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STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT1 9 9 9

Priorities for a Turbulent World

Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense University

Strategic Assessment 1999

StrategicAssessment 1999Priorities for a Turbulent WorldN AT I O N A L D E F E N S E U N I V E R S I T Y

I N S T I T U T E F O R N AT I O N A L S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

President: Lieutenant General Richard A. Chilcoat, U.S. ArmyVice President: Ambassador Daniel H. Simpson

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 1999

Editor in Chief: Hans BinnendijkGeneral Editor: Richard L. KuglerManaging Editors: Charles B. Shotwell

Kori Schake

Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 20319–5066Phone: (202) 685–3838; Fax: (202) 685–3972

Cleared for public release. Distribution unlimited.

Digital imagery on pages ii and iii courtesy of NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center, Earth Sciences Directorate

Printed in the United States of America

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing OfficeSuperintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOPWashington, DC 20402–9328

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES v

The past year has seen many thresholds crossed and turning points reached in the internationalsecurity environment. With events like the NATO intervention in Kosovo, tension betweenIndia and Pakistan, more failing states, and rising access to dangerous weapons and deliverysystems, the job for Department of Defense planners has not become easier. The National De-

fense University contributes to an ongoing dialogue with the Department of Defense through StrategicAssessment, an annual publication that applies the expertise of this institution through the leadership ofits interdisciplinary research arm, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, with the assistance of spe-cialists from elsewhere in government and academe. Offering such analyses, in both general and partic-ular areas of interest to the national security community, is an important aspect of the NDU mission.This volume examines trends, U.S. interests, and consequences for U.S. policy, followed by a net assessment for each key area.

The international security situation is clearly changed from 1 year ago. The nebulous multipolarenvironment has been stressed by forces of polarization in recent months. Yet, transition states still co-operate with the Western democratic core states on important issues. As the world continues theprocess of transformation, we need to properly assess our priorities.

Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World should prove useful beyond the defense es-tablishment, to all readers with an interest in national security affairs. We emphasize that this report isnot a statement of official policy, nor does it represent the views of the Department of Defense or theJoint Chiefs of Staff. Rather than to state policy, the role of National Defense University is to stimulatediscussion and research among both policymakers and analysts.

PrefacePrefaceBy L I E U T E N A N T G E N E R A L R I C H A R D A. C H I L C O A T, U. S. A R M Y

President, National Defense University

vi INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Strategic Assessment 1999 is neither a statement nor a critique of

U.S. Government policy. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations,

either expressed or implied, are solely those of the contributors. They do

not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University, the

Department of Defense, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

Research and writing for Strategic Assessment 1999 was completed in spring 1999 and revised to include developments through the end of June 1999.

I N M E M O R I A M

Paul Kreisberg1929–1999

Paul Kreisberg was a valued friend of the Institute for National Strategic Studiesand the author of the South Asian chapter of this year’s Strategic Assessment. Hehad a distinguished career as a Foreign Service Officer and scholar. We willremember him not only for his many intellectual contributions, but also for hisinquiring mind and his keen wit. We will miss him greatly.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES vii

Where is the world headed, and what are the consequences for U.S. national security pol-icy? This critical question is the subject of Strategic Assessment 1999. Four years ago,Strategic Assessment 1995 was optimistic about the future. At the time, the world seemedheaded toward peace, marred by modest troubles on the fringe of an enlarging demo-

cratic community. Since then, global trends have changed in worrisome ways.During the past year, violence in the Balkans engaged U.S. forces in combat operations, U.S. rela-

tions with China declined significantly, Russia continued its drift away from integration with the West,Asia’s economic problems caused political unrest and spread to two other continents, India and Pak-istan detonated nuclear devices, rogue states tested new delivery systems for weapons of mass destruc-tion, and tribal conflicts continued unabated in Africa.

The four sections and twenty chapters of Strategic Assessment 1999 offer an updated examination ofglobal trends and their consequences for U.S. interests and policies. They do not lay down a fixed blue-print or advocate particular policy responses but instead seek to analyze the critical issues in what wehope are insightful and balanced ways. Their aim is to make readers better informed, so they can maketheir own independent judgment.

Strategic Assessment 1999 articulates the central theme that, because the world is becoming murkierand more dangerous, the United States will need to continue with an energetic policy of engagement.This theme has two components. The first is that recent negative events should be kept in perspective.While the future may be more tumultuous than had been expected, the world is not irretrievablyheaded toward a global free-fall of chaos and conflict. Instead, the future is seen as “up for grabs”—ca-pable of evolving toward good, or ill, or most likely, in between. It will be shaped by the interplay of in-tegrative and disintegrative dynamics. Above all, it can be influenced by the United States and its allies.

The second component is that, owing to rapid changes ahead, the United States probably faces agrowing challenge to its national security. That challenge will require the nation to retain a high level ofdefense preparedness, and to continually review its strategic priorities. U.S. security functions—shap-ing, responding, and preparing—may need to be conducted differently than today. They may lead topolicy departures in key regions and new tasks confronting the United States and its allies.

This volume was edited with intellectual guidance and management from Kori Schake andCharles Shotwell. Its chapters were written by members of the Institute for National Strategic Studiesand outside experts. The editors and authors express their appreciation for the many military officers,civilian officials, and other analysts who provided thoughtful comments.

ForewordForewordBy H A N S B I N N E N D I J K and R I C H A R D K U G L E R

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The authors are:

FACING A CHANGING WORLD1. Global Political Trends: Integration or Disintegration? Richard L. Kugler, INSS2. Economic Globalization: Stability or Conflict? Ellen L. Frost, Institute for International Economics3. Energy and Resources: Ample or Scarce? Patrick M. Clawson, Washington Institute for Near

East Policy4. Global Military Balance: Stable or Unstable? Richard L. Kugler, INSS

HANDLING REGIONAL DYNAMICS5. Europe: How Much Unity, How Effective? James Swihart, INSS6. Russia and its Neighbors: Faltering Progress? James H. Brusstar, INSS7. Greater Middle East: Managing Change in Troubled Times? Judith S. Yaphe, INSS8. Asia-Pacific Region: Murky Future? Ronald N. Montaperto, INSS9. South Asia: Nuclear Geopolitics? Paul Kreisberg, U.S. Department of State (Ret.)

10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress or Drift? Robert B. Oakley, INSS, and Jendayi Frazier, Harvard University

11. The Western Hemisphere: Rethinking a Strategic Relationship? John A. Cope, INSS

DEALING WITH KEY COUNTRIES12. The Democratic Core: How Large, How Effective? Richard L. Kugler and Jeffrey Simon, INSS13. Transition States: New Destinies? Sherman W. Garnett, Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace14. Rogue States and Proliferation: How Serious is the Threat? Kori Schake, INSS15. Troubled States: How Troubling, How Manageable? Michael J. Dziedzic, INSS16. Transnational Trends: New Threats? Kimberley Thachuk, INSS

MANAGING MILITARY AFFAIRS17. Conventional Operations and Warfare: A New Era Ahead? Richard L. Kugler, INSS18. Strategic Forces and Deterrence: New Realities, New Roles? John F. Reichart, INSS19. Global Arms Control and Disarmament: Cloudy Prospects? Peter Wilson, The RAND Corporation20. Space and Oceans: Can They Be Controlled? John C. Dailey, INSS

Special thanks go to Michael O’Neill, former INSS Fellow (now Counselor for Politico-MilitaryAffairs at the British Embassy), for his contributions to the Democratic Core chapter; to CAPT MarkRosen, USN, for his inputs to the Oceans and Space chapter; to Ambassador Robert B. Oakley for theterrorism section in the Transnational Trends chapter; to LtCol Tom Linn (USMC, Ret.) for his editorialinput and review; to Adam S. Posen and Kimberly A. Elliott, Institute for International Economics, andDavid Denoon, New York University, for their contributions to the chapter on Economic Globalization;to Jock Covey for his text box on Kosovo in the Europe chapter; to Don Herr for his text box on theNATO Summit; to Sue Fuchs for office support; to the Typography and Design Division at the U.S.Government Printing Office for the graphics, layout, and design of this publication; and finally, to theeditorial staff of the INSS Publication Directorate, under the supervision of Robert A. Silano, whoproofed the final version of the volume and saw it through the final stages of production.

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Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiF A C I N G A C H A N G I N G W O R L D

F A C I N G A C H A N G I N G W O R L D

C H A P T E R O N E

Global Political Trends: Integration or Disintegration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1C H A P T E R T W O

Economic Globalization: Stability or Conflict? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19C H A P T E R T H R E E

Energy and Resources: Ample or Scarce? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39C H A P T E R F O U R

Global Military Balance: Stable or Unstable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

H A N D L I N G R E G I O N A L D Y N A M I C S

C H A P T E R F I V E

Europe: How Much Unity, How Effective? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69C H A P T E R S I X

Russia and its Neighbors: Faltering Progress? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89C H A P T E R S E V E N

Greater Middle East: Managing Change in Troubled Times? . . . . . . . . . . 101C H A P T E R E I G H T

Asia-Pacific Region: Murky Future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121C H A P T E R N I N E

South Asia: Nuclear Geopolitics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139C H A P T E R T E N

Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress or Drift? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153C H A P T E R E L E V E N

The Western Hemisphere: Rethinking Strategic Relations? . . . . . . . . . . . 169

D E A L I N G W I T H K E Y C O U N T R I E S

C H A P T E R T W E L V E

The Democratic Core: How Large, How Effective? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189C H A P T E R T H I R T E E N

Transition States: New Destinies? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205C H A P T E R F O U R T E E N

Rogue States and Proliferation: How Serious is the Threat? . . . . . . . . . . 219C H A P T E R F I F T E E N

Troubled States: How Troubling, How Manageable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229C H A P T E R S I X T E E N

Transnational Trends: New Threats? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

ContentsContents

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M A N A G I N G M I L I T A R Y A F F A I R S

C H A P T E R S E V E N T E E N

Conventional Operations and Warfare: A New Era Ahead?. . . . . . . . . . 261C H A P T E R E I G H T E E N

Strategic Forces and Deterrence: New Realities, New Roles? . . . . . . . . . . . 277C H A P T E R N I N E T E E N

Global Arms Control and Disarmament: Cloudy Prospects? . . . . . . . . . 289C H A P T E R T W E N T Y

Space and Oceans: Can They Be Controlled? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

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Afew years ago, the strategic challengefacing the United States seemed to behandling isolated regional tensionswhile guiding the world as it pro-

gressed toward stability and greater integration.Since then, key trends indicate the world is be-coming murkier and more dangerous. As a re-sult, Strategic Assessment 1999 is less optimisticthan earlier volumes.

In examining the impact of emerging trendson U.S. interests and policies, however, StrategicAssessment 1999 does not judge that global affairsare irretrievably headed downward. Today’snegative trends are highly visible, but, in less no-ticeable ways, positive trends are having an im-pact of their own. Owing to this interaction, thefuture is “up for grabs.” It is capable of movingin several different directions—for good or ill—depending upon how events play out.

In major ways, the future can be influencedby how the United States and its key allies act. Forthem, the new strategic challenge is to prepare fora rapidly changing world with numerous dan-gers, while encouraging progress and establishingpowerful barriers to prevent any steep descentinto global turmoil. Provided they craft soundpolicies and implement them effectively, they willenhance their prospects for success. Doing so,however, will itself be a difficult challenge.

This section summarizes major judgments;details are provided in the accompanying 20chapters.

Key TrendsThe past year has witnessed multiple nega-

tive events, including the Asian economic crisis,increased assertiveness by Iraq and North Korea,tension with China, failed reforms in Russia, nu-clear and missile tests in South Asia, mountingfear of proliferation elsewhere, and war in theBalkans. U.S. forces have conducted combat op-erations in both the Persian Gulf and the

Key FindingsKey Findings

Balkans. Strategic Assessment 1999 reports onthese and other recent events. But it also presentsa deeper probing analysis of underlying political,economic, and military trends that powerfullyinfluence international affairs.

A comprehensive review of these trends andtheir uncertainties suggests that a decade or sofrom now, the future could unfold in one of threedifferent ways, all posing challenges of theirown. Assuming the United States and its alliesact effectively, the most likely scenario is a futureof major changes in which some of today’s dan-gers worsen but others lessen. The overall mag-nitude of danger and opportunity might be simi-lar to now. Even so, this scenario could compelchanges in U.S. policy and strategy in order toaddress the changing dangers. The second sce-nario is that of a rapid plunge into global turmoilin which the overall level of instability and dan-ger increases greatly. Although this scenario isnot inevitable, its plausibility has increased as aresult of recent negative trends, and it now mustbe guarded against more firmly than in the past.The third scenario is rapid progress towardgreater stability and peace. It is now less likelythan a few years ago, but in some places, it re-mains a viable goal. Together, these three scenar-ios help ease concern that a dark future necessar-ily lies ahead. But their multiple dimensionsmake clear that future U.S. strategic tasks will becomplicated and demanding.

Forces Buffeting theInternational System

International politics today is producing aseries of bewildering surprises, good and bad,that often catch the United States and its allies offguard. These events, however, are not random.Rather, they reflect underlying patterns at work.When the Cold War ended, hopes soared thatdemocracy’s rapid spread, market economies,and cooperation would sweep away stressfulglobal security issues. The reality is that today,contemporary international politics is occurring

S T R A T E G I C A S S E S S M E N T 1 9 9 9

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in an amorphous security system that lacks thebipolar structure and ideological clarity of theCold War. Within the market democracies of Eu-rope and Northeast Asia, a high degree of peace-ful integration exists. In the vast regions outsidethis community, the situation is fragmented,fluid, and often unstable.

In such turbulent regions as Eurasia, theGreater Middle East, South Asia, and parts ofAsia, disintegrative trends work against integra-tive trends, and the outcome is in doubt. Onerisk is that disintegrative trends may intensifyand compound each other. Signs of this develop-ment are already emerging. A bigger risk is that aglobal coalition of regional rogues and local trou-blemakers might emerge, perhaps under Russianor Chinese sponsorship, to challenge the UnitedStates. Even short of this, regional conflicts, eth-nic tensions, terrorism, proliferation, and clashesover scarce resources will be principal threats toU.S. interests and potential sources of war.

Economic globalization, prosperity, and theinformation age are powerful integrative mecha-nisms for overcoming these menacing trends.Contributing to their impact has been the steadyexpansion of international trade, investment, andfinance, accompanied by the growth of interna-tional institutions and rules. These develop-ments, coupled with the ongoing spread ofdemocracy in some places, are likely to exertlong-term positive effects. Yet, the recent Asianeconomic flu raises doubts about growing pros-perity and integration in the near term. Abyproduct of globalization, the Asian crisisbegan when the flawed policies of several coun-tries triggered speculative currency flows thatcontracted those economies. When the interna-tional community intervened, the initial effectexacerbated the crisis. The shockwaves thenbegan spreading to other regions.

Current events suggest the crisis may nowbe contained, but the route back to prosperitywill be long and difficult, requiring reform in na-tional and international policies. Once steadyeconomic growth returns, the already-strongWestern countries may experience the principalgains. Countries with weak market economiesand troubled governments may experience fewergains or lose ground. They could be left frus-trated and angry at Western values that they re-gard as exploitative.

Energy and natural resources also face amixed forecast. Oil and gas supplies seem ade-quate to meet the world’s growing demands in

the future, but up to two-thirds of these sup-plies will come from the turbulent regions ofthe Persian Gulf and the Caspian basin. In theMiddle East, struggles over scarce water sup-plies could exacerbate local political conflicts.Free markets and international cooperation pro-vide the best mechanisms to distribute re-sources. The risk is that politics once again willintrude in a manner that interferes with distri-bution and produces conflict.

Regional ProspectsHistorically, Europe has been a source of

global conflict. Today, Europe is uniting on theprinciples of democracy, market economics, andmultinational institutions. Both NATO and theEuropean Union (EU) are adapting internallywhile enlarging eastward. While they face toughagendas, their long-term prospects for successare good. A principal issue will be whether theEuropean countries can surmount their internalpreoccupations to work with the United Statesand NATO to project stability outward, in Eu-rope and beyond. The future is in doubt, butprogress at the Washington Summit of 1999 is agood sign, provided key initiatives are imple-mented. Benefiting from Western enlargement,Northcentral Europe is making strides towarddemocracy, stability, and prosperity. Three newmembers have joined NATO, and other countrieshave applied. As shown by the Bosnia andKosovo crises, however, Southeastern Europeand the Balkans remain unstable, facing a trou-bled future—capable of greater war. In addition,tensions over Cyprus and concern aboutTurkey’s orientation further trouble Europe’snew-found tranquility.

The future for Russia and its Eurasian neigh-bors is also troubled. In Russia, reforms aimed atinstituting market democracy have fallen short.Russia has adopted some important features ofdemocracy, but its transformation is far from com-plete, owing to a host of problems. Its economy isin shambles, organized crime has taken hold, itsgovernment is not effective, its society is becom-ing disillusioned, and regional fragmentation isgrowing. Whereas Ukraine remains independentbut struggling, the countries of the Caucasus andCentral Asia suffer from deep tensions, even asthey try to keep their distance from Russia. InRussia and elsewhere, the reappearance of com-munism or a different extreme ideology seems


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unlikely, but the entire region could become anunstable geopolitical ghetto, creating anti-Westernattitudes and internal dangers of its own.

Asia’s future may be the most uncertain ofall, and capable of wide variations. Today theKorean peninsula remains the region’s principalflashpoint, but tensions remain high over Tai-wan. Most countries are focused inward, but theregion’s security structure suffers from a trou-bled history, enduring rivalries, and a lack of col-lective security practices. The Asian economicwoes have not only damaged many economies,but raised the prospect of further political tur-moil in Indonesia, Maylasia, and elsewhere.China faces major internal problems, and Japancontinues to encounter trouble in re-igniting itseconomy, which no longer serves as the region’spowerhouse and safety valve. If Asia recovers itseconomic energy, prospects will improve. In thelong term, the emergence of China as a worldpower and the reactions of Japan and othercountries will be key. If China integrates into theWestern community, regional stability will be en-hanced. If not, China could become a major secu-rity problem and eventual military threat inways that affect the entire region, as well as U.S.relationships with key allies.

The futures of the Middle East and the Per-sian Gulf seem menacing. There, democracy hasfew footholds, economies are not prospering,and Islamic fundamentalism is gaining ground.The improvement in prospects for Arab-Israelipeace negotiations is one bright spot in this oth-erwise difficult picture. The United States hasfriendly relations with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Ara-bia, and a few other countries, but many coun-tries are suspicious of the Western community.Almost everywhere, local political conflicts arefestering, even though most governments cur-rently are coping with their internal problems.Regime changes are either taking place or im-pending. Shifting diplomacy is underway asmany countries return to traditional securitystrategies, including greater emphasis on Araband Muslim solidarity and, in the Persian Gulf,more use of dollar diplomacy. Interest is growingin engaging Iran, if it returns to responsible par-ticipation in regional affairs.

Such rogues as Iraq and Iran are gainingstrength as the U.S. strategy of dual containmentbecomes harder to carry out. Proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) is poisedto accelerate, as evidenced by nuclear tests inSouth Asia, removal of UN inspectors from Iraq,and Iran’s military programs. The Western com-munity is vulnerable to these events, because it

depends heavily upon Persian Gulf oil and itsadversaries there are stronger than its friends.The West is also vulnerable to events in SouthAsia, not only because of the mounting dangerto regional stability, but also because of the rip-ple effects elsewhere. There, India and Pakistanare not only falling into nuclear competition, butremain in conflict over Kashmir and face inter-nal extremism, which further stresses their ex-ternal relations. Across this entire huge zone,from the Middle East to South Asia, the prospectof growing trouble poses serious implicationsfor U.S. interests.

Sub-Saharan Africa is making slow progresstoward modernity, but multiple problems areconstraining its emergence. On this huge conti-nent of 54 countries and over 600 million people,democracy has gained a foothold in some coun-tries, but others remain undemocratic. Africa isbeset by ineffective governments, unsettled soci-eties, and widespread poverty. In some places,dictatorships have passed from the scene, butlocal violence has accompanied the opening ofgovernments to multiparty elections. In Rwandaand elsewhere, larger violence has marked ethnicand interstate relations. More fundamentally, ex-isting state boundaries sometimes do not reflectunderlying social, economic, and geographic re-alities. Recent economic growth has been unevenbut, over the long term, can be an engine ofprogress, as can further democratization andmultilateral cooperation. Western economic in-vestment, imports, and exports also can help.Africa’s future will depend upon how Nigeria,South Africa, and other key countries evolve. Butthe sheer size and diversity of Africa mean thatthe future will take several different forms, somegood, others dispiriting.

Latin America’s future seems bright, espe-cially compared to a decade ago. Democracy hasmade rapid strides, replacing authoritarianismand militarism. Economies have been expand-ing, hemispheric interdependence is growing,and multilateral cooperation is taking shape.Civil wars and border disputes have been set-tled to the point where Latin America is nowone of the most peaceful regions on the globe,and it is gaining autonomy in world affairs. Yet,serious troubles remain. Economic change hasperpetuated long-standing social inequalitiesand sometimes worsened them. Populationgrowth and urbanization have created growing


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strains. Criminal organizations and drug ex-porters have planted roots. Guerrillas and localviolence remain a problem in some places. Inef-fective governments, even when democratic,have produced growing public disillusionmentand electoral turmoil. An example is Venezuela’srecent election to the presidency of HugoChavez, a former coup leader and critic of tradi-tionalism. Mexico and Brazil, totaling more thanone-half of the region’s 460 million people, willcontinue dominating the landscape. For allcountries, the future will be influenced bywhether economic progress can elevate annualper capita income, which generally today rangesfrom $4,000 to $9,000. For the United States,Latin America’s growth opens trade and invest-ment opportunities, but the inflow of drugsfrom Colombia and other countries is a continu-ing problem. In the Caribbean, Castro still rulesCuba, but once he departs, a different futuremay open up.

Key ActorsLed by the United States, the community of

market democracies will remain a powerful actoron the global stage. The great question iswhether it will project its values and strengthsoutward into endangered regions. The spread ofdemocracy is uncertain. Today, over one-half ofthe world’s nearly 200 countries are democraticto some degree. Yet, many are only in the earlystages of democracy. Moreover, the democraticprocess in some cases has been a disintegrativeforce when civil society is not prepared. Democ-ratic enlargement faces a struggle in the comingyears. Regardless of how this process unfolds,the United States will face the equally importantchallenge of persuading current allies to makegreater contributions to new missions, many ofwhich will lie outside their borders.

The key transition states are Russia, China,and India. They are pursuing foreign policies an-chored in state interests and seek to establishthemselves as leading powers on the worldscene. Each seeks a revision of the status quo thatwill increase its influence at the expense of theUnited States. Only China has the potential tobecome a global power, but Russia and India willremain regionally influential. U.S. relations withall three countries have suffered during the pastyear, but all three have incentives to avoid fur-ther deterioration.

A primary cause of future conflicts probablywill be rogue states. Rogues such as Iraq, Iran,North Korea—and recently Serbia—have provento be surprisingly durable and increasingly as-sertive. In most cases, the conventional militarycapabilities of rogue states have declined in thepast decade. In response, several now seek tocompensate by accelerating their programs foracquiring WMD. If they acquire these weaponsin the coming years, plus strengthen their con-ventional forces, their capacity for troublemak-ing will increase. In addition, several other coun-tries might join the ranks of assertive roguestates in the next few years. The problems posedby rogues could become even more difficult ifthe United States and other Western states fail todevelop common policies toward them.

Troubled states facing major internal insta-bilities, such as Bosnia and Rwanda, are consum-ing a disproportionately large amount of U.S.and allied resources. They are distinguished bytheir failure to sustain such essential conditionsas social order, economic stability, and publichealth. The reason for U.S. and Western involve-ment with their problems has generally been hu-manitarian in nature, rather than strategic. Therecord of this involvement has been mixed, be-cause the troubles of these states often defy easysolution. The problems posed by troubled stateswill continue and perhaps grow. The questionwill be whether the United States will be pre-pared to continue being involved in their inter-nal affairs. When this is the case, efforts to mountan effective response will require the integrationof civil and military assets.

Troubled states help breed the conditionsthat create growing threats by transnational ac-tors, such as terrorists, drug traffickers, organ-ized crime, and refugees. Many of these threatsaffect U.S. interests, and some pose a menace tothe U.S. homeland. Terrorists increasingly lackpolitical ideals and are often driven by religiousmotives and nihilism. Organized crime hasgrown recently, and drug trafficking has becomea hugely profitable business. To a degree, thesethreats are merging through cooperation and aretaking hold in some governments as a principaldeterminant of state behavior. Owing to the newfocus on homeland defense, U.S. forces may beused increasingly in dealing with them.

Evolving Military TrendsThe ongoing proliferation of WMD already

is having a destabilizing impact and may accel-erate. Proliferation’s effects are contagious.


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When one country acquires WMD systems, itposes a threat to its neighbors, which react withWMD systems and other measures of their own.For example, India’s nuclear tests triggered Pak-istan to do the same. North Korea’s testing ofmissiles has sent shockwaves across Asia. If Iraqor Iran acquires WMD systems, they willthreaten not only each other, but the entire Per-sian Gulf and Middle East. The looming threat ofWMD proliferation, coupled with its aftershocksand counterbalancing steps, could destabilize thehuge southern geographic zone stretching fromthe Balkans to Asia. WMD systems, of course,could also threaten key Western nations and theUnited States itself.

Conventional military trends, especiallythose resulting from the revolution in militaryaffairs (RMA), are also noteworthy. Qualitativeimprovements, rather than quantity increases,may be the chief metric of military competitionin the future. Although the United States willremain militarily superior, several countrieswill become stronger as they acquire moderntechnology and information systems. Advancedweaponry will better enable forces to strike atlong distances, inflict great damage with lim-ited assets, and conduct a widening spectrum ofoffensive actions, including surprise attacks. Akey risk is that rogues may acquire enoughstrike power to attack their neighbors andcontest U.S. intervention.

Control of space and the oceans is also grow-ing in importance. Not only is the United Statesincreasingly using space for intelligence gather-ing and communications, but so are other coun-tries. In the future, control of space and cyber-space will be key factors in determining powerbalances and the outcomes of wars. At sea, theUnited States no longer faces serious blue-waterthreats. But control of key straits, transit lanes,and offshore areas may be challenged as coun-tries develop better assets for littoral operations.

Arms control negotiations will remain a keyhope for alleviating dangerous military trendsahead. At issue is whether they will continue tobe successful. Over the last decade, the StrategicArms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Con-ventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty havecontributed greatly to lessening military con-frontations left over from the Cold War. The un-certain future of START will depend heavilyupon U.S.-Russian relations. The forums for ad-dressing new-era problems have been the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Con-trol Regime, the chemical and biological

weapons conventions, and control of fissile ma-terials. Progress has been made there, too, butthe past year has witnessed a series of frustratingsetbacks owing to accelerating proliferation inseveral regions. Current arms control agreementsdoubtless will continue to function as global ac-cords and may be strengthened. The principalchallenge will be employing them to constrainmounting proliferation dynamics in key individ-ual regions. Meeting these regional challengeswill require not only well-focused arms controlstrategies, but also policies that address the un-derlying geopolitical causes of instability. Recentevents suggest that carrying out this agenda willbe as difficult as it is important.

Consequences forU.S. Interests andPolicies

These emerging trends, both good and bad,pose major consequences for how the UnitedStates forges future policies to advance its inter-ests. For the past 50 years, the United States be-lieved that its interests required sustained in-volvement in global security affairs. Since theCold War ended, these interests have been ex-panding as a result of the enlarging Westerncommunity, the global economy, and the infor-mation age’s increasing interdependency. Incontrast to a few years ago, the United States isnow less able to rely on a peaceful internationalsystem to shore up its interests. Recent disinte-grative trends already have damaged U.S. inter-ests. The risk is that the damage could grow inthe future.

The United States will need to set prioritiesin defining how far its expanding interests ex-tend. Some new interests may be vital, but othersmay be less important in ways that call for selec-tive involvements and limited efforts to bolsterthem. Even though the United States will need toact in prudent ways, it also will need to deter-mine how it can best advance those interests im-portant enough to merit firm protecting. One ofthe key dilemmas facing the United States willbe that of balancing its enlarging interests andgrowing involvements with its need to avoidovercommitments and entangling involvementsin unresolvable situations.


xvi INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Regardless of how specific interests are de-fined, they will remain global, and the UnitedStates will face a difficult strategic agenda ahead.Dangers can be readily handled if they unfold insingle dimension ways that permit a single-minded U.S. response. The future’s dangerspromise to be multidimensional in ways that re-quire a more complex response. More basically,the United States will be pursuing multiplestrategic objectives on a worldwide scale, aimednot only at meeting dangers but also at alleviat-ing their causes and achieving progress towardstability. These multiple objectives will requirethe coordination of multiple policy instru-ments—often a difficult task. Sometimes, pursuitof one objective can complicate other goals. Inseveral theaters, for example, efforts to reassurelong-standing allies of their security complicatesmeasures to engage neighboring powers, andvice-versa. These and other complexities under-score the paramount importance of developing abalanced and prioritized U.S. national securitystrategy. In the coming years, they also promiseto make the act a truly difficult one.

Because international change is coming, achange in U.S. polices and programs may lieahead. Especially if negative trends worsen, U.S.policies will need to be more vigilant. Adaptingto new conditions will be a key factor in the fu-ture success of U.S. policies. The Cold War de-manded continuity in U.S. policy and strategy.The coming era likely will demand fresh thinkingand regular innovation. It will also demand ade-quate resources and a wise setting of priorities, sothat policy and strategy can be carried out effec-tively. Furthermore, the future will demand thecareful blending of foreign policy, internationaleconomic policy, and defense strategy, so that allthree components work closely together—not atcross purposes or in separate domains.

Engaging GloballyCurrent trends reinforce the need for the

United States to stay engaged abroad, ratherthan retreat into isolationism. The key issue ishow and where to engage. Even though theUnited States is the world’s sole superpower, itcannot succeed if it acts unilaterally. A strategythat combines U.S. leadership with multilateralactivities is needed, for strong support from al-lies and friends will be critical to meeting futurechallenges. For multilateralism to work, U.S. andallied policies will need to be harmonized.

An effective engagement strategy likely willrequire a major shift in how the three core goals

of security, economic prosperity, and democracyare pursued. Owing to changing and perhapsgrowing dangers, security likely will requirehigher priority than we had hoped, with moreattention given to controlling regional and otherpolitical conflicts that may gain intensity in thecoming years. Economic goals will still be impor-tant and can be pursued by policies that fostergreater trade liberalization, better integrate theworld economy, and ensure access to energysupplies. Likewise, democracy can still be ad-vanced and consolidated in key places, despiterecent setbacks. But if the world becomes a moredangerous place, security will have to be assuredbefore these other two goals can be attained inways that promote their integrative effects.

In pursuing security, changes also may beneeded in how the “shape, respond, and prepare”functions of current U.S. strategy are carriedout. In the future, environment shaping mayneed to shift from promoting integration to pre-venting instability and conflict. The respondfunction will need to handle an ever-widerrange of contingencies. The prepare functionmust extend beyond military modernization tofocus on creating a flexible defense posture thatanticipates adversary asymmetric strategies, andon adapting the full spectrum of U.S. nationalsecurity resources to a turbulent, changing eraahead. The overall effect could be to endow allthree functions with different and greater de-mands than now. Especially because they worktogether, all three will have to be carried outwith considerable energy and creativity, in waysthat respond to changing requirements.

A revised engagement strategy must have atruly global focus. A few years ago, popularopinion held that Europe was no longer endan-gered. Kosovo shows that Europe’s periphery re-mains vulnerable to war, along with the GreaterMiddle East and Asia. Consequently, U.S. strat-egy will need to handle the turbulent security af-fairs of all three regions, while advancing U.S. in-terests in Africa and Latin America. Moreover,future U.S. strategy will no longer be able toview these regions as fundamentally separatefrom each other. Growing interdependencymeans that political and economic events in onetheater have strong ripple effects in other the-aters. Also, opponents of U.S. interests in differ-ent theaters are beginning to cooperate with eachother. The need for the United States often todraw upon forces and resources from one theater


INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES xvii

to meet requirements arising in another furthernecessitates a global focus.

U.S. global strategy must be anchored in in-tegrated policies toward key actors. U.S. policywill need to focus on updating the Western Al-liance system so that it can help perform newmissions, while retaining necessary assets for oldmissions. In dealing with such transition statesas Russia, China, and India, an updated U.S. pol-icy should aim to integrate them further into theWestern community. If this is not possible, theUnited States should cooperate with them whenmutual interests permit, but react firmly whenlegitimate U.S. interests are opposed by them. Ata minimum, U.S. policy should prevent themfrom becoming adversaries of U.S. interests andleaders of a new anti-Western global coalition.

Dealing with WMD-armed rogues will be aprincipal challenge. Fresh thinking may beneeded, because the old Cold War doctrines ofcontainment, deterrence, flexible response, andnegotiations may not work. New doctrines shouldnot only view each rogue on its individual merits,but also recognize how U.S. actions in one regionwill affect rogue behavior in other regions. Al-though the goal should be to avoid warfare, U.S.military doctrine will need to be prepared to em-ploy decisive force against rogues that may be in-creasingly prepared to commit aggression, espe-cially if they acquire WMD systems.

U.S. policy cannot hope to resolve the prob-lems of all troubled states, but it can focus on alle-viating critical situations where practical stepswill succeed. An effective U.S. strategy will focuson averting collapse of key troubled states, miti-gating humanitarian disasters, carrying out neces-sary peacekeeping missions, and building effec-tive governmental institutions over the long haul.

Handling transnational threats will need tobe upgraded in U.S. strategy and pursued in sys-tematic ways, for these threats are not onlygrowing in themselves, but also are starting toaffect larger patterns of interstate relations. Aneven stronger U.S. interagency effort focused onassembling coordinated policies toward terror-ism, organized crime, and drug trafficking willbe needed.

Creating a “Southern” FocusA change in the U.S. geostrategic focus

seems impending. During the Cold War’s lastdecades, U.S. strategy had a “northern” empha-sis in the sense of focusing heavily on the endan-gered strategic arc stretching from Europe, acrossthe Soviet Union, and into Northeast Asia.

Owing to continuing Western efforts, this north-ern arc is now becoming more stable, despite lin-gering problems in Russia and Korea. In thecoming years, the newly endangered zone likelywill encompass a great “southern” arc that willbegin in the Balkans, pass through the GreaterMiddle East and Persian Gulf, cross South Asia,and continue along the Asian crescent fromSoutheast Asia to Taiwan.

Dealing with this entire southern arc, withits huge size and great diversity, could becomekey to future U.S. national security strategy. TheUnited States has multiple interests and commit-ments at stake and will need to take special carein deciding where to intervene and how to do so.Compared to its assets in Europe and NortheastAsia, the United States currently does not pos-sess comparable overseas-stationed forces, al-liances, and collective security mechanisms inthe southern arc. The combination of mountingtroubles and weaker assets spells significantchallenges in creating an effective strategic re-sponse. A southern strategy likely will be moremaritime and less continental than the earliernorthern strategy. It will require a flexible capac-ity to respond in shifting places at differenttimes, rather than a fixed, positional focus. It willmandate emphasis on improved U.S. power pro-jection and other instruments, greater contribu-tions from traditional allies in Europe and Asia,and better partnerships with local countries.

Forging Regional StrategiesThe United States will need to forge north-

ern and southern strategies that are interlockedwith each other. Its northern strategy shouldfocus not only on integrating the relevant re-gions, but also on drawing upon their assets toassist in the south. Its southern strategy willneed to focus on the more limited but essentialaim of stabilizing the turbulent dynamics atwork there.

The need for mutually supporting northernand southern strategies establishes the frame-work for creating strategies in each individualregion. A combination of old and new policieswill be needed in ways reflecting the comingera’s problems and priorities. A sensible U.S.strategic concept will aim at: (1) consolidatingpeaceful stability in Europe and its neighbor-hood; (2) dealing with mounting challenges inthe Greater Middle East, South Asia, and Asia;


xviii INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

and (3) ensuring that the increasingly importantregions of Africa and Latin America do not slipto the backwaters.

Managing European security is key to a suc-cessful global strategy, because, if Europe is sta-bilized, the United States will be freed to dealwith other theaters, with European allies by itsside. U.S. policy will need to adapt NATO to per-form new missions, upgrade European militaryforces, and guide the European Security and De-fense Identity in directions that preserve thetransatlantic bond and enhance NATO. It alsowill need to continue integrating NortheasternEurope while engaging Russia, even as NATOenlarges, and promoting stability and integrationin Southeastern Europe and the Balkans. This de-manding agenda promises to make U.S. strategydifficult, even though Europe is unlikely to face arestored military threat. The recent NATO sum-mit in Washington has pointed the Alliance inthe right direction, but implementation of newinitiatives will be key.

In Russia and its neighborhood, falteringprogress calls for new U.S. policies that pursue arealistic and effective transition toward marketdemocracy, while adjusting pragmatically to set-backs. U.S. policy also should continue aspiringto maintain strict government controls over nu-clear weapons and fissile materials, preserveUkraine’s independence, and enhance stability inthe Caucasus and Central Asia. A major changein U.S. policy will be needed only in the unlikelyevent that Russia drifts into open hostility to-ward the United States and NATO. Even absentsuch a wholesale deterioration, the coming U.S.policy agenda likely will be long lasting and, attimes, frustrating.

In the Greater Middle East, current U.S. pol-icy is wearing thin, and a comprehensive ap-proach aimed at handling the increasingly dan-gerous situation will be needed. U.S. policies willneed to focus on protecting access to PersianGulf oil, dampening WMD proliferation, refiningdual containment if Iraq becomes more intransi-gent but Iran moderates, getting the Arab-Israelipeace process back on track, lessening the dan-gers posed by regime changes and religious ex-tremism, and preserving the Western coalitionfor possible intervention in the Persian Gulf. Ifrapid WMD proliferation occurs, U.S. policychanges will be needed to reflect the new, greatlyendangered strategic setting. Even short of this,the act of pursuing the full spectrum of U.S.goals in this turbulent region promises to be dif-ficult. The local situation defies easy solution,

and U.S. efforts to remedy some problems oftencome at the expense of intensifying others.

In Asia and the Pacific, the murky futurecalls for U.S. policies that not only aim for eco-nomic progress, but also recognize the impor-tance of regional security affairs and healthy na-tional governments. Such policies should beanchored in a continuing U.S. leadership role asa key stabilizer and power balancer. While up-dating bilateral alliances, U.S. policy will need tomanage the delicate situation on the Koreanpeninsula by being prepared for both crisis andunification, and to approach China with a combi-nation of firmness and restraint that respects itslegitimate interests but opposes destabilizing en-deavors. A new containment strategy could beneeded if a stronger China seeks hegemony inAsia. Conversely, a broader emphasis on collec-tive security may be possible if China becomes acooperative partner. Only time will tell whereAsia is headed, but at the moment, the comingU.S. strategic agenda seems feasible—providedeffective policies are pursued.

South Asia’s emerging nuclear geopoliticsmandate that this region’s importance be ele-vated in U.S. strategy. The nuclear genie cannotbe put back into the bottle, but U.S. policies canaspire to pursue a dialogue aimed at stabilizingthe India-Pakistan nuclear balance, dampeningfurther proliferation, and controlling ripple ef-fects in other regions. The United States alsoshould determine how it can best respond in theevent of war there.

In Africa, U.S. policy cannot hope to trans-form this entire huge continent into a marketdemocracy. But, provided adequate resources aremade available, it can realistically aspire to morelimited aims, including lessening armed conflicts,encouraging democracy where possible, andgradually improving economic conditions. An ef-fective U.S strategy will be anchored in partner-ships with pro-Western nations, while workingwith multilateral organizations and strengthen-ing subregional bodies and nonstate actors.

In Latin America, U.S. policy can aim at con-solidating democracy’s widespread success, pro-moting economic progress, fostering multilateralcooperation, and stemming drug trafficking. Anew focal point will be Colombia, a troubledstate with powerful criminal syndicates thathave a profound impact on U.S. interests. OnceCastro departs, a new U.S. strategy toward Cubawill be needed.


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Maintaining U.S. DefensePreparedness

The prospect of rapidly changing and moreturbulent global security affairs underscores thejudgment that the United States will need a highlevel of defense preparedness. The United Stateswill need a defense strategy and force posturethat are coherent in their own right and inter-locked with U.S. foreign policy and global strate-gic priorities. U.S. forces capable of overseas en-gagement and power projection will be needed,and they must be capable of performing newand unexpected missions. U.S. forces stationedoverseas will need to be capable of operating in avariety of new places that are distant from cur-rent bases. CONUS-based forces will need to beable to project power to these places as fast as, orfaster than now.

The recent decision to increase defensespending responds to these strategic changes,and will better enable the Department of Defenseto pursue key goals in the future. DOD mayneed to alter its current planning framework ofpreparing for two major theater wars (MTWs). Ifso, the purpose will be to acquire greater flexibil-ity and adaptability so that future requirementsin all three major theaters can be met. Kosovosuggests that a coming challenge will be to pre-pare for medium-sized but intense conflicts, notjust peacekeeping and big regional wars in oneor two places. One possible model would be aforce capable of fighting one larger MTW andtwo medium conflicts. Such a posture would beas large as, or even larger than, today’s. Regard-less, joint forces and operations will remain keyto carrying out U.S military doctrine.

Future U.S defense requirements will de-pend on which of the three previously discussedscenarios unfolds. If the world becomes moredangerous in major ways, U.S. military require-ments could increase significantly. Even short ofthis, stronger U.S. forces will be needed to dealwith the new military and strategic environment.The prospect of weapons of mass destructionproliferating into the hands of rogues could re-quire new strike forces and defense assets. Ad-versary forces developing better conventionalforces will make it harder for U.S forces to win re-gional wars at low cost. Consequently, the impor-tance of the RMA will increase, as will the impor-tance of mobility, readiness, sustainment, andmodern weapons. Strong U.S. forces will be

needed to carry out decisive operations againstwell-armed opponents conducting asymmetricstrategies. Small-scale contingencies, includingpeace operations and sizeable crisis interven-tions, will pose additional requirements for spe-cial defense capabilities. Homeland defense, es-pecially against WMD threats, also will be agrowing requirement.

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review charteda course of maintaining current force structureand high readiness, while modernizing at a mod-erate rate to achieve the RMA and Joint Vision2010. In 2001, a similar review will be conducted.However, with a new era of global affairs arriv-ing, a different debate seems required. The previ-ous debate focused on how to get the mostmileage out of the existing defense budget. Thenew debate will address how much to increasethe defense budget and how to allocate the in-creases in ways that acquire new technologiesand meet increasing strategic requirements. Thisdebate is likely to identify dilemmas. Even witha larger budget, the United States will face diffi-culty in meeting all its defense needs. The issueof priorities will have to be addressed again. Re-solving it will be key to ensuring that the UnitedStates maintains sufficient military preparednessin a coming decade of change and, perhaps,greater trouble. Equally important will be gain-ing greater allied contributions for new missionsand combined operations.

Organizing for NationalSecurity

Because the international system already ischanging rapidly, the United States may have ashort window of opportunity to make a criticaldifference. The danger lies not only in the ad-verse trends abroad, but also in the risk that theU.S. Government may not be able to reactquickly and effectively. The current U.S. intera-gency process was created to handle the nationalsecurity problems of the Cold War. New strategicproblems may mandate new organizational so-lutions for performing the central task of weav-ing foreign policy, international economic pol-icy, and defense strategy into a seamless web ofstrong, mutually reinforcing actions.

The future will require strategic vision andsound assessments, coupled with an inter-agency process that can implement new policies.Previously separate overseas problems likelywill merge in ways that prohibit addressingthem individually on their own merits. For ex-ample, policies toward troubled states and


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transnational threats will have to take into ac-count relations with allies, neutrals, and rogues.This will require a greater degree of government-wide policy coordination than before and per-haps new people with new skills. Also, manyU.S. policies will need to be merged with thoseof other countries and international institutions.Prescribing a solution lies beyond this analysis,but recognizing the problem is the first step to-ward solving it.

Net AssessmentThe United States will need to continually

adapt its strategic priorities in order to meet themultidimentional challenges of the 21st century.The recent disturbing global trends are not yet

cause for alarm, because positive trends are also atwork. But they are a sobering reminder that theworld can become more dangerous, or at leastchange appreciably, in the future. They will needto be taken seriously in developing new U.S. poli-cies. As the world’s sole superpower and leader ofthe Western community, the United States facesthe daunting challenge of dealing with mountingdangers and still-growing opportunities in severalkey theaters. It will need to act strongly andwisely on its own, but it also will need the help ofmany allies and partners. Forging this unilateraland multilateral capability will be key to handlingthe future, as it was in the past. In this sense, thepositive lessons of the Cold War—strength, part-nership, and wise diplomacy—still endure.