symbolism and environmental design

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Symbolism and Environmental Design

Amos Rapoport

Journal of Architectural Education (1947-1974), Vol. 27, No. 4. (1974), pp. 58-63.

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Am os R a popor t

Symbolism and Environmental Design*

I n t r o d u c t i o n

T he stud y of symbolism has not playeda tnajor role in the environmentaldesign f ields. I I 'hen sy n~ bo ls ave beenconsidered at a ll , i t was only in one oft n o ways . F i r s t , the d iscussion wasrestr icted to high style design and tospecial buildings within that-religiousand the l ike. Secondly, the discussionfo r~ ne d ar t of histor ical studies, theinlplication being that in the pres entcontext syn ~bo ls e re no longer re levantto the des igner.

In t he case of thes e special buildingsthe inlportance of sym bols has beenrecognized and well studied. Amongthem, for examp le , the Byzant inechurch seen as Ikon, th e AIosclue andits court in Ir an a s symbol of paradise,the Ronlan Pan theon as the idea l domeof H eaven, an d the nledieval cathedralas th e celestial c ity. IVi t t l to~ver 1962)shom s that th e Renaissance church ,far from lteing purely an aestheticcreation, is a "visihle echo of a celestial

and universally valid harmony . . . aman made echo or visage of G od'suniverse" ip. 8 , 23 ) a nd i s r oo te d inNeo-Platonic syniholism. Scully ( 1962)sees Greek lantiscapes as syn~bolizingthe quality of th e various Gods an d thetemple as the concrete embo diment ofthe particular G od in the sacredlandscape.

Significantly all these s tudies seem tohave one th ing in common. In each caseme find th e defini tion of a special placewhich is distinguished from, andsepara ted out of, the gene rality of spacearound i t. Like the Greek temple i t

does not h ave to be a n enclosed space-merely a place fraught with a specialmeaning and of a very special kind.a reflection of a world view.

I n none of these studies ho\vever , isthe re any a t tempt to apply the ana lys ismore hroadly to all forms of organ izedspace, wheth er buildings or sett lementsSometimes tlie discussion is, in fact,explicit ly restr ic ted to churches and

public buildings and specificallyexcludes all uti l i tar ian bu ildings, a llvernacular archite cture and even niuchof high s tyl e de s ign ( P r a k , 1 x 8 ) . Y e tthe re i s much evidence, fro111 a n um berof fields, which sugge sts that t his is notthe case. I have recently tr ied toshow that this is not tru e of eithe rvernacular or pr imitive buildings orsett lements and tr ied to m ake it c leartha t most des igned environments haveniajor symbolic content ( Rapopor t ,196 9). I have suggested that this appliesto d ~ve l l in gs s fa r hac l< as we can t racethrni , v i l lages, t o~ vn s nd \vholelandscapes. Innumerable examples canbe given of the very explicit sym bolismof hous e forms-the roof as dom e, thesmoke hole and em erging smoke asa s i s i i i u l~d iof syn lbolic orientat ions,layou t of spaces within t he dwelling,furni ture a r rangenlents and sea t ingpatterns. Similar ly t l ie symbolisniunderly ing the organization of w holelandscapes ( such as the Dogon inin - \ f r ic a ) , v i llages (as in the Solski ft

vil lages of Sorthe r11 Eu ro pe ) and ofcit ies (su ch as those in China, India an delse\\ here ) seems quite clear .

In th e modern context the c la r i tyof such exanlples disappear. I would,hone ver , sugges t tha t n iany nod ernfornis of dwellings and other buildingsant1 settlem ents can be understoo d inth is may (Ra popo r t , 196 9) . S tudiessuc h a s B a nha m ' s ( 1958 ) , for example ,can a lso he in te rpre ted as showingthat the AIodern Rlovement far frombeing "rational" and "functional" isbased on symholisni of the mac hine.Similar ly sonie cur rent projections of

of th e future , of w hich the En glishArchigram gro up is only one example,are clearly symholic reflections ofcurrently fashionable att i tudes, worldexamples . Ra ther I wish to take up thetheme of definition of place andgeneral vie~v-that sy n~ bo lsar e anessential e lement in the way manperceives, evaluates and shapes hisenvironment. I will a lso suggest sonie

of th e prohlenls that sy n~ ho ls aise forthe designer today.

S y m b o l s a n d Built F o r m

Th er e have been I l lany definit ionsof "symbol" but niany recentdefinit ions seem to agr ee about cer tainfeatures of symbols. Lan ger (19 53 )defines a symbol as "any device wherebywe a re enabled to m ake an abstraction"and distinguishes them from signalsan d signs :-a signal is com prehen dedif it serves to mak e us notice th e subjector si tuation i t bespeaks whereas asymbol is understood when we conceivethe idea i t presents. In this view, thefu nct io n of a sy1111101 is e.rpressio~2ofconcepts. l l o s t definit ions agre e( I l 'o l f , 1969) on th e communicat ivenatu re of symbols and their impo rtancein though t and often point out thatsymbols give concrete expression tosocio-cultural phenomen a iSorokin ,1947) .

In the sense tha t symbolsconlmunicate , there may well be a

parallel betm een social struc tur e andspace organization w hich tells peoplesomething al)out how to behave andwha t to expect relative to world vie\\ ,hierarchies and tl ie like. In fact, Leach(1967) suggests that niuch of the workof social anthropology involves theinterpret ation of symbolic beha\ Tiou r .Artifacts generally, and 1)uildings andsett lenlents in particu lar , can then beseen as one type of symbol-structure,niaking concrete the inlniater ial ,s ~ ~ a c e l e s snd tinleless nature of values,meanings and tloriils of a society whichcannot be transm itted directly and need

vehicles ~v hic h xterna lize, socializeand ol~ jec i t fy hem (Sorok in , 191 7) .T,anguage, kin ship sys tems and th e likeare other such sets of symbol-structures,as ar e various fornls of no n-verbalbehaviour su ch as posture, ton e ofvoice and space structu ring. I n fact,I~uildin gs nd sett lenlents can be seenas heing partly a form of congealeds ~ a c e tr uc tt ir in g .

R e p r i n t e d f r o m t l i e I i lt ei .n a t& ; ~a l l o i ~ ~ i l a ifS g m b o l o g . ~Vo l . 1 K o . 3 A p r i l 1 9 i 0 , wi t h p ermi ss i o nof t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l of Sy mh o l o g l - .

-58



It seems that it is this insight into

the essentially symbolic nature of allbuilding, the building as the concreteexpression of a culture and world viewwhich unifies this aspect of the work ofEliade ( 1%1) and Langer (1953).That they should both reach a similarconclusion starting, as they do, fromvery different viewpoints seenis rathersignificant. Langer's view is that

syn~bolsn art express the idea of anemotion rather than the emotion itself

and that architecture makes visible theethnic dontain-something purelyimaginery and conceptual. The symbolicfunction of built form is then, I wouldsuggest, to place man in contact with an

ideal universe, an ideal etivironnient-the idea of a "good place.'' This seemslike a more general statement ofEliade's view that building amongprimitive people is an expression of aninrago nlundi which he also regards as

a way of taking possession of a pieceof the world by placing it in contact

with an ideal universe. The examplesthey both give-a circle of stonessevering holiness from the profane, or asingle stone marking the centre oraxis aiundi-demonstrate the symbolicprocess of making visible a sacred place.The specific high culture expressions,of mosque, church or temple, which Idiscussed above, can also be seen asspecific cases of this more general view.

Langer (1953) makes one moreimportant suggestion, that there must

be some congruence between the logicalstructures of synibol and objectsymbolized. This then means that inthe making concrete of the ethnicdonlain or the ittiago mzrndi theresulting space organization must belogically related to what is beingsymbolized no matter how difficult thiscorrespondence between built form andculture niay be to denionstrate inspecific terms a t this stage of ourknowledge. Yet some demonstration ispossible. One need only remember theclose correspondence between space

allocation and furnishings and status in

offices, reaching the stage where it isclearly and carefully specified in theBritish civil service manual. In fact,Reshers (1962) points out theimportance of symbols in providinginformation regarding social structureand behaviour. Hazard (1%2) has donethis for courtrooms, and Goodman(1959) for seat groupings.

To the extent that designedenvironments are symbols, they reflectand abstract the structure and idealsof a society and culture. They can beseen as artifacts giving conventionalizedinformation about status, territory andthe like. A s examples note the recentcontroversy about seating arrangementsand table shape at the Paris Vietnamtalks (Time, 1%8), as well as a recentphotograph (the source of which I wasunable to trace) showing two statesmensigning a treaty on a bridge-each

sitting on his territory, the border beingbetween them.

One possible reason for this verystrong tendency to symbolize in thisway niay be found in some recent views011 animal behaviour. While theuniqueness of man is most often definedin ternls of his use of symbols-as by

von Bertalanffy (1%6) and manyothers-some writers suggest that

animals show the essentialcharacteristics of a society, that ofproviding conventionalized contpetition.They point out that conventions andconventionalized behaviour are in the

nature of artifacts which becomesymbols with arbitrari ly definedmeaning. (Wynn-Edwards, 1%2)

Threats are often made through purelyformalized acts or postures showingoff a structure or other signal harmlessin itself but made formidable purelythrough association (for exampleantlers seen as symbolic structures(Hediger, 1955)) . Animals are alsosaid to accept decisions reachedthrough purely symbolic methods(Wynne-Edwards, 1%2) and ritualized

behaviour is seen as the essence of bothanimal and human societies, definingstatus, territory, etc. (Hediger, 1955).

The distinction between man andanimals niay lie in Royce's (1%5)distinction between a sign which hasone-to-one correspondence (which

seem to correspond more closely to theanimal exaniples) and symbols which

have one-to-many correspondence.

Alternatively, the distinction may lie invon Bertalanffy's (1966) definition ofsyn~bols s signs which are freely ratherthan biologically created, representsome content and are transmitted bytradition. That man is unique in the

scope of his synlbols, the creation ofa universe of synlbols and thedominance of symbols in his life isundeniable. Th e importance of the workon aninials lies in showing man'scontinuity with thein in this respect

as in so many others and hence theantiquity and fundamental nature ofsymbolic behaviour, specifically in

defining status, territory, and so on.So far I have discussed space

organization and designed environmentsas forms of synlbolic expression. Butone can also think of symbols as beinginvolved in the perception andconlprehension of the environment.After all, the perception of a problemand the definition of environmentalgoals must precede any design activity.Cultural variability seenis to be foundeven in visual perception (Segall,1966) ; f one accepts the Whorfianhypothesis it may be related to the

symbolic system par excellence-language. In any case, the perception

of the environment depends on thedefinition of categories. Bruner (1%8)considers perception to involve an act

of categorization based on a model ofthe world and hence related to values.This categorization eniploys designatawhich symbolize.

This process of categorizationinvolves the "breaking up" of the worldinto different "bits" and "chunks"



(as G. A. Miller calls them) whileMoles (1%) suggests that one way ofdealing with the bewildering amountof sensory and other information is bygrouping it into ever larger units, thelargest of which are symbols. It hasalso been widely held that messagesonly become meaningful when they arereceived and recognized. Symbols havebeen proposed as one of the most

important ways of changing the worldof signals into a world of meaningsand values. Symbols therefore helpman to understand the world and toform it into a meaningful culturalpattern which is given physicalembodiment through built form as wellas being expressed through writtenrecords, graphic symbols, song, myth,and many other symbol structures.

Symbols seen as that which organizesand gives meaning seem to be related toconcepts such as images and schemata.

It seems that the way we perceivereality and assess the quality of the

environment is by matching it againstschemata. It has even been suggestedthat we do not react to environmentalstimuli as such but rather to oursymbolization of them (Dubos, 1%9).At the same time the relative importanceattached to various categories andfeatures of the environment leads toboth selective perception and differencesin design solutions. Symbol structurestherefore, we can suggest, affect theperception of the environment, ourreaction to it, perception of problemsin it, solutions to the problems andevaluation of the failure or the successof any environmental solution ; .e.

environmental quality.

Symbols and Designers

If symbols are so important at alllevels of design and built form, whythen have they received such minimalattention from modern designers and indesign theory? The reason, I wouldsuggest, is the difficulty in the conscious

use of symbols in design, andmanipulation of the unconscioussymbols involved in the creation ofvernacular and designed forms. Thissuggestion requires some elaborationwhich is best begun by making anessential distinction between theperceptual and associational worldsand developing an argument from thatdistinction, as first proposed by Gibson

(1950). To an extent it is oneof degreerather than of kind, for there is ahierarchy of levels of meaning, rangingfrom concrete meaning (the ground),activity oriented meaning-the groundas something to be walked upon,through value and other meanings tothe other extreme of symbolic meaning-the ground as homeland, for example.This notion, and the greater importanceof symbolic as opposed to concretemeanings has, in fact, been useful inthe study of landscape and landscapepreferences. (Sonnenfeld, 1%6).

It is important to note that the

perception of an object becomes moreand more culturally determined as itpossesses ever higher levels of meaning.For example a plank raised a smalldistance above the ground is seen byall, can be perceived as a potential seatby most, but a throne can only beperceived as a throne by someonefamiliar with the concept of monarchy.'

The concrete and even use-meaningsof objects and environments are sharedby a wide variety of people; he higherlevels of meanings are far morepersonal and hence unpredictable. Tothe designer this means that theachieving of ends by the nlanipulation of

high level meanings, those in theassociational world, is more difficultand liable to chance than the achievingof ends by the manipulation of low levelmeanings. In simple terms, theperceptual world can be designed, theassociational world cannot. Forexample, pubs in England and ourculture, generally, are always associatedwith drink, although a New Guinea

tribesman would not have thatassociation. Whether this has positiveor negative associations, whether it isseen as pleasurable or otherwise, to bewelconled or avoided, is variable.Even more variable are one's ownassociations with a specific pub-itsmeaning for the group or the individualcannot be designed at all. As we haveseen above, attitudes and schemata

seem to affect the perceptual world butto a much smaller extent than theyaffect the associational world which hasmuch higher variability.

The perceptual and associationalworlds are linked ;we must have theformer before we can have the latter.The perceptual world is a necessary butnot sufficient condition for theassociational world. One cannotperceive a building as a suitable placefor prayer before one has perceived itas a building. In the past there weremany more fixed associations whichcould be manipulated because theyoccurred in traditional cultures withshared values and symbols. Today thisworks far less successfully because wehave a culture with multiple andshifting occasions. There may still besome very strong shared associationswith form in a given culture o r evenacross cultures such as the associationof roof with "Home." It may also bepossible that if certain forms werealways used in association with certainactivities, associations as low hierarchylevels would accrue;but this wouldnot work for higher level meanings.Historical, patriotic and personalassociations attach to buildings and

urban areas independently of the formand become increasingly variable andunpredictable.

This was the case even in the past. Asan example, ancient ruins were visiblein Rome throughout medieval times.They formed part of the perceptualworld and their use meaning was relatedto providing stone for building. Anyassociations were negativethey

1. This example andargument, w&e deBartlett School ofCollege. London.

parts of this portion of thew~th r. Ron Hawkes,

Arc ltecture. Universityelof? '



symbolized the devil's work. Wi th thestart of the Renaissance these sameruins suddenly took on vastlyheightened meaning and shifted fromthe perceptual to the associationalworld with a new set of associationssymbolizing a golden age, although theforms remained the same. T o giveanother example, Amsterdam has manysimilar houses, along the canals, all ofthem forming par t of the perceptualworld. They have some associationalaspects which are linked to their form-Amsterdam, Holland, Eighteenthcentury. Their associations may bemore variable at higher levels-charming, dull, desirable, undesirable.The Anna Frank house has verypowerful associations for some peoplewhich do not at al l depend on thephysical form of the house. From thispoint of view the separation ofperceptual and associational worlds isalmost complete and one cannot designfor associations in that sense. The

designer in general, therefore, has littlecontrol over the meaning which willattach to certain situations and whichgive additional levels of meaning andsignificance.

It is the symbolic nature of buildings,or rather the lack of acceptablesymbolism, which is at the back of thepublic's complaint that modernbuildings do not look like churches,houses, or others. In these cases thepublic is, in effect, complaining about abreak between the perceptual andassociational worlds rather wider thanwas the case in the past ; hey arecomplaining about the fact that theforms do not match even the low levelassociations and do not guide theni.

At this point we realize why symbolsin environmental design have beenregarded only historically and neglectedby the designers. I n the past it waspossible to design for many associations,although not the personal ones. If weaccept Hayakawa's (Royce, 1965)distinction between discursive symbols,

which are lexical and socially sharedand non-discursive (idiosyncratic)ones, I would argue that in the pastthere was a much wider area of socialagreement and less idiosyncraticvariation. Symbols in a given culturewere fixed, known and shared, both bythe public and the designers. A givenelement would always, or at least in mostcases, elicit the "right" responses

(i.e. the designed one)--or at leastwithin a narrow range of acceptability.The choices were greatly limited by theculture and these limitations accepted.Thi s was so in primitive and vernacularsituations and also in high styledesign. For example Giedion (1%3)points out that the ancient Egyptians,although familiar with the arch andvault, only used them where they couldnot be seen, since they did not matchthe symbolism of the building. Underthose conditions the associations weremuch more closely matched to formsthan is the case today.

Today it is far more difficult, ifnot inlpossible, to design in theassociational world since symbols areneither fixed nor shared. As a resultdesigners have eliminated all concernwith the associational world andrestricted themselves to the perceptualworld. This is linked with many aspectsof modern life. Eliade (1%1 ) , orexample, contrasts the religiousexperience of sacred space, which isstructured and shared, with the profaneexperience of space which is anlorphor-ous and personal. Similarly the religiousexperience of time is shared whilepersonal subjective time is not shared.Shared and structural associationscan be designed for, the personal onescannot. Analogies may be dangerousbut one is reminded of Hediger's ( 1955)description of domesticated animalsas those which have lost theirceremonial, space, and time systems.They have become aspatial andindependent of their environment.Hediger regards this as a pathological

condition. In design this has led to a"pathological" condition where thepersonal idiosyncratic symbols ofdesigners are used in design and thesedo not at all coincide with the public'sassociations and symbols.

Conclusion

Any attempt to design for associations

at levels below the personal will requireresearch in the area of symbols, therelation of forms to ranges of responses,the existence or otherwise of universalor at least transcultural symbols,means of developing shared synlbols,and so on. That certain associationsare still shared in a given culture isclear. "There is always an intimateconnection between a dwelling and thekind of existence led by those who livein it. 'Suburban semidetached,' 'slum,''country house,' and so on, signify for13ritons not just architectural stylesbut different positions in the social

system and different styles of life"(Middleton). I t may be possible to usethese, and to investigate the underlyingassociations of different forms.

In ally case there is a wide range ofgroups for which one must designtoday and frequently the users are alsounknown. The solution may then liein openendedness-not just of functionbut of meaning, so that people cantake possession by personalizing since,as we have seen, man takes possessionof the world through symbolic means. Ihave argued elsewhere that sincemeanings attached to buildings varywe need to have "loose fit" so thattnultiple meanings can be attached tothem without being out of touch withform and the designers' meanings(Rapport, 1%7). We therefore needmuch work on domains of significance,011 ranges of syn~bolsor differentgroups in connection with built form,the degrees of freed0111 desired andneeded in order to be able topersonalize and take possession. In



order for symbols to be clearly evokedthey require shared knowledge.

There must, therefore, be a greatersharing and understanding of therespective value and symbol structuresof the designers and the public whonow constitutes two cultures with fewsuch shared values, meanings andsymbols. Only if designers understandthe role of symbolism in design and alsohave some mutuality of symbols withat least some of the public, can thegrowing gap between the perceptualand associational worlds be narrowed.

References

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Moles, A. Information Theory and AestheticPerception. Urbana, Illinois: University Press,1966.

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Rapoport, A. Hmrse Forin and Culture. EnglewoodCliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-H all, 1969.

Royce J. (Ed.) Psychology and the Symbol. New~ o r k : andom House, 1965.

Scully, V. Th e Earth, the Temple and the Gods. NewHavcn: Yale University Press. 1962.

Segall, M.H. et a!. Th e IpPtcence of Cccltare onVisrcal Perce#troic. Ind~ anap olis : Bobbs-Merrill,1966.

Sonnenfeld, J. Values in Space and Landscape.Jotirnal of Social Issues, 1966, XXII. 71-83.

Sorokin, P.A. Society, Culture and Personality.New York: Harper, 1947.

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Von Behtalanffy L The Tree of Knowledge inG. Kepes (~d :) Sign, Imoge. Symbol. ~ e &wk:Braziller, 1966.

Wittkower. R. Architectural Principles in the Ageof Hrimanrsm. London: Tiranti, 1962.

Wolf A On Graphic Symbols International~ ~ ~ ; ~ a lf Symbology, 1969; 1. 13-19.

Wynne-Edwards, V.C. Anima l DisPersion in Rel&.onto Sonal Behav~mir.Edinburgh and London:Oliver and Boyd. 1962.



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