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    U.S. Department of Justice

    F ed e ra l Bureau o f Invest igat ion

    W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . 20535-0001

    November 18, 2003Daniel Marcus, General CounselNational C omm ission on Terrorist Attacks U pon th e United StatesSuite 3002 1 0 0 K S t r e e t, N . W .W ashington, D .C. 20036RE: Commission's Request fo r DocumentsDear M r. Marcus:

    In response to the Commissions Request fo r Documents, please find th efollowing:Documents responsive to Document Request 3-If ;D ocuments responsive to Do cument Request 3 Supplemental #3-e -4 Packets;Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #3-h -2 Packets; Do cuments responsive to Document Request 13-11.This is part of the FBI's rolling production and thus may be supplemented in Thefuture. Should yo u have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact m e at 202-324-9613.

    Sincerely,

    ?ert S. Sinlassistant General Counsel

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    SECURITY DIRECTIVE LISTDOCUM ENTS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE

    ORIGIN , MISSION AND RESULTS OF THESECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST CREATED AND

    DISSEMINATED BY THE FBI IN TH E IMM EDIATEAFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

    RESPONSIVEtoREQUEST #13-11

    (PACKET #2)

    COMMISSION COPY

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    9/11 COMMISSION TASK-FORO,DOCUMENT DELETION CODES[A s of August 11 , 2003]

    "A" - SOURCE/INFORMANT INFORMATION - Information, the disclosure of whichwould tend to reveal the identity of an informant or source where confidentiality isexpressed or implied.

    "B" - FBI TECHNIQUES AND/OR METHODS - Information on sensitive FBItechniques and/or methods which would impede or impair the effectiveness of thattechnique and/or method.

    "C" - NON-RELEVANT FBI CASE INFORMATION - Information neither relevant norresponsive to the Commission's requests.

    "D" - FBI PENDING CASE INFORMATION - Information which would impede orjeopardize a pending investigation of the FBI."E" - STATUTORY - Information legally prohibited from release by statute."F" - PRIVACY/SECURITY - Information, the disclosure of which would be an

    unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy or jeopardize the safety of lawenforcement personnel and/o r -tiicir iaiis% :iiejnhersMaterial redacted under this code includes (1 ) social security nuniFerS;(2 ) date and place of birth; (3 ) home address and telephonenumbers;(4) personnel cell phone and pager numbers"G" - FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION - The identity of a foreign

    government and/or foreign service to include th e names of foreign law enforcementemployees/officials.

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    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELANDSECURITY -',','

    TRANSPORTATION SECURITYADMINISTRATION

    Aviation Security Directive

    Subject: Threat to U.S.Airports - No Fly andSelectee ListsNumber: SD 1542-01-1 OB Date: April 22, 2003EXPIRATION: IndefiniteThis Security Directive (SD) supercedesand ca nce ls SD 1542-01-10A a nd must beimplemented not later than April 29,2003. Revised proceduresare indicated by boldtext.INFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has receivedinformation indicating that the individuals on the No Fly and SelecteeLists associatedwith this SD could pose a threat to civil aviation and national security.This SD provides procedures that airport operatorsare to follow to compare individualswhose names appear on the No Fly and Selectee Lists with direct employees and thoseemployees to which the airport has issued Security Identification Display Area (SIDA)identification media, or is O O H Jdering issuing SIDA identification media.

    REVISION SUMMARY: Revises procedures for comparing names of direct employeesandthose employeesto which the airport has issued SIDA identification media or is considering issuingSIDA identification media against the No Fly and Selectee Lists Provides guidanceand direction to restrict or p> ;h:hit access to the SIDA and othersterile areas of the airportACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRPORT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER 49 CFR 1542:The requirements of this SD are applicable to CategoryX through IV airports that arerequired to maintain SIDAs and sterile areas.

    I. TSAwill provide No Fly and Selectee Lists to the security coordinator of each airportto which this SD applies. The No Fly andSelectee Lists will be provided viapassword protected email or may be obtained from TSA's secure webpage. All futureSENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

    DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW. AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSIONOF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WAPIiiNRTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE VAY

    RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR I i? ''-' ""NMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

    REQ 13-11 000000004

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    '" " " " " " " ' " - " " ---= | r SECUR|TY DIRECTIVE 1542-01-10B . - - 'r Page 2 of 3 .- j

    updates (removal or ?vU!ition of names) to thp N > - iy 3 , 1 iSelectee Lists will beprovided in the S3 r KI^^T, Air ^J i> . * v > : ^ s niuat conduct a comparisonbetween the names on the most recently issued No Fly and Selectee Lists andits direct employees and any other individual to whomthe airport has issued,or is processinganapplication for SIDA, sterile area, or other identificationmedia that is evidence of em ploym ent at the airport.

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THETRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAYRESULT IN CIViL PPM.1*!,!"' OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITYTO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C.552.

    REQ 13-11 000000005

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    '. --< SECURITY DIRECTIVE 1542-01-1089/11 Closed b y Statute ' ~ ] P a g e 3 o f 2 '. I

    n.Many nunW-. ^n .-.-^-.\\r-jk do'not follow strict patterns in name order. The namesthat;appear on the No Fly and SelecteeLists may be in varying order and spelling. Data

    such ad /issue, will be provided by TSA when available. This data must be used when makinga comparison between names on the No Fly and Selectee Lists and those individualsto whom the airport has issued, or is processing an application for, SIDA, sterilearea, or other identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport.

    HI. NO FLY LIST ACTIONSA. If during the course of the name comparison, the airport operator determines it

    has issued, or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or otheridentification media that is evidence of employment at the airport, to an individualnamed on the No Fly List, the airport operator must immediately contact:1, Thenearest FBI Office. _2. TheTransportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch ad ~

    B. If processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification mediathat is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport operator must not issuethe media. For those individuals already issued SIDA, sterile area, or otheridentification media that is evidence of employment at the airport, the airportoperator must suspend the media and prohibit the individual's access, whetherescorted or unescorted, to the SIDA and sterile areas until the status of theindividual is determined by the FBI.IV. SELECTEELIST AA. If during the course of UIH nam.; comparison, the airport operator determines it

    has issued, or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or otheridentification media that is evidenceof employment at the airport to a directemployee and that employee s named on the Selectee List, the airport operatormust immediately contact:1. The nearest FBIOffice.2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch at| |

    B. lu relation to identification media:1. If the employee has applied for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification mediathat is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport operator must notissue the media unil the FBIclears the employee. An airport operatormayissue other than SIDA identification media if that employee will besubject to

    screening in accordance with the SD1542-02-03 series prior to entrance intoany sterile area of the airport.

    2. Do not permit the employee access to the SIDA if the employee hasalreadybeen issued a SIDA identification media unless that employee is accompaniedSENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

    WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY NFORMATION THATISCONTROLLED UNDER 49CFR PART1520. NO PART OFTHISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEEO TO KNOW,AS DEFINED IN 4 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON,DC 20SSO. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAYRESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US.GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETF.RMINm ;,nER 5 U.S.C. ?52.

    REQ 13-11 000000006

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    \*SECURITY DIRECTIVE 1542-01-10B ,.,--'/~% Page 4 of 3* ~ t

    scc 1 fh o has been issued a SIDA media, or the employee is cleared by

    AIRPORT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The Airport Operator must immediately providewritten confirmation to the Federal Security Director (FSD) indicating receipt of this SD.

    AIRPORT dissemination: The FSD will disseminate this SD to the Airport SecurityCoordinator (ASC) and any law enforcement element having 49 CFR 1542responsibilities at that airport. No other disseminationmay be made without priorapproval of the FSD.Airport Law Enforcement Agency Network (ALEAN) affected members who currently have amemorandum of agreement with the TSA will also receive this SD from the TSA. No otherdissemination may be made without prior approvalof the Administrator. Unauthorizeddissemination of this document or information contained herein is prohibited by 49 CFR 1520.APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, anairport operator may submit in writing to the FSD, proposed alternative measures and thebasis for submitting the alternative measures, for approvalby the Assistant Administratorfor Aviation Operations.FOR THA ACTION ONI Y: The TSA shall issue this 80 immediately to 49 CFR 1542 airportsCategc: y X thrcuah IV and to the corporate security element of all affected U.S. aircraftoperators.

    /s /J. M. Loy, ADMAdministrator

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

    DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSIONOF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY

    RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

    R E Q 13-11 000000007

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    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELANDSECURITY

    TRANSPORTATION SECURITYADMINISTRATION

    Aviation Security DirectiveSubject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators - Selectee ListNumber: SD 1544-01-21C Date: April 22, 2003EXPIRATION: IndefiniteThis Security Directive (SD)supercedes and cancelsSD 1544-01-21B and must beimplemented not later than April 29,2003. Revisedprocedures are indicated by boldtext.INFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) hasreceivedinformation indicating that individuals on the Selectee List associated with this SD maywarrant additional scrutiny prior to boarding to ensure they do not pose a threat to civilaviation and national security.This SDprovides procedures that aircraft operators are to follow to verity the identity ofindividuals who.=e names appear on the Selectee List. The procedures outlined hereinappiy to passengers carried by the aircraft operator and the frircnft op^ntoc'.*? diiietemployees.REVISION SUMMA RY: Revises procedures for verifyingthe identity of individuals whose namesappear onthe SelecteeList Revises procedures to restrict or prohibit access to restricted areas of an airport byaircraft operator employeeswhose names appear on the Selectee ListACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRCRAFT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODEOF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR). PART 1544: If you are an aircraft operator coveredby49 CFR1544, you must implement all the measures set forth in this SD.

    I. TSAwill provide a Selectee List to the security director or designee of eachaircraft operator required to implement this SD. TheSelecteeList will beprovided via password protected email or may beobtained from TSA's securewebpage. All future updates (removal or addition of names) to the SelecteeListwill be provided in the same manner. Aircraft operators must conduct acomparison betweenthe names on the most recently issued SelecteeList and

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

    DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TOKNOW, ASDEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSIONOF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC2Q590, UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL

    PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.>

    REQ 13-11 000000008

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    I i_ L .|_. . P Security Directive 1544-01 -21C

    9/11 Closed by Statute :) P a g e 2 o f 4those passengerschecking in for flights. ArtditiuiuiJiv. j

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    Security Directive 1544-01-21CPage 3 of 4 '. }

    ne'r * - j;verification check o f the information. j : . . , . ; ; < ; . - ; - J o ^ aiu oei^ctee List. A record must be maintained at each stationof all flights operated with passengers who are designated as selectees inaccordance with this SD , listing the name o f each passenger and thenames of the two aircraft operator representatives who completed theverification. These records must be maintained at the station for aminimum o f seven (7) days if in the United States or 180 days if outside theUnited States.

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING; THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT ISCONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NOPART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TOKNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOROF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITYADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON,DC20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAYRESULT INCIVILPENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER $ U-S.C. SS2.

    REQ 13-11 000000010

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    l/OCUOl-IUT-r-yI~t. I w /Q.\" "-Jiv-Wi /u*.v-\ Security Directive 1S44-01-21C9/11 Closed by Statute ^ ) P a g e 4 o f 4

    D. The procedures in Section Ill.C. do not apply to a passenger designated as aselectee based on the application of the Computer-Assisted PassengerPrescreening System (CAPPS) or manual prescreening criteria.

    IV. AIRCRAFT OPERATOR EMPLOYEESA. Aircraft operators must conduct a comparison against the most currentSelectee List for ail direct aircraft operator employees. If during the courseof the name comparison the aircraft operator determines that an employee

    has been issued, or is processing an application for a SIDA, sterile area, orother identification media that is evidence of employment with the aircraftoperator, and that employee s named on the Selectee List, the aircraftoperator must immediately contact:1. The nearest FBI Field Office if within the United States, or the United

    States legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, ifoutside the United States:2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch at|3. The appropriate lawenforcement officials at the airport, advising themof the situation.

    B. Upon completion of the steps inIV.A., aircraft operators must take thefollowing action in relation to ID media;'.. If lhemployeehasapplied to the local airport operator for SIDAidentification media, theaircraft operator must advise the airportoperator not to issue the media until the FBI clears the employee. Anaircraft operator may issue sterile area or other identification media

    that Is evidence of employmentwith the aircraft operator if thatemployeewill besubject to screening in accordance with the SD1544-01-10 series prior to entrance into any sterile area of the airport andequivalent restricted areas at airports outside of the United States, or .. _2. If the employee has already been issued a SIDA identification media,the aircraft operator must not permit the employee access to the SIDA

    or other airport sterile areas unless that employee is accompanied byan escort who has been issued and is displaying a valid S^OA media oris cleared by the FBI.

    AIRCRAFT O P E R A TO R ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The aircraft operator shall provideimmediate written confirmation to its assignedPSI indicating that it has received this SD.AIRCRAFT OPERATORdissemination required: The aircraft operator shall immediatelypassthe information and directives se t forth in this SD to all stations affected, and provide writtenconfirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 4 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WTHOUTA NEED TO KNOW AS DEFINED IN 4 CFR 1S20, EXCEPT WTH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OFTHE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT INCIVILPENALTY OR OTHER ACTION, FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE PETERMINEO UNDER 5 U.S.C. SSZ

    REQ 13-11 000000011

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    Security Directive 1544-01-21CPage 5 of 4

    eipt of the information and directives set forth in this SD.

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1S20. NO PART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVILPENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVFPNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

    REQ 13-11 000000012

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    ,, v Page 6' "' " ' ' ' ' '" ' "" " """ ' " " " " " '" '"" ""Security Directive 1544-01-21CPage 6 of 4The aircraft operator shall disseminate uJ -(. io, ;nation to senior management personnel,GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at locations within the United States and itsterritories. Aircraft operator security personnel at each location should coordinate thedistribution of information in this SDwith local airport management and law enforcementpersonnel on a strict need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within theirrespective organizations to personnel with an operational need-to-know. All aircraft operatorpersonnel implementing this SD must be briefed by the aircraft operator on its content and therestrictions governing dissemination.APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions o f this SD, theaircraft operator may submit in writing to its Principal Security Inspector (PSI) proposedalternative measures and the basis for submitting the alternative measures, for approval bythe Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations. The aircraft operator shallimmediately notify its PSI whenever any procedure in this SD cannot be carried out by theaircraft operator or its agents, or is not being carried out by a government authority chargedwith performing security procedures.FOR TSA ACTION ONLY: The TSA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate

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    %20SD-l544-01-20B%2&'2ted%204-22-03n].doc * . V Page 1

    U.S. DEPARTMENT Or HOMCUVK)SECURITY

    TRANSPORTATION SECURITYADMINISTRATION

    Aviation Security DirectiveSubject: Threat to U.S.Aircraft Operators - No Fly ListNumber: SD 1544-01-20B Date: April 22, 2003EXPIRATION: IndefiniteThis Security Directive (SD) supercedes and cancels SD 1544-01-20A and must beimplemented not later than April 29, 2003. Revised proceduresare indicated by boldtextINFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration(TSA) has receivedinformation indicating that individuals on the No Fly List associated with this SDcouldpose a threat to civil aviation and national security.There have been many instances where he name of a passenger s identical or similar toan individual on the No Fly List. This SD provides revised guidance and directionconcerning use of the No Fly List and procedures aircraft operatorsare to follow toresolve name conflicts. Affirming the incorrect derrtity of the Individual cancauseunnecessary embarrassment and inability to board a flight Additionally, this SDrevisesprocedures currently in piaec which prohibit aircraft operator employees whose namesappear on the No F ly List, accost to restricted areas o f airports.

    REVISION SUMMAR Y: Revises procedures for verifying the identity of individuals whosenames appear onor are similar to names on the No Fly List Provides guidanceand direction for the use of the No Fly List and procedures aircraftoperators are to follow to quickly resolve conflicts Revises procedures to restrict or prohibit access to restricted areas of an airport byaircraft operator employees whose names appear on the No Fly List

    ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRCRAFT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODEOF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR). PART 1544: If you are an aircraft operator coveredby49 CFR 1544, you must implement all the measuresset forth in thisSD.I. TSAwill providea No Fly List to the security director or designeeof each aircraftoperator required to implement this SD. The No Fly List will beprovided viapassword protected email or may beobtained rom TSA's secure webp age. All

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT ISCONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OFTHISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC20590. UNAUTHORIZED RFLEAS* MAY RESULT IN CIVILPENALTY OROTHER ACTION. FORU.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BEDETERMINED UNI.,.;:ju.J.C. 552.

    REQ 13-11 000000014

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    544-01 -Security Directive1544-01 -208

    Page 2 of 1

    nb_ r ? o j updates ^removal or addition of names) to the No Fly List will be provided inthe same manner. Aircraft operators must conduct a comparison between the

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NOPART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHING.\C2059^ UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAYRESULT IN CIVILPENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBUti AVV.,1ABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

    REQ 13-11 000000015

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    Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01-20S%2g-J?rted%204-22-03[1].doc' f " ~ N S e c u r i t y Directive 1544-01-208

    9/11 Closed b y Statute : ] Page3f1names on the most recently issued No Hy Lisi and tlioue passengers checking infor flights. Additionally, aircraft operators must also conduct a comparisonbetween names on each updated No Fly List and all direct aircraft operatoremployees and those individuals to which the aircraft operator has issued SIDAidentification media, or is processing an application for SIDA identification media.

    II. Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name order. The namesthat appear on the No Fly List may be in varying order and spelling. Data such as/ Iwill be provided by TSA when available. This data must be used during the flightcheck-in process to assist in the determination of an individual's status asoutlined in Section III of thisSD.

    III. PASSENGERSA. Check Prior to Arrival: When passenger reservation data is available inadvance of the arrival of a passenger for check-in, the aircraft operator mustconduct a comparisonof its flight reservation system to the most currentNoFly List. During this process, f an aircraft operator matches a name and atleast oneadditional piece of identifying data on its flight reservation systemwith the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying data that appears in theRemarks Section of the No Fly List, the aircraft operator must immediately

    contact the following:1. The nearest FBI Field Office, if the departing flight is within the

    'hji'-r-j States, or the United States legal attache at the nearest U.S.Embassy or Consulate, if the departing flight is outside the United States,2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) W atch at/ ~\3. The local Federal Security Director, if the departing flight is within the

    United States,who will alert other aircraft operators at that airport of thesituation.

    B. Clearance at Check-In (Within the United States); Upon arrival of apassenger for check-in at an airport in the United States, the aircraftoperator must conduct a comparison botv/een the names on the mostrecently issued No Fly List and their flight reserva tion -system. During thisprocess, if an aircraft operator matches a name and, if provided, at least oneadditional piece of identifying data on its flight reservation system with aname on the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying data thatappearsin the Remarks Section (if the passenger matches data in the RemarksSection, see HI. B. 4.), the aircraft operator must deny transportation to thatindividual, their accessible property, checked baggage, and any otherindividual(s) accompanying the passenger and their baggage unless clearedby the following process:1. Contact the appropriate local law enforcement officials and ensure theresponding La w Enforcement Officer (LEO) compares all available data

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1620. NOPART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON, DC2050. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVILPENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR 11/3. UVfctlNME.NT,AGENCIES, PUBUC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER * UAC. SSZ.

    REQ 13-11 000000016

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    Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01 -20B%25Mated%204-22-03[1j.dbcSecurity Directive 1544-01-20BPage 4 of 1

    Page 4 ;

    to determine if the individual is a match.

    9/11 Closed by Statute

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVESECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, ASDEFINED IN 49 CFR 1S20, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.WASHINGTON. DC 20S90. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASEMAY RESULT INCIVILP6NL

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    i Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01 -20B%2Qr...*.. . . - : f'""T Security Directive 1544-01-20B

    9/11 Closed by Statute

    2. If the LEO determines there is no matching data from the No Fly Listother than the individual's name, the aircraft operator may accept theindividual as a passengerfor transport.3. If the LEO determines that an individual matches the name and at least

    one additional piece of identifying data (requirement to match additionaldata does not apply where only aname is listed) from the No Fly List, theaircraft operator must immediately contact the following:a. The nearest FBI Field Office.b. The Transportation Security Intelligence Watch at| Ic. The local Federal Security Director who will alert other aircraftoperators at that airport of the situation.

    4 ^ Match of identifying data that appears in the Remarks Section of the NoFly List. TSA mayprovide identifying data in the Remarks Section of theNo Fly List for an individual who bears a name that is the same as, orsimilar to, a nameon the No FlyList, but who is permitted to fly. Thisidentifying data will be used to confirm that the individual is not theperson identified as a threat on the No Fly List.

    a. TSAwill accept, from individuals only, written requests for relief from the No FlyList clearance procedures of III. B. 1., 2., and 3.b. If TSA establishes that anindividual requesting relief is not on theNo Fly List, TSA will include in tho R?mar!-;r- Sectioo of the No FlyList the identifying data tSuiu distinguishes the cicii.od passengerfrom the individualwho \* prohibited from flying.c. An aircraft operator must implement a system approved by itsPrincipal Security Inspector (P3I) that:

    (1) Utilizes the data provided in the Remarks Section of the NoFly List to clear an individual for flights at check-in withoutthe procedures, listed in 1 1 1 . B. 1., 2., and 3.(2) Provides a procedure to verify that an authorized aircraftoperator representative responsible for verification of the NoFly List applies these clearance procedures.(3) Maintains at each station a record of every flight thatoperatedwith anindividual who was cleared to fly with these clearanceprocedures, including listing the name of each individual andthe names of two representatives of the aircraft operator who

    com pleted the verification. These records must be maintainedat the station for a minimum of seven (7) days.C. Clearance at Check-In (Outside of the United States); Upon arrival of apassenger for check-in at anairport outside of the United States, the aircraftoperator must conduct a comparison between the names on the mostrecently issued No Fly List and their flight reservation system. Whenan

    SENSITIVESECURfTY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 48 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN CFR 1S20, EXCEPTWITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON, OC 20SSO. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVILPENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BEDETERMWF_L> UNO K "iI.S.C.552.

    REQ 13-11 000000018

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    -> Security Directive 1544-01-20B - *^ \e6 of 1 - jClosed by Statute ' ' '

    individual rrmtcirjs information on the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifyingdata that appears in the Remarks Section (if the passenger mat

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    I * Security Directive 1544-01-20B >...*r~ Page 7 of1 - \. Aircraft operators must,condnct a comparison b

    updated No FlyList and its direci airci-nIr;i vor s^ipioyees and thoseindividuals to which the aircraft operator has issued, or is processing anapplication for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media that isevidence of employment with the aircraft operator.

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BERELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TOKNOW, ASDEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVILPENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

    REQ 13-11 000000020

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    Security DlrecUve 1544-01-20BPage 8 of 1

    9/11 Closed by Statute

    B. |f during the course of the name comparison an aircraft operatordetermines it has issued,or is processing an application for a SIDA, sterilearea, or other identification media that is evidence of employment with theaircraft operator, fp r an individual named on the No Fly List, the aircraftoperator must immediately contact the following:1. The nearest FBI Field Office, if within the United States, or the UnitedStates legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, if outside

    the United States.2. The Transportation Security Intelligence Watch aq I3. The local Federal Security Director who will alert other aircraft operators

    at that airport of the situation.

    C. If processingan application for a SIOA, sterile area, or other ID media that isevidence of employment with the aircraft operator, the aircraft operator mustnot issue the media. For those individuals already issued SIDA. sterile area,or other identification media that is evidence of employment with the aircraftoperator, the aircraft operator must suspend the media and prohibit theindividual's access, whether escorted or unescorted, to the SIDA and sterileareas until the status of the individual is determined by the FBI.

    AIRCRAFT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Upon receipt of this SD, the aircraft operator.;i! )il iKovido immediate written confirmation to its assigned PS!, indicating that they iwrareceived this SD.AIRCRAFT OPERATOR dissemination required: The aircraft operator shall immediately passthe information and directives set forth in this SD to all stations affected, and provide writtenconfirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledgedreceipt of the information and directives set forth in this SD.The aircraft operators shall disseminate this information to senior management personnel,GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at locations within the United States and itsterritories. Aircraft operator security personnel at each location should coordinate theinformation in this SD with local a * i port management and law enforcement personnel on a strictneed-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizationsto personnel with an operational need-to-know. All aircraft operator personnel implementingthis SD must be briefed by the aircraft operator on its content and the restrictions governingdissemination.APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, asstated in 49 CFR 1544, aircraft operators may submit in writing to their PSI, proposedalternative measures and the basis for submitting the requests, for approval by the AssistantAdministrator for Aviation Operations. The aircraft operator shall immediately notify its PSIwhenever the aircraft operator or its agents cannot carry out any procedure in this SD, or isnot being carried out by a government authority charged with performing security procedures.

    SENSmVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING:THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 41CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT ANEED TO KNOW. AS DEFINED IN 4t CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSIONOF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, OC S0590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVILPFH",LTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 8 U.S.C. SSI

    R E Q 13-11 000000021

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    0/o20L.ist%20SD-1544-01 -20B%2Qi3ted%204-22-03[1].doc'Security Directive 1544-01-20B

    Page 9 of 1

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION

    OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20S90. UNAUTHORIZED ZKLi-ASE MAY RESULT IN CIVILPENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

    REQ 13-11 000000022

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    K , Page 1 0 1 - '- - - - - ' " --"" ' " " '" ' ' " ' ' " ' ' f ,..?'"''""' Ty;.".v.;;*.", v.-..-.:,:.lr:';r-~r^--r.-;v,..-.--". -.--- r- f..,.--......JSecurity Directive 1544-01-20BPage 10 of 1

    FOR ISAACTION ONLY: The TSA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate securityelement of all affected U.S. aircraft operators and to local airport management and associatedlaw enforcement officials.

    FOR STATE DEPARTMENT: Retransmittal to appropriate foreign posts is authorized. Postmust refer to STATE 162917, 201826Z Sep 01 , Subject: FAA Security Directives andInformation Circulars: Definitions and Handling, for specific guidance and dissemination.

    fs lJ. M. Loy, ADMAdministrator

    SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATIONWARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THISDOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSIONOF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.WASHINGTON, DC20S90. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL

    PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FORU.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC A'/ '.ilABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER SU.S.C. 552.

    REQ 13-11 000000023

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    9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy(Rev . 01-31-2003) '- } /, t

    FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

    Precedence: PRIORITYTo: All Field Offices

    All LegatsCounterterrorism

    Date: 06/09/2003Attn: ADIC/SACASAG CounterterrorismJTTF SupervisorsAirport Liaison AgentsFBIHQ, Manuals DeskAttn: Section Chief, ITOS ISection Chief, ITOS IISection Chief, DTOSUnit Chiefs

    From: CounterterrorismSpecial Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation Security ProgramContact: SSAJiApproved By:

    Drafted By:

    Case ID #: 3 U O t i - H Q - < : i L A - i 2 0 3 - K (Pending)66F-HQ-C1384970Title: TSA NO FLY AND TSA SELECTEE LIST;PROCEDURES TO ADD OR REMOVE NAMESReference: 265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 98265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 89265A-NY-280350 Serial 158666F-HQ-C13928S2 Serial 8Enclosure: The following three TSA Avj.,\tion Security Directives,dated April 22, 2003, are enclosed:(1) SD-1544-01-21C, "Threat to U.S. Aixorai 7t Operators-SelecteeList";(2) SD-1542-01-10B, "Threat to U.S. Airports-No Fly and SelecteeLists"; and,(3) SD-1544-01-20B, "Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators-No FlyList."

    REQ 13-11 000000024

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    To: All Field O f e s From: CounterterrorivRe: 300B-HQ-C1184^03-K, 06/09/2003- A

    Synopsis: To advise of procedures established to provide consistentapplication of names submitted by the FBI to the TransportationSecurity Administration (TSA) No Fly and Selectee Lists.

    Details: Background:On October 15, 2001, the FAA issued Security Directives(SD's) after receiving lists of individuals associated with Al-Qaedafrom both the CIA and the FBI. The SD's contained a list of personswho were believed to pose a threat to civil aviation security. Thisprocess was refined to a coordinated policy and protocol between theFBI, CIA, and FAA (now the TSA) to identify persons who may pose athreat to civil aviation security. Since late 2001, there have beenrefinements - t o the protocol in which persons are either placed on orremoved from either'list. The TSA maintains the two lists and namesare submitted mostly by the CIA and the FBI, but also from theDepartment of Homeland Security/Bureau of Immigration and Customs

    .Enforcement, TSA, and on occasion, other agencies.The TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee List are not to be

    confused with other watch lists, such as:a.b.o.d.e.f.

    Definitions of each listThe perspns o < . . the TSA No Flv List are to be prevented fromusing U.S. commercial Aviation, since they have been deemed by theTSA to be a threat to civil aviation security, based upon informationreceived from various sources. These individuals may not usecommercial aviation as long as their name appears on the TSA No FlyList.When a person on this list arrives at an airport andattempts to fly, the airline is required to alert local lawenforcement. Local law enforcement authorities will be the primary-response to determine if the person at the airport matches the personon the list. If there is a positive match, then the local law

    REQ 13-11 000000025

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    j s - T V /~vTo: All Field Of; ):es From: Counterterrori. jRe: 300B-HQ-C1184203-K, 06/09/2003

    enforcement authorities will contact the local FBI Field Office'sAirport Liaison Agent or Joint Terrorism'Task Force. The FBI shallthen respond to the airport to conduct further investigation,including identity checks, consensual interview, and notification toFBIHQ. Such responses should be documented at the field divisionlevel.

    A detention is generally warranted for individuals with anoutstanding arrest warrant, or if investigation reveals the person ison an operational terrorist mission.The persons on the TSA Selectee List are not known to be athreat to aviation, but an agency has said,they may have a possibleconnection to terrorism or a terrorist organization. Passengersdetermined to match the name on this list are subject to enhancedpre-boarding security screening measures, and ultimately, arepermitted to travel on commercial aviation. The .airlines are alsorequired to notify both local and airport law enforcement and the'local FBI office. However, as long as individuals are subject toenhanced screening, additional law enforcement review is notrequired.The backbone to the regulatory process for the civilaviation industry is Security Directives, issued by the TSA (formerlyFederal Aviation Administration) . Over the past twenty months, theTSA has issued updated SB's that outline actions for airportoperators and airliner; in regard to names appearxug on either the TSANo Fly List or TSA 3 e i < > c ' i : e e Li3t. 'In essence, the SD' d advise airport operators to (1) check

    applicants for airport ID card (e.g., SIDA badge) applicants namesagainst the TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee List, and (2) outlineprocedures for airlines to check passengers names and employees forname matches from either list. Responses to positive nameidentification may require FBI involvement for further identificationand interview after screening by local or airport law enforcement inquestionable cases of identity.To control all names placed on and removed from both the TS-\o Fl

    file (300B-HQ-C1184203-K), has been established for accountabilitypurposes in the Counterterrorism Division. This file number shall beappropriately referenced in all documentation.Procedures to add or remove a person for both lists:

    The Counterterrorism Division has developed the followingprocedures to add a person to either the TSA No Fly List or TSA/\. Selectee List. TSA has concurred with the following procedures:

    REQ 13-11 000000026

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    f , - ?To: All Field Of5 )es From: Counterterrory,Re: 300B-HQ-C1184^03-K, 06/09/2003

    1. . A substantive terrorism case, such as a 265 and 199 or a266, must be open on the subject. (Neither a Headquartersnor Field Office's control file may be used for thispurpose.)2. Submissions to either the TSA No-Fly List or the TSASelectee List must be done via an EC that is uploaded withunrestricted text. The person's name and identifyinginformation must also be indexed in UNI. Submissions toadd or remove a person via an e-mail message or telephonecall will be denied.3. The EC must include all of the following:

    a. The substantive file number(s) and the control file number(300B-HQ-C1184203-K) ;

    b. Addressed to the following three ' units in t - h < = Counterterrorism Division at Headquarters:(1) the appropriate FBIHQ operational unit;(2) Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit, Room 11303; and(3) Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation SecurityProgram, Room 11795.

    c. . T h e Synous.L-; section of the EC should state:- "Kequsu i ' < >. - i . d d for remove] [Name] [DOB], a U.. S. citizen [or USPER o ; . -non-TfSPER] , to [or from] the TSA No Fly List [or TSASelectee L i s t ] -" Example: Request to add John Q. Citizen,DOB 03/15/1971, a U.S. citizen, to the TSA No Fly List.

    d. The Details section of the EC must specify: (1) which ofthe ' two lists (TSA No-Fly or TSA Selectee) th e personshould be added or removed, (2) whether the person is anUSPER (citizen) USPER (non-citizen, such as a PermanentResident Alien or lawful non-immigrant visa status), or anon-USPER, and (3) complete identifying infor.mat-.ion.

    e. For all persons -- including npn-citizen USPERs and non-USPERs - - t h e E C must include a \a person to either list without these three pieces ofinformation.

    f. For USPERs, and non-USPERs when the information isattainable, the identifying information shall include allClosed by

    REQ 13-11 000000027

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    >V / To: All Field Off }es From: Counterterrori',Re: 003-HQ-C1184203-K, OS/09/2003

    .. . other known identifiers, such as.-f

    g. The Details section of the EC must describe: (1) theperson's known or suspected connections to terrorism or aterrorist organization, and (2) the reasons to believe theperson poses a threat to civil aviation security.h. The Details section of the EC must include a point-of-contact who is thoroughly familiar with the case, such asthe case agent, co-case agent, and/or supervisor. The POCshould be available at all hours (24/7) in case questionsarise about the person placed on the list. Include direct-dial work numbers, pager number, and cellular number for"each POC.i . The Leads section of the EC must include at least fourleads to the Counterterrorism Division:

    (1) the operational unit's Unit Chief to review andapprove;(2) the operational unit's SSA;( i ) Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit ("Road and clear"),.and; . ' _(4) Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation Security

    Unit ("Read and clear") .Approval of request4. Note that only a Unit Chief or higher in the Counterterrorism.Division at HQ may approve the inclusion (or deletion) of aperson, onto either list. No one In any field office or LegalAttache has approval authority.

    a. Approval to add to the TSA Mo Flv List: If the Unit Chief(or higher) approves the request to add a person, thenhe/she will add the following statement: "The FBI considersthis person to be a threat to civil aviation security."b. Approval to del ete from the TSA No Flv List: If the UnitChief (or higher) approves the request to delete a person,then he/she will ad'd the following statement: "The FBI nolonger believes this person is a threat to civil aviationsecurity."

    REQ 13-11 000000028

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    ,, 1 * /\JTo: All Field Offf "s From: Counterterrori""N

    Re: 300B-HQ-C1184-.3-K, 06/09/2003, V . - /

    c. Approval to add_ to the TSA Selectee, List:: If the UnitChief (or higher) approves t;he request to add a person,then he/she will add the following statement: "The FBIbelieves this person may have 'a possible link to terrorismand may be a threat to civil aviation security."

    d. Approval to delete from the.TSA Selectee List: If the UnitChief (or highei") approves the request to delete a person,then he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI nolonger believes this person to \e a threat to civilaviation security."If the Unit Chief or higher in the operational unit in theCounterterrorism Division approves the addition to or removalfrom either list, then it is the responsibility of theoperational unit .to coordinate with the TSA's detailees on the-FBI's National J0int Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) for inclusiono r deletion. / \ . . . . . -The TSA's detailees to the NJTTF are currently j J and/ ~~7- They will forward the approved request to TSAfrom for placement (or removal) on the appropriate list.

    Mandatory review of USPERs6. TI an USPER is added to either list, then t h - : s -jubmittor of theUSPKR is required to review whct-.-hor t h e . person should remain onthe list. This mandatory review wi ll occur when the case is"closed and every 120 days after the- date- of the EC thatrequested submission of that person to the list. Note that an

    USPER can remain on the list even if the Field Office has closedtheir investigative or intelligence case, as long as there isjustification to do so. The justification would have to be"articulated in an EC uploaded to the substantive and controlfiles, and it must include articulable facts that the personcontinues to pose a threat to civil aviation security. Even if". the Field Office ha.-; closed the case, it is still required toconduct a review and document the results every 120 days.The results of the review -- that is, the reasons to maintainthe person on the list or the reasons to remove the person fromthe list -- will be documented in an EC that is uploaded withunrestricted text. The EC will be sent, as above, to the sameunits in the Counterterrorism Division with the same leads,described above.If the Field Office, Legat, or operational unit in the-Counterterrorism Division concludes prior to the closure of the

    * J~

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    To: All Field Of* fes From: Counterterrori's^ ;Re: 300B-HQ-C1184203-K, 06/09/2003

    9/11 Lav; Enforcement Privacycase, or prior to the mandatory"120 day review, that the personno longer poses a threat to civil aviation security, then an ECshould be submitted immediately to request deletion from thelist. " " " - . .

    Distribution of the listsThe most current TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee. List are e--mailed to all Airport Liaison Agents, Legats, and Joint. Terrorism

    Task Force members as soon as they are received from the TSA by theCounterrorism Division, Special Events Management Unit/Civil AviationSecurity Program. Dissemination of these lists may occur as much., aitwice daily. The points-of-contact in that unit are SSAI

    The lists are also posted on the FBI's Intranet, SIOC Operations,TSA/FBI Support Page, which is located at:

    / IFBI response to an airportIf an FBI response is warranted, then full database checks and

    I other .appropriate investigation should be conducted and documented.< The Terrorist .Watch and Warning Unit is available 24/7 at I II I as a resource to check ACS and NCIC.on possible matches.

    ; I If FBI searches are negative,, but; i . t .: dcturuiirind the person is; ; a match, then - Lhe t'.! i . - l . o agent should contact.,- the TSA's 24-hour.

    I i command center a t I I for background information'.. TSA's.; ; command center maintains documentation on all persons on both lists

    I I provided to them by the FBI and all o'th r, agencies who contribute to-/ ; the lists. For. these instances, it is .recommended that responses to; I positive name matches on the lists bex maintained in the appropriate

    - / I airport liaison or. civil aviation security file in the field; ! division. / , . .

    For Itegat response purposes, Individuals appearing on the TSA No/ 1 Fly. list may not utilize, U.S. commercial aviation. Interview and; ; identification of the individual will rest within the appropriatelocal law enforcement jurisdiction, at the request of the FBI. If the: . individual uses a,foreign-flag air carrier to attempt to enter the

    I ! U.S. and cannot.be prevented from traveling, the FBI office at the; / arriving city, must be contacted for appropriate action as soon asI I possible. For reference, it is the responsibility of the TSA to

    I ! include names appearing on the TSA No Fly List to also be entered inl l TIPOFF and TECS.

    In instances in which individuals are prevented from flying and; / wish to voice their objection, the TSA, Office of the Ombudsman has

    9/11 Law Enforcement. 'Sensitive

    REQ 13-11 000000030

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    V i #To: All Field Ofl. Jes From: Counterterrorik,.Re: 300B-HQ-C11S4203-K, 06/09/2003

    been organized to handle such matters. They can be contacted, inwriting, at: Office of the Ombudsman, Transportation SecurityAdministration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202.

    REQ 13-11 000000031

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    To: All Field O f j a s From: Counterterrori^Re: 300B-HQ-C1184V03-K, 06/09/2003

    TSA Security Directive 1544-01-20A[Note that this SD was replaced on April 22, 2003 by TSA SD-1544-01-2OB, but is included here for background]:

    US Department of TransportationTransportation Security A dministrationCivil Av iation SecuritySecurity DirectiveInformation of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel:Current Security Procedures Should be ReviewedSubject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators No Fly ListNumber : SD 1544-01 -20ADate: Ap ril 5, 2002EXPIRATION: Indefin i teThis Security Directiv e (SD) 1544-01-20A supercedes and canc els the SD 108-01-20 and must be implemented immediately uponreceipt by corporate offices.INFORMA TION: The TSA has received information indicating the indiv iduals on the list associated with this Security Directivear e dangerous an d could pose a threat to civilavia t ion.REVISION S U M M AR Y -

    'Updates I 'Cguldtoiyci tario"- ,-Provides an additional option for clearing passengers listed on the No Fl y Sm .ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIR CARRIERS REGULATED UND ER TITLE 49.CODE OF FEDERAL R l L ( J ( J t ATiONS CCFR"). PART1544: if yo u are an aircraft operator covered by 49 CFR Part 1544, you must implem ent all the measures set forth in this SD.I. TSA will provide a No Fly List to you. All future upda tes to the list will be forwa rded by the TSA to your corporate securityoffice under separate cover. It is anticipated that .names may be added or removed from this list. When you receive m t updatedNo Fly List, yo u must immediately conduct a comparison of passengers boarding al l flights, as well as screeners an d direct ai rcarrier employees. ,II . Ma ny non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name I K dor. The names that appear on the No Fly List may be invarying order an d spelling. Data such as Date of Birth, Citizenship, Passport Number, etc, will be provided when available.I I I . PASSENGERSA. Should you find in your flight reservation system an ind ividual whose name appears on the No Fly List, you must immediatelynotify:The nearest field office of the FBI, and at overseas locations th e nearest United States Embassy.B . Should an individual whose name appears on the No Fly List present himself or herself fo r transport, yo u must denytransportation fo r that individual, their accessible property, checked baggage and any person(s) accompanying that individualand their baggage until cleared by one of the following processes:

    RE Q 13-11 000000032

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    To: All Field Off }es From: Counterterrori iRe: 300B-HQ-C1184z03-K,\._06/09/2003 " ' _

    LEAD(s):Set Lead 1: (Info)

    ALL RECEIVING OFFICESDisseminate as appropriate.-

    12

    R E Q 13-11 000000035

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    SECURITY DIRECTIVE LISTDOCUMENTS SUFFICIENT TO ESTBALISH THE

    ORIGIN , MISSION ANDRESULTS OF THESECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST CREATED AND

    DISSEMINATED BY THE FBI IN THE IMMEDIATEAFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

    RESPONSIVEtoREQUEST #13-11

    COMMISSION COPY

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    9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy*

    ( R e v , 08-28-2000) ' .FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

    Precedence: R O U T I N E Date: 1 1 / 0 4 / 2 0 0 1To: All Field Offices Attn: ADIC'sSA.C'sCDC 1 sLEGAT's

    All LegatsFrom: Counter-terrorism\M 5328

    Contact:Approved By:Drafted By:Case ID #: 265A-NY-280350-WLC (Pending)265A-NY-280350 (Pending)Title: PENTTBOMMajor Case # 182OO:NYSynopsis: Information and guidance to aii offices regardingFAA Security Directive(SD), SD 108-01-15B and SD 108-01-17.Reference: 265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 89

    265A-NY-280350 Serial 15786Details: The FAA issued two SDs, SD 108-01-15E on October 15,.2001 and SD 108-01-17 on October 26, 2001, after receivinglists of indiv iduals a ssociate d with AL-Qaida/PSNTTBOM fromboth the CIA and FBI. SD 108-01-15B contained a list of namesprovide by the CIA and SD 108-01-17 contained a list of namesprovided by the FBI as noted in the above referencedcommunications. The SDs stated that the individuals listed inthe attachment may pose a threat to civil aviation, should bedenied transportation and the carrier should immediatelycontact the FBI. The attachment to SD 108-01-15B containedName List 4 updated on October 27,2001. The attachment to SD108-01-17 contained Name List 3.

    The FBI and CIA both believed that by providi ngnames and having them listed on a SD, it would give the FBIand CIA a useful tool for tracking and/or locating Al-Qaida/PENTTBOM associates. It however quickly became apparent

    REQ 13-11 000000001

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    To: All Field Ofi _ e s From: Counterterrori.Re: 265A-NY-280350-WLC, 11/04/2001

    LEAD(s) :Set Lead 1:

    ALL RECEIVING OFFICESRead and Clear.

    REQ 13-11 000000003

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    U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e

    Federal Bureau of Invest igat ion

    W a s h i n g t o n , D. C. 20535 -0001Novem ber 5 , 2003

    Daniel Marcus, General CounselNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon th e United StatesSuite 3002 1 0 0 K S t r e e t , N . W .Washington, D.C. 20036R E: Commission's Request fo r DocumentsDear M r. Marcus:

    In response to the Commission's Request for Documents, please find thefollowing:Documents responsive to Docum ent Request 13-9a;Documents responsive to Document Request 13-9b;Documents responsive to Document Request 13-9c;

    This is part of the FBI's rolling production and thus may be su pplemented in thefuture. Shou ld you h ave any questions, please do not hesitate to contact m e at 202-324-9613.

    Robert S. SintonAssistant General Counsel