (2014). Tracking Linguistic Primitives: The PhonosemanticRealization of Fundamental Oppositional Pairs. MA Thesis. LundUniversity.

Johansson,N.& Carling,G. (2015). TheDe-Iconization andRebuilding ofIconicityinSpatialDeixis:AIndo-EuropeanCaseStudy.ActaLinguisticaHafniensia:InternationalJournalofLinguistics,47:1,4-32.

*

[language&vincinities]Monday,15:00-15:30,room101SkirmantasJunevicius,s.junevicius@ambergrid.ltEugenijaJunevicienne,eugenija.juneviciene@gmail.comIndependentScholars,Lithuania

CategorizationandMeaning-MakingThepaperpresentsgeneralpictureofmeaninginitsmaking.Thepicturerestsonanideaofcategorization-basedcognition.„ToCognizeistoCategorize“(Harnad2005).Thebeginningofcategorizationconcurwiththeemergenceoflife-everyorganismmakes something in this world to be of certain value, leavingeverythingelsetobeworthless;that’stheessenceofcategorization;livingorganismsappeartoactasinstitutionsofcategorizationand,what’smore,asvariousmethodsofcategorization.Thecriteriausedformakingthisworlddividedintotheinitialcategoriesareobscure, ifnotwithout logic,but resultsproducedthereofconstitutebasisforthenextcriteriatobenotbaseless.Theyalsoconstituteaxiomsforall the subsequent logic-building and premises for all the subsequentmeaning-making.

90

To look at that, Pavlovian experiments (unsurpassed in experimentalsemiotics)mightbeused.Theyshowhowtheumweltofananimalcouldbeexpandedtoincludenewly-formedadditionalareasofsymbolicrealityand,ontopofthat,theysuggestideasforbridgingthetheoreticalgapbetweensignsofanimalcommunicationandhumanlanguage.Let’sassumethefollowing:1. Pavlovian-type signsof the stimulus-response realityhave semanticvalue.2. The aforesaid value could not be defined adequately in terms ofgrammaticallymodifiedwords(neithernoun“food”,northeverb“toeat”,noreventheabstractadjective“good”canmatchthemeaningexpressedby the sound-induced somatic salivation; noword canmatch a categoryderivedfromtherepertoireofanimal’ssomaticreactions).3.Thesamegoesaboutinitialpregrammaticalwords–theirmeaningisnotexpressibleinthewordsofmodernvocabulary;theyhavetobeseeninthecategoriesofthepreverbalhumanexperiencebesides.Thepaper focuseson the lastassumptionandcomes to the followingconclusion:ourwordsmakeustoliveintheworldthatconsistsofthings(“thingsinitself”);thewordsofourdistantpredecessorsmadethemtoliveintheworldthatconsistedofagent-like(“theonimic”)phenomena.To prove this case, Homeric language, Aristotelian categories (notcompatiblewiththemodernmentality!),otherreflectionsofancientmindhavebeenanalyzed.Based on that, short vocabulary of the early humans have beenelaborated.Oneexample: “M(a) / T(a)” –markersof thebasic categories “good /bad”,“vitallyimportant/deadlydangerous”,“myown/theOther”,nottheearlyformsofstrictlypersonalpronouns“me/thou”.Thenextissueislanguage-basedmeaning-making.ReferencesHarnadS.(2005).ToCognizeistoCategorize:CognitionisCategorizationinLefebvre,C.andCohen,H.,Eds.HandbookofCategorization.Elsevier.

91

[experimental]Tuesday,14:30-15:00,room4AndrzejKapusta,andrzej.kapusta[at]poczta.umcs.lublin.plJolantaKociuba,jolanta.kociuba[at]poczta.umcs.lublin.plMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

DecisionmakinginmentalillnessTheaimofthepresentationistoanswerthequestiontowhatextentthedepressiveexperienceresultsindifficultiesinpatients'decisionmakingandgenerallytoexplorethespecificpropertiesofdepressiveexperience.Weintendtosystematizeonthebasisofavailableliterature(bothselectedphilosophicalandphenomenologicalconcepts,theoreticalmodelsandtheinterpretation of empirical research in the field of psychopathology) thefeatures of patients' depressive experience (eg. self-disorders,disembodiment, deformation of common sense, irrational beliefs, theproblems of reasoning, lack of insight) and their effectiveness in socialfunctioning, abilities to cope with everyday life and to follow the socialrules.Particularfocusofourinterestisinthedepresivepatients'waysofdecision-makingincomparisontootherformsofmentaldisorders.Weespeciallyinvestigatedisordersofagency/subjectivityandtheproblemsof free will in depresive patients, their insight, reflexivity, depressivedeformationsoftimeanddisembodiment.Examined experiences will be localized on the axis: reflexive/habitualaction;decisionmaking/implementation;cognitive/emotionalcomponentsof decision-making; planning/realization; agency/authorship;real/imaginary.The proposed methodological and theoretical approach refers to thephenomenological method of analysis, and is a part of thenarrative/qualitative research tradition (Merleau-Ponty, H. Dreyfus, S.Gallagher,Varela,C.Fuchs,G.Stanghellini,A.Kępiński).Empiricalresearch(aqualitativeresearch):co-author

*

92

[intersubjectivity]Monday,11:15-11:45,AulaHenrykKardela,henkar[at]klio.umcs.lublin.plMariaCurie-SkłodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

Liberatingthesignifierfromthesignified:ACognitiveGrammar

perspectiveonErnstCassirer’sconceptionoflanguageasasystemofsymbolicforms.

FollowingErnstCassirer’sclaimaboutthesame“intuitionsandthesameprocessesunderlyingthedevelopmentofbothlanguageandmyth,”(Langer1946:ix), thepaperaddressesthequestionofhow,accordingtoCassirer,languagetakesus,asLangerputsit“fromthemythmakingphaseofhumanmentalitytothephaseoflogicalthoughtandtheconceptionoffacts”(ibid.),i.e. to a phase when scientific judgments can—via language—beformulated.This“odysseyofthemind”(Langer’sformulation)—frommythtolanguage—couldnotbepossiblewereitnotforthefactthat,asCassirerholds, quoting Humboldt, “man puts language between himself and thenaturewhichinwardlyandoutwardlyactsuponhim[sothathe]surroundshimselfwithaworldofwordsinordertoassimilateandelaboratetheworldofobjects[…]”(Cassirer1955.Vol.2:23).Yet,“theelaborationoftheworldofobjects,”Cassirermaintains,canonlytakesplacewhenthecontent,i.e.thesignified,isnotonlyboundupwiththesignifier,butwhen“atthesametime they remain distinct fromone another” (ibid.). And it is onlywhen“they remain distinct”, when the signifier can be ambiguously used,irrespectiveoftheexpressivecontentandirrespectiveofthehereandnowthat the true symbol-based “scientific judgement (via language) can beformulated.”Language,Cassirersays(1955.Vol.1:197)makes a virtue of necessity, that is of the ambiguity inevitable in thelinguisticsign.Forthisveryambiguitywillnotpermitthesigntoremainamereindividualsign;itcompelsthespirittotakethedecisivestepfromtheconcrete function of “designation” to the universal and universally validfunctionof“signification.”Inthisfunctionlanguagecastsoff,asitwere,thesensuouscoveringinwhichithashithertoappeared:mimeticoranalogical

93

expressiongiveswaytopurelysymbolicexpressionwhich,preciselyinandbyvirtueofitsotherness,becomesthevehicleofanewadeeperspiritualcontent.

WhatunderliestheCassirean“liberation”ofthesignifiedfromthesignifier,what changes “mimetic and analogical expression […] to purelysymbolicexpression,”is,inourview,intersubjectification,i.e.thecognitiveprocesswhichmakes itpossible for “[apluralityof subjects] to share [..]experiential content (e.g., feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and linguisticmeanings”(cf.Zlatevetal.2008:1).

Generally speaking, intersubjectification canbe viewed from twoperspectives: (i) from a representational diachronic- and/or languageacquisition-related perspective on language development or (ii) from asynchronic-representational perspective, involving the speaker-hearerdiscursive exchange. It is the latter perspective that this presentationfocuseson.Specifically,adoptingasapointofdeparture forouranalysisChrisSinha’s(2007:1281)modifiedversionofKarlBühler’sOrganonModelandBühler’sdistinctionsbetweensignalsandsymbolsystems(adoptedbySinhaaswell),weclaimthattheCassirean“liberationofthesignifierfromthesignified”involves(i)anintersubjectification-basedagreementbetweenthespeakerandheareronwhatconstitutesthereferentialsituationand(ii)thedegreetowhichthesymbol“coordinatesthe“jointattention”ofthespeaker and hearer, directed toward the symbolically representedreferential situation” (cf. Sinha (2007:1282—cf. Figure 49.2; dotted linessymbolize“jointattention”)

The best testing ground for the aforementionedintersubjectification-basedagreementbetweenthespeakerandhearerandfortheroleofthesymbolasa“coordinator”ofthe“speaker-hearerjointattention” (cf. Sinha’smodifiedversionof theOrganonModel) are finitecomplementswhichareembedded inmainclauseswithverbsof saying,thinking,seeingor feelingas inGeorgesaw/knew/saidthathisopponentwas closing in. In cognitive linguistics, sentences of this sort have beenanalyzed, among others, by Verhagen (2005:78). The paper offers adiscussionofsuchstructures,recastingVerhagen’sanalysisintermsofwhat

94

Langacker (2007: 183) calls the apprehension of other minds, i.e. theconceptualintegration-based“mind-reading”processwhichtakesplaceintheCurrentDiscourseSpace—CDS(cf.Langacker2008).ReferencesBühler, Karl. 1934/2011. Introduction. In Theory of Language. The

RepresentationalFunctionofLanguage.Amsterdam:JohnBenjamins.Cassirer, Ernst. 1955.The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Trans. by Ralph

Manheim.Vol.1.Language.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.Cassirer, Ernst. 1955.The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Trans. by Ralph

Manheim. Vol. 2.Mythical Thought. New Haven: Yale UniversityPress.

Langacker,Ronald.2007.Constructingthemeaningofpersonalpronouns.In:G. Radden, K-MKoepcke, T. Berg, P. Siemund (eds.)Aspects ofMeaningConstruction.Amsterdam:Benjamins,171-187.

Langacker,Ronald.2008.CognitiveGrammar.ABasicIntroduction.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Langer,Susanne.1946.Preface.ErnstCassirer.LanguageandMyth.NewYork:DoverPublications.

Sinha,Chris.2007.Cognitivelinguistics,psychology,andcognitivescience.InD.Geeraerts and H. Cuyckens (eds.)TheOxfordHandbook ofCognitive Linguistics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1266-1294.

Verhagen,Arie.2005.Constructionsof Intersubjectivity.Discourse,SyntaxandCognition.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Zlatev,Jordan,TimothyRacine,ChrisSinha,EsaItkonen(eds.)TheSharedMind.PerspectivesonIntersubjectivity.Amsterdam:Benjamins.

*

95

[semiotics&science]Tuesday,11:00-11:30,room301PiotrKonderak,kondorp[at]bacon.umcs.lublin.plMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

Metacognition,metasemiosisandconsciousnessI.SemioticcreaturesandmetasemioticsToexplainmeaning-makingactivity(asamaintopicdiscussedwithincognitivesemiotics)onehastoreflectonabilitiesofacognitive-semioticcreature.Itreatacreatureasasemioticoneif:-something(i.e.asign)canstandforsomethingelse(i.eitsobject)forthatcreature-andthesignmayinfluencebehaviourofthatbeing;inaddition:-suchacreatureisabletoreflectonsigns,i.e.itdisplaysmetasemioticcapabilities(Petrilli2014:xviii).II.MetasemioticsandmetacognitionIwillarguethatmetasemioticactivityisaspecialinstanceofmetacognition(cf.Fetzer2001).Metacognitionisunderstoodhereasacognitiveprocesscontrollingandmonitoringanyaspectofcognition.Metasemiosis-inturn-requiresakindofawareness,namely:asemioticsystemmustbeawarethatitusessignsassigns-i.e.thesystemneedstohavesomemeta-knowledgeembracingtheusageofsignsaswellasthesystemneedssomemetaprocessesthatcontroltheinterpretationofsigns.III.MetasemioticactivityFirst,Iwouldliketojustifytheclaimthatanymetasemioticcreaturewhichisabletoreasonaboutitselfanditsownsemioticactivity,needsamodelofitself,i.eithas:- beliefsaboutitself(i.e.beliefswiththeself-termsuchasIasan

argument)and- senseofembodimentandsituatednessintheworld(Shapiro,

Rapaportetall.2007:21).Iwouldliketopresentandanalysethefollowing,selectedaspectsofmetasemioticactivity,namely:

96

-abilityforre-interpretationofsigns(implyingdynamicityofmeaningandbeingaconsequenceoffallibilism)-abilitytodetectcontradictionsemergingduringtheprocessesofinterpretation-abilitytorelatemeaningsemergingindifferentsemioticsystems(implyingtheabilitytotranslateacrosstwoormoresemioticsystems);suchtranslationisaresultofmetasemioticprocesses.Finally,IwillarguethataboveconsiderationscanbesupportedbyanalysisofDamasian(2000)notionof(extended)consciousnesswhichItreatasaneuralgroundformetacognition(andthereforemetasemiotics).ReferencesDamasio,A.2000.TheFeelingofwhatHappens.MarinerBooks.Fetzer,JamesH.2001.ComputersandCognition:WhyMindsAreNotMachines.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers.Petrilli,S.2014.SignStudiesandSemioethics:Communication,TranslationandValues.deGruyter.Shapiro,Stuart;Rapaport,W.KandeferM.;JohnsonF.J.;GoldfainA.2007.MetacognitioninSNePS,AIMagazine28(1):17-29.

*

[conceptualization]Tuesday,14:00-14:30,room101IrynaKotova,iryna.kotova[at]gmail.comV.N.KarazinKharkivNationalUniversity,UkraineHeroesandAntiheroesinAmericanFilmDiscourseandNarrative

TheHEROandANTIHEROconceptscanbeimplementedinvariousdiscourses.Amongthem,AmericanfilmdiscourseisofspecialinterestduetotheglobalculturaleffectoftheAmericanfilmindustry(Ritzer&Stillman2003:37).

Film discourse is distinguished by a combined use of differentsemiotic resources that, if applied efficiently, form a meaningful and

97

coherent narrative (Wildfeuer 2014: 21, 167). Its multimodality has aneffect on the choice of linguistic means through which concepts areimplemented in film discourse. Specifically, the HERO and ANTIHEROconceptstaketheformofartisticcharacters(offiction)thatcanbeviewedas fundamental elements in story development (Abbott 2008: 130). ThisstudyanalysesverbalrepresentationsoftheHEROandANTIHEROconceptsin feature films representing what is called the American monomyth, anarrative pattern rooted in Campbell’s (2008) theory. This pattern isessentiallyanarchetypalplotformulathatrevealstheevolutionoftheherowitha special emphasison the ideaof redemption rather than initiation(Lawrence&Jewett2002:5-6).Acorrespondingplotformulacanbeworkedoutfortheantihero.

The poetics of film narrative can be regarded from a mentalperspective. For this purpose, this study utilises the cognitive semioticapproach that links “semiotic relations established internally, betweensemantic contents by purely mental connectors, and those establishedexternally, between expressed signs, or between signs and acts theycommand”(Brandt2003:29).Fromthisstandpoint,filmsaredesignedtocue spectators to perform certain operations facilitating theircomprehension of the story (Bordwell 2008: 93). Bordwell’s narrationmodel presupposes that film representations are processed perceptuallyand then elaborated on the basis of schemas that are grounded in real-worldknowledge(ibid.).Thisstudysuggeststhatlinguisticmeansusedforcharacterisationofheroesandantiheroescanbeviewedascues(expressedsigns) helping spectators realise individual characteristics related to thecorrespondingconcepts(theirsemanticcontents).Differentfeaturesofthecharacters are brought into focus at varying points of the storydevelopment.ThismeansthatthesalienceofindividualcharacteristicsoftheHEROandANTIHEROconceptsrevealedthroughthesecharactersvariesasthestoryunfolds.Thisway,narrativeinfilmdiscoursecanbeconsideredas an essential characterisation tool through which various conceptualcharacteristicsareactivated.

98

ReferencesAbbott,H.Porter(2008).TheCambridgeIntroductiontoNarrative(2nded.)Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Bordwell,D.(2008).PoeticsofCinema.NewYork,NY;Abingdon:Routledge.Brandt, P.Aa. (2003). Toward a Cognitive Semiotics. Recherches enCommunication,19(Sémiotiquecognitive–CognitiveSemiotics),21-34.Campbell,J.(2008).TheHerowithaThousandFaces(3rded.)Novato,CA:NewWorldLibrary.Lawrence,J.S.,&Jewett,R.(2002).TheMythoftheAmericanSuperhero.GrandRapids,Cambridge:Wm.B.EerdmansPublishing.Ritzer,G.,&Stillman,G.(2003).AssessingMcDonaldization,AmericanizationandGlobalization.InU.Beck,N.Sznaider,&R.Winter(Eds.),GlobalAmerica?:TheCulturalConsequencesofGlobalization(pp.30-48).Liverpool:LiverpoolUniversityPress.Wildfeuer,J.(2014).FilmDiscourseInterpretation:TowardsaNewParadigmforMultimodalFilmAnalysis.NewYork,NY:Routledge.

*

[phenomenology]Wednesday,12:00-12:30,room201HubertKowalewski,hubert.kowalewski[at]umcs.plMariaCurie-SkłodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

The“Maxwellianstyle”ofresearchincognitivesemiotics

Cognitivesemioticsismoreorlessdirectlyinvolvedinthediscussiononthenatureofsubjectiveexperiences.Onewayofrelatingthestudyofsignstothe broader discussion on subjectivity and consciousness is offered byphenomenologically oriented cognitive semiotics (e.g. Thompson 2007,Sonesson2012,Zahavi2012).TheprojectinstantiateswhatIrefertoasthe“Augustinianstyle”ofresearch,whichconsistsincombiningfindingsfromdifferent,originallyunrelated,fieldsofstudyintoacoherentsystemwiththehopethatsuchatheoreticalcomplexwilloffernewinsights.

99

This presentation sketches an alternative approach to the study ofsubjective experience, which has already secured its position in thephilosophyofmind,butitsconsequencesforcognitivesemioticshavenotbeeninvestigatedsofar.Thestyleofresearch,whichIcall“Maxwellian,”attempts to develop the science of consciousness entirely within theparadigmofnaturalsciences, i.e.with littleorno importfromHusserlianphenomenology. The most vocative call for this kind of “science ofconsciousness” comes from Daniel Dennett (1995) and David Chalmers(1997, 2010), who also outlines its metaphysical and methodologicalpostulates, but similar ideas appear in other corners of analyticalphilosophy(e.g.Tye2000,Strawson2006,Nagel2012).The“Maxwellian”philosophers of mind opt for strongly non-reductive explanations ofconscious experience, like property (non-reductive) representationalism(Tye),dualism(Chalmers),orpanpsychism(Strawson).Inthisview,purelyneurologicalflavorsofcognitivesemioticsare,atbest,incomplete.Yet“theMaxwellian phenomenology” is still founded on general metaphysicalassumptionsandmethodologyofnaturalsciences.Arguably,in“Maxwellianphenonemology”providingascientificaccountofasemioticphenomenonamountstoprovidingamodelofthisphenomenonwhich allows for making testable predictions about empirical data, i.e.semioticexpressionsinvariousmodalities(linguistic,visual,gestural,etc.).ThispresentationprovidesaproofofconceptforaMaxwelliananalysisoftworesearchproblemsincognitivesemiotics:salienceinmetonymiesandindexicalsigns,andpropertiesofsimilarityiniconicity.ReferencesChalmers,DavidJ.1997.TheConsciousMind:InSearchofaFundamental

Theory.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.———.2010.TheCharacterofConsciousness.NewYork:OxfordUniversity

Press.Dennett,DanielC.1992.ConsciousnessExplained.Boston:BackBayBooks.

100

Nagel,Thomas.2012.MindandCosmos:WhytheMaterialistNeo-DarwinianConceptionofNatureIsAlmostCertainlyFalse.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Sonesson,Göran.2012.“TheFoundationofCognitiveSemioticsinthePhenomenologyofSignsandMeanings.”Intellectica2(58):207–39.

Strawson,Galen.2006.ConsciousnessandItsPlaceinNature:DoesPhysicalismEntailPanpsychism?Exeter-Charlottesville:ImprintAcademic.

Thompson,Evan.2007.MindinLife:Biology,Phenomenology,andtheSciencesofMind.Cambridge-London:HarvardUniversityPress.

Tye,Michael.2000.Consciousness,Color,andContent.Cambridge:MITPress.Zahavi,Dan,ed.2012.TheOxfordHandbookofContemporary

Phenomenology.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.*

[experimental]Tuesday,10:30-11:00,room4MagdalenaKrzosek,magdalenakrzosek@gmail.comUniversityofRzeszów,PolandTimbrecharacterizationasthebasisofinquiryonmultisensory

experience Wemayobservethatineverydaylifemostpeopleintuitivelyassumethateach sensory reaction is assigned to a specific stimulus. The nature ofsensualmodalitiesisrarelyquestionedeitherbythesubjectsthemselvesorin the process of formal education. The perception of sound is to someextentthemostintuitivesensualexperienceofall.Althoughhearingabilityiscrucialfortheacquisitionofthespokenlanguage(Sacks,1989)andthespatialorientationofthebody,littledoweusuallyexplicitlyknowaboutitsnature.Wetendtotake it forgrantedand,unlessundergoingmusicaloracousticeducation,useitwithoutreflectingbackonit.Onemayobserve

101

thisclearlywhileanalyzingthelimitedscopeofadjectivesthatcharacterizesound.Furthermore,themajorityoftheadjectivescharacterizingsoundaredeeplyrooted intheexperienceofadifferentmodalityratherthanhearing(e.g.softascategorizationoftheperceivedsoundissecondarytosoftashapticexperience). We may observe that the number of adjectives belongingnativelytothedomainofsound/hearingisverysmallincomparisontotheadjectivesassociatedwiththeremainingsenses.Thepresentationgivesabriefsummaryofthestudyontimbreperceptionandhumanabilitytocommunicateacousticexperiencethroughthemeansoflanguage.Theauthorintentstoinvestigateinnatehumandispositionstocategorize certain stimuli and the ability to build explicit sensualconsciousness. The researchmethodwasestablishedon thebasisof thetimbresolfegeintroducedbyMiśkiewicz(1992)butvariesinapplicationandthe choice of tasks. The author believes that the same phenomena isexperiencedregardlessoftheusedlanguage.This,though,isthesubjectforfurther research as the presented experiments concern Polish languagespeakersonly.Thestudy itself is two–dimensional. Itbringsuptwomaincategoriesofquestions:

(1) Howdowedifferentiatesensoryinformation?Howdowedecidethat it belongs to one sense but not to the other?What doestalking about sound teach us about the overall sensual humanexperience?

(2) Isthereanycommongroundofsubjectiveexperienceofthetimbreofsound?Canitbecommunicatedtoothersorputingeneralterms(objectivity)?Aretheresoundsthateveryandeachofuscanrefertoassoft,warmorbright?

The author will address the aforementioned questions and present theresultsofthestudyuptonowwiththefocusonthe(1)dimension.

102

ReferencesAbbadoA.(1988).PerceptualCorrespondencesofAbstractAnimationandSyntheticSound,Leonardo.SupplementalIssue,Vol.1,ElectronicArt,pp.3-5Gibson J.J. (1966). The SensesConsideredasPerceptual System, Boston:HoughtonMifflinKutruffH.(2007).Acoustics:anIntroduction,MiltonPark:Taylor&FrancisLindsay P.H., Norman D.A. (1977). Human Information Processing,AcademicPressMerleau-Ponty M. (2002). Phenomenology of Perception, London:Routledge&K.PaulMiśkiewicz A. (2002).Wysokość, głośność, barwa – badanie wymiarówwrażeniowych dźwiękówmuzycznych [Pitch, volume, timbre – inquiry onperceptual dimensions of musical sounds], Warsaw: Fryderyk ChopinAcademyofMusicMiśkiewiczA. (1992). Timbre Solfege: A Course in Technical Learning forSoundEngineers,JournalofAudioEngineeringSociety,Vol.40,Issue7-8,pp.621-625SacksO.(2000).SeeingVoices,NewYork:VintageBooks

*

[semiotics&science]Tuesday,12:00-12:30,room301KaleviKull,kalevi.kull[at]ut.eeUniversityofTartu,Estonia

Learning,phenomenalpresent,andsemiosis

Learningcanbedefinedasestablishingofa sign relation.Computationalandsemioticdescriptionsoflearningdiverge.Thecomputationalconceptoflearningcanbedefinedasacomplexoflogicalgatesthatchangeormodifyacertainclassificationusingcertaincriteria.

Thesemioticconceptoflearningdescribeslearningasaprocessthatstartswithanincompatibility(confusion,logicalconflict,problem-situation)

103

tobesolved,followedbyhabituation(learninginanarrowsense).Criteriafor learning are not required, as the conflict itself is its cause. Thus thesemioticconceptismoregeneralthanthecomputationalconcept.

We describe a problem-situation faced by an interpreter as asituationoflogicalconflict,ormoregenerally,of incompatibility.Thisisasituationinwhichthereareoptionstochoosefrom.

According to the computational approach, the selection ofbehaviouralpathsisdescribedviasequentialoperations,suchasIFxTHENyELSEz.Hereneitheryandznorxandnon-xaretrueoptions,fortheycanbehandledsequentiallyandthuscannotbuildalogicalconflict.

Options require simultaneity. Only in case possibilities aretemporallyindistinguishable,cantheybeseenasoptionsforalivingsystem.Thisrequiresspeciouspresent(Varela1999;Kull2015).

Thus, semiotic learning or establishing of a new sign relation ispossible only within a specious or phenomenal present. A habituatedrelation (also a code) can work without the phenomenal present, i.e.,computationally.This isalsowhereasemioticrelationcanoccurwithoutlife(e.g.,inartefacts).

In addition to concluding that meaning-making assumes thephenomenalpresent,wesuggestthehypothesisthatmeaning-makingandpresent are co-extensive. In other words, semiosis itself creates thesubjectivepresent.ReferencesKull,Kalevi2015.Semiosisstemsfromlogicalincompatibilityinorganicnature:Whybiophysicsdoesnotseemeaning,whilebiosemioticsdoes.ProgressinBiophysicsandMolecularBiology119(3):616–621.Varela,FranciscoJ.1999.Thespeciouspresent:Aneurophenomenologyoftimeconsciousness.In:Petitot,Jean;Varela,FranciscoJ.;Pachoud,Bernard;Roy,Jean-Michel(eds.),NaturalizingPhenomenology:IssuesinContemporaryPhenomenologyandCognitiveScience.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,266–314.

*

104

[culturalinfluences]Monday,11:15-11:45,room101JeanLassegue,jean.lassegue@ehess.frInstitutMarcelMauss,EHESS,France

Areobjectivesciencesreallyoff-cultureproductions?

Ifoneasksamathematicianwhatkindofrolethebiographicaldimensionplays in the advancement of exact sciences, the most spontaneous andcommonanswerwouldusuallybetoopposecontingent,biographicalfactstothenecessityandimpersonalityofdemonstrativescience.Theunderlyingassumption is that individuals manage to grasp an already existingknowledgethat,byvirtueoffacultiesendowedtoparticularlygiftedminds,gets gradually unveiled through history. This assumption rests upon animplicit divide between contingency and necessity which devaluates thebiographicaldimensionofknowledgebyrelyingoncategoriesasill-definedasthatof‘genius’.Toalargerextent,italsoentailsaglobaldevaluationofintersubjectivepracticesandtransformshighlyculturalphenomenasuchastraditionsandschoolsof thoughts intomerecontingentones the roleofwhichcanbeleftaside.Iwouldliketofocusonhowtoavoidthepitfallinwhichoneislikelytobetrapped inwhenconfrontedtotheshamalternativebetweencontingentbiographicalelementsversusnecessary impersonalknowledge. Iwill firstreconsider the ‘platonistic’epistemologyusually taken forgranted in theexactandnaturalscienceswhichassumesthatobjectivityisonlyreachedwhenall tracesofhumanconstructionare leftaside. Secondly,bygivingErnstCassirer’snotionofa“symbolicform”asocio-semioticandtechnicalmeaning, Iwould like to showthat sucha renewednotionofa symbolicformisinstrumentalwhenonewantstodescribesemioticprocessesthatanticipatesfurtherdevelopmentsbybeingabletoadaptitsverystructuretonewcircumstancesasitisthecaseintheexactsciences.ThechallengeherewouldbetoexpandCassirer’spointofviewbyshowingthatwriting

105

shouldbeviewedasasymbolicformandthatit isapreconditionforthisveryspecifickindofdiscourseknowas“science”toevolveandexpand.Therefore, culture is neither a passive background fromwhich the exactscienceswouldmiraculouslyemergebycuttingthetiestheyhavewithit,nordotheexactsciencesonly“participate”inculturebyusingsomeofitsavailabletools:theyactuallyproduceculture inaveryspecificmodethatcannotbeseveredfromothersemioticproductions.

*

[culturalinfluences]Monday,10:45-11:15,room101HeeSookLee-Niinioja,leeheesook@hotmail.comIndependentScholar,Finland

MultipleCognitiveSignsoftheShamanDrumsasSami’sWorldview,Identity,andCulturalHeritage

Sami religion tells that the world is inhabited by spirits which possessmagicalpowers,protectingcreaturesinnature.Andalllifehasdualismonthe spiritual and physical levels; in the spiritual world, dead ancestorscontinue their life. This animistic, polytheistic view influenced Samitraditionstowardsharmonywithnatureandtheneedfortheshaman. As a traditional healer, the shaman keeps the multiple codes andexpressesmeaningsverbally,musically,artistically,andindance.Heknowstheircommunitycultureandactstobeunderstoodbyaudiencewithtrust.Tocommunicatewiththespiritsonbehalfofthecommunity,theshaman’smediationisillustratedbyhisobjectsandsymbols:adrumisoneofthesecommunications. Twotypesofthedrumarebasedontheirphysicalconstruction,buttheircommon symbolic signs reveal the Sami cosmology in three levels: theupperforgods;themiddleofhumans;theloweroftheunderworld.Despitedifficultiesof reading theirmeanings, causedby theChurch’seradicatingthemajority of drums (18 C), constant emergences of god, human, and

106

animal signs on surviving 71 drums suggest their central roles in Samitradition. Thisquestionshowtheappearance,location,andrelationshipofgods-humans-animalsonthedrumstookplace:Aretheyconnectedeachotheror isolated? Ifconnected,whichshapeandform?What is todowiththeshaman’scognitivemind,Samiidentity,andculture?AstheshamandrumisakeytotheSamicosmology,symbolicsignsonhisdrumwereacognitivemapforego-soul travelsbetweenthethreeworlds,collectivelyobservedandpubliclyinterpretedtohisaudience. Mypaperdiscussesthesequestionsbyassessingrepresentativedrumschosen from the 71, in order to seek, understand, and interpret themeaningsofthesethreesigns. Itchallengestocognitivesemiotics,whichdefines as “characterized as an emerging interdisciplinary matrix ofdisciplines and methods, focused on the multifaceted phenomenonofmeaning”. The finding shows that they are fairly distributed on the drum, butconnectedinvariations.Consequently,Samishamansseemtoholdflexiblecosmology in shifting seasons of nature, explaining their identity andculturalheritageinparticular.

*

[embodiment&situatedness]Tuesday,15:30-16:00,AulaKseniyaLeontyeva,ksenja_leontieva@mail.ruTambovStateUniversitynamedafterG.R.Derzhavin,RussianFederationEnactivism,cognitivesemioticsandtranslationstudies:tothe

benefitsofcooperation

Thepurportofthispaperistoshowthatenactivism,oneofthestate-of-the-artparadigmswithinthefieldofCognitiveSciences,hasasignificantpotentialformutualcoordinationofthreemajorapproaches,i.e.cognitive,sociological,andcultural(Chesterman2009),definingthecurrentstateofTranslationStudies.Itscentralconcepts,i.e.autopoesis,autonomy,sense-

107

making, value, embodiment, embeddedness, emergence, experience,adaptivity, agency, and interaction (Di Paolo, Rohde, De Jaegher 2014;Cuffari,Di Paolo,De Jaegher2015), couldprovide a truly integrated andempirically grounded semiotic framework that enables multifocal, yetontologically unified study of translation as an autopoetic (and, thus,autonomous)social(syb)system(Tulenev2010).Thissystemreproducesitsself-identity(mediation)bymeansoftranslationprocess,takenintheunityof its three dimensions, i.e. translation act, translation event, andtranslationpractice(Toury2012,Chesterman2015).

Theprocessitselfisperformedbythetranslator’s«living-livedbody»(Froese 2011), that constitutes an autonomous operationally closedcognitivesystem(DiPaolo,Rohde,DeJaegher2014).Duetosuchclosure,inactualityitisthetranslator’sandnottheauthor’sindividualexperienceandself-identity(andintention)thatisatstakeintranslationact,thetextfunctioningmerelyasan instructionmanual («trigger-causality»;Tulenev2010)forthetranslator’ssense-making(evaluation)oftheworldenactedinhisinterpretiveengagementwiththetext.Atthispointmyargumentwillbe based on the concepts of narrative experientiality (Caracciolo 2011,2012), participatory sense-making and emergence (Di Paolo, Rohde, DeJaegher 2010). At the same time, since autonomous system areinteractionally open (Di Paolo, Rohde,De Jaegher 2010), the translator’scognitive activity (translation act) extends into higher-order social andcultural value landscapes, wherein his body is embedded and whereintranslationeventstakeplaceandtranslationpracticesemergeandevolve.I will discuss the ongoing tension between individual and social valuepatterns and norms, shaping translation process as a means of socialinteractionandakindof«languaging»andsemiosis.

Finally, Iwill examine the enactivist viewon cognition as constantadaptationtoprecariousconditions,bymeansofactivecoordinationoftheinteraction flow, this interaction being transformational, not merelyinformational (Di Paolo, Rohde, De Jaegher 2010), and discuss from thisperspective the issue of the translator’s visibility, manipulation, andintervention. In this respect, enactivist perspective contributes to the

108

gradual transformation of Translation Studies into anthropocentric“Translator’sStudies”(Chesterman2009).ReferencesCaracciolo,M. (2011).TheReader'sVirtualBody:NarrativeSpaceand Its

Reconstruction.StoryWorlds:AJournalofNarrativeStudies,3,117–138.

Caracciolo,M. (2012a). Narrative,Meaning, Interpretation: An EnactivistApproach.PhenomenologyandtheCognitiveSciences,11(3),367–384.

Chesterman,A.(2009).TheNameandNatureofTranslatorStudies.Hermes–JournalofLanguageandCommunicationStudies,42,13–22.

Chesterman, A. (2015). Models of what processes? InM. Ehrensberger-Dow,B.EnglundDimitrova,S.Hubscher-Davidson(Eds.),DescribingCognitiveProcessesinTranslation:Actsandevents.Amsterdam:JohnBenjamins,7–20.

Cuffari, E., Di Paolo, E., De Jaegher,H. (2015). Fromparticipatory sense-makingtolanguage:Thereandbackagain.PhenomenologyandtheCognitiveSciences,14(4),1089-1125.

DiPaolo, E.,Rohde,M.,De Jaegher,H. (2010).Horizons for theEnactiveMind:Values,SocialInteraction,andPlay.InJ.Stewart,O.Gapenne,E.A.DiPaolo(Eds.),Enaction:TowardsaNewParadigmforCognitiveScience.Cambridge:MITPress,33-87.

Froese,T.(2011).Breathingnewlifeintocognitivescience.Avant:TrendsinInterdisciplinaryStudies,2(1),113–129.

Toury,G.(2012).DescriptiveTranslationStudies–andBeyond.Reviseded.Amsterdam:JohnBenjamins.

Tulenev,S.(2010).IsTranslationanAutopoieticSystem?MonTI,2,345-371. Acknowledgements. The research is supported by the Russian ScienceFoundation, project 15-18-10006 «Cognitive Study of AnthropocentricNatureofLanguage».

*

109

[langevo]Monday,14:00-14:30,AulaHannahLittle,hannah[at]ai.vub.ac.beBartdeBoer,bart[at]ai.vub.ac.be VrijeUniversiteitBrussel,Belgium

Didthepressurefordiscriminationtriggertheemergenceofcombinatorialstructure?

Languagehascombinatorialstructure,wheremeaninglessbuildingblockscombinetomakemeaningfulelements.Hockett(1960)hypothesisedthatcombinatorialstructurecameastheresultofpressuresfordiscrimination.Oncethelimitonthenumberofdistinctsignalsthatcanbediscriminatedisreached, then recombination of those signals needs to happen. In thiscontribution, we aim to experimentally test whether, as a meaning setexpands,signalswillbereanalysedfromholisticandpossiblyiconicwholes,todisplaycombinatorialstructure.We carried out an experiment where participants created continuoussignals using an infrared controller, LeapMotion,whichmanipulates thepitch of signals (see Little, Eryılmaz and de Boer, 2015, for details). Themeaningspacestartedasasetof5shapesthatexpandedby5witheachofthe 3 phases in the experiment. The meaning space had no internalstructure,i.e.notwomeaningshadanysharedfeatures(shape,colourortexture).Ineachphase,participantscreatedasignalforeachmeaning.Theythenheardtheirsignalsbackandhadtoselectthemeaningfromanarray.Successinrecognisingtheirownsignalsdidnotsignificantlycorrelatewiththesizeofmeaning space.However,we found that signals formeaningsintroduced laterwere significantly less predictable, given the rest of thesignalrepertoire,thanthoseinearlierphases(Χ2(1)=4,p<0.05),indicatingthatpressures fordiscriminationhadsomeeffectonhowsystematic thesignalrepertoirewasasawhole.Wealsodidaposthocplaybackexperimenttoseeificonicityreducedasthe signal space expanded, possibly indicating adoptionof combinatorialstructure.185naiveparticipantsontheInternetlistenedto1of24setsof

110

signals;eachproducedbyoneoftheoriginalparticipants,andwereaskedtomatchsignalswiththeirmeanings.Ifnaivelistenerscanpairsignalswiththeirintendedmeanings,thenthosesignalscanbesaidtobeiconic.Therewas no interaction between how early in the experiment participantsproducedsignals,andhowiconicthosesignalsprovedtobeintheplaybackexperiment. Also, iconicitywas not a predictor for howwell participantsrecognisedtheirownsignals.Wedidn’tfindmuchevidencefortheemergenceofcombinatorialstructureinourexperiment,possiblybecausehumanscandifferentiatebetweenalotofholisticmeanings.However,qualitativeanalysisandpost-experimentalquestionnaires shed light on why we were unable to find supportingevidenceforHockett’shypothesis.ReferencesHockett,C.F.(1960).Theoriginofspeech.ScientificAmerican,203,88–111.Little,H.,Eryılmaz,K.,&deBoer,B.(2015).Anewartificialsign-spaceproxyforinvestigatingtheemergenceofstructureandcategoriesinspeech.In:Theproceedingsofthe18thinternationalcongressofphoneticsciences.UniversityofGlasgow:Glasgow.Papernumber31.

*

[langevo]Monday,14:30-15:00,AulaGiuseppeMaiorano,g.maiora[at]libero.itTusciaUniversity,Viterbo,Italy

Water,air,earthandfire:detectingtheoriginsofhumanorallanguagefromtheimitationofenvironmentalsounds

In order to understand better linguistic and cognitive features ofmodernhumans,weneedtogetridofbiasesandmisunderstandings,suchas theprincipleofarbitrariness of linguistic signs, the frequentmisuse and mixing of terms like communication, language,

111

onomatopoeia, iconicity, sound-symbolism, the confusion betweenoriginandevolutionof speech,butalso tounderline inaccuracyandlimitsoflanguageandthoughtsincetheirbeginnings,particularlytheirusualresorttometaphor,polysemy,redetermination,redundancy.A long-lasting process from simple motivated starts (imitation ofsounds) resulted in modern conventional products (refined literaryworks), in which the archaic inner iconic characters still constrainmodernspeakingandthinking.I argue that a primitive linguistic iconic embryo-stage predated anymature proto-language and exploited a large archive ofmeaningfulsounds, mapped onto respective objects, animals, actions,atmospheric events, available in the environment and day-life ofpaleolithicHomoSapiens.Thisstagewasfollowedbyslowabstractionprocesses,whichevolvedsimilarlytootherlaterhumanachievements(writing, banking, onomastics) andeventually eraseda greatdeal ofspokenlanguageiconicity.Glottochronology,lexicostatistics,geneticlinguistics,traditionaldatingmethodsandnewprobabilisticmodelsofsound-changehavereacheddeeptimelimitsupto10,000yearsago,butitseemstheycannotgoany further. In the same time,multilateral comparisonwas able todetect a number of vocabulary units - global etymologies - whichbelonged to the first humanoral language and, as amatter of fact,match partially the proposed archaic iconic linguistic units of thepresent research work. However, it can be maintained that acomparativeanalysisofenvironmentalsounds,causedbyatmosphericphenomena, human activities, animal calls and cries, can recoverspeechrootsfromearlytimes.Basicsoundsandrelatedlinguisticunitsrefertovitalhumanactivities:hunting,waterandfoodgathering,toolmanufacturing,cooking.Socialinteractionsandmusicalinstrumentsarealsotobetakenintoaccount.Theyallfosterednamingprocesses,whereclearrelationshipsexistedbetweenrealtool/actionsoundsandtheirrespectivenames.

112

AsimplegroupingofsoundsisestablishedaccordingtoEmpedocles’theoryof‘FourElements’:Water,Air,Earth,Fire.Hereitsaimisonlytoestablishafirstreferencegrid,thatgoesbacktotheincipienthumanneedofexplainingtheworldstructureinitsbasiccomponents.Afundamentalresource,water,leftcluesinthevocabulariesofmanylanguages. The corresponding ‘water-sounds’ /kwa/, or /kwakwa/ inreduplicated form, and /kwo/, or /kwokwo/, from cooking activities(seeLat.coquo‘Icook’)areperceivedeventoday.Theywereemployedto mark a peculiar feature of water and liquids: a constant flathorizontal surface, a property useful to develop concepts such as‘equality’,‘equivalence’,‘quality’.Theerosionofthevelarcomponentoriginated the ‘wh-‘pronouns,meaninggenerally ‘thesameoneas’.Water-soundsbecamealsousefultoexpressregularbasicgeometricaland mathematical entities (see Eng. ‘square’ and ‘four’, from PIE*kwetwer-‘four’).Examples of motivated ‘air-sound’ terms, based on fricative andsibilant consonants, are Lat. fistula ‘reed, pipe’, Lat. fiscus ‘money-basket’,Ita.fischio‘whistle’;interestingly,Eng.fishrefersiconicallytoa‘whistlingreed’,employedasa‘fishingrod’.Moreexamplesaregiveninrelationshipwithearthlysolidmaterials,like rock and wood and Homo Sapiens’ primitive constructiontechnology.

*

[semiotics&science]11:30-12:00,room301MichaelMay,may[at]ind.ku.dkUniversityofCopenhagen,Denmark

Construalofperspectiveingraphcomprehension:Acognitive

semioticsofscientificliteracyandobjectivityThehistoryofscientificobjectivityhasbeendescribedasaheterogeneousandoverlappingdevelopmentofdifferent”epistemicvirtues”suchas”true-

113

to-nature” depictions and ”mechanical objectivity” of scientificinstrumentation (Daston & Galison 2010), but on a ”micro” level ofrepresentational practices we should be concerned with the detailedanalysis of the role of language and cognition in scientific discourse andpractices.AsemioticsofsciencewasstipulatedbyCharlesMorris–tosomeextend following C. S. Peirce – but never realized as an empiricalinvestigationofspecificsciences.Acognitivesemioticsofsciencehasbeenproposed(May2016)toscrutinizedifferentphenomenaintheconstructionandcommunicationofmeaninginscience,includingthesemioticfunctionsofinstrumentationandtheroleofrepresentationalformssuchasgraphs,diagramsandnotationalsystems.InCognitiveGrammar (Langacker1999;Verhagen2007 )perspective is aconstrualoperationonmeaningacrosslanguage,perceptionandreasoning.In cognitive science and educational research problems in graphcomprehensionhavebeendocumented since the 1980-ies, but althoughtheseproblemsarerootedinlanguageandcognitionacrossmultipleformsof representation, they have not been considered systematically as adomainofsemioticresearch.Construalofperspectiveisnotonlyakeyissueintheconstructionofscientificobjectivity,butalsoplaysarolein”didactictransformations” of scientific content through analogies andsimplifications.Examplesfrommechanicalphysics(kinematicgraphs)andphysical chemistry (reaction kinetics) will be used to exemplify how“didactictranspositions”involvingchangesinperspectivesuchasimaginedfirst-personperspectives,mayleadtomisconceptions.The role of construal operations has not only been underestimated ineducational research, but also in the philosophy of science. In recentapproachessuchas“scientificperspectivism”(Giere2010)andtheanalysisofembedded“thingknowledge”ofscientificinstruments(Baird2004)wesee an emergence of “quasi-semiotic” theories of scientific practice, butwithoutasemioticanalysisofrepresentationalformsandlevelsofmeaningconstruction.

114

ReferencesBaird,D.(2004):ThingKnowledge.UniversityofCaliforniaPressDaston,L.&Galison,P.(2010):Objectivity.MITPressGiere,R.(2010):ScientificPerspectivism.UniversityofChicagoPressLangacker,R.(1999):FoundationsofCognitiveGrammar,Vol.1.StanfordUniversityPressMay,M.,Skriver,K.,Dandanell,G.(2016):TowardsaCognitiveSemioticsofScience:TheCaseofPhysicalChemistry,in:EstablishingCognitiveSemiotics.Konderak,P.,Sonesson,G.&Zlatev,J.(Eds).PeterLang,toappear2016.Verhagen,A.(2007):ConstructionsofIntersubjectivity.OxfordUniversityPress

*

[blending]Wednesday,11:30-12:00,room4DouglasNiño,edison.nino[at]utadeo.edu.coUniversidadJorgeTadeoLozano,Colombia

ExecutiveFunction,PretensePlayandConceptualBlendingIn their Conceptual Integration Theory (CIT), Fauconnier and Turner(Fauconnier&Turner,2002;Fauconnier,2009;Turner,2014)makethreeclaims:First,thatconceptualblendingisoperativeinourunderstandingofcounterfactuals, analogies, metaphors, etc., as well as in our (belief of)objectperception.Thisentailsthatsomeblendsbeara“realitysense”andothers an “irreality” sense, although -they claim- there is no cognitivedifferencebetween them (2002: 230). Second, they claim that advancedconceptual blending is what differentiates us from other animals, forchildrenarecertainlycapableofcomplexblendings.Third,theyclaimthatCITisatheorythathelpsusexplainhumanimaginationandcreativity.These general claims, however, do not capture the differences in childdevelopment, from relative ‘simple’ tasks to more ‘complex’ ones. Forinstance, ¿why, if conceptual integration networks (CIN) consist in “the

115

sameprinciples andprocesses” (Fauconnier, 2009), only children aroundtwelve are able to fluidly manage counterfactual reasoning (Rafetseder,Schwitalla&Perner, 2013),whereas three- or four-yearold children canperfectlyunderstandotherblends likethestoryofHaroldandthePurpleCrayon(Johnson,1995),whichalsorequirescounterfactualsandadvancedblends?Iclaimthatacarefulanalysisoftheexecutivefunctiondevelopmentmaybequitefruitfulwhentrackingsomedifferencesinblendingachievement.Forinstance, it seems that there isa correlationbetweenexecutive functiondevelopmentand‘pretenseactions’,particularly,thepretenseplay,whenchildrenact‘asif’,forinstance,whenachildtakesabananaandputsitonherear‘asif’itwereaphone(cf.Leslie,1987;Carlson,White,Davis-Unger,2013).Moreover,these‘pretenseactions’appearinchildrenataround18-month old (Friedman& Leslie, 2007;Meinhardt, Kühn-Popp, Sommer &Sodian,2013).Now,ifweassumethatpretendingisanenactiveexpressionofthecognitiveblending,thestudyofexecutivefunctioncanplausiblyshowus different complexity ‘stages’ of the CIN, at the moments templatesappearfortheirmoreabstractandcomplexrealization(asincounterfactualreasoningoralgebraoperations).InthispresentationIwillpursuethisidea,byreviewingtherelevantliteratureaboutexecutivefunctiondevelopment(including the cognitive differences between believing, planning, ordesiring),pretenseplayandotherformsofpretense(andfictivity),andwilldraw some consequences for the CIT in its aspiration to explain humanimaginationandcreativity.ReferencesCarlson,StephanieM.;White,RachelE.&Davis-Unger,AngelaC.2013.“DevelopmentEvidenceforaRelationbetweenExecutiveFunctionandPretenseRepresentationinPreschoolChildren”.CognitiveDevelopment,29:1-16.Fauconnier,Gilles.2009.“GeneralizedIntegrationNetworks”(pp.174-160).In:V.Evans&S.Pourcel(Eds.).NewDirectionsinCognitiveLinguistics.Amsterdam:JohnBenjamins.

116

Fauconnier,Gilles&Turner,Mark.2002.TheWayWeThink:ConceptualBlendingandtheMind’sHiddenComplexities.NewYork:BasicBooks.Friedman,Ori&Leslie,Alan.2007.“TheConceptualUnderpinningsofPretense:Pretendingisnot‘Behaving-As-If’”.Cognition,105:103-124.Johnson,Crocket.1955[1983].HaroldandthePurpleCrayon.NewYork:Harper&Row.Leslie,Alan.1987.“PretenseandRepresentation:TheOriginsof‘TheoryofMind’”.PsychologicalReview,94(4):412-426.Meinhardt,Jörg;Kühn-Popp,Nina;Sommer,Monika&Sodian,Beate.2012.“DistinctNeuralCorrelatesUnderlyingPretenseandFalseBeliefReasoning:EvidencefromERPs”.NeuroImage,63:623-631.RafetsederE.,SchwitallaM.&PernerJ.2013.“Counterfactualreasoning:Fromchildhoodtoadulthood”.JournalofExperimentalChildPsychology,114(3):389-404.Turner,Mark.2014.TheOriginofIdeas.Blending,Creativity,andtheHumanSpark.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

*

[langevo]Monday,15:30-16:00,AulaJonasNölle,jonas.noelle[at]live.deAarhusUniversity,DenmarkStefanHartmann,hartmast[at]uni-mainz.deUniversityofMainz,GermanyPeeterTinits,peeter.tinits[at]gmail.comTallinnUniversity,EstoniaMichaelPleyer,michael.pleyer[at]hggs.uni-heidelberg.deUniversitätHeidelberg,Germany InvestigatingtheemergenceofoverspecificationinanIterated

LearningsetupNaturallanguagesdifferintheirdegreeofoverspecification,theextenttowhich overt semanticmarkers are required evenwhen irrelevant in the

117

given context. But how and why does systematic and obligatoryoverspecification emerge in the first place? Recent research hasemphasizedtheimportanceofcontextintheemergenceofdifferenttypesoflanguagesystems(Wintersetal.,2015).Thepresentpaperinvestigatesthe hypothesis that overspecification can be cognitively beneficial inparticularcommunicativesituations.Forthepresentstudy,205volunteerswererecruitedonlineandtookpartinanIteratedLearningexperiment(Kirbyetal.,2008).Intwoblocksof32randomizedtrials,theywerefirsttrainedonanartificiallanguageandthenaskedtousethatlanguagetopointoutobjectstoanalien.Theoutputofparticipantnwasusedasinputforparticipantn+1for5generations.Theinitiallanguageconsistedoffourdifferentwordsdenotingfourobjects(e.g.meeb'ball')aswellastwomarkersdenotingcolors(pu'blue',li'yellow').Intheinitiallanguage,thesemarkerswereonlyusedwhenanobjecthadtobe distinguished from the same type of object in a different color (e.g.yellowballandblueball).Acrossconditions,thisdistinctionwasrelevantin16 of the 32 trials. In the distractor condition, the other half of trialsconsistedofpicturesshowingtwoitems,butdifferenttypes(e.g.ballandpen).Inacontrolcondition,bycontrast,picturesshowingonlyonesingleitem were displayed in the remaining 16 trials. We predicted that thesemantic markers would tend to become obligatory even when notrequired by the immediate communicative context in the distractorcondition,butnotinthecontrolcondition.Overspecificationincreasedinbothtypesoftrialsbut,aspredicted,provedmorepervasiveinthedistractorcondition.Here,thecolormarkerbecamefullyobligatoryinthe5thgenerationin17outof18chains,whileitwasusedsignificantly less in the 5th generation of the control trials (two-samplet(34)=-4.06,ptwo-tailed<.001,r=.57).Importantly,thedevelopmenttobeobservedisconditionedbycontextualfactors.Inthedistractorcondition,overspecificationreducesthespeaker'scognitiveeffortofdisambiguatingbetweensame-typeanddifferent-typecontexts. While this communicative pressure is highly artificial, othersituationswheresemanticdistinctions(e.g.number)arerelevantinlimited

118

contextsareeasilyconceivable.Therefore,thepresentstudylendsfurthersupporttothehypothesisthatcontextualfactorscansignificantlyinfluencegrammaticalstructures.ReferencesKirby, Simon,Hannah Cornish& Kenny Smith. 2008. Cumulative Cultural

EvolutionintheLaboratory:AnExperimentalApproachtotheOriginsof Structure in Human Language. Proceedings of the NationalAcademyofSciencesoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica105(31).10681–10686.

Winters,James,SimonKirby&KennySmith.2015.Languagesadapttotheircontextualniche.LanguageandCognition7(3).415–449.

*

[blending]Wednesday,11:00-11:30,room4ToddOakley,todd.oakley[at]case.eduCaseWesternReserveUniversity,USA

ConceptualBlendingandtheAmalgamatedMind:A“Pivot”TowardPhilosophyofDistributedCognition

Conceptualblendinghasemergedasaninfluentialframeworkforthestudyof meaning construction, especially among practitioners in cognitivelinguisticsandsemiotics.Partoftheappeal is itssystematictreatmentofdiverse semiotic phenomena according to processes and principles thatachieve internal consistency, such that onebuilds a plausible account ofhow words, images, sounds, words and images, words and imagines isspecificplaces conspire togenerate scenesand scenarios that constitutethinking, speaking, and action (cf. Fauconnier & Turner 2002 Coulson &Oakley2000;Oakley2012).Thesearebroad,perhapsexuberantclaims,butthepointofthistalkisnottodefendCBTasaparticulartheory,forwhichthereareamplearguments forandagainst.My intent is to“pivot”awayfromspecificapplicationstowardthephilosophyofmind.

119

Ifonesurveystherangeofphenomenathatcountas“blending,”especiallycases in which the non-neural body, artifacts and social institutionscomprisetheproperobjectofanalysis(cf.Hutchins2005;Oakley2009)onesees ample reason to believe that the framework embraces distributedcognition,thenotionthatthemost interestingquestionsaboutcognitionandmeaninglieattheintersectionofbrain,body,andworld.Evenso,therearemanyintheblendingcommunitywhotakeafirmly“embedded”viewofcognition,wherebyalltheinterestingworkoccursintra-cranially,evenasthey laud the fact that the principles of blending highlight its externalvehiclesasaproperscopeofanalysis.Giventhat thereareat least4differentvarietiesofdistributedcognition(Wheeler 2013; Rowlands 2010), each of which embrace potentiallyincommensurate claims about thenatureofmindedness, it is time for asustained interrogationofdistributedcognitionandconceptualblending.My aim is to show that familiar notions of embodiment and embeddedcognition are insufficient, but that it is possible to specify an explicitphilosophicalpositionthatdoesjusticetorangeofphenomenacapturedbyblending if we adopt a philosophical position of Rowlands’ (2010)amalgamatedmind:mindsarebothembodiedandextended.Whilemostphilosophyofmindarguments relyon simplecase studies (e.g., seeinga“tomato”) this presentation grounds discussion in a fully-complex of theactoranddirector,ClintEastwood,engaginginafictiveexchangewithanabsentBarackObama,duringthekeynoteaddressatthe2012RepublicanNationalConvention.ReferencesCoulson,S&Oakley,T.(2000).Blendingbasics.CognitiveLinguistics11.3/4(2000):175-196.Fauconnier,G.&Turner,M.(2002).Thewaywethink:Conceptualblendingandthemind’shiddencomplexities.NewYork:BasicBooks.Hutchins,E.2005.Materialanchorsforconceptualblends.JournalofPragmatics37.10:1555-1577.

120

Oakley,T.(2012).Conceptualintegration..”InJ.O.Östman&J.Verschueren,eds.HandbookofPragmatics:Volume6,1-25.Amsterdam:JohnBenjaminsPublishing.Oakley,T.(2009)Fromattentiontomeaning:Explorationsinsemiotics,linguistics,andrhetoric.Bern:LangVerlag:EuropeanSemiotics:Language,Cognition,&Culture(volume8).Rowlands,M.2010.Thenewscienceofthemind:Fromextendedmindtoembodiedphenomenology.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.Wheeler,M.2011.Distributedcognitionintheanalyticandcontinentaltraditions.

*

[philosophy&cognition]Wednesday,11:00-11:30,room101DymitryOkropiridze,dimitry.okropiridze@zegk.uni-heidelberg.deRuprecht-Karls-UniversitätHeidelberg,GermanyCognitionasaHyper-CartesianPhenomenonandaHypo-HegelianFact.ACognitiveSemioticsModelbeyondDualismandDialectics.Wheneverwephilosophizeaboutmind,body,andsocietyorpsychologizecognitive, neural, and social processes, an entanglement of confoundedontologicalassumptionsabout theworld, itsagents,and their respectiveinteractionstakesplace.Thisepistemicabysshasdeeplytroubledtheentirehistoryofphilosophyand accompanied the development of the empirical sciences. It has alsochallengedsemioticiansasstudentsofgeneralmeaningmakingtobecomebridgebuildersandconnectthecliffsofmatterandideas,theconcreteandtheuncertain,indivisibleelementsandirreduciblecomplexity.Far sweeping considerations have helped to connect and position thedifferinglogicsofmoleculesandmetaphorsifonlyonanevolutionaryscale

121

withconstant reference tosemiotic thresholdsas structuralboundaries.1They have not, however, explained the simultaneously antithetical andreciprocal tendency ofmaterialist and discursive ontologies. On the onehand, even themost elaborate dyadic system (following the Saussureancamp and Poststructuralist theory), emphasizing the constantly deferredsignified cannot resolve a lingering duality betweenmaterial substancesanddiscursiveinterpretations;ontheother,therealityofmaterialobjectscannotbeextractedfromtheirsociallymediatedprocess,evenifintegratedinatriadicsignmodel(followingPeirce).Thispapertakesitspointofdeparturefromtheepistemicposition,inwhichcognition is coinstantaneously dualist and dialectic and therefore –philosophically speaking – a hyper-Cartesian phenomenon and a hypo-Hegelianfact.Inotherwords,cognitionhasadualistandadialecticmodeoffunctioning,whichareconstantlypresent.Iwillarguethatonlyageneralmodeloftheveryentanglementofdualistanddialectic ontologies can explain the reciprocity ofmutually exclusivedynamicsintheevolutionofsignsystemsandshednewlightonsemioticthresholdsasevolutionaryboundariesofrevolutionaryemergence.Forthisreason,threeaxiomaticprocessualities,whicharecommontoallsystemsofsignification–“Constraints”,“Re-Iterations”,and“Ascriptions”–willbeintroducedandexemplifiedusingexamplesfromallmajorsemioticlevelsaselaboratedbyJordanZlatev.2Thecentraladvantageoftheherebypresented“CRIA”modelliesinthenon-staticnatureoftheprocessualities,which can be studied from neural constraints to socio-historical re-iterationsuptolinguisticascriptions.

1Cf.Stjernfelt,Frederik.Diagrammatology.AnInvestigationontheBorderlinesofPhenomenology,Ontology,andSemiotics.Dordrecht:Springer,2009;Zlatev,Jordan."SemioticHierarchy:Life,Consciousness,SignsandLanguage."EditedbyPeerF.Bundgaard.CognitiveSemiotics(DeGruyter)4(Spring2009):169-200.2Cf.e.g.JordanZlatev’splenarylectureattheTartuSemioticsSummerSchool,2015:http://www.uttv.ee/naita?id=22394[09.01.2016].

122

[Peircean]Monday,15:00-15:30,room201AlinOlteanu,alin.olteanu@roehampton.ac.ukUniversityofRoehampton,UnitedKingdom

Towardsa(bio-)semioticsofsexualityIapproachhumansexualityfromasemioticposition,usingthebiosemioticnotionofbody,todiscussPeirce’sevolutionaryperspectiveonaltruism.Inthe light of recent research in biosemiotics, semiotics brings theunderstandingofsexualactivityasasemioticcompetenceofthebody.Assuch, sexual desire and activity are not understood asmerely biologicalimpulses,asithasbeenregardedinclassicDarwinismandpsychoanalysis.Fromasemioticperspective,sexualactivityisacaseofsemiosis,anactofinterpretation.IemployPeirce’stheoryofevolutiontoaccountforsexualactivityasagapicsemiosis.Assuch,sexualactivityisunderstoodasinvolvingourentirebeing,as themost intimatemanifestationof loveor themosthorridformofviolence.Moderndualistphilosophydidnotdevelopthephilosophicalpotentialityofsexuality.Inthisperspective,sexualdesirehasbeenunderstoodasmerelytheresultofegoisticbiologicalimpulses.Therationalistemphasisonmindassourceofknowledgesuggeststhatsexualactivity,asabodilyactivity,isunimportant.Empiricismaswellcan fail toseehowsucha richsensorialactivity as sexual activity can contribute to our conceptualization of theworld.Asaresult,modernphilosophygeneratedvariousethicalpositionsthateitherregardsexasnegativeortrivial,orjustifyitasmerelyimpulsive(inthecaseofpsychoanalysis).Assemioticsaccountsthathumanrelationsareprimarilysensorial,itexplainsthatsexcanbethemostinsightfulwayofknowing another person, as well as themost harmful form of violence.Sexual activity is seen as semiosis, and, as such, as one of the highestexpressionsofagapicevolution.Iexplainthat,usingPeirce’sterminology,sexisametaphorandanargument.Inthisperspective,sexualactivityisneitherstigmatizedasmorallywrongor justified as an impulse, necessary for reproduction. Peirce’s theory of

123

evolutionclaimsthattheprincipleofaltruisticlove(agape)bringstogetherchance and necessity, transcending them. Therefore, using Peirce’staxonomyofsignsandtheoryofevolution,sexualactivityisunderstoodasagapism,expressingchance,necessityandaltruisticlovealtogether.Sexualabuse is understood as anancastic, an unsaturated phenomenon ofsignificationwhichcannottranscendchanceandnecessity.Iconcludebydiscussingtheconsequencesthat thesemioticapproachtosexualityhasonattitudestowardssexualdesireandactivityandthenewdirectionsthatitbringsforsexualeducation.

*

[philosophy&cognition]Wednesday,10:30-11:00,room101JoelParthemore,joel.parthemore[at]his.seUniversityofSkövde,SwedenConsciousness,conceptualagency,andthe“unbinding”problem

Muchdiscussioninconsciousnessstudiesfocusesonhow“inputs”fromthevarioussensorymodalitiescombinewith“internal”brainprocessestogiverisetounifiedconsciousness:theso-calledbindingproblem.For a number of phenomenologists and enactive philosophers, such anapproachraisesanumberofconcerns.First, itpreoccupies itselfwithan“outdated”input/output-basedmodelofcognitionwhichmaybeusefulforcertainnarrowapplicationsbutshould,inthemain,berejectedinfavourofan intrinsically interactivemodelwhosecausal flow isnot linear (“sense-motivate-plan-act”) but circular. Second, in linewith the first concern, itassumes a problematic distinction between “internal” experience and“external” reality, where these researchers prefer to see an underlyingcontinuitybetweenagentandenvironment.Finally,byimplicitlyendorsinga reductive approach to consciousness – whereby, at least in principle,consciousnessisfullyreducibletosimplerphysicalprocesses–itfocusesonthe “bottom up” where these researchers would rather see a complexinterplaybetween“bottomup”and“topdown”.Inparticular,theywould

124

liketodistinguishbetweenthecomingtogetherofconsciousnessintermsof its underlyingmechanics, and the seemingly unavoidable reality that,phenomenologicallyspeaking,allofus(including,arguably,thosewhoaresuffering fromvariousmental healthdisorders) subjectivelyexperienceaconsciousness that is, from the onset, unified. What begins as unifiedexperiencethengetsprogressivelybrokendownintomoreandmorefine-grained conceptual categories of e.g. sensorymodalities, motor actions,“inputs”, “outputs”, thoughts, etc. This “unbinding”problem is arguablyjustasimportanttounderstandingsubjectiveexperience–phenomenology–asthebindingproblemistounderstandingtheunderlyingmechanics.Theargumentsof(intheirdifferentways)JerryFodororColwynTrevarthenaside,wedonot–onmostaccounts–startlifeasconceptualagents,evenaswearepredisposedtounderstandtheworldincertainwaysandnotinothers.Likewise,logicallyatsomepointinourspecies’past,wedidnothavetheconceptualagencythatwedotoday.Onecaneithermakethemovethatcertainconceptualistsdoandclaimthatexperiencejustisexperiencetotheextentthatitisconceptuallystructured;inwhichcasethereisapoint,bothasindividualsandasspecies,wherewelackexperience.OronecanmakethemovethatIprefer,thatexperience(withitsseeminglyinviolableunity)comesfirst–evenas,forthematureconceptualagent,experienceisaninextricablemixoftheconceptualandthenon-conceptual.

*

[Peircean]Monday,14:30-15:00,room201AleksandraPasławska,olapaslawska@op.plMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

Visualsemiotics:decodingpictorialsignsincontemporaryadvertising

In recent years, along with the rapid development of mass media,omnipresent advertisements have become deeply entrenched in oursociety.Thegrowingpopularityofvisualadvertisingresearchhaspavedthe

125

wayfornewinsightfulapproaches.Intoday’sstudies,agreatemphasisislaiduponsignsandsymbolicpatternsascrucialelementsofvisualads.Inordertosuccessfullyconceiveofthemeaning,then,thesemioticanalysisofpictorialsignsisinorder.Althoughsemioticshasbeenofsubstantialusetoresearchersdealingwithadvertisingingeneral(seeBeasleyandDanesi2002;Bignell2002;Džanić2013),noresearchhasbeendone,itseems,toexamine the semiotic nature of animal imagery in contemporary caradvertisementsusingCharlesS.Peirce’stheoryofsigns.ForPeirce,asign“addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person anequivalentsign,orperhapsamoredevelopedsign”(Peirce1931-58:2.228).In our presentation,we apply Peirce’s triadicmodel of sign as a startingpoint for the process of understanding and conceptualization of themeaninginselectedvisualads.ReferencesBeasley, Ron, Marcel Danesi. 2002. Persuasive Signs: The Semiotics ofAdvertising.Berlin:WalterdeGruyter.Bignell, Jonathan. 2002. Media Semiotics: An Introduction. Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress.Džanić,Mirza.2013.Thesemioticsofcontemporaryadvertisingmessages:Decodingvisuals.In:Jazikoslovlje.14.2-3.475–486.Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1931–1958. The Collected Papers of CharlesSandersPeirce.In:CharlesHartshorne,PaulWeiss,ArthurW.Burks(eds.).Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.

*

126

[phenomenology]Wednesday,11:00-11:30,room201JaminPelkey,jpelkey[at]ryerson.caStéphanieWalshMatthews,swalsh[at]arts.ryerson.caRyersonUniversity,CanadaXtremePosture:SemiosicPrimitivesandthePrimacyofMovementTheuseofXincorporatebrandmarksisnowubiquitous—fromGoogleXandtheX-FactortoX-Games,XBoxandXtremesports;butlittleattentionisgiven in the literature to the socio-cognitive meanings or motivationsbehind thiswidespreadpractice. This study focuses on a specific X-marktype,aniconiclegisigninwhichafaceisaddedabovetheuppercruxoftherhematic symbol to anthropomorphize X as a representationof “spread-eagle” posture. Using multiple methodologies and a mix of semiotictheories toanalyzea setof200exemplars,weargue that theXmark inadvertising is derivative of a gestalt embodied template based inproprioceptivememory,ratherthanbeingamereiconicsymbolrootedinhabitsofliteracy.Ourfindingsprovidefurtherevidenceforidentifyingthephenomenologyofmovement (Sheets-Johnstone2011)asconstitutiveofprimitivesemioticresourcessuchasopposition,markednessandreversalsbetweencontraries.

Followingabriefoverviewofoperationaldefinitionsanddatacollectionprocedures,wesummarizecomparativecontentanalysesof200X-posturebrandmarksandcorporatelogos,includingtextualanalysesofassociatedcorporatedescriptors,visualsemioticanalysesapplyingculturalsymmetrytheory (Mardsen & Thomas 2013, Washburn & Crowe 1988) andphenomenological analyses using semantic differential applications. AtypologyofX-posedbrandmarksisidentified,andlogosarefoundtoclusterunderfourthematictypes:1)healthandillness,2)wealthandgambling,3)championship and training, 4) individuality and isolation – all involvingextreme or risky experiences that are prone to reverse suddenly. Thissuggests that theprojectedX-posture inadvertisingcommandsattention

127

by triggering body memories of performance peak or impending crisisrootedinproprioception.

These findings reciprocate with cognitive semiotic perspectives.Throughmimesis,repetitionandmemory,ourimmediate,feltexperiencesofbodilymovement,includingtensionalexpansionsandlinearprojections(Sheets-Johnstone2011),canbeidentifiedasinstancesofprimarymodelingorsemiosicprimitives(Sebeok&Danesi2000,Eco2000).Theseareforgedforwardtowardsacapacityforthird-ordermodeling,throughthefilterofsecondarystructures, includinguprightposture.Thehumanexperienceisbipedal and orthogonal, involving distinctive structures oftransversalisation,segmentation,oppositionalrelation,andsubstitutionalforms that shapeour relation to, andperceptionof, theworld (Van Lier2010).Abetterunderstandingofthesemioticpotencyaffordedbyuprightposturewillrequirecloserattentiontotheserelations,includingtheinversecorrelations, complex coordinations and relative specializations of theupperandlowerlimbsinmotion.ReferencesEco, Umberto. 2000. Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and

Cognition.NewYork:Harcourt.Marsden, Jamie & Briony Thomas. 2013. Brand Values: Exploring the

Associations of Symmetry within Financial Brand Marks. DesignManagementJournal8(1).62–71.

Sebeok,ThomasA.andMarcelDanesi.2000.TheFormsofMeaning.Berlin:MoutondeGruyter.Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2011. The Primacy of Movement, 2nd ed.

Amsterdam:JohnBenjamins.VanLier,Henri.2010.Anthropogénie.Paris:LesImpressionsNouvelles.Washburn,DorothyK.,andDonaldW.Crowe.1988.SymmetriesofCulture:

Theory and Practice of Plane Pattern Analysis. Seattle: University ofWashingtonPress.

*

128

[phenomenology]Wednesday,10:30-11:00,room201CarlosAndresPerez,pericles12[at]gmail.comUniversidadJorgeTadeoLozano,Colombia Horizon:akeyphenomenologicalconceptforcognitivelinguisticsCognitive linguistics shares with static approaches to language itscommitment with finding and identifying the linguistic structures (thelinguisticsforms)thatliebeneathordinarylanguageuse,beitpresentedasintersubjectivenormativestructures(Zlatev,2010),orassubjectivementalones(suchasimageschemas(Johnson,1985)orclosed-classforms(Talmy,2003), for example).On theother hand, cognitive linguistics shareswithrecentapproachesstemmingfromenactivism(Cuffarietal,2014;DiPaoloand DeJaegher, 2015) and dynamical systems (Fusaroli and Raczaszek-Leonardi,2014)itsconcernwiththeintersubjectiveandsituatednatureoflanguage, the understanding of which demands new theoretical andmethodologicaltools,andnewdescriptivecategoriessuchasparticipatorysensemakingorsynergy,tonameafew.Forexample,ConceptualBlendingTheory,aspresentedinitssemioticversionbyL.Brand,(2013)takesintoaccount the situatednatureofmeaning construction (base space),whilerelying on static forms in the configuration of emergent meaning space(relevancespace).InmypresentationIwilltrytocaptureandelaboratethistensionwithinaphenomenological framework, following and developing the husserliannotionofhorizon.First,Iwillgiveaphenomenologicalcharacterizationofthenotionofhorizon,highlightingitsintimaterelationshipwiththenotionsoflivedbodyandtimeconsciousness.Then,Iwillpointoutthecentralityofthenotionofhorizon for cognitive linguistics,workingon threedifferentlevels: 1. Inner horizon as understood in the analyses of perceptualexperience. 2. Outer horizon, as a key concept for understanding thenotionsofframeanddomain,bothcentralinthetheoreticallandscapeofcognitive linguistics. 3. Intersubjective horizon, following a generative

129

characterizationoftheintersubjectiveworld(Steinbock,1995),inordertounderstandtheenactiveapproachtolanguage.Tomakemypointclear, Iwillendmypresentationdiscussingtworecenttheoretical proposals (Bundgaard et al, 2006; Fusaroli and Raczaszek-Leonardi,2014)basedonthisphenomenologicalframework.ReferencesBrandt, L. (2012) The Communicative Mind: A Linguistic Exploration ofConceptual Integration and Meaning Construction. Cambridge ScholarPublishing.Cambridge.Bundgaard, P., S. Østergaard, and F. Stjernfelt. (2006) Waterproof firestations? Conceptual schemata and cognitive operations involved incompoundconstructions.Semiotica,161:363-393.Cuffari, E. Di Paolo, E., De Jaegher, H. (2014). From participatory sense-making to language: There and back again. In: Phenomenology and theCognitiveSciences,doi10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9.Di Paolo, E. and De Jaegher, H. (2015). Toward an embodied science ofintersubjectivity:wideningthescopeofsocialunderstandingresearch.In:Front.Psychol.6:234.doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00234Johnson,M.(1985).Thebodyinthemind.UniversityofChicago,Chicago.Steinbock,A.(1995)Homeandbeyond.GenerativephenomenologybeyondHusserl.NorthwesternUniversityPress,Evanston.Talmy,L.(2000)Towardacognitivesemantics.MITPress,Cambridge.Zlatev, J. (2010). Phenomenology and cognitive linguistics. In:ShaunGallagherandDan Schmicking(eds).HandbookonPhenomenologyandCognitive Science, 415-446.Dordrecht:Springer.

*

130

[experimental]Tuesday,15:00-15:30,room4JohannaStegePhilipsen,johannesp@sdu.dkUniversityofSouthernDenmark,DenmarkBrandonMells,mells@ucla.eduUniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles,USACooperatinghands:Gestureasaninteractionalsemioticresource

incollectiveideationCooperatingonproblemsolvingandfindingnewinnovativesolutions

arecruciallyimportantpartsofmanyaspectsofhumanculture,commercialactivitiesandsocietaldevelopment today. In studying these issues,greatattentionhasbeengiventotheroleofspokenandwrittenlanguage.Lessemphasishowever,hasbeengivenotherkindsofembodiedandexternalaspectsof communication incollaboration, suchasgesture,prosodyandmaterialrepresentations,aswellashowthesedifferentsemioticresourcesaredrawnuponandinfluencesensemakinginjointproblemsolving.

Gesturesaremostoftenresearchedastohowtheyfunctionaseither1)aspeakerresourceforspeechproduction,wordsearch,andreasoningor2) an addressee resource for making sense of speaker produced talk ininteraction.Hereweproposeaviewofgesturethataddstothisresearchhow gesture in face to face interaction has a temporal resolution and afunctionality that reachesbeyondthe intelligibilityandproductionof thesinglewordorutterancewithwhichitwasproduced,andthusbecomearesource for tying, manipulating and exploring parts of ongoing sensemaking.Thisproposesaviewofgestureasasharedinteractionalsemioticresource, rather than an individual resource for production andunderstanding.

Drawingonmicro-analysisofnaturaldata froma clientmeeting inadigital marketing company, we show how both speaker and addresseereuse parts of prior gestures to add to, reiterate and transform a rich,enacted proposition produced in face to face interaction, thereby co-creatinganewperspectiveonasharedtask.

131

[semiotics]Wednesday,11:00-11:30,AulaRosiePicton,r.picton@space-doctors.comSpaceDoctors,UnitedKingdom

Semio-Ethnography:TheHybridSolutionforIHGCase Study: How cultural insight, commercial semiotic analysis andethnography combined powerfully to guide hotel room design fortheInternationalHotelGroup.Background:IHGwereinterestedinhowtoencodethepromiseofagoodnight’s sleep in the physical design of a hotel room. They knew that toexplicitlypromisethiswasboundtobeanunsuccessfulstrategy,sowereinsteadconcernedtoimplythepromiseofsleepinotherways.Asemioticanalysisofhowtheconceptof‘sleep’iscodedinpopularculture,brandcommunicationsanddesigninbothChinaandtheUSledtospecificguidelinesforthenewhotelroomdesign.Theseinsightswerefusedwithethnographic insights into behaviours around sleep and the hotelenvironment,andwereimplementedbyworkingcloselywiththeclienttoensuretheywererealised.The new design is currently being rolled out in the US and is proving asignificant success. This case studywill help us explore the potential forsemio-ethnographytoinfluencethemeaningsthatpeopleintuitfromtheirphysicalsurroundings.MethodologySemiotic analysis of how sleep is coded in culture, combined withethnographic research using semiotic-driven research frameworks tounderstandwhatconsumerssayvs.whattheydointhehotel-basedcontextof‘agoodnightssleep’.PurposeofthispresentationShowcase the value of ‘hybrid’ or intensely collaborative researchmethodologies, and how such collaboration is able to provide richerinspirationandstrongerrationaleformarketinganddesignteamdecision-makingandultimatelyimplementation.

132

[culturalinfluences]Monday,12:15-12:45,room101PieroPolidoro,piero.polidoro[at]gmail.comLUMSAUniversity,Rome,ItalyLeft-rightorientationinimages:aestheticpreferenceandcognitive

processesArthistorianHeinrichWölfflinwasamongthefirststoremarkthatitisnotpossibletomirroranimagewithoutalteringitsvisualeffect(inSemioticswewouldsay:“withoutalteringitsplasticmeaning”).Hewaslaterfollowedbyotherscholarsandartists,suchasWassilyKandinsky(1926)andRudolfArnheim(1954).More specifically, we should distinguish between at least two differentquestions.First:visualelementsareperceivedashavingdifferent“weights”or importanceiftheyare inthe leftpartor intherightpartofan image.Second:visualvectorsproducedifferenteffectsdependingontheirbeingleftwardorrightward.AccordingtoArnheimthereisatendencythatleadsus to prefer rightwardpictorialmovements and to feel leftwardones as“unnatural”.ThisisaveryinterestingthemeforCognitivesemiotics,becauseitliesattheintersection between perception and aesthetic effects and, perhaps,betweenbottom-upandtop-downprocesses.In the last decades these phenomena have been studied above all inPsychologyofperceptionandNeurosciences.Someofthesestudies(Levy1976;Beaumont 1985;MeadandMcLaughlin 1992) try to explain (or atleastcorrelate)thesephenomenawithbrainlateralization:theywouldbecaused by functional differences between right and left cerebralhemispheres (concerning for instance visuo-spatial tasks, cognitiveattention,facerecognition,handedness).Asecondgroupofexplanationsisbasedonculturalfactors,i.e.readingandwritinghabits(Nachson,ArgamanandLuria1999;ChokronandDeAgostini2000;Dobel,DiesenbruckandBölte2007).Inthiscaseleft-righttendency

133

would not be due to an innate cerebral predisposition, but to acquiredschematathatderivefromculturalconventions.Experimentalresultsdonotofferclearevidencesforeitherhypothesis.Forinstance,TreimanandAllaith(2013)reportdatacontrastingwiththoseofasimilarexperimentbyChokronandDeAgostini(2000);FriedrichandElias(2016)listaseriesofcontrastingstudiesinliterature.Data interpretation is complicatedby thepossible influenceof top-downculturalmechanisms,asFreimuthandWapner (1979)showed,modifyingexposuretimetothestimulus.Inrecentyearsmixedhypotheseshaveoftenbeenproposed.AccordingtoIshiietal. (2011), for instance, cultural habitsmay reinforceor reduceanaturalbiastowardsrightwardimages.InmytalkIwilldiscuss,fromasemioticpointofview,someaspectsofthistopic, such as the importance of semantic features and cultural andhistoricalvariationsinthesebiases.Iwillalsoproposeanhypothesisontheculturaloriginofleft-righttendencyofvisualvectors (Polidoro2004).Thishypothesis isnotbasedonneworexperimentaldata,butonacomparativeanalysisofexistingliteratureanditshouldbeconsideredatheoreticalsuggestionofaresearchdirection.Inaddition,itisinspiredbyaconception(Meyer1956;Eco1962)accordingtowhichaestheticeffectsmayhave(also)aninferentialbasis(Polidoro2015).Thishypothesisconsistsinrelatingrightwardbiasandits“aesthetic”effectnottoageneric“readinghabit”,buttotheexpectanciesderivingfromthishabit.Theseexpectancieswouldproduceinferentialactivityinthesubjectand consequent verification processes. The dynamic of inferenceproduction/verification (and its possible influence on single saccadicmovements)couldbeatthebasisoftheaestheticaspectsofthisbias.ReferencesArnheim,R.(1954),ArtandVisualPerception:aPsychologyoftheCreative

Eye,UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

134

Baumont, J.G. (1985),“Lateralorganizationandaestheticpreference:theimportanceofperipheralvisualasymmetries”,Neuropsychologia,23,103-113.

Chokron, S., De Agostini, M. (2000), “Reading habits influence aestheticpreference”,CognitiveBrainResearch,10,45-49.

Dobel,C.,Diesendruck,G.,Bölte, J. (2007),“Howwritingsystemandageinfluence spatial representation of actions”, PsychologicalSciences,18,6,487-491.

Eco,U.(1962),Operaaperta[TheOpenWork],Bompiani,Milano.Freimuth,M.,Wapner,S.(1979),“Theinfluenceoflateralorganizationon

theevaluationofpaintings”,inBritishJournalofPsychology,73,211-218.

Friedrich, T.E., Lorin, J.E. (2016), “Thewrite bias: the influence of nativewriting direction on aesthetic preference bias”, Psychology ofAesthetic,CreativityandtheArts,10,128-133.

Ishii, Y.,Okubo,M.,Nicholls,M.E.R., Imai, H. (2011), “Lateral biases andreading direction: a dissociation between aesthetic preferenceandbisection”,

Kandinsky,W.(1926),PunktundLiniezuFläche,Langen,München.Levy, J. (1976), “Lateral dominance and aesthetic preference”, in

Neuropsychologia,14,431-445.Mead,A.M.,McLaughlin,J.P.(1992),“Therolesofhandednessandstimulus

asymmetryinaestheticpreferences”,inBrainandCognition,20,300-307.

Meyer,L.B. (1956),EmotionandMeaning inMusic,UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago.

Nachson,I.,Argaman,E.,Luria,A.(1999),“Effectsofdirectionalhabitsandhandednesson aesthetic preferences for left and rightprofile”,JournalofCross-culturalPsychology,30,104-116.

Polidoro, P. (2004), “Inferenze, tensioni e metafore: i meccanismi dellinguaggio plastico” [Inferences, tensions and metaphors:mechanismsofplasticlanguage”],Versus,98-99,39-66.

135

Polidoro, P. (2015), “L’attività inferenziale e le aspettative nel pensieroesteticodiUmbertoEco”[InferentialactivityandexpectanciesinUmberto Eco’s aesthetic thought], Zagadnienia RodzajówLiterackich,58,116,63-74.

Treiman, R., Allaith, Z. (2013), “Do reading habits influence aestheticpreferences?”,ReadingandWriting:AnInterdisciplinaryJournal,26,8,1381-1386.

*

[language&vincinities]Monday,15:30-16:00,s.101JoannaRączaszek-Leonardi,joanna.leonardi[at]gmail.com MichałDenkiewicz,michal.denkiewicz[at]gmail.com PolishAcademyofSciences JulianZubek,zubekj[at]gmail.com AgnieszkaDębska,debska.agn[at]gmail.com AlicjaRadkowska,alicjaradkowska[at]gmail.comJoannaKomorowska-Mach,jokkom[at]gmail.comPiotrLitwin,piolitwin[at]gmail.comAdriannaKucińska,adrianna.diana.kucinska[at]gmail.comMagdalenaStępień,stepien_m[at]wp.plKrystynaKomorowska,krysia_kmk[at]o2.plUniversityofWarsaw,Poland RiccardoFusaroli,fusaroli[at]dac.au.dk KristianTylén,kristian[at]dac.au.dkAarhusUniversity,Denmark

Languageasacoordinativetoolinwinerecognitionanddescription:influencesfromtwotime-scales

Iflanguageisviewedasasystemofconstraintsonindividualandcollectivebehaviour,itscoordinativerolecomestothefore.Languagecaneffectivelychangetheprobabilitiesofsystemicbehaviours,actingasacontrolontheinteractivedynamicsandoutcomes.Suchaviewallowsforcomparingthe

136

impact of language on individual and collective systems, opening newmethods of analysis of “interpretation” in terms of assessment of thesystemic degrees of freedom, system’s dimensionality or variability ofperformance.In this study we experimentally investigate the impact of two types oflanguage-basedcoordinationontherecognitionanddescriptionofcomplexsensory stimuli, namely red wine. Participants were asked to taste,rememberandsuccessivelyrecognizesamplesofwineswithinalargersetinatwo-by-twoexperimentaldesign:1)eitherindividuallyorinpairs,and2)withorwithoutthesupportofasommeliercard-aculturallinguistictooldesigned forwine description. Both effectiveness of recognition and thekindsoferrorsinthefourconditionswereanalyzed.Whileourexperimentalmanipulations did not impact recognition accuracy, bias-variancedecompositionoferrorrevealsnon-trivialdifferences inhowparticipantssolved the task. Pairs generally displayed reduced bias and increasedvariance compared to individuals, however the variance droppedsignificantlywhentheyusedthesommeliercard.Theeffectofcardreducingthevariancewasobservedonlyinpairs,individualsdidnotseemtobenefitfrom the cultural linguistic tool. Subsequent analysis of descriptionsgeneratedwiththeaidofcardby individualsandpairsshowedthattheyweremoreconsistentanddiscriminativeinthecaseofpairs.Thefindingsare discussed in terms of global properties and dynamics of collectivesystemswhenconstrainedbydifferenttypesofculturalpractices.

*

137

[semiotics]Wednesday,12:00-12:30,AulaJoannaRączaszek-Leonardi,joanna.leonardi@gmail.comUniversityofWarsaw,PolandTerrenceDeacon,deacon@berkeley.eduUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley

Avarietyofsemioticrelationsintheprocessoflanguageacquisition

Languagelearningistraditionallythoughtofasafunctionofinternalrules(eitherinbornorlearned)thatconcernthestructureoflinguisticinput.Onsuchview,languageismostlyisolatedfromitspragmaticcontext,treatedasaseparatecognitiveskill,andacquiredonthebasisoflinguistic‘data’.Inourpaperwedrawonmorefunctionalapproachestolanguageandontheviewthatlanguagecanbetreatedasasystemofconstraintsondynamicsofactionandcognitionbothontheindividualandonthecollectivelevel.According to this view, it is crucial for language development that it isalwaysimmersedinrichdynamicalandstructuredco-action.Inthispaperweintegratesuchaviewoflanguage(basedontheworksbyPattee&Rączaszek-Leonardi, e.g., 2012)withanapproach that canhelpidentifying the variety of constraining relationships, based in semiotics(Deacon,e.g.,1997,2011).Byacarefulmicroanalysisofrealparent-infantinteractionsweshowthatonthewaytobecomingasymbolicactivity,theutterances of language have to be involved in other types of semioticrelations.Inordertodothis,firstweidentifytherelevantdynamicsinwhichsuch utterances appear, showing that it is already meaningfully(intentionally)structured.Next,weshowexamplesoficonicandindexicalrelationsinwhichutterancesoflanguageareinvolved.Finally,westipulateonnecessarypreconditionsfortheutterancestobecometrulysymbolic.Byjoiningthetwoabovementionedapproachestolanguage,wethusshowhowlanguagebecomesacontroloninteractioninthedevelopmentaltime-scale.Engagementoflinguisticformsinavarietyofothersemioticrelationsprovides a rich semiotic infrastructure, on which symbolic meaning can

138

built.Thisviewshowsbothhowlinguisticformsaregroundedandprovidesmechanismsfortheir(partial)un-groundingtobecomesymbolic.

*

[experimental]Tuesday,12:00-12:30,room4GarethRoberts,gareth.roberts@ling.upenn.eduBetsySneller,esnell@sas.upenn.eduUniversityofPennsylvania,USA

Appropriationinanalienlanguage:Anexperimental-semiotic

studyofsociolinguisticmeaningAny linguistic utterance carries social meaning in addition to semanticcontent. The variants that allow this meaning to be conveyed aretransmitted through social interaction, and social factors play importantroles in the cultural evolution of language. The use of communicationsystemstomarkidentityisalsowidespreadinnature,suggestingthatthecognitiveunderpinningsofsociolinguisticbehaviourarerelativelyancient.However, in spiteof the clear importanceof sociolinguistic behaviour tocognitivesemioticsandlanguageevolution,linksbetweenthesefieldsandsociolinguisticsarenotstrong,andfewexperimental-semioticstudieshavedirectlyinvestigatedsociolinguisticquestions.Herewepresentastudythatdoesprecisely this,usinganartificial languagegametotestahypothesisderivedfromsociolinguisticfieldwork.The study is based on interviews conducted in 2012-2013 with whiteresidentsofalow-incomeneighbourhoodinPhiladelphiawithahighdegreeof racial segregation and tension. Several male speakers were found toexhibit TH-fronting, a featureofAfrican-American English (but notwhitePhiladelphianEnglish).Surprisingly,higherratesofTH-frontingwerefoundinspeakerswhoexpressedaggressivenegativeviewsabouttheirAfrican-Americanneighbours.AlikelyexplanationforthisisthatTH-frontingamongthese speakers was due to an association with toughness and “street”cultureratherthanAfrican-Americanidentity.

139

Wetestedthishypothesiswithanexperimental-semioticstudy.Thebasicparadigm involved groupsof four participants playing a computer game,witheachplayerassignedtooneoftwoalienspecies:WiwosandBurls,withBurlsdepictedastougherthanWiwos.Beforeplaying,participantslearnedasmall“alien language”,whichdifferedslightly for thetwospecies (e.g.,fuzukivs.buzuki).Thentheyplayedaseriesofroundsinwhichtheywerepaired with each other and could chat (by typingmessages in the alienlanguage),traderesources,andfight.InoneexperimentwemanipulatedwhetherformsusedbyBurlswereexplicitlyassociatedfortheWiwoswithBurlsorwith“tougheraliens”.Consistentwiththehypothesis,Wiwosinthelatter condition appropriated Burl forms significantly more than in theformer condition. In a second (ongoing) experiment, we investigatewhether introducingadistinctionbetween“peaceful”and“hard”Wiwos,with the latter having traits in common with “Burls”, leads to greaterappropriation of Burl forms by the latter, as a means of distinguishingthemselvesfromtheirpeacefulconspecifics.

*

[intersubjectivity]Monday,11:45-12:15,AulaVictorRosenthal,victor.rosenthal[at]ehess.frInstitutMarcelMauss–EHESS,France

SemioticinstitutionofinnerlifeThe very ideaof inner life arises fromourbeingon speaking termswithourselves, from having an inner voice. I shall argue that far from beingmerely an anonymous vehicle of thought, inner voice representsanembodiedmodalityofourselfhood,ofourbeinginthesocialworld,andassuch isanessentialvectorofourhumanity.Although innervoicemay(rightfully)beviewedasinstrumentaltotheexerciseofthought(afamiliartheme from Plato to Vygotsky to Merleau-Ponty), its significance farexceeds this purely cognitive instrumental dimension: it is an essentialvectorofsemiotizationofhumanlifeanditinstitutesfull-fledgedformsof

140

inner life that differentiate us from non-humans. Moreover, even in itsoutwardly silent form, it incarnates the public character of expression,whentheaddresseeisaninvisible,fictitiouspartner.Inthissense,andincontradistinctiontoVygotsky’stheoryofinnerspeech,self-talkisnotutterlysimplified,mostlyreducedtoapredicativeformbutencompasses all of formsof discourse.Neither is itmerely dialogical (ashold the proponents of the bakhtinian tradition) for it also comprisesnarratives, self-comments and other conversational forms. Actually,epilegeinasweshallcallthephenomenonof innervoice(but isn’t italsoouter,sincewehearit)isalsothevoiceofthesubjectasapersonandasamoralinstance.For,becauseItalktomyself,somehowIamtwo-in-one,andIhavetoliveuptotheconstraintsofthiscoexistence(tothepressureoftheother voice), to become accountable to myself (if I disagree with otherpeople,Icanwalkaway;butIcannotwalkawayfrommyself;ifIdowrong,Ihavetolivealongwithawrongdoer).AndIliveinasocialworldevenwhenalone; even in my solitude I recap normative, prescriptive, imaginaryrepertoriesofmysociety.Innerspeechisthusinstrumentaltoacquisitionand stabilization of social, cultural and linguistic repertories of normsand instituted forms, bywayof repeating, rehearsing, transforming, andfictionalizing(ofwhichitisanessentialmedium).Thereisafunctionaldualityofinnerspeechinasmuchasitactsbothasanagentofthesocialworld(bytheuseofsharedlanguageandofitsculturalrepertory)andisavectorofindividuality(autonomyofattention,intimatespokesperson).Indeed,byspeakingtomyselfIfreeattentionfrompurelyimmersiveandparticipatory formof lifeandbecomeable to fixmyownagenda.Therangeofphenomenaencompassinginnervoicethusgoesfarbeyond a simple modality of speech, and it will be argued that it is anessentialinstitutionofhumanlife,andassuch,isthemain(thoughnotethesole)vehicleofinnerandsociallife.

*

141

[multimodal]Monday,11:15-11:45,room201DevonSchiller,devonschiller[at]gmail.comDanubeUniversity,Austria

Facesseen,heard,andfelt:Theintermedialhapticarchiveinfacialmeasurementtraining

Sincethe‘CognitiveRevolution’ofthemid-twentiethcentury,considerableempirical research in psychology, linguistics, and computer science isdedicated to investigating whether there are prototypical emotionsspecifiedbybiologyanduniversallyrecognizedacrosscultures.TheFacialActionCodingSystem(FACS),today’sleadingstandardfortaxonomizingthenonverbal language of the physiognomy, has supported findings for thistheory of emotions as functionally discrete types. Applying FACS, aresearchermeasuresthesignvehiclesofthefacebydescribingthesurfaceappearance of muscular movement that is visible to an observer’sclassificatory gaze. This method depends upon the archiving of mediadocuments.FACSwasdiscoveredusingdocumentationoffacialexpressionsin societies unexposed tomassmedia, developed using photograph andvideotranscriptionofexpressionsmodeledbytheresearchersthemselves,andisdeployedusingdatabasesorstimulussetsof imagesthatareface-coded and emotion-labeled. To problematize the media genealogies ofphysiognomicscience,andthesemioticstructuresof itsprincipallyvisualepistemology, I probe the FACS Training Workshop originated bypsychologist Erika Rosenberg, the only Workshop endorsed by FACSprincipal investigator Paul Ekman. How are facial signs encoded in thedocumentationofIndagine,Lavater,Darwin,Lombroso,Bertillon,Tomkins,and Ekman by the media specificities of these face-readers’ archivalpractices?TowhatextenthasthearchivingofmediadocumentsforFACSsystematized theontological commencementofa scientificparadigm formeasuringfacesignvehicles,aswellasanomologicalcommandmentinthemediaecosystemthroughwhichtheir referentemotioncategoriesaree-valuated? And how does the intermediality between the symbolic

142

representation (Thirdness) in the FACS Manual and the sensuous quale(Firstness)oftheWorkshopparticipantsupportthecomposition,reference,and transformation of mediated statements about the face through anocular, auditive,andhaptic semiosis? Ipropose that theFACSWorkshopfunctions as a haptic archive for the media documents of the‘physiognomicsof theage,’ and through the critical analysisof itsmediaspecificitiespresentachallengetothesustainedhegemonyintheWesternculturalimaginaryofphysiognomicscienceasocularocentric;connecttheseinformation-carryingimageswiththeaestheticimagesfromwhichtheyareartificially divided inmedia histories; and call for future archives of faceimagestocenteraroundtheperceptionoftouch,bothforbetterefficacyintheanaloguecodinganddigitalalgorithmsoffacialexpressionanalysis,aswellastowardsamorecomplexresearchofemotionbasedonsignvehiclesoftheface.

*

[culturalinfluences]Monday,11:45-12:15,room101AlekseiSemenenko,aleksei.semenenko[at]gmail.comStockholmUniversity,Sweden

Semioticsofnon-sense:Howcansomethingthatdoesnotexisthave

meaning?Absurdityandnonsenseareusuallystudiedasliterary,philosophicaland/orlogical categories. For example, in literary studies absurd is typicallyanalyzedasatypeofhumorontheexampleofconcretetextsandgenres.Inmypaper,Ifocusonabsurdityandnonsenseassemioticcategoriesandasoneofthemechanismsofmeaninggeneration,basingmyapproachontheworksofthesemioticianandliteraryscholarYuriLotman,andespeciallyhisconceptsofexplosion(bothasachangeinthestateofthesystemthatprovokes an unpredictable development and a situation when theinformation loadofa textdrastically increases)and thenotionsof “non-text”and“minus-device”thatrefertothemeaningfulabsenceofstructural

143

elements that influences theperceptionof the text (Lotman1962,1970,1990,2009,2010).This problem highlights the inherent informational paradox of humanculture and human communication systems, in which entropy does notimpede communicationbut on the contrary stimulates it. I examine twocases of this phenomenon: 1) the first is dealing with the so-callednonsensical signs/words that can be coined and used in any naturallanguage;2)thesecondexaminestheproblemof“non-signs”intheartistictextsandtheimportancetostudytheminrelationtonon-textsandextra-textsoftheirsemioticsphere.Asanexample,IanalyzethemechanismsofmeaninggenerationinseveralEnglish(e.g.,“Jabberwocky,”JohnLennon’stexts) and Russian (e.g., Eugene Onegin, Daniil Kharms) texts thatdemonstratedifferentfunctionsof“non-signs”inthestructureofthetext.Onalargerscaletheexampleofhowhumanculturesdealwithnonsense(and“non-sense”)incommunicationhasimplicationsforthestudyoftheevolutionofhumancultureandlanguageandalsodrawsadditionallighttothemethodologicalproblemoftherelationofthetexttothesign.

*

[conceptualization]Tuesday,11:00-11:30,room101AnastasiaSharapkova,warapkova[at]yahoo.comMoscowLomonosovStateUniversity,RussianFederation

Shiftingthemeaningthroughsocialinteraction:acaseofnobleanditssynonymsinMedievalliterature

The concept noble plays a paramount role in representing the knightlyworldoftheMiddleAgesforitisanessentialcharacteristicofcourtlylife.Asthetransformationsinsociallifeinfluencedtheknightlydiscourse,theliteraturecausedboth:changesinlinguisticmeaningandsocialbehavour:“just as medieval history is unexpectedly like romance, so medievalromance is unexpectedly like history” [Schmidt, 1982: 39]. The adjective'noble'appearedintheEnglishlanguagein13thcenturyasthekeylandmark

144

inhistoryofthecountryandlanguageitself;however,duringmerelyonecenturyitsmeaningchangeddramaticallyfrom“superiorbirth”relatedtogentry to “having high moral qualities”. The study of the text ofMorteD’Arthur by Thomas Malory and a number of other sources includingcorpora of the period shows the gradual blending of various existingmeaningsandthebirthofthenewonesduetochangingsocialsituation.The application of linguistic, cognitive and corpus approachesmakes itpossibletoassumethattheshiftofmeaningaccountsfortheshiftinthestructureoftheconceptofknighthood,thatiswell-representedinthetextsoftheperiodandsupportedbyhistoricalaccounts.We grouped all contexts according to the type of nouns combinedwithnoble. When the adjective is used with nouns denoting people (lords,ladies),itislikelytorevealitsprimarymeaningorisusedtopointatasetofcharacteristicswhichwerethoughttobeindispensableofgentlebirth.When we deal with 'noble knights', the situation becomes morecomplicatedforamancouldonlybecomeaknightbelongingtoaristocracy,sohismoralqualitiesarenotthateasilyrevealed.Inthiscase,weanalyzethenearestcontextandstudytheadjectivesmakinguptherepresentationof knightly world e.g.worthy. The adj. noble shifts in meaning whencombinedwithnon-humannouns(swords,books,deeds),butwhatismoreimportant – with abstract nouns such as, courage,while the concept iselaboratedthroughextensionoftheradialcategory(Lakoff).Morphologicalderivationalsoshedslightonfurtherconceptualderivation.The analysis demonstrates that the adj. noble is transformed andrecategorisedinthemedievaltextsthroughtheabstractconceptualizationofnobilityandknighthoodbeinggraduallycomplicatedandbrought toahighlyabstractdomainofknowledge.ByapplyingtheintegratedapproachwithcognitivetakenastheleadingoneIhopetodemonstratehowthesemiosisistakingplaceonthecrossroadsofculture,societyandliterature.

*

145

[iconicity]Tuesday,10:30-11:00,room201ShekoufehMohammadiShirmahaleh,shekufe[at]hotmail.esUniversidadNacionalAutónomadeMéxico,MexicoIconicMetaphorinLanguageandLiterature:Identificationand

InterpretationCharlesS.Peirce’s iconicmetaphor ishis leastexploredcategoryof iconsdue to his own very short and ambiguous definition of this concept: ametaphor is an icon that represents the representative character of arepresentamenbyrepresentingaparallelisminsomethingelse(Peirce),i.e.,somethingotherthansimplequalitiesoranalogousrelations.Thenatureofthis“somethingelse”isthefirstnotiontobedeterminedwhenweintendtostudythePeirceanmetaphors.While images and diagrams have received extensive attention frominvestigators and scholars, Peircean metaphors have been treatedinsufficiently both regarding their structural functions and in relation totheir interpretation effects in different fields. As a first step, this paperpresentsaclosestudyofthethreemainelementsofallsigns,i.e.,Object,RepresentamenandInterpretant,intheiconicmetaphorandtheirrelationto the Background and the Interpreter, as a guide to a completeunderstanding of the semiotic process of creation and interpretation ofmetaphors,proposingatthesametimeabettersubstitutefor“somethingelse”inPeirce’sdefinitionofthisthirdclassofhipoicons.Ontheotherhand,the question of reference and similitude in an iconicmetaphor is also amatterthatseeksspecialtreatmentithasnotbeengiven.Metaphorsareabductive,self-referential,self-creativeicons,abletosurpassthelimitsoflinguisticsandliterature,asmuchastheirownlimits.Moreover,language,initseverydaylifeandusage,andliteraturearetwoexcellentcontextswhere iconicmetaphors, togetherwithotherPeirceanicons,appearandinviteustoamorecomplexinterpretation.Manystudieshave been fulfilled about iconicity in language but once again the iconicmetaphorisleftaside,asPeirceanimagesanddiagramsgainacentralrole.

146

Therefore,asecondstepwillconsistofaconciseandpreciseclassificationofpossiblecasesinlanguageandliteraturewhereiconicmetaphorscanbeidentified:ineverydaylanguageinstruments,suchasintonationandvocalstyle,inliterarytexts,especiallyinpoeticmetaphorsandanagrams,andinrhetoric figures: ellipsis, reticence, repetition, alliteration, pause,implicationsandinferences,etc.Thisnewviewpointfocusedontheiconicfunctionsofdiscoursecomponentshasstartedtobediscussedasacrucialapproachthatcanleadustoamorecorrectandcompleteinterpretationoflinguisticandliterarymessages.

*

[communication]Tuesday,11:00-11:30,AulaGöranSonesson,goran.sonesson[at]semiotik.lu.seLundUniversity,Sweden

SemiosisinHistory.TheEmergenceofAlter-CultureFollowinguponMerlinDonald’sclaimthathumanspecificityemerges inhistory,andnotexclusively inevolutionarytime, itwillbesuggestedthatthe diversified means of producing semiosis created by human beingsaccount for thespreadofempathyandaltruismnotonlybeyondthekingroup,buttohumankindingeneral.Thisamountstotreatingotherculturesasdifferentfromus,butstillabletoenterintocommunicationwithus(asanAlter),asopposedastreatingtheseculturesarepartofnature,andthusonlysusceptibletobecommunicatedabout(asanAlius).Startingoutfromthe theory of bio-cultural evolution defended by Peter J. Richerson andRobertBoyd,aswellasfromthemulti-levelselectiontheoryofElliottSoberand David Sloan Wilson, we try to lay bare the way in which semioticstructures play a role for transforming cultural evolution, contrary tobiologicalevolution, intohumanhistory.Weinquiry intowhatmakestheexistenceofAlter-culturepossible, if, asSoberandWilsonhaveclaimed,armedwithgametheory,analtruisticsociety(anEgo-cultureinourterms),isonlypossibleinoppositiontoanothergroupinrelationtowhichgroup

147

egoismrules(thatis,inourterms,anAlius-culture).WewillfollowMichaelTomaselloinarguingfortheprimacyofgamesofcooperation,ratherthancompetition,whileaddinganhistoricaldimension,whichservestoexplainhowsuchcooperationcanbeextendedbeyondtheprimarygroup(ourEgo-culture). However, we will insist of the importance of multiple semioticresourcesfortheboot-strappingofempathyandaltruism,aswellasonthegenesisofthisprocessinculturalencounters,asreflectedinthespiritoftheEnlightenment.

*

[embodiment&situatedness]Tuesday,15:00-15:30,AulaKatarzynaStadnik,katarzyna_stadnik@interia.plMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

Thewordvis-à-visthevisualimage:Rememberingasasharedsocioculturalpractice

The paper adopts a Cultural Linguistic perspective on the language-cognition relation.Ourresearchperspectivecanbesubsumedundertheumbrellatermoftheso-calledsocioculturalsituatednessofthelanguageuserasamemberofaculturalcommunity. This approach dovetails with the research strain of situatedcognition,whichassumesthattheoperationofthehumanmindshouldbeexaminedrelativetothecontext.Itmaybesuggestedthatthecontextforthe human cognitive processes can be rendered in terms of humanembodiment, and the external environment, both physical and social.Furthermore, our understanding of what constitutes the context can bebroadenedbyincludingtheissueoftheinteractionbetweenthecommunitymemberand theexternalenvironment,with the latterpresupposing theuseofexternalvehiclesforthought. The paper takes a culturally-oriented view ofmeaning-making inhuman interaction.Of specific interest is the question of the transfer of

148

knowledge accumulated in a given community. It is assumed that theinterdependency of literature and visual arts helps sustain the culturalcommunity’smemory.Increasedattentionispaidtohowtheidiosyncraticnatureofhumancognitionaffectstheprocessofknowledgetransfer.Whatandhowisrememberedbytheindividualseemstodependednotonlyonthenatureoftheinformation-bearingmedium,butalsoontheidiosyncraticnatureoftheindividual’scognition.Theproblemoftheinterplaybetweenthe word and the visual image will be discussed relative to ZbigniewHerbert’swritings.

*

[experimental]Tuesday,11:00-11:30,room4MarleneStaib,mvs[at]dac.au.dkJonasNölle,jonas.noelle[at]live.deRiccardoFusaroli,fusaroli[at]gmail.comKristianTylén,kristian[at]cc.au.dkAarhusUniversity,Denmark

Investigatingmotivationsforiconicityandsystematicityinemergentsignsystems

Recently,therehasbeenablossomingdiscussionrelatedtotheemergenceofnovelsignsystemsand–ultimately–language.Previousstudiessuggesta prominent role for internal and individual cognitive biases shapinglinguistic structures through processes of intergenerational transmissionandlearning(Kirbyetal.,2008).Otherapproachesarguefortheimportanceofsituatedsocialinteraction(Tylénetal.,2013).Inthelatter,thesocialandmaterial environment plays a critical role providing rich semioticaffordances that scaffold and stabilize new communicative signs andsystems. Crucially, this perspective entails that different environmentsmightmotivatedifferentlinguisticstructures(Christensenetal.,2016).

This paper presents novel experimental work on aspects ofsystematicity and iconicity in emerging communication systems

149

(Dingemanseetal.,2015).Whileiconicityisrelatedtotherelationbetweensign and referent, systematicity is related to shared features betweenrelatedsignsinternallyinacommunicationsystem.Assuch,bothiconicityandsystematicityscaffoldpreviousknowledge(aboutreferents/signs),andcan therefore be treated as alternative “strategies” for bootstrapping acommunicationsystem(Robertsetal.,2015).

In an experimental setting, we independently manipulated thedistributionalpropertiesofcertaintraitsofstimulitosimulateaffordancesfor iconicity and systematicity of different environments. Pairs ofparticipantshadtocommunicateaboutvisuallypresentedcharactersusingonlygesture(i.e.withoutrelianceonexistingconventionalsigns,GalantucciandGarrod,2010).Thesecharacterseachhadveryspecific,individualtraits(e.g.,glasses),aswellastraitsthatweresharedbyanumberofreferents(e.g.,theirgender).Preliminaryfindingssupportanuancedperspectiveoniconicity and systematicity emerging in response to different semioticaffordances.ReferencesChristensen,P.,Fusaroli,R.,Tylén,K.,2016.Environmentalconstraintsshapingconstituentorderinemergingcommunicationsystems:Structuraliconicity,interactivealignmentandconventionalization.Cognition146,67-80.Dingemanse,M.,Blasi,D.E.,Lupyan,G.,Christiansen,M.H.&Monaghan,P.,2015.Arbitrariness,Iconicity,andSystematicityinLanguage.TrendsCognSci19,603-615.Galantucci,B.&Garrod,S.,2010.Experimentalsemiotics:Anewapproachforstudyingtheemergenceandtheevolutionofhumancommunication.InteractionStudies:SocialBehaviourandCommunicationinBiologicalandArtificialSystems.Kirby,S.,Cornish,H.&Smith,K.,2008.Cumulativeculturalevolutioninthelaboratory:anexperimentalapproachtotheoriginsofstructureinhumanlanguage.ProcNatlAcadSciUSA105,10681-10686.

150

Roberts,G.,Lewandowski,J.&Galantucci,B.,2015.Howcommunicationchangeswhenwecannotmimetheworld:Experimentalevidencefortheeffectoficonicityoncombinatoriality.Cognition,141,52-66.Tylén,K.,Fusaroli,R.,Bundgaard,P.F.&Østergaard,S.,2013.Makingsensetogether:Adynamicalaccountoflinguisticmeaning-making.Semiotica2013,39-62.

*

[conceptualization]Tuesday,14:30-15:00,room101AnnaStanisz,ania.stanisz[at]interia.plJagiellonianUniversity,Poland

ConventionalandunconventionalconceptualisationofloveinEnglish(DavidRicho)

TheaimofmypaperistocomparetheconventionalconceptualisationofloveinEnglishwiththeunconventionaloneinDavidRicho’spsychologicalguidebookentitledHowToBeAnAdultinLove.LettingLoveInSafelyandShowing It Recklessly from the point of view of cognitive semantics,especially the theory of conceptual metaphor and metonymy (Lakoff,Johnson,MetaphorsWeLiveBy)andthetheoryofradialcategory(Rosch,CognitionandCategorization).Thefirstpartwillbedevotedtotheconventionalconceptualisationoflovein English. As a scholarly background providing the analysis of theconventionalconceptionIamgoingtouseBogusławBierwiaczonek’sbookentitledACognitiveStudyoftheConceptofLOVEinEnglish.BierwiaczonekpointstoafewmodelsofloveintheEuropeanculture(theonebasedonsexual attraction, marital love, family love), which overlap in theunderstanding of the whole concept. My hypothesis is that the centralmemberofthelovecategoryisconventionallyconceptualisedasastrongemotionofaffectionorliking,resultingfromsexualorromanticattraction,where a person loving is passive. Therefore, the central sense of love ismetonymicallyunderstoodasanin-lovestate.

151

Anotherpartofmypaperwill focusonRicho’sconceptualisationof love,which is constructedbymeansofmetaphorsandmetonymiesaswellasprototypes. Richo creates his definition of love primarily by means ofmetonymies,paintingitasaninborn“capacity”,which,though,hastobetrained (“practice”), and by means of differentiation between love andotherconceptscommonlymistakenforit(liking,loyalty,infatuation,lust).In his definition, the prototype of love are less conventional in theconventionalconceptualisation.Richo’sprototypereferstoanattitudeofcaring, deeply rooted in the ideal of universal love, that is directed ateveryone, including ourselves, and manifesting itself in action. Richo’sunconventionalconceptualisationfocusesonformingarelationship.In conclusion, the aim of the paper will be to point to similarities anddifferences between the metaphors and metonymies in the twoconceptualisationsaswellasinthecategorymodelforthetwoconceptsoflove. Because a few models of love overlap in the European culture, Iassume that what is central in Richo’s conception of love is what isperipheralintheconventionalone.

*

[language&vincinities]Monday,16:00-16:30,room101VladoSušac,vsusac[at]unizd.hrUniversityofZadar,CroatiaMetaphoridentificationproblemorcanweextractwaterfromthe

lake?

Eversincethe‘cognitiveturn’inthetheoryofmetaphor,whichresultedinabandoning the old rhetorical approach focused on languagemetaphorsprimarily as a matter of style, anyone dealing with corpus analysis hasinevitably faced the problem of metaphor identification. The newlyadvocated ubiquity or omnipresence of metaphors in thought andconsequently in languagerecognizedthroughvariouskindsofconceptualmappingsposesamethodologicalproblemofthemetaphordemarcation

152

fromtherestofthelanguagematerial.Fromdiachronicalperspectivethemetaphorical motivation can be etymologically traced back to thebeginningsofhumanspeech,especiallyinTIME-SPACEmappingsorotherembodied experience that we share as a human race, let alone otherrelative concepts produced by particular cultures. Purely synchronicalapproach to the phenomenon only partly resolves the problem withlanguage analysis, still largely reducing the metaphoric repository forthoughtandinherentconceptualrelations.Asaparadox,evenwhatisleftin this reduced approach and recognized as metaphorical by followingMetaphorIdentificationProcedureisnotalwaysprocessedmetaphoricallyinthemindsofspeakers(orlisteners)throughcross-domainmappingfromone concept to another. This tension between linguistic and cognitiveperspective has been resolved by some authors (Steen, in particular) byoffering intersubjective approach, where communication becomes thefocusofourattention. Itreconcilesthetraditionalrhetoricwiththe latercognitive views by means of intentionality or awareness as a primarymarker in metaphor identification, where cross-domain mappings areclearly evoked in theminds of speakers and listeners. By accepting thisadapted procedure, the previously presented corpus analysis of theconceptual systems in political discourse, which included deliberate andnon deliberate metaphors, will be re-examined, especially in view ofdominantmetaphoricalmappings belonging to opposed political groups.Theresultswillshowwhetherthemajorityconceptsofdeliberatepoliticalmetaphorssignificantlydifferinqualityandnumberfromthosethatbelongtoamerelanguagehabit.

*

153

[experimental]Tuesday,15:30-16:00,room4MonicaTamariz,monicatamariz@gmail.comMaxPlanckInstituteforPsycholinguisticsJonCarr,j.w.carr@ed.ac.ukUniversityofEdinburgh,UnitedKingdomCo-evolutionaryinteractionsbetweensignalsandmeanings:an

experimentalapproach

This study explores the origin and evolution of an open-endedexperimentalsemioticsystemwhich,startingoffasonlyoneform-meaningmapping,expandsboth intheformspace(typeddescriptions)and inthemeaning space (drawings) through communicative usage. We explorewhether the evolution of the system is symmetrical and ask: Do forminnovationsaffecttheevolutionofmeaningsinthesamewaythatmeaninginnovationsaffecttheevolutionofforms?

Weuseanovelexperimentalsemiotictaskinwhichapairofparticipantsplaya communicative task. In each game,the director is given a target drawingand he has to type its description forthematcher (Fig. 1a). The descriptioncanbewritteninEnglish,buthasalimitof 16 characters and includes onlylower-case letters and spaces. The

matcher tries to guess the target from an array of drawings, and thenproducesacopyofthetargetdrawingtoletthedirectorknowwhichofthearraydrawingsshehaschosen(Fig.1b).Finally,thedirectorhastoguessfromthematcher'sdrawingwhichofthearraydrawingssheunderstood.Foreachcorrectguess,thepairscores5points.Additionally,Ifbothguessesarecorrect,indicatingcommongroundaboutlabelanddrawinghasbeenestablished, the drawing is added to the world, and can appear in thecontextorasatargetinfuturegames.

Type the name of this object60 105:12

small%triang%

Now draw the object65 104:48

small%triang%

Q W E R T Y U I O P

A S D F G H J K LZ X C V B N M send

senddel

del

?%%%%%%?%%?%%?%

(a) % % % % % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%(b)%

Figure%1.%Two%snapshots%of%the%director’s%(a)%and%matcher’s%(b)%%ipads%during%the%communica=ve%task%

154

Theresultforeachpairisatreeofsignalsandmeanings(Fig.2)whereeachdrawingproducedhasadescriptionanddescendsfromaparent--thetargetinthegamewhereitwasproduced.Wecodedthreesuchtreeswith120drawings each, to identify meaningful features in descriptions and indrawings.E.g.inFig.2,'loops'inthedescriptionandcirclesinthedrawingare associated features. If forms and meanings affect each other in asymmetrical fashion, we should expect similar levels of (a) changes indrawingfeaturesfollowingrelatedchangesindescriptionfeaturesand(b)changesinthedescriptionfeaturesfollowingrelatedchangesinthedrawingfeatures. We find, however, that changes in the system originate indrawingswhiledescriptionstendto follow.Wediscussthe impactof thediscrete/continuous difference between typed words and drawings, andthenatureofthecommunicativetask.

*

threloops)dot)

three)lps)dot)

))vert)loops)op)

))))circle)c)c)dot)

))))))))))ccccc)dot)

o)ccc)

occc)o)))circl)big)small)dot)

three)loops)and)dot)

loops)ooo)c)

Figure)2)

155

[representation]Tuesday,14:30-15:00,room201MarcinTrybulec,marcin.trybulec[at]umcs.lublin.plMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

EthnographyofexternalrepresentationsreconsideredThe aim of the presentation is to reflect upon the notion of externalrepresentation (ExR) used by David Kirsh in "Thinking with Externalrepresentations"(2010).Kirshaptlystressesthatthematerialdimensionofrepresentation plays crucial role in cognition, especially as it comes tosharingthesamecontent,rearrangingideas,re-describingproblemstobesolved, and constructing abstract structures.One of the possibleway toanalysethenotionofexternalrepresentationusedbyKirshistofocusonepistemological andontological featuresof external representations. Forexample,wecanreasonablyaskthequestionwhethertheideaofexternalrepresentationisconsistentinitself,sinceExRalwayshadtobeinterpretedandassuch,itwillconsistofsomeinternalcomponents(Wachowski2014).The account presented inmy paper ismore parsimonious. Iwill ask thequestion,whetherallexternalrepresentationsarenecessarilyspatial,visualandstable?Kirshclaimsthat"keydifferencebetweeninternalandexternalrepresentations (...) is their difference in stability and persistence overtime"(Kirsh,2010,p.447).Thisclaimseemstobedubious.Theargumentagainstitwillbedevelopedinthreesteps.FirstpartjustifiestheclaimthatKirsh analysis of external representations is based upon incompletedistinctionbetweenexternalandinternalrepresentations.Thedistinctionis incomplete because it ignores the fact that not every externalrepresentationisspatiallystableandpersistentovertime(e.g.speechacts,sign language). Itwillbearguedthateventhough,Kirshmentionspokenwords as an example of external representation, in fact his analysis isconfined to graphical representations (e.g.maps, receipts,mathematicalnotation,videoinchoreography,modelsinarchitectureetc.).Thesecondpart isdevotedtoanswerthequestionwhatarethethreatsofassumingthatallexternalrepresentationsarepersistentandstable.Ifweclassifyoral

156

utterancesasbelongingtobroaderclassofexternalrepresentations,wewillbe prone to ignore the specific consequences of spoken language astransientphenomena,andascribetoitconcequencestypicaltographicalrepresentations(Linell,2004).Thisconclusionwouldbeunjustified inthelightofanthropologyofcommunication(Finnegan,1988)andpsychologyofreading(Homer,2009;Olson,2013).Eventhoughethnographyofexternalrepresentation pays special attention to material dimension of externalrepresentations, it leftno space for transient representationswhicharebothmaterialandexternal.Thirdpartofthepresentationjustifiestheclaimthatmorefinegrainedclassificationofexternalrepresentationisneeded.InordertodosoIwilluseclassificationbasedonclassicaltypologyofsignsinsemiotics(Heersmink,2013).ReferencesFinnegan,R.H.(1988).LiteracyandOrality:StudiesintheTechnologyofCommunication.Oxford:BlackwellPub.Heersmink,R.(2013).ATaxonomyofCognitiveArtifacts:Function,Information,andCategories.ReviewofPhilosophyandPsychology,4(3),465–481.Homer,B.D.(2009).Literacyandmetalinguisticdevelopment.InD.R.Olson&N.Torrance(Eds.),TheCambridgeHandbookofLiteracy(pp.487–500).Cambridge[etc.]:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kirsh,D.(2010).Thinkingwithexternalrepresentations.AI&SOCIETY,25(4),441–454.Linell,P.(2004).TheWrittenLanguageBiasinLinguistics:ItsNature,OriginsandTransformations.London,NewYork:Routledge.Olson,D.R.(2013).Writing,thediscoveryoflanguage,andthediscoveryofmind.DialogueandUniversalism,23(1),9–14.

*

157

[experimental]Tuesday,11:30-12:00,room4KristianTylén,kristian[at]cc.au.dkSvendØstergaard,semsvend[at]dac.au.dkAarhusUniversity,Denmark

ThesocialroutetoabstractionAbstraction lies at the heart of human cognition, categorization andsemiosis.Wearesensitivetoregularitiesevenwhentheseconcernhigher-order complex relations, and readily infer rules from complex sensorystimulus (Gómez, 2002). Most theories of abstraction and complex ruleformation - often implicitly - take the individual as a starting point: asindividualssuccessivelyencountervariedtokensthatsharerelationsamongtheirfeatures,theygeneralizetheseasbelongingtothesametype(Medin&Smith,1984).However,ithasalsobeensuggestedthatabstractionmightberelatedtohuman-specificmodesofsocialbehaviorandsharedattention(Tomasello,1999).Thecombinationand integrationofperspectives fromtwoormoreindividualsalreadyintheoutsetaccommodateslargerdegreesof variability due to individual differences in experience, knowledge andcognitive style (Page, 2008). This is likely to make groups converge onrepresentationsthataremoreabstract(Schwartz,1995).Inthispaperwepresenttwoexperimentsthatcomparetheperformanceandbehaviorof individualsandgroupsinproblemsolvingtasksaffordingcognitiveprocessesofabstraction.Ourresultssuggestthattheprobabilityof reachingmore abstract and superior solutions is highest in groups ofindividualsandevidenceispresentedthatthiseffectiscontingentupontheextent to which groups display aspects of cognitive diversity andcomplementarity.ReferencesGómez,R.L.(2002).Variabilityanddetectionofinvariantstructure.PsycholSci,13(5),431-436.

158

Medin,D.L.,&Smith,E.E.(1984).Conceptsandconceptformation.AnnuRevPsychol,35(1),113-138.Page,S.E.(2008).Thedifference:Howthepowerofdiversitycreatesbettergroups,firms,schools,andsocieties:PrincetonUniversityPress.Schwartz,D.L.(1995).Theemergenceofabstractrepresentationsindyadproblemsolving.TheJournaloftheLearningSciences,4(3),321-354.Tomasello,M.(1999).TheCulturalOriginsofHumanCognition.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.

*[conceptualization]Tuesday,12:00-12:30,room101ValentynaUshchyna,uval[at]ukr.netLesyaUkrainkaEasternEuropeanNationalUniversity,Lutsk,Ukraine

Situatedconceptualizationofrisk:Towardsasocio-cognitivesemioticsofstancetakinginrisk

discoursesituationThisstudyconcernsthesocio-cognitivedynamicsof interactiveprocessesofstancetakinginthediscoursesituationsofrisk.Discursiveconstructionofstancesintheriskdiscoursesituationinvolvespersonalriskperceptionandconceptualization as well as interpersonal communication of risks.Therefore, stancetaking on risk is seen here as an intricate and dynamicphenomenon that linksboth individually cognitiveandcommonly sharedsocialprocessesofsense-making.Language, as a prime means to stimulate and manage the building ofsituatedconceptualizationsforunderstandingdifferentculturalandsocialenvironments, serves the main source through which “people arecategorizingtheirexperienceoftheworld”(Taylor2003,p.xii).Linguisticcues work as the most important reference points for meaningconstruction.Theytransformcognitiveprocessingfromanindividuallytoasocially-distributedactivity,andthus,motivateresearcherstopromotetheecologicalviewofdiscourseproductionasasocio-semioticpractice.

159

Theobjectiveofthisstudyistofindoutwhatlinguisticmeansandcognitivemechanisms are used by the speech participants to conceptualize thediscoursesituationasasituationofriskandanalyzethewaysthestancesononeandthesameproblem(e.g., theriskofwar,theriskofeconomicproblems or the risk of political crisis) are taken by different discourseparticipantsunderdifferentcommunicativeconditions.The theoretical framework for the study synthesizes sociocognitiveapproaches to discourse analysis (van Dijk 2008; Kesckes 2012, Wodak2006),whichformaninterfaceofmind,discourseinteractionandsociety.Inotherwords,theuseofsocio-cognitiveapproachallowslookingintothewaysinwhichindividualcognitiveprocessesarerelatedtothestructuresofdiscourse,verbalinteraction,communicativeeventsandsocialsemioticsofsituateddiscourse.FrameNet,basedonatheoryofmeaningcalledFrameSemantics, deriving from the work of Fillmore et al. (2003), offered itsversion of the RISK situation model. This model served as a conceptualfoundationfortheanalysisofstance,framedbythesituationalcontextofRISK.Risks are seen as both real and constructed: risk thinking is a way ofintending to control one’s life and theworld in general.Weoftenmakenecessarychoicesindifferentsituationsoflifeapplyingmentalmodelsandcommonsenseknowledge,whichguideourdecision-making.“Risksociety”(Beck1996)becomesadiscursivestagewhereriskthinkingproducesevenmorerealrisks.Peoplebecometherisksubjectsfacinganecessityofriskydecisionsonaregularbasis.

*

160

[language&vincinities]Monday,14:30-15:00,room101AnuVastenius,anu.vastenius@semiotik.lu.seJordanZlatev,jordan.zlatev@semiotik.lu.seJoostVandeWeijer,joost.van_de_weijer@ling.lu.seLundUniversity,Sweden

Constituentorderinpictorialrepresentationsofeventsisinfluencedby

language Theoriginofwordorderinhumanlanguagehasbeenaddressedinrecentyearsinempiricalresearch,andinsomestudiesSOVhasbeenfoundtobethemostbasicordefaultorder.Goldin-Meadowetal.(2008)conductedastudy to test how speakers of languages with different word ordersrepresenteventswithpicturesandgestures.TheresultsshowedthattheparticipantspredominantlyusedtheorderActor-Patient-Act(ArPA)intheirnonverbalrepresentations,irrespectiveoftheirnativelanguage.Basedonthis,Goldin-Meadowetal.(2008:9167)concluded:“thereappearstobeanaturalorderthathumans,regardlessofthelanguagetheyspeak,usewhenaskedtorepresenteventsnon-verbally”.Later on, other studies have thrown doubt on the universality of such a“natural order” (e.g. Schouwstra & de Swart, 2014). To investigate thisissue,wereplicatedtheexperimentbyGoldin-Meadowetal.usingaslightlymodified design. In the replication, no gestures were used, as they areintrinsicallymore related to language than pictures (Kendon, 2004), andtherefore possibly more easily influenced by the native-language wordorder. Furthermore, contrary to the original study, the pictures wereprintedonseparate,non-transparentcards,whichneededtobeplacedinaparticularorder soas toproducea representationof theevent. In theoriginalstudy,thepictureswereprintedontransparencies,whichalwaysresulted in the same final product regardless of the order inwhich theywere placed. Consequently, no consistent strategy of ordering wasrequired. In our study, participants performed the task on a transversalplanewithasagittaldirectionality(fromfurthesttoclosesttothem).More

161

specifically, the participants had to place the picture cards below oneanother on a 13 x 52 cm board, with the narrow side facing them. Theintentionwasthat,inthisway,theywouldbeminimallyinfluencedbythedirectionofmotionshowninthepictures.Twenty-sixnativespeakersofKurdish (SOV) in theKurdish regionof Iraqandtwenty-sevenspeakersofSwedish(SVO)werepresentedwith36videoclips showing the events. Half of each language group were asked todescribetheeventpriortoorderingthepictures,andtheotherhalfonlytoorderthepicturesaftereachvideo.Theresultsshowedthat,unlikeintheoriginalstudy,theconstituentorderof the native-language did have an impact on the order of the pictorialrepresentations when using this experimental design. The speakers ofSwedishwerelessconsistentinusingtheArPAorderthanthespeakersofKurdish,andthistendencywasstrongerfortheparticipantswhodescribedthe events verbally before representing them pictorially. This caninterpretedasamoderateversionof linguistic relativity, suchasSlobin´s(1996)thinking-for-speaking,statingthatlanguagemodulatesthecognitiverepresentationsthatarerecruitedduringtheprocessoflanguageuse.Itislikelythattheexplicit linearorder inwhichthepictureshadtobeplacedwasmoreanalogoustowordorder,andhencewasmoreeasilyinfluencedbyit,thaninpreviousdesigns.ReferencesGoldin-Meadow, Susan,Mylander,Carolyn, So,WingChee, andÖzyürek,Asli(2008)Thenaturalorderofevents:Howspeakersofdifferentlanguagesrepresenteventsnonverbally.PNAS,105:9163-9168.Kendon, Adam (2004) Gesture: Visible action as utterance. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPressSchouwstra,Marieke.,deSwart,Henriëtte(2014)Thesemanticoriginsofwordorder.Cognition131:431–436.Slobin, Dan I. (1996) From “thought and language” to “thinking forspeaking”. In J.J.Gumperz & S.C Levinson (Eds.) Rethinking linguisticrelativity(p.70-96).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

162

[semiotics]Wednesday,10:30-11:00,AulaTommiVehkavaara,tommi.vehkavaara[at]uta.fiUniversityofTampere,FinlandMakingsemioticconceptsforcognitivesemiotics–manyrather

thanoneconceptofsignCognitivesemiotics(CS)hasbeencharacterized“asaninterdisciplinarymatrixof(subpartsof)disciplinesandmethods,focusedonthemultifacetedphenomenonofmeaning”(Zlatev2012).Oneofthemanydifficultiesofthischallengingprojectistheintegrationofconceptualandempiricalstudies.Ofteninempiricalstudies,theusedsemioticconcepts(e.g.meaningorsign)arereferredonlyinsomevagueintuitivesenses.Theoreticalstudies,inturn,easilystuckintodebatesbetweencompetingabstractdefinitionswithoutanycriteriaspecificenoughwhichwouldcontroltheirapplicability(Sonesson2008andZlatev2009).Inordertoapplyabstractsemioticconceptscontrolledlyinconcreteempiricaldata,weneedtomaketheusedsemioticconceptsclear.Another difficulty is inherited from the initial idea of CS which was tointegratecognitivesciencesandthehumanities,“withtheultimateaimofprovidingnewinsightsintotherealmofhumansignification”(Zlatev2012).Now as this has been further extended to cover also non-humansignification,wemayaskwhetherthestudyofnon-humansignificationandits theoretical concepts should somehowbe subordinate to the studyofhuman cognition or rather be considered per se, independently on itsimplications to human signification. If those forms of cognition that aresharedbyhumansandnon-humanagentswithoutlanguagefaculty,thereis a risk that the choices and definitions of the preferred theoreticalconcepts of CS are ill-advisably linguistically or humanistically biased(especiallybecausemanyoftheleadingcognitivesemioticiansarelinguistsorhavegottheirbasiceducationinlinguistics).Onewaytoproceedinbothoftheseproblemsistolookbeyondthemereabstractdefinitionsofourconceptstotheperceptionsor intuitions, from

163

which thedefined conceptsof signandmeaningarederived,how thesederivations are executed, andwhat kind of “essential features” they aresupposedtopreserve.Forhelpofthismeta-semioticalquestion,IwillrecallC.S.Peirce’snotionofconceptformation:alltheelementsofconceptsareoriginatedbyperception/intuition:“Theelementsofeveryconceptenter into logical thoughtat thegateofperceptionandmaketheirexitatthegateofpurposiveaction;”(EP2:241,CP5.212,1903)In this formulation of Pragmatism (that it is!), the meaning of an(intellectual)conceptcanbefoundbyconsideringthepossible“exitgate”,butthecontentisinheritedfromtheperceptual/intuitiveorigin.Theroleoforigin is not to justify or warrant the abstracted concept or its possibleapplications–quitethecontrary–thereisnoguaranteethattheabstractedconceptwillafterallbeapplicabletodescribethecommonsenseprototypefromwhichitwasderived.Origindoesnotinprinciplelimititsapplicabilitytocompletelydifferentkindofphenomenaeither.Buttheinspectionoftheintuitiveoriginandthederivationoftheconceptmayteachuswhatkindofconceptitis,whatkindofhiddenstructureithas,i.e.whatkindofimplicitelements, relations, etc. its derivation requires and which are notabstractedaway.AsthereareseveralconceptsofsignthathavebeenappliedinCS,theycanbecomparedwith respect to theirderivation.Happily, threeconceptsofsign have clear and explicit derivations: Peirce’s logical sign, Saussure’sstructural-linguistic sign, and Sonesson‘s phenomenologically derivedconceptofsign.AllofthemcanbefoundcollaterallyusefulconceptsforCS,buthavingtheirownrestrictionsduetotheirorigins.Peirce’sconceptofsignwasderivedasameanforrepresentativecognitionfamiliartousinscientificorrationalinquiry,andtheinitialproblemishowa rational inquirer interprets his/her (surprising) observations orperceptions(sign)inordertocomposeatruthfulconception(interpretant,“Dicisign”ofStjernfelt2014)abouttheirrealconditions(object).AlthoughmanyPeirceansemioticians,especiallybiosemioticians(likeStjernfelt),feeljustifiedtoabstractthisconceptfurtherandapplyiteventothemetabolic

164

processesofthemostsimpleformsoflife,thelooktoPeirce’sderivationsofhislogicalsignshowsthatthebasictriadicstructureofsignisdependenton interpreter’sconscious interestontruth–a facultythatbacteria (andoftenalsohumans)certainlylack.ThisdoesnotmeanthatPeirce’sconceptwould be completely inapplicable in biosemiotics, only that theconstitutional requirements of the sign relation should be fulfilled in itsapplication.Saussure’sprototypeofsign,inturn,wasmeanttobeavehicleof(linguistic)communication of mental ideas and its derivation led to the abstractedconceptlackingthereferentialcontent.AlthoughSonesson’sderivationofhis concept of sign is more phenomenological than structuralistic, hisstartingpointintuitionseemstobenotveryfarfromSaussure’sone–signconsistsminimallyoftheunionofexpressionandcontent).ButSonesson’sderivation starts from the core phenomenon of CS, perception (and notfromcommunication)resultingahierarchyof“meanings”ofwhichonlythehighestonedeservestobecalledassign.Thevagueideaoflinguisticsignand meaning seems nevertheless to constrain the derivation to someextent,whichisnotproblematicperseunlessitisclaimedthatsuchconceptofsignissomehowprivilegedinCS(ortheonly“true”conceptofsign).Besides these three intuitive origins, rational inquiry, communication ofideas, and meaningful perception, there is still (at least) one possiblestartingpoint.Ihavesuggested(Vehkavaara2006)thatcertainapplicationsrequire differently derived concept of sign starting from the idea ofintentionalaction.Anyactionthatismoredirectedthanblindcompulsivereactions requires some kind of anticipation of the result of a plannedaction.Suchanticipationcanbethoughttobeaninternalsignbywhichtheactor uses as a mean to guide or constrain the results of action. Theresulting practical or constructive concept of sign is a normative anddynamicsignbut its triadicstructure isdifferentthantheoneofPeirce’sconcept.WhentheempiricalstudiesaremadeinCS,weshouldseriouslyconsiderwhich one(s) of these types of concepts (or perhaps some fifthone)arethebesttomodelthestudiedcognitivephenomena.

165

ReferencesBrandt,PerAage(2004)Spaces,DomainsandMeanings.EssaysinCognitiveSemiotics.Bern:PeterLang.Deacon,T.W.(1997).Thesymbolicspecies:theCo-evolutionoflanguageandthebrain.NewYork:W.W.Norton.El-HaniCharbel,JoãoQueiroz,ClausEmmeche2009.Genes,information,andsemiosis.Tartu:TartuUniversityPress.Kull,K.(2009).Vegetative,animal,andculturalsemiosis:thesemioticthresholdzones.CognitiveSemiotics4/2009:8–27.PeirceCharlesS.(CP):CollectedpapersofC.S.Peirce.PeirceCharlesS.(EP):EssentialPeirce.Saussure,Ferdinandde1916.CourseinGeneralLinguistics.(Transl.RoyHarris,1983).Chicago&LaSalle(Ill.):OpenCourt1997StjernfeltFrederik(2007):Diagrammatology.Springer.StjernfeltFrederik(2014):NaturalPropositions.DocentPress.SonessonGöran(2008):Fromthemeaningofembodimenttotheembodimentofmeaning:Astudyinphenomenologicalsemiotics.InZiemke,Zlatev,Frank(eds.):CognitiveLinguisticsResearch,35.1:Body,Language,andMind,Volume1:Embodiement.MoutondeGruyter:85-127.SonessonGöran(2012):TheFoundationofCognitiveSemioticsinthePhenomenologyofSignsandMeanings.Intellecta58(2)/2012:207-239.VehkavaaraTommi(2002):Whyandhowtonaturalizesemioticconceptsforbiosemiotics.SignSystemsStudies30(1)/2002:293-313.VehkavaaraTommi(2006):LimitationsonapplyingPeirceansemeiotic.Biosemioticsasappliedobjectiveethicsandestheticsratherthansemeiotic.JournalofBiosemiotics1(2)/2006:269-308.ZlatevJordan(2009):TheSemioticHierarchy:Life,consciousness,signsandlanguage.CognitiveSemiotics4/2009:169-200.ZlatevJordan(2012):CognitiveSemiotics:Anemergingfieldforthetransdisciplinarystudyofmeaning.PublicJournalofSemioticsIV(1)/2012:2-24.

166

[intersubjectivity]Monday,10:45-11:15,AulaElżbietaWąsik,wasik[at]wa.amu.edu.plAdamMickiewiczUniversityinPoznań,Poland Exposingthedialogicalnatureofthelinguisticselfininterpersonalandintersubjectiverelationshipsfromthefirst-person,second-

personandthird-personperspectiveThesubjectmatterofthispapercomprisesthelinguisticpropertiesofthehumanselfwhosedialogicalnature results fromthe fact that it takesanactive part as a member of a society in observable interpersonal andassumableintersubjectiverelationships.Alludingtothenotionofselfhood,borrowed from philosophy and psychology, the paper departs from theviewaboutthetwoexistencemodesofcommunicatingindividuals:(1)theselfasasubjectiveknower,orthe“I”,and(2)theselfasanobjectthatisknown,orthe“Me”.Accordingly,itpointsouttoconsequencesresulting,forresearchersoflanguagecommunication,fromthedistinctionbetween:(1)amentalsubject,i.e.,the“I”asaninternallyconceivableexperiencingagentwhoformulatesandinterpretsitsthoughtsinsignpatterns,and(2)aphysical person, i.e., the “Me” as an externally observable object ofexperiencewhosendsand receives itsmessages throughsign-processingactivities.Inthiscontext,particularattentionispayedtothediversityofthelinguistic properties of human selves who are able to speak differentlanguages and their varieties as the basic means of signification andcommunication.Thisstatemententitlestheauthorofthefollowingpapertoproposetheconceptofthelinguisticselfbeingaccessibleasanobjectofpotential investigations on the basis of significative-communicative actsperformedindifferentdomainsofitseverydaylife.Inparticular,thementalsignificative-cognitive processes of humans and their manifestations insocial and cultural practices should be exposed while resorting toknowledgecomingfromcognitivesciencesandsemioticphenomenology.Specialemphasisdeserveshereaholisticapproachtohumancognitionforwhichnotonlyhumanmindisresponsiblebutthewholebodyofacognizing

167

subjectasabiologicalorganismandpsychicalbeing.Finally,inreferencetothedialogicalstructureofhumanconsciousness,emerginganddevelopingthanks to social interactions, this paper expounds on the ways andpossibilities of understanding and interpreting verbal utterances ofcommunicatingselvesengagedintherolesofexperiencers,interlocutors,observersandnarrators.Whattheymeanisinfactnotcontainedinwordsbut ratherdeterminedby thedistancebetween themas communicationparticipantswhotalkotherwiseaboutthemselves,aboutthosewithwhomtheycommunicateandaboutthoseaboutwhomtheycommunicate. It istheir intentions which are attached to their utterances when they actaccording to their feelings and emotions, beliefs, attitudes, needs, andvaluesinspecificsituationalandsocialcontexts.

*

[philosophy&cognition]Wednesday,11:30-12:00,room101ZdzisławWąsik,zdzis.wasik[at]gmail.comPhilologicalSchoolofHigherEducationinWrocław,Poland

EpistemologyasasemioticcartographyofhumancognitionThis paper will depart from the famous dictum: “The map is not theterritory”expressedbyAlfredKorzybskiinScienceandSanity(1933))—onthebasisofErnstMach’sBeiträgezurAnalysederEmpfindungen(1886)andRichardAvenarius’Kritik der reinen Erfahrung (1888)— known thanks toGregory Bateson’s anthology Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972) andsubsequently his book Mind and Nature (1979) in a human-centeredepistemology as the science of the ways of acquiring knowledge aboutrealitybycognizingorganismsas(non)humanselves.Withreferencetothemodelling abilities of animals and humans in their extraorganismicperception and intraorganismic apprehension of reality, the author willponder theapproachesof Jakob vonUexküll,Umwelt und Innenwelt derTiere (1921/1909/),ErnstCassirer,AnEssayonMan (1944), Juri Lotman,“The place of art among other modelling systems”, ([2011[1967], and

168

Thomas A. Sebeok, “In what sense is language a ‘primary modellingsystem’?”(1988).ThepointofarrivalforthesakeofadetailedpresentationwillconstituteametascientificunderstandingofepistemologyspecifiedasasetofinvestigativeperspectivesbyZdzisławWąsikinhisEpistemologicalPerspectives on Linguistic Semiotics (2003) and Lectures on theEpistemologyofSemiotics(2014).Indetachinginvestigative“perspectives”of cognizing subjects from cognized “properties” of investigated objects,epistemologyisseenthereasabranchofthephilosophyofsciencestudyingthe nature of human knowledge principally accumulated in the body oftheoriesandpraxiswhichresultfromresearchactivitiesofscientistswhoaddress respective questions connected with the ontological andgnoseologicalstatusofscientificobjectsandthemethodologyofscientificfields in particular. The examination of the epistemological positions,representedbyagivendiscipline,isbasedontheconvictionthatthechoiceofagiveninvestigativeapproachstipulatesascientist’soutlookuponthenatureofhis/herinvestigatedobject.Inconsequence,thisoutlookusuallycoincideswiththechoiceofconceptualandoperationalinvestigativetoolsproviding thus a basis for the formulation of investigative postulates.Bearinginmindtheco-occurrenceofdifferentapproachestotheobjectofscientific study and to the investigative domain of a scientific field, andconcentrating on consequences resultant froma specific epistemologicalposition assumed by a subject of science in accordance with a choseninvestigativegoal,theaimofepistemologyisthereforeseeninansweringhow far the commitments of scientists to their attendant viewson theirobjectofstudycorrespondtoitsinvestigativeapproachability.

*

169

[Peircean]Monday,15:30-16:00,room201DonnaWest,westsimon[at]twcny.rr.comStateUniversityofNewYorkatCortland,USA

SeeingtheUnseeable:AbductionsasCreativeFirstnessesThis inquiry investigates the influence of hallucinations upon abductivereasoningandultimatelyupontruth-seeking(cf.Westinpress).Itexploresthe semiosisofunbiddenenvisionments -- guessing rightbyentertainingperceptualjudgmentsarisingfromuncontrolledhunchesinFirstness.Well-foundedguessesinFirstnesssurfacespontaneously,sometimesfromother,morefoundationalFirstnesses,andsometimesfrombruteforcereal-worldimpositions in Secondness. In either case, Peirce’s contention thatfoundational inferences (abductions) derive from “judicative perception”(5.186: 1903) validates the influence of idiosyncratic, created judgmentsuponhypothesis-making,andultimatelyupontheprocessoftruth-seeking.The pervasive hold of different kinds of Firstnesses (hallucinations,fantasies,anddreams)uponindividualemotiveprofilesandactionhabitswillbeshowcased.Accordingly,Peirce’sthreekindsofhallucination(EP2:1921903)will beoutlined (obsessional, social, creative); and themyriadwaysinwhichinferencesemergefromunforeseeninnersourcestoplayoutasactivestrategieswillbeaddressed. Infact,Peirce’spragmaticaccountemphasizing that signs are ultimately grounded in experience, howeverempirical,isobviouslynotinsulatedfromseedsgerminatedintheFirstnessof the guessing instinct. Peirce’s creative kind of hallucinations (notgrounded in delusion or fear) giving rise to novel action habits can defymereconvention,bygrowingupinepisodesofbodilymimesis.ThepromiseofPeirce’s thirdkindofhallucination (creative)willbedistinguishedasaforumforbirthingfictionalobjects/concepts(versusimaginaryones),ratherthanencroachmentoffaultyreasoning–acomparisonwhichGibson(1979:261)clearlyarticulates.ForGibson,“fiction”enhancesinformationpickup,and does not “automatically lead one astray,” akin to Peirce’s creativehallucination.

170

These created judicative perceptions give rise to perceptual judgmentswhich qualify as “extreme abductive inferences” (5.180-212: 1903) –illustrating that theplaying-field for theemergenceofgoodguessesmaybestbejustthiskindofhallucination,becauseitisbywayofspontaneousbutuncontrolledjudgmentsthatidiosyncraticfictionshavethebestchanceforimplementation.Peirceisadamantthatdreamsandimaginingsinhabitour very action habits: “Day dreams are often spoken of as mereidleness…butfortheremarkablefactthattheygotoformhabits…byvirtueofwhichwereallybehaveinthemannerwehaddreamedofdoing”(6.286:1893).Infact,itisinchildren’splaythatdreamsofteninscribethemselvesupon localized canvases of Secondness, when freedom to prescind (tonarrowly focus upon pregnant possibilities) can supersede mereconventionsinThirdness.ReferencesGibson,J.(1979).TheEcologicalApproachtoVisualPerception.Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates.Peirce,C.S.(i.1866–1913).TheCollectedPapersofCharlesSandersPeirce,Vols.I–VIeds.CharlesHartshorneandPaulWeiss(Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress1931–1935),Vols.VII–VIIIed.ArthurBurks(Samepublisher,1958).Peirce,C.S.(i.1866–1913).TheEssentialPeirce:SelectedPhilosophicalWritings.Vol.1,N.Houser&C.Kloesel(Eds.);Vol.2,PeirceEditionProject,(eds.).Bloomington:UniversityofIndianaPress,1992-1998.West,D.(Inpress).Towardthefinalinterpretantinchildren’spretensescenarios.InJ.Pelkey,Ed.Semotics2015.

*

171

[Peircean]Monday,16:00-16:30,room201JackJ.Wilson,mljjw[at]leeds.ac.ukTheUniversityofLeeds,UnitedKingdomHannahLittle,hannah[at]ai.vub.ac.beVrijeUniversiteitBrussel,Belgium

ANeo-PeirceanFrameworkforExperimentalSemioticsInexperimentalsemiotics,howsignsarecharacterisedisaprimaryconcern.Some new terminology is surfacing to deal with the nuanced nature oficonicity (e.g. absolute and relative iconicity, Monaghan et al., 2014).However, existing Peircean terminology that provides a more nuancedframeworkiscurrentlyunderrepresentedintheliterature.Muchoftheexperimentalsemioticsliterature(seeGalantucciandGarrod,2010, forareview) focussesontherelationshipbetweensignandobject(symbol,indexandicon),takingthefocusawayfromcommunication(Short,2007).WereintroducetwotypesofPeirceansign,sinsigns,(singleinstancesofasigntiedtoacontextofuse),andlegisigns(conventions)(Peirce,1955).Sinsignsmaybetiedtolegisignsasreplicas,orbeoneoffsigns.Thesetermscanfurtherbecombinedwiththenotionsofsymbol,indexandicon.Garrodetal.(2007)arguedthaticonsevolveintosymbolsviainteraction.Intheirpictionarytask,participantsstartedbyproducingiconicsinsigns,butin Peircean terms, signs retained iconicity after interaction but becamelegisigns.Theestablishmentoflegisignsmayinitiallyhavenoeffectontheproductionoficonicsinsigns.However,asalegisignbecomesincreasinglysignificant, a sinsignmight lose iconicity,without its iconicity necessarilydisappearingentirely.InLittleetal.(2016),participantsusedacontinuoussignallingspace(pitch)to describe a continuous meaning space (size). The paper argued thatmappings between continuous spaces were iconic strategies (e.g.participantsmakinghigh-pitchedsignals forsmall referents).However, inPeircean terms, size-pitchmappings could occur for different reasons. Itcouldbebecausesmallthingstypicallymakehighnoises(makingthesign

172

aniconicsinsign),oritcouldbeaniconiclegisign,establishedbyconventionviatheaforementionedrelationship,or itcouldbeansymbolic legisign ifthereisnoreasonforhighnoisestoberelatedtosmallreferents.In experimental semiotics, there is also a trend to measure iconicity bygetting naive participants to pair signs with their intended meanings(Garrodetal.,2007;Perlmanetal.,2015).However,methodssuchasthesecanonlyseparateiconicsinsignsfromothertypesofsign.With this contribution, we aim to argue that Peirce established anunderusednuancedframeworkthatwecanusetounderstandnewresultsinexperimentalsemiotics.Usinganeo-Peirceanframework,wewillreviewtheexamplesabove,aswellasothersfromthecurrentliterature.ReferencesGalantucci,B.,&Garrod,S.(2010).Experimentalsemiotics:anew

approachforstudyingtheemergenceandtheevolutionofhumancommunication.InteractionStudies:SocialBehaviourandCommunicationinBiologicalandArtificialSystems.

Garrod,S.,Fay,N.,Lee,J.,Oberlander,J.,andMacLeod,T.(2007).Foundationsofrepresentation:wheremightgraphicalsymbolsystemscomefrom?CognitiveScience31,961–987.

Little,H.,Eryilmaz,K.,&deBoer,B.(2015).LinguisticModalityAffectstheCreationofStructureandIconicityinSignals.InD.C.Noelle,R.Dale,A.S.Warlaumont,J.Yoshimi,T.Matlock,C.D.Jennings,&P.P.Maglio(Eds.),Proceedingsofthe37thAnnualConferenceoftheCognitiveScienceSociety(pp.1392-1398).Austin,TX:CognitiveScienceSociety.

Monaghan,P.,Shillcock,R.C.,Christiansen,M.H.,&Kirby,S.(2014).Howarbitraryislanguage?.PhilosophicalTransactionsoftheRoyalSocietyB:BiologicalSciences,369(1651)

Perlman,M.,Dale,R.,&Lupyan,G.(2015).Iconicitycangroundthecreationofvocalsymbols.RoyalSocietyOpenScience,2:150152.

Peirce,C.S.(1955).PhilosophicalWritingsofPeirce,JustusBuchler(ed.).NewYork:DoverPublications

173

Short,T.L.(2007).Peirce’sTheoryofSigns.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress

*[conceptualization]Tuesday,15:00-15:30,room101PaulWilson,p.wilson[at]psychology.bbk.ac.ukUniversityofLodz,PolandBarbaraLewandowska-Tomaszczyk,blt[at]uni.lodz.pl StateUniversityofAppliedSciencesinKonin,PolandCompassionandSympathyinBritishEnglishandPolish:ACultural

LinguisticPerspectiveThe focus of our cross-cultural investigation is to compareconceptualisationsofcompassionandsympathyemotionclustersinBritishEnglishandPolish.Meaningclustersinvolvesensesthatareusuallyonlypartiallyoverlapping.Someofourthinkingtendstobemoreeffable,i.e.,possibletoexpressinalanguage,whilealargepartofitremainsmorefeltthanexpressed,moreimaginedthanputinwords.Katz’sPrincipleofEffability(1978),proposingthat every thinkable thought in natural language can be encoded andexpressedbyasenseofsomesentenceinlanguage,doesnotstanduptocriticism pronounced by semioticians, philosophers and linguists. Thus,what iscommunicatedverbally isnot inone-to-onecorrespondencewithour thinking and feelings. (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2012). Ontologicalcategories expressed verbally in one language are left non-verbalized inanother.Thustheyareonlypartially,i.e.,approximately,alignedtosimilar,albeit not identical concepts in another language (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk2012)andthatiswhyusersrefertothemintermsofclustersofmeaningsratherthanbyasingleform.Threemethodologieswereemployed to comparepride inBritish Englishand Polish. The GRID instrument (e.g., Fontaine et al. 2013) employs asystemofdimensionsandcomponents,whichbringaboutinsightintothe

174

natureofemotionprototypicalstructures.Thecognitivecorpuslinguisticsapproachprovides informationon themetaphoricusesof the termsandfrequenciesanddistributionalpatternsofrelevantlinguisticpatterns.Intheonlinesortingmethodologygraphicalrepresentationsofemotionclusterswere created on the basis of the frequency of co-occurrence of eachemotionwiththeotheremotionsinthecategoriesthatwereformedbytheparticipants.TheresultsshowthatcompassionischaracterisedmorepositivelythanitsPolishcounterpart,współczucie,whichisconsistentwiththerelativelymoreindividualisticconceptualisationofcompassionthatismorelikelytohaveaself-focusonthehelpthatonemightofferasufferingindividualvis-à-vistherelativelymorecollectivisticconceptualisationofwspółczuciethatpossiblyhasamoreoutwardfocusonthesufferingofanindividualinneedofhelp.Other results showing the greater association betweenwspółczucie andwstyd(shame)suggeststhatcompassionandwspółczuciemightalsodifferconceptuallyintermsofcompassiontype,withtheformerpossiblybeingcharacterised by genuine compassion and the latter by submissivecompassion.Furtherresultsshowthatsympathyhasamorecentrallocationinitsclusterstructure than its Polish equivalent, sympatia. Additionally, itwas foundthatsympatia,polysemousinPolishbetweenthesensesofcompassionandfondness/liking,hasarelativelymorepositivevalencethansympathy.ReferencesFontaine JRJ, Scherer KR, Soriano C. (2013). Components of emotionalmeaning: a sourcebook. Oxford: OUP.Katz, J., (1978) Effability andTranslation. In: Meaning and Translation: Philosophical and LinguisticApproaches,ed.F.GuenthnerandM.Guenthner-Reutter.NewYork:NYUPress,191-234.Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk B. (2012). Approximative spaces and thetolerancethreshold incommunication. InternationalJournalofCognitiveLinguisticsvol.2,no2.NovaScience.

175

[embodiment&situatedness]Tuesday,14:00-14:30,AulaJordanZlatev,jordan.zlatev[at]semiotik.lu.seLundUniversity,Sweden

EmbodiedIntersubjectivityandCognitiveLinguisticsIs linguistic meaning grounded in bodily experiences or social-culturalpractices?Traditionally,therehasbeenatensionbetweenthosewhohavearguedfor(theprimacyof)oneortheother.Eveninattemptstoresolvethis tension “dialectically” (Zlatev, 1997), embodiment and situatednesswere opposed to one another. In cognitive linguistics, the emphasis hasusually beenon thebody, as a physical (biological, neural) phenomenon(Lakoff&Johnson,1999).Morerecently,therehasbeenagrowing“socialturn” inthefield(Verhagen,2005).However,thisgives littleattentiontothelivedandlivingbody.First, I argue that embodiment and intersubjectivity should not bejuxtaposed,especiallyiftheirunderstandingandinterrelationisinformedbyphenomenology(Zlatev,2010).Infact,Merleau-Ponty(1962)combinedthe twoconcepts ina singleexpression, coining the term intercorporéitétranslated as intercorporeality or embodied intersubjectivity. Thisemphasizes the central role of the sentient and active human body forrelatingtoothersandjointlyconstitutingasharedmeaningfulworld.Second,Ishowtherelevanceofbodilyintersubjectivityforcentralconceptsincognitivelinguisticssuchas(image)schemas(Zlatev,2007),(conceptual)metaphors (Zlatev, Blomberg, & Magnusson, 2012), and construal(Möttonen, 2016). At the same time, this casts new light on thesephenomena, and suggests rather different analyses from the traditionalonesintermsofcross-domainmappingsandmentalsimulation.ReferencesLakoff,G.,&Johnson,M.(1999).Philosophyintheflesh:Theembodied

mindanditschallengetowesternthought.NewYork:Basicbooks.

176

Möttonen,T.(2016).Construalinexpression:Intersubjectiveapproachtocognitivegrammar.Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki.

Verhagen,A.(2005).Constructionsofintersubjectivity:Discourse,syntax,andcognition.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress

Zlatev,J.(1997).Situatedembodiment:studiesintheemergenceofspatialmeaning:Stockholm:Gotab.

Zlatev,J.(2007).Intersubjectivity,mimeticschemasandtheemergenceoflanguage.Intellectica,46,123-152.

Zlatev,J.(2010).Phenomenologyandcognitivelinguistics.InS.Gallagher&D.Schmicking(Eds.),Handbookofphenomenologyandcognitivescience(pp.415-443):Springer.

Zlatev,J.,Blomberg,J.,&Magnusson,U.(2012).Metaphorsandsubjectiveexperience:motion-emotionmetaphorsinEnglish,Swedish,BulgarianandThai.MovingOurselves,MovingOthers:Motionandemotioninconsiousness,intersubjectivityandlanguage,423-450.

*[blending]Wednesday,12:00-12:30,room4KonradŻyśko,konradzysko[at]gmail.comMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversityinLublin,Poland

Canconceptualblendingreconciletwoopposingparties?AconstructionofsemioticexpressionsasblendsduringMarsz

WolnościiSolidarnościandprotestsofKomitetObronyDemokracjiinPoland.

TheaimofthispresentationisasemioticanalysisofcreativesignsusedbytheparticipantsofMarszWolności i Solidarności (theMarchofFreedomand Solidarity) and the supporters of Komitet Obrony Demokracji(Committee for the Defence of Democracy) during two publicdemonstrations in Poland, held on the 13th and 19th of December 2015,respectively. We assume the notion of creativity after Tokarski (2013),which should be understood as “an attemptmade at presenting a non-

177

standardworldviewand introducing alterations in theexisting systemofvalues”. We also claim that it is conceptual blending (Fauconnier andTurner,1996)thatiscapableofsynthesizingknownconceptswiththenewones, and consequently helping to account for meaning emergingdynamicallyfromsuchacreativeuseofsigns.Weargue,afterBrandtandBrandt (2002), that the constructionof semiotic expressions as blends isdependentoncommunicationcontextsand isdeterminedbythespecificcommunicativegoals.ReferencesTokarski, Ryszard. Światy za słowami: wykłady z semantyki leksykalnej.Lublin:WydawnictwoUMCS,2013.Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner. “Blending as a central process ofgrammar”.InConceptualStructure,DiscourseandLanguage,editedbyA.Goldberg. Stanford: Center for the study of Language and Information,1996.Brandt,L.,andBrandt,P.A.2002.MakingSenseofablend.Apparatur4:62-71.

*[langevo]Monday,15:00-15:30,AulaPrzemysławŻywiczyński,przemek[at]umk.plSławomirWacewicz,wacewicz[at]umk.plNicolausCopernicusUniversityinToruń,Poland

PantomimeinlanguageoriginsIn current language evolution research, the importance of pantomime isrevived in twohighly influentialaccountsof languageorigins:byMichaelArbib(2005,2012)andbyMichaelTomasello(2008).However,despitethepopularityoftheirproposals,theconceptofthepantomimicstageisoftenconsidered a weak point in their scenarios (e.g. Tallerman 2007). Arbibdescribes pantomime mostly in intuitive terms and mainly from a

178

neuroscience perspective, while Tomasello proposes pantomime andpointingtobethetwotypesofcommunicationbootstrappingtheemerginglanguagefacultybutfocusesonthelatter,anddoesnotgoontofleshoutthepantomimiccomponentofhisconceptionwithempiricalevidence. Theunderlyingproblemofthoseandsimilarpantomimicaccountsis that the notion of pantomime has not so far been analysed in muchtheoreticalandempiricaldetail.Acrossthelanguageevolutiondisciplines,researchintopantomimeremainsrelativelylimitedandfragmented,withdisparatefindingsnotintegratedintoamorecomprehensiveframework.Inthispaper,welayfoundationsforacoherentaccountofthistopic,workingfromabroadunderstandingofpantomime, informedbyMerlinDonald’s(1991, 2001) and Jordan Zlatev’s (2008) concept of bodily mimeticcommunication – volitional and holistic (but non-conventional)communication of complex messages, with or without nonlinguisticvocalisation. From this vantage point, we carry out further definitionalwork, consulting a wide spectrum of research positions, such as literarytheory(Broadbent1901,Callery2001,Lust2002)andnarratology(Labov&Waletzky1976,Genette1980,Herman2007),gesturestudies(Hewes1973,McNeill 1992, McNeill in press), sign linguistics (Emmorey 2002) orneurocognitiveandneurotherapeuticresearch(Fergusonetal.2012,Rose2003,Nispenetal.2012). Finally, we discuss the consequences of such a more refinedunderstandingofpantomimefortheevaluationofArbib’sandTomasello’sproposals.Atthis juncture,wealsoconsiderthequestionofwhetherthe“pantomimic”proposalsfitbettergesture-firstormultimodalhypotheses.ReferencesArbib, M. A., 2005. “From monkey-like action recognition to humanlanguage:anevolutionaryframeworkforneurolinguistics.”BehavioralandBrainSciences28:105–167.Arbib,M.A.,2012.Howthebraingotlanguage.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

179

BroadbentR.J.,1901.Ahistoryofpantomime.London:Simpkin,Marshall,Hamilton,Kent&co.CalleryD.,2001.Throughthebody.LondonandNewYork:NickHernBooks.Donald,M.,1991.Originsofthemodernmind:Threestagesintheevolutionofcultureandcognition.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.Donald,M.,2001.AMindSoRare.TheEvolutionofHumanConsciousness.NewYork:Norton.Emery,N.J.Emmorey,K.,2002.Language,cognition,andthebrain:Insightsfromsignlanguageresearch.PsychologyPress.Ferguson,N.F.,EvansK.,Raymer,A.M.,2012.“AComparisonofIntentionandPantomimeGestureTreatmentforNounRetrievalinPeopleWithAphasia.”41stClinicalAphasiologyConference.AmericanJournalofSpeech-LanguagePathology21.S126–S139.Genette,G.,1980.NarrativeDiscourse.AnEssayinMethod.NewYork:CornellUniversityPress.Herman,D.,2007."Introduction",in:DavidHerman(ed.)TheCambridgeCompaniontoNarrative,3-21.Hewes,G.W.,1973.“Primatecommunicationandthegesturaloriginoflangauge.”CurrentAnthropology14.1/2,5-24.Labov,W.,Waletzky,J.,1967.NarrativeAnalysis:OralVersionsofPersonalExperience,in:JuneHelm(ed.)EssaysontheVerbalandVisualArts.Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress.Lust,A.,2002.“FromtheGreekMimestoMarcelMarceauandBeyond:Mimes,Actors,Pierrots,andClowns:aChronicleoftheManyVisagesofMimeintheTheatre.”ScarecrowPress.McNeill,D.,1992.WhatGesturesRevealAboutThought.Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress.Nispen,K.van,Sandt-Koenderman,M.vande,Mol,L.,Krahmer,E.J.,2012.“Specificpantomimesforspecificobjects:Astudyonthedifferentmodesofrepresentationusedinpantomime.”in:Proceedingsofthe5thconferenceoftheInternationalSocietyforGestureStudiesThecommunicativeBodyinDevelopment,p.71-.

180

Rose,M.,Douglas,J.,2003.Limbapraxia,pantomine,andlexicalgestureinaphasicspeakers:Preliminaryfindings.Aphasiology,17(5):453-464.Tallerman,M.,2007.”Didourancestorsspeakaholisticprotolanguage?”Lingua117:579–604.Tomasello,M.,2008.OriginsofHumanCommunication.MITPress.Zlatev,J.,2008.“Theco-evolutionofintersubjectivityandbodilymimesis.”in:J.Zlatev,T.Racine,C.Sinha,E.Itkonen(red.)TheSharedMind:Perspectivesonintersubjectivity.Amsterdam:JohnBenjamins,pp.215-244.

181

[posters]

182

[poster]Monday,16:30-17:30,HallKatarzynaKarska,kakarska[at]gmail.comMedicalUniversityofLublin,PolandMagdalenaGoguł,magda.gogul[at]gmail.comMinistryofHomeAffairsHospital,Lublin,Poland

ConceptualmetaphorsinradiologyThe presence of constructional metaphor in all aspects of human life isunquestionable. Therefore a number of different metaphors such asmechanical, biomilitary, religious or artistic can be encountered also inmedicalcontext.Food,cookingandnutritioningeneral isasphereof lifethataccompanieseveryhumanbeingsincethedayofthebirth.Theaimofthepresentposteristoshowthevarietyoffoodmetaphorsemployedinthefieldofradiology.Metaphorsareparticularlyfrequentlyexploitedbyradiologistsindailypracticeofimageinterpreting.ReferencesBiss,E.2014.MedicineandItsMetaphors,lastaccessedonthe20thJanuary2016,availableathttps://www.guernicamag.com/features/medicine-and-its-metaphors/StephenR.Baker,Partyka,L.2012.RelativeImportanceofMetaphorinRadiologyversusOtherMedicalSpecialties.InRadioGraphics.Vol.32/1Tajer,C.,D.2012.Thinkingmedicinemetaphorically.InArgentineJournalofCardiology,Vol.80Nº6Masukume,G.andZumla,A.2012.Analogiesandmetaphorsinclinicalmedicine.London.Khullar,D.2014.TheTroubleWithMedicine'sMetaphors.TheAtlantic.Vol.8ThomasC.2013.She’sarealfighter!Andothermetaphorsinmedicine.Availableathttp://myheartsisters.org/2013/02/12/metaphors-in-medicine/

183

Lakoff,G.,Johnson,M.2003.Metaphorsweliveby.Chicago.Sontag,S.1988.Aidsanditsmetaphors.NewYork.[poster]Monday,16:30-17:30,HallLetíciaVitral,leticiaavitral[at]gmail.comJoãoQueiroz,queirozj[at]gmail.comFederalUniversityofJuizdeFora,Brazil

Theepistemicroleofintermedialvisualartworks

Inopposition to the trivialnotionof iconasasign thatstands for itsobject in a relation of similarity, we are going to describe and analyzeseveral examples of intermedial visual artworks as iconicmodels whosemain feature is the possibility of discovering new information about itsobject-thisspecificfeatureiscalledoperationalcriterionforiconicity.Wedescribehowtherelationsbetweensemioticresourcesperformaniconicepistemic role,dependenton the situatedmanipulationof theartwork’smaterialandstructuralconstraints.

184

185

[practicalinformation]

186

187

WelcometoLublin,the“Cityofthreecultures“

Lublin–thecapitaloftheLubelskieRegion–isthelargest(ca.350000inhabitants)andthefastestdevelopingcityontherightsideofthe Vistula River. It is also the largest academic centre in easternPolandandoneofthemostimportantculturalcentersinPoland.

Lublin is amulti-cultural melting pot, where western – Catholic,eastern–OrthodoxandJewishculturesco-existedanddefinedtheuniquevalueofthecity.Now,Lubliniscalled“thegatetotheEast”duetoitsrichcultural,politicalandinformalcontactswithUkraineandBelarus.Walkingaroundthecity:theOldCity,theJewishdistrict,thecastleand its vincinitiesyoucandiscover the tracksof theoldtimesandthethreecultures.Thereisalsoonemoreplace,atragicplaceinthecity,wherepeopleofthethreeculturesmetinthepast:the formerGerman concentration camp in Lublin, popularly calledMajdanek.

Lublin, sightseeing: Lublin is one of the oldest andmost beautifulcitiesalloverPoland:therearemanysights(manyofthemcamefromXIV and XV century), there is one of the most beautiful andpicturesqueOldTownsinPoland.BeingtiredofsightseeingyoucanrestinoneofLublin’sparks,inMCSUBotanicalGardensorinLublinVillageOpenAirMuseum.ItissaidthatLublinis–likeRome–locatedonsevenhills.Havingabird’s-eyeviewofLublin,youwouldnoticethatthesehillsareverygreen–Lublinisagreencity.

188

Lublin,thecityofinspiration:LublinwasoneofthefinalistsoftheEuropeanCityofCulture2016contest.AlthoughWrocławbecametheEuropeanCapitalofCulture,theprogramme“Lublin–EuropeanCapitalofCulture2016isrealizedunderthebanner“Lublin–cityindialogue2017.Theyear–2017–isimportantforLublin.700yearsearlier,onAugust15,1317,LublinreceivedacitychartergrantedbyKingWładysławItheElbow-high.

Lublin–anacademiccity: thereare fiveUniversities inLublin: thelargest–MariaCurie-SkłodowskaUniversity,theoldest–theCatholicUniversity of Lublin, the Medical University, the AgriculturalUniversityaswellastheTechnicalUniversity.Therearealsoseveralotherhighereducationcentres.TemporarilyinLublinliveca.100000students.

More information: the city of Lublin webpage:http://www.lublin.eu/en

189

ConferencevenueTheConferencewillbeheldatMariaCurie-SklodowskaUniversity,MariaCurie-SklodowskaSq4/4a20-031Lublin

intwobuildings:

FacultyofPhilosophyandSociology:registration,plenarylectures(Aula)parallelsessions(rooms:101,201,301),symposia(room4),coffee&tea(room3)&

FacultyofHumanities:lunches(restaurant“Bazylia”)

190

TransportationwithinLublin

Mostofthemainattractions(includingtheOldCity)andmostpopularhotelsarelocatedwithin30-minwalkingdistancefromtheUniversityandtheconferencevenue.

191

BUS

Youcangettotheuniversitybybussesno:

• 10,26,31(busstopUMCS01orUMCS02)• 3,7,12,18,20,30,57(busstopKUL03orKUL02)• 2,4,12,13,15,44,55,74(busstopKUL01)

details:http://mpk.lublin.pl/en/

Most popular tickets for busses and trolleybusses are valid for 30minutessincepunchingthemonboardandcost3,20PLN.Ticketsareavailablefromticketmachines(withZTMlogo)inkiosks.Youcanbuytickets in selectedbusesor trolleybuses fromticketmachines (justcoins)

TAXI

Thereareseveraltaxicompanies,e.g.:• AleTaxi,815111111• EchoTaxi,tel.815240000• RadioTaxiLublin,817441666• HaloTaxi,817433000• DamelTaxi(recommededbyAirport),815333333