1G.R. No. 192957, September 29, 2014EMMANUEL B. MORAN, JR., (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HISWIDOW, CONCORDIA V. MORAN , Petitioner , v. OFFICE OF THEPRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY THEHONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA ANDPGA CARS, INC.,Respondents .FACTS: The late Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. fled with the ConsumerArbitration Ofce (CAO) a verifed complaint against privaterespondent PGA Cars, Inc. pursuant to the relevant provisionsof Republic Act No. 7394(RA 7394), otherwise known asthe Consumer Act of the Philippines.The complaint allegedthat the private respondent should be held liable for theproduct imperfections of a BMW car which it sold tocomplainant. CAO rendered a decision in favor of complainant and orderedprivate respondent to refund the purchase price of the BMWcar in addition to the payment costs of litigation andadministrative fnes. Defendant appealed such decision to the Secretary of theDepartment of Trade and Industry Sec. of DTC dismissed the appeal. Appeal to the Ofce of the President was fled who thengranted such and reversed the DTI resolution and dismissedthe complaint holding that private respondent cannot be heldliable for product defects which issue was never raised by thecomplainant and because the private respondent was not themanufacturer, builder, producer or importer of the subjectBMW car but only its seller. Complainant fled a petition for certiorari with the CA andalleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the OP for ruling oncases involving a violation of RA 7394. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that itwas a wrong mode of appeal. However, petitioner argues thatthe CA erred in denying the petition for certiorari which allegederror of jurisdiction on the part of the OP.She contends that incases alleging error of jurisdiction on the part of the OP, theproper remedy is to fle a petition for certiorari with the CAbecause appeal is not available to correct lack ofjurisdiction. Further, the petitioner claims that the OP lackedappellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the DTI in casesinvolving a violation of RA 7394 based on Article16611 thereof, which expressly confers appellate jurisdiction toreview such decisions of the DTI to the proper court through apetition for certiorari .Hence, the OP cannot be deemed asthe proper court within the purview of Article 166.The OP however contends that the Presidents power ofcontrol over the executive department grants him the power toamend, modify, alter or repeal decisions of the departmentsecretaries .ISSUE:Whether CA is correct in dismissing the petition for certitorari on theground that petitioner resorted to a wrong mode of appeal as the OPhaving jurisdiction of the case in controversy.RULING:No. The CA is incorrect in dismissing the petition as the OPs executivecontrol is not absolute.The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by AdministrativeOrder No. 18, Series of 1987.Section 1 thereof provides:SECTION 1.Unless otherwise governed by special laws , an appeal tothe Ofce of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days fromreceipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/ordercomplained of or appealed from(Emphasis supplied.)In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board ofInvestments,15 we interpreted the above provision and declared that adecision or order issued by a department or agency need not beappealed to the Ofce of the President when there is a special law thatprovides for a diferent mode of appeal.Such executive power of control over the acts of departmentsecretaries laid down in Section 17 Article VII of the 1987 Constitutionis not absolute. It may be efectively limited by the Constitution, by law,or by judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellateprocedure as in the instant case .Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exceptionto the remedy of appeal to the Ofce of the President from thedecisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1thereof, a decision or order issued by a department or agency need notbe appealed to the Ofce of the President when there is a special lawthat provides for a diferent mode of appeal.In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided forimmediate judicial relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary by fling apetition forcertiorari with the proper court. Hence, should haveelevated the case directly to the CA through a petition forcertiorari .In fling a petition for certiorari before the CA raising the issue of theOPs lack of jurisdiction, complainant Moran, Jr. thus availed of theproper remedy.MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III ET AL., G.R. NO. 209287, July 1, 2014Supreme Court partially granted the consolidated petitions for certiorariand prohibition and declared the following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances unconstitutional for violating Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fscal year and without complying with the statutory defnition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts;(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other ofces outside the Executive; and2(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Acts.The Court further declared void the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certifcation by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts(GAAs).Administrative law; Budget process; Implementation and funding of the Disbursement Allocation Program (DAP). Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifcally: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability.The DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring savings coming from the various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying thesavings and unprogrammed funds to augment existing [program, activity or project] or to support other priority PAPs.Administrative law; Nature of the DAP. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the mainactor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not contravene Section 29(1), Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufcient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, andthe identifcation of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance ofan appropriation made by law].Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI. The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the Constitution], must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective ofces; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective ofces; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective ofces.It is then indubitable that thepower to augment was to be used onlywhen the purpose for which the fundshad been allocated were already satisfed, or the need for such funds hadceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized. Thisinterpretation prevents the Executive from unduly transgressing Congress power of the purse.Savings, defned. The defnition of savings under the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or fnal discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efciencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets.The Court agreed with petitioners that respondents wereforcing the generation of savings in order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending. Respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments inthe middle of the fscal year, in efect deprived funding for PAPs withexisting appropriations under the GAAs.The mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of theAdministrative Code is to revert to the General Fund balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fscal year. The Executive couldnot circumvent this provision by declaringunreleased appropriations and unobligatedallotments as savings prior to theend of the fscal year.Augmentation is valid only when funding is defcient. The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be defcient, to wit: x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be defcient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.The President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress. The Court held that the savings pooled under the DAPwere allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in thepertinent GAAs. Although the [Ofce of the Solicitor General] rightly contends that the Executive was authorizedto spend in line with its mandate tofaithfully execute the laws (whichincluded the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretionthat allowed the President to substitutehis own will for that of Congress. Hewas still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, giventhat his power to spend pursuant tothe GAAs was but a delegation to himfrom Congress. Verily, the power tospend the public wealth resided inCongress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threatento undo the principleof separationof powers.Cross-border transfers or augmentations are prohibited. By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, andthe Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA for their respective ofces, Section 25(5) has delineated borders between their ofces, such that funds appropriated for one ofce are prohibited from crossing over to another ofce even in the guise of augmentation of a defcient item or items. 3Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5) disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited under Section 25(5).Operative fact doctrine. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifes the void law or executive act but sustains its efects.It providesan exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no efect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutionallaw or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.The operative fact doctrine applies to the implementation of the DAP. Todeclare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the ofces under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. Thatscenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equityalleviates such burden. Sanchez v. Commission on Audit Facts: Congress passed R.A. 7180 (General Appropriations Act of1992, w/c provided an appropriation for the DILG and setaside the amount of P75M for the DILGs Capability BuildingProgram (the fund). Atty. Mendoza, Project Director of the Ad Hoc Task Force forInter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy,informed then Deputy Executive Secretary de la Serna of theproposal to constitute and implement a shamrock type taskforce to implement local autonomy institutionalized under theLGC. The stated purpose for the creation of the task force wasto design programs, strategize and prepare modules for anefective program for local autonomy. The proposal was accepted by the Deputy ExecutiveSecretary and attested by then DILG Secretary Sarino, whoissued a memorandum for the transfer and remittance to theOfce of the President of the sum of P300K for the operationalexpenses of the task force.An additional cash advance ofP300K was requested. These amounts were taken from theFund. 2 cash advances both in the amount of P300K were withdrawnfrom the Fund by the DILG and transferred to the Cashier ofthe Ofce of the President. The frst cash advance wasliquidated (payroll, Ofce Rentals, etc.) although no receiptswere presented. There is no record of the liquidation of thesecond cash advance. However, upon post-audit conducted by the Departmentauditor the amounts were disallowed because: 1. No legalbasis for the created Task Force to claim payment thru DILGby way of cash advance; 2. Previous cash advance granted toaccountable ofcer has not yet been liquidated; 3.Expenditures funded from capability building are subject torestrictions/conditions embodied in the Special Provisions ofthe DILG Appropriations of R.A. 7180 which should be met; 4.Estimate of expenses covered by the cash advance notspecifed. A Notice of Disallowance was then sent to Mr. Sarino, et al.holding the latter jointly and severally liable for the amount anddirecting them to immediately settle the disallowance. The COA afrmed the disallowance.Issue: W/N there is legal basis for the transfer of funds of the CapabilityBuilding Program Fund appropriated in the 1992 General AppropriationAct from the Department of Interior and Local Government to the Ofceof the President.Position of the COA:- There is no legal basis because the Fund was meant to beimplemented by the Local Government Academy. Further,transfer of funds under Sec. 25(5), Art.VI of theConstitution maybemadeonlyby thepersonsmentioned in the section and may not be re-delegated beingalready a delegated authority.- Additionally, the funds transferred must come only fromsavings of the ofce in other items of its appropriation andmust be used for other items in the appropriation of the sameofce. In this case, there were no savings from whichaugmentation can be taken because the releases of funds tothe Ofce of the President were made at the beginning of thebudget year 1992. - Also, while the Fund is a regular appropriation, it partakes thenature of a trust fund because it was allocated for a specifcpurpose.Thus, it may be used only for the specifc purposefor which it was created or the fund received.The COAconcludes that petitioners should be held civilly and criminallyliable for the disallowed expenditures.Held: SC upheld decision of the COA. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of governmentfunds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds wereutilized for the purpose for which they had been intended. The power to transfer savings under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the1987 Constitution pertains exclusively to the President, thePresident of the Senate, the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, andthe heads of Constitutional Commissions and no other.Parenthetically, petitioners fail to point out to the Court thespecifc law and provision thereof which authorizes thetransfer of funds in this case. 4 Here, the power and authority to transfer in this case wasexercised not by the President but only at the instance of theDeputy Executive Secretary, not the Executive Secretaryhimself.Even if the DILG Secretary had corroborated theinitiative of the Deputy Executive Secretary, it does not evenappear that the matter was authorized by the President.Morefundamentally, even the President himself could not havevalidly authorized the transfer under the Constitution. There are two essential requisites in order that a transfer ofappropriation with the corresponding funds may legally beefected. First, there must be savings in the programmedappropriation of the transferring agency.Second, there mustbe an existing item, project or activity with an appropriation inthe receiving agency to which the savings will be transferred. Actual savings is a sine qua non to a valid transfer of fundsfrom one government agency to another.The word actualdenotes that something is real or substantial, or existspresently in fact as opposed to something which is merelytheoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical. The President,Chief Justice, Senate President, and the heads ofconstitutional commissions need to frst prove and declare theexistence of savings before transferring fund. By the nature of maintenance and operating expenses,savings may generally be determined at the end of the year, orearlier in case of completion, discontinuance or abandonmentof the work for which the appropriation was authorized.Incontrast, savings from personal services may generally bedetermined even at the opening of the fscal year in case ofunpaid compensation pertaining to vacant positions andleaves of absence without pay. It should be emphasized thatthe 1992 GAA did not provide an appropriation for personalservices for the Capability Building Program.Savings fromvacant positions which pertain to personal services, therefore,may not be considered savings from the Fund which may betransferred. There is no question that there were no savingsfrom the Fund at the time of the transfer. Thus, the responsible public ofcials are personally liable forthe disallowed disbursement by virtue of their position aspublic ofcials held accountable for public funds.Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)1.Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)(Constitutionality of RA 10153)/CONSTITUTIONALFacts:RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation of ARMM.Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for the date of the election; RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140November 26, 2001, RA 93332nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three years thereafter.Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.Several people, including herein plaintif assailed the constitutionality ofthe said enactment.Issue/s:1.WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the power to appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be flled during the May 2013 elections.Held:1.Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there is no incompatibility between the Presidents power ofsupervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specifc confnes of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.The power of supervision is defned as the power of a superior ofcer to see to it that lower ofcers perform their functions in accordance withlaw. This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an ofcer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate ofcer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power includes the power to remove these ofcials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people.Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The provision states:Section 3. Appointment of Ofcers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint ofcers-in-charge for the Ofce of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said ofces until the ofcials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualifed and assumed ofce.The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the ofces of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same ofcials will remain in ofce until they are replaced by the duly elected ofcials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.DE CASTRO VS. JBCMARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYOG.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election.5Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be flled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Councilfor every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be flled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of theConstitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appointmembers of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifcations for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specifed period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor ofChief Justice Puno upon his retirement.HELD:Yes. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fll a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in confict.The frst, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, fve, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be flled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specifcation was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does notrefer to the Members of the Supreme Court.Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specifcation was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does notrefer to the Members of the Supreme Court.Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they afect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistentwith the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.DIGEST: Nazareth v.s. Villar G.R. 188635 (2013)Facts: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to provide a program for human resources development in science and technology in order to achieve and maintain thenecessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery. Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefts (Magna Carta benefts) to the covered ofcials and employees of the Department of Scienceand Technology (DOST). Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefts are to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439. The DOST Regional Ofce No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefts to the covered ofcials and6employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specifc appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas, after conducting a post-audit, issued several NDs (Notice of Disallowance) disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefts. The provision for the use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) was vetoed by the President; hence, there was no basis for the payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefts according to the State Auditor. DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Ofce of the President (OP) for the authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefts. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr., With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting authority to use savings from the appropriations of that Department and its agencies for the payment of Magna Carta Benefts as provided for in R.A. 8439, please be informed that the said request is hereby approved. Petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefts for the period covering CY 1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in the GAA of 1998.Issue: Is the act of the Executive Secretary falls under Article VI, Section 25 (5) which provides (5) No law shall be passedauthorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective ofces from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.Held:Yes. Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings from one item to another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control and supervision. This is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize the department heads to use savings toaugment other items of appropriations within the Executive Branch. Such power could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under the doctrine of qualifed political agency enunciated by theSupreme Court in the case of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the ofcial acts of a Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the President, was legal and valid but in so far as the use of agencys savings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in2001, the authority granted on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.The April 12, 2000 Memorandum was not a blanket authority from the OP to pay the benefts out of the DOSTs savings. Although the Memorandum was silent as to the period covered by the request for authority to use the DOSTs savings, it was clear just the same that the Memorandum encompassed only CY 1998, CY 1999 and CY 2000. The limitation of its applicability to those calendar years was based on the tenor of the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. to the efect that the DOST had previously used its savings to pay the Magna Carta benefts in CY 1998 and CY 1999; that the 2000 GAA did not provide for the useof savings; and that the DOST personnel were looking forward to the Presidents favorable consideration. The Memorandum could only be read as an authority covering the limited period until and inclusive of CY 2000. The text of the Memorandum was also bereft of any indication that the authorization was to be indefnitely extended to any calendar year beyond CY 2000. As we see it, the COA correctly ruled on the matter at hand. Article VI Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitutionfrmly declares that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury exceptin pursuance of an appropriation made by law. This constitutional edictrequires that the GAA be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations. As such, the requirement under Section 2013 of R.A. No. 8439 that the amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta benefts were to be appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must be purposefully, deliberately, and precisely included in the GAA. The funding for the Magna Carta benefts would not materialize as a matter of course simply by fat of R.A. No. 8439, but must initially be proposed by the ofcials of the DOST as the concernedagency for submission to and consideration by Congress. That processis what complies with the constitutional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment of the benefts because the GAA did not mirror every provision of law that referred to it as the source of funding. It is worthy to note that the DOST itself acknowledged the absolute need for the appropriation in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte, Jr.would not have needed to request the OP for the express authority to use the savings to pay the Magna Carta benefts.GR No. 183591Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of SultanKudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas-vs-Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and respondents in intervention Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,FACTS:On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and ofcial copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slatedsigning of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. 7They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.ISSUES: Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;RULINGS:There is a suspensive provision inthe MOA-AD that provides any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon efecting the necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in efect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of ofce, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.G.R. No. 160093 July 31, 2007MALARIA EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (MEWAP), represented by its National President, DR. RAMON A. SULLA, and MEWAP DOH Central OfceChapter President, DR. GRACELA FIDELA MINA-RAMOS, and PRISCILLA CARILLO, and HERMINIO JAVIER, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, (substituting the former Executive Secretary Renato de Villa), THEHONORABLE SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL DAYRIT and THEHONORABLE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, respondents.FACTS:President Estrada issued E.O. No. 165 "Directing the Formulation of anInstitutional Strengthening and Streamlining Program for the Executive Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on Executive Governance (PCEG) composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) as co-chair.The DBM issued the Notice of Organization, Stafng and Compensation Action (NOSCA). PCEG likewise issued Memorandum Circular No. 62, entitled "Implementing Executive Order No. 102, Series of 1999 Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health."2 M.C. No. 62 directed the rationalization and streamlining of the said Department.Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No. 136, Series of 2000, ordering the Undersecretary, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau or Service Directors and Program Managers of the Department of Health to direct all employees under their respective ofces to accomplish and submit the Personal Information Sheet due to the approval of the Department of Health Rationalization and Streamlining Plan.Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of afected employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP fled a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila seeking to nullify Department Memorandum, the NOSCA and the Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and other issuances implementing E.O. No. 102.ISSUES:Whether the President has authority under Section 17, Article VIII of the Constitution to efect a reorganization of a department under the executive branch.Whether there has been abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of former President Joseph E. Estrada in issuing Executive Order No. 102, Redirecting the functions and operations of the Department of Health.RULING:Yes. We deny the petition.The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:8Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and ofces. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public ofce is lodged with the legislature.This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public ofce is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the ofce was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or ofces inthe executive department are concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular ofce, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.9The Presidents power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures, viz.:SEC. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifcally enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.10Petitioners argue that the residual powers of the President under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 refer only to the Ofce of the President and not to the departments, bureaus or ofces within the executive branch. They invoke Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book IIIof the same law, viz.:Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Ofce. The President, subject to the policy inthe Executive Ofce and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efciency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Ofce of the President. x x xThe interpretation of petitioners is illogically restrictive and lacks legal basis. The residual powers granted to the President under Section 20, Title I, Book III are too broad to be construed as having soleapplication to the Ofce of the President. As correctly stated by respondents, there is nothing in E.O. No. 292 which provides that the continuing authority should apply only to the Ofce of the President.13 If such was the intent of the law, the same should have been expressly stated. To adopt the argument of petitioners would result to two conficting provisions in one statute. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given efect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conficting provisions. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.14IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65475 dated September 12, 2003 is AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENRG.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENR andSecretaryGR. No. 175368April 11, 2013Topic: General Supervision of Local Governments & AutonomousRegions - Art. X, Sec. 4 & 16NATURE OF THE CASEPetition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that the Courtorder the following: (1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code) and Section 24 of R.A. 7076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991);(2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and(3) declare as illegal the DENR Secretarys nullifcation, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.THE PARTIESPetitioner: League of Provinces - a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under the Local Government Code; it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Province of Bulacan; it states that its petition is a collective action of all provinces 9through the League, as a favorable ruling will beneft all provinces and all local governmentsRespondent:DENR and DENR Secretary Angelo ReyesOther parties: Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) applicant for a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA); fled before Mines and Geosciences Bureau,Regional Ofce No. III (MGB-RO); application was denied twice Mercado, Cruz, Cruz and Sembrano (MCCS) applicants for Quarry Permit; fled before the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Ofce (PENRO) of Bulacan Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) applicant for Exploration Permit; fled before the PENRO of BulacanTHE FACTS Golden Falcon applied for FTAA (Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement) before the MGB-RO April 29, 1998 - MGB-RO denied Golden Falcons application for FTAA on for failure to secure the required area clearances from theForest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR-RO. Golden Falcon appealed the denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central Ofce (MGB-CO) February 10, 2004 - pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO, MCCS fled with the PENRO of Bulacan their applications forquarry permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA application. July 16, 2004 MGB-CO fnally denied Golden Falcons appeal September 13, 2004 - AMTC fled with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration permit covering the same subject area. Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons applying for quarry permits the contention was the date the area of Golden Falcons application became open to other permit applicationsfrom other parties October 19, 2004 - upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB Director Ramos stated that the denial of Golden Falcons application became fnal on August 11, 2004, or ffteen days after Golden Falcon received the order of denial of its application. Hence, the area of Golden Falcons application became open to permit applications only on that date. Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Ofcer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating that the subject area became open for new applications on the date of the frst denial on April 29, 1998 (MGB-ROs order of denial), as MGB-COs order of denial on July 16, 2004 was a mere reafrmation of the MGB-ROs April 29 order; hence, the reckoning period should be April 29. Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsedthe applications for quarry permit, now apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the Governor of Bulacan. PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said applications. Eventually, the Governor issued the small-scale mining permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullifed and cancelled the governors issuance of small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that the area was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO denial). Hence, the applications for quarry permit fled on February 10, 2004 were null as these were fled when the area was still closed to mining location. On the other hand, AMTC fled its application when the area was already open to other mining applicants, hence, its application was valid. The small-scale mining permits were also issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining program. THE ISSUES1. Whether DENRs act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR Secretary substituted the judgment of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.2. Whether or not Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of the Small-Scale Mining Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and ExecDepts) has the power of supervision only, not control over acts of LGUsTHE RULING: DENR Secs act was valid and authorized pursuant to its power ofreview under the RA 7076 and its IRR; Assailed statutes did notovercome the presumption of constitutionality, hence, are notunconstitutional. Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining inthe provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or TheLocal Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the People'sSmall Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or thePhilippine Mining Act of 1995.Control - the power of an ofcer to alter or modify or set asidewhat a subordinate ofcer had done in the performance of his/herduties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latterSupervision - the power of a superior ofcer to see to it that lowerofcers perform their function in accordance with law. The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X,Sec. 2 of the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomyof the LGUs or the decentralization of government authority. Itdoes not make local governments within the State. Administrativeautonomy may involve devolution of powers, but it is still subject tolimitations, like following national policies or standards and thoseprovided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring ofLGUs and the allocation of powers/responsibilities/resourcesamong the LGUs and local ofcials are placed by the Constitutionto Congress under Article X Section 3. It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the Statesconstitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,development and utilization of the countrys natural resources,10pursuant to the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC.Hence, the enforcement of the small-scale mining law by theprovincial government is subject to the supervision, controland review of the DENR. The LGC did not fully devolve to theprovincial government the enforcement of the small-scalemining law. RA 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining program wasestablished to be implemented by the DENR Secretary incoordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA7076). Section 24 of the law makes the Provincial/ MiningRegulatory Board under the direct supervision and control ofthe Secretary, its powers and functions subject to review bythe same. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and its IRR to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conficts, or litigations over conficting claims. This quasi-judicial power of the DENR can neither be equated with substitution of judgment of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor control over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of the AMTC over conficting claims based on the law. In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullifed, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear andbeyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the grounds raised by the petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 17 b(3)(iii) of theLGC and Section 24 of RA 7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of the law.Hence, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Eduardo ErmitaWhile Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 othersenators fled a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else.On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an ofcer in the civil serviceprovided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued thead interim appointments this also proves that the president was in good faith.It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the presidents to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confdence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifcations to an ofce, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.The ofce of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego ofthe President, the acting appointee to the ofce must necessarily have the Presidents confdence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient thatthe acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president may temporarily designate an ofcer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an ofce in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.Doctrine: Promotional appointmentsCase: Funa v COAFacts:Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 andduring the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar wasdesignated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April14, 2008.Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated andappointed as Chairman of the COA.Shortly thereafter, on June 11,2008, the Commission on Appointments confrmed his appointment.He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicatedin the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of hisofce as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged inthis recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold onthe chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairmanaccorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. Hewould argue, in fne, that his term of ofce, as such chairman, is up to11February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when hewas appointed to that position.Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura)was appointed as COA Commissioner to serve the unexpired term ofVillar as Commissioner or up to February 2, 2011.Issues:Whether or not Villars appointment as COA Chairman, whilesitting in that body and after having served for four (4) years of hisseven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the termlimitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in,Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the ConstitutionRULLING:WHEREFORE the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.Theappointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position ofChairman of the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N.Carague, whose term of ofce as such chairman has expired, is herebydeclared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) ofthe Constitution.Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, reads:(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall beappointed by the President with the consent of theCommission on Appointments for a term of seven yearswithout reappointmen t. Of those frst appointed, the Chairmanshall hold ofce for seven years, one commissioner for fveyears, and the other commissioner for three years, withoutreappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only forthe unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor . In nocase shall any member be appointed or designated in atemporary or acting capacity. (Emphasis added.)Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those frst appointed, the Chairman shall hold ofce for seven years, one commissioner for fve years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.The Court fnds petitioners position bereft of merit. The faw lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity,it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.The frst sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing him to appointan additional or two more commissioners.On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualifed by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointmentto the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman,provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year termfrom February 2008 to February 2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word reappointment, there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be constitutionally ofensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.12In net efect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would efectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the frst set of commissioners, a fxed term of ofce of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of ofce of the frst set of commissioners, shall always be for a fxed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entireperiod, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the frst appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifes that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same ofce (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving amovement to a diferent position or ofce (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.CSC vs PILILLA WATER WATER DISTRICTFacts: Paulino J. Rafanan was frst appointed General Manager (GM) on a coterminous status by the Board of Directors (BOD) of the Pililla Water District (PWD). On June 16, 2004, the BOD approved a Resolution for the extension of service of Rafanan- who is reaching his age 65 on that month of 2004. The CSC denied the request of PWD forthe extension of service of Rafanan and considered the latter "separated from the service at the close of ofce hours on his 65th birthday. However, On April 8, 2005, the PWD reappointed Rafanan as GM on coterminous status. Said reappointment was signed by Chairman Paz and attested by the CSC Field Ofce-Rizal.Pililla Mayor Leandro V. Masikip, Sr. questioned Rafanans coterminousappointment as defective and void ab initio considering that he was appointed to a career position despite having reached the compulsory retirement age. Three years later, the CSC invalidated the coterminous appointment issued to Rafanan as GM on the ground that it was made in violation of Section 2 of R.A. No. 9286-which in efect placed the position of GM of a water district in the category of career service. It posits that this can be inferred from the removal of the sentence "Said ofcer shall serve atthe pleasure of the Board," and replaced it with the sentence "Said ofcer shall not be removed from ofce, except for cause and after due process." The CA reversed the CSC and ruled that the position of GM in water districts remains primarily confdential in nature and hence, BOD may validly appoint Rafanan to the said position even beyond the compulsory retirement age. Issue: Whether under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 as amended by R.A. No. 9286, the position of GM of a water district remains as primarily confdential.Held: Yes. In the case of the General Manager of a water district, Section 24 in relation to Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended, reveals the close proximity of the positions of the General Manager andBOD.SEC. 24. Duties.The duties of the General Manager and other ofcers shall be determined and specifed from time to time by the Board. The General Manager, who shall not be a director, shall have 13full supervision and control of the maintenance and operation of water district facilities, with power and authority to appoint all personnel of thedistrict: Provided, That the appointment of personnel in the supervisory level shall be subject to approval by the Board. (As amended by Sec.10, PD 768) It is established that no ofcer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are contractual and coterminous in nature. Since the position of General Manager of a water district remains a primarily confdential position whose term still expires upon loss of trust and confdence by the BOD provided that prior notice and due hearing are observed, it cannot therefore be said that the phrase "shall not be removed except for cause and after due process" converted such position into a permanentappointment. Signifcantly, loss of confdence may be predicated on other causes for removal provided in the civil service rules and other existing laws. In fne, since the position of General Manager of a water district remains a primarily confdential position, Rafanan was validly reappointed to said position by respondent's BOD on April 8, 2005 under coterminous status despite having reached the compulsory retirement age. Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.ONG VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT[GR NO. 184219, JANUARY 30, 2012]Doctrine:Temporary appointments are made if only to prevent hiatus in the government's rendition of public service. However, a temporary appointee can be removed even without cause and at a moment's notice. As to those with eligibilities, their rights to security of tenure pertain to ranks but not to the positions to which they were appointed.Facts:The petitioner [Ong] joined the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) as a career employee in 1978. He held theposition of NBI Director I from July 14, 1998 to February 23,1999 and NBI Director II from February 24, 1998 toSeptember 5, 2001. On September 6, 2001, petitioner wasappointed Director III by the President. His appointment paperpertinently reads: Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, the following arehereby appointed to the NATIONAL BUREAU OFINVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE co-terminuswith the appointing authority: SAMUEL B. ONG - DIRECTORIII(vice Carlos S. Caabay) [DEPUTY DIRECTOR] Petitioner received from respondent Reynaldo Wycoco amemorandum informing him that his appointment, being co-terminus with the appointing authority's tenure, would endefectively at midnight on June 30, 2004 and, unless a newappointment would be issued in his favor by the Presidentconsistent with her new tenure efective July 1, 2004, hewould be occupying his position in a de facto/hold[-]overstatus until his replacement would be appointed. On December 01, 2004, the President appointed respondentVictor A. Bessat as NBI Director III as replacement of thepetitioner. Consequently, respondent Wycoco notifed thepetitioner that, efective on December 17, 2004, the lattershould cease and desist from performing his functions as NBIDirector III in view of the presidential appointment ofrespondent Bessat as petitioner's replacement. The petitionerreceived the aforementioned notice only on January 27, 2005.[7] (underscoring supplied and citations omitted) On February 22, 2005, Ong fled before the CA a petition for quowarranto. He sought for the declaration as null and void of (a) hisremoval from the position of NBI Director III; and (b) his replacement byrespondent Victor Bessat (Bessat). Ong likewise prayed forreinstatement and backwages. Issue:Whether petitioner has been removed from his position as NBI Director IIIHeld:The petition is bereft of merit.MC No. 02-S.2004 did not remove Ong from the position of Director III. Assuming arguendo that it did, the defect was cured when the President, who was the appointing authority herself, in whose hands were lodged the power to remove, appointed Bessat, efectively revoking Ong's appointment. MC No. 02-S.2004,[30] addressed to Ong, Bessat, Deputy DirectorNestor Mantaring, and Regional Director Edward Villarta, in part reads: Records indicate your appointment status as co-terminus withthe appointing power's tenure which ends efectively atmidnight of this day, 30 June 2004. Unless, therefore, a new appointment is extended to you byHer Excellency GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, consistentwith her new tenure efective 01 July 2004, your services shalllapse into a de facto/hold[-]over status, to ensure continuity ofservice, until your replacements are appointed in your stead.[31] President appointed Bessat as Ong's replacement.[32] Bessat wasnotifed on December 17, 2004. Wycoco furnished Ong with a Notice,[33] dated December 20, 2004, informingthe latter that he should cease from performing the functions of DirectorIII, efective December 17, 2004. 14It is argued that in the hands of the appointing authority arelodged the power to remove. Hence, Wycoco allegedly actedbeyond the scope of his authority when he issued MC No. 02-S.2004. This Court notes that MC No. 02-S.2004 did not in efectremove Ong from his post. It merely informed Ong that records of theNBI showed that his co-terminous appointment had lapsed into adefacto /hold-over status. It likewise apprised him of the consequences ofthe said status. Be that as it may, if we were to assume for argument's sakethat Wycoco removed Ong from his position as Director III by virtue ofthe former's issuance of MC No. 02-S.2004, still, the defect was curedwhen the President herself issued Bessat's appointment on December1, 2004. The appointing authority, who in this case was the President,had efectively revoked Ong's appointment. Ong lacked the CES eligibility required for the position of Director III and his appointment was co-terminus with the appointing authority. His appointment being both temporary and co-terminous in nature, it can be revoked by the President even without cause and at a short notice. FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case DigestFacts:After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fed to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.Issue:Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines? Ruling:The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest.This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.The documented history of the eforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos.The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from takingpreemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government.The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or withgrave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.VFP vs. ReyesFacts: Petitioner Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) is a corporate body organized under Republic Act No. 2640. Sometime in August 2002, petitioner received a letter from Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) to conduct Management Audit of VFP pursuant to RA 2640, where it stated that VFP is under the supervision and control of the Secretary of National Defense. Petitioner complained about the broadness of audit and requested suspension until issues are threshed out, which was subsequently denied by DND. As a result, petitioner sought relief under Rule 65 assailing that it is a private non-government corporation. Issue: Whether or not veterans federation created by law is a public ofce, considering that it does not possess a portion of the sovereign functions of the government and considering further that, it has no budgetary appropriation from DBM and that its funds come frommembership dues.Ruling: Yes, petitioner is a public corporation. In Laurel v. Desierto, public ofce is defned as the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised for the beneft of the public. In the instant case, the functions of VFP the protection of the interests of war veterans which promotes social justice and reward patriotism certainly fall within the category of sovereign functions. The fact that VFP has no budgetary appropriation is only a product of erroneous application of the law by public ofcers in the DBM which will not bar subsequent correct application. Hence, placing it under the control and supervision of DNDis proper.Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora360 SCRA 718 Law on Public Ofcers Security of Tenure in a Public Ofce No Vested Right to a Public Ofce Power to Create and Destroy Public Ofce During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily 15conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to abolish a public ofce, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and thatthe abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.HELD: No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public ofce islodged with the legislature. The exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other ofces under the executive department, the president may deactivate them pursuant to control power over such ofces, unless such ofce is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the presidents power to reorganize the Ofce of the President. Basis of such power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of thePhilippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish ofces, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. Yes, the President has the authority to do so. Sec. 48 of RA 7645 provides: Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and ofces and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public servicesand which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. X X X. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be efected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Ofce of the President.Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations has always exceeded P100 million per year. To save the government some money, it needed to abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation just P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest.Lastly, EEIB employees right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no bad faith in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infrm. Valid abolition of ofces is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public ofce ceases to exist, there is no separation ordismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold ofce. Except constitutional ofces which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an ofce or its salary.Canonizado v. Aguirre323 SCRA 312FACTS:Respondents are seeking a reconsideration of the Courts 25 January 2000 decision, wherein it declares Section 8 of R.A. No. 8551 to be violative of petitioners constitutionally mandated right to security of tenure. The Court holds the petitioners removal as NAPOLCOMs Commissioners and the appointment of new Commissioners in their stead were nullities, and ordering their reinstatement and payment of full back wages. Respondents point out that Canonizado was appointed by the Pres. Estrada to the position of Inspector General of the Internal Afairs Service (IAS) of the PNP in the interim. According tothe respondents, by virtue of the fact, Canonizado is deemed to have tohave abandoned his claim for reinstatement, since the ofces of the NAPOLCOM Commissioner and the Inspector General of IAS are incompatible.ISSUE: Whether Canonizados appointment to and acceptance of the position of Inspector General should result is an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM.HELD: NO. There is no question that the position of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible with each other. As pointed out by respondents, RA 8551 prohibits any personnel of the IAS from sitting in a committee charge with the task of deliberating on the appointment, promotion or assignment of any PNP personnel, whereas the NAPOLCOM has the power of control and supervision over the PNP. However, the rule on incompatibility of dutieswill not apply to the case at bar because at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the two ofces simultaneously. Canonizado was forced out of his frst ofce by the enactment of Section 8 of RA 8551.Thus, when Canonizado was appointed as Inspector General he had ceased to discharge his ofcial functions as NAPOLCOM Commissioner. Thus, to reiterate, the incompatibility of duties rule never had a chance to come into play for petitioner never occupied the two positions, of Commissioner and Inspector General, nor discharged their respective functions, concurrently.SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary 421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085February 3, 2004Facts: Some three-hundred junior ofcers and enlisted men of the AFP haveseized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained ofthe corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support forthe government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretaryof Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation ofArticle 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of ProclamationNo. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared underthe State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the ofcers wentback to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1,2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and16Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellionwas issued. In the interim, however, the following petitions were fled: (1)SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVESECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of theConstitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion tocall out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for suchproclamation. (2)SJS Ofcers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, etal, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention ofthe report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend thatthe presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise ofemergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power tothe President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyoand Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there wasusurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), ArticleVI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears thatthe declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to theunconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime ofrebellion. Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 areconstitutional? Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi tobring suit? Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 andGeneral Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does notexpressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in additionto its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitutionexecutive powers. It is not disputed that the President has fulldiscretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine thenecessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examinewhether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in amanner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitionershere have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the Presidentacted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the reportis of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals havereplaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over thefunctions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislativepower of the Congress is of no moment since the President, indeclaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, wasmerely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on thePresident by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to thedelegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person maybe subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crimepunishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a validwarrantless arrest is present. Petitioners: DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-GENERALERespondents : HON. RONALDO PUNO, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICEFACTS:The day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawlessviolence in the named places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM.The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. It is pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-Chief.The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on herwisdom.The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killingsISSUE:WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato CityHELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.17Lacson vs Sec. PerezPresident Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mobarmed with explosives, frearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones andother deadly weapons assaulting and attempting to break intoMalacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was astate of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issuedGeneral Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines andthe Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the NationalCapital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders andpromoters of the rebellion were thereafter afected.Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the