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Questions For F ormer Senator Warren Rudman

Purpose: The Senator testified before the Joint Inquiry on topics including theIntelligence C om mu nity's architecture, establishment of the Dept. of Hom eland Security,overall homeland security priorities, and Congressional oversight. The purpose of this

interview is (1) to delve further into the Senator's views on the 1C's architecture andCongressional oversight, (2) to update his views on homeland security priorities, and (3)to explore the role of PFIAB in conducting oversight of the 1C.

The Architecture of the Intelligence Community1) What do you think the fundamental role of the DCI is - to serve as the President's

principal intelligence adviser, or to be the steward of the nation's nationalintelligence assets?

2) In your testimony before the Joint Inquiry, you stated that creation of an

Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence would be "a terrible idea" because

"Secretaries of D efense have been trying to run the Intelligence Com munity inthis town for 25 years" and that if the USDI is created, "you just as well dismantlethe Intelligence Com munity as we know it and call it what it is, the Department of

Defense." In your experience, what ha ve Secretaries of Defense done to try tocontrol the 1C? And how would you assess the performance and effect of theUSDI to date?

3) In your testimony b efore the Joint Inquiry, you supported expanding the DCFs

authorities. How do you respond to the argument that the DCI does not need newauthorities because he is not fully exercising the authorities that he already has?Why do you think that the DCI lacks authority, and w hat more authority does the

DCI need?

4) Do you still believe th at the FBI is capable of conducting d omestic lawenforcement, or do you think that a new d omestic security service is needed ?Should that service report to the DCI or the Attorney General?

5) Are there any other ways in which the IC's architecture should be altered in orderto combat terrorism while maintaining capabilities against state actors?

The PFIAB

1) What is the PFIAB's role in oversight of the 1C? To what extent d id the PFIA B

focus on the IC's counterterrorism capabilities? If the 1C is centralized, do youthink that the PFIAB can provide oversight of the IC's protection of civil liberties

and privacy, or should the PFIA B focus on strategic issues and a new body becreated for civil liberties oversight?

Homeland Security1) Do you believe that the Homeland Security C ouncil in the White House should be

folded into the NSC in order to bridge the foreign/domestic divide?



2) How well is the DHS functioning an d integrating its various components?

3) In your testimony b efore the Joint Inqu iry, you stated that tw o other priorities fo r

homeland security are training the National Guard for consequence management

and increasing port security. How well have we done on these issues, an d havenew, high priority issues emerged?

Congressional Oversight

1) As you know, the statute creating the 911 Commission specifically requires the

Commission to make recomm endations concerning Cong ressional oversight. Inyour testimony to the Joint Inquiry, you talked about how Congress has tended toget into the details and not deal with larger strategic questions concerning

intelligence. Wh y has Congress tended to focus on details rather than strategicissues? How has this orientated affected the 1C's performance? How canCongressional oversight of intelligence be improved?

2) In your testimony to the Joint Inquiry, yo u discussed the need for consolidatedoversight of DHS so that senior DHS officials would not have to spend the bulkof their time testifying before Con gress. How would yo u assess Congress'sperformance on homeland security oversight to date? Should the House SelectComm ittee on Hom eland Security be mad e permanent, and should the Senatecreate an equivalent bod y?



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STATEMENT OF THE HON. WARREN RUDMAN, A FORMER SENATOR FROM

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Mr. RUDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to be here.

This is the committee I served on, one of my favorite

committees in my time in the Senate, and I am honored to

appear before you.

I expect that two of the things that I did in the last

few years are of interest to you and I have tried to draw

from them in my testimony: first, of course, chairing PFIAB;

secondly, chairing Hart-Rudman; and third, something I want

to talk about a bit this morning that Chairman Goss is very

familiar with, and that is the Roles and Other

Responsibilities of the Intelligence Community for the 21st

Century, which we prepared at the request of this Congress.

I think it is Public Law 971. I wish more people had

read it. I want to talk a little bit about this morning. I

would highly recommend that every staff member read this

before you write your final report, if you haven't already;

and I would think that Members might want to read some

portions of it, because it was a very distinguished group of

Americans who spent a lot of time looking in advance of 9/11

at precisely the things that you are looking at post-9/11.

I want to just give you a couple of excerpts from that,

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and I will take 5 or 6 minutes. I do not have a prepared

statement, but rather I thought I would respond to the

specific questions addressed to me by the leadership of the

committee.

The first question that you asked was that our national

security study group, Hart-Rudman, warned in 2001 that the

United States was not prepared to deal with terrorist attacks

in the U.S. homeland. "please summarize why you felt that to

be true at the time, what steps were taken, if any, in

response to our report and why we believe important steps

were not taken and what measures remain to be taken." .

Briefly, this Commission was commissioned by the Congress

and the previous administration. Its task was to prepare a

report on U.S. national security for the 21st century to be

limited to the incoming President in 2001, so no one knew who

that would be at that time or what party that person would be

in.

It was a totally bipartisan group. We spent a huge

amount of time. We traveled all over the world. We met with

friend and foe. We met with intelligence agencies, those

with whom we have good relations and those with whom we have

poor relations.

And we came to the overwhelming conclusion at the end of

our study that we were facing an asymmetric threat to our

entire national security structure. And to everyone's

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surprise, our lead recommendation dealt with homeland

security and international terrorism.

No one on that committee would have thought at the time

that we started that that would have been our conclusion. We

would have thought it might have been more in the area of DOD

reorganization or intelligence reorganization or changing the

State Department, changing public diplomacy. It was not.

And you are all familiar with the report; I have

discussed it with many of you personally. We said in that

report, quote, "More or less, large numbers of Americans will

die on American soil, victims of terrorism, in the coming

century." .

It happened a bit sooner, rather than later.

Why did we come to that conclusion? It was obvious.

From the excellent history that Eleanor Hill gave you a few

minutes ago, it was an escalation of attacks against American

interests. It was quite apparent that the homeland was not

secure and that, at a point in time, those terrorists, be it

al Qaeda or many other groups--some of which you are, I am

sure, studying; others which you may not be--that someone

would launch an attack on this country.

We talked about weapons of mass destruction, we talked

about weapons of mass disruption; and we laid it out in

laborious detail, because it was overwhelmingly apparent to

all of us that that was going to happen.

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