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Strategies in Contemporary Maritime Security

Challenges Confronting the Arabian Gulf

Sabahat Khan

Prepared for the UAE Navy; Distribution unlimited

INEGMA Strategies in Contemporary Maritime Security

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Established in 2001, the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) was set up as a Middle East think-tank focusing on military and strategic affairs of the wider region. INEGMA also provides a range of specialist services to clients in government, military, and commercial companies operating in Middle East defense and security, including; Strategy and Risk Management, PR and Marketing Consultancy, and Events Organization. INEGMA is a Free Zone Limited Liability Company based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © INEGMA 2009

All rights reserved. No part of this

publication may be reproduced in any

form or by any electronic or

mechanical means (including

photocopying, recording, information

storage and retrieval) without prior

permission from INEGMA.

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Preface This study is based on the proceedings of the Maritime Security Cooperation Conference that was organized by the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) under the joint presidential patronage of His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE, and His Excellency Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, on May 25-26, 2009, at the Armed Forces Officers Club, Abu Dhabi, on the inauguration of the French ‘Peace Camp.’

The Maritime Security Cooperation Conference (hereon referred to as ‘the Conference’) was a two-day high-level maritime security conference comprised of over 50 participants covering four plenary sessions and nine working groups. Participants came from a variety of institutions from around the world, with strong representation from the UAE, France, the United States, Italy, Lebanon, and Jordan. The Conference included senior participants such as the Foreign Ministers of the UAE and France, Chiefs of Naval Staff from UAE, France, and Lebanon, the Commander of U.S. Naval Force Central Command, and the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation. (Participant list and program can be found in the Appendix).This study absorbs most of the discussions that took place at the Conference by drawing on notes and materials compiled over the course of the Conference. The bulk of the research was conducted in early 2009. Within the domain of maritime security there are inherently overlapping issues in the current context. Topics such as surveillance, information exchange, and patrolling activities, for example, are important in almost any maritime security-centered discussion as well as when assessing security threats from both state and non-state actors. The contents from various different discussions are thus synthesized into a form that is encompassing, coherent, and non-repetitive.

By focusing on the delivery of core messages to the reader as transmitted by the speakers at the conference to their counterparts


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and audience, this study has refrained from elaborating upon points made by speakers, apart from in the final chapter where INEGMA makes a summary of observations.

The study was prepared by INEGMA, however, the views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the sponsoring organizations or their personnel or INEGMA. The publication of this document is being carried out under the aegis of INEGMA. INEGMA aims to improve public policy by providing decision-makers and the public with rigorous, objective research on critical policy issues affecting the Middle East. INEGMA is a Free Zone Limited Liability Company based in Dubai Media City, United Arab Emirates, and Beirut, Lebanon. Established in 2001, INEGMA was set up as a think-tank to provide a range of specialist services to clients in government, military, and commercial companies operating in Middle East defense and security.

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Contents

Preface _______________________________________________ iii

Figures and Tables _____________________________________ vii

Acknowledgements ____________________________________ viii

Abbreviations __________________________________________ x

Maritime Security ______________________________________ 1

Piracy in the Twenty-First Century _________________________ 5

Operational Responses to Combating Piracy __________________ 8

The International Dimension of Maritime Security ____________ 10

Case Study: EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta _________________ 14

The UN World Food Program_____________________________ 15

Cooperation in Anti-Piracy Efforts _________________________ 18

Assessing Anti-Piracy Efforts _____________________________ 20

Illegal Maritime Activities and the Coast Guard _____________ 23

Coast Guard Frameworks for Response ____________________ 23

Case Study: The Italian Coast Guard _______________________ 25

Growing Needs for Real-Time Intelligence __________________ 27

Maritime Search And Rescue and Disaster Relief Operations ___ 31

Improving Search and Rescue Operations ___________________ 32

SAR as a System: Planning and Architectures ________________ 33

Asymmetric Warfare in the Arabian Gulf ___________________ 35

The IRGC: Naval Force Capability and Modernization __________ 36

IRGC Operational Planning and Exercises ___________________ 38

Summary of Recent Maritime-Related Incidents Involving

the IRGC ____________________________________________ 40

Implications and Possible Responses to Asymmetric Warfare ___ 45


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Sea Based Air Defenses: The Navy’s Role in the Missile Defense

Network ____________________________________________ 49

Potential Conflict between Iran and Israel __________________ 50

Conflict Scenarios to an Israeli Attack on Iranian Nuclear Sites __ 52

The Navy’s Role in Ballistic Missile Defense _________________ 55

Security of the Marine Environment ______________________ 57

The Marine Environment of Abu Dhabi _____________________ 58

Coastal and Marine Protection ___________________________ 60

Conclusion

Maritime Security Strategy and the Franco-Emirati Strategic

Partnership __________________________________________ 63

Appendix ____________________________________________ 67

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Figures and Tables

Figures

1.2b Gulf of Aden ____________________________________ 7

1.4a Somali Basin and Horn of Africa ____________________ 14

4.6a Strait of Hormuz ________________________________ 46

4.6b Bab Al Mandeb _________________________________ 48

Tables

1.2a Frequency of Pirate Attacks ________________________ 6

1.3a Selected Articles of the United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) _________________________ 11

1.5a UN Security Council Resolutions on Somalia and

Anti-Piracy Efforts ______________________________ 16

1.5b The United Nations World Food Program ____________ 17

1.6a NSC – NATO Shipping Centre ______________________ 19

1.6b MTO – Maritime Trade Operations _________________ 20

1.6c MARLO – Maritime Liaison Office __________________ 20

2.2a Recent Trends in Illegal Migration __________________ 24

5.3a Impact of Low-Yield Nuclear Payloads on Dry Soil or

Dry Soft Rock _________________________________ 54

5.3b Key Iranian Nuclear Installations and Approximate Sizes 54


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Acknowledgements As this study is conducted on the proceedings of the Conference, a warm thank you is extended to all of the speakers at the Conference for the time and effort they expended towards making the conference a truly stimulating gathering for all of the participants. This study could not have been possible without the work of all of these distinguished experts.

INEGMA is grateful for the Presidential Patronage extended to the Conference by the His Highness the President of the UAE and His Excellency the President of the French Republic, and to His Highness Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan, Foreign Minister of the UAE, and His Excellency Bernard Kouchner, Foreign Minister of the French Republic, for their participation at the event. We also wish to thank the UAE and French navies for their encouragement and unflinching support in the organization of the event right until its conclusion.

A special thank you is owed to Brigadier Ibrahim Salem Al Musharakh, Deputy Commander of the UAE Navy, and his team, and to Vice Admiral Gerard Valin, Commander of the French Joint Forces in the Indian Ocean, and his team, whose support and dedication on behalf of their respective organizations were crucial in making a remarkable success of the event.

The rapporteur is grateful to Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director of Research and

Development at INEGMA for a thorough review of the draft of this study and the

suggestions forwarded to improve its substance. Lastly, the rapportuer is indebted

to Riad Kahwaji, CEO of INEGMA, whose dedication to facilitating greater

knowledge-transfer and intellectual debate amongst the regional defence and

security community enabled this study to materialize.

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Abbreviations

ADSB Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding Company

AIS Automated Identification System

AOO Area of Operation

AOR Area of Responsibility

ARES Automated Reporting System

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

CBR Chemical, Biological, or Radioactive

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, or Nuclear

CMF Coalition Maritime Force

CMRECS Coastal and Marine Resources and Ecosystem Classification System

CPXs Command Post Exercises

CTF151 Combined Task Force 151 (U.S.-led multinational Task

Force)

C4I Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

DGA Délégation générale pour l’armement (French Defense Acquisition

Corps)

EAD Environment Agency – Abu Dhabi

ECM Electronic Countermeasures

EIA Energy Information Administration (Agency of Department of

Energy, United States)

EIA Environmental Impact Assessments

EPIRBs Emergency position-indicating radio beacons

ESDP European Security and Defense Policy (European Union’s)

EU European Union

EU NAVCO European Union Naval Coordination Cell

EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Forces

FSA Flag State Agreements

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GMD Ground-based Midcourse Defense

GMDSS Global Maritime Distress Safety System

GOA Gulf of Aden


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HAMZAT Hazardous Materials Database System

HRD Humanitarian Response Depots

HOA Horn of Africa

IMO International Maritime Organization

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp

IRIB Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting

IRNA Islamic Republic News Agency

IRTC International Recommended Transit Corridor

IIS International Seapower Symposium

KT Kilo-ton

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

LOCSAT-VMS Localization by Satellite-Vessel Monitoring System

MAB Man and the Biosphere (A UNESCO program)

MARLO Maritime Liaison Office (U.S.)

MSCHOA Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (EU)

MMBD Million barrels per day

MTO Maritime Trade Operations Unit (Dubai-based UK

Information Fusion and Exchange Center)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSC NATO Shipping Centre

OSC On-Scene Coordinator

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy (China)

Psi Pounds per square inch (measurement of pressure)

QIP Quick Impact Projects

RCC Rescue Coordination Center

RFID Radio frequency identification

RSC Rescue Sub-Center

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R’td Retired

SAM Surface-to-air missile

SAR Search and Rescue

SARTs Search and Rescue Transmitters

SC Search and Rescue Coordination

SLOC Sea Lines of Communication

SMC Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator

SNMG1 Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (Task Force)

SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea

SRR Search and Rescue Region

STXs Situational Training Exercises

TFG Transitional Federal Government

TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UCAVs Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNESCO United Nations Environmental, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

UNSC Unite Nations Security Council

VTS Vessel Traffic Service

WFP World Food Program (UN Agency)

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction


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1

Maritime Security

The concept of maritime security has a double meaning because on the one hand it

must help mitigate the impact of sea-generated threats on the mainland, and on the

other, safeguard the free exercise of legal sea activities that contribute to world

economic development.

As we approach the second decade of the second millennium, our world continues

to change at a growing pace. In this changing world, how we protect our interests is

constantly challenged by new and emerging threats. The maritime domain has

always been a crucial arena to security of states. In bygone eras, those who

commanded power at sea took the status of ‘great powers,’ able to keep their own

territories secure and build empires stretching to faraway places. Today, the age of

the global trade again stresses the importance of the world’s oceans and seas in

economic prosperity.

Maritime transport is a link in worldwide and regional trade, and both a driver and

sustainer of globalization. Economies of developed and developing countries cannot

sustain without shipping, ports, and the offshore industry. As maritime security is a

vital national interest, all nations have interests in two complementary objectives –

firstly, to facilitate commerce that underpins political stability and economic

security, and secondly to protect against criminal acts on the ocean.

Ships, platforms, sea straits, territorial waters and sea harbors can be targets for

criminal organizations to execute their next attack. However, under the umbrella of

maritime security, various inter-related issues such as piracy and armed robbery,

illegal trafficking of people and goods (including drugs, weapons, and high-value

commodities), maritime terrorism, unsafe transportation, maritime fraud, and

illegal broadcasting from the sea come together to form an increasingly challenging

environment.


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These menaces can come from the high sea or from international areas, and have

become an issue of transnational security as they often involve more than one

state. Maritime security strategies must also take into due consideration those

activities not directly related to security, such as search and rescue, fishery control,

and environment protection. The delicate marine environment, for example, must

be protected from irreparable damage by rapidly growing maritime activities, and

law enforcement has a growing role to play in this context.

However, protecting against vulnerabilities cannot happen without preparation,

control and law enforcement as states are evermore involved as flag, port, or

coastal states. Governments are able to react to the plethora of threats by

improving their intelligence and surveillance capabilities, adopting new laws,

effective law enforcement by military and police forces, applying best-practise

operational methods, adopting international standards, and upholding international

law.

The challenge for the Arabian Gulf region is characteristically unique. Among the

fastest growing economies of the world, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states

of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait are posed a set of

challenges in the maritime domain that impact not just their own security but have

implications far beyond. As some of the world’s largest exporters of natural oil and

gas, much of the world –from the United States to China – depends critically on the

timely shipment of energy resources from the Arabian Gulf region. The flow of oil

and gas from the Arabian Gulf also keeps international commodity prices stable and

serves as an important pillar for growth in the global economy.

In the current context, key maritime issues confronting the wider region in the

Middle East involve piracy, illegal activities, terrorism, asymmetric warfare

capabilities, changing distributions of power, and potential regional confrontations

that may employ an extensive use of missile technology to block sea lines of

communication and threaten critical national interests. The threat environment

consistently emphasizes the importance of greater maritime surveillance

capabilities, enhanced information sharing networks, common operating principles,


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and high levels of readiness to respond to emergencies – all reinforced by stronger

internal, regional, and international frameworks of cooperation.

Responding to today’s maritime challenges requires a combination of serious cost

assessments and investment, and broader collaboration internally and

internationally. In every aspect of meeting maritime security objectives,

cooperation as an enabler of common goals is a key recurring theme. Cooperation

in the maritime domain rests on three important pillars: Building a common political

and strategic view; Greater information exchange to improve the surveillance of

maritime areas, and; Synergizing efforts between navies and other security agencies

to improve overall effectiveness.


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5

Piracy in the Twenty-First Century

The piracy phenomenon has recently caught the headlines in the mainstream

media. The well documented rise in the number of vessel hijackings by Somali

pirates around the Gulf of Aden (GOA), Horn of Africa (HOA), and most recently in

the Sea of Oman has been the main reason behind greater public and political

awareness of the security threat posed from modern day pirates.

As military assets are currently focused on deterring and disrupting pirates rather

than intelligence collection, knowledge of piracy “Pattern-Of-Life” is still in

development. It is however known that favorable weather in the Somali Basin

facilitates increased piracy activity and there appears to be a seasonal trend that

follows the monsoon transition periods when this typically intensifies. Much like

terrorists, pirates are difficult to identify: From simple fishermen they can transform

themselves with adapted boats and weapons into dangerous groups with a master-

plan and the capability to hijack large vessels, taking crew and passenger hostage,

and demanding large ransoms for their release.

What is more, the total number of ships pirates can hold for ransom is unknown and

this creates ambiguity around their true degree of capacity they possess. However,

pirates can be identified at sea prior to the launching of an attack because they are

known to maneuver with speed (drawing on their charged fire-hose engines), and

do not abort their attack unless they cannot board or are threatened with

counterforce.

The proportion of vessels being attacked in the GOA area is still below 1 percent but

has peaked at 1.4 percent in the Somali Basin: Considering the aggregate amount of

maritime traffic these statistics suggest that pirate capacity and capability remains

high. As the frequency of attacks has increased, so have false alarms – giving to the

psychological fear this threat has created over the past few years.


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Despite the dispatching of greater forces to police pirate hotspots and deter and

prevent further attacks, there has been a clear escalation in piracy activity in the

GOA and HOA areas over the past few years:

Year No. of Attempted Attacks

No. of Successful Attacks

2005 35 16

2006 10 5

2007 25 10

2008 165 43

2009 (until May) 114 24

Adapted from Vice Admiral Gerard Valin’s presentation, “Piracy, Security, and Safety of SLOCs,”

Maritime Security Cooperation Conference, May 25, 2009

Rising incidents of hostage taking and the hijacking of vessels carrying sensitive

items, such as oil, food, or even arms, can prove costly for both the private sector

and governments–in terms of human life and finance. While piracy today does not

pose an overarching threat to global trade per se it does carry the capacity to

impact global trade flows by seriously disrupting and discouraging sailing vessels.

A concerted action against pirates has thus recently moved to the top concerns of

many maritime forces, and is widely regarded as an important area of the maritime

security challenge the wider Middle East region currently confronts. A number of

maritime forces dispatched from around the world have deployed to waters near

the Middle East tasked with complementing international efforts at preventing,

deterring, and combating pirate activity.

Unfortunately for governments and international authorities, capture,

imprisonment and death are not deterring pirates. Pirates are still very active in

GOA and not only are they learning to find soft targets to improve their chances of

success, they are also beginning to coordinate efforts amongst pirate groups to

counter effects of the naval force presence.

Table 1.2a


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The ability of Somali pirates to adapt and evolve even in the face of unprecedented

international anti-piracy efforts, as the previous points demonstrate, reflects a

threat that is highly dynamic in nature. The level of sophistication in operations

mounted by today’s pirates varies but in some cases is extraordinary given the

circumstances in which these criminals operate.

For example, on the high end of sophistication pirates may use a mothership, or a

brothership – a larger skiff filled with gas and equipped with tows. Accompanied by

two or three other skiffs to mount an attack further out at sea than most would

think feasible, attacks by pirates have been reported at a distance of well over

1000km from the coast of Somalia –a remarkable distance.

Figure 1.2a


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Operational Responses to Combating Piracy

The truth is that the solution to the problems of piracy, particularly in the case of

Somalia, lie ashore rather than at sea – and as a long term proposition, the

development of a Somali coastal force is necessary. However, until that solution is

found ashore, counter-piracy efforts must concentrate on three interrelated

elements: Improving self-defense capabilities of the shipping industry; Ensuring the

international naval presence needed to deter, disrupt, and defeat pirate ships, and;

and strengthening the legal framework for the resolution of piracy cases. Given that

none of these three elements are alone sufficient, it is important to pursue all lines

together and in harmony.

When considering the range of operational countermeasures against piracy, three

basic lines of action exist. First is to prevent attacks by pirates through reducing

vulnerabilities and opportunities for pirates to initiate an attack. For example, the

most effective method for avoiding piracy is still through the merchant ship’s own

defensive actions. This may imply a combination of features such as armed on-

board security personnel to raise the risks of mounting an attack for pirates and

strict adoption of best practice to reduce the vulnerabilities that pirates seek to

exploit.

Other options include a more stringent application of ‘group transit concepts,’ and

where needed, shifting transit corridors for vessels farther out from land. At the

most basic level, the commercial shipping industry needs to adopt a more vigilant

and precautionary attitude in known pirate hotspots, and be willing to speed up or

take evasive action as necessary if they sense an impending attack. Unbolting the

ladder that pirates use to board ships is also a basic measure that is still not

implemented as standard practice by shipping vessels once they have departed

from port - despite the fact that pirates now search for ‘soft targets’ before they

initiate an attack.

Options that fall under this first line of action are the most favorable (military

operations in support of anti-piracy efforts can only deliver limited success) given

their cost effectiveness against, say, interrupting attacks in progress or in mounting


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hostage rescue operations, and then pursuing prosecution against captured pirates.

A second line of action is to disrupt attacks by pirates through interrupting and

terminating their operations. In its simplest form, this could involve the seizure and

destruction of pirate vessels or the equipments they outfit. Other tactics could be

employed to disrupt pirate operations under this line of action include:

Deception tactics where warships are disguised as civil merchant ships to

increase chances of encounter with pirates

Enforcing blockades to monitor the entrance and egress of shipping into

and out of Somalia could help cut pirates off from their bases on land

Embargos that prevent the introduction by land, sea or air, of weapons,

communications devices and other equipment destined for use by pirate

gangs to starve pirates of key equipments needed to undertake increasingly

sophisticated operations

Tailored Exclusion Zones that use naval forces to prevent the use of certain

items or devices – such as high horsepower outboard motors – in

designated areas such as Somalia’s exclusive economic zone to make life

much harder for pirates

Executing strikes against safe havens on land and on logistics activities on shore that

are identified as pirate staging areas also offer a possible course of action. However,

such efforts could be made difficult by the danger of igniting anti-western or anti-

U.S. reaction. Therefore, other options that rest on direct encounters with pirates

may still be more desirable where attempts to disrupt their operations fail.

Countermeasures falling under this second line of action demand a persistent

interdiction-capable presence of forces as well as enhanced international

communication networks and protocols to enable greater levels of effectiveness.

This can be challenging given the financial costs of sustaining forces indefinitely, and

the technical, security, political or even legal obstacles to information sharing

between various forces that optimizes effectiveness.

A third line of action, essential on the strategic level, is to ensure that pirates are


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brought to justice by victims and coastal states. Today, the reason that Somali-

based piracy flourishes is because it is largely consequence free. An effective

delivery of consequences must follow interdiction in order to win the longer battle

against piracy. Strict rules govern the evidence required for prosecuting pirates and

legal options are limited with few countries are willing to prosecute pirates

captured by naval forces.

In this regard, much needed progress was recently made when an Exchange of

Letters to permit the transfer of detainees to Kenya was signed March 6, 2009. That

captured pirates were being transferred to Kenya within four days of the signing of

the agreement showed the need for greater political efforts to be made

internationally in strengthening the process by which captured pirates can be

punished for actions. Similar agreements to the one signed with Kenya are being

discussed with other regional states such as Seychelles, Djibouti, Tanzania, and

Oman.

These basic lines of action cannot be pursued in the absence of necessary political

conditions and supporting efforts. From the range of options available in countering

piracy, the final strategy must be able to bind together and connect necessary

short-term countermeasures with the long term goals of the efforts. For this reason,

the execution and delivery of anti-pirate efforts must rely on five underlying pillars:

Improving operational and intelligence support to counter-piracy operations;

Strengthening the judicial framework for the detention and prosecution of captured

pirates; Disrupting the financial operations of pirates; Strengthening the self-

defense capabilities of commercial ship vessels, and; Pursuing the diplomatic and

public information efforts that discourage piracy.

The International Dimension to Combating Piracy

International law provides the legal framework within which to operate for naval

forces and maritime law enforcement organizations. Because counter-piracy

operations are effectively a law enforcement operation they do not fall under the

law of armed conflict. As a result, a different legal framework is applied and


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legislation on human rights, for example, may be applied more stringently than it

would in situations of military conflict. In the context of anti-piracy operations,

international law extends into areas that govern the permissibility, range and extent

of force that can be taken by maritime forces involved in anti-piracy efforts.

There is some ambiguity around the legal considerations anti-piracy forces must

undertake, and this is likely to become more important if piracy continues to

intensify because of the restrictions international law places on anti-piracy efforts.

In the mean time, the basic legal framework in combating international piracy is

found in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was

signed on 10 December 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. Below are some selected

excerpts that contain a direct inference to combating piracy.

Selected Articles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Article Notes

Article 100

“Duty to co-

operate in the

repression of

piracy”

States that all States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent

in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place

outside the jurisdiction of any State

Article 101

“Definition of

piracy”

States that Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of

depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the

passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against

persons or property on board

such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place

outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or

of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or

Table 1.3a


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The various naval forces involved in anti-piracy efforts in HOA and GOA today take

their mandate from UN Security Council Resolutions (some of which are illustrated

in Table 1.5a). These resolutions have aided anti-piracy efforts by providing greater

legal flexibility to commands in the range and application of force they can

undertake during potential confrontations with pirates than would otherwise be the

case.

Various forces from around the world have been supporting international anti-

piracy efforts around the region. The international effort involves around thirty

ships and five maritime patrol aircraft overall and us made up of deployments by

number of nations with important interests in the region, such as China, India,

Japan, Malaysia, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Mission-specific multinational forces such

as CTF 151 and Operation Atalanta are also important contributors to the

international effort.

In early 2009 the Coalition Maritime Force (CMF) established a new mission-based

Task Force CTF 151, which was composed of forces from coalition nations that

agreed to deploy naval forces and cooperate in counter-piracy efforts in the region.

aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described

in subparagraph (a) or (b)

Article 105

“Seizure of a

pirate ship or

aircraft”

States that on the high seas, or in any other place outside the

jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or

aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control

of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board.

The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide

upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the

action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property,

subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith

Article 107

“Who are entitled

to seize on

account of piracy”

States entitlement of warships or military aircraft identifiable as

being on government service and authorized to that effect to seize

on account of piracy


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This United States built-around coalition has contributions from Denmark, South

Korea, Turkey, and Singapore.

As a mission-specific force, CTF 151 is not geographically constrained and has the

flexibility to operate across the CMF Area of Operation (AOO) as necessary to

counter piracy. It is tasked with a number of responsibilities such as: Providing a

Maritime Security Patrol Area and acting as a World Food Program escort; Deterring

and disrupting pirate activity, capturing pirates, and destroying equipment seized

from pirates; Helping overcome barriers to coordinate, de-conflict, and share

intelligence; Providing best practice feedback to the shipping industry, and;

Providing communications support to pirated vessels during negotiations.

Another multinational force that occasionally deploys and participates in anti-piracy

efforts is NATO’s Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 – SNMG1 – which has recently

been conducting counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Together with other

naval forces operating off the HOA and GOA, SNMG1 helps deter and disrupt acts of

piracy and protect vulnerable shipping. Additionally, through an active, visible

presence SNMG1 provides reassurance and enhances the general safety and

security of commercial maritime traffic in the region.

Since its set up in November 2008 by the Council of the European Union, the

EUNAVFOR [EU Naval Forces] Task Force ‘Operation Atalanta‘ has been actively

involved in efforts to improve maritime security off the Somali coast. It has been

closely involved in preventing and deterring pirate attacks, and helping safeguard

merchant shipping in the region. Since mid-December 2008 the mission, operating

in the region under the command of Rear Admiral Philip Jones based at Northwood,

United Kingdom, has been supported by maritime patrol aircraft.

While the mission end-date of Operation Atalanta was adopted December 12, 2009,

a mid-period appraisal in May 2009 may lead to an extension or an evolution in the

mission. The review, to be conducted by the EU Council at some point later in the

year, will study the security situation and feedback from its command to possibly

extend EU involvement in the area.


14

Case Study: EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta

Operation Atalanta was commissioned and tasked for the duration of one year for

the protection of UN World Food Program (WFP) shipping, other vulnerable

shipping on a case-by-case basis with selected humanitarian, European and

participating state flagged vessels). Other responsibilities of the task force involved

deterring piracy in high-risk areas – particularly through establishing surveillance

operations – and, subject to suitable arrangements for prosecution being in place,

arresting pirates and armed robbers in the area of operation.

As a baseline operation and a key military task, Operation Atalanta has protected

international food aid deliveries –particularly through the UN WFP – into East Africa

from Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, and Mombassa in Kenya into Mogadishu, Somalia –

Figure 1.4a


15

and, occasionally, into Boosaasso and Berbera in Somalia. The Task Force is

supported by Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), set up by the EU

as part of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) initiative to combat piracy

in the HOA. Working in Brussels, Belgium, the work of this cell commenced with the

establishment of EU NAVCO in September 2008 when it began establishing linkages

with a broad cross-section of the maritime community and with EU forces operating

in the region.

The fact that many of the vessels available for Charter tended to be of small sizes

and towards the end of their lives – moving at as little as five knots to their

destination at times – tested the EU effort. However, the ‘group transit concept,’

which encourages vessels to transit in groups through the International

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) enabled the mission to utilize resources and

helped protect deliveries of 176 metric tons straight through some of the highest

risk piracy areas in the world, ensuring that an estimated 3.25 million in need of

humanitarian aid within Somalia could be given some relief.

The group transit concept encourages vessels to journey according to their speeds,

particularly when passing through areas assessed as the most vulnerable, after

sanitization of the area by naval forces. Through this course of action, naval forces

are able to offer protection for all vessels during the time of their transits.

The United Nations World Food Program

The United Nations World Food Program (WFP) has been at the centre of various

international anti-piracy efforts – for example, Operation Atalanta was tasked with

protecting WFP shipments as a baseline responsibility. There are various areas for

cooperation with the military that the WFP can and does benefit from.

Perhaps the most obvious is the provision of military armed escorts to protect truck

convoys, staff movements, and assessment and monitoring missions. Then there is

the use or exchange of assets, such as airlifts, trucks, rail, and helicopters, and

cooperation in the provision of services and equipment such as fuel or the


16

maintenance of assets and equipment. Cooperation may also take place in

infrastructure rehabilitation and assistance for Quick Impact Projects (QIP), in safety

and evacuation issues (such as security or medical evacuations), the provision of

medical facilities and services, and general liaison and coordination.

UN Security Council Resolutions on Somalia and Anti-Piracy Efforts

Date UNSC

Resolution

Notes

May 15,

2008

1814 Requesting States and regional organizations to take

action to protect the World Food Program maritime

convoys

June 2, 2008 1816 For a period of six months, States cooperating with the

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) are allowed to

enter the territorial waters of Somalia, with

notification provided by the TFG.

October 7,

2008

1838

States urgently requested to actively participate in the

fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia and, at this

end, to cooperate with the TFG. States and regional

organizations are urgently requested to continue

extending protection to the World Food Program

maritime convoys. Coordination is to be provided by

the TFG.

December 2,

2008

1846 Extension of Security Council Resolution 1816 for 12

months.

December

21, 2008

1851 Urging assistance to the TFG in taking all necessary

measures to interdict those who use Somali territory

and airspace to plan, facilitate or undertake acts of

piracy and armed robbery at sea.

WFP feeds 3.2 million people in Somalia –or about half of the Somali population,

and some ninety percent its food deliveries to Somalia arrive by sea. Out of the 102

piracy incidents worldwide in the first quarter of 2009, some 61 of these took place

Table 1.5b


17

in Somali waters. Since NATO Naval escorts for WFP Food began in November 2007,

some 440,000 tons of food for 2.2 million people for one year have been safely

shipped to Somalia. When the EU began extending naval escorts to WFP shipments

in fall 2008, some 176,000 tons for 1.8 million people for 6 months have been safely

shipped to Somalia. In fact, naval escorts were used for the protection of small

convoys of two-three ships transporting UN WFP aid for up to two miles from the

discharge port, before Somali contractors took over protection. Flag State

Agreements define the relationship between the guide ship and that escorted (even

though naval escorts are responsible for protecting aid rather than the actual ship).

Under its agreements, the WFP provides a minimum of 2 weeks’ notice to the

escorting navy. Wherever possible, the WFP minimises the number of states from

which the ships are charted to reduce the number of negotiations required.

Responsibility for securing the Flag State Agreement (FSA) lies with the escorting

navy, who liaise directly with the vessel’s flag state –the WFP is not involved in this

part of the process.

The World Food Program

The World Food Program (WFP) is the largest humanitarian agency of the United Nations, operating in 72 countries across four regions to help feed over 100 million people around the world. Working with over 3,260 international and local NGOs, the WFP employs 12,000 personnel and has a total expenditure of some U.S. $6.4 billion. Last year it procured 2.8 million metric tons of food and goods and services worth U.S. $267 million. On average, it has some forty ships on the high seas at any given time, flies 100 aircraft carrying cargo and passengers on any given day, and has more than 5,000 trucks on the road daily. In total, just its global logistics staff numbers over 3,000. It is quartered in five Humanitarian Response Depots (HRD) worldwide in strategic locations – in Panama City (Panama), Brindisi (Italy), Accara (Ghana), Dubai (UAE), and Subang (Indonesia) – benefiting from free storage facilities in these locations. All requests are made through a centralized support office, which is involved in activities such as immediate purchase (of stocks and suppliers), virtual stocks (through long-term agreements), and exchange and loans (with multiple stocks of partners).

Table 1.5a


18

Cooperation in Anti-Piracy Efforts

In October 2007 the chiefs of the navy, marine corps., and coastguard of the United

States issued a new maritime strategy document (A Cooperative Strategy for the

21st Century) at the 18th International Seapower Symposium (ISS) – the largest ever

assembly of senior naval and military leaders in the world. The strategy stressed the

importance of developing international standards, systems, and protocols to enable

more effective levels of cooperation as well as continued efforts to encourage the

different players involved in maritime security to evolve together.

The genesis of the framework found in the strategy document reaches back to

Newport in 2005 when, at the 17th ISS, chiefs of fifty-five navy and coastguard from

around the world gathered. At this earlier IIS gathering, participants had listed the

challenges faced by each country only to find that their challenges were almost

identical. In its conclusion, the 17th ISS categorically asserted the acute need for

much higher levels of cooperation in the maritime domain and the necessity of

creating new initiatives to enable this.

It also called for raising the level of political awareness about seaborne threats, and

emphasizing the value of national investment in maritime forces to tackle these. As

the document was more about operating principles than strategy itself it could

serve as a source of guidance for about any maritime force. It could also be seen as

an important driving force in developing the international standards, systems, and

protocols called for by naval commanders from around the world who unanimously

agree about the acute needs for greater cooperation.

Achieving goals in anti-piracy efforts rest greatly on cooperation between all

stakeholders – from the coast guard to the navy, between nations, and with the

commercial industry. Take the example of CTF 151, whose effectiveness relies on

international force participation in the coalition, maritime merchant community

participation and active self defense, and merchant marine active communication

with the Maritime Trade Operations (MTO) Unit – See Table 1.6b – and the

Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) – See Table 1.6c – to maintain situational

awareness.


19

Despite the challenges of building and sustaining participation from various

channels, the work of CTF 151 has been opening new avenues for military

coordination between nations – and especially as a result of its leading role in

encouraging daily coordination between Task Forces. Since stand-up in early 2009,

CTF 151 has also been routinely involved in:

Coordination and de-confliction to enable working together between CMF,

EUNAVFOR, NATO, Malaysia, Russia, China, India, and Japan;

Providing presence in support of deterrence, disruption, and suppression of

pirate activity;

Intervening against pirate attacks in progress, interdicting motherships, and

boarding suspected pirate vessels when encountered;

Collecting information to better understand piracy Pattern-of-Life;

Providing piracy data and best practice recommendations to industry,

warnings to commercial shipping of potential pirate locations, and

encouraging group transit plans for commercial shipping, and;

Extending surveillance and communications support after ships have been

taken

The work of CTF 151, just as with all the other international efforts in the region,

emphasizes the critical importance of efficient information exchange. Any effective

operational response to piracy rests on effective information exchange. This can be

a challenge with all of the different forces operating in the region, because non-

Coalition forces possess different operating systems and TTPs (tactics, techniques,

and procedures).

NSC – NATO Shipping Centre

The NATO Shipping Centre is a contributor to the counter piracy operations by NATO and

the EU by exchanging the merchant shipping picture in the region with all coalition and

friendly forces. The NSC does this as part of its role as a link between Coalition and NATO

military forces and the merchant community, in close cooperation with UK MTO Dubai

and the EU MSC-HOA. The NSC also maintains close relations with the UN WFP office for

Somalia, based in Kenya.

Table 1.6a


20

However, despite the fact that various deployed forces have little past experience of

working together, there is some encouragement. Attempts at collaboration have

led to improvised on-scene efforts, much like a ‘pick up’ game. For example, PLAN

ships (i.e. the Chinese navy) have routinely coordinated with Coalition ships on-

scene and with the Combined Maritime Forces Headquarters in the Gulf not over

military channels but via their email accounts over the internet.

Regional coordination is vital and in the near term there is a need to identify a single

contact point – such as the Dubai-based MTO – for vessels facing an immediate

threat. Over the long term, the creation of a regional maritime security coordination

center to fuse intelligence and share information is essential to shift responsibility

toward regional states. This presents an opportunity for regional states dependent

on the safety of freedom of navigation in the HOA —specifically Egypt, Saudi Arabia

and the Gulf states — to provide funding and training for such a center.

Assessing Anti-Piracy Efforts

The current naval force alone is unable to counter piracy over the large areas of sea

MTO – Maritime Trade Operations

The Royal Navy’s Maritime Trade Operations

(MTO) unit is based in Dubai, responding to

the needs of all UK interest vessels. In 2007

a daily average of 90 position reports were

received routinely. Additionally, the MTO

unit continues to provide security briefings

and advice to visiting ships and company

personnel. The MTO service provides an

essential service, through the Merchant

Vessel Voluntary Reporting Scheme, of

reassurance to ships in the region east of

Suez.

MARLO –Maritime Liaison Office

MARLO facilitates the exchange of

information between the United States

Navy, Combined Maritime Forces, and

the commercial maritime community

in the Middle East. Liaison officers

from MARLO travel regularly

throughout the Gulf and East Africa to

foster communication, stay apprised of

changes in local port infrastructure and

management, and proactively address

user concerns.

Table 1.6b Table 1.6c


21

in which it is occurring today. While the IRTC is a 480 mile by 12 mile corridor (5760

sq miles) and can facilitate group transit concepts, the Somali Basin –which is

600,000 sq miles of open sea – is too vast and unsuitable to such approaches.

Besides limited military assets to cover a vast area, many other factors limit military

options for the use of force, such as rules of engagement – which vary between

navies – and national and international legislation on the permissibility and extent

of countermeasures that can be taken in anti-piracy operations. The legal process

for prosecuting captured pirates needs to be made more efficient as higher rates of

conviction will serve as a long-term strategic deterrent against international piracy.

While there is no direct correlation between coalition presence and piracy

incidents, greater military presence on whole has resulted in better chances of

preventing a successful piracy attack. From February 25– March 31, 2009, seven

percent of the unsuccessful piracy attempts were the result of direct military

presence or intervention. On average, it is believed that roughly ten percent of

unsuccessful piracy attempts have resulted from direct military presence or

intervention.

Nevertheless, it remains questionable if the deployment of large numbers of

warships from distant states into the area is sustainable, especially as many of the

deployed forces are unfamiliar with the region and unaccustomed to operating far

from home and without logistical support. It also remains unclear if such a large

area can realistically be patrolled –even by a large multinational force. It could take

more than 60 warships to provide an effective presence throughout just a single

narrow vessel transit corridor, and the financial burden of such a large deployment

would be enormous. While there is significant military presence in the GOA, full

military coverage is simply not likely to happen, or even feasible.

As the patrol area is enormous, coordinated tasking of naval assets from all

countries is required. While navies answer to individual national authorities, a

collective political will to take aggressive military action is what is truly needed.

However, there is no unified political body under which to consolidate the military

effort – NATO, the EU, CMF and other forces all have an independent chain of


22

command. For now, the lead is being taken by the U.S. CMF (Combined Maritime

Forces Command) which hosts monthly coordination meetings with representatives

of most participating navies, and CTF 151 which coordinates warship positioning

with other maritime participants to maximize the effectiveness of limited assets.

On the technological angle, additional airborne reconnaissance assets are required

to increase probability of encounter. Unmanned systems represent an under-used

asset and their greater use in detection and monitoring of piracy activity may

simultaneously reduce warship requirements and serve as a force multiplier for

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

As the limited success of military-led anti-piracy operations suggests, the most

effective method for avoiding piracy is still through the merchant ship’s own

defensive actions. The international shipping industry will have to take additional

steps to ensure the safety of merchant shipping in the areas of greatest risk.

Merchant ships should follow recommended best practice and continue to broaden

their defensive responses. They should be seriously encouraged to employ

professionally trained organic or contract security teams capable of repelling pirate

attacks on-board some ships. They should also look to develop such systems that

would make pirates unable to gain control of ship once onboard.

For regional naval and coast guard forces, smaller warships, such as patrol craft and

corvettes, should be embraced over the long-term to make the task of combating

piracy more efficient. Maritime power should simultaneously develop regional

coastal maritime security capacity, complementing or eventually replacing the

foreign presence. Until other more effective approaches are developed and begin

to demonstrate progress, however, there is no immediate substitute for operational

patrols by major maritime powers.


23

Illegal Maritime Activities and the Coast Guard

Today we are faced with a significant increment in unlawful and criminal activities at

sea and from the sea. The nature and intensity of these illegal activities pose a

relevant threat to national and international security. A wide spectrum of unlawful

and criminal acts is comprised of piracy, international terrorism, drug trafficking,

illegal migration, the illegal exploitation of marine resources, and environmental

pollution. As a result, criminal activities at sea pose a potentially serious and direct

impact on the global economy.

Criminal organizations frequently take advantage of the continuously increasing

maritime traffic and from the resultant difficulties in exercising effective control

over it. These activities are orchestrated by both domestic and international

criminal organizations which belong to networks often able to operate far from the

coast, taking advantage of the lack of means and relevant international laws.

Providing an effective preventive function is made possible by focusing on defense

and national security capabilities that provide protection in critical areas of national

interest and related lines of communication. Coast guard services together with

navies and law enforcement agencies have much more to do today to ensure

preparedness for the next illegal act since criminal attacks are highly unpredictable.

Basic tasks of the coast guard involve maritime search and rescue, vessel traffic

monitoring and information service (for institutional services related to maritime

transport safety issues), maritime law enforcement (comprising support for the

control and vigiliance of illegal migration at sea), marine environment protection,

fisheries control, and safety of navigation (also for maritime- and port-security

related issues).

Coast Guard Frameworks for Response

Illegal activities bring along substantial danger of loss of life but effective measures


24

in border management can contribute to the reduction of such losses as well as

enhance broader security arrangements. There is however growing need for a

stronger legal framework in combating the illegal trafficking.

Appropriate international law, such

as the 2000 Palermo Protocol

Against the Smuggling of Migrants

by Land, Sea, and Air

(supplementing the UN Convention

Against Transnational Organized

Crime), combines with domestic

legislation to outline the

responsibilities of nations in the

maritime domain. Laws which

emphasize the need to safeguard

the lives of migrants transported

by unsafe vessels and those which

attempt to strengthen the

capacities of maritime law

enforcement against illegal

trafficking address the realities of

modern maritime threats.

Within these frameworks,

concerned international

organizations are able to play a

role in extending technical

assistance aimed at strengthening

the management of operational

cooperation at external borders,

while responsibility for control and

surveillance of external borders

remains with member states.

Recent Trends in Illegal Migration

Many acts of illegal migration nowadays involve

less than 50 people on board crafts that eight

meters or less in length. There are various

reasons for the growing use of smaller sized

craft as means of illegal migration. Firstly,

criminal organizations may have made a

strategic choice to use small crafts given they

are more difficult to intercept in the seas unless

there is a hard patrolling activity employed by

the coast guard. Secondly, the use of smaller

craft may enable an increase in the frequency of

passages, which means while a few boats may

be detected others can escape the surveillance

system. Thirdly, access to small crafts such as

rubber dinghies (which are easily purchasable

on the open market) can let criminal

organizations build their fleets cheaply and

expand quickly if demand were to increase.

Fourthly, smaller craft can make it easier to

gather, hide and manage the smaller groups of

people they will be used to transport, as well as

making it easier for the traffickers to change

departure spots and elude law enforcement

operations. Lastly, it may be a case that there is

unavailability of larger-sized boats – such as

boats longer than 10 meters – from the place of

departure – in these instances, this means the

lessening of migratory flows.

Table 2.2a

1.6a


25

Article 8.6 of the Palermo Protocol indentifies ‘national competent authorities’

thatcan work in support of assuring effective cooperation with other countries

involved in law enforcement activities related to migrants smuggling. Establishing

national coordination centers in order to strengthen inter-agency cooperation can

and is undertaken to make these efforts more effective.

Case Study: The Italian Coast Guard

The demand for security and sustainable development of maritime transport

increasingly highlights the key role of institutional tasks and missions assigned to

the coast guard under specific obligation of national laws and international

relations, beginning with international search and rescue (SAR) operations even

beyond national and surrounding areas of responsibility. The Italian Coast Guard

undertakes a wide array of responsibilities and can be called on to:

Provide any information related to course, cargo, crew, ship-owner, and

last ports of call;

Cooperate with its aero-naval assets and extend support for inspections,

diversion, and seizure of suspected crafts within territorial waters as well as

in the high seas – as requested by relevant national authorities

Provide assistance for the safe handling of suspect ships, cargo, and crew

within harbor areas and along the coasts

In its efforts to exercise strategic control over maritime traffic and carry out any of

the functions that it may be called on to perform – as outlined above – the Italian

Coast Guard manages the following integrated systems (soon to be operational as a

fully integrated system):

Automated Reporting System (ARES), compulsory for Italian merchant

vessels in international navigation

Hazardous Materials (HAMZAT), an integrated system within the

framework of EU regulations with the aim of continuously updating a


26

national database of hazardous material carried out in the maritime area

under Italian responsibility

Localization by Satellite-Vessel Monitoring System (LOCSAT-VMS), for real

time localization and tracking of Italian fishing vessels all over the world,

capable of data sharing among European and international authorities

Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), a multi-sensor strategic system designed to

exercise control over the entire maritime traffic, either within harbor areas

and within sea areas of national interest, capable of data-sharing among

European and international authorities

Automated Identification System (AIS), acting on frequencies of radio-

mobile maritime service in order to avoid collision between ships and to

supervise naval units within VTS areas, giving a more detailed image of

maritime traffic into coastal areas and ports, tracking of dangerous good

aboard ships to give added protection against dangers connected with

these, and transmitting large amounts of information about a certain ship

(such as identification code, positions, speed, direction of movement,

dimensions and size, and cargo onboard) to other ships and earth stations

VTS and AIS are systems designed to increase the level of safety in maritime

navigation. Furthermore, these systems contribute not just in managing maritime

traffic, to improve its efficiency, but also to reduce the risk of accidents that may

endanger human life or release polluting substances into the marine environment.

By law, the Italian national VTS is a service that seeks to improve navigation safety,

the efficiency of maritime traffic, and protection of the sea environment. As the

identified competent authority, it is able to interact with ships that transit areas of

interest.

Once fully operating, the system will be able to: Verify the rules of navigation safety;

Oversee the precise implementation of maritime traffic norms; Support the

prevention of accidents that cause pollution; Provide the competent maritime

authorities with appropriate tools for strategic evaluations of maritime transport

policies; Carry out surveillance on maritime activities, giving priority to safeguarding

human life; Managing emergency operations for SAR missions, and; Monitoring


27

traffic with the purpose of preventing illegal activities and activating actions to

repress these where necessary.

Growing Needs for Real-Time Intelligence

Coast guards are today realising the critical importance of knowing in real-time the

precise size of vessel traffic within territorial waters and ports as well as large

portions of international waters in surrounding areas. This need for intelligence

extends to SAR (Search and Rescue) areas of responsibility and even ecological

protection zones if the coast guard is to perform the full range of its defined

responsibilities.

Maritime surveillance is carried out directly or indirectly by national authorities

mainly to identify and deter a) regulation infringements and b) safety and security

threats. These objectives overlap and include law enforcement as well as

compliance monitoring. Surveillance carried out for domains such as fisheries

protection, environmental protection, maritime transport safety, and border

control in most cases fall under a) on the basis of laws and regulations that govern

these matters.

Surveillance is critical to exercising national sovereignty at sea. Surveillance systems

include non-automatic reporting (or ‘messaging’) systems which rely on ships to

provide information – such systems can be labelled as cooperative systems. Other

forms of non-automatic reporting systems depend on information provided by

ships, too. Another type of reporting system use sensors such as radar and camera

to collect information without reliance on the provision of information by ships –

these types of systems are termed non-cooperative systems.

Infringements and threats that surveillance is supposed to identify can be

intentional or unintentional. Cooperative information provided by ships cannot thus

be assumed as either correct or totally accurate. Non-cooperative systems are

therefore an essential element in surveillance as they can verify information

garnered through cooperative sources, and provide a much fuller picture of activity.


28

At the same time however it can be impractical to submit all ship traffic to non-

cooperative inspection. As a result, cooperative systems remain a vital part of the

system and ultimately manage the bulk of compliant vessels.

Means or assets (including naval, aerial or for intervention at shore) deployed to

take action against infringements or threats when they are detected have a dual

role. In addition to their basic function, these assets can also serve as an integral

part of the ‘net’ surveillance system. The overall infrastructure of surveillance

systems encompasses sensors and communication systems which can be based on

shore, space, and means (such as patrol vessels and aircraft). As information

gathered by shore- and space-based systems is often limited in detail and in most

cases likely to be insufficient for identifying infringements or threats, there is an

almost inescapable need for close-up inspections. This need is increasingly being

fulfilled by the use of mobile means.

In order to perform operational tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible,

important choices about which surveillance systems to use, and how to deploy

them must be made. It is these choices that eventually distinguish surveillance

systems from one another because each is designed to be more capable in carrying

out a specific set of tasks. Different surveillance systems cover various sub-sets of

maritime traffic according to their tasked needs, and no single system is able to

have a complete overview of all vessels within a certain area.

As it is vital to have as complete a maritime picture as possible to detect all relevant

infringements and threats, it is increasingly important that the overall maritime

picture is a supplemented by the combined information from surveillance systems

used by all different authorities. While useful, non-cooperative systems also have

their limitations as they are not able to detect all ships under all conditions. For

example, small vessels (such as those often used for drugs smuggling, illegal

migration, and terrorism) may be hard to detect for non-cooperative sources even

under favourable conditions.

Nonetheless, fewer targets are missed when data is combined from multiple

surveillance systems monitoring the same area. This however leads to a different


29

challenge because the more complete the maritime picture, the more targets are

included. In turn, this makes the task of knowing which of these pose a risk or

behave illegitimately and which do not much more difficult and potentially

overwhelming. In these cases, it is data from cooperative reporting systems that can

help recognise known and compliant ships and separate potential infringements

and threats from actual ones.

Combining data from different reporting systems extends the fraction of known

ships and reduces the number of unknown ones, resulting in fewer potential targets

that remain requiring closer attention. Where several authorities perform

surveillance in the same area with different systems, integrating their data can lead

to a more complete maritime picture to support the management of maritime

traffic to the benefit of all.

Issues of confidentiality can potentially throw up barriers against the integration of

surveillance data. Arising from any combination of commercial, political, military,

crime-fighting, or even privacy grounds, the barriers to successful optimisation in

information-sharing means it remains an important but challenging priority.


30


31

Maritime Search and Rescue and Disaster Relief Operations

International shipping has always lived with an element of risk, and the best way to

enhance safety at sea is by the collective development and implementation of

regulations by shipping nations. In the modern era, maritime nations gathered in

1914 (two years after the sinking of the Titanic) for the first time to develop the first

international shipping safety convention. The emphasis was not only on preventing

shipping accidents, but also on improving the chances of survivors of accidents at

sea.

The conference resulted in the adoption of the International Convention for the

Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) which covered rules of navigation safety by setting

minimum standard, as well as introducing regulations, provisions, and equipments

needed for life saving at sea in case of emergencies. Since its creation in 1959, the

International Maritime Organization (IMO) has also concentrated efforts on

worldwide integrated systems to respond to shipping emergencies as well as

adopting conventions that deal with the safety and assistance of persons or ships in

distress at sea, especially in matters of SAR. The IMO later to adopt an amended

version of the SOLAS, which is considered to be the most important international

treaty on maritime safety.

Search and Rescue operations can be defined as the use of available personnel and

resources in rendering aid to persons and property in distress or in potential

distress. The objective of SAR operations is to retrieve persons in distress, provide

for their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety. With

this duality in purpose, SAR operations may take many forms and vary in their

complexity and size. Other factors, such as location and time could impact

considerations of staff and facilities to be used in SAR operations.

Organizing and coordinating available resources is crucial in achieving the objectives


32

of any SAR or relief operation. Although a purely humanitarian mission, SAR is

governed by a legal framework outlined by international law and regulations that

define the provisions of how countries should act and cooperate for the safety and

security of persons at sea. Conventions related to SAR are the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), the SOLAS-74 Convention (with

amendments), Annex 12 of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), SAR

Conventions, and national laws as implemented individually by states.

Improving Search and Rescue Operations

Lessons in improving SAR and disaster relief operations on the domestic, regional,

and global levels stress various important elements of organization. Firstly, there is

a need of coordination among domestic authorities dealing with maritime affairs to

prevent the duplication of efforts –including collaboration and support between

various governmental and non-governmental services. Secondly, there is a need to

enable the means for prompt responses that can deliver aid just-in-time to those in

need of relief. Thirdly, there is a need to minimize the duration of time in search

missions, and lastly, to reduce the level of risk to the search crew during the

operations.

Greater cooperation between all authorities to enhance the quality of information

sources dealing with distress incidents and disasters is critical. In support of the

above and other needs, there is an underlying necessity to sign protocols regarding

SAR and disaster relief with neighboring countries that would deal with response

coordination and sea rescue attempts.

The importance of surveillance systems along the coasts is ever-growing, even more

so because it can allow cost-cutting and decrease personnel fatigue through

reducing the continuous need for maritime patrolling. The acquisition of naval and

air assets that are able to sail or fly in all kinds of weather and provide aid to people

in distress at sea represents a related capability area with much growth potential

for the future.


33

Strengthening the foundations for disaster relief operations, both in individual

national cases and those conducted in cooperation with other states is key

requirement. This can begin with strengthening the legal framework for SAR and

disaster relief and, beyond this, assigning responsible authorities or focal points and

organizing available resources – particularly naval and air assets – along the

appropriate lines. Communications systems, such as the Global Maritime Distress

Safety System (GMDSS), Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs), and

Search and Rescue Transmitters (SARTs), play a critical role in SAR and disaster relief

and must be enhanced for a much more complex environment. Procedures to

improve SAR and disaster relief services from the planning stages, in the training

realms, and in the coordination and operational functions must be improved using

international best practices that apply lessons drawn from more recent operations.

SAR as a System: Planning and Architectures

Besides being a team effort SAR is also a system. Insofar as this, it is essential to

establish rescue coordination centers and sub-centers that operate around the

clock with a qualified staff – that have a good command of English – to ensure the

close coordination between maritime and aeronautical services in successfully

performed SAR and disaster relief operations can be achieved. Achieving the

requirements for efficient SAR systems means SAR organizations must be provided

with the means for establishing: a) A SAR Coordinator (SC) b) A SAR Mission

Coordinator (SMC) c) A Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) d) A Rescue Sub-Center

(RSC) e) An On-Scene Commander (OSC) and f) SAR Units (SRUS).

The ICAO and the IMO coordinate with authorities on a global basis with the goal of

providing an effective worldwide system to enable SAR services are at hand if

needed. Within this system, individual efforts made by states in establishing,

providing, and improving SAR services are considered integral. However, one of the

benefits of having a global SAR system encompassing the humanitarian side and

practical response is the elimination of the need for each country to provide SAR

services for its own citizens wherever they travel worldwide.


34

As the globe is divided into SAR regions each with a Rescue Coordination Center

(RCC) and associated SAR services and SAR units, anyone in distress – regardless of

their nationality, origin or status, or the circumstances in which he or she is found –

can be assisted. Due to the importance of air assets (both rotary and fixed wing) in

the SAR response stage, particularly for operational readiness and rapid response,

most countries have adopted a joint Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) that is

responsible for both aeronautical and maritime incidents. The RCC is then assigned

to an appropriate Search and Rescue Region (SRR) as a competent authority.

The challenges facing less developed states in this regard are greater, and

developed countries should help establish through their experience and resources

the necessary foundations for SAR and disaster relief. Living in the ‘global village’ of

today, the outcome of doing so would be to the benefit of all given the increasing

flows of people around the world.


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Asymmetric Warfare in the Arabian Gulf

“Asymmetrical warfare... is [our] strategy for dealing with the considerable

capabilities of the enemy. A prominent example of this kind of warfare was [the

tactics employed by Hizbullah during] the Lebanon war in 2006... Since the enemy

has considerable technological abilities, and since we are still at a disadvantage in

comparison, despite the progress we have made in the area of equipment, [our only]

way to confront [the enemy] successfully is to adopt the strategy [of asymmetric

warfare] and to employ various methods of this kind." - Major General Jafari,

Commander, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp – September 3, 2007

In September 2007, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, promoted

Mohammad Ali Jafari, then coordinator of the IRGC Research and Command Center,

to the rank of Major General and the Commander-in-Chief of Iran’s Islamic

Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Throughout his military career, Major General

Jafari has emphasized the need for asymmetrical warfare capabilities and for

developing Iran's ballistic missile capabilities to make them the defining features of

its military might. Whilst serving as commander of the ground forces, Jafari

conducted studies that assessed American strengths and weaknesses based on

events in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Major General Jafari has stated that in the event of a confrontation with the West

Iran will be willing to employ the organizations under its influence. In January 2005,

whilst serving as commander of the ground forces, Jafari stated, “[i]n addition to its

own capabilities, Iran also has excellent deterrence capabilities outside its [own

borders], and if necessary it will utilize them.” He added, “[T]he Revolutionary

Guards [Corps] will invest efforts in strengthening its asymmetrical warfare

capabilities, with the aim of successfully confronting the enemies… After September

11, [2001], all [IRGC] forces changed their [mode of] operation, placing emphasis on

attaining combat readiness. The first step [towards achieving] this goal was to


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develop [a strategy] of asymmetrical warfare and to hold maneuvers [in order to

practice it].”

The IRGC: Naval Force Capability and Modernization

The IRGC is believed to number over 125,000 – drawing on an estimated one million

Basij, the voluntary revolutionary paramilitary force – with a Naval Guard at an

estimated strength of 20,000 including around 5,000 marines. In terms of capability,

the IRGC naval force is thought to consist of six main elements, namely: surface

vessels; subsurface vessels (midget and unconventional submarines); missiles and

rockets; floating and underwater mines; aviation, and; military industries.

Over the past few years, the IRGC has been implementing various force

modernization measures designed to supplement and upgrade its asymmetric war-

fighting capabilities at sea. In particular, small fast-attack craft, heavily armed with

rockets or anti-ship missiles and more numbers of fast mine-laying platforms have

been a core focus area in the IRGC’s capability expansion efforts. The IRGC today

possesses a large-scale mine warfare capability which draws mainly on the use of

small craft and commercial boats that can rapidly deploy to undertake mass mine-

laying operations.

A great deal of focus has also been placed on acquiring more numbers of small,

mobile, hard-to-detect platforms that go beyond small fast-attack craft to include

enhanced subsurface warfare assets such as various types of sensors, submarines,

semi-submersibles, and even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This reflects a

serious desire on the part of the IRGC to develop and employ subsurface and aerial

assets that enable it to hit targets through more evasive means, buttressing its

offensive reach as a result.

Various sea-based launch platforms have been outfitted with large numbers of anti-

ship missiles as well, providing a high level of offensive capacity against surface

combatants. This includes at least 40 light patrol boats and 10 Houdong guided-


37

missile patrol boats armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles, which have a range of

150km. Other launch platforms possessed by the IRGC include surface vessels such

as missile boats, torpedo boats, catamaran patrol boats equipped with rocket

launchers, motor boats armed with heavy machine guns, and subsurface assets such

as the Ghadir-class (also known as Qadir-class or Qadr-class, and sometimes

referred to as Yono-class or Type SS-3) midget submarines armed with mines, and

smart swimmer delivery vehicles.

As part of its modernization efforts, Iran has also launched a domestic weapons

procurement campaign aimed at improving its defense capabilities and has

announced the development of 109 types of advanced military equipment over the

past two years. While not much is known about the precise details of its weapons

production capabilities, Iranian reports around the subject surface intermittently:

• On November 11, 2008, IRGC Naval Guard Deputy Commander, Rear Admiral Ali

Fadavi, told the Fars News Agency that both unmanned speedboats and UAVs are

now mass-produced in the country

•On December 6, 2008 the Iranian Navy test-fired a new surface-to-surface missile

from a warship as part of exercises along a strategic shipping route. “The Nasr-2 was

fired from a warship and hit its target at a distance of 30 km (19 miles) and

destroyed it,” Iranian state run radio reported

•In December 2008, Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari

confirmed the delivery of two new domestically-built missile boats, Kalat (Fortress)

and Derafsh (Flag), as well as a Ghadir-class light submarine to the Iranian navy

Other than this, the IRGC has introduced more specialized training for its personnel

including efforts to enable better coordination between fighting units. As a wider

part of these efforts to facilitate better coordination, the IRGC has also invested

more heavily in customized and purpose-built high-tech equipment and developed

its command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) system.

Improving C4I has also led the IRGC to pay more attention to means used to gather

more timely intelligence and in its ability to engage more effectively in


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counterintelligence and deception operations, especially through greater use of

UAV technology. Efforts have also been made to enhance the IRGC’s capability to

disrupt enemy C4I systems through electronic warfare capabilities.

On the defensive side, measures have been taken to mitigate the vulnerability of

even small naval units to air and missile attack. The IRGC is known to stress the

importance of initiative, and avoidance of frontal engagements with large U.S. naval

surface warfare elements. Both of these points reflect the desire to safeguard

limited assets, employing them only in coordinated operations initiated with some

degree of surprise.

The joint force nature of the IRGC means they also possess an air capability. The

IRGC air branch flies UAVs and UCAVs and also control Iran’s strategic missile force.

As a result, they have under their command one Shahab 1 short range ballistic

missile (SRBM) brigade with 12-18 launchers that can launch missiles with ranges of

500-700km, and one Shahab 3 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) battalion

that is comprised of six launchers, each carrying four missiles with ranges of 1,200-

1,280 km. This gives the IRGC the capability to deliver conventional weapons such

as bombs and mines, and unconventional weapons including chemical, biological,

radioactive, or nuclear (CBRN) payloads into targets such as ports, and oil and

desalination facilities.

IRGC Operational Planning and Exercises

Arguing that it is today faced with extra-regional threats rather than regional ones,

the Deputy Army Commander of the Iranian Army, Brigadier General Abdolrahim

Moussavi, has spelled out Iran’s commitment to expanding its strategic reach. A

naval base was recently upgraded at Assalouyeh in Iran's southern Bushehr province

– the fourth in a string of IRGC bases along the waterway that will extend from

Bandar Abbas to Pasa Bandar near the Pakistan border. Iran has also started

construction at new naval bases along the coasts of the Gulf and the Sea of Oman

for what IRGC's Navy Commander Rear Admiral Morteza Saffari has described as an


39

“impenetrable line of defense.”

Having been put in charge of defending Iran's Gulf coast in September 2008, the

IRGC is currently operational in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and could possibly

operate elsewhere if given suitable sealift or facilities. The naval branch of the IRGC

has numerous bases and contingency facilities in the Gulf, some being situated near

the Strait of Hormuz and many others near key shipping channels in places such as

Al Farsiyah, Halul (an oil platform), Sirri, Abu Musa, Bandar-e-Abbas, Khorramshahr,

and Larak. On October 27, 2008, Iran opened a new naval base at Jask, located at

the southern mouth of the Strait of Hormuz – the key strategic chokepoint for

Arabian Gulf oil.

Given it expanding role, the IRGC now reportedly operates all mobile land-based

anti-ship missile batteries. Additionally, the IRGC-controlled coastal defense force

has naval guns and HY-2 Seersucker land-based anti-ship missile units deployed in

five to seven sites along the Gulf coast. These sites also home numerous staging

areas for the IRGC, which has trained and organized the Basij militia from amongst

the local populations to undertake support operations when these may be needed.

The IRGC often claims to conduct very large exercises, sometimes with 100,000 men

or more. However, while the exact size of such exercises is unclear they are often a

small fraction of IRGC claims. An important aspect of IRGC exercises is the almost

total absence of the regular Iranian navy in some cases, whose functions are more

oriented towards the classical tasks of sea denial and power projection ashore in

the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. Exercises conducted by the IRGC demonstrate

the capability to attack or raid key export and infrastructure facilities, tankers, and

shipping vessels. This is in addition to regular amphibious exercises carried out in

collaboration with the land branch of the IRGC against objectives like disputed

islands in the Gulf.

The IRGC can threaten shipping lanes in the Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and the Caspian Sea

through the application of a variety of assets at its disposal, including: Three Kilo-

class (Type 877) submarines and an unknown number of Ghadir-class midget


40

submarines; Smart torpedoes; Smart mine capability (free-floating and dumb mines)

executable through its five minelayers, amphibious ships, small craft, and fleet of

adapted commercial boats, and; Land-based, long-range anti-ship missiles

strategically based on land and islands (Seersucker HY-2, CSS-C-3), and on ships

(CSS-N-4 and others, including possibly the Sunburn).

The IRGC could also launch a coordinated attack that involves any combination of

explosives-laden remote-controlled boats, swarming speedboats and fast-attack

craft, semi-submersible torpedo boats, kamikaze UAVs, shore-based anti-ship

missile launches, and artillery fire. This raises the prospect of an Iranian attack

scenario that “swarms” a U.S.-escorted convoy or surface action group transiting

the Strait of Hormuz, and barrages of rockets with cluster warheads being used to

suppress enemy defensive fire and carrier air operations. Attacks on tankers,

shipping, and offshore facilities by naval guards could also be conducted through

eight P-3MP/P-3F Orion MPA and combat aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles such

as the C-801K (8-42 km), and CSS-N-4. The combination of launch platforms gives

Iranian forces the capability to carry out extensive raids against Gulf shipping and

against countries on the southern Gulf coast as well.

By displaying both its real and virtual military (e.g. naval) fighting capabilities

through electronic, printed, and network media, and through endless official

statements, Iran tends to achieve the politico-diplomatic propaganda ends known

as “the 4Ds”: Defiance to maintain a course of resistance, targeting primarily the

Western political system and Western political will; Deception on the real state of

Iranian war-fighting capabilities by targeting Western military establishments;

Deterrence with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s military “might,” targeting Western

public opinion, delivered through the media, and; Demonstration of the outreach of

its own power, targeting the Iranian people and the Muslim world.

Summary of Recent Maritime-Related Incidents involving the IRGC

January 27, 2006: Iran completes major military exercise that tests Tehran’s ability


41

to attack Gulf shipping and Arab oil facilities. Sources said the exercise was designed

to test capabilities to strike U.S. and Arab targets throughout the area of the Gulf.

According to a diplomatic source, the exercise was meant to show the West that

Iran could stop all oil shipments in the Gulf and destroy numerous oil facilities in

Gulf Arab countries, and included a range of fighter-jets and helicopters from the

Iranian Air Force, with the Iranian navy contributing surface vessels and submarines.

August 19, 2006: Iran launches a series of large-scale military exercises aimed at

introducing the country's new defensive doctrine, state-run television reported. The

television report said the military exercise would occur in 14 of the country’s 30

provinces and could last as long as five weeks. The first stage of the maneuvers

began with air strikes in the southeastern province of Sistan va Baluchistan. The

military exercise, is said to have involved 12 infantry regiments, and is called “The

Blow of Zolfaghar,” in reference to a sword that belonged to Imam Ali, one of the

most revered figures for Shi'ite Muslims.

November 3, 2006: Iran's Revolutionary Guards began another series of exercises

days after a United States-led naval exercise began in the Gulf. Iran began the 10

days of maneuvers in the Gulf by test firing dozens of missiles, including the long-

range Shahab-3 (estimated range: 2000 km or 1,240 miles), and the Shahab-2,

which Iran says can carry a cluster warhead that can deliver 1,400 bomblets at once.

Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, leader of the Revolutionary Guards, says on

television that Iran's military exercises were not meant to threaten neighboring

countries. “We want to show our deterrent and defensive power to trans-regional

enemies, and we hope they will understand the message of the maneuvers,” he

said. “The first and main goal is to demonstrate the power and national

determination to defend the country against possible threat.” General Safavi said

the exercises would last 10 days and would take place in the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman

and several Iranian provinces.

March 23, 2007: Fifteen Royal Navy sailors and Marines from HMS Cornwall are

seized by Iranian warships after searching a cargo boat in the Gulf that Iran claims

was within its territorial borders. Iranian state television reports the Britons are


42

being held after entering Iranian waters, but the UK insists the group were within

Iraqi boundaries. The 15 personnel are flown to the UK on a British Airways flight to

Heathrow a day after Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says the Royal Navy

personnel will be freed as a “gift” to the UK.

March 23-30, 2007: Iran’s regular Navy launches week-long war-games on its

southern shores. The military exercises are being carried out in the Gulf by Iran's

regular Navy.

January 7, 2008: U.S. ships are harassed by Iran. Iranian boats approach three U.S.

Navy ships in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, threatening to explode the American

vessels. The U.S. forces are reported to be on the verge of firing on the Iranian boats

– believed to be from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's navy – when the boats

turned and moved away. A Pentagon official says, “It is the most serious

provocation of this sort that we've seen yet,” He says the incident occurs at about 5

a.m. local time Sunday as Navy cruiser USS Port Royal, destroyer USS Hopper and

frigate USS Ingraham were on their way into the Gulf and passing through the strait

– a major oil shipping route. There were no injuries but the official said there could

have been, because the Iranian boats turned away “literally at the very moment

that U.S. forces were preparing to open fire” in self defense.

July 7, 2008: Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps launch large-scale, five-

day war-games, dubbed “Exercise Stake Net,” carried out in the Strait of Hormuz

and the Sea of Oman, where an assortment of new weapons were brought into

play. The Iranian military maneuvers take place on the same day the United States

announces it too will hold naval exercises in the Gulf. Iranian state media say that

the military maneuvers by the IRGC’s Navy and Air Force missiles unit are aimed at

improving the force’s military abilities. Separately, Brigadier General Mahmoud

Chaharbaghi, commander of the IRGC Ground Forces artillery and missiles unit,

announces that 50 of his unit’s brigades are being armed with smart weapons and

cluster bombs. Iran later test-fires nine missiles including what is claims is an

upgraded version of Shahab-3 ballistic missile with a one-ton warhead capable of

destroying targets within a 2,000-kilometer (1,245-mile) range.


43

September 7, 2008: Iran’s armed forces test the country’s new weapons systems

and defense plans in a three-day military maneuver. Iran’s naval forces claim to

have made a breakthrough in building various types of "radar evading" submarines

to guard its territorial waters. The IRGC says it successfully test-fired advanced

shore-to-sea, surface-to-surface and sea-to-air missiles. The Islamic Revolution

Guards Corp (IRGC) and the Army take part in drills involving anti-aircraft defense

systems. The main purpose of the maneuvers is to maintain and promote the

combat readiness of relevant units and to test new weapons and defense plans.

Iran’s Navy Commander, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, said Iran is upgrading its

naval fleet with a new generation of domestically-built submarines.

September 15, 2008: The Islamic Republic Air Force tests Iran’s domestic-made

warfare in a joint military exercise with the IRGC, the Defense Ministry says. The

joint aerial maneuver is aimed at boosting Iran’s defensive capabilities and

operational tactics, Iran’s Defense Minister Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad-

Najjar say. The military exercise, which involves The Islamic Republic of Iran Air

Force (IRIAF) and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, comes in the wake of

escalating U.S. and Israeli threats to strike the country's nuclear facilities.

October 10, 2008: Islamist militiamen affiliated to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary

Guards Corps stage military exercises in the suburbs of Tehran on Friday to defend

the Iranian capital against “natural disasters” and “enemy assaults.” Members of

the paramilitary Basij take part in military drills under the command of the Tharallah

Garrison in Tehran. Similar war games are held in Karaj, Islamshahr, Shahre Rey,

Rabat Karim, and Varamin, said the acting deputy commandant of the IRGC,

Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi, who also commands the Tharallah Garrison.

The maneuvers last for 48 hours. Meanwhile another senior Basij leader announces

that the paramilitary force is giving specialized training" to its units across

Iran.”These units are receiving specialized air, sea and ground training to be

prepared for defending the country, the ruling establishment, and the revolution,”

said Brigadier General Ahmad Zolqadr, operational commander of the Basij, on the

sidelines of a military parade in Zanjan, north-west Iran.


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November 12, 2008: Iran launches a “new” type of long-range ballistic missile

dubbed Sajeel, but its general layout was indistinguishable from the description of

the Ashura, which was flight-tested about one year ago.

November 2-7, 2008: Iran announces recent upgrades to the naval base in

Asalouyeh and the now online base facilities in the port of Jask. Iranian officers state

that long range tactical missile silos and shore based anti-ship missiles have long

been key aspects of planning of potential military operations in the event of an

open conflict. Top Iranian Army commander Major General Ayatollah Saleh is

quoted in Presstv as saying “the heavy weight of the enemy warships provides the

Iranian side with an ideal opportunity for launching successful counter-attacks.” Iran

announces that it is in the final stages of planning an extensive naval and military

exercise “Unity 87” due to commence in December 2008. Iran says it will seek to

accomplish objectives that include defense against Israeli and U.S. threats, closing

the Strait of Hormuz to local and international shipping, and the testing new and

improved military equipment and tactics. Admiral Qasem Rostamabadi tells states

radio that, “*t+he aim of this maneuver is to increase the level of readiness of Iran's

naval forces and also to test and to use domestically-made naval weaponry.” He

says the naval maneuvers cover an area of 50,000 square miles, including the Sea of

Oman off Iran’s southern coast. “In this six-day long maneuver there will be more

than 60 combat vessel units,” Kayhan quotes Admiral Habibollah Sayyari,

commander of the navy as saying it will include destroyers, missile-equipped

battleships, submarines, special-operations teams, helicopters, and fighter planes.

Iran has previously claimed it could close the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, through

which about 40 percent of globally traded oil passes while the United States has

pledged to protect shipping routes. An Iranian naval commander says a week earlier

that the country’s navy could strike an enemy well beyond its shores and as far

away as Bab Al Mandab, the southern entrance to the Red Sea that leads to the

Suez Canal. Iran test-fires a new surface-to-surface missile from a warship in a

strategic shipping route, as part of the war games in the Sea of Oman and the Gulf

region: State radio reports, “[T]he surface-to-surface Nasr-2 missile was tested in

the [Sea of] Oman operational region.” IRNA reports that, “[T]he Nasr-2 was fired


45

from a warship and hit its target at a distance of 30 km (19 miles) and destroyed it,”

adding it was the first test of the new, medium-range missile.

June 22, 2009 Iran began three days of air force exercises in the Gulf and the Sea of

Oman to raise operational and support capability. “Long-distance flights of around

3,600 km along with aerial refueling from tanker to fighter jet and from fighter jet to

fighter jet will be part of this exercise,” state broadcaster IRIB’s website reported.

“Low altitude flights over the waters of the ... Gulf and the Sea of Oman by Iranian

fighter jets over distances of 700 km will also be tested,” it said. The military

exercise plans were announced last month. IRIB said the exercises were also aimed

at raising the force’s ability to use intelligence aircraft “to send signals and analyze

threats.”

Implications and Possible Responses to Asymmetric Warfare

Steadily rising global demand for Gulf crude oil, gas, and other derived products –

particularly driven by rising Asian demand, much of which is exported indirectly to

the West – reinforces the criticalness of regional energy infrastructure security to

international security and development. However, these often heavily concentrated

facilities are designed to economies of scale and generally have poor-response

planning, lack modern systems integration architectures, and have long-lead times

for the replacement of key components if they were to be damaged.

Furthermore, energy infrastructure in its day-to-day use often nears limits of

capacity meaning that success in even a small fraction of attempted attacks could

cause serious disruptions in global energy supplies and push prices up dramatically.

It also leads to an increased vulnerability given the improving lethality and range of

precision strike systems, and ’smarter’ saboteurs and terrorists.

The threat of asymmetric warfare in the region is real. The IRGC can threaten

shipping lanes in the Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and the Caspian Sea, and can also conduct

attacks on tankers, shipping, and offshore facilities in the event of a potential


46

military confrontation. Besides the asymmetric warfighting capabilities of the IRGC,

the vulnerabilities that arise due to the geographic characteristics of areas such as

the Strait of Hormuz, for example, create an added risk.

The Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint for global energy supplies from the

Gulf, is 280 km long and just 55 km (34 miles) wide at its narrowest point. It consists

of 2-mile (3.2 km) navigable channels for inbound and outbound traffic separated

by a 2-mile wide buffer zone. Through this corridor, 90 percent of all Gulf exports

pass accounting for 40 percent of all globally traded oil supply, including over 75

percent of Japan’s oil –one of the key pillars of the global economy.

Figure 4.6a


47

Some 13.4 million barrels per day (MMBD) of crude passed through Strait of

Hormuz in May 2007, as well as 2 MMBD of other oil and gas products and over 31

million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG). According to predictions by the Energy

Information Administration (EIA) of the Department of Energy in the United States,

exports from the region will double to 30-34 MMBD by 2020 and the Gulf will

export 40 percent of the world’s LNG by 2015. The narrow transit channels of the

Strait put passing ships easily in reach of Iranian anti-ship missiles which have

ranges of 150km and are outfitted on numerous highly mobile launch platforms.

Another area that may be a particularly attractive staging ground for asymmetric

attacks because of its vulnerability is Bab Al Mandab. The Bab Al Mandab is a

narrow naval passage some 30km (18 miles) wide at its narrowest point, located off

the southern-most tip of Yemen overlooking the northern coast of Djibouti –

connecting the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea.

It comprises two channels of traffic each 2-miles wide going northbound and

southbound. Some 3.3 MMBD of energy shipments pass through Bab Al Mandab of

which 2.1 MMBD is destined to flow northbound through the Suez Complex. A

growth of more than 25 percent is projected to occur over the next decade in

energy shipments passing through this chokepoint. In the case of a disruptive

attack, the only major bypass is the Saudi East-West Pipeline which has the capacity

to transport 4.4MMBD – however, this pipeline is already operating at full capacity.

Planning for asymmetric warfare needs to begin with deterrence and conflict

prevention in the political domain, which is as critical as defense itself. On the

defense side, in addition to ensuring defense against strikes at critical nodes and on

infrastructure, there is a real need for integrated GCC force planning and war

planning efforts. The GCC must demonstrate the political will and operational

capability to act together, and it should demonstrate that it has exercised a

retaliatory capability. To enable such an endeavor, improved interoperability

amongst Gulf forces and also with the American, British, and French forces will be a

top priority.


48

Undertaking joint exercises at the GCC level, such as realistic “red-blue” war games

with realistic Command Post Exercises (CPXs) and Situational Training Exercises

(STXs) would help determine common options and requirements. Emphasizing joint

warfare approaches that tie in paramilitary and security forces would help develop

comprehensive strategies that tie together all resources in support of the required

objectives.

Figure 4.6b


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Sea Based Air Defenses: The Navy’s Role in the Missile

Defense Network

Determining the role and effectiveness of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system

must begin with two basic questions. Firstly, to what level are National or Theater

Ballistic Missile Defenses required to accomplish a specifically defined set of

political and military objectives – assuming a given level of technical performance

for the component systems. Secondly, what level of technical performance must

these defenses meet if existing programs are to deliver on useful political and

military objectives successfully.

It is possible to ascertain several plausible objectives for a missile defense network.

A missile defense network may be used to: Completely block an attack of a given

size; Attenuate an attack by a certain percentage, and; Protect some target-set so

that a specified fraction of what is defended can survive a given attack. This

particular discussion will opt for a scenario-based approach taking into

consideration the political and security threat perceptions of various stakeholders

involved in the region. Some politico-military trends in the region that ought to be

taken into account when constructing a hypothetical scenario are:

The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missile technology in the region and

their users

The possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapons capability in the near

future

Any subsequent pre-emptive action that Israel might undertake against a

perceived Iranian nuclear capability – alone or with the United States

Another important point to consider is that regardless of whether the U.S. approves

any strike on Iran, it will likely be accused of having given the green light to Israel for


50

a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear sites by the Islamic Regime. It may also be

accused of assisting in the planning and implementation of any such mission, which

would necessarily be complex and high-risk.

In turn, GCC states may find themselves being accused of helping the U.S. and as a

result be made targets as Iran retaliates. Alternatively, GCC states could find

themselves targeted indirectly as Iran targets American and Western assets and

interests in the region. At a minimum, GCC states could find themselves placed in

the middle of cross-fire between Israel and Iran in a conflict that may involve a

highly intense use of ballistic missiles.

Potential Conflict Between Iran and Israel

As its nuclear program has advanced, Iran has simultaneously been investing heavily

in its national missile program. It has focused particularly on developing precision

strike munitions and boosting its anti-ship missile capabilities. Today, Iran

manufactures the anti-ship missile called Noor – an upgraded version of the Chinese

C-802, the missile believed to have hit an Israeli Navy ship during the 2006 war in

Lebanon. Besides Noor, which has a range of 150km, Iran produces another anti-

ship missile by the name of Ra’ad, which has a greater of range of 350km. Iran also

possesses a considerable arsenal of cruise missiles, including the Kh55 Russian land-

attack cruise missile, and has been heavily invested in advancing its ballistic missile

capability – the weapon of choice for delivering nuclear payloads.

Iran has declared its arsenal of ballistic missiles to be for defensive purposes, such

as against threats of foreign invasion – a threat which Tehran seems to perceive as

coming particularly strongly from the United States. However, closer analysis

reveals that the missile arsenal Iran continues to assemble is intended to inflict

maximum casualties and maximum damage in the event of a potential war.

The basic variant of the Shahab 3/3A carries a maximum payload of 1158kg and can

deliver warheads up to a maximum range of 1,350 km. The more advanced version


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of the Shahab 3 is able to reach targets up to 2,000 km away carrying a reduced

payload of somewhere between 100-200 kg. A new intermediate range ballistic

missile (IRBM) and space launch vehicle are also currently being developed, and Iran

could potentially possess an intercontinental range ballistic missile (ICBM) capable

of reaching the U.S. by 2015.

Seeing Iran’s growing capabilities and its apparent drive for nuclear weapons

capability, Israel has come to regard Iran as an existential threat. Israel has taken

the stance that Iran should not be allowed to obtain the nuclear capabilities that

could eventually allow it to produce nuclear weapons. Viewing Iran as an existential

threat to the state of Israel, Israel believes that Iran’s nuclear aspirations represent

a ticking bomb that must be dealt with in the immediate future.

Iran’s nuclear timeline continues to be a matter of difference in approximations

between the Israeli and U.S. intelligence communities. While Israel estimates Iran

will have a nuclear weapon as early as 2009, the U.S. intelligence community thinks

this is unlikely to happen before 2013 (potentially a post-Obama administration).

Israel calculates that once the Russian-built nuclear installation in Bushehr becomes

operational in 2009 and an increase in centrifuges in Esfahan is achieved, Iran will

be able to produce weapons grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) by 2010. This

capability, according to Israeli estimates, will be further enhanced when the heavy

water reactor goes becomes operational in Arak.

The U.S. on the other hand thinks Iran will not have the capacity to produce a

nuclear weapon before around 2013, but that from 2014 it may have the capacity to

produce 25-30 nuclear weapons a year. For the meantime, the U.S. approach thus

far has been to continue exhausting political efforts through a combination of

international diplomacy and sanctions while leaving all ‘other options’ on the table.

The Iranian nuclear program continues to pose a major threat to the status quo in

the Middle East, particularly to Israeli and U.S. interests. Iran is increasingly a hot

topic on the international foray but while it is unlikely that the U.S. will undertake

military action against Iran on the Israeli timeline for Iran potentially acquiring


52

nuclear weapons, military action against Iran nonetheless remains a real possibility.

The following set of circumstances identifies scenarios that could accelerate a strike

against Iran:

With enough of an inventory of nuclear weapons, Iran could acquire a

deterrent against U.S. and Israeli strikes by 2010 and begin to pose a

serious threat to its neighbors and Israel

Possessing an inventory of highly accurate short, medium and long range

ballistic missiles, capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

A modern surface-to-air (SAM) air defense system, such as the Russian

S‐300PMU2 “Favorit,” giving Iran an advanced BMD capability in addition to

an advanced SAM Air Defense System

An Iranian maritime capability that can threaten commercial shipping and

naval forces in the Gulf, and possibly interrupt the flow of oil through the

Straits of Hormuz

Increasing the threat of asymmetric attacks against American interests and

allies in the region and even beyond by training and controlling a number of

counter-insurgency groups

Conflict Scenarios to an Israeli Attack on Iranian Nuclear Sites

Two basic scenarios exist for a potential pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear

facilities that Israel might choose to undertake. The first scenario would involve an

Israeli Strike Force Comprised of F15I and F-16C/I Combat Aircraft. The total strike

package of around 80 aircraft would include all of the 25 F‐15I in the Israeli Air Force

Inventory plus 55 F‐16C/I. Aerial refueling would be required along the way

(including the way back), and there would be a need to avoid detection by Turkish,

Syrian and American intelligence.

All the Israeli refueling tankers will have to be airborne to service the F‐15E and

F‐16C/I Strike Force during the outbound and inbound legs of the mission. Once in

Iranian territory, the jets will need to fly at surface level until over their targets to

avoid detection – they would also need to apply electronic countermeasures (ECM)


53

all the way. If detected by Iranian air defense, they will likely encounter interceptors

and the firing of ground based SAMs.

A military strike by the Israeli air force against Iranian nuclear facilities without U.S.

aid is possible. However, as outlined above, it would be complex and judged high

risk on the operational level. Furthermore, it lacks any assurances of a high mission

success rate. If Israel concludes that without U.S. approval and assistance the

mission would be too risky – and assuming no change in Israeli attitudes towards

seeing Iran as an existential threat that must be dealt with immediately regardless

of the consequences – a second scenario can be envisioned.

The second scenario involves Israel launching Jericho II/III ballistic missiles fitted

with low-yield nuclear warheads against Iranian nuclear facilities. Although Israel

states that it will not be the first in the region to introduce nuclear weapons, it has

also maintained that nuclear weapons are “weapons of last resort.” The implication

of this is that when Israel’s existence as a state is threatened, nuclear weapons can

become these “weapons of last resort.” Applying a doctrine of defensive deterrent

or offensive first strike, Israel may well decide to use nuclear weapons to dissolve an

existential and apparently imminent threat identified in Iran.

With facilities linked to the Iranian nuclear and missile programs dispersed across

the country, any ballistic missile strike campaign conducted by Israel would have

numerous potential targets. Furthermore, because several facilities are constructed

underground and shielded overhead by varying combinations of reinforced concrete

and dry soil, Israel could need nuclear warheads to increase the chances of

penetrating such defenses and ensuring enough damage could be inflicted that

would either destroy the targeted sites or make them unable to fulfill whatever

purpose they are designed to serve. The tables on the following page illustrate

estimated sizes of Iranian facilities that would likely be priority targets in the event

of an Israeli pre-emptive strike, and the impact of low-yield nuclear payloads which

Israel may consider as options for a strike in view of the former.

In essence, Iran’s missile arsenal functions as a major component of Iran’s assymet-


54

-ric warfighting capabilities, and would be a strong contributor in Iranian

attempts to achieve high rates of attrition. An important question that arises here is

how Iran may be preparing for any potential conflict with Israel and the United

Key Iranian Nuclear Installations and Approximate Sizes

Location Description Estimated Size (sq m)

Esfahan Nuclear Research Center; Uranium

Conversion Facility (UCF)

10,000

Arak Heavy Water Plant and Future Plutonium

Production Reactor

5,500

Natanz Uranium Enrichment Facility 65,000

Adopted from Dr. Abdullah Toukan’s presentation, “Sea-Based Air Defense: The Navy’s Role in the

Missile Defense Network,” Maritime Security Cooperation Conference, May 26, 2009

Impact of Low-Yield Nuclear Payloads on Dry Soil or Dry Soft Rock

Yield (KT) Crater Radius

(m)

Crater Depth

(m)

10 psi Range

(m)

5 psi Range

(m)

10 36 18 536 800

20 45 22 675 1000

100 73 36 1,155 1,720

500 118 59 1,960 2,950

Adopted from Dr. Abdullah Toukan’s presentation, “Sea-Based Air Defense: The Navy’s Role in the

Missile Defense Network,” Maritime Security Cooperation Conference, May 26, 2009

States – i.e., what does its war doctrine look like? Clues to this question are found in

analysis of the large-scale military exercises that Iran has been conducting over the

past years – these have been explored in some in the preceding chapter on

‘Asymmetric Warfare in the Arabian Gulf.’

Table 5.3b

Table 5.3a


55

Iran’s military response in either scenario would likely rest on the goal of escalation.

The immediate Iranian retaliation to strikes would likely be counter-strikes using its

inventory of ballistic missiles. This may involve multiple launches of Shahab 3

including the possibility of Chemical, Biological, or Radioactive (CBR) warheads

being carried against targets such as Tel Aviv, Israeli military and civilian centers,

and suspected nuclear weapons sites in Israel.

Iran may also use proxy groups such as Hizbullah or Hamas to attack Israel with

waves of suicide bombings, covert attacks using CBR materials, and rocket attacks

from southern Lebanon. There are however other likely consequences of an attack

on Iran – for example, any strike on Iranian nuclear facilities will likely cause Iran’s

withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and increase its long-

term resolve to develop a nuclear deterrent program.

As discussed earlier, Iran may also launch asymmetric attacks against American

interests and allies in the Arabian Gulf. Targeting U.S. and Western shipping in the

Gulf and possibly attempting to interrupt the flow of oil through the Strait of

Hormuz, the Arabian Gulf may well turn into the front-line of the battlefield in the

event of an Iranian conflict with Israel and the United States.

The Navy’s Role in Ballistic Missile Defense

The role of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (also known as Sea-Based

Midcourse) is to provide an efficient and highly mobile sea‐based defense against

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their midcourse phase –i.e., in the

post-boost phase prior to reentry. The system allows the BMD Command to

transfer its defense capabilities closer to the enemy sites and thereby gain greater

probability of mission success. The system is outfitted with engagement and long-

range tracking capabilities and is designed to intercept short- to medium-range

ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of the flight with Standard Missile–3.

The Aegis system coordinates engagements of short- and medium-range ballistic


56

missiles with terminal missile defense systems, and as tracking information is

shared among these systems, the BMDs will have the opportunity to follow the

engagement of a target during the midcourse segment with coordinated terminal

engagements. The Aegis also serves as a forward deployed sensor, providing early

warning and long-range search and track capabilities for ICBMs and IRBMs. As a

result, the battlespace of the BMD system is effectively extended and this

contributes to achieving an integrated layered defense. Vessels equipped with the

system also extend the range of the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD)

system by providing reliable track data which is used to calculate firing solutions.


57

Security of the Marine Environment

Outdated perceptions of the oceans still lead some to think of them as immense,

bountiful, and inexhaustible resources that are infinitely resilient and impervious to

human influence. However, ocean resources and the ocean’s ability to absorb

human impact have limits and no longer represent a new frontier yet to be

exploited. Major threats to the ocean are posed by coastal development, pollution

(contaminants and excessive nutrients), climate change, ocean acidification,

overfishing and destructive fishing practices. By 2025, global coastal populations are

expected to reach 6 billion and by 2050, 91 percent of the world’s coastlines will

have been impacted by development.

A study in the U.S. by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

suggested that nearly half as much particulate-matter pollutants are now released

into the air by marine-based sources as the total amount released by the world’s

cars. The growing number of pleasure craft and motorized water sports are

contributing to pollution from marine-based sources. However, of all ocean

pollution, 90 percent originates from land-based activities. In much of the world,

more than 80 percent of sewage enters the coastal ocean untreated and partly as a

result, there are parts of the oceans that contain over one million plastic particles

per km2.

Marine pollution can originate from land-based sources or come from ships. Land-

based sources of marine pollution include eutrophication, a process that raises the

level of chemical nutrients (typically compounds containing nitrogen or phosphorus)

in an ecosystem, and originates from cities, industries, and agricultural areas.

Radioactive waste which is released directly into the sea also contributes to

eutrophication.

A large part of the maritime pollution coming from ships can be attributed to cruise


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ships – some 24 percent of solid waste generated by vessels worldwide. Greywater

is another major concern for pollution and sewage is a significant threat to the

marine environment. Oil spillage – the origin of the first pollution that came from

ships – poses another major threat where in the past century more than 20 oil spills

of over one hundred thousand tons occurred. Maritime transportation accounts for

45 percent of oil spills whereas 32 percent is due to routine loading, discharging and

flushing of tanker ships.

Ballast water, which threatens the introduction of invasive marine species, is

considered one of the four greatest threats to the world’s oceans. Shipping moves

over 80 percent of the world’s commodities and transfers approximately three to

five billion tons of ballast water each year. Ballast water, which is carried in unladen

ships to provide stability, is pumped on board at the port from which the voyage

begins also taking in tiny stowaways in the form of marine organisms. While many

of these stowaway organisms die over period of the voyage, surviving ones are

pumped out at the destination port and some of these organisms then go on to

establish populations in the surrounding waters.

More than 100 species of marine organisms are known to have been introduced by

ballast water and while some appear benign, others have become pests threatening

biodiversity, fisheries and aquaculture. Some toxic dinoflagellates even cause red

tides and algal blooms – an event seen on the coastline of the UAE and Oman in

2009 – that affects and can even kill fish, shellfish, sea birds, and humans.

The Marine Environment of Abu Dhabi

The coastal and marine environments represent massive natural and economic

assets that must be looked after. These resources provide much of what supports

everyday life such as food, livelihood, economic development, recreation, water

resources, and the fresh air we breathe.

Healthy coral reefs support substantial fish and marine resources (up to 30 tons per

km2 a year) and significantly contribute to the recreational industry. They thus offer


59

great potential for a growing tourism industry in the UAE. On the other hand,

mangrove areas provide benefits including clean water, food, natural medicine, and

support biodiversity by extending shoreline protection from storms and erosion of

the coastline.

Sea grass beds support multi-species fisheries and numerous endangered species

acting as coastal stabilizers and playing a role in maintaining water clarity through

sediment trapping. Beaches and foreshores are extremely important as buffers as

well, and represent important nesting sites for sea turtles and various species of

birds. Beaches support recreational and tourism activities, and land behind beaches

is highly prized in the real estate markets supporting the national economy.

Marine environments, particularly coastal zones, are very sensitive ecological

systems. The shared demands placed on them by densely populated coastal regions

and rapid economic growth imposes stresses on finite coastal systems and

resources. Unprecedented expansion in national economies and tourism over the

past decade has exerted increased pressure on the coastal and marine areas and

their resources.

Almost all major cities in the UAE are coastal, and the majority of the population in

Abu Dhabi, for example, lives in coastal areas with close to 85 percent of the

population living along the 400 km coastline – the size and shape of which is

constantly changing as a result. Increasing coastal development as a result of social

and economic driving forces such as industrial development, urban expansion, oil

and gas exploration, ports and harbors development, second homes, and tourism

has led to habitat degradation as well as increasing pollution from land-based

activities and marine-based sources.

The impact of climate change far exceed the findings of a report in 2007 by the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and climate studies in different

parts of the world substantiate the fact that increased impacts from storminess are

likely to be significant in the region. The problems of sea acidification are

particularly serious for the environment as there are few options for adaptation and

reversal once it occurs. Also, if sea levels rise in tandem with greater and more


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frequent storms, coastal flooding and erosion problems will exacerbate already

vulnerable coastal areas.

Coastal and Marine Protection

Solutions to marine pollutions can be devised on the international, regional, or

national level. On the international level, various efforts have been made in favor to

protect a healthy and sustainable marine environment: The London Convention

(1972/1996) covers the deliberate disposal of wastes or others matter from vessels,

aircraft, and platforms; The Marpol Convention (1973/1978) works to preserve the

marine environment through the complete elimination of pollution by oil and other

harmful substances; The Ballast Water Convention (2004) contains measures to

prevent the potentially devastating effects of the spread of harmful aquatic

organisms carried by ships' ballast water by enforcing minimum standards for

ballast water management, and; The international liability system for oil pollution

damage, which guides compensation funds for international oil pollution.

On the sub-national level, Abu Dhabi is in the preliminary stages of developing

integrated coastal zone management arrangements, a multidisciplinary process that

brings together all stakeholders involved in the development, management and use

of the coast within a framework that facilitates the integration of their interests and

responsibilities. Current efforts have included the establishment of an emirate-wide

committee on coastal zone management led by the Environment Agency Abu Dhabi

(EAD).

The basic objectives of the strategy include the adoption of a comprehensive and

integrated approach to coastal planning and management, recognition and

protection of essential coastal and marine habitats, wildlife, seascapes and

landscapes, and maintenance of the health of ecosystems by ensuring their

resilience. More specifically, the committee is tasked to: Establish a process that will

lead to an integrated system of management for the coastal zone in the emirate;

Integrate the management of various coastal environments and resources by

incorporating proactive planning elements; Assist government authorities in the


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development of guidelines and regulations for decision-makers and technical staff;

Identify overlaps, redundancies, or gaps in coastal regulations and develop

strategies to resolve conflicts and address new and emerging concerns of coastal

zone matters; Develop mechanisms for the resolution of issues arising from

activities that may have an impact on the environmental quality of the coastal

ecosystems and to ensure sustainable coastal resource use and development, and;

Address the needs of an increasing coastal population.

Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) are conducted as part of the

responsibilities of the EAD to evaluate environmental and social impacts which

should be addressed before a project is implemented with the objective of

assessing the consequences of new projects or activities on the environment and

local community, providing information, choices, and options for informed decision-

making, and identifying alternatives and actions to mitigate adverse consequences.

Specific measures to protect sensitive habitats has led to the preparation and

implementation of conservation and management plans for coral reefs and other

habitats, and led to the establishment of 10 permanent coral reef monitoring

stations. The protection of marine biodiversity with special emphasis on

endangered species is critical to preserving marine assets and efforts in this area are

being supported by the recent signing of international MOUs on dugongs and sea

turtles conservation, and the development and implementation of conservation and

management plans for dugongs.

In conservation and management, establishing Biosphere Reserves and Protected

Areas to protect essential habitats and species has lead to one biosphere reserve

(Marawah Marine Biosphere Reserve) under the United Nations Environmental,

Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) ‘Man and the Biosphere’ (MAB)

program, and marine protected areas at Al Yasat (482 km2 in size) and Busiyyeyif

(282 km2 in size).

The promotion of sustainable development has also led to the adoption of better

fisheries management practices including gear modifications, reduction of fishing

capacity, and measures for rehabilitation of overexploited species. It has also led to


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the implementation of management practices to reduce land-based sources of

pollution through introducing reception facilities, marine debris clean-up programs,

the establishment of effluent limits, marine water quality monitoring.

Effective Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) requires the consideration of

a wide range of issues that cover biological, ecological, economical, social, cultural,

and governance factors. As a result, programs pertaining to information provision

are essential components of the ICZM process. Coastal and marine resources atlases

convey essential information to meeting requirements for policy-making, planning,

development, and implementing conservation measures for coastal and marine

environments.

The coastal resource atlas is based on a hierarchical Coastal and Marine Resources

and Ecosystem Classification System (CMRECS) developed by EAD for the Emirate of

Abu Dhabi. It provides a complete solution for aggregating data describing Abu

Dhabi’s coastal and marine resources into a comprehensive digital database. The

core of the system is a spatial data atlas containing all of Abu Dhabi’s coastal and

marine resources including habitat classifications, human and socio-economic

resources classifications, and an environmental vulnerability index for the coastal

and marine environment.


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Conclusion

Maritime Security Strategy

After a century where air superiority determined perceptions of overall force

capability, many analysts have written about the 21st century being, like the 19th

century, one of maritime power. As the coming decade is likely to testify, the multi-

dimensional challenge to national security for Gulf littoral states will place their

naval forces at the heart of integrated, across-the-board national security

architectures. Naval capability will be crucial in protecting key infrastructure nodes,

protecting critical national maritime interests, and in the exercise of national

sovereignty.

Key areas of overlapping concern in maritime security for GCC states include:

Protecting offshore oil and gas infrastructure against terrorist attack; Detecting and

preventing the illegal trafficking of people, weapons, goods, money, and rare

commodities into the peninsula; Building vaster countermeasure capabilities against

asymmetric warfare at sea; Enhancing surface- and underwater- surveillance and

detection capabilities; Enhancing real-time intelligence gathering, processing and

dissemination systems; Enhancing maritime picture and early warning information-

sharing at the GCC-level; Protecting sea-based components of the missile defense

network against attack at all costs; Developing response coordination protocols

against attack or disaster vertically among GCC states; Collaborating with

international actors and friendly forces in meeting common security objectives, and;

Avoiding a devastating regional conflict.

In meeting near-term maritime security challenges, force posture remains as critical

ever. The challenge of synchronizing acquisitions to match prioritized capability

demands will be particularly important as Gulf naval forces undergo force

transformation to adapt to a changing environment. This new environment is likely


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to be characterized by a potential arms race in the region and new emergent

threats in the maritime domain – particularly from terrorism and asymmetric

warfare.

As policing rather than power projection will likely define core maritime objectives

of GCC states for at least the next decade, expanding fleets of smaller craft such as

corvettes should be the near-term focus. Smaller, more agile craft would enable

wider and more efficient patrolling to be exercised around the peninsula and lay the

foundations for rapid response units that can deploy quickly to trouble spots –

especially offshore oil and gas facilities – as well as expand the net surveillance

system.

Protecting critical national assets such as offshore energy infrastructure which are

commonly comprised of heavily concentrated facilities will rest heavily on rapid

response capabilities given their vulnerabilities to attack. This is made all the more

important given most facilities already operate at full capacity and losses incurred

from any potential attack to them could carry heavy financial burdens due to long-

lead times of damage repair and low adaptability allowing for stop-gap

improvisations.

In the mid-term, the development of a region-wide maritime surveillance system

that draws more widely on automated surveillance technologies and is able to share

real time intelligence with GCC and other friendly forces will be increasingly

important. In particular, the Strait’s narrow passage provides an opportunity to use

as a gateway, allowing the monitoring of incoming and outgoing civilian traffic, and

movements in military traffic to create an accurate maritime picture. Greater use of

low-cost commercially available off-the-shelf technology solutions such as radio

frequency identification (RFID) could be used for identification purposes of not just

friendly forces, but also regularly visiting commercial vessels and regionally owned

tankers.

A region-wide maritime surveillance system would also represent a crucial step

forward towards the realization of a purpose-driven, long-term development of a

regional patrol and rapid response force. Given the near-identical maritime security


65

challenge to all GCC states, a joint GCC patrol and rapid response force tasked to

conduct operations in support of counterterrorism and SAR would be desirable not

just on the political level but also financially as it would avoid duplicated national

efforts in meeting common security objectives. Given the vital role of naval forces in

air- and missile- defense systems, any future GCC surveillance and information

exchange should ideally be integrated with a region-wide early warning system

against incoming airborne threats, paving the way for a comprehensive unified GCC

monitoring and response coordination center.

Effective mine countermeasure capabilities that can detect and counter very large

numbers of sea-mines will be crucial to exercising national sovereignty and

protecting critical national maritime interests in the region. On a regional level,

urgent investment in mine countermeasure assets is needed to minimize

vulnerabilities to asymmetric warfare tactics that would draw on a thorough use of

underwater and floating mines to cut-off sea lines of communication in a potential

conflict (which may not directly involve GCC states).

Unmanned aerial assets will provide navies of the future with the means for around

the clock surveillance and intelligence-gathering without having to spend large

amounts of resources and manpower on hard patrolling activities. Moreover, the

success of armed UAVs such as predator drones flown by the U.S. Central Command

in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also suggest a future role for similar assets in the

maritime domain. Precision-strike capabilities of more advanced UAV variants

would not only enable early preventative measures to be taken against asymmetric

threats and raise the costs of mounting disruptive operations, they would also boost

psychological warfare efforts through demonstrating a crippling use of force that is

difficult to counter.

Finally, the role of strategic partners such as France, the United States, and the UK

will be increasingly important in supporting regional efforts at developing the

technological capabilities and adopting best-practice operational principles to

buttress their deterrent against emerging regional threats. In this regard, political

support at the highest levels for joint industrial collaboration will be important as

between allies.


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The Franco-Emirati Strategic Partnership

Key lessons learned are based on several growing trend lines that include maritime

security and beyond. President Nicolas Sarkozy has gone beyond France's

traditional policy of selling arms to Gulf states by signing a deal with Abu Dhabi for a

permanent French naval base. This projects France into the complex politics of the

Gulf, identifying it even more closely with Gulf Arab countries which have expressed

concern about the future policies of Iran. President Sarkozy appears willing to

accept that this exposes France to the risks involved in such a sensitive area,

highlighted by the confrontation between Iranian speedboats and U.S. naval ships

recently.

There is also a dispute between Abu Dhabi and Iran over three small islands in the

Strait of Hormuz. The president said the base was agreed at the request of the

Emirates. In addition, France might be seen as aligning itself more openly with the

U.S., which maintains its own large base in Bahrain for the Fifth Fleet and which has

also been selling arms to Gulf countries. However, some might also welcome a

French presence as an alternative to the American. France is already playing an

active role in trying to increase sanctions on Iran over its refusal to accept Security

Council demands for a halt to uranium enrichment. Another significant element of

the deal is that France is lining up to construct two nuclear power reactors for Abu

Dhabi. This indicates the interest that Gulf states are showing in nuclear power,

despite their own oil and gas resources. It mirrors the growth of nuclear power in

Iran and of course the implications are the same, in that a capability in nuclear

power could turn into a capacity for nuclear weapons at some stage.

Overall, France has traditionally had a close relationship with the UAE. It has sold

Mirage jet fighters and AMX-30 tanks to the Emirate and has had a defense

agreement with it (mainly dealing with the support of arms contracts) since 1995.

But the establishment of a naval base and access to Abu Dhabi’s airfields gives

France a new ability to assist and project influence and power across the Arabian

Peninsula in the years to come.


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Appendix

Program of Maritime Security Cooperation Conference

First Day of Conference – May 25, 2009 Opening Session Keynote Addresses 09:00 - 09:10 Welcome address, Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA 09:10 - 09:30 His Highness Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Foreign Minister Of

the UAE 09:30 - 09:50 His Excellency Bernard Kouchner, Foreign Minister Of the French Republic 09:50 - 09:55 Exchange of gifts between Host, Guest and Organizers 09:55 - 10:20 Morning coffee break and networking 10:20 - 10:25 First Plenary Session:

Global and Regional Maritime Security Chaired by Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director, Research and Development, INEGMA

10:25 - 10:45 Global Geopolitical Challenges: A French Vision M. Olivier Darrason, Chairman, Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale (IHEDN), France

10:45 - 11.05 The Regional Approach to Strategic Partnerships H.E. Dr. Anwar Mohammad Gargash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Minister of State for Federal National Council Affairs, UAE

11:05 - 11:25 Challenges of Establishing Strategic Partnerships Admiral Luciano Zappata, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, NATO

11:25 - 11:45 Panel Discussion 11:45 - 12:15 Networking break, refreshments, and prayers

Second Plenary Session 12:15-12:20 Key Factors of a Maritime Safety and Security Strategy

Chaired by General (R’td) Khalid Abdullah Al Buainnan, Former Commander, UAE Air Force and Air Defense, President, INEGMA

12:20 - 12:40 The French Comprehensive Approach


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Michel Miraillet, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, France 12:40 - 13:00 The UAE Vision on Strategic Partnerships

H.E. Staff Colonel Pilot Sheikh Saeed bin Hamdan Al Nahyan, Director, Operations and Training, UAE Navy

13:00 - 13:20 Developing a Collective Maritime Security Strategy: Needs & Goals Vice Admiral William Gortney, Commander, Naval Forces Central Command, Commander, Fifth Fleet, Commander, Combined Maritime Forces, United States

13:20 - 13:40 Panel Discussion 13:40 - 15:00 Luncheon and prayers 15:00 - 16:30 First Round of Working Groups

Threats, Risks and Vulnerabilities (Workshops running parallel)

1. Piracy, Security and Safety of SLOC’s Moderator: Vice Admiral Gerard Valin, Commander, French Forces in the Indian Ocean Ms. Anne Sophie Ave, Director General, Armateurs de France, France Rear Admiral (R'td) Jacob Schuford, Former President, U.S. Naval War College, United States Rear Admiral Phillip Jones, Commander, European Operation Atalanta

2. Terrorism and Asymmetric Threats Moderator: Brigadier Ibrahim Salem Al Musharakh, Deputy Commander, UAE Navy Dr. Anthony Cordesman, Burke Chair for Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), United States Rear Admiral Marin Gillier, Commander, Navy Special Forces, France Camille Grand, Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France

3. Illegal Maritime Activities - Goods & Human Trafficking Moderator: Pascal Chaigneau, Director, Centre d’Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques, France Pierre Lellouche, Member of French Parliament, Special Representative of France to Aghanistan and Pakistan, France Vice Admiral Xavier Magne, Maritime and Air Operations, Assistant Chief of Staff, France Vice Admiral Raimondo Pollastrini, Commander, Italian Coast Guard 4. Pollution, Environmental Disasters, and Preserving Fishing Maritime Resources: International and Regional Challenges


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Moderator: Jon Hutton, Director, World Environment Monitoring Centre, United Nations Thabit Zahran Al Abdessalaam, Director, Marine Biodiversity Management, Environment Agency Abu Dhabi, UAE Emmanuel Fontaine, Attorney at Law, Oil Maritime Pollution Specialist, France Damien Cazé, Director, Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable development and Spatial Planning, France

16:30 Close of first day of conference 20:00 Gala Dinner Reception Second Day of Conference – May 26, 2009 08:00 - 08:10 Third Plenary Session Technology and Cooperation

Chaired by Professor Gilles Kepel, Chairman, Middle East Studies, Sciences-Po Paris, EuroGolf, France and Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director, Research and Development, INEGMA

08:10 - 08:30 Key Factors for Successful Cooperation Jean-Francois Tallec, Secretary General for the Sea, France

08:30 - 08:50 Naval Technological Advances in C4I Major General (R'td) Abdullah Al Hashemi, Former Deputy Commander of UAE Air Force and Air Defense

08:50 - 09:10 Sea-Based Air Defense: The Navy’s Role in Missile Defense Network H.E. Dr. Abdullah Toukan, Non-Resident Scholar, INEGMA

09:10 - 09:30 Panel Discussion 09:30 - 10:00 Morning coffee break and networking Second Round of Working Groups 10:00-11.30 “The Need for Cooperation” (Working groups running parallel)

1. Maritime Intelligence (Surveillance and Information Exchange) Moderator: Rear Admiral (R’td) John Sigler, Deputy Director, National Defense University, United States Mike Coulter, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States Frederic Fave, Director Safety, Security, & Environment Department, CMA-CGM, France

Professeur Forcade, Professor, Sorbonne University, France


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2. New Technologies: Impact on Maritime Challenges – Industrial Implications, Joint Ventures, and Civil Companies Moderator: Brigadier General Jacques Roujansky, Head of “Protection and Safeguard,” DGA (French Defense Acquisition Organization), French Forces

Bill Saltzer, CEO, Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB), UAE Vice Admiral (R'td) Xavier Rolin, Corporate Defense Adviser, Thalès Moayad Samman, CEO, King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB), Jordan 3. Disaster Relief: Search & Rescue Operations & Role of Naval Assets in Aid Missions Moderator: Rear Admiral Ali Al Moallem, Commander, Lebanese Navy Vice Admiral (R'td) Kevin Cosgriff, Former Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet, United States Amar Daoudi, Director, Logistics, World Food Program, United Nations Alain Perret, Director, Homeland Security Department, Ministère de l’Intérieur, France 4. Energy, Oil and Gas Geopolitical and Economical Challenges – Gulf Cooperation Council & Europe Moderator: Olivier Appert, Chairman and CEO, Institut Français du Pétrole, France

Jerome Ferrier, Director, Global Security Total, France Ms. Ruba Husari, Middle East Energy Expert

5. International Security Organizations: Local, Sub-Regional, Regional and International Moderator: Rear Admiral (R'td) Dr. Samir El Khadem, Former Commander, Lebanese Navy

Francis Vallat, Chairman, Institut Français de la Mer, France Dr. Eric Thompson, Director, International Affairs Group, Center for Naval Analysis, United States Captain George McCarthy, Head of Outreach and Coordination, Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness, United States

11:30 - 12:00 Networking break, refreshments, and prayers 12:00 - 12:05 Final Plenary Session “The Way Ahead”

Chaired by: Brig. Gen. Rashad Al Shibani, Commander of Staff College, UAE Armed Forces

12:05 - 12:20 Improving International Maritime Security Cooperation Admiral Pierre-François Forissier, Commander, French Navy

INEGMA� ��Strategies�in�Contemporary�Maritime�Security�

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71�

12:20��12:35�� Improving�Gulf�Maritime�Security�Cooperation��Rear�Admiral�Mohammed�Al�Sabab�Al�Tenaiji,�Commander,�UAE�Navy�

12:35��12:50�� Panel�Discussion��12:50��13:00�� Closing�remarks�by�Riad�Kahwaji�and�close�of�conference��13:00��14:00�� Luncheon��

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72�

� �

His�Excellency�Bernard�Kouchner,�Foreign�Minister�of�the�French�Republic�and�His�Highness�Sheikh�Abdullah�bin�Zayed�Al�Nahyan,�Foreign�Minister�of�the�UAE�

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Left�to�Right:�Rear�Admiral�Mohammed�Al�Sabab�Al�Tenaiji,�Commander,�UAE�Navy�with�Brigadier�Ibrahim�Salem�Al�Musharakh,�Deputy�Commander,�UAE�Navy,�and�Admiral�Pierre�François�Forissier,�Commander,�French�Navy,�with�his�Office�Chief�of�Staff�


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73�

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Right�to�Left:�H.H.�Sheikh�Abdullah�bin�Zayed�Al�Nahyan,�Foreign�Minister�of�the�UAE,�H.E.�Bernard�Kouchner,�Foreign�Minister�of�the�French�Republic,�Lieutenant�General�Prince�Fahd�bin�Abdullah,�Commander,�Royal�Saudi�Naval�Forces,��and�Admiral�Luciano�Zappata,�Deputy�Supreme�Allied�Commander�Transformation,�NATO��

�� Left�to�Right:�Rear�Admiral�Al�Tenaiji,�Commander,�UAE�Navy,��Vice�Admiral�Gortney,�Commander,�Naval�Forces�Central,�United�States,�Vice�Admiral�Valin,�Commander,�French�Joint�Forces�in�the�Indian�Ocean,�and��Brigadier�Ibrahim�Salem�Al�Musharakh,�Deputy�Commander,�UAE�Navy�listening�in�onto�the�commentary�of�a�presentation�


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74�

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Left�to�Right:�Brigadier�Khaled�Saif�Al�Naser,�Deputy�Commander,�Qatar�Emiri�Navy�Forces,�Brigadier�General�Abdullah�Saeed�Al�Mansoori,�Commander,�Royal�Bahrain�Naval�Force,�Rear�Admiral�Ali�Al�Moallem,�Commander,�Lebanese�Navy,�and�Colonel�Mohammed�Rasheed�Al�Raisi,�Director,�Operations�and�Training,�Royal�Navy�of�Oman�watch�a�presentation�

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�� Left�to�Right:�General�(R’td)�Khalid�Abdullah�Al�Buainnan,�President�of�INEGMA�and�Former�Commander,�UAE�Air�Force�and�Air�Defense�presenting�a�gift�to�Admiral�Pierre�François�Forissier,�Commander,�French�Navy�


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75�

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Left�to�Right:�Michel�Miraillet,�Under�Secretary�of�Defense�for�Policy,�France,�delivering�a�presentation�while�H.E.�Staff�Colonel�Pilot�Sheikh�Saeed�bin�Hamdan�Al�Nahyan,�Director,�Operations�&�Training,�UAE�Navy,�Vice�Admiral�William�Gortney,�Commander,�Naval�Forces�Central�Command,�U.S.,�and�Riad�Kahwaji,�CEO,�INEGMA�look��

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onLeft�to�Right:�Rear�Admiral�Mohammed�Al�Sabab�Al�Tenaiji,�Commander,�UAE�Navy�being�presented�a�gift�by�Rear�Admiral�Ali�Al�Moallem,�Commander,�Lebanese�Navy,�and�His�Excellency�Fauzi�Yusuf�Fawaz,�Lebanese�Ambassador�to�the�UAE��


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76�

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Left�to�Right:�H.E.�Dr.�Anwar�Mohammad�Gargash,�Minister�of�State�for�Foreign�Affairs,�UAE,�M.�Olivier�Darrason,�Chairman,�Institut�des�Hautes�Etudes�de�la�Défense�Nationale�(IHEDN),�France,�and�Admiral�Luciano�Zappata,�Deputy�Supreme�Allied�Commander�Transformation,�NATO�in�a�panel�discussion�

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Left�to�Right:�Admiral�Pierre�François�Forissier,�Commander,�French�Navy,�and�Lieutenant�General�Prince�Fahd�bin�Abdullah,�Commander,�Royal�Saudi�Naval�Forces�exchange�views.�In�the�background,�H.E.�Dr.�Anwar�Mohammad�Gargash,�Minister�of�State�for�Foreign�Affairs,�UAE,�speaks�with�Michel�Miraillet,�Under�Secretary�of�Defense�for�Policy,�France�

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