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Systems Analysis of Community Resilience Lynne Genik, DRDC Centre for Security Science
Ivan Deith, Serco UK
Cornwallis XVIII Presentation
April 17, 2013
Agenda
• DRDC EMBC Project Background
• Systems Analysis of Community Resilience Introduction
• Resiliency System Under Study
• Workshop Events
• Architecture Outputs
• Findings of Pemberton Study
• Evaluation of Utility of the Approach
• Potential Future Use by Municipalities
• Conclusions
• Next Steps
3
DRDC EMBC Project Background
DRDC EMBC Collaborative Project
Post V2010, established “two year” DRDC EMBC
collaborative project focused on:
• Risk assessment
• Critical infrastructure
• Information sharing as it relates to above areas
DRDC goals:
• Support EMBC in achieving their objectives
• Demonstrate value of scientific approach
• Develop approaches (methodologies, tools, etc.)
that can be applied nationally
DRDC resources:
• 1.5 scientists, co-op student (1 FT term, 1 PT term),
2 contracts 5
Gap Areas Identified
DRDC identified gaps in the following areas:
• Planning
• Concepts
• Measurement and validation
• Partnerships
• Training
6
DRDC Projects
Projects to address some of the gaps identified:
1. Systems Analysis of Community Resilience (with
Serco UK, completed Mar 2013)
2. Scenario “Mission to Task” Analysis (with KaDSci,
anticipated completion end of 2013)
3. CI Pilot Project (anticipated completion spring 2013)
4. Extensive Literature Searches (completed fall 2012)
This presentation focuses on the first project
7
8
Systems Analysis of Community Resilience Introduction
What’s the Problem?
• Heavy and increasing reliance on interdependent systems
• Systems becoming more complex
• Inter-relationships often unseen/unknown
• Privatisation of many critical services (e.g. utilities)
• Fragmented control & co-ordination
• Drive for efficiency has removed layers of resilience
• Incidents expose planning and capability deficiencies 9
Typical Inquest/After Action Review Findings
• Strong performance by individual agencies, but confusion
/ inefficiency / ineffectiveness at boundary points
• Considerable planning activity but gaps & disparities from
a failure to share and reconcile plans
• Lack of joint training & exercising among responders
• Constrained and/or sub-optimal sharing of data
• Failures of communication between organisations within
complex systems
• Problems of collaboration, especially in situations where
there is no single authority with the power to instruct other
stakeholders in the system
• Lack of multi-agency situational awareness & response /
recovery capability 10
What Drives Resilience?
Wide range of factors, including:
• Inherent resilience of individual infrastructure elements
• Effectiveness of day-to-day management systems & processes
• Availability of relevant, accurate & timely info for decision making
• Communication between organisations - levels, formats, means
• Effectiveness of emergency plans, supporting training & exercising
• Available resources to deal with incidents
• How well resources are co-ordinated, deployed and commanded
…improving resilience is a broad-based &
holistic undertaking
11
Community Resilience Study
• Many small and / or remote communities across
Canada
• Varying degrees of support available
• Varying degrees of planning capability / capacity
• Many communities may be unnecessarily
‘fragile’
• …how to strengthen community resilience?
• …architecture approaches suitable?
12
Purpose & Objectives
Project Purpose:
• Evaluate the utility of Architectural Frameworks and Soft
Systems Methodologies in supporting a small
municipality’s holistic risk management framework for
enhancing community resilience
Objectives:
• Understand what hazards communities face, what
resources they rely on, what steps can be taken to avoid
incidents and respond to those that do happen
• Identify specific lessons that can be applied in the
Pemberton Valley but also the general points that could
be applied elsewhere
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Resiliency System Under Study
Resiliency System - Definition
• Set of plans, capabilities & resources strengthening a
community’s ability to withstand disruptive influences
and enabling it to recover from crisis events
• For example:
• River defence systems preventing flooding
• Generators providing backup power supplies at key
locations
• Emergency services providing response capabilities
• Emergency plans & arrangements enabling rapid
intervention & effective management of resources
15
Pemberton Valley
16
• Located 160 km north-northeast of Vancouver
• 30 km northeast of Whistler
Pemberton Valley
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Why Pemberton Valley?
• Referred by EMBC, also considered Squamish
& Bella Coola
• Pemberton Valley selected due to:
• Size: 5,000 people
• Boundaries: Able to define clear boundaries
for the extent of the study area
• Stakeholders: Communities reflecting
Canada’s cultural diversity, multiple
stakeholders spanning both public and
private sectors, existing collaborative
relationships, completed EMBC HRVA
• Engaged Emergency Planning Coordinators 18
Approach
• Pre-visit research
• Initial visit June 2012 & document review
• Workshop sessions October 2012
• Post Workshop analysis & architectural
development
• Validation sessions & scenario workshop
February 2013
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Pre-Workshop Research
• Researched provision of essential services
against 11 standard categories: • Shelter
• Water
• Food
• Energy
• Safety (inc. Emergency Services)
• Transportation
• Health
• Information & Communications Technology
• Finance
• Government Services
• Manufacturing 20
Sample Research Materials: Energy
21
• Key elements of BC Hydro
infrastructure
• Availability of alternatives:
• Generators
• Independent power projects
• Carbonaceous – gas, wood burning
stoves
Considered Key Dependencies & Interdependencies: Energy Supply
Power: BC Hydro
Local ICT Infrastructure
Reservoir
SCADA Systems
Well Pumps
Telecoms switches
Cellular Networks
Fixed Circuits
Sewage Works
Lift Station Pumps
Local Emergency
Service Radio Comms
Alternative: Fire Dept ‘Manual’
Pump
Consequence: Reduced
Firefighting / rescue capacity
Public mains
Hydrants
Servers & Systems
Generator Backups?
Places of safe public resort
22
Key Risks
Initial discussions with stakeholders highlighted
three key hazards:
• Flooding
• Wildfire
• Rockslides
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Flooding
• Regular problem
• Freshet (spring)
• Rain on snow (fall)
• Changes in river channel
24
Wildfire
• Regular problem
• Responsibility of provincial Ministry
of Forests Wildfire Management
Branch
• Particular areas of concern include
new Mount Currie site
25
Rockslides
• Relatively minor rock and debris slides
common
• Routine impingements on roads
• Major threat to new Mt Currie site
• Potential threat to Village of
Pemberton
• Mt Meager slide 2010
• Second largest in Canadian history
• Mass evacuation
26
Also Considered Wider Range of Risks…
• Debris flows
• Avalanches
• Log / Ice Jams
• Severe winter storms
• Critical Infrastructure
Failure
• Key Supply Chain Failure
(etc…)
27
Workshop Events
Soft Systems Methodology
• Developed by Peter
Checkland at University of
Lancaster in 1960’s
• Designed to enable
structured comparison of the
world as it is versus a range
of models of the world as it
could be
• Helps to untangle situations
with multiple goals and
multiple perspectives on
those goals
• Seven steps in a full SSM
study
• Our focus on 1-3
29
Application of SSM
SSM calls for deliberately ‘broad’ research in order
to capture a wide range of perspectives
• Workshop invitees encompassed broad range
of respondents from members of the Women’s
Institute and ecological campaign groups to
pilots and road maintenance workers
SSM encourages wide range of research methods
• Used individual interviews, structured group
sessions, documentary review, observation
30
Workshops October 2012
• Conducted 4 Workshops in October 2012: • Lil’wat Nation group
• Pemberton Village ‘Community’ group
• Pemberton ‘Business’ group (+ SLRD workshop Nov 2012)
• Emergency Responders Group
• Five sessions in each: • What the Valley is known for / what it provides
• Essential Services
• Hazards to essential services
• Consequences of disruption over 3 days / 3 weeks
• Expectations of service restoration after disruption
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Workshop Participants (28 Organizations)
• Mount Currie Capital Projects
• Mount Currrie Healthcare
• Mount Currie Fire
• Mount Currie Public Works
• Pemberton Women’s Institute
• Pemberton Valley Seniors
• Christian Fellowship
• Village of Pemberton Council
• Stewardship Pemberton
• Pemberton Valley Dyking District
• Flying Club
• Pemberton Valley Supermarket
• Mainroad Howe Sound Contracting
• BC Ministry of Transport
• Pemberton Chamber of Commerce
• Rotary Club
• Survey Practice
• Private Power Generator
• Riverlands Farm
• Copper Cayoose Outfitters (Adventure
Co)
• Stable Ent (Industrial Park)
• Sea to Sky Community Services
• Village of Pemberton Emergency
Planning
• Vancouver Coastal Health
• Pemberton Fire Dept
• BC Ambulance Service
• RCMP
• Village of Pemberton Public Works
32
Workshops Results
High commonality in essential services
identification
• Shelter, water, food, fuel, power, roads
• Only one group (community) cited volunteers
as important resources
High commonality in top hazards: flood, fire,
land/rock slide
• Seismic, weather, rail incident distant 4-6th
• Only community raised epidemic/pandemic,
water contamination
• Only responder raised traffic incident
33
Workshops Results (cont’d)
• Several groups changed content and order of
essential services during discussion on effects
of disruptions and restoration of service
• Discrepancies between public expectations and
responder groups for timelines on restoration of
• Temporary shelter
• Water supply
• Food supply
• Emergency services
34
Responders’ Scenario Workshop Feb 2013
• Major earthquake centred just south of Squamish
• Sunday, July 28 at 4:15am
• Triggers landslide and rockfalls in PV
• Mt Currie new site
• Village of Pemberton
• Damage to infrastructure – reservoir, Hwy 99
• Damage in wider area including Vancouver area
• Discussed immediate response and issues 5 days later
with supply shortages
35
Scenario Workshop
36
Scenario Outcomes
• Would be first time dealing with major incident without external support
• Existing plans focused on ‘getting the right people in the room’ – not
providing a rolling start to response & recovery
• Would make best use of available resources and prioritise but expect
all services to be overloaded, very difficult decisions and rapid burnout
• Likely personal / professional conflicts “…my house is on Dogwood St;
would be hard to stay focused on my job”
• Would be heavily reliant on community spirit & personal networks
• Would have to draw heavily on ‘northern’ supply routes via Duffey /
Hurley
• Some useful resources are already in the Valley – if they can be
acquired
• No evidence that the community would prioritize one community over
the other
37
Architecture Outputs
Enterprise Architecture
“Who, what, how…?”
Organisational structures
Breakdown of functions & operations
Relationships between tasks & organisations
Relationships between plans, policies and activity
NATO Architecture Framework (NAF)
• Mature method implemented within Serco Architecture tool
• Coherent, contiguous models of the enterprise reflecting range of
viewpoints:
System Views (NSV) describes systems and system interconnections, supporting the services
Service Views (NSOV) description of services needed to directly support the objectives
Operational Views (NOV) description of the functions, activities, organisations and information required
Capability Views (NCV) High Level Description of What needs to be in place to realise objectives
People
Capability
Business Func tion
Systems
Processes
Loc ation
40
Community Resilience Framework
• Reusable template for a Community Resilience
Framework
• Specifies a generic set of capabilities, policies,
systems etc. used to provide resilience; e.g.
• Emergency Planning
• Incident Detection
• Emergency Response
• Framework sets out at high level what needs to be
done to provide resilience
• Individual architecture identifies how those things are
done in a particular community and by whom
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Canadian Community Resilience Reference Model
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Hazard: Service Matrix - Example
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Service: Service Matrix - Example
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Findings of Pemberton Study
Misaligned Policies
Goal clashes between different community groups,
where solving one problem can exacerbate another
For example, strengthening dyke protection in upper valley channels
greater volumes of water downstream
Tensions between the development of proactive and
reactive capabilities
Funds supporting proactive work have to be bid for in competition with
other schemes while eligible ‘response’ costs are met in full and eligible
‘recovery’ costs met at 80%
46
Misaligned Policies
Tensions between the steps required to contain
environmental hazards and the protection of natural
habitats
For example, removal of sandbars for flood protection only permitted if
new fish habitat created elsewhere – doubling costs of work
Governance complications through differing funding
regimes for First Nations versus other element of the
community
Mitigates against coordinated initiatives
47
Misaligned Expectations
Public’s expectations of disruptions in major event
may be unrealistic
Workshops results indicate that public expectations and responder
estimates on restoration of services following a major event do not
necessarily align
48
Community Perspectives on Sustainability
First Nations
• Traditional skills and strong sense of
community would enable sustainment
Rural community
• Built-in resilience to certain problems
Village community
• Generally more dependent
49
Essential Services
Several essential services require rapid
intervention in event of loss, especially in winter
and particularly for vulnerable people
• Shelter, food, power, emergency services,
medical services
Community considered “unsustainable” in less
than 3 weeks with loss of:
• Road network, emergency services, medical
services, water and sewer
• Exacerbated by time of year
50
Planning
• Sophisticated EM response structure (British Columbia
Emergency Management System) exists, based on
Incident Command Structure (ICS)
• EMBC HRVA Tool Kit encourages communities to
consider threats and hazards and impacts but stops
short of providing framework for response plans
• Need for local plans that address the consequences of
key risk events, enabling the community to rapidly
identify and act upon priorities
51
Recommendations
• Create Generic Plans
• Pre-determined restoration priority guide
• Community Resilience & vulnerable persons logs
• Community Resilience Team
• Provision of fallback generators for key infrastructure
elements
• Maximise key resources held in valley
52
Potential for ‘Toolkit’ Approach:
53
Conclusions
Overall Conclusions
55
Next Steps
• Evaluate project outcomes and recommendations
• Provide summary and recommendations to EMBC as part
of overall DRDC EMBC project report
• As part of DRDC follow-on project, examine:
• Human and organization factors in adopting products
• Capability and cost options
• Assessment framework
• Scope of training packages
• Partnerships
• Development, test and evaluation plan
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Q & A
Questions?
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