SUICIDE AS SECONDARY DEVIANCE: A PROCESS THEORY

OF SUICIDE INTEGRATING DURKHEIMIAN,

LABEUNG, AND IDENTITY THEORY

i>y

LARRY WILLSON TAYUJR. B.S.

A THESIS

IN

SOaOLOGY

Submitted la dK Gnliiate Faculiy

of Texas Tecb Univetsity ia Panial FulfUlmcnt of the Requiremeats for

die Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

May. 2003

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Where does one begin when recognizing all the people who helped with this project,

the many family members, friends, colleagues, and professors that helped in guiding this

project to conclusion?

A special thank you goes to my wife, Marianna, and my step-children. Erica and

David for their patience and understanding throughout this entire project. Without them I

would never have completed this thesis. Oh, Erica, you can have the computer back now.

Thank you. Dr. Charles Peek. You not only have been a wonderfiil chairperson,

instructor, and mentor, you have also, most of all, been a good friend. 1 would like to

thank my other committee members, Dr. Charlotte Dunham and Dr. Juhe Harms-Cannon

for their invaluable insights and guidance.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my friends for their understanding

when all 1 spoke of in their presence was the content of this thesis when I know they

would rather have conversed on other matters. You guys are great, I owe you one!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii

LIST OF FIGURES ,

CHAPTER

I. DURKHEIM'S LEGACY ON SUICIDE: MACRO THEORIES IN NEED OF MICRO EXPLANATIONS 1

Suicide: A Social Fact Produced by Social Isolation I

Purpose and Preview of Thesis 5

II. DURKHEIM ON SOCIAL ISOLATION AND SUICIDE: MACRO THEORIES IN NEED OF MICRO EXPLANATIONS 6

Anomic Suicide, Egoistic Suicide, and Social Isolation 6

Pioblems With Durkiieim's Theory 13

The Dismissal of Mental Illness 14

ni. SUICIDE AS SECONDARY DEVIANCE TO

LABELS OF MENTAL ILLNESS 16

Mental Illness: Secondary Deviance and Social Isolation 17

Mental Illness, Isolation and Suicide: Meanings to The Labeled Individual 19

IV. IDENTITY THEORY AND THE PROCESS

TOWARD SUICIDE 24

Identity Theory 24

The Interruption of Identity 29

V. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR

A PROCESS THEORY OF SUICIDE 33

A Process Theory of Suicide Revisited 33

Emotions, Identity Interruption, and GeiKler 36

Conchlsions 38

REFERENCES 41

LIST OF FIGURES

Control System View of the Identity Process, Showfing the Cycle ofMeaning with Possible Points of Interruptions at A and B 39

Suicide as Secondary Deviance 40

CHAPTER I

DURKHEIM'S LEGACY ON SUICIDE:

MACRO THEORIES IN NEED OF

MICRO EXPLANATIONS

Suicide: A Social Fact Produced bv Social Isolation

Ahhough preceded by earlier work on suicide (e.g., Marx, 1999; Peuchet, 1999;

Martineau, 1838,1995), for over one hundred years, Emile Durkheim's Suicide (1897,

1951) has influenced sociological and psychological research on suicide (Stack, 1982;

Lester, 1994; Tomasi, 2000; Besnard, 2000). This research usually starts with

Durkheim's definition of suicide (1951: 44) "...death resuhing directly or indirectly fix>m

a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which [the victim] knows will produce

this resuh. Sociological research on suicide has also continued with his method of

aggregate/ecological level correlation in examining social forces which affect suicide,

although a shift toward individual level investigations popular in psycho bgical research

has recently emerged (Breault, 1994). Most influential on this research are Durkheim's

theories of bow social integration and regulation affect suicide (Davies and Neal, 2000;

Lester. 1994; Pickering and Walford, 2000).

Durkheim's key contribution was to view suicide as a social fact, a phenomenon tied

to group forces more than to characteristics of individuals. Although others (Marx, 1999;

Peuchet, 1999) had also viewed suicide in this manner prior to Durkheim, when

Durkheim's book was first published in the late 1800s, most who delved into the subject

saw suicide as something purely psychological, a highly individualized act (Moksony,

1994). Durkheim describes their position: "Since suicide is an individual action affecting

the individual only, it must seemingly depend exclusively on individual factors, thus

belonging to psychology alone. Is not the suicide's resolve usually explained by his

temperament, character, antecedents and private history? "(1951: 46). Disagreeing with

this position, he sought to move suicide from the realm of psychology to an act that had

its roots within society. Through careful observation and statistical analysis Durkheim

came to the conclusion that society plays an important role in suicides. According to

Durkheim (1951):

...instead of seeing in them only separate occurrences, unrelated and to be separately studied, [when] the suicides committed in a given society during a given period of time are taken as a whole, it appears that this total is not simply a sum of independent units... but is itself a new feet sui generis, with its own unity, individuality and consequently its own nature. ..dominantly social, (p. 46)

In Durkheim's opinion, suicide is a social fad, illustrated by its link to social integration

and social regulation, both indicators of social isolation from groups.

Social integration refers to how well individuals are connected to one another within

a society, while social regulation refers to the amount of control a society has over the

actions of an individual. Breault (1994) described social integration and social regulation

as two different continua, at the ends of which are Durkheim's theories of suicide.

Durkheim generates two theories of suicide from each of these influences, proposing that

opposite ends of both continua (high and low social integration, high and low social

regulation) are more likely to produce suicide.

Elaboration of Durkheim's views on social integration and social regulation is a

preliminary step to understanding both as different manifestations of social isolation.

While he sees these processes as closely related (Davies and Neal, 2000), he thinks they

are analytically separable. Researchers who stress the distinctness of these processes

(Breault, 1994; Davies and Neal, 2000) treat them as two continua, the extremes of which

produce more suicide. When social integration is high, altruistic suicide, the intentional

taking of one's ovm life for the seemingly greater good of the group (i.e., a soldier at

war), is more likely. Egoistic suicide, the intentional taking of one's own life due to

feelings of being isolated from society, is more a result of low social integration. High

social regulation is more likely to trigger fatalistic suicide, the intentional taking of one's

own hfe as a means of escape when the rules of a society are rigid to an extreme and

inflexible (5u(c/i/e, 1951: 276), while anomic suicide, the intentional taking of one's own

life due to a perceived absence, breakdown, conflision, or conflict in the norms of society

(MarshaU, 1998).

Durkheimian scholars have recognized close ties between social integration and

social regulation. Some argue that social integration and social regulation are one and the

same, merging anomic with egoistic suicide and proposing one cause of suicide (Johnson,

1965; Pope, 1976). Sociological research has also tended reflect this focus, leading to

what Besnard (2000:116) has called "the primacy of egoistic suicide" earUer inthis

research. Even among those who oppose viewing social integration and regulation as

identical, some admit the two are so "closely related" that "[w]hether or not we treat

egoism and anomie as separate variables or as different aspects of the same thir^ is

largely a matter of convenience" (Davies and Neal, 2000:36). Tomasi (2000:14) proposes

that solidarity is the common thread of regulation and integration, calling suicide "an act

against solidarity ... related above all to the stage of integration of the individuals and

groups who live in that society."

Following Tomasi's (2000) argument, I view egoism (low social integration) and

anomie (low social regulation) as types of low social solidarity or social isolation from

groups. Egoism is a more direct indicator of social isolation. It "springs from excessive

individualism" propelled by norms and values in the collective conscience (Durkheim,

1951:209). As individuals follow these cultural dfrectives, they become less connected

interactionally to each other (Breault, 1994). Rather than discouraging attachment to

other group members, anomie produces social isolation by failing to establish clear group

boundaries and thus exactly to what group members individuals might become attached.

Anomie is a failure of groups to have clear norms and values or feilure of individuals to

perceive these cultural guidelines. While both conditions resuh in low social regulation of

individuals' conduct, each condition also produces a sense of detachment from one's

groups. If individuals do not understand the cultural markers that define group

membership, either because these markers do not exist or are ill perceived, they have

little sense of where these groups begin and end and thus can have only weak attachments

to them.

Punwse and Preview of Thesis

This thesis focuses on egoistic and anomic suicide, viewing both as results of social

isolation. Usir^ symbolic interaction theory, it attempts to develop a process explanation

of how individuals who are more isolated (less socially regulated and/or less socially

integrated) come to take their lives, and integrate this micro explanation with Durkheim's

macro theory. Chapter II reviews Durkheim's ideas about low social regulation and low

social integration as precursors of suicide. Chapter III begins to thread symbolic

interaction theory into the larger cloth of Durkheim's macro theory. It draws from

labeling theory, proposing that suicide is frequently ultimate form of secondary deviance

—a reaction to deviant labels of mental illness. Chapter IV utilizes identity theory in an

effort to understand the process through which social isolation produces suicide among

those labeled mentally ill. Arguing that suicide results from interruptions in identity

control processes at both the input and output reveals, and showii^ links of social

isolation to both types of interruptions, this chapter demonstrates that symbolic

interaction theory is not just several threads in but an integral (ahhough hidden) part of

Durkheim's theory. Chapter V summarizes this micro theory and where it fits into

Durkheim's macro theory. The chapter concludes by suggesting implications of the

combined macro and micro theories for better understanding both suicide and links of

gender to suicide, the latter topic being one on which Durkheim has been critkjued

(Lehman, 1995).

CHAPTER II

DURKHEIM ON SOCIAL ISOLATION AND SUICIDE:

MACRO THEORIES IN NEED OF

MICRO EXPLANATIONS

Anomic Suicide. Egoistic Suicide, and Social Isolation

Anomic Suicide

Durkheim separates his treatment of anomic suicide into two spheres; first, as a

direct resuh from economic crisis; and second, as a result of divorce. Both are used to

illustrate his theory of suicide resulting from a lack of social regulation.

Economic Crises and Anomie

Anomie is described as absence, conflict, breakdovm, or confusion in the norms of a

given society (Marshall, 1998:21). Durkheim explains that anomie, in part, is a by­

product of the age of industrialization. He explains, "...industry, instead of being still

regarded as a means to an end transcending itself, has become the supreme end of

individuals and societies alike" (1951:255). When, accordit^to Marshall (1998),

economic change occurs faster than the ability of moral regulation to keep pace with

increasing labor differentiation and specialization, then an anomic pathological division

of said labor occurs, thus creatii^ a sense of normlessness.

In Suicide (1951), Durkheim describes anomic suicide occurring most notably

during times of economic boom or depression, when there is a decrease of economic and

normative regulation. During these economic periods, individuals are less connected to

the norms of their groups, and their desires and behavior become less regulated.

Durkheim argues that human desire contains no mechanism of limitation and can only be

controlled through social regulations. When there is a reduction in regulation and an

increase in perceived normlessness, individuals within a society become more susceptible

to anomic suicide.

Norms define groups and their boimdaries. As a result, perceptions of normlessness

can produce a sense of isolation from the groups to which the individual belongs. What

economic crises tend to do is change many individual's group memberships. These

individuals were employed, now they are unemployed. These individuals were in the

working class, now they are at, or betow, the poverty level. Individuals who lived in

middle class neighborhoods can now, due to substantial salary increases, relocate to

upper class neighborhoods. Separation from old groups, feilure to understand the norms

and boundaries of new groups, and absence of visible regulatory activities of these new

groups can combine to produce a sense of detachment from groups; ergo, social isolation.

Durkheim's theory posits that both an increase and a decrease in prosperity can

create a state of insufficient regulation. However, more recent research (Lampert, 1984)

suggests that sharp increases in prosperity are not associated with increased suicide rates.

Other research (Piatt. 1984; Diekstra, 1990) continues to indicate that a disproportionate

number of unemployed commit suicide and considerable number of suicides were

unemployed. These studies suggest that there may be a deeper sense of isolation at play

with the stigma of being unemployed, being unable to provide for the individual's needs

and the needs of his or her femily (Piatt, 1984; Stack and Haas, 1984). Although most

unemployed individuals fmd new employment within a few months, new jobs are often

lower in wage and skill levels and involve a change in groups. These individuals are also

at a higher risk of suicide (Stack and Haas, 1984) because economic change increases

their social isoIatioiL Piatt (1984) cautions that there may be a selection process at work.

Persons already feeling more isolated and other psychologically disturbed individuals

may be both more suicidal and more likely to quit or be dismissed from employment than

nondisturbed individuals.

Divorce and Anomie

Durkheim also uses divorce to illustrate anomic suicide as well as egoistic suicide.

He contends that marriage increases regulation because it limits various appetrtes such as

sexual desire (Stack, 2000), and increases integration by providit^ a clear group identity.

Stack (1982) states that marriage increases integration and regulation because it adds

greater meanir^ to one's own life and thus presumably more reason to control it.

However, divorce should increase suicide risk because it breaks the ties between

individuals and marriage, reducing regulation by changing group relationships. Divorced

individuals have higher levels suicidal conditions than the general population. Stack

(2000) states that divorced individuals have a depression level 40% higher than married

individuals, a morbidity rate 52% higher for men, 43% higher for women, increased

financial pressures, and an

increased risk of alcohol abuse throughout the process of divorce. Divorced individuals

may experience a sense of shame, guift, disorientation, and a feeling of emotional hurt

(Stack, 1994).

Durkheim's anomic suicide is, over all, suicide borne of crisis of group membership

change, whether it be economic, divorce, death of a spouse, or any great altering group

change. Such chaise may create a sense of isolation from groups, producing a good deal

of stress and disorientation.

Egoistic Suicide

Durkheim contends that weak social integration, the degree to which individuals are

connected interactionally to each other, can also create suicidal tendencies (Breauft,

1994). Durkheim views a lack of social integration as propeUed by norms and values

contained in the collective conscience, "... springing from excessive individualism"

(1951:209) that a particular version of the collective conscience emphasizes. He labeled

suicide that results from this isolation egoistic suicide. His discussions of domestic and

religious integration elaborate the association between interactional isolation aiKl suicide.

Domestic Integration

Durkheim (1951: 175) illustrated domestic integration mainly for men in terms of

marriage and divorce. Durkheim hypothesized that if the marriage rate for men (but as

well for women as related to men) in any given society is high, men's suicide rate will be

low. If the divorce rate is high, the suicide rate will also be high. Over the years many

studies have been conducted to test Durkheim's hypothesis (Stack, 2000). Here are a few

of the more important ones.

Leenaars, Lester, and Yang (1993) measured the effect of domestic stress on suicide

rates in Canada and the United States between the years 1950 to 1985. This study

indicated that marriage has a protective effect on suicide in the United States but not in

Canada. Divorce rates were associated positively with suicide in both nations. The higher

the divorce rates, the higher the suicide rates.

A study conducted by Lester (1994) used World Health Organization data to

examined the impact of domestic integration and suicide in twenty-one nations between

the same years as the study above. This study supported Durkheim's prediction that

suicide rates would be high where divorce is high and suicide rates would be low where

marriage is high. However, Lester did caution that this analysis had inconsistent resuhs

for some countries in the study.

A year after the study above was published Lester (1995) conducted another study

examining domestic integration within a specific region using divorce, marriage, single,

and widowed rates in the continental United States in 1980. The results of this study

show divorce to be a good indicator of general social integration within specific regions

of the United States. It supports Durkheim in that in areas where divorce is high, so too is

suicide.

Religious Integration

Up until recently, most research on religious affiliation and suicide have largely

been limited to Durkheim's Proteslant-CathoUc differences (Stack, 2000). Indeed, Gibbs

(1994) termed this interest in religion a near obsession. Durkheim hypothesized that the

Catholic reUgion should shield against suicide because of the many shared beliefs and

rituals that foster closer social integration. Protestant religions, with their subcultures

pushing individual freedom, would foster less social integration and therefore would have

higher suicide rates.

A study by Burr, McCall, and Powell-Griner (1994) looked at the Catholic Church

and its mediating effect of divorce on suicide. This study explored the possibility that the

Catholic Church's moral values on divorce may have an indirect effect on suicide among

its members. It examined Catholic Church membership, Protestant Church membership,

divorce, and suicide rates in major metropolitan areas. Findii^s of this study were

inconclusive. They supported Durkheim's hypothesis that Catholic Church membership

has a shielding effect on suicide, but it was unable to provide conclusive evidence that the

Catholic Church's moral view on divorce fostering closer marital integration played a key

role in suicide rates. Results of this study may be due to stronger social networks and

support among Catholics than shared beliefs of the Catholic Church.

Siegrist (1996) atten^ted to measure the difference in suicide ideology between

Catholic churches and various Protestant denominations throughout Germany. He

postulated that Catholics were more religiously integrated than Protestants, and

Protestants were more integrated than people without religious affiliation. Results of this

study support Durkheim's hypothesis that reUgious denomination affects suicide ideation.

Catholics reported less approval of suicide than Protestants, and Protestants reported less

approval of suicide than those subjects who had no religious affiliation. Suicide ideology

was influenced by church attendance as well as by denomination; those who attended

church frequently showed less approval for suicide than those who aUnost never attend

church..

Most studies on religious integration, including some of the studies cited above

seem to support Durkheim's theory. However, some researchers argue that it is not

necessarily that one reUgion shields from suicide more than another; rather, it is possibly

the degree to which the individual is integrated into a specific congregation (Stack,

2000). Other studies (Pescosolido, 1990; Pescosolido and Georgianna, 1989) found that

the impact of religion on suicide is dependent on three special contexts. First is urbanity,

where people are more apt to fmd corehgionists and construct a slroi^ reUgious

interactional network, group integration, and stronger negative association of religion

with suicide. Second, congregations with a conservative ideology and tension with

mainstream culture (e.g., many Islamic congregations. Southern Baptists, and

Evangelicals) are more likely to reduce suicide risk ^a in because they provide group

members with stronger networks. Third, the historical hub of a religion (the social bonds

it creates) and its strong emphasis on membership networkii^ and integration most likely

lowers the rates of suicide among members.

Problems With Durkheim's Theory

Dismissal of the IndivJdial and I^ck of Micro Theory

Some of Durkheim's critics claim that he dismissed the individual and was trying to

"make flie psychology of suicide seem irrelevant"(Hendin, 1978:116). This does not

appear to be what Durkheim was attempting. Taylor (1994) argues that Durkheim was

interested in connections between the individual and society. His opposition was to

individualistic ejqjlanations, partKularly explanations using individual consciousness as a

basis for an individual's actions. Taylor argues that "[it] was the relationship between the

individual and this moral order that Durkheim sought to explain. At the center of his

theory was his notion of'homo duplex.' Each person's life has a double center of gravity

[the selfandsociety]...There is perpetual tension betweenthe two" (1994: 3). Durkheim

sought to use societal forces to account for actions of the irjdividual.

However, Durkheim failed to show how social forces linked to suicide actually

mduced individuals to take their own lives. As several critics point out, Durkheim did not

adequately explain just wf^ individuals commit suicide, particularly why one individual

in a high-risk condhion such as divorce, absence of religious affiliation, or economic

crisis would commit suicide while others would not (Gibbs, 1994; Stack, 1994; Phillips,

Ruth, and MacNamara, 1994). What Durkheim's macro theory of suicide needs is a

micro component that adds social-psychological processes through which individuals are

moved toward suicide, a topic Durkheim (1951) treated in very limited fashion.

Some researchers have suggested that a linking of macro and micro theories in

sociology may provide more inclusive explanations of social phenomena (Coleman,

1990; Etzioni, 1988). Katz (1988) argues for such an approach in an effort fo understand

deviance in general, merging foreground forces such as motivational processes that

attract individuals to deviance with background forces such as memberships in particular

groups or categories. More directly, Pescosolido (1992) suggests combining Durkheim's

macro theories of suicide with micro analyses to provide a better understanding as to why

particular individuals choose suicide.

The Dismissal of Mental Ilhiess

In Suicide (1951), Durkheim disregarded mental ilkiess as a cause of suicide for

three reasons. First, he sees mental ilbess as an attribute of individuals while he describes

suicide as a social fact or an attribute of groups. His sociological method (1895) would

allow explanation of social facts only by other group forces, not by something inside of

individuals like mental illness. Second, he argues that suicide is a voluntary, rational

choice. He concludes that individuals suffering from mental illness are not in a rational

state of mind. Thus, they caimot voluntarily take their lives and may not even know that

they are doing so. Finally, he iiUerprets the little current research on mental illness and

suicide available to him at that time as demonstrating that "the social suicide rate ... bears

no definite relation to the tendency to insanity" (Durkheim, 1951:76).

Because a considerable amount of current research demonstrates that mental illness

in general (Jobes and Mann, 1999; Leenaars, Lester and Yar^, 1993) and depression

more specifically (Cavaiola and Lavender, 1999; Lester, 1992) are associated with

suicide, some sociologists tend to see this as a problem with Durkheim's theory (Tomasi,

2000; Phillips et al., 1994). This thesis atten:^)ts to address Durkheim's dismissal of

mental illness as a precursor of suicide. It uses the connection between mental illness and

suicide as a springboard into an identity theory of suicide, a theory which helps to

understand the foreground, motivational forces that propel Durkheim's social isolated

people (those experiencing anomie or egoism) toward suicide.

CHAPTER m

SUICIDE AS SECONDARY DEVIANCE TO

LABELS OF MENTAL ILLNESS

Chapters III and IV draw from symbolic interaction theory, attempting to develop a

micro theory of foreground motivational forces (Katz, 1988) produced by social isolation,

the key force behind both Durkheim's anomie and egoism that lead to suicide among

individuals labeled as mentally ill. If successful, this explanation can restore the

relevance of suicide among mentally ill people to Durkheim's theory

Use of symbolic interaction theory to explain how suicide among the mentally ill

transpires—to identify processes from identity theory through which suicide actually

occurs—is reserved for chapter four. Chapter 111 focuses on why social isolation produces

suicide among the mentally ill. It begins by placing this suicide squarely within the

framework of symbolic interaction theory, identifying it as secondary deviance—a

reaction to labels of mental illness. It then connects social isolation to labels of mental

illness, showing how social isolation can both lead to and resuh from these labels,

especially from other types of secondary deviance that precede suicide as reactions to

mentally ill labels. The last part of this chapter examines particular meanings created by

this isolation (through mental ilhiess labels and reactions to these labels it creates) and

shows how some of these meanings may motivate people to suicide.

Mental lllnesg- St^ondarv Deviance and Social Isolation

Accordmg to labeling theorists (Lemert, 1951), primary deviance is a condition in

which an individual who is perceived otherwise as "normal" acts differently from the

collective. If the initial breaking of norms earns the violating individual a label of

deviance, such a label often promotes subsequent norm violations as a means of defense

or adaptation to real or anticipated reactions of others to the label. Lemert (1951) dubbed

such violations secondary deviance, which Sampson and Laub (1997) show may continue

for certain segments of the life course.

Focusing on labeling m the area of mental ilhiess, Scheff (1984) made two points

relevant to suicide as secondary deviance, similar to arguments of Foucauh (1965). First,

SchefTs key poinl-nane widely debated (see Cockerham, 1996, for a review)~contends

that chronic mental illness is secondary deviance; by implication, so is suicide as one

reaction to the mentally ill label. Scheff (1975:10) argues that once individuals are

formally labeled as mentally ill and experience community social control mechanisms,

they are "launched on a career of 'chronic' mental ilhess" through their reactions to this

label. Thus, chronic mental ilbess becomes secondary deviance—essentially a role of

more and more amplified violations of basic interactional group norms in reaction to

negative labels of mental illness.

SchefFs other point is that individuals' extreme social isolation from all groups is a

key force in their receiving labels of mental illness in the first place. He states that only a

special type of rule-breaking may result in people acquiring labels of mentally ill. He

calls this residual rule breaking—violations of rules so basic to group interaction that we

have no names for this type of deviance. Seeing or hearing things that other group

members do not, disregarding interaction rules of appropriate body spacmg, making

constantly repeated uninterpretable noises, disregarding/ignoring others' presence, very

inappropriate physical appearance (smearing with body waste, nudity in situations where

highly inappropriate)-all are examples of residual deviance. The reason that this

deviance does not have a name like crime (violation of criminal laws) or substance abuse

(violation of substance use norms) and is thus "left over" is that few group members ever

consider anyone within the group would violate such basic norms. Individuals who

violate such basic norms are, in essence, exhibiting extreme isolation from not just one or

two groups but all groups. These mdividuals are acting contrary to basic group life or

"human nature." Hence, for individuals to be labeled as mentally ill in the first place,

their norm violations have to show a good deal of isolation from group life. Coupled with

the later increased isolation that comes from secondary deviance as a reaction to this

label, the chronic mentally ill probably have a degree of group isolation uiqiaralleled

elsewhere in society.

Just as social isolation leads to mental ilhiess labels, it also results from these labels.

Martin, Pescosolido, and Tuch (2000) argue that this secondary deviance makes those

with the label of mental ilbess even more isolated from their groups. They show that the

stigma associated with both the label of mental Ubess and the subsequent secondary

deviance strikes "fear and loathing" across society that other medical disorders manage to

escape. To the extent that social isolation may compel suicide, Scheff s argument that the

mentally ill—through secondary deviance-become even more isolated from their groups.

suggests that this greater isolation may produce suicide as the ultimate secondary

deviance.

Link, Cullen, Struening, Shrout, and Dohrenwend (1989) described a process

through which mental ilbess emerges as secondary deviance and those so labeled

become isolated. First, there is the societal conception of mental ilbess. This conception

creates expectations of rejection and outcast by society for the labeled bdividual. Even

when the medical community defmes the disorder as a medical problem, the patient sees

the disorder fi^m a cuhural context rather than a medical context. The second step is the

official labelmg through treatment providers. This step personalizes cuhural concepts

about mental ilbess directly to the bdividual bemg labeled as mentally ill. The third step

is the individual's response to the stigma of the label, secrecy and withdrawal. Although

secrecy and withdrawal may be beneficial for the bdividual, it can lead to the fourth step,

the limitmg of life chances. The secrecy and withdrawal and subsequent Umitbg of life

chances can lead to the final step m that the individual may suffer from poor self-esteem,

diminished social ties, possible unemployment, and loss of control over his or her social

status as a result from the negative label. Self-imposed isolation and subsequent suicide

can become and end result.

Mental Illness. Isolation and Suicide: Meanbgs to The Labeled Individual

What are the meanii^s to individuals of the isolation generated by labels of mental

ilbess and the secondary deviance which follows these labels? Symbolic bteraction

theory as well as research on mental ilbess and suicide highlight feelbgs of anxiety,

shame, depression, and loss of control among people labeled mentally ill. The rest of this

chapter tries to show how these feelbgs make suicide more likely, thus forging a link

between mental ilbess and suicide by connectmg foreground motivations for suicide to

social isolation.

Consideration of what isolation due to mental ilbess means to mdividuals begins

with Mead. In Mind, Self and Society (1934) Mead dravre a distbction between two parts

of the self; the "1," which is spontaneous and subjective; and the "me," which is the

bternalized norms and attitudes of society. Mead states that the "me" is how individuals

see themselves through the eyes of the "generalized other," or society at large. Mead's

symbolic bteraction contends that people labeled as mentally ill may take the role of the

other and anticipate what others' reaction to the label might be. Domg so makes them

more conscious of the label and more likely to experience the stigma of shame, anxiety,

and depression due to others negative evaluations of this label. These feelbgs can

exacerbate the problem. Individuals carmot escape from their own realization of their

negative stigma and must come to terms with the depression, shame, and anxiety such

realization produces (Poole, Regoli, and Pogrebin, 1986; Lester, 1997). As they try to

counter these feelbgs and react against the label they emerge mto secondary deviance

and may tum the label mto a self-fulfillbg prophecy, frequently actii^ b accordance

with it (Lemert, 1962). Labels of mental ilbess and others' reactions to these labels may

produce additional secondary deviance.

One type of secondary deviance is a feelbg of loss of control. Poole et al. (1986)

pobt out that negative labels such as mental ilbess can create a situation where

bdividuals feel as though they "can't w b for losbg" and that they can no longer control

how society views them This feelbg of loss of control over others' negative views of

one's self has consequences for one's self control. If mentally ill people perceive that

others view them as not b control of how society sees them, then, followbg Mead's

(1934) dictum that we see ourselves as we think others see us, they may quickly begb to

see themselves as people who are not m control of anything—of society's views or of

themselves and their own behavior. Not only is this perception of one's self doubly

deviant m societies which value self control as well as power over others, it also raises

questions to mentally ill people about whether they can control their behavior. The mere

raising of this question may make the killbg of oneself more possible, b the sense that

one feels prawerless to stop the journey toward self destruction. Because emotions such as

those experienced by bdividuals labeled as mentally ill tend to exaggerate contmuous

activity that fits the label (Heise and Weir, 1999), fellbg loss of self control may also

result b a more permanent self-image that reflect this feeling. When persons receive

deviant labels, they tend to become those labels, both m action and b emotion.

Poole et al. (1986) and Goffman (1963) describe some actions and emotions

mentally ill persons take toward others to manage feelbgs of loss of control over them.

Mentally ill people frequently develop feelmgs of bebg watched, and as a result, watch

others more closely. These individuals take on the role of others to prepare them for what

others' reactions might be and rehearse possible management strategies. Such strategies

often create selective negative attention from others that fiirther serves to amplify

secondary deviance from the labeled bdividual. A downward spiral of loss of control

emerges, b which these strategies validate the mdividual's negative label and results m

more intense reactions toward that person, who attempts yet more control which produces

yet more exclusion from bteraction.

A second type of additional secondary deviance is depression. While behavior

exhibhbg depression may have been bstrumental b getting people labeled as mentally

ill, it is also clearly another reaction of these people to this label. It is not only culturally

ejqiected behavior that mentally ill people exhibit (Poole et al., 1986), it is also a

culmbation to the combination of the other three negative self evaluations—a response

of an anxious, shameful self with no control over others or itself Dori and Overholser

(1999) concluded that the severity of depression was helpful b differentiatbg between

bdividuals who had recently or repeatedly atten^Jted suicide versus bdividuals who had

never attempted suicide. Jobes and Mann (1999) conducted a reasons for living/dybg

interview and found that the majority of those wantbg to die listed self-esteem and

hopelessness stemming from depression important reasons for suicide. Beutrais et al.

(1999) concluded that past studies of suicide failed to see the correlation between these

factors and the severity of suicide ideation.

Low self esteem is a third and perhaps the most important type of additional

secondary deviance. A precept of symbolic bteraction theory is that self-esteem or

evaluation of our selves reflects what we perceive to be others' evaluation of us. Low

self-esteem may result from two forces. One is external—isolation from others. Refiisal

of others to associate with people labeled mentally ill sends a strong message of rejection

and devaluation of self to these people, tybg low self-esteem to isolation. The other is

internal. Individuals' negative meanbgs/emotions they attribute to themselves-anxiety,

shame, depression and loss of control—can together make for an extremely negatively

evaluated "Me." Some suicide may result from this extreme devaluation of self produced

by these two forces-it may be one last final attempt to deal with these very low self

evaluations one feels from others m at least three ways. First, it may keep these

evaluations fix)m eroding further, by simply takmg the self out of existence-if the self is

no loiter there to evaluate, its evaluations cannot contmue to spiral downward. Second, it

allows one to escape forever from the psychological pains produced by these low

evaluations. Fbally, suicide m a sense may be perceived by those takmg their lives one

fmal effort to transcend these low self evaluations—to raise others' perceptions of one's

self by the bdividual actbg agabst this self In Mead's terms the "I" attempts to

transcend low self esteem by killing the "Me," the harbbger of others' low evaluations.

In doing so, the "I" acts b accordance with others' perceived opinions of one's self as

worthless, and allows the bdividual to finally anticipate positive reactions of others to

her/his self—if the "I" acted b agreement with others' opbions b obliteratir^ a

worthless self, the "I" will surely be held m more esteem by others. Note that b this

process, the more poshively evaluated "I"— t̂he part of the self that performed the last

act—becomes the whole self, supplantbg the more negatively evaluated "Me." As the

last component of the self remabmg, it allows those committmg suicide to anticipate a

more posftive and very stable (i.e., fmal) evaluation of their selves by others.

CHAPTER IV

IDENTITY THEORY AND THE PROCESS

TOWARD SUICIDE

Identity Theory

This chapter utUizes Burke's (1996) Identity Theory, b conjunction with his Identity

Intemiption Theory (Burke, 1991; 1996; Burke and Stets, 1999; Stets and Burke, 2000)

and Higgbs' (1987) theory of emotions to illustrate the processes bvolved m how the

labelbg of mental ilbess can—b some bdividuals—lead to social isolation, anxiety,

depression, and a sense of loss of control. The unsuccessful, contbued atten^ts to

manipulate and correct the role changes—that is, a spfral of secondary deviance m

response to the label of mental ilbess—can lead to suicide as secondary deviance.

Identity theory relies on a key concept of symbolic bteractionism derived from the

works of George Herbert Mead (1934); society shapes self shapes social behavior.

Individuals take the role of the "generalized other" (society), view themselves as the

think others do (self), and behave b such a manner as they perceive the group to dictate

(social behavior). Accordmg to identity theory society— t̂he basis of the generalized other

and the origb of our identities—is an assortment of group relationships or social networks

with defbed patterns of behaviors, beliefs, and norms. These groups can be defined

by—or cross boundaries of—gender, class, ethnicity, religion, and age (Stryker and Burke,

2000). Accordmg to Stryker and Burke (2000), groups with which an bdividual identifies

dictate the roles this bdividual may adopt b order to be accepted by flie group and be

seen as a member. Sfryker (1%8, 1980) has referred to this as role choice behavior.

These roles and their evaluations by groups are the source perceptions of others'

views about us and thus of our selves/self identities. Individuals identify themselves

through group roles they play and may have many roles ranked accordmg to importance.

The more important a group is to an bdividual, the more salience that group's roles to the

person's identity. An bdividual's "self is multifaceted, made up of bdependent,

bterdependent, conflicting, and reinforcing group roles and their evaluations. The

amount of "selves" are congruent vrith the amount of groups, networks, and relationships

with which the bdividual is mvolved. Expectations of each role are bternalized and

acted out, producbg social behavior. Stryker and Burke (2000) refer to these expectations

as "cognitive schema" (borrowed from Cognitive Social Psychology; Markus, 1977).

Burke's Identity Control Model

Burke (1996) exambes internal mechanisms associated with how people use roles to

create and mabtab identities. He delbes self identity as the total set of meanbgs an

individual places on the assorted roles contained m the "self" Role identity consists of

meanbgs an bdividual attaches to self b a particular role. Individuals try to control each

role (i.e., role identity) b accordance to how they think they are seen and, at tlK same

time, desire to be seen by group members. Burke (1996; Stryker and Burke, 2000)

defmed this type of role management as Identity Control.

Burice (1996) stated that an identity operates as a control system b the form of a

feedback loop with four main parts. First, there is an identity standard which consists of

the various meanings an individual has for oneself b a social role, or. what it means to be

who one is. This is the role identity, as discussed in flie paragraph above. Second, the

bput fonction is the set of self-perceptions the bdividual has relevant to the identity

derived from the environment. Stated b simple terms, bputs are stimuli from the

environment and society. Third is the comparator which assesses the match between

bputs from the social environment and the identity standard. The comparator bdicates to

the individual whether or not the social environment is perceiving the bdividual as he or

she wishes to be perceived. Fourth is the output-resuhant behaviors exhibited by the

bdividual toward society as an attempt to keep discrepancies between the mput fonction

and the identity standard to a mbimiun. This loop is a contmuous operation that works

with each salient role identity an bdividual might have. An bdividual might have many

identity control feedback loops operatbg at the same time. Once a role identity is

established the identhy control is contbued largely on a subconscious level (Burke,

1991).

Burke's Integration of Identity Control and Interruption Theory

Research on distress and anxiety has been conducted over the years (Mandler, 1982)

and has developed mto interruption theory. Interruption theory argues that bterruption of

an organized thought process or behaviors resuhbg b a rise b autonomic activity

(Mandler, 1982). Burke (1996) btegrates bterruption theory and identity control theory.

He states that identities are organized thought processes, and bterruptions b the identity

control loop can result b negative emotions such as depression or anxiety—types of

autonomic activity.

As background to explorir^ connections between bterruptions in the identity

control loop and suicide as secondary deviance, it is important to imderstand that labels

of mental ilbess produce negative emotions by activatii^ a sense of "control loss" over

an mdividual's identity.

Interruptions of Identity and Emotions

Higgbs' (1987) theory of self-discrepancy is used by Burke (1996) and Large and

Marcussen (2000) to explab the emotional severity of some interruptions. Self-

discrepancy concerns divergence between one's actual i:«//(beliefs about what one really

is, which constitute the self concept) and one or both of two "self-guides"—^the ought self

(beliefs about what one ought currently to be) and the ideal self {wishes or hopes about

what one will ukimately be). (Such discrepancies of self are the equivalent b Burke's

(1996) theory of Type I bterruption discussed below—Iwoken identity control loop.)

Higgins (1987) empirically demonstrates that negative emotions are connected with

self-discrepancy or bterruption b identity control b two ways. First, different types of

self-discrepancies produce different types of negative emotions. Discrepancies between

the actual and ideal selves are more likely to produce depression. Such divergence brmgs

about dejection and sadness because the hopes concemmg one's self are seen as not

likely to ever be fiilfilled. Discrepancies between flie actual and the ought selves more

readily yield anxiety from not livbg up to one's own norms/standards of self or

obUgations to others, and shame to the extent that one perceives others as aware of this

discrepancy. Second, Higgbs (1987) shows that the strength of the negative emotions

experienced from the self discrepancy or identity bterruption can be predicted from the

magnitude of the discrepancy—the greater the divergence between the actual and either

of the two self guides, the stronger the negative emotional response. Burke (1996) adds

that greater persistence of the discrepancy and higher salience of the btermpted identhy

will also produce greater emotbnal distress. Large and Marcussen (2000) state these

bsights and findbgs as a set of assumptions about how bterruptions m identity create

negative emotions that b the terms of this thesis, become secondary deviance.

Mbor bcongruences can be feirly easily corrected by changes b the output of

Burke's identhy control model. However, labels of mental ilbess nearly always generate

self discrepancies sufficiently severe, persistent, and salient that they cannot be corrected

by small alterations m the output phase of identity control. These self-discrepancies may

be addressed by trybg to make changes b other parts of the identhy control loop,

changes which bvolve bcreasbgly divorcbg reality as others perceive it. For example,

individuals labeled as mentally ill may scale down their self-guides so that distance

between the actual and ought or ideal selves is reduced, sometimes to the extent of totally

obliteratbg both self-guides, as catatonics b the back wards of mental bstitutions seem

to do. Or, these individuals may drastically after bput or self-perceptions they get from

their environment (ignore or mJsperceive signals from others concembg the self

discrepancies). Fbally, they may manipulate operation of the comparator so that

considerable divergence between the actual and ought or ideal selves become acceptable.

Many of these other "adjustments" to self discrepancy/identity bterruption play out

as secondary deviance, lockbg those who use them even more firmly bto the role of

mentally ill by denybg others' views of reaUty. To the extent these other adjustments

sufficiently reduce the persistence, salience, and severity of identity bterruption, then

output of stror^ negative emotions amoi^ the mentally ill that can lead to suicide may

not occur. However, if changes b other parts of the identity control loop are not

attenqjted or do not work well, strong negative emotions—depression, anxiety, shame,

and sense of loss of control—may well produce suicide as the final effort to repair the

identity bterruption.

The Interruption of Identity

Now that we have a basic understandbg of what is bvolved emotionally when there

is a discrepancy b self-concept and in self-guides, we now tum to Burke's (1996)

bterruption theory to locate where m the identhy control process both labels of mental

ilbess and suicide of mentally ill bdividuals are most likely to occtir. Burke's (1996)

theory consists of four types of bterruptions b the feedback loop which controls and

mabtains identities. It is the Type 1 bterruption, the broken loop, that best locates the

process of bebg labeled mentally ill and subsequent suicide. Burke (1996) separates

Type I bterruptions bto two parts. In Type la, the loop is broken at the location of the

output—the individual's behavior feils to restore coi^ruity between bputs (others'

behavior toward that bdividual) and self identity standards. Type lb consists of cracks at

the pomt of bput. Individuals may not be able to perceive correctly or may not perceive

at all meanings about situations others communicate (and thus divergence of these

meanings from self identity standards). Because of this feilure bdividuals do not

effectively change output to deal with these inharmonious meanings. By designating

these "a" and "b" Burke is describing differences, not delbeatmg order of occurrence.

Because the label of mental ilbess sometimes occurs as Type lb interruption followed by

suicide as a Type la bterruption, I consider the two types m this order.

Type lb bterruption consists of bterruptions at the bput level of the identity control

model. Whh this type the bdividual may not understand the meanbgs from the

environment or may perceive the bputs incorrectly. Burke (1996) states that bdividuals"

behaviors may have effects on the environment that they misread or perceive bcorrectly.

Such distortions m perceptions of bputs may generate feelbgs of bebg misunderstood.

More importantly, these misreadings may also trigger behaviors that are construed as

pecuUar, not b Ibe with social norms, or that confuse others m efforts to bring their

identity standard bto agreement with thefr environment. This is wliere the label of mental

ilbess will most likely occur.

Research (Laungoni 2002; Sheff,1975; Walsh 2002) has indicated that flie labelmg

of mental ilbess can be arbitrary and based on what society considers normal or

abnormal behavior. When an mdividual's behavior goes beyond what society deems

normal the bdividual may be considered mentally ill. Others will treat the bdividual as

not normal, thus, contributbg to the type lb behaviors exhibited. In a continuous effort to

brmg the identity standard bto agreement with his/her perceived environment, the

mdividual's behaviors may bcrease b abnormality. This can eventuaUy lead to a person

bemg asked, or forced, bto the psychological evaluation process. If, after evaluation, a

label of mental ilbess is forthcombg, the identity control model is successfully broken at

the bput pobt.

Once an bdividual has been convbcbgly labeled as mentally ill the type la broken

identity process at the output level, the level at which suicide occurs, begins. Accordii^

to Burke (1996) and Large and Marcussen (2000), an bdividual will chaise behaviors at

the output portion of the loop m order to bring about cor^ruence between the identhy

standard and mput from his/her perceived environment. If a label of mental ilbess is

clinically sanctified, then the bputs from others will likely change to indicate the

bdividual is, b fact, mentally ill. No matter how the bdividual's behavior changes at the

output level, those behavioral changes probably will be either ignored or misunderstood.

Stronger and more extreme output behaviors exhibited from the bdividual will not

produce the btended effect of brbgbg the feedback from the bput level back b Ibe

whh the identity standard. Such behaviors will probably have just the opposite effect of

expandbg distance between bput-level feedback and the identhy standard. This spiral of

bcreasingly more extreme output behaviors and acceleratbg negative responses of others

to these behaviors produces a greater gap between the identity standard and bput

feedback. Suicide is the fmal resuh of this spiral—the uhimate output that attempts to

control identity.

As the spiral amplifies, negative emotions associated with suicide become more

btense. Usmg the assumptions put forth by Large and Marcussen (2000), Burke (1996),

and Higgins' self-discrepancy theory (1987), the greater the magnitude of the discrepancy

between bput and identity standard the greater the distress. The greater the discrepancy

between the actual/self and the ideal/self, the greater the depression. The greater the

discrepancy between the actual/self and the ought/self, the greater the anxiety and shame.

Sbce identity is interrupted at both the input and the output levels of the identity control

model whh such magnitude, any kind of conscious or subconscious correctional

behaviors at either of these two levels only assist b exacerbating the crisis. The more the

bdividual tries to correct the identity control bconsistency, the more the individual

solidifies the label of mental illness. Thus, the shame, anxiety, and depression bcrease.

So does the sense of loss of control. To transcend loss of identity control, as well as

the negative emotions associated with h, suicide—the ultimate secondary

deviance—becomes the last absolute control these people have. Choi^ Ho Shon (1999:

29), b his studies on murder describes transcendence that can be equally applied (even

though Durkhebi disagreed to this cormection) to an bdividual committbg suicide. He

states that "transcendence can be understood as a desire for overcomir^ an undesirable

situation. There is no 'rationality' b the subject's actions b any objective sense. The

irrational becomes 'rational,' 'creative,' and 'meanbgful' msofer as it is an idiosyncratic

mode of transcendence, marked by a series of paradoxes which the killer uses to justify

[their] actions." The bdividual has the ultimate control over society and negative labels

by deliberately removbg him or herself from society.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR

A PROCESS THEORY OF

SUICIDE

In this chapter 1 first summarize the process flieory of suicide combinbg

Durkheim's social btegration (egoism), social regulation (anomie), labelbg of mental

ilbess, and identity control. Second, I exambe the differences b emotion and identity

interruption with regard to gender and argue that even though emotional work and role

identity for men and women may be different, the process theory of suicide can be

viewed as a general theory. The identity control process has the same mechanical

properties and may lead to the same outcome for both genders. 1 conclude by argubg that

this theory provides a Ibk that has been missmg to Durkheim's macro theory of suicide

and micro explanations.

A Process Theory of SuJcideRevisited

In Chapter I, I describe Durkheim's theories of suicide as a resuk from anomie (low

social regulation) and egoism (low social btegration). Durkheim saw these two as closely

related yet separate. 1 describe how some researchers see social regulation and social

integration as social solidarity. Suicide as a resuh from either anomie or egoism is an act

against social solidarity, a result of social isolation. Low social solidarity is, according to

some theorists (Tomasi, 2000), social isolation. In explabbg that low social regulation

and low social integration are social isolation, I lay the ground work for a process theory

of suicide usmg Durkheim's macro theories of social isolation as a sprbg board.

Chapter II discusses Durkheim's egoism and anomie b greater detail. It provides a

description of Durkheim's anomie with economic crises and divorce—how these can

decrease social regulation and bcrease the risk of anomic suicide b some bdividuals.;

and egoism with religious affiliation and divorce, explabbg that with some religious

groups (Catholics and b Jewish communrties) membership increases social btegration

and acts as a shield against egoistic suicide. People who are not members of a religious

group are at greater risk of egoistic suicide.

Near the end of Chapter II, I exambe some of the problems with Durkheun's theory.

Durkheun sought to use social isolation to account for the actions of the bdividual.

However, he feiled to show how this social force actually induced people to commit

suicide.

Durkheim did not adequately explab just why people commh suicide, m part

because he had no stated micro theory which allowed him to do this, and b part because

he ignored the role of mental illness b producbg suicide. Considerable data relatbg

mental ilbess b general and depression more specifically to suicide demands that any

micro theory of suicide deal with this relationship. Symbolic bteraction theory which

emphasizes the role of mental ilbess and shows how social isolation motivates p>eople to

take their lives fits nicely with Durkheim's macro theory. Together, the two theories

show how both background social forces such as group membership and foreground

forces of motivational processes (Katz, 1988) woric b concert to produce suicide.

Chapter III discusses why social isolation (drawbg from Durkheim's low social

regulation/btegration) produces suicide among the mentaUy ill by usbg labelbg theory,

identifymg the suicide as secondary deviance. It connects social isolation to labels of

mental ilbess argubg that social isolation can lead to and result from these labels. The

last part of Chapter III looks at the meanbgs created by this isolation and how these

meanings may motivate some people to take their own lives.

Chapter IV bru^s my process theory of suicide as secondary deviance together by

utilizbg Identity Theory and Identity Intemiption Theory b conjunctkin to Higgins'

Theory of Emotions. I show how isolation from groups—as a result of group norm

violations by the individual—can lead to a label of mental ilbess. Contbued norm

violations m the form of secondary deviance from the bdividual exacerbates the label

creating a downward spiral resulting b suicide as secondary deviance on the part of the

bdividual. I argue that this suicide is seen as an escape from the feelii^s of loss of

control, a final output.

Puttbg it all Together

I have described how Durkheim's anomie and egoism represent social isolation from

groups. This isolation can result from an bdividual's violation of group norms. When an

bdividual violates group norms this person's behavior is—b effect—isolatbg

him/herself from the group. This behavior may result from misunderstood bputs from

society (see Burke's Identity Control Loop; Figure 5.1)

In figure 5.2,1 show b flowchart fashion the process through which social isolation

can produce suicide. Once social isolation has resufted m a mental ilbess label, this label

m tum can create secondary deviance at the output level of the identity control

loop—attempted corrective behaviors—in an effort to remove flie mental ilbess label.

These corrective behaviors stem from and display strong negative emotions associated

with the label of mental ilbess—anxiety, shame, depression, and a sense of loss of

control. Such corrective behaviors, as products of strong emotions, are likely to be

extreme and be seen fixim the group standpobt as even more secondary deviance (i.e.,

strange and deviant behavior which fits the label of mental ilbess), which may lead to

more negative identity bput from group members which fiuther isolates the labeled

bdividual. Even more extreme corrective behaviors as identity output are forthcombg,

which trigger more extreme negative reactions at the bput level, which create fiirther

extreme output corrective behaviors, and so on. Eventually, this spfral of bcreasbg

secondary deviance may end m suicide, the final attempted output correction to identity

bterruption and the uhimate secondary deviance.

Emotions. Identity Interruption, and Gender

In his investigation bto suicide, Durkheim dismisses suicide b women as

unimportant. He states that".. .her sensibility is rudimentary rather than highly

developed" (1951:215). It seems as though he is placbg women in the same category as

the mentally ill. Accordii^ to Cermele, Daniels, and Anderson (2001), women are

diagnosed as mentally ill more often than men. They attribute this to the possibility that

women are more likely to seek help for emotional problems than men. Some socblogists

(Rosenfield, Vertefiiille, and McAlpbe, 2000) attribute emotional differences exhibited

between men and women to the way men and women are taught to handle emotions. Men

are socialized to "tough it out—be a man." Men are seen as weak if they display their

emotions. Women, on the other hand, are socialized to express their feelbgs—talk rt out

with a friend. Hochschild (1979) states that with the advent of capitalism not only did

gender roles and work become divided, so too did emotional work. Even though there are

differences b the suicide rates for men and women and differences m the way men and

women handle emotions, 1 contend that the process theory of suicide I propose works the

same way for both genders. That is, the identity bterruption proce^^ works similarly

across gender. When a person—regardless of gender—violates group norms they are

isolated from the group. Attempts to repair the btermpted identities with corrective

behaviors can have the same effect regardless of gender. The contbued downward spiral

that can lead to suicide as secondary deviance applies to both men and women. This

process theory works as a general theory because-regardless of gender, rega-dless of

roles—if the identity disruption is severe enough it can produce the same output; suicide.

The end result—social isolation and suicide apply to both men and women.

Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis is to describe a process theory of suicide utilizbg the

work begun by Durkheim and his description of suicide as a social feet. Over the years

research has contbued to study suicide as a resuh of societal forces (Stack, 2000). In an

effort to bring the study of suicide back bto the social psychological arena I combme

Durkheim's macro explanations with micro explanations utilizbg symbolic bteraction

theories. I argue that the use of both enable a further understandbg as to why people kill

themselves. This thesis brings to Durkheim what his theory lacks—the motivational forces

that lead some people to believe suicide is the best of all other possible solutions. It also

restores mental ilbess, which Durkheim dismissed, the realm of social forces that can

eventuaUy lead to suicide. In so doing, this thesis provides a startbg pomt for research

that PescosoUdo (1994) argues; research that explores how both macro and micro forces

b tandem produce suicide.

Ider.tity SlandBrd

Social SilMDei

V

Figure 5.1 Control System View of the Identity Process I Shoving the Cycle of Meaning with Possible points of Interruption at A and B.

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