study guide...kynan is a year 6 student, taking the most mundane subject combination possible, pcme...
TRANSCRIPT
ARAB LEAGUE STUDY GUIDE
Raffles Model United Nations 2019 Sic Parvis Magna - From Small Things, Greatness
Table of Contents Welcome Letter from the Dais 3
Chair Biographies 4
The Arab League 5
Kurdish Autonomy in the Middle East
Statement of Problem 6
Historical Background 7
Current Situation 9 Kurdish Autonomy in Iraq 9 Situation in Syria 10 Situation Outside the Arab League 12 General Situation 15 Regional Dynamics 16
Past International Action 18 Arab League 18 UN Actions 18
Scope of Debate 20 Extent of Kurdish Autonomy 20 State Unity and Sovereignty 20 Recognition of Kurdish Representation 22
Identification of Blocs 24
Proposed Solutions 26 Tackling Kurdish Militarism/ Terrorism 26 Formalising Extent of Kurdish Autonomy 26
Key Guiding Questions 28
Bibliography 29
Press Freedom in the Arab League
Statement of Problem 34
Historical Background 36 Oppression and Authoritarianism 36 Arab Spring 36
Current Situation 38 Democratisation and Democratic Backsliding 38 Trend of Liberalisation in the Arab League 38 Safety in Journalism 40
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Online Press and Social Media 41 Foreign Influence on the Press 43
Past International Action 44 Arab League 44 UN Actions 44
Scope of Debate 46 Impetus for Arab League Action 46 Extent of Press Independence 47 Human Rights of Journalists 47 Extent of Influence Abroad 47 Online Censorship 48
Identification of Blocs 50
Case Studies 52 Assassination of Jamal Khashoggi 52 Qatar Diplomatic Crisis 53
Proposed Solutions 54 Protection of the Freedom of the Press 54 Regional Standardisation 54
Key Guiding Questions 56
Bibliography 57
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Welcome Letter from the Dais
Dear Delegates,
The Dais of the Arab League bids you a warm welcome to Raffles Model United Nations
2019.
For over 60 years, the Arab League has served as a platform for multilateral,
intergovernmental cooperation amongst Arab States in the Middle East - a volatile region that
has hitherto been plagued with numerous conflicts. (The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, various
insurgencies, geopolitical tensions, etc). The Arab League serves to resolve such conflicts,
but tensions between member states have impeded its progress.
The many conflicting ideologies across the Middle East may pose an impediment to debate.
Delegates are therefore encouraged to overcome possible deadlocks in council through
diplomacy and compromise. The Dais hopes the council will produce constructive solutions
to the issues while remaining cognizant of the intricacies in the region.
Given this council is of intermediate difficulty, the Dais expects the debate to be more
rigorous and intensive. All delegates should therefore put in their utmost during the three
days of this conference. Moreover, delegates should adhere strictly to the Rules of Procedure
of the conference at all times for debate to be orderly.
The Dais hopes that the council will be productive in its proceedings, and we look forward to
fruitful debates ahead. See you at RMUN 2019!
Best Regards,
The Dais, Arab League
Raffles Model United Nations 2019
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Chair Biographies
Chairperson - Kynan Ho Chun Keet
Kynan is a Year 6 student, taking the most mundane subject combination possible, PCME
(though he sorely regrets not taking history). Being the last MUN he’ll attend before a hiatus
in preparation for the dreaded A levels, Kynan is honoured to chair the Arab League in his
second year in the circuit. Having seen the importance of ROP (the lack of which commonly
resulted in chaos in council), Kynan is particularly strict with regards to its implementation -
then again, delegates should take comfort that council will proceed smoothly under his
“guidance”. Other than being noticeably pro-Russian, spending all his free time (or whatever
that is left) listening to Soviet/ Russian songs, Kynan’s interests include Astronomy (trivia),
amateur engineering and vexillology – he claims to be able to identify any national flag with
at least 90% accuracy. As with his previous chairing experience, Kynan hopes to see fruitful
and eventful debates in council, especially in the unique regional context of the Arab League.
Resolved to bring to delegates the best MUN experience they will ever encounter, Kynan
decides to remain actively seized on the matter.
Assistant Chairperson - Tan Gene, Travis
Travis is a Year 5 student in Raffles Institution’s Humanities Programme. As a former AL
delegate in RMUN 2018, he is honoured to return to the council where his MUN journey
began. Outside of MUNs, Travis can be found poring over The Guardian and The New York
Times (the unequivocal two best newspapers), asleep on the benches around school, or
attempting to relive his days as a Cross Country runner by going on occasional 8 pm trots.
Contrary to popular opinion, his favourite subject is Economics, and his nemesis is
Mathematics. Coincidentally, Travis is also in Raffles Institution’s Middle East Programme.
After amassing 5 conferences’ worth of MUN experience, Travis firmly believes that the
amount of effort one invests in each conference determines how much he gains from his
MUN journey. Travis looks forward to seeing all delegates give their utmost during these 3
days of debate, and hopes to help everyone forge indelible memories from RMUN 2019.
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The Arab League
Established in 1945, The Arab League is a regional intergovernmental organisation
comprising all states in the Arab World. It serves as a platform for Middle-Eastern
governments to discuss pertinent regional issues, address conflicts in member states, and
coordinate policy decisions. Its mission is to “draw closer the relations between member
States and coordinate collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and
sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries”.
In the Arab League, all member states equally hold one vote, and are able to vote on all
procedural and substantive matters. Observer states, however, cannot vote in substantive
matters. Unique to the organisation, however, is that resolutions are only legally binding for
member states which have ratified them; member states who abstained or voted against the
resolution will not be obligated to adhere to the resolution. Moreover, there is no minimum
number of states required to vote in favour of a resolution for it to pass.
To more accurately represent the Rules Of Procedure used in the actual Arab League, the
Arab League council of RMUN 2019 will use a modified version of the standard conference
ROP. Substantive voting now only applies to amendments, and as such will still require a
two-thirds majority to pass. Resolutions, on the other hand, will be passed as long as there is
at least one member state voting for it. However, a simple majority must still be achieved for
a motion to move into direct voting procedure to pass. With this change, tabling a resolution
will only be possible through a separate motion to table the resolution (unless the resolution
receives no votes for), itself a substantive vote.
This is to ensure that the council respects the ROP used in the actual Arab League as much as
possible, while promoting productive debates and inclusivity towards all member states.
Aside from these modifications, standard conference ROP applies.
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Kurdish Autonomy in the Middle East
Statement of Problem
The Kurdish people are currently the largest nation without a state, with around 30-45 million
ethnic Kurds worldwide. Inhabiting significant portions of the Middle East, the Kurds have 1
long established a separate identity from that of their neighbours. Yet, despite their long
history as a distinct nation, Kurdish statehood has remained unattainable. While there have
been plans to establish an independent and sovereign Kurdistan, such plans have consistently
failed. The desire for greater self-determination has led to multiple Kurdish autonomy and
independence movements in the region.
At present, the response to movements towards Kurdish sovereignty are mixed. While some
countries support an autonomous Kurdish entity in the region, others are hostile to the very
idea of Kurdish autonomy. The Arab League has recently made a statement denying the
legitimacy of a Kurdish independence referendum, justifying its decision with the rationale
that Iraqi unity is imperative in the fight against terrorist groups in the region. 2
Delegates must keep in mind that the issue of Kurdish autonomy in the Middle East is a
multi-faceted and complicated issue. It spans 4 countries with varying attitudes towards
Kurdish autonomy, thus a delicate balance of these respective national interests must be
achieved for a resolution to be effective.
1 Pasko, A. N. (2017, October 26). Israel Must Recognize An Independent State of Kurdistan. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.breakingisraelnews.com/96892/israel-must-recognize-independent-state-kurdistan-opinion/ 2 Astorri, F. (2017, October 6). Arab League Secretary General says no to a Kurdish state. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/10/06/Arab-League-Secretary-General-says-no-to-a-Kurdish-state.html
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Historical Background
Origins of the Kurdish Nation
Tracing their roots to antiquity, the Kurdish people believe themselves descended from a
group of ancient Iranians known as the Medes. 3
Figure 1: Map of Kurdish-inhabited areas 4
The region of what modern Kurdish people refer to as “Greater Kurdistan” came under the
rule of several empires, some of which were of Kurdish origin themselves. However, when
ruled by non-Kurdish rulers, suppression of Kurdish culture was common, including the
deportation of Kurdish people to parts of what is now modern-day Iran. , The region, along 5 6
3 West, B. A. (2009). Encyclopedia of the peoples of Asia and Oceania. New York City, NY: Facts On File. 4 The University of Austin. (1992). Kurdish-inhabited lands. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kurdish_lands_92.jpg 5 Floor, W. M. (2015). Iran and the world in the Safavid age. London: Tauris. 6 Blow, D. (2009). Shah Abbas: The ruthless king who became an Iranian legend. London: I.B. Tauris.
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with the Kurdish people, eventually ended up in the hands of the Ottoman empire. The roots 7
of Kurdish nationalism can be traced back to this period, as the Kurdish people began to
assert their independence from the central government in Constantinople. 8
Though the Kurds were once autonomous within the Ottoman Empire, by the late 19th
century, policies increasing centralization from the government in Constantinople revoked
many rights of local Kurdish chieftains. This escalated pre-existing sentiments of cultural
distinctiveness into a unified nationalist struggle that demanded a fully independent Kurdish
state. In neighbouring Qajar Persia, Kurdish nationalist movements were launched with 9
similar objectives. Both the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Persia, however, suppressed such 10
rebellions and continued to enforce their respective rule over the region. 11
The region of “Greater Kurdistan” remained under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for much
of the 18th and 19th centuries. The Treaty of Sèvres was signed at the end of World War I
that began the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and proposed an independent Kurdistan.
However, it was never successfully implemented as Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk successfully retook the previously-Ottoman lands in Eastern Anatolia and
prevented their secession to other states. Following the victory of the Turkish National 12
Movement, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed that superseded the Treaty of Sèvres and
established the modern Republic of Turkey. As a result, the original plan for an independent 13
Kurdistan collapsed, especially after Turkey became hostile to the idea. Though the
geopolitics of the region has dramatically changed since then, modern movements for
Kurdish autonomy and/or independence remain rooted in this very same Kurdish nationalism
that has driven the Kurdish people and “Greater Kurdistan” for centuries.
7 Murphy, A. B., & Fan, C. C. (2002). The Political Geography of Kurdistan. Eurasian Geography and Economics,43(4), 271-299. Retrieved March 10, 2019. 8 Özoǧlu, H. (2004). Kurdish notables and the Ottoman state: Evolving identities, competing loyalties, and shifting boundaries. Albany (New York): State University of New York Press. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 The British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, & Serb-Croat-Slovene State. (1923, July 24). Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Lausanne_ENG.pdf
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Current Situation
As the world’s largest stateless nation, the Kurdish people are a topic of contention for the
international community. While the independence movements of the past have cooled to
more political movements for greater Kurdish autonomy, nationalist sentiments still remain
high in several regions. The status of the Kurdish people also varies greatly between states,
ranging from autonomy to outright oppression and suppression.
Kurdish Autonomy in Iraq
The Kurds in Iraq have enjoyed the highest level of autonomy out of the four regions of
“Greater Kurdistan”. In Northern Iraq, or what the Kurds consider as “Southern Kurdistan”,
the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) exists as an autonomous entity that handles all
internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan. First established in the 1990s and subsequently enshrined
in the new Iraqi Constitution of 2005 after the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the KRG has
been a relatively successful autonomous government in Iraq. 14
The KRG itself comprises multiple Kurdish parties, most notably the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Moreover, the KRG has its own
military as well, the Peshmerga, as the constitution forbids Iraqi troops from entering Iraqi
Kurdistan. , 15 16
Consequently, being protected by the Iraqi Constitution and recognised by the Arab League
as the only autonomous entity in the organisation, the KRG has been widely considered to be
the most successful case of Kurdish self-determination and autonomy. However, the KRG is
not without its issues. Currently, the KRG holds some Iraqi territory that is technically not
part of the established Iraqi Kurdistan, and vice versa to a lesser extent. Overall, however, 17
the politics in Iraqi Kurdistan remains largely stable.
14 Republic of Iraq. (n.d.). Iraqi Constitution. Retrieved May 6, 2019, from http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf 15 Kurdistan Regional Government. (2006, October 11). Constitution of Iraqi Kurdistan. Retrieved May 6, 2019, from http://www.nefel.com/articles/article_detail.asp?RubricNr=1&ArticleNr=1506 16 Ibid. 17 Bartu, P. (2010). Wrestling with the integrity of a nation: The disputed internal boundaries in Iraq. International Affairs,86(6), 1329-1343. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00946.x
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Yet, despite the political stability of the current autonomous arrangement under the Iraqi
Constitution, there persist nationalist sentiments. In September 2017, a referendum was held
in Northern Iraq on the issue of Kurdish secession from Iraq to become a fully independent
state. Nearly 93% of those who voted in the referendum indicated their desire for a
completely independent Kurdistan. 18
The results of the referendum, however, were not welcomed by many parties. In October
2017, the Secretary-General of the Arab League made it clear that Kurdish independence
would not be accepted in the Arab League, citing concerns regarding the disintegration of the
Iraqi state and the compromising of effective countermeasures to fight the remnants of ISIS
in the region. The US, a long time supporter of the Kurds, also did not support the 19
referendum, citing similar concerns. 20
Situation in Syria
Even after the independence of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Kurds remain oppressed under
the new government. Many Kurds were stripped of their Syrian citizenship and denied basic
rights, leading to multiple protests against the Syrian government. Unsurprisingly, these 21
protests were unsuccessful, and the Syrian Kurds remained oppressed. 22
Following the eruption of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Kurds in Northeastern Syria formed
militias to fight both the government and terrorist cells present in those regions. With the 23
support of the US-led coalition to defeat ISIS, they were largely successful, and in the
process, were able to extend their control to a huge swath of Northern and Northeastern
Syria, also known to the Kurds as “Western Kurdistan”.
18 Yekta Uzunoglu. (2017, August 27). Kurdish Referendum. Retrieved May 6, 2019, from http://yektauzunoglu.com/en/2017/08/27/kurdish-referendum/ 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Human Rights Watch. (1996). Syria - The Silenced Kurds. Human Rights Documents Online,8(4), e. doi:10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-4502-0072 22 Marcus, A. (n.d.). Blood and belief - the PKK and the Kurdish fight for independence. doi:9780814795873 23 L'Orient Le Jour. (2013, July 19). Syrie: Les Kurdes combattent les jihadistes pour imposer leur autonomie. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/824383/syrie-les-kurdes-combattent-les-jihadistes-pour-imposer-leur-autonomie.html
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In late 2013, following the withdrawal of government troops from North and Northeastern
Syria, the region gained effective autonomy from the Assad government. In particular, 24
Kurdish nationalists in Syria sought to establish their independent rule with the region of
Rojava declaring official regional autonomy and adopting an interim constitution. Rojava 25
eventually declared itself a federation on 17 March 2016 and has remained a de facto
autonomous political entity to this day - retaining control of all internal affairs and to some
extent foreign affairs despite not receiving official international recognition of autonomy
from Syria. Now known as the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS), the
federation’s government is dominated by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a
predominantly Kurdish party. Other than its government, the DFNS also possesses its own 26
military, consisting of the conscription-based Self-Defense Forces and other volunteer
militias such as the Syrian Democratic Forces. In general, the DFNS seeks to establish itself 27
as an autonomous entity in a future democratic and federalist Syria. 28
Moreover, there are still multiple other Kurdish parties and coalitions who have sought to
fight for the interests of the Kurdish people in Syria, though their specific goals may be
different from that of the DFNS. For example, the Kurdish Union Party and the Kurdish
Freedom Party attended the summit that created the National Coalition for Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, also known as the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), a
major political coalition that is against the Assad government. The SNC is currently the 29
political entity recognised as the representative of Syria in the Arab League (and much of the
24 Hall, R. (2013, November 12). Syria's Kurds move towards autonomy with announcement of transitional. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrias-kurds-move-towards-autonomy-with-announcement-of-transitional-government-8935441.html 25 Ibid. 26 Khalaf, R. (2016). Governing Rojava - Layers of Legitimacy in Syria. London: Middle East and North Africa Programme, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. 27 Gold, D. (2012, October 31). Meet the YPG, the Kurdish Militia That Doesn't Want Help from Anyone. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yv5e75/meet-the-ypg 28 Van Wilgenburg, W. (2016, March 17). Analysis: 'This is a new Syria, not a new Kurdistan'. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-new-syria-not-new-kurdistan 29 Goodenough, P. (2015, March 27). Eyeing Yemen Operation, Syrian Rebels Urge Arab States: 'Finish Off' Assad Too. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/eyeing-yemen-operation-syrian-rebels-urge-arab-states-finish-assad
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global community), and it has the participation of the Kurdish National Council (KNC). The 30
PYD, however, rejected the SNC and criticised it for “obedience to Turkey and Qatar”. The 31
PYD has also criticised the KNC for joining the SNC. 32
Situation Outside the Arab League
While the major concerns regarding Kurdish autonomy in the Arab League lie within
member states, it is important to note that the Kurdish people also reside in the Arab
League’s neighbours, Iran and Turkey. These countries each also have a stake in the issue, as
the status of the Kurds in the Arab League would also affect their national unity and interests.
As such, it is important for the Arab League to consider the status of the Kurdish people in
both countries.
Turkey
Compared to their counterparts in Iraq and Syria (DFNS), the Kurdish people in Turkey face
much harsher conditions. Since the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic, Kurdish
culture has been strictly suppressed by the Turkish government. In the eyes of the Turkish 33
government, the proliferation of any form of Kurdish culture is a threat to Turkish territorial
integrity, as it may spur calls for Kurdish secession from Turkey. The Turkish government 34
has enacted many laws banning the use of the Kurdish language, both in public and private. 35
Even the term “Kurdistan” is banned from use in Turkey - the Kurdish are referred to as
“Mountain Turks” by the Turkish Government. Though the situation has somewhat eased in 36
recent years, with the Turkish government allowing for the Kurdish language to be taken as
30 Van Wilgenburg, W. (2013, September 30). PYD Leader Skeptical of Kurdish Agreement With Syrian Opposition. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/30092013 31 Reuters. (2018, October 29). Syria Kurdish leader rejects new coalition. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/syria-kurdish-leader-rejects-new-coalition-1.1107985 32 Ibid. 33 British Broadcasting Corporation. (2017, October 31). Who are the Kurds? Retrieved May 8, 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440 34 Barkey, H. J. (2019, March 11). The Kurdish Awakening. Retrieved May 8, 2019, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-02-12/kurdish-awakening 35 Letsch, C. (2017, December 21). In Turkey, Repression of the Kurdish Language Is Back, With No End in Sight. Retrieved May 8, 2019, from https://www.thenation.com/article/in-turkey-repression-of-the-kurdish-language-is-back-with-no-end-in-sight/ 36 Ibid.
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an elective, the government has been hostile to any further demands by Kurdish groups and
made it clear that the Kurdish Language will not be a proper subject in Turkish schools. 37
The most significant Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey is the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK), which was founded in 1978 in response to the increasing suppression of the Kurds by
the Turkish government. Since then, the PKK has waged war against the Turkish 38
government, with its activities concentrated in Southeastern Anatolia, or what the Kurds
consider as “Northern Kurdistan”. The main insurgency began in 1984 after the PKK
declared a Kurdish uprising; since then, the PKK has been classified as a terrorist 39
organisation by Turkey, the US, EU and UK. The PKK’s main demands in the past included 40
complete Kurdish independence from Turkey, but in more recent years the PKK has changed
its tone to a more conciliatory one, seeking greater Kurdish autonomy in Turkey and the
recognition of and respect for Kurdish culture. Multiple ceasefires were declared 41
unilaterally by the PKK, with the latest declared in 2013 as part of the “Solution Process”
after talks between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and figurehead leader of the
PKK Abdullah Öcalan, the latter currently in jail in Turkey. As part of the plan, the PKK 42
withdrew from Turkey into Iraqi Kurdistan, helping to ease the situation. However, by 43
2015, the ceasefire broke down after Turkey launched military action against the PKK under
37 Ibid. 38 British Broadcasting Corporation. (2016, November 04) Who are Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) rebels? Retrieved May 8, 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100 39 Hedges, C. (1992, March 30). Kurds In Turkey Seem To Be Nearing Full-Scale Revolt. Retrieved May 8, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/30/world/kurds-in-turkey-seem-to-be-nearing-full-scale-revolt.html 40 Press Release - May 9, 2., Press Release - May 6, 2., & Press Release - May 1, 2. (2018, October 15). Turkey: Extremism & Counter-Extremism. Retrieved May 8, 2019, from https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/turkey 41 Inside the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). (n.d.). Retrieved May 8, 2019, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/inside-kurdistan-workers-party-pkk 42 Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process. (n.d.). Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process,3-3. Retrieved May 9, 2019. 43 Hurriyetdailynews.com. (2013, May 01). Barzani and the PKK. Retrieved from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/nihat-ali-ozcan/barzani-and-the-pkk-46040
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the guise of intervening in the Syrian Civil War. In retaliation, the PKK has since resumed 44
insurgent activities in Southeastern Anatolia, reigniting the Kurdish-Turkish Conflict. 45
Domestically, there also exists pro-minority Turkish parties that support Kurdish rights. The
most notable among them is the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), which seeks to change the
current Turkish-Kurdish divide and encourage greater integration of the Kurdish people in
Turkey. The HDP polls the highest in Southeastern Anatolia due to large Kurdish support, 46
causing it to be seen as a threat to the incumbent government. 47
Iran
Though Iran is not as hostile towards the Kurdish as Turkey, Kurdish culture remains
suppressed in Iran. While the Iranian government does not explicitly suppress any mention 48
of Kurdish-related terminology - there is a province in the region called Kurdistan, although
it encompasses just one-fourth of the lands the Kurdish reside in Iran - in general, the Iranian
government is against any form of Kurdish nationalism. Iran views any calls for Kurdish
autonomy as a form of Kurdish nationalism, and thus a threat to state unity. Iranian
suppression of Kurdish autonomy still exists, as evidenced by the killings of Kurdish
journalists and/or political prisoners. , , Such politically-motivated killings are not 49 50 51
44 British Broadcasting Corporation. (2016, February 15). Syria calls for UN action on Turkish attacks on Kurds. . Retrieved May 7, 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35576153 45 British Broadcasting Corporation. (2017, March 10). Turkey-PKK conflict: UN report tells of '2,000 dead' since truce collapse. Retrieved May 7, 2019 from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39228548 46 Ibid. 47 Wilks, A. (2019, March 30). Turkish elections: Much at stake in Kurdish-majority southeast. Retrieved May 6, 2019, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/turkish-elections-stake-kurdish-majority-southeast-190330051827609.html 48 Correspondent, T. B. (2016, February 26). Poetry and silence: Iran's Kurds tread the line between art and activism. Retrieved May 7, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/26/iran-kurdistan-rouhani-tehranbureau 49 Watchdog. (2009, November 11). Iran Executes Kurdish Political Activist. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.rferl.org/a/Iran_Executes_Kurdish_Political_Activist/1875171.html 50 Hassan, S. (2010, January 6). After Ehsan Fatahiyan another Activist Fasih Yasamani has been Executed. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://canadafreepress.com/article/after-ehsan-fatahiyan-another-activist-fasih-yasamani-has-been-executed 51 Fathi, N. (2010, May 11). Iran Denies Families Bodies of Executed Kurds. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/world/middleeast/12iran.html
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uncommon - in fact, the Iranian government has executed several of these individuals, some
without the provision of a fair trial. 52
Pro-Kurdish groups that operate or formerly operated in Iran are mostly militant. Both the
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan
(Komalah) have operated in Iran in the past, mostly waging guerilla warfare against the
Iranian government. , These groups have been banned by Iran and as such are operating in 53 54
exile in Northern Iraq. , The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), a left-wing militant group 55 56
that was founded much later compared to the PDKI and Komalah, is widely considered an
offshoot of the PKK in Turkey and has waged an intermittent armed struggle against the
Iranian government in support of greater Kurdish autonomy in Iran. The PJAK also seeks a 57
democratic federal Iran where the rights of all minorities are respected. The party remains 58
illegal in Iran and has been classified as a terrorist organisation by Iran, Turkey and the US. 59
General Situation
Overall, the situation of Kurdish autonomy is quite varied across the region. That being said,
there still exist more than 50 different Kurdish groups in the Middle East with varying levels
of influence and/or political representation that fight for Kurdish rights, autonomy, and/or
independence. These groups may be diverse in membership and/or geopolitical boundaries,
but they all work towards the common goal of Kurdish interests.
The PKK, as mentioned earlier, primarily functions in Turkey as an insurgent group.
However, the PKK has activities in the other parts of “Greater Kurdistan” as well, though
perhaps not to the extent of the insurgency in Turkey. The PKK in Turkey itself is however
also part of a larger umbrella group, the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), which also
52 Ibid. 53 Brown, L. C., & Buchta, W. (2000). Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic. Foreign Affairs,79(6), 188. doi:10.2307/20050019 54 Robins, P. (1996). A modern history of the Kurds. International Affairs,72(4), 853-853. doi:10.2307/2624227 55 Ibid. 56 United Kingdom: Home Office. (2016). Country Information and Guidance - Iran: Kurds and Kurdish political groups(2nd ed., Rep.). London: United Kingdom: Home Office. 57 Ibid. 58 Tamadonfar, M. (2017). Islamic Law And Governance In Contemporary Iran: Transcending Islam For Social, Economic, And Political Order. S.l.: Lexington Books. 59 Ibid.
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includes the PYD in Syria, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) in Iran, and the Kurdistan
Democratic Solution Party (PÇDK) in Iraq.
Regional Dynamics
While the question of Kurdish autonomy might be most directly relevant in states with a
substantial Kurdish population, it also needs to be viewed in the context of larger regional
geopolitics - here, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Middle East for dominance and influence
has also spilt over into the issue.
Iran, Iraq and Syria (sometimes Lebanon and Bahrain) constitute what many consider the
“Shi’ite Crescent”. In the case of Iran, Iraq and Bahrain, these states have a Shia majority
(though Bahrain is ruled by a Sunni royalty); in Syria, Assad’s Shi’ite government rules over
a Sunni-majority country; in Lebanon, their somewhat close relations with Shi’ite Iran lead to
closer political ties with Iran, drawing much ire from Sunni-majority powers such as Saudi
Arabia. First coined by King Abdullah II of Jordan, the Shi’ite Crescent has come to refer to
the region in which Iran has sought to increase its influence, both in terms of political
involvement and military presence. 60
On the other hand, Sunni Saudi Arabia leads the other Sunni-majority countries against the
rising Iranian influence in the region. This conflict of interests in establishing and
strengthening political influence in the region has an integral impact on the Kurdish issue
Sunni countries are more open to the allowing Kurdish autonomy, because autonomous Sunni
Kurdish entities in the region break up the contiguous Shi’ite Crescent, thus allowing Sunni
states to further halt Iranian ambitions in the region. This could manifest in the form of 61
limiting Iranian military influence over the region through the presence of non-Shi’ite led
troops, preventing Iranian military operations in the area (or at least complicating the
process), or simply reducing the geographical territory under the influence of Shi’ite powers.
As it currently stands, Iran is trying to establish a Shi’ite crescent to envelop and surround
60 Hardball with Chris Matthews - King Abdullah II of Jordan [Interview by C. Matthews]. (2004, September 12). Retrieved May 11, 2019, from http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6679774/ns/msnbc-hardball_with_chris_matthews/t/king-abdullah-ii-jordan/#.XNWwMY4zZhF 61 Trofimov, Y. (2016, September 29). After Islamic State, Fears of a 'Shiite Crescent' in Mideast. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-islamic-state-fears-of-a-shiite-crescent-in-mideast-1475141403
16
Saudi Arabia to contain the latter’s influence. However, the presence of Sunni Iraqi Kurdistan
has partially disrupted the continuity of the northern parts of the Shi’ite Crescent.
Should a Sunni (or at least a religiously neutral) Kurdish entity be established in Northeastern
Syria, or even in Western Iran or Southeastern Turkey, this would further disrupt the
homogeneous Shi’ite dominance exerted by Iran in the region. As such, this conflict of
interests has complicated the plan for a unified resolution to the Kurdish issue in the region.
17
Past International Action
Arab League
While the Arab League itself has not intervened much in the affairs of the Kurdish people,
the organisation has at times expressed its disapproval towards Kurdish independence. As
mentioned earlier, the Arab League strongly opposed any attempts by the KRG towards
complete Kurdish independence from Iraq. However, the Arab League still remains
supportive of the continued semi-autonomous rule of the KRG within Iraq, as can be seen
from the former’s recognition of the KRG as the sole autonomous entity within the Arab
League.
Moreover, the Arab League’s recognition of the SNC as Syria’s official representation rather
than the Assad government of Syria has indirectly supported increased Kurdish
representation and rights in Syria. Whereas the Assad government remains hostile towards
Kurdish autonomy, the new SNC is more receptive to the idea of providing the Kurdish
people with representation in the new SNC and potentially the new Syria - this signals the
possibility of greater Kurdish autonomy in Syria. This may soon change, however - the 62
Arab League has increasingly expressed desires to restore Assad’s government into the
Syrian seat in the organisation, which may signal the Arab League’s backtracking of its
policy on the Kurds in Syria. 63
UN Actions
Back in 1991, after the end of the Gulf War, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
passed resolution S/RES/688 that demanded the Iraqi government respect the human rights of
its population and halt the repression of minorities in Iraq, including the Kurds in the north.
62 Al Arabiya With Agencies. (2012, November 12). Syria’s opposition chooses president, formally signs coalition deal. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/12/249032.html 63 Chulov, M., & McKernan, B. (2018, December 26). Arab League set to readmit Syria eight years after expulsion. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/26/arab-league-set-to-readmit-syria-eight-years-after-expulsion
18
The US, UK and France used the resolution to establish a no-fly zone above Northern Iraq. 64
As Iraqi troops withdrew from the region, the Kurds were able to establish de facto
autonomous rule in Northern Iraq as Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds maintained their de facto 65
autonomy until a new constitution was drafted and accepted in 2005 that formally recognised
Kurdish autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan. 66
In more recent times, the UN has not intervened much in Kurdish affairs, and it appears
ambivalent on the issue. Following the recent independence referendum, the UN offered itself
to help “solve the problem” regarding the increasing division between the KRG and the Iraqi
government, even as the UNSC unanimously opposed the referendum. , 67 68
64 British Broadcasting Corporation News. (1998, December 29). Forces And Firepower | Containment: The Iraqi No-Fly Zones. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/crisis_in_the_gulf/forces_and_firepower/244364.stm 65 Unrepresented Nations & People's Organisation. (2018, June 6). Iraqi Kurdistan. Retrieved April 21, 2019, from https://unpo.org/members/20878 66 Ibid. 67 Cockburn, H. (2017, September 28). UN offers to help resolve Iraq's Kurdish independence crisis. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/un-help-resolve-baghdad-iraq-kurdistan-kurdish-referendum-crisis-syria-a7972911.html 68 News Wires. (2017, September 22). UN Security Council opposes Kurdish independence vote. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.france24.com/en/20170922-united-nations-security-council-says-opposes-kurdistan-iraq-independence-vote
19
Scope of Debate
Extent of Kurdish Autonomy
The extent of Kurdish Autonomy, if at all, remains a major point of contention among
involved parties. Certain states may respect Kurdish autonomy and the rights of the Kurdish
people to govern themselves; they are amenable with preserving the current situation in Iraq,
where Kurdish populations are given the right to govern all internal affairs. However, other
states remain hostile to the idea of Kurdish autonomy, seeking to eradicate all traces of an
independent Kurdistan.
The extent to which the Kurds can be granted autonomy is also an important area to discuss.
If they are granted too much autonomy, governments may risk losing influence over lands
that are technically still within their sovereign control. However, if the Kurds are granted too
little autonomy, they may feel oppressed by the central government, which may spur them to
undertake retaliatory measures that will further destabilise the region.
The issue of the scope of Kurdish autonomy is further complicated by the existence of
multiple Kurdish entities in the region. The Arab League must decide which to recognise or
denounce, and which should be granted autonomy in their respective territories. For instance,
the Arab League recognises the Kurdistan Regional Government but does not officially
recognise Kurdish entities in Syria, such as the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. The
process by which the Arab League chooses the entities to recognise also remains contentious.
Should the Arab League choose to legitimise the Kurdish entity with the strongest military, or
the one which respects diplomacy by engaging in dialogue and negotiations? While the Arab
League may serve as a mediator to decide on the level of autonomy that these entities should
or should not have, the ultimate question remains the receptivity of such proposals by the
affected member states themselves.
State Unity and Sovereignty
A major concern for any forms of Kurdish autonomy is that it may compromise the state
unity of the state in which the Kurdish entity is located. Though linked with the extent of
Kurdish autonomy, this issue mainly concerns the preservation of overall state borders and
20
preventing further destabilisation of the already fragile region of the Middle East.
Recognising the autonomy of one entity may spur other entities to conduct their own
independence movements, leading to state fragmentation and a potential collapse of the
central government. Presently, it is the fear that their territorial sovereignty will be
compromised that drives states to reject any form of Kurdish autonomy.
The importance of this issue stretches beyond the Kurdish region, as the whole of the Arab
League is at least indirectly implicated in the discussion of the issue of state unity and
sovereignty. The precedence set by autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan has already sparked
increased calls for autonomy or independence in other regions of the Arab League, even those
that are not related to the Kurds in any way. Such may include the Houthis in North Yemen,
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Morocco, Somaliland and Puntland in
Somalia, Darfur state in Sudan, among others. Should Iraqi Kurdistan be given full
independence, and/or the provision of increased autonomy or even independence to other
Kurdish-dominant areas such as the DFNS, this may set a dangerous precedent that may
promote increased independence movements all across the Arab League, potentially causing
the region to crumble into perpetual civil war.
Moreover, indirectly-involved states - mainly regional powers - have the same goal of
preserving state unity but for different reasons. Sunni-majority countries favour regional
stability, and as such do not want to risk granting too much autonomy to the Kurdish for fear
that other separatist groups may follow suit. At the same time, Sunni-majority countries still
seek to break up the Shi’ite crescent by promoting Sunni entities in the region. Shia-majority
countries, on the other hand, favour protecting the state unity of Shia-led Iraq and Syria in
order to strengthen the Shi’ite Crescent and therefore their continued influence in the region.
Hence, the Arab League must take into account the states’ sovereign right to rule and balance
the power of the central government of states with any potential Kurdish autonomous entities.
The Arab League is officially against potentially destabilising policies that may endanger the
state unity of member states, for a fragmented and volatile Arab World may become
vulnerable to external influences and/or interventions; however, the true motives behind such
a stance may differ from official statements. Nevertheless, delegates must consider the
importance of state unity when proposing solutions for the issue of Kurdish autonomy.
21
Recognition of Kurdish Representation
In the issue of Kurdish autonomy, it is imperative to also recognise the existence of the many
Kurdish groups in the region (and abroad), all of which push for varying objectives, ranging
from increased rights and decreased suppression of the Kurdish culture to the provision of
autonomy, or even outright independence. Moreover, different groups have different levels of
official endorsement on the domestic, regional and/or global level - some are deemed
legitimate parties representing the Kurdish people in their region, while others are deemed
illegitimate, or even of terrorist intent.
It is important to distinguish the different categories that different Kurdish groups fall under.
Mainly, these groups can be classified into two categories: political and military. For
example, Iraq’s KDP and PUK are mostly political groups in control of the KRG, while
PJAK is commonly viewed as a militant group. However, the distinction between the two
types is often blurred, especially for certain Kurdish groups that straddle between the two
and/or have active branches in each area. The PKK, though often claiming as a political party
fighting for Kurdish rights in Turkey, is also engaged in military attacks in Turkey.
Depending on the nature of the Kurdish group(s) in question, the Arab League may take
different approaches to address their concerns. For more political groups, the Arab League
may seek a peaceful forum with these groups, in hopes of achieving a common understanding
and even a plan for the Kurdish-dominated regions in the Middle East. However, towards the
more militant groups, the Arab League must proceed with caution, as these groups may pose
a threat to regional stability, especially in the form of Kurdish terrorism.
While attempting to resolve the issue of classifying the different groups pushing for Kurdish
autonomy, the issue of Kurdish terrorism should be discussed in tandem as well. Kurdish
terrorism extends beyond the boundaries of the Arab League, particularly into Turkey and
Iran. This complicates the process of recognising the rights and representation of Kurdish
groups, as more militant groups may jeopardise the peaceful intents of other, more diplomatic
political groups. Whereas the latter may seek diplomatic resolutions, militant Kurdish groups
may instead seek the use of violent means to achieve their goals, especially for independence.
In that regard, and as a response to their actions, some states have classified these militant
22
groups as “terrorists”, such as that of the PKK by Turkey. While the Arab League may be
split on the future of Kurdistan as a whole, the issue of Kurdish militarism and terrorism is a
more immediate and pressing problem that the Arab League should address before moving on
to the long term plans for the Kurds and the wider region of “Greater Kurdistan”.
The existence of these groups has proven the need to determine where, when and which of
these groups should be considered as legitimate parties representing the Kurdish people.
Before any solution is proposed for the resolution of the issue of Kurdish autonomy in the
Middle East, these Kurdish groups must be taken into account by delegates, especially given
that some of these groups have significant political and/or military influence in the “Greater
Kurdistan” region.
23
Identification of Blocs
When suggesting potential solutions for the issue of Kurdish autonomy, it is pertinent that the
Arab League also look at the key players in the problem, as these states are either directly or
indirectly involved in the issue. Their experience and/or cooperation is essential for the Arab
League to formulate feasible solutions to the issue - such solutions should also consider the
national interests of these key players.
Iraq
Given that Iraq is the only state in which an officially autonomous Kurdish entity exists, the
country plays a significant role in raising potential solutions to the Arab League, especially
with regards to the future of the Kurds in Syria. The Arab League can look towards Iraq as an
example of how Kurdish autonomy can be granted; however, it should remain cognizant of
the limitations of existing arrangements. Iraq’s attitude towards certain Kurdish groups such
as the PKK should also be focused on, given that neighbouring countries might hold more
hostile approaches to such attitudes.
Syria
Though still embroiled in the civil war, Syria must consider its future as a country,
particularly with consideration of the sizable Kurdish population in Northern and
Northeastern Syria. The current DFNS serves as a reminder that the Kurdish people in Syria
retain their desires for autonomy, incompatible with Assad’s Syria. However, given that Syria
is represented in the Arab League by the SNC and not the Assad government, potential
solutions should be implementable by the SNC should they gain full governance of Syria.
Moreover, a more cautious approach is warranted, given that the existence of any Kurdish
entity in the region may lead to diplomatic complications with neighbouring Turkey.
Turkey
Though not an official member of the Arab League, Turkey remains a major player in the
issue of Kurdish autonomy, particularly given the PKK insurgency in the Kurdish-Turkish
Conflict in the majority of Southeastern Anatolia that is considered by the Kurds as “Western
Kurdistan”. Historically hostile to any idea of an autonomous Kurdistan, let alone an
24
independent one, Turkey has recently been more open to a buffer state in Kurdish-populated
areas of Syria against ISIS. However, domestically speaking, Turkey remains hostile to 69
Kurdish autonomy, and views rising Kurdish nationalism and/or autonomy in neighbouring
countries as a direct threat to Turkish rule over Southeastern Anatolia. As such, the Arab
League must keep in mind the importance of Turkish cooperation on the issue when
discussing potential solutions on the Kurdish question.
Iran
While Iran does not face as many complexities regarding the Kurdish issue, the fact remains
that significant populations of Kurds are living in Northwestern Iran. The continued 70
suppression of the Kurdish culture and any movement deemed “threatening” to state unity
has compromised the Kurdish people’s desire for greater rights and autonomy in Iran.
Moreover, Iran has had Kurdish groups which it has banned and/or listed as terrorist groups,
with some of these groups potentially having links to other Kurdish groups in other countries.
Moreover, given Iran’s continued efforts to strengthen its influence over the Shi’ite Crescent,
any forms of Kurdish autonomy might be viewed with hostility by Iran. Hence, any potential
solutions by the Arab League on the Kurdish issue should consider the impacts that they
might have on Iran, as retaliatory actions from Iran would be far from desirable for the Arab
League.
Saudi Arabia
Though not a directly involved party in the Kurdish issue - there are no significant Kurdish
populations living in Saudi Arabia, nor are there influential Kurdish groups in Saudi Arabia -
Saudi Arabia remains concerned about the issue of Kurdish autonomy. As a major regional
power in the Middle East and a direct rival to neighbouring Iran, Saudi Arabia’s main interest
in the issue lies in weakening the contiguous Shi’ite Crescent. Additionally, Kurdish
nationalism does not directly compromise Saudi Arabia’s state unity - this allows for Saudi
Arabia to exert its influence greater on the issue without fear of backfiring back on their
home soil.
69 Avraham, R. (2019, January 23). What are the implications of a Turkish buffer zone in Syria? Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-syria/what-are-implications-turkish-buffer-zone-syria 70 Ibid.
25
Proposed Solutions
Tackling Kurdish Militarism/ Terrorism
In the short run, the issue of Kurdish militarism and/or terrorism should be tackled as it
stretches across borders, extending into neighbouring countries that are not Arab League
member states. It is thus especially urgent that the Arab League suppress further
terrorist/militant acts by violent Kurdish separatist groups which may threaten state unity.
Furthermore, attacks by militant Kurdish groups may prompt non-member states to engage in
military intervention in member states with Kurdish populations. Terrorist attacks and
separatist movements by the PKK in Turkey have prompted it to launch attacks against
Kurdish forces in Northern Syria. This threatens to further destabilise the region, and may 71
allow a non-member state to achieve a foothold in the territory of a member state. A
coordinated effort by Arab League member states to suppress militant Kurdish groups may be
recommended, especially in the short run.
Direct military involvement under the auspices of the Arab League itself may be possible -
the Arab League possesses a Joint Defence Force, consisting of troops contributed by
member states, for the purposes of peacekeeping in the region. However, any form of military
intervention may threaten individual state sovereignty especially when the receiving state
does not consent to such intervention. Military intervention may also cause a humanitarian
crisis, destabilising the region even further. Moreover, the Joint Defence Force has hitherto
only been used only for defensive purposes. Invoking it for an offensive against potential
Kurdish militants may set a dangerous precedent for the future. Alternatively, the Arab
League may serve as an unbiased mediator between the involved groups, so as to reach a
common compromise for regional stability. However, the receptivity of particularly militant
Kurdish groups towards diplomatic talks should be considered as well.
Formalising Extent of Kurdish Autonomy
In the long run, Kurdish autonomy remains a possibility that member states might consider.
Although already successfully implemented in Northern Iraq (with minor skirmishes still),
71 Coles, I. (2017, April 25). Turkish jets strike Kurdish fighters in Syria, Iraq's Sinjar. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-iraq-idUSKBN17R0D2
26
the extent of Kurdish autonomy - whether there should be changes to the level of autonomy
the North Iraqi Kurds have - should be further explored. The Kurdish question in Syria must
also be addressed, especially since there is no existing plan or solution to deal with the
Kurdish movements in Northern Syria.
Some states have called for a federalised Syria in the future, to be established after their civil
war in a system similar to what happened in Iraq, where the Syrian Kurds will be granted
autonomy in their regions, including autonomy in governance, economy and/or defence. 72
However, there is currently no concrete plan for Syrian Kurdish autonomy.
While the concept is theoretically possible, there are problems with a proposing for a
federalised Syria. Should Assad remain in power after the Civil War, he is unlikely to
relinquish his power for a federalised Syrian government. Furthermore, the receptivity of
neighbouring countries, particularly Turkey to the north, to an autonomous Kurdish entity
directly south of its borders should be considered. Moreover, the extent of autonomy granted
to the Syrian Kurds, as well as which areas to grant autonomy to, needs further discussion.
If autonomy is out of the question, then the extent to which the Kurds are able to exercise
their culture, and their right to recognition and representation in their countries’ governments,
should be deliberated as well. Kurdish representation in the parliaments and/or governments
of member states with significant Kurdish populations could potentially Kurdish nationalism,
but such solutions should also be scrutinised for their feasibility in certain member states.
72 Ibid.
27
Key Guiding Questions
1. To what extent should the Kurdish people have the right to self-rule?
2. Is Kurdish autonomy the only way to address this issue?
3. What should the balance be between national sovereignty/ state unity and granting
autonomous rule to minorities, specifically the Kurdish?
4. Which Kurdish groups should be recognised as legitimate representatives of the
Kurdish people?
5. How can the Arab League differentiate its policy towards militant and/or diplomatic
Kurdish groups?
6. How can the Arab League differentiate its policy on the Kurdish issue for different
countries? Is standardisation possible, and if so, how?
7. How should the Arab League regard Kurdish groups that are not recognised as
legitimate/legal in their own states? Do these groups still possess the right to voice
their concerns/ demands?
8. How can the Arab League, in the process of resolving the Kurdish issue, ensure
continued peace in the region? How can the Arab League prevent further
destabilisation of the region?
9. What should the trans-border cooperation be like regarding the Kurdish issue?
10. How far can foreign powers intervene in the Kurdish issue? Is the issue of Kurdish
autonomy a domestic one, or a regional one?
11. Is the reconciliation between involved states of their different stances on the Kurdish
people an achievable goal?
28
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-islamic-state-fears-of-a-shiite-crescent-in-mideast-
1475141403
42. Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process. (n.d.). Turkey and the PKK: Saving
the Peace Process,3-3. Retrieved May 9, 2019.
43. United Kingdom: Home Office. (2016). Country Information and Guidance - Iran:
Kurds and Kurdish political groups(2nd ed., Rep.). London: United Kingdom: Home
Office.
44. Van Wilgenburg, W. (2013, September 30). PYD Leader Skeptical of Kurdish
Agreement With Syrian Opposition. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from
http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/30092013
45. Van Wilgenburg, W. (2016, March 17). Analysis: 'This is a new Syria, not a new
Kurdistan'. Retrieved May 11, 2019, from
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-new-syria-not-new-kurdistan
46. Watchdog. (2009, November 11). Iran Executes Kurdish Political Activist. Retrieved
May 11, 2019, from
https://www.rferl.org/a/Iran_Executes_Kurdish_Political_Activist/1875171.html
47. West, B. A. (2009). Encyclopedia of the peoples of Asia and Oceania. New York
City, NY: Facts On File.
48. Wilks, A. (2019, March 30). Turkish elections: Much at stake in Kurdish-majority
southeast. Retrieved May 6, 2019, from
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/turkish-elections-stake-kurdish-majority-so
utheast-190330051827609.html
49. Yekta Uzunoglu. (2017, August 27). Kurdish Referendum. Retrieved May 6, 2019,
from http://yektauzunoglu.com/en/2017/08/27/kurdish-referendum/
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Press Freedom in the Arab League
Statement of Problem
The complex geopolitical reality in the Arab League, particularly the diverse governments of
its member states makes the issue of the freedom of the press a rather contentious one. In
particular, there is a wide diversity in the relationship between thestate and the press in the
region, with a clear disparity in the degree of press freedom among countries. While many in
the region rank among the lowest on the Press Freedoms Index, the existence of other states
with more press freedom has at times complicated relations within the Arab League and with
the world as a whole. 73
Once considered one of the least democratic regions of the world, the Middle East has seen a
wave of democratisation since the Arab Spring of 2010-2012. Yet, the extent of freeing up 74
the press differs greatly between member states. The increasingly educated population and
liberalised youth of the Arab League are forcing member states to rethink their official
policies and resultant actions towards their countries’ press. This is compounded by the surge
in the use of social media within the Arab League, which is a whole other area of press/media
freedoms regimes need to address. 75
The recent alleged state instigated assassination of notable Saudi critic Jamal Ahmad
Khashoggi has reignited the world’s focus on the state of press freedom in the Middle East.
The killing of Khashoggi in the Saudi Arabian consulate in Turkey has added a whole other
dimension to the issue, as a foreign state that is not part of the Arab League is being
implicated in the press affairs of the Arab League. The issue of press freedoms in the Arab 76
73 Reporters Without Borders. (2018). 2018 World Press Freedom Index. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table 74 Noueihed, L. (2011, January 19). FEATURE-Peddler's martyrdom launched Tunisia's revolution. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.reuters.com/article/tunisia-protests-bouazizi-idAFLDE70G18J20110119 75 Dubai School of Government’s Governance and Innovation Program, Alshaer, S., & Salem, F. (n.d.). The Arab World Online: Trends in Internet Usage in the Arab Region(Rep.). Bayt.com. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://archives.dimed.gouv.fr/sites/dimed.gouv.fr/files/asmr_-_the_arab_world_online_trends_in_internet_usage_in_the_arab_region_-_avril_2013.pdf 76 Jamal Khashoggi: Turkey says journalist was murdered in Saudi consulate. (2018, October 07). Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45775819
34
League is no longer constrained within the geographical boundaries of its member states - the
influence of member states in foreign territories complicates the issue, as the organisation as
a whole and member states specifically have to consider the extent to which they would
enforce their policy on press freedoms abroad.
35
Historical Background
To understand the current state of press freedoms in the Arab League, it is essential to first
understand the backdrop against which the press in the Middle East developed. The history of
the Arab World provides valuable insights into the reasons why most member states currently
enact policies that suppress both the domestic and international press.
Oppression and Authoritarianism
Following the independence of the Arab states from their former colonial rulers, many
declared themselves “republics” or “kingdoms”. However, many of these “republics” were
far from democratic - instead, these states descended into authoritarian and/or autocratic rule,
where a small group of elites or even only a single person possessed the right to rule within
their respective states. 77
As with many authoritarian governments, this was often accompanied by the oppression of
their people and the suppression of the free press. After all, the existence of a free press 78
clearly threatens authoritarian governments, especially by spreading potentially destabilising
ideas. As such, through much of the 20th century, the Arab world comprised mostly 79
authoritarian governments with restricted presses. 80
Arab Spring
The Arab Spring began in December 2010 with the self-immolation of Tunisian protestor
Mohamed Bouazizi, who was protesting against the government for confiscating his fruit
produce after he has been unable to find work. His self-immolation sparked an uprising in 81
77 Independence and Decolonization, Middle East. (n.d.). Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://what-when-how.com/western-colonialism/independence-and-decolonization-middle-east/ 78 Bourgault, A. (n.d.). Freedom of the Press Under Authoritarian Regimes (Vol. 6, Article No. 3). Susquehanna University Political Review. 79 Ibid. 80 Shishkina, A., & Issaev, L. (2018). Internet Censorship in Arab Countries: Religious and Moral Aspects(Rep.). Moscow, Russia: Laboratory for Monitoring of Sociopolitical Destabilization Risks, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/9/11/358/pdf. 81 Fahim, K. (2011, January 21). Slap to a Man's Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&src=twrhp
36
Tunisia, as more and more protestors gathered and united against the authoritarian Tunisian
government. The success of these protests led to major protests in neighbouring countries 82
such as Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, emulating the “Tunisian Burning Man” and rising
up against their authoritarian governments. These protests eventually spread across the 83
entire Arab World, though the intensities of such protests varied. The aftermath of the Arab 84
Spring led to the toppling of some authoritarian regimes, the increased liberalisation and
democratisation of others, but also a descent into civil wars for others - this has also led to a
wide diversification in the situation of press freedoms within various member states.
The wave of liberalisation and/or democratisation that followed, at least in the more
immediate period following the Arab Spring, led to the freeing up of restrictions on the press
in several states. However, in more autocratic states where power had been concentrated 85
and consolidated, the extent of such liberalisation was not as significant - Saudi Arabia, for
instance, retains strict control over its press. In other cases, there are also instances of 86
democratic backsliding, which has reversed previous efforts to open up and liberalise the
press.
82 Noueihed, L. (2011, January 19). Peddler's martyrdom launched Tunisia's revolution. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-tunisia-protests-bouazizi/peddlers-martyrdom-launched-tunisias-revolution-idUKTRE70I7TV20110119 83 Raghavan, S. (2011, January 27). Inspired by Tunisia and Egypt, Yemenis join in anti-government protests. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/27/AR2011012702081.html 84 Agdemir, A. M. (2016). The Arab Spring and Israel’s Relations with Egypt: A View from Turkey. Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs,10(2), 223-235. doi:10.1080/23739770.2016.1221154 85 Priest, D., McPhillips, D., & June-Friesen, K. (2015, July 26). After Arab Spring, journalism briefly flowered and then withered. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/after-arab-spring-journalism-briefly-flowered-and-then-withered/2015/07/25/cb4c43fe-1c2a-11e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html 86 Ibid.
37
Current Situation
Democratisation and Democratic Backsliding
Following the Arab Spring, only Tunisia fully transitioned into a democracy - other member
states ranged from implementing scant governmental changes to descending into all-out civil
war. This disproportionate level of democratisation has also led to a multitude of different
degrees of press freedoms, as more democratic countries tend to respect the freedom of
speech and freedom of the press more than more authoritarian countries.
However, the correlation and causation of increased democratisation and increased freedoms
of the press are complicated by the presence of deep state entities. In certain countries,
non-governmental actors such as the military or a powerful group of elites are able to
influence the government and restrict press freedoms for their own gain - these non-state
actors either bribe officials or outright threaten them to do the former’s bidding. This is 87
worsened when the governments turn from democracy towards authoritarianism (a trend
known as democratic backsliding) and revoke or compromise press freedoms that were
established earlier. These trends are certainly evident in the Arab League countries.
Trend of Liberalisation in the Arab League
Though often used as a synonym for democratisation, the liberalisation of member states is
different from democratisation. Political democratisation refers to the transition of the
government itself in a broad sense towards more democratic measures such as elections and
government transparency. Political liberalisation, however, refers to the relaxation of 88
restrictions and policies targeted at the country’s society. While liberalisation may lead to 89
democratisation, this causality need not always hold - certain governments may free up
domestic policies but retain their concentrated power and rule over their country as a whole.
Such countries are often considered as “liberalised autocracies”.
87 Youssef, N. (2015, June 25). How Egyptian media has become a mouthpiece for the military state. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/25/egyptian-media-journalism-sisi-mubarak 88 Huntington, S. P. (2017, February 21). Liberalization and Democratization: How the World Can Modernize. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14510 89 Ibid.
38
A liberalised autocracy may liberalise domestic policies by increasing the freedom of
expression, allowing the freedom of association, decreasing censorship and filtering,
protecting the individual rights of citizens, etc. However, the same country may maintain an 90
autocratic rule, denying rights to vote or democratic processes from being implemented,
instead favouring the further consolidation and protection of the incumbent government’s
power. Some have considered Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Jordan to be such countries. 91 92
The desire for press freedom across the Middle East has increased following the liberalisation
of some member states, but it is worth noting that liberalisation does not always equate to a
freer press. Saudi Arabia, for example, has increasingly liberalised their domestic policies
while remaining an absolute monarchy, especially after the installation of Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in power. However, the country has 93
remained very much against the idea of democratisation and/or freeing up the press, which
has led to the conflicting trends of limited social liberalisation and the continued clamping
down on the press. 94
Another form of liberalisation includes social liberalisation, as the population holds
increasingly liberal views. In the Arab World, social liberalisation has affected especially the
Arab youth, who have been increasingly calling for greater freedoms and democracy. 95
Indeed, this trend was one of the reasons for the Arab Spring being able to spread throughout
the Arab World with such intensity in the first place. Along with such calls for
democratisation, the Arab youth have also demanded increased freedoms of speech and the
90 Brumberg, D. (2002). Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy. Journal of Democracy,13(4), 56-68. doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0064 91 Ibid. 92 Brumberg, D. (2011, December 19). Sustaining mechanics of Arab autocracies. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/19/sustaining-mechanics-of-arab-autocracies/ 93 Radical reforms in Saudi Arabia are changing the Gulf and the Arab world. (2018, June 23). Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/06/23/radical-reforms-in-saudi-arabia-are-changing-the-gulf-and-the-arab-world 94 Feierstein, J. (n.d.). Saudi Arabia: Liberalization, Not Democratization. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://www.afsa.org/saudi-arabia-liberalization-not-democratization 95 Howard, P. N. (2010). The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam (M. Aouragh, Ed.). The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,28(3), 394-397. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199736416.003.0009
39
press. This surging trend in among the youth has threatened the autocratic rule of some 96
governments and may be one of the reasons motivating political liberalisation in the Arab
League.
Safety in Journalism
When it comes to safety, journalists in the Arab League do not necessarily have it as a
guaranteed right. Despite being enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression”,
the state of press freedom in the Arab League has remained poor. The Press Freedom Index 97
(RFI) by the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) organisation has consistently ranked many
member states near the bottom of the list, though there are exceptions, especially for more
democratic countries. 98
Among other dangers, journalists in the Arab League face threats to personal freedom and
safety. In some instances, certain states resort to detention and arrests of journalists in
attempts to reduce dissent among critical journalists, often using unsubstantiated claims such
as links to terrorism to justify the arrests and imprisonment of journalists. For example, 99
investigative journalist and researcher Ismail Alexandrani was arrested in Egypt following
unfounded charges of affiliation with terrorist organisations. His detention has been
repeatedly renewed ever since. In other times, states may use extrajudicial kidnappings to 100
silence journalists that are deemed “incompatible” or a “threat” to the continued authoritarian
rule of certain governments. Some governments may even resort to outright killings/ 101
96 Ibid. 97 United Nations. (n.d.). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://undocs.org/A/RES/217(III) 98 Ibid. 99 Reporters Without Borders. (2018, April 25). RSF Index 2018: Middle East riven by conflicts, political clashes. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://rsf.org/en/rsf-index-2018-middle-east-riven-conflicts-political-clashes 100 Masr, M. (2016, February 23). Egypt is one of the 'biggest prisons' for journalists, says watchdog. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/23/egypt-prison-for-journalists-reporters-without-borders-letter 101 Powell, J. (2018, December 21). 'Not a lot of good news': Press freedom continues to suffer in Middle East in 2018. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/not-lot-good-news-press-freedom-continues-suffer-middle-east-2018
40
assassinations of journalists, so as to consolidate their rule and prevent dissent from
threatening their power in their countries. 102
According to the RSF, almost 37% of all jailed journalists around the world are imprisoned in
just four countries: Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Among others, Syria and Yemen 103
have been ranked as one of the worse in terms of the killings of journalists, with 11 and 8
journalists killed in these countries respectively in 2018 alone. 104
Online Press and Social Media
In the age of technology, the internet has grown to become indispensable for a large
proportion of the modern world, especially in urban areas. This is no different in the Arab
League, where over 184 million people use the internet (43.8% of the Arab League’s
population). As the number of internet users continues to climb in light of increasing 105
internet penetration within member states, so do the compounding efforts of governments
attempts to increase their grip and control over the internet, the online press, and social
media.
Online media and press remain a somewhat freer source of information. Internet users in the
Arab League are able to obtain information about the world and especially their region and
country online that may contradict what the state claims and thus possibly undermine the
legitimacy of autocratic and/or authoritarian rule in their states. Laws passed by member
states to restrict freedom of speech and information often date back to the pre-digitalisation
period, and as such may not apply directly to the digital world. Licensing of newspapers is a
commonly used strategy to curb dissent in traditional media, with its implementation seen in
countries such as Bahrain, Egypt and Tunisia. 106
However, in the increasingly globalised and connected world, media outlets and press
agencies are able to reach to wider audiences abroad, which allows foreign agencies to reach
the domestic populace and provide them information that they would not be able to get
otherwise. This presents a problem to authoritarian regimes, as unwelcomed foreign influence
102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid.
41
in the form of unendorsed information that contradicts what the government says may
compromise their ability to safeguard their control of information and thus their power. Some
states have attempted to regulate the digital press through forms of online censorship, either
broad censorships or smaller-scaled selective filtering. In Saudi Arabia, Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) have to route all internet traffic through the government-controlled and
surveilled Internet Services Unit at King Abdulaziz City for Sciences and Technology in
Riyadh; Oman, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE and Yemen all apply broad online filtering of
various websites; Bahrain, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco implement limited degrees of
selective censorship. However, the existence of technologies such as Virtual Private 107
Network (VPN) proxies allow internet users to simply circumvent such censorship, adding
another dimension of uncertainty and difficulty in states’ attempts to regulate the internet. 108
The role and influence of social media cannot be underestimated, especially in the context of
the Arab League - social media played a major role in sparking and spreading the Arab
Spring. Many protesters took to social media to rally fellow citizens to join the protests, 109
causing the number of participants to swell to the tens of thousands. In 2011 alone, when 110
the Arab Spring was in full swing, the proportion of Bahrain’s population using the internet
went up to 88%. Given the impact that social media has on the mindset of the populace and 111
social stability, states may hence seek to strengthen their efforts to regulate the online space,
in order to protect their stable autocratic and/or authoritarian rule from internal and external
threats. This is especially since the Arab World, for the most part, has relied on suppression
to protect its autocracies against the increasing strength of foreign influence spreading
democracy into and within the Arab World. Yet, such regulations have proven difficult,
107 Al-Bab.com. (n.d.). The internet in Arab countries. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://al-bab.com/arab-media/internet-development 108 Ibid. 109 Howard, P. N. (2011, February 23). The Arab Spring's Cascading Effects. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://psmag.com/economics/the-cascading-effects-of-the-arab-spring-28575 110 Cavanaugh, D. (2016, October 03). Arab Spring Activists Relied on Social Media - And America Taught Them How to Use It. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://medium.com/war-is-boring/arab-spring-activists-relied-on-social-media-and-america-taught-them-how-to-use-it-3eb5a1bda2d8 111 Stepanova, E. (n.d.). The Role Of Information Communication Technologies In The “Arab Spring” - Implications Beyond The Region(Publication No. 159). PONARS Eurasia, The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://pircenter.org/kosdata/page_doc/p2594_2.pdf
42
especially given the anonymity of the internet, the high penetration rate within some states,
and in general the difficulty of regulating such a large transnational entity.
Foreign Influence on the Press
The existence of transnational press agencies complicates states’ attempts to control the press
within their borders. While it is easier for member states to control terrestrial media, the
advent of newer technologies such as satellite television has allowed transnational press
agencies to broadcast their news abroad with little intervention from the receiving state. For
example, Al Jazeera, the Qatar-based satellite broadcaster, has been able to broadcast
relatively liberal content to the wider region, a situation that is viewed by neighbouring states
with varying levels of hostility. It is widely speculated that discontent regarding Al Jazeera 112
prompted several Arab countries to impose a blockade on Qatar in 2017. The decreasing cost
and portability of satellite technologies have made it even harder and less feasible for
member states to regulate, as citizens can easily obtain these technologies, thus
circumventing domestic restrictions of the press. Furthermore, the different regulatory 113
standards between member states allow press agencies to often exploit loopholes and gain
pseudo-immunity from legal responsibility, as they may be headquartered in foreign states
that are out of reach of some states’ attempts to enforce their domestic laws. Hence, these 114
press agencies retain the ability to report news and information that certain member states
may deem as dissent or a “threat to national security or unity”.
112 Ibid. 113 New World Encyclopedia. (n.d.). Freedom of the Press. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Freedom_of_the_press 114 Amin, H. Y. (2014, December 30). Social Engineering: Transnational Broadcasting and Its Impact on Peace in the Middle East. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from http://www.globalmediajournal.com/open-access/social-engineering-transnational-broadcasting-andits-impact-on-peace-in-the-middle-east.php?aid=35061
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Past International Action
Arab League
The Arab League has mostly remained silent on the issue of press freedom. However, several
members of the Arab League have recently been more open to the idea of protecting press
freedoms. In Cairo, Egypt on 30 May 2018, the Federation of Arab Journalists (FAJ) and the
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) presented a joint Declaration on Media Freedom
in the Arab World to Arab League members and requested for the signing of the declaration. , Six member states have endorsed the declaration: Palestine, Tunisia, Jordan, Sudan, 115 116
Morocco and Mauritania. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) hosted the first 117
Young Arab Media Leaders Program in February 2018, in which several major media outlets
attended and were able to meet officials to discuss the issue of media freedoms in the UAE
and the Arab League in general. 118
UN Actions
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ratified on 10th December 1948, served as a
pledge by all ratified states to uphold the values of human rights and work towards the
protection and furthering of such rights. Among the articles of the UDHR, Article 19
specifically states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Moreover, the UN 119
115 International Federation of Journalists. (2018, June 01). Declaration on Media Freedom in the Arab World discussed at League of Arab States meeting in Cairo / IFJ. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-freedom/article/declaration-on-media-freedom-in-the-arab-world-discussed-at-league-of-arab-states-meeting-in-cairo.html 116 Federation of Arab Journalists, & International Federation of Journalists. (n.d.). Declaration on Media Freedom in the Arab World. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.ifj.org/fileadmin/user_upload/filelist/Declaration_on_media_freedom_in_the_Arab_World_EN.pdf 117 Ibid. 118 WAM. (2018, November 07). Shaikh Mohammad meets young Arab media leaders. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://gulfnews.com/uae/shaikh-mohammad-meets-young-arab-media-leaders-1.2279540 119 Ibid.
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has also passed several resolutions towards encouraging greater press freedoms in general. 120
Usually passed by consensus, these resolutions condemned acts of violence against
journalists, and encouraged the opening up of the press and the further protection of press
agencies through capacity building to ensure their freedom of reporting the news. The 121
Human Rights’ Council has also passed several resolutions that more specifically worked
towards ensuring greater safety of journalists around the world and protecting the rights of
journalists. 122
However, given the non-binding nature of these resolutions, such measures have not been
equally implemented in all countries. Authoritarian countries tend to ignore such
recommendations, and may even use their memberships in the Human Rights’ Council to
block pro-freedom resolutions. , Hence, while introduced in good faith, these resolutions 123 124
ultimately do not have significant impacts on the status of press freedoms in the Arab world
in general.
120 Reporters Without Borders. (2017, November 22). RSF hails new UN resolution on journalists' safety | Reporters without borders. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-hails-new-un-resolution-journalists-safety 121 Brown, D. (2017, November 21). UN General Assembly adopts resolutions to protect human rights online for journalists and human rights defenders. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.apc.org/en/news/un-general-assembly-adopts-resolutions-protect-human-rights-online-journalists-and-human-rights 122 APC. (2016, September 01). APC welcomes landmark HRC resolution condemning threats to women journalists and restrictions on encryption. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/apc-welcomes-landmark-hrc-resolution-condemning-th 123 British Broadcasting Corporation. (2018, October 12). UN criticised over new human rights council members. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45840980 124 Calamur, K. (2018, June 20). The UN Human Rights Council Is a Deeply Flawed Body. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/us-un-human-rights/563276/
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Scope of Debate
Impetus for Arab League Action
The impetus for the Arab League to take action on this issue, despite the noticeable lack of
attention given to press freedoms in the past, lies in the multitude of impacts that press
freedoms have in every member state. In particular, the extent to which a potentially freer
press might pose a significant threat to the internal stability of certain member states. Even in
member states where the press is seen with less hostility, it cannot be denied that a free press
may still sway the public view in ways that may not be desirable for some states. As such,
member states may prioritise national security and use it as a justification for further control
over their domestic press.
However, despite the importance of national security, international backlash remains a
significant counter-pressure for member states to undertake press-liberalising policies. Even
as member states may view press freedoms with hostility and enact policies limiting press
freedoms, they must still consider the possible reaction of the international community, even
if the latter has no specific or direct influence in the domestic situation of member states.
Member states may try to frame their policies under the guise of other justifications, such as
the aforementioned case of protecting national security and interests.
In any case, member states would attempt to further stabilise their domestic situation, though
the path which they can take may differ - increased liberalisation, to quell the population’s
dissatisfaction, or to further impose autocratic measures to suppress dissent. The mutual
exclusivity of the two goals - strengthening national security, or compromising to
international pressure for greater press freedoms - calls for a tradeoff to be made, and further
divides member states in their stances on press freedoms.
Extent of Press Independence
Perhaps the most obvious point of contention is the extent of control that the state and/or
government have over the country’s press. This control may come in many forms, from
relatively milder to more stringent censorship policies, or even outright banning of potentially
dissenting press agencies. Moreover, the issue of national security often comes into play, as
46
governments which support restricting press freedoms often use this issue as justification for
their continued control over the country’s press - foreign subversion, hostile ideologies,
terrorism, etc.
Human Rights of Journalists
Authoritarian governments in the Middle East may view a free and independent press as a
threat to their rule or to national security. Consequently, journalists in the Arab World
frequently face threats, detentions, kidnappings, forced disappearances, or even killings.
Given the difference in the level of press freedom between member states, the human rights
of journalists will be respected to varying degrees by respective member states. Delegates
must keep in mind the current position of their respective governments towards journalists,
particularly their right to expression, personal freedom, and life.
At the same time, delegates must also remember that the violation of the fundamental human
rights enshrined in the UDHR has become a salient topic of discussion amongst the
international community, including transborder non-governmental organisations such as
Freedom House and Reporters without Borders. Without proper measures to ensure that the
human rights of journalists are respected, the Arab League is likely to face backlash from the
international community.
Extent of Influence Abroad
As digital platforms make the world more interconnected, press agencies are to extend their
reach overseas through publishing their content online. Press agencies - especially more
prominent ones such as The New York Times - serve as conduits of information for
international audiences, and their reporting can shape the opinions of readers from other
countries. However, the influence that powerful overseas press agencies can have on the
domestic sphere of another country is sometimes viewed as a threat to national security and
sovereignty. Large foreign press agencies with ideals that differ from that of the state may
spread ideas deemed subversive to the population, which will weaken the government’s
influence. Governments have recognised the influence that overseas press agencies have on
public opinion, and some countries have even attempted to interfere with press agencies in
47
other countries to further their national interests, such as when Saudi Arabia demanded Qatar
shut down Al Jazeera in 2017.
The question of national security comes into play when discussing the freedom of the press,
but more importantly in this regard is the extent of foreign influence allowed in one’s country
and its press. Qatar in the recent Qatar Diplomatic Crisis may be the first explicit instance,
but it may not be the last. The Arab League must thus closely examine this controversial
issue.
Online Censorship
As member states increasingly adopt more advanced technologies on digitalisation, it is
inevitable that the internet becomes a substantial part of the lives of many within the region.
The Arab World has seen increased usage of the internet: as of 2017, half of the Arab
League’s member states have an internet penetration rate of 50% and above, with Bahrain
and Qatar leading the way with a 98% and 94.3% penetration rate respectively; only two
members have single digit penetration rates, namely the Comoros and Somalia, each with a
penetration rate of only 7.9%. Though the extent of internet penetration between member 125
states varies greatly, the online press still plays a major role in shaping the opinions of its
readers. It can disseminate content to a wide audience via the internet, as many readers obtain
their news from digital newspapers, or even forums and blogs. Certain governments may
perceive this as a threat, as the freedom of information allowed by the anonymity of the
internet and/or the pseudo-immunity of international press agencies from domestic
prosecution allows for messages deemed by the government to be inappropriate or a threat to
national security to spread easily. In response, governments often resort to online censorship,
through means such as blocking access to certain sites; censoring “unwanted” messages or
posts, and even online surveillance to identify potential critics of the government . A 126
pan-Arab League policy may be introduced on the issue of online censorship, though the
feasibility and reception towards such a plan should be considered.
125 Miniwatts Marketing Group. (2017, March). Arabic Speaking Internet Users Statistics. Retrieved April 14, 2019, from https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats19.htm 126 Oweidat, N., Schneider, C. P., Oweidat, N., & Schneider, C. P. (2016, July 28). The Great Silencing: Intolerance and Censorship in the Arab World. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-great-silencing-intolerance-and-censorship-in-the-arab-world/
48
With that in mind, delegates should recognise both the influence of online platforms on the
information intake of citizens, as well as the difficulty of exerting control over the flow of
information from and within the internet. With technologies such as VPN to circumvent
censorship efforts by governments, delegates should consider how can states ensure that their
policies of internet usage can be enforced if it should be at all. Again, the difference in the
political standing of member states - democratic or otherwise - will play a significant role in
shaping the Arab League’s policy towards online media.
49
Identification of Blocs
Saudi Arabia
As a regional power not just in the Arab League but also the entire Middle East, Saudi Arabia
wields substantial influence in the organisation. , Its draconian oppression of press 127 128
freedom has been used by other member states as justification to do the same. The recent
assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi (further discussed below) demonstrates Saudi
Arabia’s hitherto strong resistance to press freedom. It is thus the responsibility of the Arab
League to focus on the status of press freedom in the respective regional powers in the
organisation before a common solution for the issue of press freedom can be made.
Tunisia
Since the Arab Spring, Tunisia has made considerable progress in democratising, especially
after its previously authoritarian government and its replacement were both overthrown and
replaced with a unicameral parliamentary system. The press within Tunisia has also been 129
rated as partly free, with the 2014 constitution guaranteeing the freedom of the press. 130
However, there are still cases of government intervention in journalism, such as police
interference in how newspapers report on protests in the country. Nonetheless, the country 131
has, in general, moved towards greater press freedom, and has established itself as one of the
most liberal countries in the Arab League. Should the Arab League decide to move towards 132
greater press freedom, Tunisia could be a model for other states to work towards.
Egypt
127 Kenton, W. (2018, December 13). Arab League. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arab-league.asp 128 Ehteshami, A. (2018). Saudi Arabia as a Resurgent Regional Power. The International Spectator,53(4), 75-94. doi:10.1080/03932729.2018.1507722 129 Frosini, J. O., & Biagi, F. (2017). Political and constitutional transitions in North Africa: Actors and factors. London: Routledge. 130 Freedom House. (2019, February 11). Tunisia - Freedom on the Net 2018. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/tunisia 131 Freedom House. (2019, February 11). Tunisia - Freedom on the Net. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/tunisia 132 Ibid.
50
After the initial stages of the Arab Spring, Egypt seemed to be making progress towards
establishing a democracy. However, a subsequent coup by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has resulted
in democratic backsliding. Press outlets remain oppressed in Egypt - the country is the
third-largest jailer of journalists as of 2016. Straddling public calls for democracy and the 133
government’s desire to continue its authoritarian rule, Egypt must consider its domestic
situation before contributing to solutions by the Arab League on the issue of press freedoms.
This is also a dilemma that the many Arab states face, as the government’s desire to hold on
to power conflicts with the people’s desire for democracy and press freedom.
Qatar
The status of press freedoms in Qatar is somewhat ambiguous. While the press has been rated
as “not free” or with “noticeable problems” in general, the government-owned Al-Jazeera
network has in many occasions published news critical of neighbouring regimes. However, 134
there remain elements of press oppression, both direct and indirect - journalists will still be
prosecuted should they criticise the Qatari royal family, the government, or Islam, and such
an atmosphere has also resulted in widespread self-censorship. The recent Qatar 135
Diplomatic Crisis should also be considered by the Arab League, as it evidently displays the
influence that certain powers might have on smaller nations’ press agencies.
133 Koc, C. (2018, December 13). Turkey Still Worst Jailer of Journalists in 2018, Watchdog Says. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-13/turkey-still-worst-jailer-of-journalists-in-2018-watchdog-says 134 Ibid. 135 Freedom House. (2017, October 25). Qatar - Freedom of the Press 2017. Retrieved March 10, 2019, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/qatar
51
Case Studies
Assassination of Jamal Khashoggi
Jamal Ahmad Khashoggi was a notable Saudi dissident who served both as a journalist for
The Washington Post and a general manager and editor-in-chief of the Al-Arab News
Channel. Fleeing from Saudi Arabia in 2017 and under self-imposed exile till his death,
Khashoggi remained a sharp critic of both the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as
well as the Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.
On October 2018, after entering the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey to retrieve
documents related to a planned marriage, Khashoggi never left the building. He was
classified as a “missing person” by Turkey, but investigations later confirmed that Khashoggi
was assassinated and subsequently dismembered in the consulate by a cadre of 15 hit-men.
Allegations also implicated Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in issuing the order
to assassinate Khashoggi. The Saudi government and especially the Saudi Royal Family
initially denied Khashoggi’s death. However, as more incriminating evidence was released
from investigations by Turkish authorities, the Saudi narrative shifted multiple times. The
Saudi Government eventually admitted that Khashoggi’s death was a “premeditated murder”,
but insisted that the killers were part of a “rogue operation” with no connection to the Crown
Prince.
Though the alleged perpetrators of the operation have been prosecuted, many members of the
international community continue to condemn the Saudi government and Crown Prince for
the assassination - regarded as an act of suppressing journalistic freedom and inhumane
censorship. In mid-December 2018, Khashoggi was named the “Person of the Year” by
Times Magazine, and hailed as a “Guardian of the Truth”. Turkey has also vowed to continue
its investigations to shed more light on the situation.
The assassination of Jamal Khashoggi clearly evinces the abysmal lack of press freedom in
the Middle East. The fact that the assassination was conducted by an Arab state in a foreign
country has also prompted debates on the extent of foreign influence on the press, especially
with regards to the power of certain states to enforce their rules in other states, possibly
compromising the latter’s sovereignty. Delegates should thus recognise the soft and covert
52
influence of certain powers in the region, and the implications that extended foreign influence
might have on their local press and by extension the sovereignty over their own soil.
Qatar Diplomatic Crisis
The Qatar Diplomatic Crisis is a diplomatic blockade of Qatar by a coalition of countries
including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt, the Maldives,
Mauritania, Senegal, Djibouti, the Comoros, Jordan, the Tobruk-based Libyan government,
and the Hadi-led Yemeni government that began in 2017 and has continued to this day.
Among other demands required for a lifting of the blockade was for the Qatari government to
shut down the government-owned Al-Jazeera news agency, which openly reported dissenting
views of other Gulf States. These demands, which Qatar has refused to yield to, are
denounced by agencies, media outlets, journalists and media rights organisations as attempts
to limit press freedoms in the Middle East.
In response to Qatar’s refusal to yield, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE all
blocked domestic access to all Qatari news agencies, including Al-Jazeera. The UAE has
even instituted laws that made it illegal to show any sympathy to Qatar through any forms of
media, including social media. Hence, using political circumstances as justification, the UAE
has instituted press restrictions within its borders.
The Qatar Diplomatic Crisis, specifically about Al-Jazeera, is a prime example of two areas
of contention - the use of political justifications to institute press restrictions, and the use of a
country’s soft power to influence the press of another. In the domestic sense, the increased
restrictions of the press evidently show the ability of states to enforce their control over their
domestic press situation. However, such restrictions can also go further to indirectly exert a
state’s control and/or influence on the press of another country. In this regard, the council
needs to demarcate the extent of a state’s jurisdiction over information entering its borders. Is
it limited to within the state, or does it extend to any foreign press outlet deemed by the
government to be a threat to its domestic security?
53
Proposed Solutions
Protection of the Freedom of the Press
More democratic states might strive to protect the freedom of the press and media, and
especially uphold the rights of journalists, particularly in the areas of their freedom to
expression and life. As democracies are often expected to act in line with guaranteeing
individual freedoms and reduced intervention from the state, more democratic member states
of the Arab League might turn towards policies to open up the flow of information to and
from citizens, as well as permitting greater freedoms for both domestic and foreign press
agencies to report news. For instance, following the Arab Spring, the rights to freedom of the
press have been enshrined in the constitution of Tunisia and Kuwait. , 136 137
However, more authoritarian regimes, especially those which seek to protect their
consolidated power within their countries, might instead seek to push for policies towards
allowing greater control by individual member states to set their own domestic policies on the
press, through which their oppression of the press can continue undeterred. National security
as deemed by the government would be regarded with higher priority than the freedom of the
press and media, or the rights of journalists. Online censorship might also be pushed by such
states, given their desires to control the flow of information.
Regional Standardisation
In general, while the Arab League might be limited in enforcing its policies in domestic
situations, the nature of resolutions passed in the Arab League is important to be considered -
resolutions are binding only for ratified member states. As such, it is still possible for the
Arab League to come up with a common framework or guidelines on the issue of press
freedoms. The extent of press freedoms within the geographical boundaries of the
organisation may be more clearly defined by member states, as may the human rights of
journalists - in that regard, a joint declaration by the Arab League may be possible, though
the differences in member states’ opinions on the issue may complicate the process.
136 Ibid. 137 Freedom House. (2016, December 01). Kuwait - Freedom of the Press 2016. Retrieved April 21, 2019, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/kuwait
54
The same can be said for a common framework on internet control and regulation - the type,
form and extent of online censorship can be further discussed by member states, before a
framework agreed upon by member states can be introduced and ratified. Information sharing
could also be considered by delegates, given that such a plan may allow member states to
increase their online surveillance capabilities should they deem certain parts of the internet to
be a threat to their national security. Moreover, such a scheme may allow member states to
increase their control and regulation of the greatly-interconnected digital world, hence
providing member states with a greater extent of foreign press influence without the concern
of infringing national sovereignties (since the scheme would be mutually agreed upon);
however, the intrusion of personal privacy that such a scheme may pose should be
considered, especially by the more democratic states within the Arab League.
55
Key Guiding Questions
1. Is press freedom more important, or should national security as deemed by member
states be of higher priority?
2. How can the Arab League balance between the different national interests of member
states, with due consideration given to the different governance types of member
states?
3. To what extent should governments have the right to control their press? What kinds
of control should be allowed?
4. What rights should journalists possess? How far should governments respect these
rights?
5. How far can governments regulate foreign press agencies on their soil? If a foreign
press agency is deemed “a threat”, should the press agency or its origin country be
held accountable?
6. Should states intervene in the press of foreign countries? To what extent can such
soft/hard influence be deemed appropriate?
7. Should the internet be regulated and/or censored? If so, how?
56
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