A STUDY OF Vl'2 OPEKATIONS1

• . jared by: Koai 2m Johnson Cap fcain, Infantry

ii4i/w~ l°i4i/w~ l°iyoyoTableTable of Contentsof Contents

Sectionl t Papers accompanying the study.Sectionl t Papers accompanying the study. PagePage 1.1.

Section llr The study (Title)Section llr The study (Title) PagePage UU-- ..

Section III: General considerationSection III: General consideration PagePage 1.1.

8,8,Section IV: Night marchesSection IV: Night marches PagePage

Section V: Night AttacksSection V: Night Attacks PagePage 15.15.

Section VI: Night attacks by mechanized weapons Page 23.

Section VII:VII: Raids Page 25.25.Pare

Section VIII: Night Defense Page 27.

-Section IX: Historical Samples Page 28.

Section Xr Conclusion Page 30.

Bibliography Page 3<U

MS.IORAITDUL!: For the Director, 2nd year claso, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leave nworth, Kansas.

SUBJECT: A study as to what extent night operations will become necessary, considering improvements in modern arms and the governing principles of nd^Jit operations.

1. Papers Accompanying.— Bibliography for this study.

2. The Study Presented.-- -Considering improvements in modern arms, the

Air Corps, etc., to what extent willnight operations become necessary and

what wi-11 be the governing- principles of night attacks, night marches,

etc. — 3. General considerations. Fieli Service Regulations, United States

Army, 1923 states, "Resort must frequently be had to the cover of dark­

ness in order to effect surprise and to inininiize losses." This single

statenent covers entirely the reasons ,for military operations £fc- night,

namely to effect surprise and to minimize losses.­

study of military history willreveal that ni^ht operations are

as old as war itself and historical examples nay be found in the Bible

but a stu:' 1-'"1-'" of these examples will show that, the commanders always initiated 1

these operations 'with * v*<iw to securing the same effects •

In the pa«t nnd prior to th« .Torlu V.'^i;, due to the comparative

short range of the .-niscle throwing vteapons carried in tho field and the

inferior means of obsor^ttx; nr.d reconnaissance, night operation soon

made necessary only in c]jr,e proximity to, or on the battle field, how­

ever the principles laid dovfo hy *:ho commander of the past ar9 of eqml

value today if properly applied to oon&Jtiohs existing in modern warfare.

The modern- battle area is. of considerable" extent wheil a study is

made of the moans available to bhe presont day array for preventing

surprise and inflicting casualties.

The area of irrncdiate contact between two opposing forces is covered

with a mass of SHiall-armc> aut.oitftlie weapons and artilleiy, capable of

placing such distinctive fires along the front that the passage of assault

troops through these fires can only be fcoconplished at an enormcus ex­

penditure of men and munitions.

Modern artillery with its excellent means of observation and its

ability to accurately deliver its fire at long ranges greatly deepens

the zone in which, it is reasonable to expect, severe casualties.

Interdiction and fires on troop movements and concentrations in reer

areas are normal missions of part of the heavier batteries and ranges

extending to sixteen thousand yards are now possible. (9-1 to 32, 140 to

143, 173 to 179)

Aviation more than any other weapon" will force troops to make use

of the cover of darkness in order to, carry out operations in which it is

desired bo'effect surprise and reduce casualties. Itfs distant radius

of action,- its ability to observe and deliver destructive fire will cause

many operations, which in the past have been carried out in safety in day­

light, to be at night. The ability of aviation to observe and attack at

night in single planes or small groups willnecessitate the taking of both

positive and negative measures for protection against aircraft, even during

night operations. (10-Chap. IV, VII, VIII).(10-Chap..

The modern armored or mechanized force consisting of tanks, armored

cars, self propelled artillery and other weapons, while having great

2

mobility anl an extended radius of action 5s so difficult to control and

lrVtied in visibility when prepared for combat that its employment at

ni£l«t willnot constitute a serious menace to operations taking place in

rear areas. It has however possibilities for use in at gainst enemy

positions end will be discussed later in this paper.

From the above brief statements it appears that night operations will

play a tiore important part in future wars and in order to effect surprise,

the concentration and preparation for battle will, for the most part,

be made under cover of darkness. In addition night combat v/ill have to

be resorted to not only to secure surprise and minimize losses but to

thoroughly defeat an enemy in the shortest possible time and before re­

serves can be rushed into fcha battle and by the modern, rapid means of

transportation. For the same reasons the defense must be as stubborn at

night as during the hours of daylight.

Night operations, in general, may be classed under the two following

headings;

xa) Movements made under protection of other covering troops, i.e.,

night marches, concentration and reliefs of front line units.

b) Movements and operations carried out without the protection of

otter covering troops, i.e. attacks, approach marches, marches

in the presence of the enemy and withdrawal. (1-114) (2-199)

In general, certain characteristics are common to all night operations

and exercise the greatest influence on the success or failure of operations

and exercise the greatest influence on the success or failure of the move­

ment undertaken.

Darkness decreases the effect of infantry rifle as automatic rifle

fire and therefore increases the importance of the weapons of close com­

bat and weapons fired from fixed mounts which can be laid in definite lines

of fire during hours of daylight.

The difficulty of movement and in maintaining control, contact and

communication beween units necessitates the use of close formations with

decreased intervals and distances.

Direction is hard to maintain and therefore itwillbe necessary to

follow roads, trails or other well-defined direction lines and advance

to limited and easily recognized objectives.

3

1 ~: ruin3The morale of fcroopfl at zr. ;hl ia highly n anaana panic nay

he r;ost trivial Incident*rapidly spread thr it a coranand from the moa

This increases • \u25a0 tith o ve ons to

secure s ;rpriso and for troops on the >f tsive • mararc to inaure

fche service eurit;-. (1-114 ) (•

In view of theoe characteristics, requirements

necessary, for aT ssf.tl night op*: it :.s and are °s follows

a) 3ecrecy.-Ind orJer tc secure Sv tnd reduce casualties every

effort must be made to keep secrot t': operations at night including all

preparations*

b) Careful preparation* -ftie ;r.o»*t careful preparation are necessary,

icluding the t el; nd correct issuance of orders ?,n& all necessary and

possible reconnaissances in order that the operation may proceed smoothly

and with little or no confusion.

c) Security. -Adequate security tneasures are necessary ir order to

avoid confusion or pinis in event of an -inexpeoted happening o** c. counter

v/ilh the enemy.

d) High morale and training.-Due to th^ sensitive moral* of troops

at ni-^ht, only those having a high morale and are well trained can be

expected to successfully conclude a night operation, (1-114) (2-199, 200,

202) (3-2) (4-3, 4)

4. Night Marches.— Kight marches are made in order to effect secret

concentrations either before or during battle, to make approach marches

and deployments for attacks to be launched at day light, to v/ithdraw from

combat or any inarch which is desired to be concealed from the enemy and is

made within the radius of his observation and reconnaissance agencies. In

the tropics and during hot weather night marches may sometimes be resorted

to in order to escape the effects of heat durint the daylight hours*

(1-114) (2-201) (5-144,145)

They have the advantages of maintaining the secrecy of the movement,

increasing the surprise effect and reducing losses. The disadvantageso

are: the difficulty of following unknown roads or routes across country,

the difficulty of control, the uncertainty of the time required for their

execution, the increased fatigue of movement at night and the lowered morale

4

duo to the loss of sleep and the inability of the troops to observe their

surroundings during dnrkness. (3-2,3) (4-4)

Under the most favorable conditions the };lans and preparations for

a night inarch must be carefully considered end carried out to the last

detail possible depending on the time available and the existing situation.

The situation -permitting, a complete reconnaissance should he made

tc 3elect the best routes. Routes should be selected that willavoid

the cross injr of column's" or the interference or collision of columns in

the" dark. Full use should be made of good roads as poor roads, trails

and cross-country marches will increase the difficulties of the rvarch*

Ifnecessary to move across -country, compass directions should be

determined during daylight or the route clearly marked so that it can

be followed in darkness. Guides should be made familiar with the route

during daylight. Preparations should be made to place men at road inter­

sections and in towns in order to direct movement without delay.

Iftroops are to move into bivouac areas at the completion of the

march, these areas should be reconnoitered and marked, ifpossible.

Bivouac areas should be selected so as to allow the ronr elements of the

column to be in them before daylight* Areas such as woods and villages

should be selected, if concealment for troops and trains is desired.

Assembly areas for troops advancing to a line of departure should have

good lines if approach into the area and from it to the line of departure.

The area should provide concealment and cover from hostile fire and should

be of sufficient distance from the advance enemy elements so as they may

not discover the movement into or out of the area.

Every effort must be made to keep the inarch and the preparations

for it, secret. It may be necessary to give out false infomation as to

routes, destination and mission in order to mislead enemy agents. The

maintaining of secrecy in the preparations will be most difficult and

only those officers whom it necessary to inform beforehand should have

correct information of the movement. lawns and villages should be avoided

if possible but if passed through strict control of both troops and in­

habitants should be inforced. Smoking and lights must be prohibited. If

near the enemy noises must be reduced to a minimum, equipment must be

5

\u25a0->secured against rattling, wheel* oJ vohicl . . . Ith burlap

r soft materials and lon 1'in;: or shouted orders pi > .ibiteH

,VT: i 90Om§ I'j of :f iutain" is vital, the time ro­j

:or t) roh L« such that warning orders

should be is "­ -se followed by

detailed orders for the march •

The orders must he explicit as to rentes, destination, initial

ointa 8 head of column should reach same or columns clear.

Time and spacfl umst be carefully calculated and due allovraace made for

the uncertainty of isoveaent at bight. (1-65) (2-201) (3-3) (4-4, 5) (5-144)

Due to the sensitive norale of troops and the liability of panic,

security for night marches is of the utmost importance.

Even though the front flanks and rear are covered by friendly troops,

security detachnents should be provided, as 5;..u1l enemy groups, although

not capable of doing physical damage to a column, may at night, throw a

large force into confusion. Security detachments amy be smaller than

those used in daylight and due to decreased effectiveness of aimed fire,

march with reduced intervals and distances. They should, however, have

enough strength to c^rry out the necessary reconnaissance, provide security

against surprise and provide the necessary connecting files. Supporting

weapons, as a rule, cannot assist the security detachment at night and

need not be attached thereto unless the situation appears to call for

combat at daylight by these detc.chi^nts. At night, the same positive and

na^ative measures should be taken to prevent observation and attack by

hostile aircraft as a,re taken during daylight hours. On bright moonlight

nights troops on broad, white roads may be observed from au altitude of

three thousand feet, on dark roads from an altitude of fifteen feet and

on a clear starlight night hostile aviation flying a few hundred feet

the ground may observe the movement. Once the column is detected,rove the use of parachute flares may permit the avitctbr to closely estimate the

strength and composition of the force. In addition, attack observation ,

operating at low altitudes may detect the column and cause considerable

6

damage, delay and confusion* 3ecurity against eneny long range artillery

fire nay be effected by moving around areas normally interdicted, iilitary

police or others should bo provided to direct troops around localities

the eneny habitually shells. (1-65,114) (2-203) (5-145) (10-Chap IV, p. 4,

Chap VIIpp 10, 11)

,March discipline must be strictly inforced In order to prevort

strn-.-lia* and to keep units well closed up. Officers should march in the

rear of all units. Officers should be nade responsible for the rate of

march and careful consideration mast be given to the condition of the

route, weather and degree of darkness. Ample tine must bo given for troops

to reach their objective or bivouac areas. Exact time should be prescribed

the inarch,for the halts for resting and to continue numerous connecting

files must be employed to maintain contact between the elements of the

column. (1-65) (2-202) (5-146)

From the above the following principles for night marches may be

deduced:

a) Careful and complete plans and preparations must be made and

kept secret.

b) Local security, both from ground and air forces is of primary

importance •

c) Objectives or bivouac areas must be reached ty all elements of

the column before daylight.

d) Strict march discipline must be maintained and careful considera­

tion given to the rate of march.

c) Daylight should find the march completed, and the command secured

from fire, observation or attrack.— 5. Night Attacks.- While a continuation of daylight attacks must be

carried out during hours o£ darkness in order to maintain direct pressure

against an enerr/ and inflict a decisive defeat before an opponent and

reorganize and recuperate the attacks considered in this paper willbe

only those which are launched under cover of darkness w:'.th a miss? on of

securing its objective before daylight. These attacks may b& launched

in order to decrease the heavy losses incident to the capture of a

highly organized tactical locality, to secure points necessary: for the

7

operatk-vi to follow at daylight, to drive in covering forces preparatory

to the main attack or similar missions. (1-115; (2-207, 208) (4-11)

Night attacks, in addj to having the advan lisadvanti

common to all night operations are characterized by the follow" o«

<\u25a0Losses to the assaulting troops are not so obvious

morale effect ia lesaenod

They permit the attaok to be launched close to the eneray lines which

reduces the time the troops [posed be . memy'c fire.

The attack pushed for ith determination to uoc the bayonet: v/ill

often enable a stmll force to defer.t a much larger one.

The attack when properly conducted increases the element of surprise

and creates the utriost confusion in the enemy's lines.

They have the disadvantages of liability of panic, the difficulty

of observation and of determining friend from eneny, they can only be

rae.de to limited objectives with a lock of close artillery support and

there is the increasing problem of determining the objective and position

and maintaining the direction of the attack. (3-2) (4-9, 10)

Weather exercises a decided influence on night attacks. Mights for

an attack should be selected which are clear in order to facilitate

control and the ground should be hard or the footing such that it will

not impede the movement. Mnd coining from the direction of the enemy

lessens the liability to discovery by sound. These conditions may as a

whole not exist at the time tho attack is desired but due to the hazards

of night operations the weather conditions must be given careful considera­

tion. (3-4)

Terrain which is open end facilitates ease and rapidity of moverrjent

\u25a0 is more suitable for the attack. Darkness is depended on for concealment

and to decrease casualties. Broken and wooded country which would offer

better chances for a successful advance during dayli.rht may cause

disorganization and lack of control when passed over at night. (3-4)

Due to the difficulties of movement, control, maintenance of

direction, coordination and the use of supporting artillery fire, night

attacks should be made to limited objectives that can be easily recognized

when reached. It should be easy to approach and permit the troops to

8

assemble close upon it before moving to the assault* The objective

should not contain more bhan one defensive position ana should be

shallow enough to permit the support:* artillery to fire in support

of the infantry and its subsequent defe re of fche objective without

forward displacement. If the attack i.3 on a broad front definite

objectives must le £iveri each uni^. of' t c attacking force. (1-115)

(2-208) (3-6) (5-150, 151)

The preparations for a r. ck. like ell other t operations ,

tuke considerable time and must be carried out in great datail.

Reconnaissances should be made both before and after dark Ln order

to become thoroughly familiar with the terrain, under both conditions* As

many unit leaders as time arid the situation permits should make a

re connai seance and this should if possible include platoon ai;d section

leaders. The routes to and from the assembly positions should be marked,

the line of departure marked or easily recognized and compass bearings

taken and prominent objects marked, so as to insure proper direction being

taken in moving on the objective*

All ranks taking part in the atta k must wear a specific distinguishing

mark easily visible at night.

Warning orders must be issued in sufficient tine to enable all

elements of the attacking force to thoroughly complete its preparation.

The orders for the attack must be in detail and in addition to the

matter normally prescribed in fisld orders, should cover the following:

Definite routes should be prescribed for each column to its assembly

position or the line of departure, depending on the location at the time

the orders are received.

A specific distinguishing mark to be used by all assault troops.

The methods to be used in maintaining direction and of determining

location.

The objective to be secured by each column and the action to be

taken when the objective is reached.

Definite instructions as to the use of the reserve and to troops in

the flanks of the assault elements.

9

Ifpracticable, a time tnb.lo for each successive movement during the

operat s on*

De fif.ilo arraageme 11fc rd to conmmnic&tior

' Designated rallying points for each unit in event *-he attack

unsuccessful. (1-115) (2-21C, 211) (4-10)

The Advance to the attack i- usually made in lir.es of erull columnfl

writh decreased intervals tistances and covered to the front bycovered to the front by

scouts and or. the flanks by strong combat patrols*

Deployments ere not made until close to tht / posil

generally junt before bhe assault is made*

The troepe must he determined to close with the enevcj &nd make the

assault with the bayonet. Resorting to fire action p.t night with small

arms is not only ineffective bu1 will disclose the position of the attack!*

troops.

The use of an artillery preparation is vcrj questionable. While it \u25a0

may raise the morale of the attacking force and lower that of the eneray,

if fired long enough to create sufficient neutralization the elenent of

surprise willbe lost.* It willbe better for the artillery to rex&ain

normal until the assault is made and thereafter to support the attack by

fires in advance of the troops on prearranged targets and execute countep­

battery fire. Fires should be prepared to assist the troops in holding

the objective vrhen gained from the subsequent counter-attacks.

Aviation can but assist the attack by executing its norzal battle

reconnaissance missions, illuminating the area by use of parachute

flares -or marking the objective by dropping flares behind the objective

in prolongation of the direction of attack. Care must be exercised in

the use of flares as as not to prematurely discloce the attack or blind

the attacking troops.

Engineers should be present to assist in the passage of obstacles.

The reserve should be located well to the rear and on the flanks so-fit not to become involved in a retreat in case the attack is 'insuccescful

and in order to cover a retreat ifnecessary.

Tro&ps must be kept well in hand during the entire operation and

all impressed with the necessity for prompt reforming when the objective

is reached. They should then be disposed to meet counter-attacks.

10

pursuit after a night attach I'jnlz. only roc It 5n disorganization

•-ver security gr shoul ihed out i d dalay* (1-114, 11)0)

(2-208, 209, 21C) (3-3, 9, IC, XI) (S-U2, 152, 164)

Tho success of night attacks will therefore & on the fol

rDettiled plan* ond orde ret and co ratl

eluding ft the. reconnaissance, I o r< leader ah i] on

\u25a0 ,art of illcon- . rfcl Nt excellently trail

\u25a0cVs to 1 015 w*ri b troops c^^able

carrying out during kin* of

3trict conpliar.ce irith 1 '.dpi*- or simplicity, pcrticulerly i

regard to plans and foraation* for th« r-ttack#

6» Sight attacks by riecha:.ized weapons.— -Tiio tank used during fbrld

*hr and at present in general use in our amy, due to its noise find United

visibility could rarely Ke used in night operations* Ir; addition, the lnck

reens of comunication between tanks end the difficulty of connsßnd greatly

reduced their effeetiveneeo when employed in groups.

There is no reason to believe that these disadvantages willexist with

tho mechanized weapons of the future.

The use of mufflers with cut-outs or other silencers car be employed

to drown the noise of motors and the use of so c form of periscope, bullet­

proof or other ne&ns willincrease the visibility to the extent

necessary ?or night movement. 3ven shoulc the means of visibility fail

the tenk could still operete by a compass direction and a computation of

speed.

The use of radio telephones for communication between tanks should

enable the group commander to direct the operation of hie unit in c. nenner

similar to that uced by fleet commanders during naval battles.

The concealment from air observation of tank tracks, has, in the

pf ct precented a difficult problem in effecting secret concentrations near

theiront. As a greet number of* the vehicles in the future willprobably

nove on wheels until just prior to their entry into battle, this problem

willbe greatly simplified.

11.

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due todue to wo^o'sr&^ofj duri;duri; t^a ..'orlcHovld "'&: jonsida:jonsidar^ble -.. LthRRti«*tenti~tenk oo the "Tar 4

-'.:, Increase inin n-rl^r, ofof moreok of b pone^ . inan increase number, ! fsres

,, hay#fut'irefut'irs may,may, along organized hare to beto yedbe yed coTer

naoke screens or during hours of derkr.ess iv order to decrease the ir:r^< r

ofof casualties*

thethe aion-; or^rir.'zed frfr mder-inder carer ofof

casualties.

The reasonor. forfor ni&htnight op^rfitionfioperati !s to effecteffect survri&e andandsurprise «cre^

*' ­\u25a0casualties,cafiualtiec, therefore, mechanized fcrc6 duedue c.

exdexd irith improved materiel, moremateriel, effectivemore effective s ofof cc- end theend the

therefore^ forc6 to itsto its sharfccteristic*ristics

«rith insproved means eosmnd

adoptionadoption ofo^ group tactics willprovide a powerfulgroup tactics willprovide a powerful w forwe c.

either by day or night* (personal opinion)either by day or night* (personal opinion)

7#7 #7#7 # Sftids#<™-The for securingfor securing infonaation particularlyparticularly identifiesidentificaitie­necessity informationRaids •-—The necesslt/

of>f opposing troopsopposing thetroops the front thethe ezecut:alongalong frorz lines willlines willceuse acycauee execution

* •rei *\u25a0rsids,

f lf? raids may carriedmay carried success!. Ie reids be outbe out in daylight the c for thefor the &uc;es£ A

-execution ofexecution thisof this aission #irith aa ndnimiiajbubwin ofof cee'ialtle:;, -..illnission^with casualties^ willbe

increasedincreased Ifif carriedcarried Lmderunder ofof d&rknesE­out coverout cover d&rkness.

sition of aof a raid way/ v&ry froi few en toto aT?:eThe compositionc raiding fcr-e. vary c '

ec 0 fore

>f allall arr,6.of arr

'"/•o-' '\u25a0/•"****1Vi5 0r

' • . force. ItIti !to support Ing force*

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12

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cc t&e .. r« frequent

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c loce r ofof reel stance id be

\u25a0>•r> &n . mJii'.'-'\u25a0''

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0 to the lack of '

roo 0 ni^tt attack, a

\u25a0orta3 coidter--«tcounter-^"1. '

-er. jec th«fcha bayonetbayonet irili cwill b*

rffrc:;lf ;jri^cv eff«ctire#rc: 79 # TheThe local counter-fltt advajrtfcgjetsoct e I lowl ccur.ter-si^t' ckck hstB the of beizig

115er15er with tthe;.e grc orr whichwhich ththe ftttacftttac shed;dȣrcu.

Bnergeticr^etic patrollisgpatrollisg andaad alertalert sec^r:t vr v groapgr groapg should easily di«car«;ec^r:t

ni^it attack followsthe.c approach ofapproach aof a night aad ths*i c?.- .1.1 2? foil

placlacir; »̂ of'

previously arrangedpreviously arranged co'^te? preparcttioa na fireu iaco^r-ter jjriijzr'' ana protectiveprotective firec i:

front of ' '

sn#

fie fire should witheldfie fire should witheld ustil the athe a di^tf.bsbs usfcil ene;-^ pre-er.tcene;-^ pre-er.tc distil]

tar Bt#

Ifpracticable provisionspracticable adeprovisions ade illun^r^atinj;r/*..-it:'r.. the groundthe groundf should forshould for ill

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retreatretreat :"/fraj

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-IHcin sso-Japfcfjes ..'e.r, the attae^ of t s« or. the ni'- 4­

of i-2 . , »ptur« of Ma»jey^fl billIs *.:.

©zee1©zee lent1lent ezaaple ss^it la c;^ "• r; in which aexaaplc of aof a cf^it attach:attach :r. (?pej r&r« Is vfcicb all

prinefplec of »5 /it attacks were correctly applied, (3-124, 12S}

— .. . Consltfslcm* In addition fc<s recuire.. necezz&ry:;"or*or thethetiae ?<i^-r r

syce. sion o* if.,-r.t o-'.'-i'rs # i . I -^.;;slon I j-.t aperfttioa«

H^ nriacipel jbfect of all ni^ht o-^r^'i: w eaa i Ec

irprise*

—^'* -rtreae >f c > «ii

->ad«rs firsj . . "'-vV

14

53-^: be ana of both natural and artificial concealment, the clement of

.loss' is one that oan always 'tended upon I h will reduce

>° this destructive fire. It may therefore be concluded that as

nd effect of fire power increase, the value and frequency of

ht 0] •.vill have a corresponding increase

f prise, the second object; oT night operations, is obtained by

S movement. Secret marches and concentrations are necessary in

order to obtain the full effect of surprise and again concealment must be

: bo in orier event discovery by the enemy. Powerful optical

its, the groat radius of action and rapidity of movement of motorized

reconnaissance vehicles and aviation \u25a0reatly increase the difficulties of

aintaining cecrecy, even in areas sone distance from the front lines or

9 o? contact. 3ven with a marke superiority in aviation and with

adequate antiaircraft defense, it is practically impossible to keep an

enemy from discovering daylight move ents of forces of any size. Darkness,

however, is a most powerful weapon v; b which to combat these agencies of

observation and reconnaissance, therefore in the future, in order to

obtai rise, night operations must be resorted to more frequently than

in the past.

All night operations willrequire complete and detailed preparations

including plans, orders and reconnaissances. These preparations, as well

as the execution of the operation must be secured against discovery by the 1

enemy m

Due to the sensitive morale of troops at night adequate security measures

must be taken to insure protection from both enemy ground and air forces.

The highest degree of leadership is necessary on the part of all

commanders, from the highest to the lowest echelons of command. To this

end, the study of night operations should be stressed in all service scnools

organizations.

On^. troops, with high morale, well trained and confident in their

ability to operate at night, can hope to be successful in night operations,

ofore, exercises during hours of darkness should be included in the

Piflii "i o;rogrario of all units the Regular Army and National Guard.

15

The use of the mechanized force in ni^hb operations appears to be

possible find practicable) and further studios should be made and exercises

carried out in order to determine the best methods of movement, concontra

tion and attack for this force as well as meana for defense against such

attacks*

16

t

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Key: (1-115, llfi)equals No. 1 texs (below) pages 115 and 116. *

1. .Field 3ervic©> ?eg ilations, United St4t9B Army, 1920. Covenant Printing Office, Washington, 1924.

Z. British Field Service Regulations, Voluni' 11, Operations, 1924. EiS Majesty 131 3 Stationary Office, London,

3. Tactical Principles and Decisions, Chapter XXI, Wight Operations. The General Sorvieo Schools, Fort Leaven//orb;t, Kansas , 1925.

4. Tii^ht Operations, (Pamphlet) The Infantry School, Dopartment o

Military Art# 2923-1924.

5. Lectures on Land Warfare. A ?ield Officer, William ?^bv?ers and Sons^ Ltd., London, 1922.

6. Military Operations. France and Belgium, 1914. August-October 1914. Brigadier-Cieneral J. E. Edmunds. HacMillan and Co., Ltd.,- London, 1922.

7. Hostory of the War in South Africa, 1399-1902. Vol. I. Hajor-General Sir Frederick Maurice, Hunt and Blackett, Ltd., London, 1906,

8. Official History, the Russo-Japanese War. Vol. 11. Historical Section of the c ndtteeittee of Imperialof Imperial Defense. Endland,Endland, 1912,Defense, 1312.

q \u0084

• and Technique of Field Artillery. The General Service Schools Presw, 7oi Leavenworth, Kansas, 1927.

10. Tactics .id Technique of Air Corps. Chapters IV, VIIand VIII. The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1929.

11. Tactical Principles and Decisions. Chapter XX. Raids. The General Service Schools, Fort LeaVenv/orth, Kansas, 1925.

\u25a0i

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