strategic theory for practitioners

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THEORY FOR PRACTITIONERS:

THE R OLE OF STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN PROFESSIONAL

MILITARY EDUCATION

by

Thomas G. Mahnken

Professor of StrategyU.S. Naval War College

686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841

(401) [email protected]

A paper presented at the 98th Annual Meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociation, August 29 – September 1, 2002 in Boston, Massachusetts.



1

At no time in recent memory has there been a greater need to think afresh about

how to use force to achieve political objectives. The United States and its allies are

waging a protracted global war against radical Islamic terrorists and their supporters,

adversaries who look and act much differently than past foes. To be victorious, we will

need soldiers and statesmen who are capable of devising creative ways to defeat our

enemies. The global war on terrorism occurs against the backdrop of even larger changes

in the character and conduct of warfare. Over the next several decades, the growth and

spread of the information revolution will transform how wars are fought. To exploit this

revolution, we will need officers who can think about ways to harness new ways of war

to achieve our aims.

In a period marked by so much change, it is all the more important for soldiers

and statesmen to distinguish that which is novel in warfare from that which is enduring.

The best guide to understanding the nature of warfare is that provided by the classical

approach to strategy. This article argues that an understanding of the theory and practice

of strategy should be at the core of professional military education. To be useful to

practitioners, a course on strategy must balance theory and application. It should

challenge the student to think critically about strategic issues. By teaching officers to

think strategically, we improve the quality of advice that the military is able to provide

civilian authority.



2

SOLDIERS ANDSTRATEGY

Soldiers are not a bookish lot. The military profession by and large values practice

and experience over education. One rarely, if ever, finds soldiers reading Clausewitz in

the field. On War is a complex book and is at any rate too large to stuff into the pocket of

one’s utilities. The institutional military, for its part, is highly ambivalent about

professional military education. Since 1945, only one graduate of the Naval War College

has risen to become Chief of Naval Operations. And for many military instructors,

teaching at a professional military education institution is a terminal assignment.

And yet profession of arms is by its very nature highly theoretical. Unlike

members of other vocations, soldiers practice their trade only intermittently. Instead, they

spend most of their time studying and training. An officer may devote an entire career to

preparing for war without ever actually waging it.

If the military has a claim to a unique body of professional literature, it is that

dealing with strategy, operational art, and tactics. While strategy has many definitions,1

what follows is based upon the notion that it is “the art of distributing and applying

military means to fulfill the ends of policy”2 or “the use of engagements for the object of

the war.”3 Strategy is the essential link between political objectives and military force.

Even the most basic political aims are unobtainable without a sound strategy. Similarly,

1 See, for example, Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17-23; B.

H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd

edition (New York: Praeger, 1967), part IV; Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy:

The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), Appendix 1. 2 Liddell Hart, Strategy, 335. 3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War , ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1976), 128. While this paper focuses upon strategy in wartime, the concept is equally

applicable in peacetime. However, in practice the two may be quite different. In war, strategy is aimed atimposing one’s will on one’s adversary. In peace, it involves force planning and the development of

various tools of competition.



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as the German army demonstrated in two world wars, mastery of the operational level of

war counts for little without a coherent strategy.

Strategic theory guides soldiers and statesmen as they contemplate using force,

helping them to recognize the underlying strategic logic of a situation. However, even the

most elegant strategic maxim is useless if it lacks feasible application. Because strategy is

a practical subject, strategic theory must provide answers that are useful to the

practitioner. It succeeds or fails in direct proportion to its ability to help decision makers

formulate sound strategy. As Bernard Brodie put it, “Strategy is a field where truth is

sought in the pursuit of viable solutions.”4

The classical approach to strategy, as represented by the works of Clausewitz, Sun

Tzu, Machiavelli, and Thucydides, is based on four key tenets. First and foremost, war is

a political instrument. It is a means to an end, used to advance or protect the interests of

the state.5 Second, war should be waged as rationally as possible. For war to be an

effective means to achieving political aims, the political leadership should set clear goals

and weigh the cost and benefit of war carefully. Third, however, there are limits to

rationality. Passion, friction, chance, and uncertainty are cons tant features of war. They

cannot be wished away, no matter how much one would like to do so. Finally, war cannot

be abolished. As long as there are political units, and as long as they have interests, and

as long as those interests clash, war is always a possibility.

In recent years, both scholars and practitioners have questioned the utility of the

classical approach. First, some have argued that the advent of the information age has

4 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 452-3. 5 War can, however, do quite well in the absence of states. Empires, city-states, confederations, and sub-

national groups have all used war to preserve or aggrandize themselves.



4

invalidated traditional theories of warfare. They claim that technology either has or will

soon overcome much of the friction that has historically characterized combat.6 As

Admiral William A. Owens wrote several years ago:

Military theorists from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz have pointed out the value

of understanding one’s enemies and the geographical-political-social-context in which they operate. What is different, however, is that some

technologies – available either now or soon – will give the United Statesan edge that approaches omniscience, at least relative to any potentialopponent.7

Those who take this view argue that the advent of the information age demands a new

body of strategic theory, one drawing its inspiration from business theory, economics, or

the so-called new physical sciences. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J.

Garstka, for example, have written that “there is as yet no equivalent to Carl von

Clausewitz’s On War ” for the information age (emphasis added). The implicit

assumption, of course, is that such a work is needed.8

A second group agrees that the classical approach to strategy is anachronistic, but

for a much different reason. These critics allege that the utility of the classical approach

is limited to wars between armies and states, whereas war today more often involves

trans- or sub-national groups.9 In John Keegan’s characterization, Clausewitzian thought

makes “no allowances for…war without beginning or end, the endemic warfare of non-

6 Admiral Bill Owens with Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2000), 11-

15. 7 Admiral William A. Owens, High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World (Annapolis, MD:

Naval Institute Press, 1995), 133. 8 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and

Future,” Proceedings 124, no. 1 (January 1998): 29. 9 See, for example, John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993); Martin van

Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991).



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state, even pre-state peoples.”10 Implicit in this critique is the assumption that such

conflicts obey logic distinct from those involving states.

Finally, some have argued that strategy itself is an illusion. In this view, strategic

concepts are misleading, even harmful. The military historian Russell Weigley has

written that “War in the twentieth century is no longer the extension of politics by other

means. It is doubtful whether the aphorism affirming that war is such an extension of

politics was ever true enough to warrant the frequency with which it has been

repeated.”11 Others have taken issue with strategic concepts. Mark Cancian, a Colonel in

the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, has argued that the concept of a center (or centers) of

gravity is “a myth.”12

While each of these arguments has its adherents, each is flawed. Like the Bible,

On War is more frequently quoted then read, more often perused than comprehended.

Those who criticize Clausewitz have at best a limited understanding of his strategic

thought.13 First, while the growth and spread of stealth, precision, and information

technology has had a dramatic influence on recent conflicts and portends even greater

changes, there is as yet no evidence that it has altered the fundamental nature of war.

Recent conflicts have demonstrated the enduring value of such concepts as friction and

the culminating point of victory. Indeed, both played a central role in the decision to

10 Keegan, A History of Warfare, 5. 11 Russell F. Weigley, “Political and Strategic Dimensions to Military Effectiveness” in Allan R. Millett

and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, vol. III, The Second World War (Boston: Allen &

Unwin, 1988), 341. 12 Colonel Mark Cancian, USMCR, “Centers of Gravity Are a Myth,” Proceedings 124, no. 9 (September

1998). 13 Christopher Bassford, “John Keegan and the General Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic,”

War in History (November 1994): 319-336.



6

terminate the Gulf War after one hundred hours of ground combat. 14 If anything, the

increasing complexity of modern war may if anything actually multiply sources of

friction.

Proponents of new “theories of war” drawn from business literature and science

frequently confuse novelty with utility. As Richard K. Betts has correctly noted, “Critics

would have to demonstrate that more recent and numerous theories in other fields are

better theories – more useful to understanding the world – than the fewer and older ones

of strategy. Theories may endure because each new one proves wanting. One

Clausewitz is still worth a busload of most other theorists.”15

Second, it is unclear that war involving non-state actors is any different from that

between states. The strategic questions most relevant to America’s war with Al Qaeda

differ little from those in previous wars. While Al Qaeda looks and operates much

differently than a conventional state adversary, it is nonetheless a strategic actor. Its

leadership has well-defined political objectives and attempts to use force to achieve

them.16 Indeed, Al Qaeda supporters have been known to look to strategic theorists such

as Sun Tzu for guidance on how best to wage war.17

14 See, for example, Thomas G. Mahnken, “A Squandered Opportunity? The Decision to End the Gulf

War” in Andrew J. Bacevich and Efraim Inbar, eds., The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered (London: Frank

Cass, 2003). 15 Richard K. Betts, “Should Strategic Studies Survive?” World Politics 50 (October 1997), 29. 16 See, for example, Ahmed S. Hashim, “The World According to Usama Bin Laden,” Naval War College

Review 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 11-35. 17 Abu-Ubayd al-Qurashi , “Al-Qa’ida and the Art of War,” Al-Ansar WWW-Text in Arabic, January 15,

2002: 11-15, FBIS document ID GMP20020220000183[0].



7

Third, those who argue that strategy is an illusion confuse the difficulty of

executing strategy with the existence of an underlying strategic logic.18 It may be difficult

to develop strategy to achieve vague or opaque political goals. Some strategic concepts

may be of limited utility in practice. It may prove impossible to identify the culminating

point of victory a priori. And leaders may be unable to estimate the value of an objective

before the fact. But each of these concepts is nonetheless important for strategists to take

into account.

The concept of a center of gravity is certainly problematic. It may prove

extremely difficult to identify an adversary’s center of gravity. In other cases, leaders

may differ in their assessment of their adversary’s center of gravity, as did General

Wesley Clark and Lieutenant General Michael Short during Operation Allied Force,

NATO’s air war over Serbia and Kosovo. 19 Or, having identified it, it may prove

impossible to attack. However valid such qualifications may be, it does not follow,

however, that the concept of a center of gravity is useless. Indeed, the notion that an

adversary no center of gravity and no vulnerabilities is profoundly astrategic, for it denies

the existence of comparative advantage. More practically, without a focus for military

operations, the commander is left with guesswork or mindless violence. Critics would do

better to try to come up with a viable alternative concept.

That critiques of the classical approach are unconvincing is not to say that

existing theories of war hold all the answers. Clausewitz has little to say about the

18 Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000); Colin S. Gray,

“Why Strategy is Difficult,” Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1999): 7-12. 19 General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 242.



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impact of technology on war, for example.20 And his views of intelligence are

anachronistic. Yet those who reject the classical approach to strategy have nothing to

offer in its place. Indeed, by rejecting strategic thought one must also discard the notion

of the use of force as an instrument of policy.

TEACHING STRATEGY

Strategy is more an art than a science. Teachers cannot train their students to

develop sound strategy. Rather, a course in strategy should be designed to inculcate in

officers a habit of thought, to teach them to think strategically. It cannot provide them

with prescriptions; it can, however, offer insight into the underlying logic of war. As

Clausewitz put it, “Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems,

nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a

hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of

phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of

action.”21

Since strategy is utilitarian, the study of strategy must combine theory and

application. As Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner enjoined students at the Naval War

College thirty years ago:

Always keep in mind that the product which the country desperately needsis military men with the capability of solving complex problems and ofexecuting their decisions. Scholarship for scholarship’s sake is of no

importance to us. You must keep your sights on decision making or

20 Michael I. Handel, “Clausewitz in the Age of Technology” in idem., War, Strategy, and Intelligence

(London: Frank Cass, 1989). 21 Clausewitz, On War , 578



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problem solving as your objective. Problems are not solved by standard or pat solutions, especially not in terms of such rapid change as we are now

experiencing.22

A good course in strategy is not a theory course. Rather, it should use theory to suggest

how to ask the right questions and provide insight into the range or potential answers.

Nor is it a history course. Rather, it should use historical case studies to illuminate

various strategic problems and potential responses.

A course in strategy may present its subject matter in any number of ways. One

may teach historically, beginning with the Napoleonic Wars or American Civil War and

working forward to the present. Or one may choose a thematic approach, drawing upon

different historical cases to highlight selected themes in the conduct of war. Each has its

own strengths and weaknesses. A chronological treatment is likely to be easier for

students to grasp, particularly if their understanding of history is limited. On the other

hand, it can all too easily lapse into diplomatic or military history while obscuring the

underlying theory of war. The thematic approach has the great advantage of highlighting

enduring concepts. Its main disadvantage is that it can produce a superficial

understanding of strategy, one detached from historical experience.

A course in strategy should have three components: theories, themes, and case

studies. Theories provide the intellectual framework for the study of strategy. Themes

translate this framework into practical considerations for the strategist. And a critical

analysis of historical cases offers a way to explore theories and themes in action.

22 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, “Convocation Address”, reprinted in Naval War College Review 51, no.

1 (Winter 1998): 79.



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Much of what follows is based upon the method used to teach strategy at the U.S.

Naval War College over the past three decades. Its aim is “to enhance the capability

of…officers to make sound decisions in both command and management positions.”23 It

is obviously but one of many potential approaches. It is, however, one that has proven

quite successful and has been widely emulated by other professional military education

institutions and civilian universities.24

Theories

Strategic theory provides the conceptual foundation of an understanding of

strategy. It offers the student a toolkit that he can use to analyze strategic problems. In

Clausewitz’s view, the purpose of theory was not to uncover fundamental, unchanging

truths about war, but rather to educate the mind. As he wrote:

[Theory] is an analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience – in our case, to military history –

it leads to a thorough familiarity with it… Theory will have fulfilled itsmain task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, todistinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the

properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, todefine clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phasesof warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to

anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way,ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls…It is

meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately,to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual

23 Ibid ., 74-75. 24 Professional military education institutions that have used this approach include the U.S. Army War

College (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/dmspo/ASAP/Strategic_Art_Lessons.htm). Civilian

universities include Georgetown University, the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced

International Studies (http://www.sais -jhu.edu/depts/strategic/courses/sp2001/syllabus.html); TuftsUniversity’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (http://fletcher.tufts.edu/staff/rshultz/P241.html), the

University of Maryland, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University.



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development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of hislife.25

An understanding of Clausewitz should form the cornerstone of the study of

strategy.26

On War ’s greatest strengths are its sophisticated treatment of the role of

politics in war as well as its explanation of war’s interactive nature. The book also

contains a number of fundamental strategic concepts, including friction, the center of

gravity, the rational calculus of war, and the culminating point of victory. Historians tend

to view Clausewitz and his writings as a product of the Napoleonic era. In a course on

strategy, however, he should be treated as any other political theorist: as a thinker whose

work transcends his time in many important respects. 27 At the same time, the instructor

should examine aspects of Clausewitz’s thought that may have less relevance today, such

as his view of the limited utility of intelligence. He should also explore important

dimensions of war that are under-represented in On War , such as the role of technology.

It makes sense to augment Clausewitz with other theorists. However, it is better to

explore at most a handful of theorists in depth than to treat a larger number superficially.

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War provides a stark contrast with On War on the role of

intelligence and deception in warfare together with the prospects of winning without

fighting.28 Students will find both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu challenging: whereas On War

is often a thicket of prose, much of The Art of War is made up of deceptively simple

aphorisms. Mao Tse-tung, while in many respects derivative of Sun Tzu, is worthy of

25 Clausewitz, On War , 141. 26 See, for example, Gray, Modern Strategy, ch. 4. 27 Eliot A. Cohen, “Strategy: Causes, Conduct and Termination of War” in Richard Shultz, Roy Godson,

and Ted Greenwood, eds., Security Studies for the 1990s (Washington: Brassey’s 1993), 83. 28 While many translations of Sun Tzu are available, the best are Sun Tzu, The Art of War , trans. Samuel

B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare, trans. Roger Ames

(New York: Ballentine Press, 1993).



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study because of his attention to how a weak power can defeat its much stronger

adversary, an aspect of war that Clausewitz does not fully address.29 While Julian

Corbett’s intellectual pedigree is explicitly Clausewitzian, his examination of how navies

can help fight and win wars goes beyond the work of the master. He also develops more

than Clausewitz the distinction between wars fought for limited and unlimited aims. 30

Henri Jomini and Alfred Thayer Mahan are worthy of discussion because of their failure

to take strategic interaction into account.31

There are two basic approaches to teaching strategic theory. The first is to view it

as comprising a single body of thought.32

The second is to treat different theorists as

offering alternative approaches to strategy. Either can be successful. However, the

instructor should be clear in his own mind as to the path he has chosen.

Themes

Because there are few fixed rules in strategy, it is both misleading and futile to

offer students formulas for success in war. Instead, it is useful to present them with

recurring strategy and policy themes. These themes accustom students to asking

questions and getting a feel for the answers. Over a period of several years, the faculty of

the Naval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department has developed nine interrelated

themes for use in the critical analysis of historical case studies. They are divided into two

29 Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1967). 30 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1911). 31 Baron de Jomini, The Art of War , trans. G.H. Mendenhall and W.P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B.

Lippincott, 1862); Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783 (New York:

Hill and Wang, 1957). 32 This is the approach taken in Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought , 3

rd

revised and expanded edition (London: Frank Cass, 2001).



13

broad categories: those dealing with the process of strategy making, and those

concerning the environment in which that process takes place (see Appendix A):

The Process of Strategy Making

1. The Policy-Strategy Match

2. Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans3. The Instruments of War

4. Interaction and Adaptation5. War Termination

The Environment of Strategy Making

6. The International Dimension of Strategy

7. The Material Dimension of Strategy

8. The Institutional Dimension of Strategy9. The Social Dimension of Strategy

These are not meant to be an exhaustive checklist. Rather, they are meant to serve as a

point of departure for analysis and discussion.

Case Studies

Having equipped students with a range of theoretical tools and a series of

considerations, the instructor should give students the opportunity to apply these concepts

in the context of historical case studies. These should both allow students to explore the

full range of themes and portray the variety of strategic situations that may occur. These

include wars fought for limited and unlimited objectives, unilateral and coalition wars,

theater and global wars, conventional and unconventional wars, and wars fought by land

and sea powers.

Wars fought for l imi ted and unl imi ted objectives : As Clausewitz notes, wars

fought for limited political objectives, such as the annexation of territory, are



14

fundamentally different from those fought for unlimited aims, such as the overthrow of

the adversary’s regime.33 Success in the former type of war often turns on the balance of

mobilized forces as well as operational skill. Victory in the latter type of conflict is often

the result of economic mobilization, coalition solidarity, and popular support. The

termination of limited wars requires negotiation; peace in unlimited wars is dictated. For

these and other reasons it is worthwhile to explore both types of conflict. Good examples

of wars fought for limited aims are the Wars of German Unification, the Russo-Japanese

War, the Korean War, and the Gulf War; those fought for unlimited aims include the

Napoleonic Wars and the two world wars.

Uni lateral and coaliti on wars: Waging a war as part of a coalition introduces

new considerations for the strategist.34 Coalition management often becomes a

significant undertaking during the course of a war, while coalition considerations

frequently impinge upon war termination and the crafting of a postwar settlement. The

Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II, and the Gulf War all offer excellent cases

that can be used to examine these issues.

Theater and global wars: Some wars are confined to a single theater of

operations, while others span multiple theaters, even the globe. Each carries unique

challenges with it. The former presents strategists with the opportunity for (or threat of)

horizontal escalation. The latter requires strategists to consider the apportionment of

33 As Clausewitz wrote, “War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the

enemy – to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace

we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier districts so that we can annex them or use them for

bargaining at the peace negotiations. Transitions from one type to the other will of course recur in my

treatment; but the fact that the aims of the two types are quite different must be clear at all times, and their

points of irreconcilability brought out.” Clausewitz, On War , 69. 34 Even unilateral wars involve coalitions, in that one or more belligerents frequently seeks to deny the

adversary a coalition.



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effort between theaters. A course on strategy should consider both types. Examples of

theater wars include the Russo-Japanese War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the

Gulf War; examples of global wars are the Seven Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars,

World War I, and World War II.

Conventi onal and unconventional wars: A course on strategy should explore

various forms of warfare. Such an exploration should include a discussion of the

elements common to all forms of warfare as well as the features unique to revolutionary

wars, insurgencies, and terrorism. These include the marked asymmetry in material

power of the two sides, the use of strategies of protracted war, and the importance of

popular mobilization. Examples of unconventional wars include the American

Revolutionary War, Chinese Civil War, French Indochina War, Algerian Civil War, and

the Vietnam War.

Land powers and sea powers: The interplay between land (or continental) and

sea (or maritime) powers is another recurring theme in the history of strategy. Each type

of state has its strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, as Phillip II’s Spain, Napoleon’s

France and Hitler’s Germany all found out, it is difficult for a land power to come to

grips with a sea power. The opposite is also true. The Peloponnesian War, the Punic

Wars, the Napoleonic Wars, the Russo-Japanese War, and the two world wars all offer

excellent cases that can be used to illustrate these dynamics.

A critical analysis of historical case studies should explore not only the strategic

decisions that were taken, but also those that were not taken. As a result, counterfactuals

can become a powerful pedagogical tool. In recent years both history and international



16

relations have given increased attention to the use of counterfactuals.35 As one might

expect, the result has been a mixed bag. Some efforts are good, others mediocre, others

still are silly, bringing to mind the counterfactuals explored in several of the early

episodes of Saturday Night Live, such as, “What if Eleanore Roosevelt Could Fly?” or

“What if Spartacus Had a Piper Cub?”

In a course on strategy it is worthwhile to ask how the course and outcome of a

particular conflict might have been different.36 It is difficult to understand the seemingly

mindless slaughter that characterized World War I on the Western Front, for example,

without considering the alternatives open to the Entente and Central Powers. Similarly,

World War II might have played out much differently had the Japanese military chosen to

undertake its southward advance without attacking Pearl Harbor or the Philippines, or if

Hitler had chosen not to declare war on the United States. Similarly, the course and

outcome of the war in Europe could have been dramatically different if the Allies had

chosen to launch a cross-channel invasion in 1943 instead of 1944, as the U.S. military

advocated,37 or if Operation Overlord had failed, as Eisenhower and Marshall feared it

might.

35 Collections of historical counter-factuals include Robert Cowley, ed., What If? (New York: G.P.

Putnam’s Sons, 1999); Harold Deutsch and Dennis Showalter, eds., What If?: Strategic Alternatives of

WWII (Chicago: Emperor’s Press, 1997); Peter G. Tsouras, ed., Rising Sun Victorious (Mechanicsburg, PA:

Stackpole Books, 2001; Peter G. Tsouras, ed., Third Reich Victorious (Mechanicsburg, PA: StackpoleBooks, 2002). For a discussion of counter-factuals in international relations theory, see Philip E. Tetlock

and Aaron Belkin, eds., Countefactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological,

and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).36 Indeed, if outcome couldn’t have been different, then the case probably shouldn’t be studied in a course

on strategy, because strategy didn’t play a role in its outcome. 37 John Grigg makes the case for a 1943 cross-channel invasion in idem.,1943: The Victory That Never

Was (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980). It should be noted, however, that the failure of such an invasionwould have had dramatic consequences for the Allies, and in particular Britain’s willingness to undertake

subsequent offensive operations.



17

One useful exercise is to try to win the war for the losing side. Particularly in

cases where the two sides were fairly evenly matched, such as World War I, it is not all

that difficult to envision how the loser might have triumphed. The same is true of wars

where the weaker side in fact prevailed. One can without too much difficulty make a

compelling case that Russia could easily have won the Russo-Japanese War, or that the

Nationalist government could have defeated the Chinese Communists during the Chinese

Civil War. It is also worthwhile to explore how the victor might have achieved his aims

more quickly or at lesser cost. For example, however lopsided the battlefield results of

the Gulf War, it is clear that the end of the war did not bring peace. It is therefore

worthwhile to explore strategic alternatives to the termination of the war that might have

yielded a more satisfactory outcome. In each case, consideration of how things might

have been different lays bare the underlying strategic logic and forces students to think

strategically.

CONCLUSION

Some 2,500 years ago the Spartan King Archidamus asked a question that

strategists throughout history have asked: “What then is to be our war?”38 Today, in a

time and place much different from ancient Greece, strategists are called upon to answer

questions that differ little from those the Athenians and Spartans faced at the outbreak of

the Peloponnesian War. These include: Who or what are our adversaries? What are our

adversaries’ strengths and weaknesses? What are our strengths and weaknesses? What

are our political objectives? What must we do to achieve them? What can military force

38 R. B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides (New York: Free Press, 1996), 1:81.



18

accomplish? What can’t it accomplish? How will we know when we have achieved our

political objectives? This is no coincidence. While we live in an era of great

technological change, the fundamentals of strategy endure. As a result, the classical

approach to strategy remains the best guide available to understanding the nature of war.



19

Appendix A

Strategy and Policy Themes

The Process of Strategy Making

1. The Policy/Strategy Match . What were the political objectives of the belligerents?Was military force the best means to achieve the political objectives or were other meansat least as promising? If the option of force was selected, were policy limitations placed

on its use? If so, were these limitations so stringent as to reduce the chances of success?Were the political goals clearly articulated and understood? Did the political aim call for

the removal from power of the enemy’s regime or for a more limited objective?

How valuable were the political objectives to the belligerents? Were the costs

and the risks of the war anticipated and were they commensurate with the benefits andrewards to be achieved? How carefully were alternative strategies considered? What

assumptions did statesmen and military leaders make about the linkage between theachievement of military objectives and the achievement of political objectives?

2 . I ntell igence, Assessment, and Plans . How reliable and complete was the intelligence

collected prior to the war? How accurately was it interpreted, and how well were itslimits understood? Was a serious effort made to analyze the ‘lessons’ of previous warsand if so how did this influence the making of strategy?

Was strategy based upon an objective net assessment of friendly and enemy

strengths and weaknesses? Was account taken of the possibility of non-rational behavior by the enemy or of the existence of differences in culture, political systems, and strategic

traditions? Did military leaders and statesmen correctly predict the nature of the war onwhich they were embarking?

What did planners identify as the center or centers of gravity of the enemy? Or did

other concepts guide planners in their choice of what to attack? To what extent did plansrely upon strategic deception and surprise? Did planning make adequate allowances forthe fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war?

3 . The Instruments of War . Did political and military leaders understand the

capabilities of the different forms of military power at their disposal in terms of theirstrategic effects as well as operational effectiveness? Did strategists properly take into

account operational, logistical or other physical constraints on the deployment andemployment of the available instruments of war?

Did strategists understand how to integrate the different forms of military

power in the most strategically effective way? Did those in command of the differentinstruments of war share a common set of assumptions about how the use of force would



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translate into the achievement of the political objective? What limitations prevented oneside or the other from attaining an optimal integration of the different forms of military

power?

Did a strategy exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did a

country’s strategy effectively translate asymmetries in technology into a strategicadvantage? Was there a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) prior to or during thewar, and if it occurred, did its tactical and operational consequences produce lastingstrategic results?

4 . I nteraction and Adaptation . Was the initial strategy implemented as anticipated, orwere the prewar plans disrupted by unexpected enemy action? What effects didinteraction with the enemy have on the nature (and the perception of the nature) of the

war? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its preferred terms? If not, howwell did strategists adapt to what the enemy did?

If the initial strategy proved to be successful, did that strategic success drive changes,whether wise or ill considered, in political objectives? Alternatively, if the initialstrategy proved to be unsuccessful or too costly, was there a timely reassessment of eitheror both political objectives and strategy? How, and how well, were policy and/or strategy

adapted as a result?

5 . War Termination . In taking the first steps into war, and during its progress, didstrategists consider what the last steps could, or might, be? Were there realistic

opportunities for a successful end to the war that were not grasped? Did the commitmentof one side to removing the enemy’s leadership from power result in a longer war andheavier casualties?

Did the winning side carefully consider how far to go militarily at the end of the

war? In an attempt to maintain military pressure on its adversary, did it go beyond theculminating point of victory? Or did the winning side not go far enough militarily to give

the political result of the war a good chance to endure? Did the winning side carefullyconsider what specific political demands to make on the enemy in fulfillment of itsgeneral political objectives? Did the postwar settlement meet the political objectives of

the winning state, or states? Were the long-range consequences of the peace termsrecognized? To what extent did the stability or instability of the settlement stem from the

nature of the settlement itself? Did the winning side maintain the strength and will toenforce the peace?

The Environment of Strategy Making

6. The I nternational Dimension of Strategy. (International Politics and Coalitions)



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What effects did the prevailing system of international politics exert on the outbreak,duration, conduct and settlement of the war? How did the war’s outcome change the

international environment?

Did the belligerent states seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries? Did they

seize opportunities to create coalitions? If so, what common interests unified thecoalition partners? Was there effective strategic coordination and burden sharing withina coalition, and what were the consequences if not? Did military strategies have theeffect of solidifying the opposing coalition or splitting it apart? To what extent did

partners act to restrain or control one another within the same coalition? If a coalition fellapart, was this chiefly the result of internal stress, external pressure, or a combination of

both?

7. The Materi al Dimension of Strategy . (Mobilization and the Economy)

How effectively did each belligerent mobilize the material resources at its disposal?

How did a country’s financial strength, availability of resources, manufacturing plant andtechnological prowess affect its ability to wage war? Was the outcome of the war duemore to material superiority or superior strategy?

If a belligerent adopted a strategy of economic warfare, how appropriate was thisstrategy, and how well was it integrated with other strategies? How important were

communications by sea to the functioning of a belligerent nation’s economy?

8. The I nstitu tional Dimension of Strategy . (Intra-Military Relations, Intra-Governmental Relations, and Civil-Military Relations)

If there was rivalry and competition among the military services, how did this affectthe making and implementation of strategy? Did such rivalries impede the presentationof a coherent military point of view on strategy to the civilian leadership?

If there was competition within the governmental elite, did this obscure the military

leaders’ understanding of the political objectives of the war? How did any lack of clarityor constancy in the political aims affect the wartime civil-military relationship?

Were the relations among military leaders and statesmen effective? If not, why wasthis so and what were the consequences? How did the personalities of the key military

and civilian leaders affect the civil-military relationship and the making of policy andstrategy throughout the war? How did the political and military leadership divide their

respective tasks, and how did those divisions change over time? If the political leadersdemanded of the military instrument something that it could not effectively deliver, or ifthe political leaders imposed overly stringent political constraints on the use of force,

how did the military leaders respond? If military leaders proposed operations that promised to be militarily effective but threatened to be politically risky, how did the

political leaders respond? Did those trade-offs subvert the subordination of strategy to policy?



9. The Social Dimension of Strategy . (Societies at War)

How did a state’s society and history shape strategy? Is there, for example, an‘American strategic culture,’ or an American way of war? If so, what are its fundamental

characteristics and does it allow an adversary to predict how the United States will act?

Did moral, ideological or religious considerations influence the selection of policy andstrategy?

Was the embodiment of Clausewitz’s trinity — the relationship among government, people, and the military — able to withstand the strain of a protracted war or the shock of

an enemy attack? If not, why not? If the war was protracted, how successful was thevictorious side in weakening its adversary from within? Did the government’s militarystrategy deliver sufficient ‘incremental dividends’ — periodic successes or tokens of

success — to maintain support for the war? Did governments attempt to mobilize publicopinion, and if so, with what success? Did the ‘passions of the people’ make it difficult

for political and military leaders to maintain the proper relationship between policy and

strategy?

strategic theory for practitioners

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