t8 b2 faa ny center charles alfaro fdr- unclassified and classification mfrs and handwritten notes-...

8/14/2019 T8 B2 FAA NY Center Charles Alfaro Fdr- Unclassified and Classification MFRs and Handwritten Notes- ZBW Had No

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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMM ISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUMFOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal A viation Adm inistration (FAA)New York Air Route Center

Type of event: Interview with CharlesAlfaroDate: Tuesday, September30, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown and Miles Kara

Team Number: 8

Location: FAA New York Air Route Center,Rokonkomo, New York

Participants - Non-Commission: CharlesAlfaro and Alfred R. Johnson, Jr., FAA D eputy

Regional Counsel, Eastern Region

Participants - C omm ission: John Azzarello, M iles Kara,Geoffrey Brown

Background:

Alfaro started in January of 1977 as an Assistant Controller. He worked in thatposition until 1981 when he was dismissed for three years. At the end of that period hewas retrained on the sectors he had beenqualified for, and became an OperationalSupervisor for the area in October of 2000. He worked in Area C of ZNY for his entirecareer, until a year and a half ago when he switched to Area F, Oceanic. [Staff Note:Alfaro is one of only a few of the Controllers fired by President Reagan who was

reinstated and continued a career in theFAA.]His responsibilities as an Operations Supervisor are to run theshifts and manage

the area Air Traffic Controllers (A TC). He does not m an a radarscope, but is required tosit on e 8-hr shift at a scope per month to maintain currency. In a typical day his dutiesinclude oceanic planning, sector splits,shift start, and the monitoring of air spacerestriction enforcement in his area. He reports to the Operations Manager in Charge(OMIC).

Events of 9-11:

On the morning of September 11, 2001, Alfaro's shift started at 0630. TheOperations Supervisor in Charge(OSIC) position was initially assigned to Andy Epstein.

At roughly 0730 Epstein had paperwork to do, andAlfaro was assigned as OSIC. BruceBarrett was the OM IC on9-11.

A A 11 :

Around 0830 a call came infrom the Boston Center supervisor of Rockdale sectorthat passed inform ation on a primary target. The inform ationAlfaro was given for theprimary target Boston Center was tracking was a best kn own position of 20 milessouthwest of Albany, and a reported last altitude of Flight Level (FL) 290 with

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instructions toclimb to FL 350. ZNYwas told the aircraft was notcommunicating withthe controller. Alfaro notedto Commissionstaff that the first phone callfrom Boston wasnot recorded and he was notinformed of any "threatening" communications from thecockpit.

Alfaro informed Barrett, the OMIC, aboutthe call from Boston Centerand the

informationon theprimary target.He did notknow if Barrett had already been informedfrom anothersource. Alfaro commented that usuallyin a circumstance involvinganaircraft that is not comm unicating withthe controllersa call is made from the ATCCenter to Airlnc. Airlnc is a service provided tomajor airline carriers that has its owndedicated communications link withan aircraft, an d serves the primary purposeofprovidinga backup methodof communicating withan aircraft. After Alfaro informedtheOM IC, Tim Stephany, the Sector R34 controller, toldAlfaro of a deviation on theprimary target that ZBW had identified as AA11. Alfarocalled Boston Rockdale fromthe R49 radar desk, which is anadjacent position to R34.

Alfaro noted to Commissionstaff that the area was looking for AA 11 at altitudesbelow 29K feet. Sector42 controls aircraft at 24K ft. andabove, Sector35 controls thoseat 23K ft. andbelow. To compensatefor the uncertaintyof AA 11's altitude, thecontrollersfo r these areas were toldto keep all their air traffic five miles awayfrom theprimary targetidentified as AA 11. As long as a controller can see a primary target acontroller can"block" (protect airspace) from the ground up.Alfaro commented that thiswas a standard procedurein the case of primary onlyaircraft in question.

Alfaro related to Comm issionstaff that a second phone call from Boston Centerconfirmed that the primary target being trackedwas in fact AA 11, and told ZNY thatBoston Center was"treating him like a hijack". Alfaro then went to see Bruce Barrettfor the second time.He recalled it could have beenfive or so minutes betweenthe twophone calls. He told Barrett AA11 was headed southbound. Barrett said he was aware

and was already talkingto the Am erican Airlines dispatchoffice.Pre 9-11 concerning anomalies:

Alfaro explained to Commissionstaff that aircraft routinelyare NORDO (nocomm unications with controllers), and that there are various m ethods to get in touch withthe aircraft. Further,Alfaro explained thatit was notunusualfor an aircraft to be out ofcommunicationsfo r five or six minutesbefore a controller regainedcontact. However,controllers wouldinform supervisors imm ediately aboutthe situation. Alfaro's estimatesand comm ents were based on 23 years experience.

Alfaro commented that alost transponder incident averaged in frequency at aboutonce a mon th. He considered it routine to lose a transponder and noted that it was not

something to be alarmed about. The protocol was for a controller to ask the pilot torecycle the transponder. Accordingto Alfaro, when the pilot recycledthe transponder, inmost circumstance the transponder signal would be restored.

The combination of a NORDO condition and a lost transponder wasinfrequent;according toAlfaro this occurred more than oncea year but was still extremelyinfrequent. The combination of NO RDO , a lost transponder and a serious coursedeviation wasvery rare.

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Further on AA 11:

When Alfaro was told Boston Centerwas consideringAA 11 a hijackhe hadalready assumedAA 11 was anongoing hijackand told the OM IC rightaway.He stillbelieved it was a possibility that AA11 was experiencing a serious mechanicalmalfunction,and had still heard nothingof the threatening com munications heardfrom

the cockpit. If it was a co ckpit emergency his thought was the plane w ould head for eitherKennedy or Newark since both airports had extended runwa ys.

Accordingto Alfaro,the OMIC at ZNY did not give any direct orderto thecontrollersto treat AA 11 as a hijack.Tom Kelly from Sector 35 went back to Barrettfo rinformation.Barrettdid not inform Alfaroof thepossibilityof threateningcommunications. However,once Barrett didinform him Alfaro was sure of the gravityof the situation. He went back to the area and told Sector 35 that it was not an emergencylanding; that it was a hijack.

He does not know of anyefforts made in Area C to verify altitude since theydidno t need that informationto keep otheraircraft away. He assumed thatthe identification

of theprimarywas positive,and hisarea did notdoubt Boston.He watched AA 11 head towards Kennedy Airport untilit disappeared from the

scope. H e thought that it was m alfun ctioning radar when the target did not come back onscreen. There was no inform ation from any other source that AA11 struck the WTC, andAlfaro thoughtAA 11 might have landedat Kennedy.

Alfaro changed that opinion when ZN Y received a phone call asking if they hadlost anairplane. Carl Schmalz,a controllerwho was athome at the time, calledthe centerand informed themof the crash at the World Trade Center. Schmalz saidhe thought itwas a small aircraft.Alfaro was hoping thatit was not A A11 , but gradually changed thatposition to acknowledge it was probab ly AA 11.

Alfaro then wentto the TM Udesk and spoke with LeCates, ThumserandM cCormick. He referred to AA11 as probably hitting the WT C and was told "we alreadyknow". H e went back to his area thinking that AA1 1 had impa cted the W TC .

He was notinvolved withthe UAL 175 incident and noted to Commissionstaffthat he could only commenton AA 11. He saw thesecond impacton CNN andknew itwas a comm ercial a irplane when the impact was replayed, but did not know wha t planestruck thetower.

Training:

Alfaro commented that his hijack procedure priorto the events of 9/11 was toverify the hijack withthe pilot via thehijack code,"7500", and to notify his supervisorthat a hijack was in progress. The standard procedurewas not toma ke inquiries withthepilot in thecockpit to avoid escalating events.Any request fo r military assistance wou ldbe handled at the OMIC level.

The training he received w as com puter refresher training and dyna mic simulationexercises. Hedoes not recall any mu ltiple hijacking exercises. Further,Alfaro noted thatall his training dealt with single-eventscenarios.

Other Information:



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Alfaro recalled media reportsof an aircraft striking the WTC but did nothear an yreports that 1) it was A A 11; or 2) airtraffic controllers continuedto look for AA 11.Alfaro expressed his feeling regardingthe identity of the airplane involvedin the WT Ccrash did point tow ards A A1 1, but on 9/11 he was never sure.

The second timeAlfaro went to Sector 35 he advised the controller to call NY

Tracon.Alfaro noted to Commissionstaff that no controller indicated thatAA 11 wasslowing down or descending. T he controllers were on ly tracking a primary target andZNY could not tell the airspeed o f the plane.Alfaro comm ented that they assumed theairspeed was "fast".

Alfaro assumed thatany contact withthe ATCSCC at Herndon wou ld have beenby the OMIC, Bruce Barrett.Alfaro did not know w hat role the Washington O perationsCenter in the events of the day.



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[Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)New York Air Route Center

Type of event: InterviewDate: Tuesday, Septem ber , 2003

SpecialAccess Issues: None

Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown

Team N um ber: 8

Location:FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo,New York

Participants - Non-Com mission:Alfred , FAA G eneral Consul

Participants- Com mission: John A zzarello, Miles Kara,Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: U nless otherwise no ted,the following paraphrasesthe response an d opinionof

the interviewee. Pleaserefer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

CHARLES ALFARO

1440EDT

Operations supervisor

Started January of 1977 as assistant controller. Worked until1981. Dismissed for threeyears. Retrained on sectors prioryqualified for. Work ed in position as o perationalsupervisor October 2000.

Area c operational supervisor for about a year on9/11. All career in area c.

Jo b responsibilities:run shifts an d mange ATCs. Typicalday needs to do ocean planning,sector splits, start shifts.

Year and a half ag o transferredto area f oceanic.

Dom estic areas openstaff. Checkon eventsof midnightstaff. Make sureal l restrictionsin place are followed . Need to ma intain currency 8 hours a mon th at the actual radar.Reports to area managerwho m ay not beworkingshift, but always reportsto OMIC.

9/11: started shift at about 06300 , operational supervisorin charge, Alfaro assigned toAndy Epstein. Ho ur or so later Epstein had paperwork, andAlfaro became OSIC. BruceBarrett was OMIC reportedto on 9/11.


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AA11:Around 0830 call from Boston supervisor giving primary target best knownposition 20 southwestof Albany. Lastalt was 29ktold to climbto 35k. W as told planewas N ordo. Supervisor wasfrom Rockdale sector.

Chap4 8 min.

0830 - first phone callfrom Boston did not inform of . . . .

Went to OMIC an d informed of events. Usu ally with lost com c allAirlnc,etc. R34controllercalled him over to tell of a deviation on primary forAA11. Said r34 sector toldAlfaro about change in course on primary (Tim Stefani). First phone call on hard-linewas not recorded. At r49, adjacentto r34, Alfarocalled Boston Center to Rockdalesectoron hotline. That is a landline. That w as requested as a phone c all.No indicationfrom Bruce Barrettafter the first communication of events Barrett gave noindication that he had inform ation

Sector 42 owns 24 and above. Concern to tell 35 controller that he is headed southbound.Didn't know of altitudeso didn't know which altitudeto cover. Gave indicationto allsectors to stay a full five miles away.As long as you can seeprimary you canblock fromthe ground up. That wo uld be one of the standard things that can be done. M ore thanlikely other op supers would m ake the same choice.

Second phone call, whenconfirmedtarget, more than like ly a controller, told ZN Y"treatinghim like ahijack", then went to see Bruce Barrett for second time. Couldprobably be 5 or so minutes between the two phone calls. Tells Barrett headedsouthbound. Barrett saidhe was aware and wastalking to the dispatchalready.

Pre 9/11 Observations m ade:Nordo - routinely occurred, but has various methods to get in touch w ith a NO RDO.Norm was that withinfive or six minu tes could get in touch w ith theaircraft.But ATCswould inform supervisors immediately - based on 23 years experience.Lost transponder- could happen oncea month. Considered routineto loose atransponder.Wasn't something to be alarmed about. Protocol wouldbe for controller toask pilot to recycle transponder. U sually would w ork.Nordo and lost transponder -infrequent.More than once a year but extremely infrequent.Nordo, lost transponder and serious dev iation - very rare.

When heard word hijackfrom Boston, had already assum edAA11 was ahijack ongoing.

Told OM IC right away. Scenario was considered that there might have been somethingextremely serious wrong withaircraft. Not ruling out gross mechanical error. Heardnothing of threatening comm unications. K ennedy runway has longer than normal landingpad.

Was ZNY treatingAA 11 as ahijack after report from ZBW that the ATC on thephonewas? No. O MIC gave no directions. ZBW had not requested militaryassistance.As area


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supervisor duty would be to let the OM IC know .

After second call stoppedin area b. if he wasabove fl 240 would be in area b airspace.

Sometime between 8/30 and 8/40 spoke to Rockdale for secondtime.

Did not listen to tape priorto meeting. Certain documents were "notavailable".Sectors34 and 35 were not available. Went to OMIC and sat behindsector 35. Everyone sat andwatched primary target. Tom Kelly (35 on theh), went back to B arrett to try and getscenario.Barrettdid not tell Alfaro informationon the voices.

Once Bruce said voices in the cockpit knew it was a hijacking.

Went back to 35 that it was not an em ergen cy landing, the it was a hijack .

Don't know ofefforts made in area c toverify altitude sincedidn't need that informationto keep tracking away. Tracking as primary, assume/positive id on primary - undoubtedby Boston.

Watched A A 11head towards Kennedy but then it disappearedform the scope. Thought iswas a bad radar issue. Did not come back on screen. No informationfrom another source.Thought might have landed at Kennedy.

Change of opinion when phone call cane on line and asked if they had lost an airplane.Carl show calledfrom being off andinformedof crash. Carl said he though t it was asmall aircraft.Thing and hoping htat itwasn't AA11. Open gradually changed toacknowledge it was probably AA11-don' t recall.

Went up to LeCates, Thumser and McCorm ack andreferred to A A 11probably hittingW TC and he said "w e alreadyknow",did not talk to Paul that day talked with T humser.Thought about it that day and decided it was probably it. Had no more conversation thatwould indicate thatUA L 175 hitWTC.

Gained no situation awarenessafter the effect of problem s withU A L175. Only knowsabout AA11 . Don't know if called o rA ndy cameback to area.

A ll aircraft that were close by still in Boston Center airspace. The boundary of New YorkCity airspacedid nothave any of those crafts coming from 16k above from Boston.

Didn 't know what it was that hit WTCfrom CNN.

Hijack training:verify hijack with code 7500,notify QIC that hijackin progress.

Military assistance -from OMIC.

Computerrefresher training for hijacking,and dynamic simulation exercises.Can' t recall


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any multiplehijackingexercises. Trainedto verify hijackin progress before declaringone? Y es, wouldverify with pilot then report. If pilotwasn' t7500 code , stillhijackscenario? Yes, but not recalled.

M edia reportsof aircraft striking WT C.any point after Cha rles smalls called reportingAA11 ,did not hear any reports that said 1) it wasAA11;or that 2) people kept lookingfor AA11 .Feeling regarding identityof WTCcrash did point towards AA11,but wasn'tsure.

Second time wen tto 35 advised c ontrollerto call Tracon.No controller indicated slowdown onAA11 .Only tracking in primary. C ouldn't tell speed but assumed it wasfast.

Aw are of ground stop, ZNY - when came back to area, ZNY w as directed it wasreceiving moretraffic. Then decidedto close airspacein total.Direction to Boston andClevelandfor all traffic to avoidNew York airspaceand travel directlyfrom ZBW toCleveland.At time of national ground stop ZNY w as already sterilized.

Herndo n air center role in hijack - would assume they w ould be in charge.

WOC - didn't know if they had any role.

Extended runway (Kennedy, Newa rk)- was that concept learnedor shared with Boston.Commonknowledge.For Alfaro,based on personal experience.A plane, just like AA 11on that day,don' t kno w that Boston was aw are that that was a comm on thought process.

SCETANA - aware if any of ZNY airspace turned over to military? No.

No understanding of the regional operation center.

Recommendations:

TO BE GIVEN.Please note that there may be adifference in terminolog y over the use of ROC foroperational cen ter betweenNew Hampshireand NewYork.Please note interviewee asked for tape of telephone call between sector49 and Ro ckdalesector Boston.

[Classification]

M E M O R A N D U M F O R T H E R E C O R D


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t8 b2 faa ny center charles alfaro fdr- unclassified and classification mfrs and handwritten notes-...

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