sunflower v ca

8/4/2019 Sunflower v CA

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/sunflower-v-ca 1/35

G.R. No. 136274. September 3, 2003]

SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, represented by FLORO ARAGAN, petitioners,vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL LACAP PHIMNA, MeTC,

Branch 77, Paraaque City and ELISA MAGLAQUI-CAPARAS, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the July 16, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.46861 (a) declaring null and void the injunction orders respectively issued by Judge Amelita Tolentinoin Civil Case No. 96-0253, for Expropriation, and Judge Rolando G. How in Civil Case No. 96-0480, forProhibition with Preliminary Injunction; and (b) ordering the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 78, to enforce its July 8, 1996 Writ of Demolition. The dispositive portionread:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the injunction orders subject of the instant petition are herebyDECLARED NULL AND VOID. Corollary thereto, the Court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 78,

Paraaque, is hereby directed to ENFORCE its Writ of Demolition dated July 8, 1996.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as executrix of the testate estate of Macaria Maglaqui, filed on March 16, 1993 a complaint for unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 8550)against Alfredo Mogar and 46 other persons who were occupying several parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B,C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United Paraaque Subdivision IV, Metro Manila. These parcels of land arecovered by individual transfer certificates of title registered in the name of Macaria Maglaqui, privaterespondents mother.

The MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, eventually decided in favor of private respondent. On appeal,the decision of the MeTC was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66.Mogar et al. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but their petition was dismissed by theappellate court on December 12, 1994. After the dismissal became final, a writ of demolition wasissued by the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78. The writ, however, was not immediatelyimplemented because the case was transferred to Branch 77 of the same court. On February 6, 1997,Mogar et al. filed a petition with the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257, presided over by JudgeRolando G. How, to enjoin the implementation of the writ of demolition. However, this petition wasdenied and subsequently, an alias writ of demolition was issued by Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of MeTCBranch 77, the court of origin.

The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this time due to the ex parte issuance of a writof preliminary injunction by Judge Amelita Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation case (CivilCase No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of Paraaque against the Testate Estate of MacariaMaglaqui.

Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots I-F and I-G)subject of the unlawful detainer case, organized themselves into the Sunflower NeighborhoodAssociation (Sunflower), the petitioner herein. On November 18, 1996, Sunflower, represented by oneFloro Aragan, filed a complaint for prohibition/injunction with preliminary injunction against privaterespondent also with the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257. Sunflower argued that its membersshould be excluded from the demolition order as they were not parties to the original unlawfuldetainer case. To include their houses in the demolition would be to deprive them of due process. Thistime, Judge How granted the injunction and ordered the exclusion of the houses belonging topetitioner from demolition.

Thus, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals (CA GR SP No. 46861) assailing both the injunction orders issued by Judge Tolentino in theexpropriation case and by Judge How in the prohibition case.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent holding that, as the judgment in the unlawfuldetainer case had already become final, the execution could not be enjoined. Consequently, the MeTCof Paraaque City, Branch 77 issued another alias writ of demolition on September 14, 1998.

In order to stay the execution of the writ of demolition, Sunflower filed on January 7, 1999 an urgentmotion in this Court for the issuance of a status quo order. This we granted in a resolution datedJanuary 20, 1999. Prior to the issuance of our resolution, however, the writ of demolition wasimplemented on January 14, 1999. Petitioner thus filed a motion to allow its members to return to thepremises, which we granted in another resolution dated April 28, 1999. Thereafter, we required bothparties to submit their memoranda.

Sometime in November 1998, the group of Mogar et al. filed in this Court a petition for review of thedecision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR SP No. 46861. However, we dismissed the same on January

18, 1999 for failure of said petitioners to comply with certain procedural requirements, including theirfailure to submit a certification of non-forum shopping.



For its part, petitioner Sunflower likewise assailed the same decision of the Court of Appeals in thispetition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Before we proceed, it should be pointed out that any issue relating to the expropriation case (CivilCase No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of Parañaque has been rendered moot by the dismissal of that case. This Court, in a Resolution dated January 29, 2003, the presiding judge of the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 274 to report on the status of the expropriation case filed by the Municipalityof Parañaque against herein private respondent. The presiding judge reported that the case wasalready dismissed on June 1, 1999 in an order issued by then Presiding Judge Amelita Tolentino whogranted the motion to dismiss filed by herein private respondent. Said dismissal was not challenged bythe Municipality of Paraaque.

The basic issue before us is whether petitioners members, who were not parties to the unlawfuldetainer case, may be ejected from the land subject of this case.

We rule in the affirmative. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded andgiven an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has notbeen impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendantfraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of

the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) asublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.

In the case at bar, the records show that petitioners members are trespassers or squatters who do nothave any right to occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the ownership of theparcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that the subject property is owned by MacariaMaglaqui, mother of private respondent. Petitioner failed to establish any right which would entitle itsmembers to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioners onlydefense against the eviction and demolition orders is their supposed non-inclusion in the originaldetainer case. This defense, however, has no legal support since its members are trespassers orsquatters who are bound by the judgment.

Petitioners argument that the parcels of land occupied by its members (Lots I-F and I-G) were not

included in the original ejectment complaint has no basis. The complaint private respondent filed withthe MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, clearly included Lots I-F and I-G as part of the subject matterunder litigation in the unlawful detainer case. Thus, petitioners members, together with all the partiesin the unlawful detainer case, must vacate the disputed land.

The Court commiserates with respondent, already in her twilight years, who has been unlawfullydeprived of her land for a good number of years. Thus, we exhort the court of origin to execute thisdecision with reasonable dispatch, consistent with the requirements of Section 28 of RA 7279 andEO 152, on eviction and demolition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SPNo. 46861 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.



[G.R. No. 150633 : November 12, 2003]

HEIRS OF DEMETRIO MELCHOR, represented by CLETO MELCHOR, petitioners, vs. JULIO MELCHOR,respondent .

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J .:

The Municipal Trial Court would not have jurisdiction over a purported unlawful detainer suit, if the complaint failsto allege jurisdictional facts.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August16, 2001 Decision2and the October 18, 2001Resolution3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 63465. Thedispositive portion of the assailed Decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordinglyDISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Joint Decision dated February 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of

Cauayan, Isabela which embodied the assailed judgment inCivil Case No. 20-1125 and affirmed the Decision dated September 1, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, dismissing the complaint for ejectment of the petitioners in Civil Case No. 2325 , entitledHeirs of Demetrio Melchor represented by Cleto Melchor v. Julio Melchor, is hereby AFFIRMED and REITERATED.

Costs against the petitioners.4

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:

Petitioners, who are the heirs of DEMETRIO MELCHOR, claim to be the owners, by

way of succession, of the subject property allegedly in possession of respondentJULIO MELCHOR. The subject property is a portion of the twenty (20) hectares of land registered in the name of PEDRO MELCHOR, evidenced by Original Certificateof Title No.I-6020 of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela. The said property waspurchased by the late DEMETRIO MELCHOR from PEDRO MELCHOR, the deceasedfather of herein respondent JULIO MELCHOR. During the lifetime of the lateDEMETRIO MELCHOR, a request for the approval of the Deed of Sale datedFebruary 14, 1947between DEMETRIO MELCHOR and PEDRO MELCHOR was made to theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 4, 1953, which was subsequentlyapproved. Since February 14, 1947up to the present, petitioners further allege that respondent hasbeen occupying the subject property and has been harvesting crops thereon and using it for grassingcows and carabaos.

A demand letter dated August 21, 1999 was allegedly sent by the petitioners to the respondent, demanding him tovacate and surrender the said property, but the latter refused. The disagreement reached the barangay authorities, which case was not amicably settled, resulting in the issuance of a certification to file action.

Petitioners filed against respondent a complaint for ejectment before the MTC of Cauayan, Isabela which theysubsequently refiled in their Second Amended Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2325 and dated May 31,2001, to accommodate additional allegations therein.



For his part, the defendant (now respondent) in Civil Case No. 2325 principally raised the matter of ownership byalleging affirmative/special defenses, among others, that the parcel of land in possession of the defendant isregistered in the name of ANTONIA QUITERAS, the deceased mother of the defendant, as per Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-274828 of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela, and that the same property is now owned bythe defendant and his three (3) sisters and one (1) brother, having inherited the same from their late mother,ANTONIA QUITERAS.

The Decision dated September 1, 2000, which was penned by acting MTC Judge BERNABE B. MENDOZA, wasrendered in favor of the respondent, the pertinent portions of which read:

There is no allegation that plaintiffs have been deprived of the possession of the land by force, intimidation, threat,strategy or stealth.

The dispossession was made in 1947. As such, ejectment is not the proper remedy.

WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela, presided over by Executive Judge HENEDINOP. EDUARTE, rendered, together with another related complaint for ejectment, i.e., Civil Case No. 20-1126, theJoint Decision dated February 5, 2001, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. Br. 20-1126 entitled, Heirs of Liberato Lumelay, et al. vs. Heirs of JulioMelchor. Costs against the appellants.

2. Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. 201-1125, entitled, Heirs of Demetrio Melchor, et al. vs. Julio Melchor.Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Sustaining the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to make a case for unlawfuldetainer. It opined that the MTC had never acquired jurisdiction over the case, because there was no allegationthat the parties had entered into a contract -- express or implied -- or that there was possession by tolerance.

Furthermore, the appellate court held that the proper remedy should have been a plenary action for recovery of possession, not a summary action for ejectment.

Hence, this Petition.

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners raised only one alleged error:

The Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it ruled that the Second Amended Complaint does not allege asufficient cause of action for x x x unlawful detainer.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Lone Issue:

Sufficiency of the Complaint

for Ejectment

Petitioners filed a summary action for ejectment based on Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1 of theRule, two separate remedies are available -- one for forcible entry and another for unlawful detainer. Petitionersmaintain that while the Complaint does not support a cause of action for forcible entry, the allegations thereincertainly indicate one for unlawful detainer. They add that they did not commit any jurisdictional infirmity in failingto allege prior physical possession, because that fact is not an element of unlawful detainer.

We do not agree. Even if petitioners may be correct in saying that prior physical possession by the plaintiff neednot be alleged in an action for unlawful detainer, the absence of such possession does not ipso facto make theirComplaint sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the MTC.

In ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The test fordetermining the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid

judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.



A review of the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners discloses these pertinent allegations: the absolute ownerof the subject land was their father, Demetrio Melchor, who bought it on February 14, 1947 from respondentsfather, Pedro Melchor; being the heirs of Demetrio Melchor, petitioners became the owners of the property byreason of succession; as such, they sent a formal demand letter to respondent, who had been using the propertysince February 14, 1947, for grazing cows and carabaos and for planting crops; and in that letter, they asked himto vacate and surrender the property, but he failed to do so.

Accordingly, petitioners prayed for judgment ordering respondent to vacate the property and to pay P500,000,which represented the income earned from February 14, 1947to the present, as well the costs of the suit.

It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case for either forcibleentry or unlawful detainer. These actions, which deal with physical or de facto possession, may be distinguished asfollows:

(1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physicalpossession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not havebeen in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawfulab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while inunlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out.Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.

As correctly held by the appellate court, [f]orcible entry must be ruled out as there was no allegation that thepetitioners were denied possession of the subject property through any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70[of the Rules of Court].

Neither was unlawful detainer satisfactorily alleged. In determining the sufficiency of a complaint therefor, it is notnecessary to employ the terminology of the law. Not averred in this case, however, were certain essential factssuch as how entry was effected, or how and when dispossession started. Petitioners merely alleged their ownershipof the land, which had supposedly been possessed by respondent since 1947. There was no allegation showing thathis possession of it was initially legal -- by virtue of a contract, express or implied -- and that it became illegal afterthe expiration of his right to possess.

Neither did the Complaint claim as a fact any overt act on the part of petitioners showing that they had permittedor tolerated respondents occupancy of the subject property. It is a settled rule that in order to justify an action forunlawful detainer, the owners permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession.Furthermore, the complaint must aver the facts showing that the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the case; forexample, by describing how defendants possession started or continued.

The prayer of petitioners contradicts, however, the existence of possession by tolerance. It must be noted that theyseek to be paid P500,000 as payment for the use of the property by respondent from 1947 to the present. Thisallegation implies that they never permitted him to possess the land.

Since the Complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for forcible entry or unlawfuldetainer, the appellate court was correct in holding that the MTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case.

Verily, the failure of petitioners to properly allege a case for ejectment does not leave them without any otherremedy. Under the proper circumstances, what may be filed is a case either for accion publiciana, which is aplenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria,a suit to recoverownership of real property. This principle was laid down in Ong v. Parel as follows:

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver factsconstitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how andwhen dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accionreivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.

If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court inan accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceedingof unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannotbe wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one yearby resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was notobtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.



FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. P-01-1527. April 22, 2002]

LEAH H. BISCOCHO, JANET T. LABATA, VIRGINIA MANUEL, NORA MANUEL, LEDILLA DIONEDA, GILCALICDAN, ELIZABETH SARMIENTO, thru Counsel Atty. CASIANO L. MONTES, complainants, v.

CORNELIO C. MARERO, Sheriff IV

, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J .:

This is an administrative complaint against Cornelio Marero, Sheriff IV of theRegional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72, for grave misconduct.

The complainants allege in a verified complaint that on July 13, 1999, respondentsheriff implemented a Writ of Demolition issued in connection with RTC Civil CaseNo. 97-4486, entitled Pepito Samson v. Ernesto Sarmiento, et al., upon theresidents of Sitio Lower East Kamias, Cogeo II, Antipolo City. The demolitionincluded the houses of the complainants who were not parties to the civil case;

hence, the complaint against the respondent who conducted the demolition.

In his Comment, the respondent denies the charges, and claims that the demolitionwas pursuant to a lawful order which he is tasked to implement. He furthercontends that the demolition was conducted without threat or intimidation againstthe complainants who were illegally occupying the subject property. Finally, thecomplainants interest in the outcome of RTC Civil Case No. 97-4486, as indicated intheir administrative complaint, is an implied admission that their houses wereproper subjects of the demolition.

The complainants allege in their Reply that the decision of the municipal trial courtin Civil Case No. 2954 (RTC Civil Case No. 97-4486) was erroneous, and that thedemolition of their houses was illegal. They attached the Sheriffs Return/Report onthe Writ of Demolition to prove the respondents ignorance of his duties as a sheriff.

The complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,report and recommendation. The OCA found the respondent guilty of violatingcomplainants right to due process of law and recommended thus:

xxx respondent be suspended from the service for six (6) months without pay and be ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 with a warning that repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

We agree.

An ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein judgment is bindingonly upon parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to beheard. However, this rule admits of the exception that even a non-partymay be bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of thefollowing: (1) trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulentlyoccupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferee

pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family,relative or privy of the defendant.

It is clear that the complainants were not parties to the civil case for which the writ

of demolition was issued.Nor is there anything on record to prove that they belong



to the abovementioned exceptions. Yet, the respondent sheriff, in utter disregard of the rights of the complainants, included their houses in the demolition. In a vainattempt to justify his actions, the respondent claims that he merely implemented alawful order of the court. This contention is devoid of merit. The dispositive portionof the decision of the municipal trial court provides:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and all personsclaiming rights under them ordering the latter the following:

1. To vacate the subject properties and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff.

2. To pay plaintiff the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) each as monthly rental or reasonable compensationfor the use and occupation of the subject properties from the filing of the complaint until after the possessionthereof is surrendered to the plaintiff.

3. To pay plaintiff the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) each as and by way of attorneys fees.

4. To pay plaintiff the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court through officer-in-chargeAntonio T. Ventayen quoted the foregoing dispositive portion and ordered therespondents, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, you are hereby commanded to effect theexecution of the Courts judgment; that you cause the ejectment/eviction from subject premises in questionof herein defendants and any and all persons claiming rights therefrom; that of the goods and chattels of the defendants in the premises and elsewhere, you cause to be had the quoted sums, together with all your lawfulfees for the service of this writ, all in Philippine currency and that you render the same to said plaintiff, aside fromyour fees on this execution. In the event that payment cannot possibly be made against defendants personalproperties to the satisfaction of this execution and your lawful fees thereon, then you are likewise commanded thatof the lands and houses of said defendants, you make the said sums of money in the manner required by the Rulesof Court. Make a return of this Writ with the required endorsement thereon within sixty (60) days from the datehereof.

xxx xxx xxx

The Decision of the Municipal Trial Court and the Writ of Execution of the RegionalTrial Court were specifically directed against the defendants and all personsclaiming rights under them. It is plain error on the part of the respondent toimplement the writ against the complainants who are neither the defendants norpersons who derived property rights from the defendants in the civil case. Sucherror translates into grave misconduct especially where the effect is to denyindividuals of their fundamental right to due process of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Cornelio Marero, Sheriff IV, is found GUILTY of grave misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay andpay a fine of P10,000.00. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar actin the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.



THIRD DIVISION CRISPINA UNIDA, married toANTONIO MABALOT, NANCYUNIDA, married to EUGENIOUNIDA, EDWIN DAMO,ANDREW MABALOT, RICARDODAMO and JOCELYN DAMO, Petitioners,- versus -HEIRS OF AMBROSIO URBAN,represented by LUCIOCABADDU,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 155432 Present:

PANGANIBAN, Chairman,SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,* CORONA,CARPIO MORALES, andGARCIA, JJ .

Promulgated: June 9, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present petition for review on certiorari originated from a complaint for

unlawful detainer filed by respondent, 'Heirs of Ambrocio Urban represented by

Lucio Cabaddu, against the defendants-herein petitioners Crispina Unida et al. at

the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Camalaniugan, Cagayan.

Since the main issue raised is one of jurisdiction over the subject matter, a recital

of the pertinent allegations of the complaint is in order.

In its March 3, 1998 Complaint, the plaintiff-herein respondent who claims to be

the owner of the property, which had been subdivided into Lots 298, 299, and 616,

subject of the case alleged that:

x x x7. About ten (10) years ago, more or less, without the knowledge orconsentof the owners, the defendants[-herein petitioners], without anylegal rightwhatsoever, entered the premises of the land which is thesubject of this suit and cultivated the same as their own, not givingany share to the owners;8. Because the location of the land was then infested by the NewPeople's Army at the time of the instrusion of the defendants, theowners did nothing but to tolerate their (defendants) stay and

cultivation over the land in question;x x x[1](Underscoring supplied)In their Answer, the defendants-herein petitioners denied, among other things,

having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief regarding the

authority of Lucio Cabaddu to represent the plaintiff and concluded that 'he has no

right and/or personality to represent the alleged [H]eirs' -plaintiff. On the merits,

petitioners asserted that petitioner Crispina Unida has possessed Lots 298 and 616,

and that petitioner Nancy Unida has possessed Lot 299, both in the concept of

owner, personally and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time

http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2005/jun2005/155432.php#_ftn1









immemorial, and that the title to the property subject of the complaint, OCT No. P-

48306, was fraudulently obtained by respondents.[2]

By Decision[3]of June 7, 1999, the MTC, resolving in the affirmative the issues of 1)

whether the plaintiff 'impliedly tolerated the defendants' act of cultivating the land,

and 2) whether the plaintiff is the 'lawful owner of the land, accordingly rendered

judgment against the defendants-herein petitioners.

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the defendants-herein petitioners

raised the following assignment of errors:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FORTHERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THEAUTHORITY OF ALLEGED PLAINTIFF LUCIO CABADDU TOINSTITUTE THE PRESENT SUIT;

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE EJECTMENT OF THE

DEFENDANTS ALTHOUGH THEY ARE IN ACTUAL, OPEN, PUBLICAND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LOTS IN DISPUTE UNDERBONAFIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP EVEN BEFORE THE SECONDWORLD WAR HAVING INHERITED SAID LAND FROM THEIR FATHERLUIS UNIDA.[4](Underscoring supplied)

By Decision[5]dated October 26, 1999, Branch 10 of the RTC of Cagayan reversed

the MTC decision, it holding that although Lucio Cabaddu was given a Special Power

of Attorney (SPA) subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the SPA did not contain

a specific authorization for him to institute the complaint.

In any event, the RTC held that the complaint was dismissible for while in its titleLucio Cabaddu appeared as the representative of the plaintiff-Heirs of Ambrocio

Urban, paragraph 1 of the complaint alleged as follows:

1. Plaintiff[,] of legal age, married to Leticia Urban and a resident of Dugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan, is the Authorized representative of theheirs of Ambrocio Urban,[6]

thus clearly showing that he instituted it as plaintiff in behalf of the heirs, hence,

'not allowed as he is not the real party in interest.

On the substantive issue, the RTC held that since the complaint itself asserted that

petitioners' entry into the property was unlawful from the very beginning,

respondents' alleged toleration thereof cannot be considered as toleration in

contemplation of law in unlawful detainer cases, hence, the action for unlawful

detainer was improper. Neither was forcible entry the proper remedy, added the

RTC, as the entry of petitioners was not by 'means of force, violence, threats,

intimidation, stealth or strategy. The RTC suggested though that the remedy of the

plaintiff-herein respondent was to file an accion publiciana or reivindicatoriabefore

the proper RTC.

On appeal of respondent to the CA, it assigned two errors of the RTC, to wit:

I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS'REPRESENTATIVE LUCIO CABADDU LACKS THE PERSONALITY TOSUE DESPITE HIS CONSTITUTION AS AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT BYPETITIONERS THROUGH A VALIDLY EXECUTED SPECIAL POWEROF ATTORNEY.

II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OFTHE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINTON THE GROUND THAT THE MODE OF ACTION (UNLAWFULDETAINER) TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER IS INAPPROPRIATE

DESPITE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THATRESPONDENTS POSSESSION OVER THE LAND IN DISPUTE WAS


















ONLY UPON THE MERE TOLERANCE OF THEPETITIONERS.[7](Underscoring supplied)

By Decision promulgated on September 19, 2001,[8]the Court of Appeals reversed

the decision of the RTC and reinstated that of the MTC.

In reversing the RTC decision, the appellate court held that the subsequent

execution of an SPA in favor of Lucio Cabaddu cured the defect in the filing of the

complaint. And the appellate court 'agree[d] with the Municipal Trial Court that [the

plaintiff-herein respondent] had established [its] right of possession as owners of

the [property]. Furthermore, the appellate court held that 'an allegation that the

defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed

sufficient for one alleging that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate

is unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.

Hence, the present Petition for Review with the following assignments of errors:

a) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED INRULING THAT THE SUBSEQUENT SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEYCURES THE DEFECT IN THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE SUCHCONCLUSION WAS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATION, THEINFERENCE MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, AND THE JUDGMENTWAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.[9]

b) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDINGTHAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEUNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS CRISPINAUNIDA AND HUSBAND ANTONIO MABALOT AND EUGENIO UNIDA

MARRIED TO NANCY UNIDA ARE THE OWNERS OF THE LAND INDISPUTE HAVING POSSESSED THE SAME SINCE PRE-WAR TIMEAND INHERITED SAID LAND FROM THEIR FATHER LUIS UNIDAWHO OWNS SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES BEFORE THE SECONDWORLD WAR.[10](Underscoring supplied)

As stated early on, the main issue, that reflected in herein petitioners' second

assigned error, is one of jurisdiction over the complaint of herein respondent.

From the earlier quoted material paragraphs-allegations of the complaint,

petitioners' entry into the property was, by respondent's own information, unlawful

from the very beginning. Respondent, nonetheless, claimed that it merely toleratedpetitioners' presence in the property. Clearly, an unlawful detainer action does not

lie.

For to justify an action for unlawful detainer,

the permission or tolerance must have been present at thebeginning of the possession. Otherwise, if the possession wasunlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be animproper remedy. 'Sarona v. Villegas elucidates thus:

"A close assessment of the law and the concept of theword 'tolerance' confirms our view heretofore expressed

that such tolerance must be present right from the startof possession sought to be recovered, to categorize acause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcibleentry[11](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As correctly held then by the RTC, the case cannot be considered as an unlawful

detainer case, the tolerance claimed by respondents not being that contemplated

by law in unlawful detainer cases; neither can the case be considered as one for

forcible entry because the entry of petitioners was not alleged to have been by

means of force, intimidation, threats, stealth or strategy.





















Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause

for unlawful detainer or forcible entry, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the

case.[12]It is in this light that this Court finds that the RTC correctly found that the

MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint. Parenthetically, it was error for the RTC

to find the complaint dismissible also on the ground that Lucio Cabaddu was not the

real party in interest. That paragraph 1 of the complaint alleged that 'plaintiff [is] of

legal age, married to Leticia Urban . . . is the Authorized representative of the heirs

of Ambrocio Urban did not modify the name of the plaintiff appearing in the title of

the complaint. In other words, that the plaintiff appearing in the title was worded as

'Heirs of Ambrocio Urban represented by Lucio Cabaddu complied with Section 3 of

Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 3.Representative as parties. ' Where the action is allowed to beprosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in afiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of thecase and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. Arepresentative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, anexecutor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules.An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosedprincipal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except whenthe contract involves things belonging to the principal. (Underscoringsupplied)

The foregoing discussion renders it unnecessary to still rule on the first issue of

whether the Special Power of Attorney presented by Lucio Cabaddu, therepresentative of respondent, may be validly considered, it not having been

formally offered in evidence before the MTC. Suffice it to state that, as a rule,

documents presented as proof of a fact in issue must be offered in evidence before

a trial court.[13]

A final note. Since the RTC found that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, it

should have followed the mandate of Sec. 8, Rule 40, which provides:

Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of

jurisdiction. If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower courtdismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional TrialCourt may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover,shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed withit. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for furtherproceedings.

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court onappeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction

thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with thepreceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let the records of the case be remanded to Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of

Cagayan which is hereby directed to take action on it in accordance with the above-

quoted provision of Sec. 8 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.











G.R. No. 146364. June 3, 2004

COLITO T. PAJUYO, Petitioner , v. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us is a petition for review of the 21 June 2000 Decision and 14 December 2000 Resolution of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43129. The Court of Appeals set aside the 11 November 1996decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, affirming the 15 December 1995decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31.

The Antecedents

In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (Pajuyo) paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rightsover a 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.

On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra (Guevarra) executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free providedGuevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that hewould voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand.

In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded that Guevarravacate the house.Guevarra refused.

Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,Branch 31 (MTC).

In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot wherethe house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for

socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did notshow up or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to thelot.

On 15 December 1995, the MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo. The dispositive portion of theMTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and againstdefendant, ordering the latter to:

A) vacate the house and lot occupied by the defendant or any other person or persons claiming anyright under him;

B) pay unto plaintiff the sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) monthly as reasonable

compensation for the use of the premises starting from the last demand;

C) pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and

D) pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Guevarra appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 (RTC).

On 11 November 1996, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision. The dispositive portion of the RTC decisionreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds no reversible error in the decision appealed from,being in accord with the law and evidence presented, and the same is hereby affirmed en toto.



SO ORDERED.

Guevarra received the RTC decision on 29 November 1996. Guevarra had only until 14 December 1996to file his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing his appeal with the Court of Appeals,Guevarra filed with the Supreme Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari Basedon Rule 42 (motion for extension). Guevarra theorized that his appeal raised pure questions of law. TheReceiving Clerk of the Supreme Court received the motion for extension on 13 December 1996 or one

day before the right to appeal expired.

On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filed his petition for review with the Supreme Court.

On 8 January 1997, the First Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution referring the motion forextension to the Court of Appeals which has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. The case presentedno special and important matter for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of at the first instance.

On 28 January 1997, the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting themotion for extension conditioned on the timeliness of the filing of the motion.

On 27 February 1997, the Court of Appeals ordered Pajuyo to comment on Guevaras petition forreview. On 11 April 1997, Pajuyo filed his Comment.

On 21 June 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing the RTC decision. The dispositiveportion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and it is hereby declared that the ejectment case filed againstdefendant-appellant is without factual and legal basis.

SO ORDERED.

Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. Pajuyo pointed out that the Court of Appealsshould have dismissed outright Guevarras petition for review because it was filed out of time.Moreover, it was Guevarras counsel and not Guevarra who signed the certification against forum-shopping.

On 14 December 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying Pajuyos motion forreconsideration. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

The Ruling of the MTC

The MTC ruled that the subject of the agreement between Pajuyo and Guevarra is the house and notthe lot. Pajuyo is the owner of the house, and he allowed Guevarra to use the house only by tolerance.Thus, Guevarras refusal to vacate the house on Pajuyos demand made Guevarras continued possessionof the house illegal.

The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC upheld the Kasunduan, which established the landlord and tenant relationship between Pajuyoand Guevarra. The terms of the Kasunduanbound Guevarra to return possession of the house ondemand.

The RTC rejected Guevarras claim of a better right under Proclamation No. 137, the Revised NationalGovernment Center Housing Project Code of Policies and other pertinent laws. In an ejectment suit, theRTC has no power to decide Guevarras rights under these laws.The RTC declared that in an ejectmentcase, the only issue for resolution is material or physical possession, not ownership.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals declared that Pajuyo and Guevarra are squatters. Pajuyo and Guevarra illegallyoccupied the contested lot which the government owned.

Perez, the person from whom Pajuyo acquired his rights, was also a squatter. Perez had no right ortitle over the lot because it is public land. The assignment of rights between Perez and Pajuyo, and theKasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra, did not have any legal effect. Pajuyo and Guevarra are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The court will leave them where they are.

The Court of Appeals reversed the MTC and RTC rulings, which held that the Kasunduan betweenPajuyo and Guevarra created a legal tie akin to that of a landlord and tenant relationship. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Kasunduan is not a lease contract but a commodatum because the agreement isnot for a price certain.

Since Pajuyo admitted that he resurfaced only in 1994 to claim the property, the appellate court heldthat Guevarra has a better right over the property under Proclamation No. 137. President Corazon C.Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 137 on 7 September 1987. At that time, Guevarrawas in physical possession of the property. Under Article VI of the Code of Policies Beneficiary



Selection and Disposition of Homelots and Structures in the National Housing Project (the Code), theactual occupant or caretaker of the lot shall have first priority as beneficiary of the project. The Courtof Appeals concluded that Guevarra is first in the hierarchy of priority.

In denying Pajuyos motion for reconsideration, the appellate court debunked Pajuyos claim thatGuevarra filed his motion for extension beyond the period to appeal.

The Court of Appeals pointed out that Guevarras motion for extension filed before the Supreme Courtwas stamped 13 December 1996 at 4:09 PM by the Supreme Courts Receiving Clerk. The Court of Appeals concluded that the motion for extension bore a date, contrary to Pajuyos claim that the motion

for extension was undated. Guevarra filed the motion for extension on time on 13 December 1996 sincehe filed the motion one day before the expiration of the reglementary period on 14 December 1996.Thus, the motion for extension properly complied with the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals inits 28 January 1997 Resolution. The Court of Appeals explained that the thirty-day extension to file thepetition for review was deemed granted because of such compliance.

The Court of Appeals rejected Pajuyos argument that the appellate court should have dismissed thepetition for review because it was Guevarras counsel and not Guevarra who signed the certificationagainst forum-shopping. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Pajuyo did not raise this issue in hisComment. The Court of Appeals held that Pajuyo could not now seek the dismissal of the case after hehad extensively argued on the merits of the case.This technicality, the appellate court opined, wasclearly an afterthought.

The Issues

Pajuyo raises the following issues for resolution:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ABUSED ITS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TANTAMOUNTTO LACK OF JURISDICTION:

1) in GRANTING, instead of denying, Private Respondents Motion for anExtension of thirty days to file petition for review at the time when there was nomore period to extend as the decision of the Regional Trial Court had alreadybecome final and executory.

2) in giving due course, instead of dismissing, private respondents Petition for

Review even though the certification against forum-shopping was signed only bycounsel instead of by petitioner himself.

3) in ruling that the Kasunduan voluntarily entered into by the parties was infact a commodatum, instead of a Contract of Lease as found by the MetropolitanTrial Court and in holding that the ejectment case filed against defendant-appellant is without legal and factual basis.

4) in reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in CivilCase No. Q-96-26943 and in holding that the parties are in pari delicto beingboth squatters, therefore, illegal occupants of the contested parcel of land.

5) in deciding the unlawful detainer case based on the so-called Code of Policies

of the National Government Center Housing Project instead of deciding the sameunder the Kasunduan voluntarily executed by the parties, the terms andconditions of which are the laws between themselves.

The Ruling of the Court

The procedural issues Pajuyo is raising are baseless. However, we find merit in the substantive issuesPajuyo is submitting for resolution.

Procedural Issues

Pajuyo insists that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright Guevarras petition for reviewbecause the RTC decision had already become final and executory when the appellate court acted onGuevarras motion for extension to file the petition. Pajuyo points out that Guevarra had only one daybefore the expiry of his period to appeal the RTC decision. Instead of filing the petition for review withthe Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with this Court an undated motion for extension of 30 days to file apetition for review. This Court merely referred the motion to the Court of Appeals. Pajuyo believes thatthe filing of the motion for extension with this Court did not toll the running of the period to perfect the

appeal. Hence, when the Court of Appeals received the motion, the period to appeal had alreadyexpired.

We are not persuaded.

Decisions of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction are appealable to theCourt of Appeals by petition for review in cases involving questions of fact or mixed questions of factand law. Decisions of the regional trial courts involving pure questions of law are appealable directly tothis Court by petition for review. These modes of appeal are now embodied in Section 2, Rule 41 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Guevarra believed that his appeal of the RTC decision involved only questions of law. Guevarra thusfiled his motion for extension to file petition for review before this Court on 14 December 1996. On 3January 1997, Guevarra then filed his petition for review with this Court. A perusal of Guevarras

petition for review gives the impression that the issues he raised were pure questions of law. There is a



question of law when the doubt or difference is on what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is aquestion of fact when the doubt or difference is on the truth or falsity of the facts alleged.

In his petition for review before this Court, Guevarra no longer disputed the facts. Guevarras petitionfor review raised these questions: (1) Do ejectment cases pertain only to possession of a structure, andnot the lot on which the structure stands? (2) Does a suit by a squatter against a fellow squatterconstitute a valid case for ejectment?(3) Should a Presidential Proclamation governing the lot on which

a squatters structure stands be considered in an ejectment suit filed by the owner of the structure?

These questions call for the evaluation of the rights of the parties under the law on ejectment and the

Presidential Proclamation. At first glance, the questions Guevarra raised appeared purely legal.However, some factual questions still have to be resolved because they have a bearing on the legalquestions raised in the petition for review.These factual matters refer to the metes and bounds of thedisputed property and the application of Guevarra as beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137.

The Court of Appeals has the power to grant an extension of time to file a petition for review. InLacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court , we declared that theCourt of Appeals could grant extension of time in appeals by petition for review. In Liboro v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that the prohibition against granting an extension of time applies only in a casewhere ordinary appeal is perfected by a mere notice of appeal. The prohibition does not apply in apetition for review where the pleading needs verification. A petition for review, unlike an ordinaryappeal, requires preparation and research to present a persuasive position. The drafting of the petition

for review entails more time and effort than filing a notice of appeal. Hence, the Court of Appeals mayallow an extension of time to file a petition for review.

In the more recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals , we held that Liborosclarification of Lacsamana is consistent with the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals andSupreme Court Circular No. 1-91. They all allow an extension of time for filing petitions for review withthe Court of Appeals. The extension, however, should be limited to only fifteen days save inexceptionally meritorious cases where the Court of Appeals may grant a longer period.

A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact onthe lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. The RTC decision could nothave gained finality because the Court of Appeals granted the 30-day extension to Guevarra.

The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it approved Guevarras motion forextension. The Court of Appeals gave due course to the motion for extension because it complied withthe condition set by the appellate court in its resolution dated 28 January 1997. The resolution statedthat the Court of Appeals would only give due course to the motion for extension if filed on time. Themotion for extension met this condition.

The material dates to consider in determining the timeliness of the filing of the motion for extensionare (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition, and (2)the date of filing of the motion for extension. It is the date of the filing of the motion or pleading, andnot the date of execution, that determines the timeliness of the filing of that motion or pleading. Thus,

even if the motion for extension bears no date, the date of filing stamped on it is the reckoning pointfor determining the timeliness of its filing.

Guevarra had until 14 December 1996 to file an appeal from the RTC decision. Guevarra filed his motionfor extension before this Court on 13 December 1996, the date stamped by this Courts Receiving Clerkon the motion for extension. Clearly, Guevarra filed the motion for extension exactly one day before the

lapse of the reglementary period to appeal.

Assuming that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed Guevarras appeal on technical grounds,Pajuyo did not ask the appellate court to deny the motion for extension and dismiss the petition forreview at the earliest opportunity. Instead, Pajuyo vigorously discussed the merits of the case. It wasonly when the Court of Appeals ruled in Guevarras favor that Pajuyo raised the procedural issuesagainst Guevarras petition for review.

A party who, after voluntarily submitting a dispute for resolution, receives an adverse decision on themerits, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the court. Estoppel sets in not because the judgment of the court is a valid and conclusive adjudication, but because the practice of attacking thecourts jurisdiction after voluntarily submitting to it is against public policy.

In his Comment before the Court of Appeals, Pajuyo also failed to discuss Guevarras failure to sign thecertification against forum shopping. Instead, Pajuyo harped on Guevarras counsel signing the

verification, claiming that the counsels verification is insufficient since it is based only on mereinformation.

A partys failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the partys failure tosign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by the party, andnot by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.

On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictionalrequisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are trueand correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading isfiled in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A partys representative, lawyer or anyperson who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue on the certificate against forum shopping was merely

an afterthought. Pajuyo did not call the Court of Appeals attention to this defect at the early stage of the proceedings. Pajuyo raised this procedural issue too late in the proceedings.



Absence of Title over the Disputed Property will not Divest the Courts of Jurisdiction to Resolve the Issue of Possession

Settled is the rule that the defendants claim of ownership of the disputed property will not divest theinferior court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Even if the pleadings raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass on such issue to determine only the question of possession, especially if the ownership is inseparably linked with the possession. The adjudication on the issue of ownership is

only provisional and will not bar an action between the same parties involving title to the land. Thisdoctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of the two summary actions of ejectment, forcibleentry and unlawful detainer, where the only issue for adjudication is the physical or materialpossession over the real property.

In this case, what Guevarra raised before the courts was that he and Pajuyo are not the owners of thecontested property and that they are mere squatters. Will the defense that the parties to the ejectmentcase are not the owners of the disputed lot allow the courts to renounce their jurisdiction over thecase?The Court of Appeals believed so and held that it would just leave the parties where they aresince they are in pari delicto.

We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.

Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of possession.The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal possession except

to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical possession. Thesame is true when the defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. The absence of titleover the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectmentcase.

The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to thephysical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable, or when both partiesintruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the propergovernment agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party inpeaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is theunlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.

Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the ownerhimself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession intime, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better rightlawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is theright to physical possession.

In Pitargue v. Sorilla, the government owned the land in dispute. The government did not authorizeeither the plaintiff or the defendant in the case of forcible entry case to occupy the land. The plaintiff had prior possession and had already introduced improvements on the public land.The plaintiff had apending application for the land with the Bureau of Lands when the defendant ousted him from

possession. The plaintiff filed the action of forcible entry against the defendant. The government wasnot a party in the case of forcible entry.

The defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the courts to settle the issue of possession because whilethe application of the plaintiff was still pending, title remained with the government, and the Bureau of Public Lands had jurisdiction over the case. We disagreed with the defendant. We ruled that courts

have jurisdiction to entertain ejectment suits even before the resolution of the application. Theplaintiff, by priority of his application and of his entry, acquired prior physical possession over thepublic land applied for as against other private claimants. That prior physical possession enjoys legalprotection against other private claimants because only a court can take away such physical possessionin an ejectment case.

While the Court did not brand the plaintiff and the defendant in Pitargue as squatters, strictly speaking,their entry into the disputed land was illegal. Both the plaintiff and defendant entered the public landwithout the owners permission. Title to the land remained with the government because it had notawarded to anyone ownership of the contested public land. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were ineffect squatting on government property. Yet, we upheld the courts jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession even if the plaintiff and the defendant in the ejectment case did not have any title over thecontested land.

Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession because of the

public need to preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawfuldetainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace andcriminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone toobtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his ownhands. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions torecover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.

We further explained in Pitargue the greater interest that is at stake in actions for recovery of possession. We made the following pronouncements in Pitargue:

The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without jurisdiction to take cognizance of possessory actions involving these public lands before final award is made by the Lands Department,and before title is given any of the conflicting claimants? It is one of utmost importance, as there arepublic lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especially in newly opened regions. Italso involves a matter of policy, as it requires the determination of the respective authorities and

functions of two coordinate branches of the Government in connection with public land conflicts.



Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil Code, either in the old, which was in forcein this country before the American occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory action, the aimand purpose of which is the recovery of the physical possession of real property, irrespective of thequestion as to who has the title thereto. Under the Spanish Civil Code we had the accion interdictal, asummary proceeding which could be brought within one year from dispossession (Roman CatholicBishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as early as October 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we implanted the common lawaction of forcible entry (section 80 of Act No. 190), the object of which has been stated by this Court to

be to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrueto those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the court to assert their claims. (Supia andBatioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) So before the enactment of the first Public Land Act(Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was already available in the courts of the country. So thequestion to be resolved is, Did the Legislature intend, when it vested the power and authority toalienate and dispose of the public lands in the Lands Department, to exclude the courts fromentertaining the possessory action of forcible entry between rival claimants or occupants of any landbefore award thereof to any of the parties? Did Congress intend that the lands applied for, or all publiclands for that matter, be removed from the jurisdiction of the judicial Branch of the Government, sothat any troubles arising therefrom, or any breaches of the peace or disorders caused by rivalclaimants, could be inquired into only by the Lands Department to the exclusion of the courts? Theanswer to this question seems to us evident. The Lands Department does not have the means to policepublic lands; neither does it have the means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or containbreaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts of possession. Then its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper award, the settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the court hereinhas another ultimate purpose, i.e., the protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of breaches of the peace. The power to dispose and alienate could not have been intended to include the power to prevent or settle disorders or breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants prior to the final award. As to this, therefore, the corresponding branches of the Governmentmust continue to exercise power and jurisdiction within the limits of their respective functions. Thevesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public lands,therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exerciseof the respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.

Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in American courts to the effect that courtshave no jurisdiction to determine the rights of claimants to public lands, and that until the disposition

of the land has passed from the control of the Federal Government, the courts will not interfere withthe administration of matters concerning the same. (50 C. J. 1093-1094.) We have no quarrel with thisprinciple. The determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands is different fromthe determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation with a view to protectingthe same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court orderingrestitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never be prejudicialinterference with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if courts weredeprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of possession, that threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of lawlessnesswould probably be produced between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice, would rule.

It must be borne in mind that the action that would be used to solve conflicts of possession betweenrivals or conflicting applicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcible entry. This action,

both in England and the United States and in our jurisdiction, is a summary and expeditious remedywhereby one in peaceful and quiet possession may recover the possession of which he has beendeprived by a stronger hand, by violence or terror; its ultimate object being to prevent breach of thepeace and criminal disorder. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) The basis of the remedy is mere possession as a fact, of physical possession, not a legal possession. (Mediran vs.Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752.) The title or right to possession is never in issue in an action of forcible entry;as a matter of fact, evidence thereof is expressly banned, except to prove the nature of the possession.(Second 4, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) With this nature of the action in mind, by no stretch of theimagination can conclusion be arrived at that the use of the remedy in the courts of justice wouldconstitute an interference with the alienation, disposition, and control of public lands. To limitourselves to the case at bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in any way interfere with themanner of the alienation or disposition of the land contested? On the contrary, it would facilitateadjudication, for the question of priority of possession having been decided in a final manner by thecourts, said question need no longer waste the time of the land officers making the adjudication oraward. (Emphasis ours)

The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases

The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari delicto to this case.

Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code embody the principle of pari delicto. We explained theprinciple of pari delicto in these words:

The rule of pari delictois expressed in the maxims ex dolo malo non eritur actio and in pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. It leaves theparties where it finds them.

The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as there are exceptions to its application.One of these exceptions is where the application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-established

public policy.



In Drilon v. Gaurana, we reiterated the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry andunlawful detainer. We held that:

It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of theactual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turnedout by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statuteis to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of

the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrueto those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force togain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This is thephilosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed tocompel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims ishis.

Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of ejectment between squatters isfraught with danger. To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delictowould openly invitemayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of the lot that thelatter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them wherethey are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his priorpossession at all cost.

Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment cases or actions for recovery of

possession seek to prevent. Even the owner who has title over the disputed property cannot take thelaw into his own hands to regain possession of his property. The owner must go to court.

Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suit are squatters. Thedetermination of priority and superiority of possession is a serious and urgent matter that cannot beleft to the squatters to decide. To do so would make squatters receive better treatment under the law.The law restrains property owners from taking the law into their own hands. However, the principle of pari delicto as applied by the Court of Appeals would give squatters free rein to dispossess fellowsquatters or violently retake possession of properties usurped from them. Courts should not leavesquatters to their own devices in cases involving recovery of possession.

Possession is the only Issue for Resolution in an Ejectment Case

The case for review before the Court of Appeals was a simple case of ejectment. The Court of Appealsrefused to rule on the issue of physical possession. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that thepivotal issue in this case is who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has the priority right as beneficiary of the contested land under Proclamation No. 137. According to the Court of Appeals, Guevarra enjoyspreferential right under Proclamation No. 137 because Article VI of the Code declares that the actualoccupant or caretaker is the one qualified to apply for socialized housing.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals has no factual and legal basis.

First.Guevarra did not present evidence to show that the contested lot is part of a relocation site underProclamation No. 137. Proclamation No. 137 laid down the metes and bounds of the land that itdeclared open for disposition to bona fide residents.

The records do not show that the contested lot is within the land specified by Proclamation No. 137.Guevarra had the burden to prove that the disputed lot is within the coverage of Proclamation No. 137.He failed to do so.

Second . The Court of Appeals should not have given credence to Guevarras unsubstantiated claim thathe is the beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra merely alleged that in the survey the projectadministrator conducted, he and not Pajuyo appeared as the actual occupant of the lot.

There is no proof that Guevarra actually availed of the benefits of Proclamation No. 137. Pajuyoallowed Guevarra to occupy the disputed property in 1985.President Aquino signed Proclamation No.137 into law on 11 March 1986. Pajuyo made his earliest demand for Guevarra to vacate the propertyin September 1994.

During the time that Guevarra temporarily held the property up to the time that Proclamation No. 137allegedly segregated the disputed lot, Guevarra never applied as beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137.Even when Guevarra already knew that Pajuyo was reclaiming possession of the property, Guevarra didnot take any step to comply with the requirements of Proclamation No. 137.

Third.Even assuming that the disputed lot is within the coverage of Proclamation No. 137 and Guevarrahas a pending application over the lot, courts should still assume jurisdiction and resolve the issue of possession. However, the jurisdiction of the courts would be limited to the issue of physical possessiononly.

In Pitargue, we ruled that courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public land todetermine the issue of physical possession. The determination of the respective rights of rivalclaimants to public land is, however, distinct from the determination of who has the actual physicalpossession or who has a better right of physical possession. The administrative disposition andalienation of public lands should be threshed out in the proper government agency.

The Court of Appeals determination of Pajuyo and Guevarras rights under Proclamation No. 137 waspremature.Pajuyo and Guevarra were at most merely potential beneficiaries of the law. Courts shouldnot preempt the decision of the administrative agency mandated by law to determine the qualifications

of applicants for the acquisition of public lands. Instead, courts should expeditiously resolve the issueof physical possession in ejectment cases to prevent disorder and breaches of peace.



Pajuyo is Entitled to Physical Possession of the Disputed Property

Guevarra does not dispute Pajuyos prior possession of the lot and ownership of the house built on it.Guevarra expressly admitted the existence and due execution of the Kasunduan. The Kasunduan reads:

Ako, si COL[I]TO PAJUYO, may-ari ng bahay at lote sa Bo. Payatas, Quezon City, ay nagbibigaypahintulot kay G. Eddie Guevarra, na pansamantalang manirahan sa nasabing bahay at lote ng walang

bayad. Kaugnay nito, kailangang panatilihin nila ang kalinisan at kaayusan ng bahay at lote.

Sa sandaling kailangan na namin ang bahay at lote, silay kusang aalis ng walang reklamo.

Based on the Kasunduan, Pajuyo permitted Guevarra to reside in the house and lot free of rent, butGuevarra was under obligation to maintain the premises in good condition. Guevarra promised tovacate the premises on Pajuyos demand but Guevarra broke his promise and refused to heed Pajuyosdemand to vacate.

These facts make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the withholding by aperson from another of the possession of real property to which the latter is entitled after theexpiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession under a contract, express or implied .

Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his property by tolerance without any contract, the

defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand, failing which, anaction for unlawful detainer will lie. The defendants refusal to comply with the demand makes hiscontinued possession of the property unlawful. The status of the defendant in such a case is similar tothat of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continues by toleranceof the owner.

This principle should apply with greater force in cases where a contract embodies the permission ortolerance to use the property. The Kasunduanexpressly articulated Pajuyos forbearance. Pajuyo did notrequire Guevarra to pay any rent but only to maintain the house and lot in good condition. Guevarraexpressly vowed in the Kasunduan that he would vacate the property on demand. Guevarras refusal tocomply with Pajuyos demand to vacate made Guevarras continued possession of the property unlawful.

We do not subscribe to the Court of Appeals theory that the Kasunduan is one of commodatum.

In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so thatthe latter may use the same for a certain time and return it. An essential feature of commodatum isthat it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatumis that the use of the thing belonging to another isfor a certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expirationof the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted.If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for temporary use. If theuse of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at will, inwhich case the contractual relation is called a precarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum.

The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentiallygratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain theproperty in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract differentfrom a commodatum.The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum. Caselaw on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenantrelationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of the lease. Thetenants withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence.

Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of commodatum, Guevarra asbailee would still have the duty to turn over possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. Theobligation to deliver or to return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or contractsof commission, administration and commodatum. These contracts certainly involve the obligation todeliver or return the thing received.

Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on the sole ground that like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter.Squatters, Guevarra pointed out, cannot enter into a contract involving the land they illegally occupy.Guevarra insists that the contract is void.

Guevarra should know that there must be honor even between squatters. Guevarra freely entered intothe Kasunduan. Guevarra cannot now impugn the Kasunduan after he had benefited from it. The

Kasunduan binds Guevarra.

The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has a rightto physical possession of the contested property. The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of Guevarras recognition of Pajuyos better right of physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor inbad faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as there would still be an impliedpromise to vacate.

Guevarra contends that there is a pernicious evil that is sought to be avoided, and that is allowing anabsentee squatter who (sic) makes (sic) a profit out of his illegal act. Guevarra bases his argument onthe preferential right given to the actual occupant or caretaker under Proclamation No. 137 onsocialized housing.

We are not convinced.



Pajuyo did not profit from his arrangement with Guevarra because Guevarra stayed in the propertywithout paying any rent. There is also no proof that Pajuyo is a professional squatter who rents outusurped properties to other squatters. Moreover, it is for the proper government agency to decide whobetween Pajuyo and Guevarra qualifies for socialized housing. The only issue that we are addressing isphysical possession.

Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment. This is one of the distinctions

between forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physicalpossession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Thus, hemust allege and prove prior possession. But in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholdspossession after the expiration or termination of his right to possess under any contract, express orimplied. In such a case, prior physical possession is not required.

Pajuyos withdrawal of his permission to Guevarra terminated the Kasunduan.Guevarras transient rightto possess the property ended as well. Moreover, it was Pajuyo who was in actual possession of theproperty because Guevarra had to seek Pajuyos permission to temporarily hold the property andGuevarra had to follow the conditions set by Pajuyo in the Kasunduan. Control over the property stillrested with Pajuyo and this is evidence of actual possession.

Pajuyos absence did not affect his actual possession of the disputed property. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before heis deemed in possession. One may acquire possession not only by physical occupation, but also by the

fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will. Actual or physical occupation is not alwaysnecessary.

Ruling on Possession Does not Bind Title to the Land in Dispute

We are aware of our pronouncement in cases where we declared that squatters and intruders whoclandestinely enter into titled government property cannot, by such act, acquire any legal right to saidproperty. We made this declaration because the person who had title or who had the right to legalpossession over the disputed property was a party in the ejectment suit and that party instituted thecase against squatters or usurpers.

In this case, the owner of the land, which is the government, is not a party to the ejectment case. Thiscase is between squatters. Had the government participated in this case, the courts could have evictedthe contending squatters, Pajuyo and Guevarra.

Since the party that has title or a better right over the property is not impleaded in this case, we cannotevict on our own the parties. Such a ruling would discourage squatters from seeking the aid of thecourts in settling the issue of physical possession. Stripping both the plaintiff and the defendant of possession just because they are squatters would have the same dangerous implications as theapplication of the principle of pari delicto.Squatters would then rather settle the issue of physicalpossession among themselves than seek relief from the courts if the plaintiff and defendant in theejectment case would both stand to lose possession of the disputed property. This would subvert thepolicy underlying actions for recovery of possession.

Since Pajuyo has in his favor priority in time in holding the property, he is entitled to remain on theproperty until a person who has title or a better right lawfully ejects him. Guevarra is certainly not thatperson. The ruling in this case, however, does not preclude Pajuyo and Guevarra from introducingevidence and presenting arguments before the proper administrative agency to establish any right towhich they may be entitled under the law.

In no way should our ruling in this case be interpreted to condone squatting. The ruling on the issue of physical possession does not affect title to the property nor constitute a binding and conclusiveadjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership. The owner can still go to court to recover lawfullythe property from the person who holds the property without legal title. Our ruling here does notdiminish the power of government agencies, including local governments, to condemn, abate, removeor demolish illegal or unauthorized structures in accordance with existing laws.

Attorneys Fees and Rentals

The MTC and RTC failed to justify the award of P3,000 attorneys fees to Pajuyo. Attorneys fees as partof damages are awarded only in the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Thus, theaward of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule. Attorneys fees are not awarded everytime a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right tolitigate. We therefore delete the attorneys fees awarded to Pajuyo.

We sustain the P300 monthly rentals the MTC and RTC assessed against Guevarra. Guevarra did notdispute this factual finding of the two courts.We find the amount reasonable compensation to Pajuyo.The P300 monthly rental is counted from the last demand to vacate, which was on 16 February 1995.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision dated 21 June 2000 and Resolution dated 14December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43129 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 11November 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943,affirming the Decision dated 15 December 1995 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch31 in Civil Case No. 12432, is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. The award of attorneys fees is deleted.No costs.

SO ORDERED.



RUDY LAO, Petitioner, vs. JAIME LAO, respondent .

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

As early as 1956, the spouses Julian Lao and Anita Lao had constructed a buildingon a parcel of land in Balasan, Iloilo City, owned by Alfredo Alava and covered byTransfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28382. They then occupied and leased thesame without any written agreement thereon. Anita Lao also put up her business in

the premises.

On May 12, 1982, Alfredo Alava, as lessor, and Anita Lao, as lessee, executed aContract of Lease[1]over the said property. The parties agreed that the lease of theproperty was to be for a period of 35 years, at an annual rental of P120.00.However, the contract of lease was not filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds; hence, was not annotated at the dorsal portion of the said title.

Aside from Anita Lao, petitioner Rudy Lao also leased another portion of the sameproperty where he put up his business. In fact, Anita Lao's building was adjacent towhere the petitioner conducted his business. At that time, the petitioner knew thatAnita Lao and her husband were the owners of the said building. He also knew that

she had leased that portion of the property, and that respondent Jaime Lao, theirson, managed and maintained the building, as well as the business thereon.

In the meantime, on March 21, 1995, the petitioner purchased the property fromAlava, and was later issued TCT No. 152,097 in his name. By then, the propertyhad been classified as commercial, but the yearly rental of P120.00 in the contractof lease between Alava and Anita Lao subsisted.

On July 14, 1997, the petitioner filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against therespondent with the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Carles-Balasan, IloiloCity. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent had occupied a portionof his property without any lease agreement and without paying any rentals

therefor, and that the same was only through his tolerance and generosity. Thepetitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor asfollows:

1. Ordering the defendant, his agents and/or representatives and allpersons claiming under him, to vacate the premises he occupies, remove allimprovements thereon and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff;

2. Directing the defendant, his agents and/or representatives and allpersons claiming under him, when proper, jointly and severally, to payplaintiff the sums of: P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; at least P15,000.00 asmiscellaneous litigation and necessary expenses; such compensation for useof the portion she (sic ) occupies, at the rate of P5,000.00 a month from

January 24, 1997, until the full and complete surrender thereof to theplaintiff; and

3. The costs of this suit.ry

In his answer to the complaint, the respondent alleged that the petitioner had nocause of action against him, the truth being that the lessee of the property was hismother, Anita Lao, as evidenced by a contract of lease executed by Alava, theformer owner thereof. He further alleged that she had been paying the annualrentals therefore, the last of which was on July 16, 1997 and evidenced by areceipt. He further alleged that she had designated him as manager to maintain thebuilding, pay rentals and operate the business. He then prayed for the dismissal of

the complaint.

http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2005/may2005/149599.php#_ftn1




During the preliminary conference, the respondent admitted that he was in actualpossession of the property. For his part, the petitioner admitted that he had beenrenting another portion of the same property from Alava for years, and that hisbusiness establishment and that of Anita Lao's were adjacent to each other. He alsoadmitted that Anita Lao had been renting the said portion of the property for yearsbefore he bought it.

The respondent adduced in evidence the contract of lease between his mother,Anita Lao, and Alava.

On March 4, 1999, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner andagainst the respondent. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing circumstances, JUDGMENT is herebyrendered in favor of the Plaintiff, Rudy Lao and as against defendant,Jaime Lao, as follows:

1. Ordering defendant, Jaime Lao, his successors-in-interest, agents,members of his family, privies or any person or persons claiming under his

name to vacate the portion of Lot No. 3 occupied by him, and to deliver thephysical possession thereof to plaintiff, Rudy Lao;

2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, Rudy Lao, the sum of P3,000.00representing as the monthly rentals of the premises occupied by defendanton Lot No. 3 starting the month of January 1997, until the possessionthereof is actually delivered and turned over to the plaintiff;

3. Ordering defendant, Jaime Lao, to pay plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00as attorney's fees;

4. Ordering defendant, Jaime Lao, to pay Plaintiff, Rudy Lao, the sum of P10,000.00 representing as litigation expenses; and to pay the costs of thissuit.

SO ORDERED.ry

The respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of BarotacViejo, Iloilo City, Branch 66, which rendered judgment on January 28, 2000affirming the said decision with modification. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from this court is hereby affirmed witha modification that defendant-appellant Jaime Lao is ordered to payplaintiff-appellee Rudy Lao the sum of P1,000.00 per month as reasonableuse of the land subject of the case from January 1997 until possession is

turned over to the plaintiff; to pay Rudy Lao the sum of P10,000.00attorney's fees and P5,000.00 litigation expenses.

With cost against the defendant-appellant.

SO ORDERED.ry

The RTC ruled that under Article 1676 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner was thepurchaser of the property and had the right to terminate the lease between Alavaand Anita Lao, it appearing that the lease contract was not registered with theOffice of the Register of Deeds. Not being the lessee, the respondent could notinvoke the same provision. The trial court also held that the respondent, not hismother, was the real party as defendant in the MCTC, since it was he who was in

actual possession of the property. The RTC maintained that if Anita Lao was sued asdefendant and was ordered evicted, the decision would not be binding on therespondent since he was not impleaded as defendant.

The respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), assertingthat '

I. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED INAFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS FINDING OF THE MCTC THAT THIS CASE WASPROPERLY BROUGHT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WHEN HE IS ONLY ANAGENT OF THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST, ANITA LAO.

II. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS FINDING OF THE MCTC THAT THERE IS NOAGENCY BETWEEN ANITA LAO AND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BECAUSE



THERE WAS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THEFACT OF AGENCY.

III. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED INIGNORING THE FACT THAT THE MCTC BLATANTLY DISREGARDING (sic )THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER IT ISSUED, ISSUING A DECISION

CONTRARY TO THE FACTS ADMITTED BY [THE] PARTIES THEMSELVESESPECIALLY THE ADMISSION OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE THAT HEKNOWS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE LEASE.y

On February 27, 2001, the CA rendered judgment setting aside and reversing thedecision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the real party-in-interest as defendant in theMCTC was Anita Lao, the lessee of the property, and not the respondent who wasmerely the administrator/manager of Anita Lao's building and the occupant of theproperty.

The petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been deniedby the appellate court, he now comes to this Court for relief via a petition for review

on certiorari , claiming that:The Hon. Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it convertedpetitioner's cause of action against respondent into a cause of actionagainst respondent's mother; and on the basis thereof, dismissedpetitioner's complaint for ejectment against respondent under the mistakenfinding that said ejectment case should have been filed againstrespondent's mother.

The petitioner avers that the respondent was the real party-in-interest as defendantin the complaint for unlawful detainer because the respondent's possession of theproperty was in his personal capacity, and not as the caretaker of the property andthe business in the building owned by Anita Lao, the lessee thereon. The petitioner

argues that, in an ejectment suit, the threshold issue is who has the right to thematerial or de factopossession of the subject property as distinguished from the de

jure possession thereof; hence, the defendant in an ejectment case is the person inactual physical possession of the property.

The petitioner insists that the respondent, having admitted in the MCTC that he wasin actual possession of the property and that in fact, Anita Lao was no longerstaying in the property after her husband died, is the real party-in-interest, asdefendant. He posits that if he filed a complaint for ejectment against Anita Lao, itwould be dismissed because it was the respondent, and not his mother, who was inactual possession of the property.

The petition has no merit.

We agree with the petitioner that, in ejectment cases, the word possession meansnothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the sensecontemplated in civil law.[10] The only issue in such cases is who is entitled to thephysical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claimof ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.ry

We, likewise, conform to the petitioner's contention that in an action for unlawfuldetainer, the real party-in-interest as party-defendant is the person who is inpossession of the property without the benefit of any contract of lease and onlyupon the tolerance and generosity of its owner. Such occupant is bound by an

implied promise that he will vacate the premises upon demand. This situation isanalogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term has expired, but whoseoccupancy continued by mere tolerance of the owner. He is the real party-in-interest as defendant.y

However, the records in this case show that the respondent has been in possessionof the property subject of the complaint not by mere tolerance or generosity of thepetitioner, but as the manager of his mother, Anita Lao, who conducted herbusiness in the building/warehouse which stood on a portion of the property leasedfrom Alava, the former owner. Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the respondent'spossession of the property was in behalf of his mother, the lessee thereof, and notin his own right, independently of that of his mother.







The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lease of the subjectproperty by Anita Lao, the existence of the building and her business thereon, andthe fact that the respondent managed his mother's building and business. It mustbe stressed that during the preliminary conference of the parties before the MCTC,the petitioner admitted his knowledge of the foregoing facts.

While it is true that the contract of lease between Alava and Anita Lao was not filedin the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the dorsal portion of thepetitioner's title over the property, nevertheless, the petitioner was bound by theterms and conditions of the said contract of lease. The lease, in effect, became apart of the contract of sale.y

Under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner, as the vendee of theproperty, had the right to file an action for unlawful detainer against Anita Lao upondemand, but for breach of the contract of lease:

SEC. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. ' Unlessotherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced

only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and tovacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of suchdemand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such noticeon the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails tocomply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) daysin the case of buildings.

If the petitioner had done so and judgment was rendered in his favor, orderingAnita Lao to vacate the property, the respondent herein, who is in possession of theproperty for and in her behalf, would then have to abide by the decision and vacatethe same. This was the ruling of the Court in Oro Cam Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals, thus:

It is well-settled that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding notonly upon the defendants in the suit but also against those notmade parties thereto, if they are:

a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendantfraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the

judgment;b) guests or other occupants of the premises with thepermission of the defendant;c) transferees pendente lite;d) sublessee;e) co-lessees; orf) members of the family, relatives and other privies of thedefendant.ary

Apparently, the petitioner believed that it was unfair for Anita Lao to be paying anannual rental of only P120.00 for the portion of the property leased by her,considering that the said lot had already been classified as commercial property.Moreover, it was not Anita Lao who stayed in the leased premises; it was her son.The petitioner had no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Anita Laobecause of the subsisting contract of lease; hence, he could not file the complaintagainst her. What the petitioner had no right to do directly, he did indirectly byfiling a complaint for unlawful detainer against her son, the respondent, believing

that by so doing, he will be rid of Anita Lao's lease contract.The Court, thus, rules that the CA acted in accord with law when it ordered thedismissal of the complaint.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIEDfor lack of merit.Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.



[G.R. No. 128743. November 29, 1999]

ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC.

,Petitioner , vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES, INC., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J .:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeal,dated November27, 1996, annulling an injunctive order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,Cagayan de Oro City, enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution in anejectment case and ordering said court to dismiss the petition for certiorari filed bypetitioner for lack of cause of action. For the reasons stated hereunder, the decisionof the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

The facts are as follows:

Private respondent Angel Chaves, Inc. is the owner of a commercial building inCagayan de Oro which he leased to several business establishments.

On January 15, 1991, private respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer inthe Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as CivilCase No. 13040. The complaint alleged inter alia that

2. Plaintiff owns a commercial building with frontage along J.R. Borja and Yacapin Extension Streets, Cagayande Oro City leased to business establishments, some of whom are defendants herein, for uniform and fixedperiod of one (1) year since 1986.

3. The latest written contracts of lease for 1 year period between the parties were executed on July 31, 1988,with following particulars:

Lessee/Business Name Lease Period Monthly rentals

Constancio Manzano July 1, 1988 P7,750.00

Oro Cam Enterprises June 30, 1989

Ernesto/Leody Marcoso July 1, 1988 P3,400.00

Queenies Jewelry June 30, 1989

Fortunato Melodia Sr. July 1, 1988 P3,400.00

Meltrade June 30, 1989

Alfredo/Elena Co July 1, 1988 P3,400.00

Oro Jewelry June 30, 1989

The complaint further alleged that, before the aforementioned leases expired onJune 30, 1989, private respondent sent forms for new lease contracts to thelessees, indicating increased rentals for the period July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1990,for their signatures, to wit:

Name New monthly rentals

Oro Cam Enterprises P10,000.00

Queenies Jewelry P 4,000.00



Meltrade P 4,000.00

Oro Jetcycle P 4,000.00

Thereafter, private respondent made a demand upon the lessees to pay theincreased rent or, otherwise, vacate the premises. The failure of the lessees to

comply with the demand of private respondent led to the filing of the suit forunlawful detainer.

In his answer to the complaint, defendant Constancio Manzano, through hiscounsel, Atty. Cesilo Adaza, alleged:

3. That it is not true that in the said contract the monthly rentals of the defendants as stated in paragraph 3 of thecomplaint are to be paid by the defendants. What was agreed was for the following defendants to pay the followingrentals beginning July 1, 1988 and two years thereafter, to wit:

a. Constancio Manzano


On July 23, 1992, the MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint againstthree defendants, including petitioner, but ordered the ejectment of the fourthdefendant Alfredo Co. The dispositive portion of the MTCC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. Dismissing complaint as against Manzano (Oro Cam), Melodia (Meltrade) and Marcoso (Queenies Jewelry) forlack of cause of action.

.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Misamis Oriental, Cagayande Oro City, reversed the MTCC and ordered the four defendants ejectedfrom the premises. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision ordereddefendants

1. To vacate and surrender to plaintiff-appellant the premises in question that they respectivelyoccupied;

2. To pay the corresponding reasonable rent of said premises from July 1, 1990 until they havefully vacated the same, at the following rates:

a) Constancio Manzano at P12,500.00 per month

b) Melodia at P5,000.00 per month

c) Ernesto Marcoso at P5,000.00 per month, and

3. To pay jointly and solidarily to plaintiff-appellant the sum of P30, 000.00 as attorneys fees andP10,000.00 as litigants expenses, and the costs of the suit.

Vicente Manzano, brother of Constancio Manzano, then filed a petition forreview of the RTC decision with the Court of Appeals (CA-GR Sp. No.34167), alleging that Constancio Manzano had died in the meantime and

informing it of his status as administrator of the estate. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond thereglamentary period. The dismissal was subsequently affirmed by thisCourt in a resolution issued on September 26, 1994 in G.R. No. 116933.

On January 9, 1995, private respondent filed with the MTCC a motion forthe issuance of a writ of execution specifically against Constancio Manzanoand petitioner Oro Cam Enterprises. Petitioner opposed the motion on theground that it was never impleaded nor included as party-defendant in theejectment case (Civil Case No. 13040). It appears that petitioner later fileda petition for certiorari and prohibition, with an application for the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, in the Regional Trial Court,Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, where the case was docketed as Sp. Civil



Case No. 95-560, entitled Oro Cam Enterprises, Inc. v . Hon. Antonio A.Orcullo and Angel Chaves, Inc. On December 7, 1995, the trial court issued

an order granting the application for preliminary injunction, viz .:

WHEREFORE, petitioners application for preliminary injunction, being meritorious, is hereby GRANTED, and,accordingly, respondents, their agents or representatives or all persons acting on their behalf, are hereby ordered

during the pendency of this case to cease and desist and refrain from issuing, implementing, enforcing or carryingout any writ of execution or similar order in Civil Case No. 13040 entitled Angel Chaves, Inc. v. ConstancioManzano, et al. to execute the Decision dated December 27, 1993 rendered by branch 25 of this Court, or fromdoing or performing other acts prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.

Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appealswhich, on November 27, 1996, rendered a decision declaring the writ of injunctionas null and void, and ordering the trial court to dismiss Sp. Civil Case no. 95-560.

Hence, this petition where petitioner submits the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that [petitioner] Oro Cam Enterprises Inc. is privy tothe contract of lease between [private respondent] and defendant Constancio Manzano.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion in declaring null and void the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction as aninterlocutory order issued by the RTC.

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner contends that Oro Cam Enterprises is a corporation with a personalityseparate and distinct from the latter and that the Court of Appeals erred in holdingthat petitioner is privy to the lease agreement between private respondent andConstancio Manzano.

The argument is untenable. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in the appealeddecision:

1. In the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioner ACI with the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City, docketed asCivil Case No. 13040, it is specifically alleged that:

2. Plaintiff owns a commercial building with frontage along J.R. Borja and Yacapin Extension Streets, Cagayan deOro City, leased to business establishments, some of whom are defendants herein, for uniform and fixed period of one (1) year since 1986:

3. The latest written contracts of lease for 1-year periods between the parties were executed on July 31, 1988,with the following particulars:

Lessee/Business Name Lease Period Monthly Rental

Constancio Manzano July 1, 1988 to P7,750.00

Oro Cam Enterprises June 30, 1989

2. In the Answer dated March 12, 1991 filed by defendant Constancio A. Manzano through his counsel, Atty. CesiloAdaza, he did not deny that he/Oro Cam is a lessee of petitioner ACI, thus:

3. That it is not true that in the said contract the monthly rentals of the defendants as stated in paragraph 3 of thecomplaint are to be paid by the defendants. What was agreed was for the following defendants to pay the followingrentals beginning July 1, 1988 and tow year thereafter to:

a. Constancio Manzano


x x x

3.The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by MTCC reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. Dismissing complaint as against Manzano (Oro Cam), Melodia (Meltrade) and Marcoso (Queenies Jewelry) forlack of cause of action.

x x x



SO ORDERED.

Cagayan de Oro City, July 23, 1992

4. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 23), Cagayan de Oro City,docketed as Civil Case No. 92-486, Oro Cam is undeniably interlinked with defendant-appelleeManzano, to wit:

In consequence, there [are] subsisting and binding oral lease contracts between appellant and therespective appellees during the period July 1, 1989 up to June 30, 1990; which were at the agreedmonthly rates of P10,000.00 for three (3) doors of appellants building in the case of ConstancioManzano (Oro Cam) and P4,000.00 each for Appellees Melodia (Meltrade) and the Marcoso (QueeniesJewelry).

Indeed, this agreed rate of rentals is borne out by the evidence on record and affirmed by the rebuttalevidences:

a) O.R. No. 2755 (Exh. 16) issued in the name of Oro Cam Ent. Inc. for the declared sum of P5,000.00for the month of December, 1989,

b) Again O.R. No. 2716, (Exh. 15) in the name of Oro Cam Ent. Inc. for the declared sum of P5,000.00

as rental for October 1989, x

And the dispositive portion of the decision of said RTC reads:

SETTING ASIDE the part dealing with the rest of the defendants-appellees and a new one entered,ORDERING Defendants-appellees Constancio Manzano, FORTUNATO MELODIA, SR. and ERNESTOMARCOSO, their heirs, assigns and representatives:

1. To vacate and surrender to plaintiff-appellant the permission question that they respectivelyoccupied;

2. To pay the corresponding reasonable rent of said premises from July 1, 1990, until they have fullyvacated the same, at the following rates:

a) Constancio Manzano at P12,500.00 per month;

b) Melodia at P5,000.00 per month;

c) Ernesto Marcoso at P5,000.00 per month, and

3. To pay jointly and solidarily to plaintiff-appellant the sum of P30,00.00 as attorneys fees andP10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

Cagayan de Oro City, December 27, 1993.

5. Upon the above decision having become final and executory, herein petitioner ACI filed a motion forissuance of writ of execution specifically against defendants Constancio Manzano, Jr. and Oro CamEnterprises, represented by administrator/general manager Vicente Manzano, their heirs, assigns andrepresentatives.

6. In its Opposition to Motion for Execution, Etc., private respondent Oro Cam posited that if the motionfor execution is granted, it would be deprived of the possession of the premises in question withoutdue process as it has never been impleaded nor included as party-defendant in ejectment case (CivilCase No. 13040). Oro Cam further contended that:

4. The Oro Cam Enterprises Inc., being an indispensable party considering the fact that saidcorporation as a separate entity, is the actual possessor and occupant of the three doors portion of thesubject building should have been impleaded as party defendant and of which the plaintiff have failedto do, therefore, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over said Corporation (Sene versus Mangubal,

156 SCRA 113 and National Development Co. versus Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 422).

5. The Oro Cam Enterprises Inc. has been paying religiously its rental of the three doors portion of thesubject building to Constancio Manzano and later to the estate of Constancio Manzano by virtue of averbal agreement thereof.

7. The letter dated May 30, 1991 addressed to the Clerk of Court of the RTC for consignation of monthlyrental of Oro Cam in the light of the refusal of collector of the lessor to accept the same was sent byAtty. Cesilo A. Adaza as counsel for Oro Cam. Atty. Adaza himself filed the Answer of defendantConstancio A. Manzano in the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 13040).

8. In its motion for reconsideration filed in Civil Case No. 92-456, Oro Cam referred to itself asdefendant-appellee. While it prayed to set aside the decision of the RTC ordering defendant Manzano,his heirs, assigns and representatives to vacate the leased premises, it did not deny being a privy tosaid defendant Manzano.



It is noteworthy that the existence of the lease agreement was neverdenied in the answer filed on behalf of Constancio Manzano and petitioner.

What the answer questioned was amount of monthly rentals. Throughoutthe proceedings in the MTCC, RTC, and in this Court in G.R. No. 116933,petitioner never questioned the jurisdiction of the court over it. Only whenthe order of ejectment was sought to be executed did petitioner raise thisargument. As noted by the Court of Appeals:

Contrary to the findings of respondent court, the MTCC had jurisdiction over Oro Cam against which thewrit of execution was correctly issued. The claim of Oro that it is a corporation with a personalityseparate and distinct from Manzano is irrelevant. The judicial admission of Oro Cam that it paid themonthly rentals to Constancio Manzano, the undisputed lessee of herein petitioner, indubitably shows,without need of any further presentation of evidence, that it is privy with defendant Manzano insofar asthe leasing of the premises in question is concerned.

Petitioner is thus estopped from asserting that the MTCC had not acquired jurisdiction over it. It did not question the failure of private respondent toimplead it as a party defendant. On the contrary, evidence clearly showedthat petitioner had knowledge of the existence and the pendency of theunlawful detainer suit filed against Constancio Manzano. It would beunjust to private respondent to allow petitioner to put in issue at this latestage the jurisdiction of the court over it. In Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v.Court of Appeals, we held:

While it is a rule that jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this however, admits of anexception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. This Court has time and again frowned uponthe undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for a decision and then accepting the judgment,only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

Moreover, petitioner admits that it has been the actual occupant of theleased premises since 1980 and it has authorized Constancio Manzano to

pay the rents for and in its behalf. In fact, it claims to have been payingthe rent religiously, effectively implying that it is a co-lessee or sub-lesseeof the property. Thus, it is still bound by the ejectment suit even if it wasnot named a party thereto. It is well-settled that a judgment in anejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit but alsoagainst those not made parties thereto, if they are:

a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustratethe judgment;

b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant;

c) transferees pendente lite;

d) sublessee;

e) co-lessee; or

f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.

Consequently, the appellate court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the trial courts order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.

The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutoryorder; as such, it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition forreview on certiorari . The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such anorder is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the maincase, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where theassailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequateand expeditious relief. In the instant case, the trial court issued as writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the judgment in CivilCase No. 13040, in spite of the fact that the right of petitioner to occupythe leased premises has been declared by final judgment to be inexistent.Having no clear legal right, petitioners plea should not have merited the

favorable action of the trial court. The order granting the writ of



preliminary injunction was thus clearly erroneous and must be set aside.As the appellate court succinctly explained:

We are mindful of the ruling of the Supreme Court that where the court has jurisdiction over thesubject matter, the orders or decisions pertaining to the cause are orders or decisions within its

jurisdiction and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. However,while certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court, theSupreme Court allows certiorari as a mode of redress where the assailed order is patently erroneousand appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. Petitioner would be made to sufferunnecessary waste of time before it could proceed with the ejectment of its lessees and all persons,including private respondent Oro Cam claiming under them if we opt to dismiss the petition and ignorethe patently erroneous granting of the writ of preliminary injunction and unduly impose uponpetitioner the burden of going through the proceedings with respondent court which had evidentlytaken a patently erroneous view against herein petitioners valid stand.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.



RULE 70 FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a

person deprived of the possession of any land or building byforce, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession ofany land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expirationor termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of anycontract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or

assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawfuldeprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the

proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or personsunlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any personor persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such

possession, together with damages and costs. Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall becommenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditionsof the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by

serving written notice of such demand upon the person found onthe premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no

person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to complytherewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five(5) days in the case of buildings. Sec. 3. Summary procedure. Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy laws or whenthe law otherwise expressly provides, all actions for forcibleentry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount ofdamages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall begoverned by the summary procedure hereunder provided. Sec. 4. Pleadings allowed. The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint,compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer,and the answers thereto. All pleadings shall be verified. Sec. 5. Action on complaint. The court may, from an examination of the allegations in thecomplaint and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismissthe case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of acivil action which are apparent therein. If no ground fordismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue summons. Sec. 6. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendantshall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereofon the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction overthe subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaimsnot asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. Theanswer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within ten (10) days from service of the answer in whichthey are pleaded. Sec. 7. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the

period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of



the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by thefacts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed fortherein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount ofdamages and attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or

otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicabilityof section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants. Sec. 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties.

Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed,a preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of Rule18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminaryconference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminaryconference shall be cause for the dismissal of his complaint.The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall

be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance withthe next preceding section. All cross-claims shall be dismissed. If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shalllikewise be entitled to judgment in accordance with the next

preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where one oftwo or more defendants sued under a common cause of action whohad pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminaryconference.

No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted except for highly meritorious grounds and without prejudice tosuch sanctions as the court in the exercise of sound discretion

may impose on the movant. Sec. 9. Record of preliminary conference.

Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminaryconference, the court shall issue an order stating the matterstaken up therein, including but not limited to: 1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement,and if so, the terms thereof; 2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties; 3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulationsand admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered

without the need of further proceedings, in which event thejudgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuanceof the order; 4. A clear specification of material facts which remaincontroverted; and 5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition ofthe case. Sec. 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers.

Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in thenext preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavitsof their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issuesdefined in the order, together with their position paperssetting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. Sec. 11. Period for rendition of judgment.

Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing thesame, the court shall render judgment.



However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an orderspecifying the matters to be clarified, and require the partiesto submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters

within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of thelast affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing thesame. The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just togain time for the rendition of the judgment. Sec. 12. Referral for conciliation. Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is noshowing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed

without prejudice, and may be revived only after thatrequirement shall have been complied with. Sec. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not beallowed: 1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lackof jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply

with section 12; 2. Motion for a bill of particulars; 3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment,or for reopening of trial; 4. Petition for relief from judgment; 5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits orany other paper; 6. Memoranda; 7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against anyinterlocutory order issued by the court; 8. Motion to declare the defendant in default; 9. Dilatory motions for postponement; 10. Reply; 11. Third-party complaints; 12. Interventions. Sec. 14. Affidavits. The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shallstate only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants

which are admissible in evidence, and shall show theircompetence to testify to the matters stated therein.

A violation of this requirement may subject the party or thecounsel who submits the same to disciplinary action, and shall

be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portionthereof from the record. Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction.



The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance withthe provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.

A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or

unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing ofthe complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entryor unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The courtshall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filingthereof. Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.

When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownershipshall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Sec. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations of thecomplaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the

plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justlydue as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the useand occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it

finds that said allegations are not true, it shall renderjudgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If acounterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment forthe sum found in arrears from either party and award costs asjustice requires. Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusivein actions involving title or ownership. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry ordetainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession onlyand shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership ofthe land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action

between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to theappropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on

the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in thecourt of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may besubmitted by the parties or required by the Regional TrialCourt. Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shallissue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been

perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficientsupersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages,

and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time totime under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgmentof the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, heshall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable valueof the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding

month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of thelower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding monthor period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the

Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk ofthe Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.



All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal,unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or inthe absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to

withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise.Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, theappellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof ofsuch failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but suchexecution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its courseuntil the final disposition thereof on the merits.

After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay ofexecution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions

of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case whereinit appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful

possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue ofthe execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court,damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of

possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of theRegional Trial Court disposing of the appeal. Sec. 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal. Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10) days from the

perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the latter

may issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restorethe plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied that thedefendant’s appeal is frivolous or dilatory, or that the appealof the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious. Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals orSupreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendantshall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a furtherappeal that may be taken therefrom.

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