ABOUT:        

The  symposium  aims   to  address   the  emerging  new   faces  of  philosophy  of   religion  that   expand   on   the   wider   cultural   issues   of   theorizing   religion   today.   Topics   to   be  addressed   range   from   how   ideology   critique   has   come   to   change   the   face   of   studying  religion   academically   and   whether   theology   and   religious   studies   can   or   should,   in   the  context  of  post-­‐phenomenological  debates,  co-­‐exist  in  the  university,  to  whether  traditional  philosophy   of   religion,   as   distinct   from   philosophical   theology   and   phenomenology   of  religion,  is  more  properly  philosophy  of  religious  studies.    

The  subject  matter   is  a  pressing  one.  Philosophy  of   religion   is  changing  so  rapidly  that  many  wonder,  more  now   than  ever,   in  what   it   consists.  This  often   raises   the  urgent  question   whether   philosophy   of   religion   should   persist.   The   symposiasts   offer   ways   in  which   to  mitigate   the   issues,   underlining   the   importance   of   reflexivity   in   the   context   of  religion  and  not  philosophy  alone.                                                      

9:00-­‐10:30  SESSION  1    Welcome  

  Jim  Kanaris  (McGill  University,  QC)  

 

The  Future  of  Philosophy  of  Religion  

Morny  Joy  (University  of  Calgary,  AB)  

This  paper  will  focus  on  the  implications  of  two  edited  volumes  that  I  have  recently  published:   Continental   Philosophy   and   Philosophy   of   Religion   (2011)   and   After  Appropriation:  Explorations   in   Intercultural  Philosophy  and  Religion   (2011)   for   the   future  study   of   philosophy   of   religion.   In   English-­‐speaking   regions,   philosophy   of   religion   has  been  principally  identified  with  analytic  philosophy,  where  the  universal  presumptions  of  an  abstract  reason,  especially  with  reference  to  belief  and  its  justification,  have  dominated.  As   a   result,   theists   and   atheists   have   debated   long   and   often,   according   to   tenets   of  propositional   logic,   on   the   particular   merits   of   their   positions   on   the   above   issues.   In  contrast,  Continental  philosophy  does  not  demarcate  a  specific  area   that   is  designated  as  philosophy  of   religion,  nor   is   it  principally   concerned  with  establishing   ideals  or  verities.  Instead,  questions  regarding  religion  are  located  with  reference  to  specific  themes  within  a  worldview   that  has  been   influenced  by  a  number  of   factors.  These   include:   the   “death  of  God,”   the   “phenomenological   turn,”   “a   hermeneutics   of   suspicion,”   and   a   questioning   of  modernity’s   presumed   objectivity   and   its   ideologies.   In   its   turn,   Intercultural   philosophy  investigates  certain  errors  that  have  resulted  when  the  religions  and  philosophies  of  non-­‐Western  peoples  have  been  interpreted  by  reducing  or  manipulating  their  ideas  and  values  to   fit   with  Western   concepts   and   categories.   The   post-­‐colonial   critique   and   the   effort   of  decolonialization   together  constitute  one  such  undertaking.  My  aim   is   to   investigate  how  philosophy  of   religion  would  change   if   (a)   the  presuppositions  of  Continental  philosophy  were  accepted  and  (b)   the  concepts  and  of  non-­‐Western  philosophies  and  religions  were  taken  as  being  of  equal  importance.      

9:00-­‐10:30  SESSION  1  (CONT.)    

Towards  a  New  Paradigm  for  Philosophy  of  Religion  

Maurice  Boutin,  Professor  Emeritus  (McGill  University,  QC)  

We  sometimes  put  research  in  the  service  of  refusing  to  find  anything  out.  (Peter  Sloterdijk)  

 Do   other   images,   other   grammars,   other   repertoires   exist   that   account   for   hope?  

This   question   calls   for   critique   of   confusing   finitude   with   limitation.   Such   a   critique  demands   what   French   philosopher   Gaston   Bachelard   (1884-­‐1962)   calls   a   “substantial”  imagination.   It   gives   rise   to   a   paradigm   that   opens   up   thinking   to   so-­‐called   “felicitous”  practices  with  reference  to  religious  experience  and  human  destiny.    

Philosophy   of   religion   is   still   fond   of   trying   to   peacefully   implement   impossible  links:   the   link   between   human   finitude   and   limitation,   divine   transcendence   and   the  infinite.   Philosophy   of   religion   has   a   future   as   long   as   it   avoids   reducing   finitude   to  limitation.  Such  a  reduction   is  badly  needed  by  a  certain  understanding  of   transcendence  not   only   to   affirm,   but   even   to   impose   itself   with   the   relatively   clearly   stated   goal   of  rescuing   its  proper  amalgamation  with   the   infinite,   thus  avoiding   to  realize   that  agony  of  transcendence  in  such  an  amalgamation.  

Philosophy   of   religion   must   rid   itself   of   an   idea   of   limitation   that   places   human  finitude  under  the  tutelage  that  harmonizes  with  the  transcendence  of  a  world  of   ideas—not  with   god’s   incarnation,  which   reveals   that   only   a   finite   being   can   be   a   transcendent  being.                                

10:45-­‐12:15  SESSION  2    After  the  End:  Retractions  and  Reaffirmations  of  The  End  of  Philosophy  of  

Religion  

N.N.  Trakakis  (Australian  Catholic  University,  Melbourne)    

In  my  2008  book,  The  End  of  Philosophy  of  Religion,   and   in   a   series   of  metaphilosophical  papers  both  before  and  after   this  book,   I   had   taken  a  highly   critical   line   towards   several  strands  of  contemporary  philosophy  that  has  aroused  a  range  of  responses  and  emotions,  from  the  celebratory  to  the  condemnatory.  In  this  presentation  I  will  focus  on  three  groups  of  criticism  that  have  emerged  in  response  to  my  metaphilosophical  views:  (i)  critiques  of  my   assessment   of   the   so-­‐called  Wittgensteinian   school,   headed   by   D.Z.   Phillips,   and   the  allied  realism/non-­‐realism  divide  in  philosophy  of  religion;  (ii)  responses  to  my  criticisms  of   analytic   philosophy   of   religion,   either   from   friends   of   analytic   philosophy   (seeking   to  show   that   the   nature   of   analytic   philosophy   has   been   misrepresented)   or   from   foes  (holding   that   the  problems   identified  do  not   get   to   the  heart   of   the  matter   as   to  what   is  wrong   with   the   analytic   program);   and   (iii)   responses   to   my   more   recent   attempts   to  identify  serious  deficiencies  in  Continental  philosophy  of  religion.  In  (re)considering  these  responses,   I   will   retract   some   aspects   of   my   earlier   metaphilosophy   while   reaffirming  others,  and  in  the  process  I  will  provide  an  alternative  account  of  the  nature  and  future  of  philosophy  of  religion,  one  that  sees  it  as  both  contemplative  and  participatory  in  ways  that  are  often  neglected.    From  Post-­‐Colonial  Paralysis  to  Post-­‐Correctional  Progress:  The  Future  of  Philosophy  of  Religion  as  Multidisciplinary  Comparative  Inquiry  

Wesley  J.  Wildman,  (Boston  University,  MA)  

  Postcolonial  awareness  and  post-­‐structuralist  critique  have  conferred  upon  the  few  philosophers   of   religion   who   pay   serious   attention   to   religious   studies   a   profound   and  multi-­‐faceted   problem.   For   these   philosophers,   crypto-­‐theological   approaches   within  philosophy  of   religion  can  no   longer  pretend   to   ignore   their   cultural-­‐religious   specificity.  Comparative  approaches  can  no  longer  pretend  that  key  terms  and  categories  are  free  from  the  influence  of  contextual  conditioning  and  questionable  translation  decisions.  Speculative  approaches   can   no   longer   pretend   that   the   natural   and   human   sciences   have   nothing  relevant  to  say  about  religious  life-­‐worlds  and  philosophical  cosmologies.  The  result  of  this  multi-­‐faceted   challenge   has   been   abandonment   of   the   rollicking   high-­‐seas   adventures   of  philosophy  of  religion  and  the  confinement  of  research  effort  to  the  relatively  safe  harbors  of  historical  and  analytical  approaches.  But  even  historical  and  analytical  approaches  can  no  longer  pretend  that  they  are  immune  from  the  infection  of  critical  self-­‐awareness.  The  way   forward   for  philosophy  of   religion   in   this   situation   is   to   exchange   the  paralysis   that  comes  with  critical  self-­‐awareness  for  the  productivity  of  seeking  correction  of  hypotheses    

10:45-­‐12:15  SESSION  2  (CONT.)    wherever  possible.   If  philosophers  of  religion  already  always  operate   in   the  post-­‐colonial  aftermath   of   potentially   poisonous   cultural   blindness   and   interpretative   habits,   then  we  should   surrender   the   delusion   of   epistemic   foundationalism   with   its   heartwarming   but  false  moral  reassurances  and  just  launch  into  inquiries  without  apology  for  the  determinate  and  flawed  character  of  their  leading  hypotheses.  Thereafter,  we  should  ceaselessly  strive  to   correct   those   hypotheses   with   as   much   energy   and   as   many   comparative   and  disciplinary  engagements  as  possible.  This  is  the  post-­‐foundationalist,  correctional  shift  in  theories  of  inquiry.  The  way  forward  for  philosophy  of  religion  is  therefore  to  move  from  post-­‐colonial   paralysis   to   post-­‐correctional   progress.   This   is   to   conceive   philosophy   of  religion  not  as  a  discipline  but  as  a  family  of  loosely  related  multidisciplinary  comparative  inquiries   exploiting   whatever   modes,   techniques,   and   resources   prove   relevant   for  advancing  inquiry.    What  Can  Non-­‐Philosophy  do  for  Continental  Philosophy  of  Religion?  

Clayton  Crockett  (University  of  Central  Arkansas,  AR)  

The philosophy of François Laruelle is being increasingly translated and engaged in English-speaking contexts. This paper will sketch out some of his ideas, and offer some critical engagement. My desire, however, is not so much to introduce Laruelle’s project of non-philosophy, but rather to examine what kinds of insights it provides to re-conceptualize Continental Philosophy of Religion. In some respects his terminology appears idiosyncratic and his conclusions naïve, but I will argue that there are some valuable insights to be applied. First, to understand the role of non-philosophy is to embrace the fact that Continental Philosophy of Religion can never be sufficiently philosophical to justify itself as analytic or post-analytic philosophy of religion. Second there is a turn to the sciences in recent Continental philosophy, including Badiou, Meillassoux, and Malabou. Laruelle’s work continues this trajectory, although he appeals less to mathematics and more to physics, specifically quantum physics in his book Philosophie non-standard (2012). Finally, Laruelle’s work specifically on religion and religious themes is interesting in its own right, including heresy, Gnosticism and the figure of Christ. These themes culminate in a politically charged vision of insurrection.                    

1:30-­‐3:00  SESSION  3    The  Enecstatic  Jig:  Personalizing  Philosophy  of  Religion  

Jim  Kanaris  (McGill  University,  QC)  

The reference to the dance in my title pays homage to Nietzsche as does the neologism “enecstasis” to Heidegger. Both men radically reshaped philosophy providing for understandings of personal reflexivity that foundationalist programs ineluctably misplace. This aporia suffusing the desire for engaged thought points to a complex history. As a result it has metastasized (hence ever precarious) into a peculiar form of transcendental reflection in contemporary Continental philosophy. As deracinating and subversive, this enecstatic form disrupts the intonations of an invariable program. As hyper-vigilant and affirming, it incites the participation of the concerned individual whose horizon for theory selection is determined by context-specific needs. Reminiscent perhaps of the simple two-step, the musical measure here is far more difficult to follow not only because of its erratic rhythm, but also because its interpretation is exclusively agent dependent.

Enecstatic philosophy of religion broaches these issues in the context of religious studies where Analytic philosophy continues to have remote relevance. Consequently I reconfigure the personalist gesture of phenomenology of religion in line with developments in Continental theorizing of religion. Sui generis religion is replaced by a topology within which individuals philosophize variant cultural forms, nurturing their own appreciation of and for “transcendence”. I call this: disruptive agential self-possession. Philosophy,  Religion,  and  the  Question  of  Genre  

Jin  Y.  Park  (American  University,  Washington,  DC)  

In  his  recent  book,  Invention  of  Religion  in  Japan  (2012),  the  author  discusses  how  in  East  Asian  languages,  the  term  “religion”  (宗教,  J.  shūkyō;  C.  zōngjiào;  K.  chonggyo  )  was  born  in  1853  when  an  American  warship  arrived  in  Japan  and  issued  a  demand,  among  others,  for   freedom  of   religion.   The  word   “religion”   did   not   exist   in   East   Asia   until   the   late   19th  century.  The  same  is  true  for  the  word  “philosophy.”  The  East  Asian  word  “philosophy”  (哲學,  J.  testugaku;  C.  zhéxué;  K.  ch’ŏhak)  came  into  existence  only  in  the  late  19th  century  when  Japanese   philosopher   Nishi   Amane   (西周   1829-­‐1897)   used   the   expression   in   his   book  Hyakuichi  shinron   (百一新論,  One  hundred  one  new  ideas,  1874).  What  does   it  mean  that  the  words  “religion”  and  “philosophy”  became  language   in  East  Asia  only   in   the   late  19th  century?   It   might   be   easy   to   dismiss   the   situation   with   a   simple   assertion   that   neither  religion  nor  philosophy  existed  in  East  Asian  until  its  encounter  with  the  West  in  the  19th  century.  However,  we  know  that  the  phenomenon  is  much  more  complex.  The  very  lack  of  vocabulary  for  “religion”  and  “philosophy,”  not  to  mention  the  discipline  of  “philosophy  of  religion,”   which   is   the   topic   of   this   conference,   offers   us   an   occasion   to   reconsider   the  apparent  borders  of  the  discipline  of  “philosophy  of  religion”  when  we  think  about  the  field  with  East  Asian  religious  and  philosophical  traditions  in  mind.    

 

1:30-­‐3:00  SESSION  3  (CONT.)    What   happens   to   philosophy   of   religion   in   a   tradition   in  which   the   disciplines   of  

“philosophy”  and  “religion”  are  deeply  intertwined,  as  is  the  case  in  East  Asia?  Buddhism,  Confucianism,  and  Daoism,  all  contain  what  in  the  West  would  be  traditionally  considered  both   philosophy   and   religion.   How   does   this   “other”   to   the   tradition   of   philosophy   of  religion  influence  our  understanding  of  philosophy  of  religion?  This  is  not  merely  an  issue  of   categorization   (i.e.,   “genre”)   or   naming.   As   Jacques   Derrida   persuasively   argued   in  Margins  of  Philosophy  (Marges  de  la  philosophie,  1972)  and  Du  droit  à  la  philosophie  (1990),  among  other  works,  the  issue  of  naming  is  an  issue  of  right  and,  thus,  of  the  rightness  and  power.   This   paper   will   explore   this   chiasmic   dimension   of   philosophy,   religion,   and   the  Eastern  and   the  Western   traditions  by  examining   this  emerging  discussion  of  philosophy  and  religion   in  East  Asia  at   the  end  of   the  19th  and  the  beginning  of   the  20th  century  and  considering   how   the   incorporation   of   religious-­‐philosophical   traditions   of   East   Asia   will  require  a  new  perspective  on   the   traditional   subjects  of  philosophy  of   religion,   including  the  relation  between  philosophy  and  theology,  the  existence  of  God  and  evil,  and  the  nature  of  immorality,  among  many  others.    

 Signs   Outdistancing   the   Times:   How   Globalization   and   Post-­‐Colonial  Theory  Is  Redefining  Contemporary  Philosophy  of  Religion    

Carl  Raschke  (University  of  Denver,  CO)  

While  Western  philosophers  and  philosophers  of  religion  continue  to  wrangle  over  whether   philosophy   and   theology   can   have   anything   to   do   with   each   other   anymore,  especially   in   a   university   setting,   or   whether   “the   future”   of   the   philosophy   of   religion  should  be  extrapolated  from  the  latest  innovations  in  phenomenology,  linguistic  research,  cognitive   science   or   physical,   or   whatever,   a   trend   barely   noticed   in   the   traditional  academy  is  shifting  the  entire  scene  of  emergent  discourse.  It  is  the  decline  of  the  West  not  so   much   in   Spengler’s   sense,   but   the   decline   of   the   importance   and   utility   of   the   very  inferential  system—what  I  call  the  “hermeneutical  engine”  of  discourse  itself—in  which  we  as  academics  are  accustomed  to  pose  these  questions  in  the  first  place.  It  is  something  far  more  monumental     than  Thomas  Kuhn’s  now  famous,  and  often  clichéd,  “paradigm  shift.”    Paradigm   shifts   occur,   as   Kuhn   pointed   out,   within   the   orbit   of   “normal   science.”       The  insight   can   be   applied   analogically   to   the   way   in   which   Western   philosophy   frames  questions  and  stakes  out  positions.  But  rarely  does  the  framework  for  the  establishment  of  the  paradigm  itself,  or  the  hermeneutical  engine  as  a  whole,  come  into  question.    

This  paper  will   argue   that   two  global  and  broad-­‐based   trends   (in  both   the   spatio-­‐temporal  and  conceptual  sense)  are  raising  significant  doubts  and  generating  conundrums  regarding  the  very  hermeneutical  engine  of  Western  philosophy,  which  has  operated  fairly  consistently   and   efficiently   since   the   age   of   the   ancient   Greeks.     These   trends   are   all  interconnected  with  each  other  in  a  larger  perspective,  but  we  will  focus  on  the  two  main  factors   or   forces   that   are   challenging   the   current   state   of   affairs:     the   phenomenon  increasingly   understood   as   “globalization”   as  well   as   the   new   “geo-­‐philosophical”   (Gilles  Deleuze’s  term)  language  incubated  within  the  cross-­‐disciplinary  field  of  the  humanities    

1:30-­‐3:00  SESSION  3  (CONT.)    and   religious   studies   known   as   “post-­‐colonial   theory,”   or   more   recently   “de-­‐colonial  theory.”   Both   globalization   theory   and   post-­‐colonial   discourse   have   their   origins   in   late  twentieth  and  early  twenty-­‐first  century  Continental  philosophy  of  religion.  However,  just  as   the  emergent  and   former  colonized  nations  of   the  world  have   turned  have   turned   the  mechanisms,   institutions,   and   policy-­‐strategies   of   Western   capitalism   against   itself   to  create  a  vast,  brave  new  kind  of  economic  order,  so  Western  educated  philosophical  elite  of  these   cultures   have   stood   Western   philosophy   on   its   head   with   an   even   more   radical  reformulation   of   what   Foucault   would   call   the   current   “episteme”   than   even   the   French  post-­‐structuralists  of  the  last  generation  might  have  imagined.  

The paper will explore how these trends are mirrored in the work of certain current academic writers and theorists who have critical relevance for the traditional task of the philosophy of religion. I will attend largely to the publications of Homi Baba, Gayatri Spivak, Walter Mignolo, and Ian Almond. I will seek to demonstrate how the efforts of these post-colonial theorists, conventionally considered as simply derivative when it comes to contemporary philosophy, actually concentrate and more finally attune the thought of such well-known, “card-carrying” philosophical luminaries as Derrida, Deleuze, Badiou, and Charles Taylor.

3:15-­‐5:30  SESSION  4    Reverence  and  Criticism  in  Philosophy  of  Religion  

  Tyler  Roberts  (Grinnell  College,  IA)  

Ordinarily, philosophers of religion think about philosophy as a critical discourse that takes religion as its object or data: philosophy of religion thinks critically about religion. Recent work I’ve done on how the boundaries between religious thought and philosophy are named, drawn, transgressed or blurred, has led me to focus, increasingly, on the critical possibilities for a philosophy that thinks with, not just about, religion. I am provoked to this kind of question by William Desmond, who writes about a “two-way intermediation or communication between religion and philosophy, not just a singular direction from religion to reason”; by Stanley Cavell, who rethinks philosophy, and the history of modern philosophy, from the “re-beginning” he finds in the “sacred yes” of Emerson and Nietzsche; and by Willi Goetschel who shows us how Jewish philosophy questions the universalism of western philosophy at the “nexus between philosophy and the messianic vision of redemption.” These thinkers raise historical and genealogical questions about how mainstream traditions of philosophy, whether analytical or continental, have understood critique, cultural criticism, or critical thinking more generally. And they also raise constructive questions about the potential for rethinking philosophy and criticism in terms of religious moods, practices, and concepts such as gratitude, praise, reverence, and the messianic. My paper pursues these lines of thinking by identifying the religious resources these thinkers offer for reorienting philosophical criticism in an affirmative direction and by articulating the questions and challenges their claims present for a future philosophy of religion. Where  Can  Radical  Theology  Find  a  Home?  

John  D.  Caputo,  Professor  Emeritus  (Syracuse  University,  NY  and  Villanova  University,  PA)    

                   Where  can   radical   theology   find  a  home?  Where  and  how  can   it  have  a  place   in   the  churches  or   the  university?  How  can   it   acquire  an   institutional  body?  Does   it  have   it   any  place  at  all?  Does  it  even  exist?  Or  is  it  irreducibly  homeless,  maybe  even  inexistent?  If  so,  might   it  still  have  a  reality  or   force  of  a  different  sort?  Might   it  have  a  way  of   insinuating  itself   into  thinking  in  a  way  that  gives  theology  no  peace,  that  gives  us  no  peace?  Might   it  have  a  mode  of  insistence  without  existence,  a  way  to  be  without  enjoying  a  robust  and  full-­‐fledged  existence?  Might  it  not  exist  but  have  a  kind  of  spectrality,  like  the  un-­‐dead,  which  haunts  the  houses  of  confessional  theology  and  even  haunts  the  university?  Perhaps  radical  theology   calls   for   a   new   species   of   theologians,   for   a   university   to   come,   for   a   church   to  come,   which   will   be  more   welcoming   of   specters.   Perhaps   the   subject   matter   of   radical  theology   is   the   specter   of   the   “perhaps”   itself,   the   “might-­‐be”   that   insinuates   itself   into  everything,  including  even  and  especially  God  “almighty.”  Perhaps  we  should  be  asking  not  where  radical   theology  exists  but  how   it   insists,  not  where   it  has  a  place  but  how   it  may  take  place,  not  where  it  can  find  a  home  but  how  it  may  happen,  how  something  homeless  and  uncanny,  something  un-­‐heimlich,  can  nevertheless  be  of  the  greatest  import.  

3:15-­‐5:30  SESSION  4  (CONT.)    Re-­‐visioning  ‘life’  in  Philosophy  of  Religion  

Pamela  Sue  Anderson  (University  of  Oxford,  UK)  

Traditionally  moral  and  religious  philosophers  have  defended  ‘life’  as  something  of  great  value.   ‘Pro-­‐life’,   ‘sanctity  of  life’,   ‘quality  of  life’,   ‘life  after  death’  are  just  some  of  the  conceptions   employed   when   taking   an   unequivocal   stance   on   life.   Yet   such   a   stance  requires   philosophical   justification;   and   this   has   generally   come   at   a   price.   Too   often   a  closed  morality  has  been  thought  necessary  to  protect  the  sacredness  of  life,  while  a  static  religion  has  ensured  strict  obedience  to  moral  imperatives.  The  problematic  result  of  this  closure,   which   is   decisive   for   my   argument,   has   been   exclusion,   conflict   and   wars   of  religions.  My   paper  will   propose   a   ‘re-­‐visioning’   of   life,   in   order   to   create   openness   to   a  dynamic   future   in   philosophy   of   religions.   I   aim   to   develop   this   practice   of   re-­‐visioning,  which   I  began   in  Re-­‐visioning  Gender  in  Philosophy  of  Religion:  Reason,  Love  and  Epistemic  Locatedness  (2012),  in  order  to  bring  about  openness  to  creative  emotions  and  a  generative  flow  of  life  and  living  relations.  With  the  help  of  feminist  philosophers  Simone  de  Beauvoir,  Michele  Le  Doeuff  and  Elizabeth  Grosz  I  will  argue  for  ‘life’  as  a  process  of  generating  new  forms  of  loving  and  being  loved.  Love  like  joy  can  be  creative  in  bringing  about  an  assured  confidence  that  sustains  dynamic  forms  of  living  life  together:  and  this  human  conception  of   life,   I   propose,   should   be   at   the   heart   of   contemporary   philosophical   debates   about  religions.                                            

CONFERENCE  ORGANIZERS    

Jim  Kanaris,  McGill  University  Nathan  R.  Strunk,  PhD  candidate,  McGill  University  

   

Special  thanks  to:      

Francesca  Maniaci  Alex  Sokolov  Bruna  Salhany  Ian  Pattenden  Susan  C.  Su    

 Sally  Trace,  cover  artwork:  

“Fullness  of  Manifestation”  ©  2012  Sally  Trace  at  www.sallytrace.com          

This  conference  was  made  possible  through  the  generous  support  of:      

   

Social  Sciences  and  Humanities  Research  Council  of  Canada  Conseil  de  recherches  en  sciences  humaines  du  Canada