student number: 09002557 - wordpress.com · web viewsimilarly, the united states and canada have...

42
Coursework question: The United Nations Security Council is often seen as the key actor in maintaining international peace and security. In light of the conflict in Syria, critically discuss the effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s role and action since the conflict began in 2011. Word count: 3443 1

Upload: others

Post on 30-Jan-2021

1 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Student Number: 09002557

Coursework question: The United Nations Security Council is often seen as the key actor in maintaining international peace and security. In light of the conflict in Syria, critically discuss the effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s role and action since the conflict began in 2011.

Word count: 3443

Introduction

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was established under Chapter V of the Charter of the United Nations (the Charter). It carries ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (Article 24 of the Charter) and Members of the United Nations (UN) must ‘agree to accept and carry out the decisions’ of the UNSC (Article 25 of the Charter). Thus it is that the ‘legitimacy of Security Council decisions derives directly from the Charter’. The UNSC consists of five permanent members and ten non-permanent members (Article 23 of the Charter).

This essay will argue that the UNSC has engaged in the Syrian conflict through the provision of humanitarian aid, but has failed to fully uphold peace and security within the region. It will endorse the UNSC’s actions in relation to humanitarian aid, but will explore whether the UNSC could have supported the use of force within Syria. It will argue that countries are rapidly coming to an international agreement outside the UNSC in respect of the use of force against the terrorist group Islamic State (ISIL) but that diplomatic and political differences between Russia and Iran – who support President Assad – and the NATO alliance – who support the rebel groups – are effectively hobbling the UNSC from fully resolving the conflict in the region. It will argue that veto powers among the five permanent members may seem to be harming the UNSC’s ability to maintain peace and security but that any reform to veto powers based on the UNSC’s ineffectiveness in Syria would be premature and could weaken the authority of international law. In this way, it adopts Bosco’s ‘governance perspective’ in ‘essentially judg[ing] the Council by its success in confronting external challenges’. This allows the essay to focus on the UNSC’s responses to the Syrian conflict within the wider reform context.

Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria in 2011, the Security Council has passed 12 Resolutions in relation to the conflict. These have included Resolutions on the use of chemical weapons, on access for humanitarian aid and concerning the Islamic State. There have also been three draft Resolutions which were vetoed by China and Russia; a French draft resolution referring Syria to the International Criminal Court, a resolution condemning violence and supporting the Arab League’s attempts to facilitate a political transition, and a resolution condemning the violent response to protestors.

On the 20 November 2015, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2249, which ‘calls upon’ Members to ‘take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law’ to ‘prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL’. Despite this, it is not certain that this authorises the use of force within Syria; for example, David Cameron has said that the United Kingdom’s position remains that the ‘main basis’ for action against ISIL is ‘the collective self-defence of Iraq. Iraq has a legitimate Government—one that we support and help’.

Given the Security Council’s remit under Article 24, its primary effectiveness may be defined by the state of ‘peace and security’ in Syria, but this in fact involves a number of constituent elements, in some of which the UNSC has been more effective than in others. One crucial role which the UNSC has assumed has been the provision of humanitarian aid to those affected by the conflict.

Humanitarian Aid Provision

The main provisions of international law relating to humanitarian aid in non-international disputes, such as Syria, are contained in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, requiring humane treatment and the right of the International Committee of the Red Cross to offer humanitarian assistance, and also Article 18 of the Additional Protocols II to the Geneva Conventions, and particularly Article 18(2) which in the context of non-international conflict holds that

If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.

The general understanding of providing humanitarian aid in situations of disaster or war is that there is an obligation on third party States to do so, but that they must first seek consent from the State in which the aid is needed, which that State cannot unreasonably withhold. Consent can only be overridden by a declaration of the UNSC under Chapter VII. It is generally accepted that this is in order to respect State sovereignty, yet Krisch argues that all humanitarian intervention will breach State sovereignty and the acceptance of the UNSC’s power to order it demonstrates that sovereignty is not the key tension in humanitarian intervention. Instead, he sees this as part of efforts to maintain international peace; by ‘insisting on [UNSC] authorization, opponents of a unilateral right [to humanitarian intervention] seek to prevent arbitrary interventions from flourishing and thereby seek to preserve international peace’.

When understood as part of the measures to maintain international peace and security, the provision of humanitarian aid therefore becomes a key action which the UNSC can authorise and oversee. As Gillard notes, ‘the agreement of all affected parties is necessary to ensure the safety of humanitarian operations’, and so the cloak of legitimacy which unanimous UNSC support can give to humanitarian operations is particularly important.

Within the Syrian context, Gillard sees Resolution 2139 as ‘an important departure from previous practice, with the [UNSC] for the first time demanding that all parties promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access’. Previously, the UNSC had focussed on creating safe conditions for humanitarian access, rather than on imposing humanitarian relief. The effect of Resolution 2139 is that the Syrian government is no longer able to withhold consent, and it is the first time that the UNSC have ‘[laid] down an unqualified obligation’ in this area. Modirzadeh argues against this, stating that

there is nothing in those [UNSC] decisions… that establishes that if Syria refuses to allow consent… the relief actions may be taken by the UN without the State’s consent. Where a State has failed to comply with a [UNSC] decision, it is up to the Council to decide how to react.

In the event, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2165, authorising UN humanitarian agencies access to Syria merely by notifying the Syrian authorities.

The UNSC’s expansion into the area of humanitarian aid and its recent actions to mandate humanitarian relief in Syria should be welcomed as part of the movement to protect international peace and security. That the UNSC has been able to unanimously adopt Resolution 2139 shows that it has been able to effectively ensure humanitarian access as part of efforts to maintain international peace and security. Its further adoption of Resolution 2165 is particularly welcome, and sets a precedent that the UNSC is fully prepared to ensure compliance with Resolutions on humanitarian aid. In this regard, it could be seen to be not only highly effective at providing humanitarian aid to Syria but the key international body in doing so.

Use of Force

Unfortunately, the ability of the UNSC to directly intervene in the Syrian conflict has been curtailed by the internal politics of the five permanent members. Each has a veto (Article 27 of the Charter) and as such their co-operation is crucial to the ability of the UNSC to respond effectively to developing situations in Syria. As discussed in the introduction, China and Russia have used their vetoes to prevent Resolutions authorising the use of force in Syria.

There are three situations in which a State can justify the use of force within another State’s borders; self-defence without UNSC support (Article 51 of the Charter); where the UNSC has authorised the use of force (Article 41 of the Charter); where the State has consented to the use of force within their territory.

Some academics have argued for an emerging international “pro-democratic intervention thesis” which allows States to intervene, including by the use of force, where popular uprisings in favour of democracy occur. This, they asseverate, arises because ‘governments unsupported by popular will, expressed in the form of elections, are not legitimate governments, and as such the state does not benefit from the protection’ normally afforded by international law against forceful interference in State matters. This is similar to the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which would allow States to intervene where grave human rights violations were occurring.

The example of international action in Libya in 2011 is often used to argue for the recognition of the pro-democracy thesis internationally. Nevertheless, Woolaver argues, ‘States did not claim an independent right to use force against Libya, to support pro-democratic reform or otherwise’. Indeed, she notes that ‘both [UNSC] resolutions [authorising NATO intervention]… expressed commitment to Libyan sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence’. Many commentators still express unease about any emerging doctrine which would override State sovereignty without UNSC approval.

In contrast to the Libyan experience, the UNSC has still been unable to agree on the use of force within Syria. Russia argues that ‘an aggressive foreign interference [in the Middle East] has resulted in a flagrant destruction of national institutions and the lifestyle itself. Instead of the triumph of democracy and progress we got violence, poverty and a social disaster’. China

has endeavoured comprehensively and in a balanced manner to engage with the Government of Syria and opposition parties to urge them, based on the demands of all sides, to seek a middle path appropriate to the country’s conditions and accommodating the interests of all sides through dialogue and negotiation.

This strongly supports the previous international position of non-intervention in State sovereignty and suggests a lack of international support for an emerging pro-democracy thesis. Similarly, the United States and Canada have made explicit that the absence of UNSC support for the use of force in Syria is what differentiates it from the Libya situation and prevents a pro-democratic intervention in Syria.

International law would also support the inability of States to interfere in Syria without a UNSC mandate. General Assembly Resolution 2625 held that no State may interfere in the internal affairs of any other State, including that ‘no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State’. This principle was endorsed by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, where it held that a ‘prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely’. This includes the choice of ‘political, economic, social and cultural system’.

Another element of international law which weighs against intervention without UNSC mandate is the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, first developed by Premier Zhou Enlai. These have ‘been accepted by the overwhelming majority of countries in the world’ and embody: mutual respect for State territory and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful co-existence. Although this remains an ideal, when faced with the cross-border threat of violence posed by groups like ISIL, it speaks strongly of China’s hesitancy to use military means in facing the threat of terrorism. It also reflects the continued international acceptance of traditional respect for State sovereignty.

Nevertheless, a self-posited ‘insider’, Cai argues that the recent blocking of UNSC Resolutions by China should be seen in its emerging acceptance of a non-forceful doctrine of Responsibility to Protect as a means of balancing non-intervention with humanitarian intervention. Cai argues that China is using its increasing economic dominance to pressure States to act before humanitarian intervention becomes necessary. In the case of Syria, this is evidently inadequate to deal with emerging threats, but for broader UNSC reform, China’s non-interventionist approach as an effective tool to maintain peace and security should not be underestimated. What, perhaps, is needed is a greater willingness on the part of China to recognise that intervention can become an inevitable necessity and that, where this is so, they should perhaps be more willing to allow UNSC sanctioned military action.

Absent a UNSC Resolution, therefore, the use of force within Syria would only be permitted if this was consented to by the Syrian government or was a measure of collective self-defence. The Russian intervention was begun as a result of a request by President Assad for assistance; this would satisfy the requirement of consent. Similarly, Iraq requested assistance in defeating ISIL within its own territory, and as seen in the United Kingdom intervention (see quote in the introduction) this is now being used as the basis for the use of force in Syria to target ISIL also – particularly in light of the ISIL armed attacks in Paris and the requirement of collective self-defence within NATO, of which France is a member.

It could therefore be argued that in this case a UNSC Resolution is not necessary to begin to use force to attempt to resolve the civil war within Syria. Although most interventions (Russia excepting) began after the November 2015 Resolution, the United Kingdom, for example, has been clear that the ‘legal basis of the Coalition’s activity against ISIL in Syria has been, and continues to be, the inherent right of self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter’ but that ‘Resolution 2249 provides clear and unanimous political endorsement by the international community for the military action being taken by the Coalition’. It is clear, therefore, that a UNSC Resolution is seen as a political instrument and may not be strictly necessary under international law for the use of force in Syria in this case. The respective reliance on traditional justifications for force, however, also argues that countries are far from accepting a right to breach State sovereignty, either on pro-democracy or protection grounds.

Reform

Then Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2003 spoke of ‘the urgent need for the Council to regain the confidence of States, and of world public opinion –… by demonstrating its ability to deal effectively with the most difficult issues’. In the same speech, he spoke of the need for the UNSC to become more representative of interests and views within the international community; arguably, however, it is the divide between Russia and China with NATO powers which has brought about the inertia of the UNSC as regards Syria.

Following reaction to the 9/11 attacks, Kofi Annan authorised a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (the Panel). In its rep ort, the Panel suggested that the UNSC should only authorise force after considering five criteria: the seriousness of the threat; the purpose of the use of force; whether force is a last resort; whether force is proportionate; whether the consequences of action are less serious than the consequences of inaction. This broadly replicates the action of the UNSC, which has long refused to consider force against Syria, but did pass Resolution 2249, and its much stronger language, following an arguable increase in the seriousness of the threat and the consequences of inaction. Thus Gray argues that the UNSC ‘had never been accused of having used excessive or unnecessary force, but rather of not having used it when it was thought necessary’. She therefore concludes that the criteria were not likely to have any impact on the UNSC as they were ‘inherently flexible and largely subjective; they will not in themselves be able to produce agreement’.

Further suggestions centre on reform of the veto power, so that one permanent member cannot block the actions of the UNSC. Eldar notes that the UNSC is ‘a form of public trust, under which [UNSC] members are entrusted with certain defined powers that they are required to exercise for the benefit of the international community’ and that the veto ‘may suggest that they are entitled to use their voting powers to maximize their own interests’. Nevertheless, Eldar argues that

the better view is that countries’ duty is towards the international community at large. The veto powers are designed to ensure that the [UNSC] does not usurp its powers, and there is nothing in the UN Charter to suggest that they override the [UNSC]’s duties to maximize the collective good.

Similarly, Chan argues that the veto is a ‘core structural part of the Security Council in order to constrain excessive or unilateral exercise of military or political power’. The Syrian conflict and China’s vetoes, he argues, are ‘precisely why the veto is constitutionally built into the structure of the UNSC’. He posits that without the veto there would be greater numbers of malevolent military action and further crumbling of international peace and security.

Conclusion

It is clear that UNSC action in relation to Syria has not always been adequate. Speaking at the General Assembly, several countries took the opportunity to criticise the UNSC: India said its response had been ‘less than robust’ and that it ‘had not remained the primary driver of the political process to resolve disputes’; Lichenstein said it had ‘been unable to adequately respond’ and ‘had prevented the United Nations from maintaining international peace and security’; South Africa noted that ‘the Assembly had acted where the [UNSC] was unwilling or unable to do so’; the Maldives said it ‘represented one of the gravest failings of the time’.

What prevents the UNSC from taking more forceful action in situations which threaten international peace and security such as that of Syria – namely, political disagreements within the permanent member states, or a lack of political willpower to act – is not, however, necessarily a weakness.

Gray argues that the UNSC is limited by ‘practical and political problems rather than any disagreement on the law [which will] remain the main obstacle to an effective UN collective security system’. It could, in fact, be argued that the UNSC is a victim of its own success; it is by representing a range of international opinion and not becoming a tool for one or more powerful States to legitimise excessive or unnecessary force against other States that it is often perceived to be slow to respond to situations such as the one in Syria. Krisch, for example, argues that ‘it is rather the strength than the weakness of the collective security system that led to its circumvention by Western states at the end of the 1990s’ and that the fact that ‘China and Russia have become less willing to simply endorse Western policy shows that the institution has acquired teeth’. Bosco argues that the strength of the UNSC is as a body bringing major powers together in diplomacy not war, not in UNSC action to external threats. Joyner concurs that the UNSC is

fulfilling its role as a discretionary, governing body of nations whose withholding of consent is indicative of their dissatisfaction with the proposed action, which dissatisfaction was permitted, by the organization of the [UNSC], to be expressed in a peaceful and diplomatic manner rather than communicated by corresponding reprisal by force.

Criticism of the UNSC has long centered on the perceived lack of action or quick response to international threats like ISIL. Nevertheless, the second half of the twentieth century was one characterised by a remarkable period of global peace and stability. Whilst some, including the pope, may argue that we are now part of World War Three, it is clear that reform of the current UNSC system may not be enough, and that far more effective, at least in response to the threat posed by the Syrian civil war to peace and security, would be for the five permanent members to work together and with the global community within the current system. With a diverse range of countries and viewpoints within the UNSC united in agreement to act against the atrocities happening in Syria, there will be far stronger condemnation of the acts which have breached international humanitarian law than for alliances to act alone.

One commentator goes so far as to suggest that ‘so completely has [the UNSC] re-invented itself [since 1989] that worries about the Council’s paralysis have quickly given way to concerns about the limits of its powers’. The veto power wielded by an often skeptical China and Russia is a particularly strong way of restraining the UNSC and giving its actions a significant legitimacy. As President Putin said,

It is absolutely natural for such a diverse and representative Organization. When the UN was established, its founders did not in the least think that there would always be unanimity. As a matter of fact, the mission of the Organization it (sic) to seek and reach compromises. Its strength comes from taking different views and opinions into consideration.

Table of Cases

Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14

Table of Legislation

Charter of the United Nations (adopted 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI

Geneva Conventions (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950)

North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949)

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts(adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978)

UNGA Res 2625 (24 October 1970) A/RES/25/2625

UNSC Draft Res 612 S/2011/612 (4 October 2011)

UNSC Draft Res 77 S/2012/77 (4 February 2012)

UNSC Res 2118 (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2118

UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2139

UNSC Draft Res S/2014/348 (22 May 2014)

UNSC Res 2165 (14 July 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2165

UNSC Res 2170 (15 August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2170

UNSC Res 2191 (17 December 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2191

UNSC Res 2199 (12 February 2015) UN Doc s/RES/2199

UNSC Res 2209 (6 March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2209

UNSC Res 2235 (7 August 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2235

UNSC Res S/Res/2249 (20 November 2015)

Bibliography

Articles

Aznar-Gomez M.J., ‘A Decade of Human Rights Protection by the UN Security Council: A Sketch of Deregulation?’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 223

Bosco D, ‘Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective’ (2014) 20 Global Governance 545

Cai C, ‘New great powers and international law in the 21st century’ (2013) 24(3) European Journal of International Law 755

Caron D, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’ (1993) 87 American Journal of International Law 552

Chan P, ‘A keen observer of the international rule of law? International law in China’s voting behaviour and argumentation in the United Nations Security Council’ (2013) 26(4) L.J.I.L. 875

Chesterman S, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 331

Damrosch L.F., ‘The Permanent Five as Enforcers of Controls on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Building on the Iraq ‘Precedent’?’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 305

Depuy P-M, ‘Back to the future of a multilateral dimension of the law of state responsibility for breaches of “obligations owed to the international community as a whole”’ (2012) 23(4) European Journal of International Law 1059

Eldar O, ‘Vote-trading in international institutions’ (2008) 19(1) European Journal of International Law 3

Fassbender B, ‘Uncertain STEPS INTO A Post-Cold War World: The Role and Functioning of the UN Security Council after a Decade of Measures against Iraq’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 273

Gillard E-C, ‘The law regulating cross-border relief operations’ (2013) 95(890) International Review of the Red Cross 351

Goodrich L.M., ‘From League of Nations to United Nations’ (1947) 1(1) International Organisation 3

Gray C, ‘A crisis of legitimacy for the UN collective security system?’ (2007) 56(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 157

Henderson C, ‘The UK Government’s legal opinion on forcible measures in response to the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Government’ (2015) 64(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 179

-- and Lubell N, ‘The contemporary legal nature of UN Security Council ceasefire resolutions’ (2013) 26(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 369

Joyner D.H., ‘The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm’ (2002) 13(3) European Journal of International Law 597

Krisch N, ‘Review Essay Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 323

Kritsiotis D, ‘The Arab Spring, Massive Violations of Human Rights and the Use of Force’ (2013) 5 Amsterdam Law Forum 80

Matiya J, ‘Repositioning the international human rights protection system: the UN Human Rights Council’ (2010) 36 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 313

Obse K, ‘The Arab Spring and the question of legality of democratic revolution in theory and practice: a perspective based on the African Union normative framework’ (2014) 27(4) Leiden Journal of International Law 817

Ryngaert C, ‘Humanitarian Assistance and the Conundrum of Consent: A Legal Perspective’ (2013) 5 Amsterdam Law Forum 5

Sivakumaran S, ‘Re-envisaging the international law of internal armed conflict’ (2011) 22(1) European Journal of International Law 219

--, ‘Arbitrary withholding of consent to humanitarian assistance in situations of disaster’ (2015) 64(3) I.C.L.Q. 501

Tams C.J., ‘The use of force against terrorists’ (2009) 20(2) European Journal of International Law 359

Woolaver H, ‘Pro-democratic intervention in Africa and The “Arab Spring”’ (2014) 22(2) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 161

Books

Amerasinghe C.F., Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (Cambridge University Press 2005) 105-130

Boyle A and Chinkin C, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) Ch 1

Klabbers J, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009), 205-228

Shaw M N, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 1-128, 778-814, 1204-1235

Official Documents

HC Deb 26 November 2015 vol. 602 col. 1491

HC Deb, 01 December 2015, vol 603, 17332W

Panel Report, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ UN Doc a/59/565

Websites

Annan K, ‘The Secretary-General Address to the General Assembly New York, 23 September 2003’ (UN) accessed 5 December 2015

BBC, ‘Battle for Iraq and Syria in maps’ BBC (London, 10 December 2015) accessed 11 December 2015

Channel News Asia, ‘Damascus confirms Assad asked Putin for military aid’ Channel News Asia (30 September 2015) accessed 12 December 2015

Clinton H and Baird J, ‘Remarks With Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird After Their Meeting’ (US Department of State, 4 August 2011) accessed 04 December 2015

Dorn A.W., ‘The League Covenant and the UN Charter: A Side-by-Side (Full Text) Comparison’ (Royal Military College of Canada 2008) accessed 06 October 2015

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Botswana, ‘China’s Position on Syria Issue’ (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Botswana) accessed 05 December 2015

Embassy of the Russian Federation Washington DC, ‘Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the strikes on Syrian territory’ (Embassy of the Russian Federation Washington DC) accessed 05 December 2015

Evans G, ‘R2P and RWP After Libya and Syria’ gevans.org (23 August 2012) accessed 11 December 2015

Mason P, ‘What would the world look like if we defeated Isis?’ The Guardian (London, 16 November 2015) accessed 21 November 2015

McKelvey T, ‘Arming Syrian rebels: Where the US went wrong’ BBC (Washington, 10 October 2015) accessed 11 December 2015

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China) accessed 08 December 2015

Modirzadeh N, ‘Guest Post: Strong Words, Weak Arguments – A Response to the Open Letter to the UN on Humanitarian Access to Syria (Part 1)’ Opinio Juris accessed 16 November 2015

Nuruzzaman M, ‘Revisiting “Responsibility to Protect” after Libya and Syria’ e-ir.info accessed 25 November 2015

Putin V, ‘Statement at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly’ 28 September 2015’ accessed 10 December 2015

Schneible A, ‘UPDATED: Pope calls Paris terrorist attacks part of 'piecemeal WWIII'’ Catholic News Agency (Vatican City, 14 November 2015) accessed 07 December 2015

Security Council Report, ‘UN Documents for Syria’ (Security Council Report) accessed 13 November 2015

Shaheen K and others, ‘Bashar al-Assad thanks Putin for Syria strikes as Russia announces US talks’ Guardian (Beirut, Sochi and London, 21 October 2015) accessed 11 December 15

United Nations, ‘What is the Security Council?’ (United Nations Security Council) accessed 13 November 2015

UN, ‘Examining Security Council’s Annual Report, Speakers in General Assembly Urge More Analysis, Criticize Response to Syrian Crisis, Terrorism as Inadequate’ (UN.org, 12 November 2015) accessed 10 December 2015

United Nations Security Council, ‘7180th meeting’ 22 May 2014 S/PV.7180

� Charter of the United Nations (adopted 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI

� Phil C.W. Chan, ‘A keen observer of the international rule of law? International law in China’s voting behaviour and argumentation in the United Nations Security Council’ (2013) 26(4) L.J.I.L. 875, 877

� Kareem Shaheen and others, ‘Bashar al-Assad thanks Putin for Syria strikes as Russia announces US talks’ Guardian (Beirut, Sochi and London, 21 October 2015) accessed 11 December 15; Mohammed Nuruzzaman, ‘Revisiting “Responsibility to Protect” after Libya and Syria’ e-ir.info accessed 25 November 2015

� This is used here to refer to countries within the NATO alliance taking part in operations within Syria and Iraq: United States, France, United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and Belgium. It also encompasses Australia as part of the “US-led coalition”. See BBC, ‘Battle for Iraq and Syria in maps’ BBC (London, 10 December 2015) accessed 11 December 2015

� Tara McKelvey, ‘Arming Syrian rebels: Where the US went wrong’ BBC (Washington, 10 October 2015) accessed 11 December 2015

� David Bosco, ‘Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective’ (2014) 20 Global Governance 545, 546

� UNSC Res 2118 (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2118; UNSC Res 2209 (6 March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2209; UNSC Res 2235 (7 August 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2235

� UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2139; UNSC Res 2165 (14 July 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2165; UNSC Res 2191 (17 December 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2191

� UNSC Res 2170 (15 August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2170; UNSC Res 2199 (12 February 2015) UN Doc s/RES/2199

� UNSC Draft Res S/2014/348 (22 May 2014)

� UNSC Draft Res 77 S/2012/77 (4 February 2012)

� UNSC Draft Res 612 S/2011/612 (4 October 2011)

� UNSC Res S/Res/2249 (20 November 2015)

� HC Deb 26 November 2015 vol. 602 col. 1491

� Geneva Conventions (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts(adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978). Please note Syria are not signatories to Additional Protocols II.

� Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Arbitrary withholding of consent to humanitarian assistance in situations of disaster’ (2015) 64(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 501; Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Humanitarian Assistance and the Conundrum of Consent: A Legal Perspective’ (2013) 5 Amsterdam Law Forum 5

� Nico Krisch, ‘Review Essay Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 323

� Ibid 331

� Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘The law regulating cross-border relief operations’ (2013) 95(890) International Review of the Red Cross 351, 354

� UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2139

� Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘The law regulating cross-border relief operations’ (2013) 95(890) International Review of the Red Cross 351, 378

� Ibid 381

� Naz Modirzadeh, ‘Guest Post: Strong Words, Weak Arguments – A Response to the Open Letter to the UN on Humanitarian Access to Syria (Part 1)’ Opinio Juris accessed 16 November 2015

� UNSC Res 2165 (14 July 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2165

� Hannah Woolaver, ‘Pro-democratic intervention in Africa and The “Arab Spring”’ (2014) 22(2) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 161, 163

� See Dino Kritsiotis, ‘The Arab Spring, Massive Violations of Human Rights and the Use of Force’ (2013) 5 Amsterdam Law Forum 80 for a full discussion of Responsibility to Protect in the context of the Arab Spring

� Hannah Woolaver, ‘Pro-democratic intervention in Africa and The “Arab Spring”’ (2014) 22(2) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 161, 173

� Hannah Woolaver, ‘Pro-democratic intervention in Africa and The “Arab Spring”’ (2014) 22(2) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 161, 173

� Hannah Woolaver, ‘Pro-democratic intervention in Africa and The “Arab Spring”’ (2014) 22(2) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 161; Dino Kritsiotis, ‘The Arab Spring, Massive Violations of Human Rights and the Use of Force’ (2013) 5 Amsterdam Law Forum 80

� Vladimir Putin, ‘Statement at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly’ 28 September 2015’ accessed 10 December 2015, 4

� United Nations Security Council, ‘7180th meeting’ 22 May 2014 S/PV.7180, 14

� Hillary Clinton and John Baird, ‘Remarks With Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird After Their Meeting’ (US Department of State, 4 August 2011) accessed 04 December 2015

� UNGA Res 2625 (24 October 1970) A/RES/25/2625

� Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 205

� Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 para 205

� Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China) accessed 08 December 2015

� Ibid

� Congyan Cai, ‘New great powers and international law in the 21st century’ (2013) 24(3) European Journal of International Law 755, 755

� Ibid

� Channel News Asia, ‘Damascus confirms Assad asked Putin for military aid’ Channel News Asia (30 September 2015) accessed 12 December 2015

� See North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949) Article 5

� HC Deb, 01 December 2015, vol 603, 17332W

� Kofi Annan, ‘The Secretary-General Address to the General Assembly New York, 23 September 2003’ (UN) accessed 5 December 2015

� Panel Report, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ UN Doc a/59/565; see Gareth Evans ‘R2P and RWP After Libya and Syria’ gevans.org (23 August 2012) accessed 11 December 2015 for the relation of Panel criteria to Responsibility While Protecting doctrine.

� Christine Gray, ‘A crisis of legitimacy for the UN collective security system?’ (2007) 56(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 157, 165

� Christine Gray, ‘A crisis of legitimacy for the UN collective security system?’ (2007) 56(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 157, 166

� Ofer Eldar, ‘Vote-trading in international institutions’ (2008) 19(1) European Journal of International Law 3, 19

� Ofer Eldar, ‘Vote-trading in international institutions’ (2008) 19(1) European Journal of International Law 3, 19

� Phil C.W. Chan, ‘A keen observer of the international rule of law? International law in China’s voting behaviour and argumentation in the United Nations Security Council’ (2013) 26(4) L.J.I.L. 875, 881

� Phil C.W. Chan, ‘A keen observer of the international rule of law? International law in China’s voting behaviour and argumentation in the United Nations Security Council’ (2013) 26(4) L.J.I.L. 875, 905

� Ibid 882

� UN, ‘Examining Security Council’s Annual Report, Speakers in General Assembly Urge More Analysis, Criticize Response to Syrian Crisis, Terrorism as Inadequate’ (UN.org, 12 November 2015) accessed 10 December 2015

� Christine Gray, ‘A crisis of legitimacy for the UN collective security system?’ (2007) 56(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 157, 170

� Nico Krisch, ‘Review Essay Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 323, 334

� David Bosco, ‘Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective’ (2014) 20 Global Governance 545

� Daniel H. Joyner, ‘The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm’ (2002) 13(3) European Journal of International Law 597, 608

� For a summary, see Christian J Tams, ‘The use of force against terrorists’ (2009) 20(2) European Journal of International Law 359

� Ann Schneible, ‘UPDATED: Pope calls Paris terrorist attacks part of 'piecemeal WWIII'’ Catholic News Agency (Vatican City, 14 November 2015) accessed 07 December 2015

� C.J. Tams, ‘The use of force against terrorists’ (2009) 20(2) European Journal of International Law 359 375

� Vladimir Putin, ‘Statement at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly’ 28 September 2015’ accessed 10 December 2015 2

�Here, the key provisions of the question have been highlighted. The question is asking for a discussion of the effectiveness of the UN Security Council, but the conflict in Syria should be used as an example to inform this evaluation.

�The use of sub-titles during the essay helps to keep clear what each structure is going to explore. This is useful both for the reader, and also for the author, to help clarify and keep to a strong structure.

�This is explaining to the reader that throughout the rest of the essay, the shortened form – in this case UNSC – will refer to a specific concept, body or legal term. As long as the first mention of a term is given in full, and it is clear what the shortened form which will be used is, it is perfectly acceptable to shorten specific terms or names in order to save words towards the word count.

�This paragraph is providing a brief introduction to the body which will be discussed – the UN Security Council – and setting out its composition and remit and the legal sources from which it derives its authority. Note also the reference (footnote 2) to a journal article; this is introducing an evaluation of the Security Council within the first paragraph (that it derives authority directly from the Charter – thus it has legal legitimacy). It has also explained the reference in the question to the UNSC being the “key actor in maintaining international peace and security”.

�This introduces the key argument around which the essay will be based.

�This sets out the arguments which will be explored during the work, in the order in which they will appear, thus also explaining the structure that the essay will take.

�The final two sentences explain the perspective which is being adopted, give a source for the perspective, and justify why this is appropriate in answering the question set – that adopting this perspective allows the essay's arguments to be situated within the conflict in Syria on which the question focusses.

�This gives the – legal – history of the Syrian conflict in the UNSC. Note that all of the statements are fully, and individually, referenced.

�This alerts the reader to a recent development in the UNSC's response and tentatively draws suggestions on whether this has changed the situation.

�This links the legal provisions already cited to the evaluation which will be carried out, explaining why those have been chosen as relavent to the question.

�Again, this signposts the reader to where the essay is going.

�This paragraph again gives a miniature-introduction to the section of the essay, by introducing the legal background to the evaluation.

�This paragraph again pivots the legal provisions just discussed back to the context of the question – the role of the UNSC – and also begins to evaluate

�This again is justifying how this is relevant to answering the question, yet it is also evaluative; it is relevant, because humanitarian aid is argued to be part of maintaining peace and security (which is what the question asks in terms of the UNSC), but use of terms like “a key action” are evaluative in nature – it is setting this up as an important role of the UNSC, and therefore the evaluation of their effectiveness in this area has particular weight.

�This paragraph goes on to use the point previously raised and evaluate the UNSC action, within the Syrian conflict, on the provision of humanitarian aid. It begins to link this evaluation of the UNSC to a wider debate about the theory of humanitarian aid and State consent.

�This paragraph concludes the section on humanitarian aid by evaluating UNSC action in relation to humanitarian aid provision. It thus directly answers the question, and again pivots the points previously raised back to their relevance to the question. Note also that it mirrors the phrase used in the question, a useful way of linking the reader back to the question.

�Be careful to always give a reference where a new legal provision is mentioned.

�This refers the reader back, which both reinforces the structure and how this ties in to the overall essay, and also avoids the need to re-cite references by referring back (although if this had made a direct reference to or quoted a source, the citation would need to be given again in the footnotes).

�As ever, this gives the legal provisions before moving into an analysis of the law.

�This paragraph introduces an academic theory. At LLM level you are expected to do more than merely state the law. By placing the debate about the UNSC actions in Syria – which must form the bedrock of all discussions in the essay in order to answer the question – within a current academic debate, this is both demonstrating a knowledge of the wider literature and meeting the criteria for analysis and evaluation.

�This paragraph gives the counter argument, using a specific example to illustrate where the theory may be weak. Again, this has moved the essay on from simply giving a description of the law (though reference is still made to underlying legal provisions) to analysing and evaluating the law in a broader, deeper context.

�This paragraph does two key things:

1) It pivots the previous discussion on the academic theory back to the question, and shows the relevance of the theory to the question

2) It further evaluates the theory, in effect arguing that the theory is not correct. This is allowing the author to make their own argument – that there is no pro-democratic intervention thesis – but ensures that the argument is fully supported by reference to other sources, and it is clear that the author has understood both sides of the debate and formed their opinoin based on solid evidence.

�This gives the legal background to the argument advanced – that State sovereignty is still the deciding factor in international intervention – including both UNSC's resolutions and also case law.

�This paragraph introduces a new theory, which is in direct opposition to the previous theory, and, having already disagreed with a theory, gives one opposing view within the debate.

�In this paragraph, several things happen:

1) A third theory is explored, which reconciles both the previous theories;

2) It again refers back to the question, and specifically the requirement to evaluate UNSC action as regards Syria, by reminding the reader of the relevance of the theories to the Syrian conflict;

3) It moves beyond the Syrian conflict to introduce ideas of broader UNSC reform, answering the requirement to “critically discuss the effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s role and action”;

4) It makes a recommendation – this shows originality, based on a strong bedrock of evidence and grounded in recognised academic theories.

�This paragraph begins to conclude the section on the use of force, summarising the current situation and linking it back to the question. Note that the legal basis for the statements is again made explicitly clear.

�This paragraph concludes the conclusion on the use of force, by setting out the legal and political situation and making clear why this is relevant to the theories explored.

�This paragraph neatly summarises the arguments for UNSC reform. Note the source - although not a traditional legal source, the justification for using it is given, by reference to the role of the person quoted, which makes them a recognised authority on the subject.

�Remember that however late in the essay it occurs, if you wish to shorten a name or term to save words, you must give the shortened form that you are going to use, so the reader is clear what you are talking about.

�This paragraph again explores one theory related to the section of the essay, then gives the opposing view.

�In earlier sections, the essay has followed the traditional ILAC format – Introduction, Law, Analysis, Conclusion. In this section a different structure is used, where each theory is put forward and then evaluated in turn, so that the structure is moulded around the theories.

�This paragraph, like the paragraph before it, gives an argument against one of the suggestions for reform.

�This paragraph introduces criticism from other countries, placing the debate about the UNSC within its political context, following on from an exploration of the academic debate earlier in the essay.

�This gives the author's view based on all of the evidence presented as to the core of the essay question – how effective is the UNSC?

�This gives a number of authorities to support the argument put forward by the author in the preceeding paragraph.

�Again, because this is the conclusion, the author is using the argument put forward to date to make their own assessment of the situation.

�This provides the final summary of the author's argument – that the UNSC doesn't need reform and in fact draws its strengths from the things it is commonly criticised for. It also ends the essay on a good quote from a recognised authority.