Stopping ShortAuthor(s): John WestonSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2000), pp. 166-167Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049874 .

Accessed: 14/06/2014 23:25

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to ForeignAffairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:25:58 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Letters to the Editor

Amos Perlmutter reveals Barak's game plan; John ?Veston defends U.N. peacekeeping;

Howard Dean on Vermont's Burma law; and others

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ASSAD

To the Editor:

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak has not misread Syrian President Hafiz

al-Assad, as Henry Siegman suggests

("Being Hafiz al-Assad," May/June 2000).

Barak is aware that Assad remains an

anachronistic pan-Arabist who has not

caught up with modern realities better

understood by those Assad disdains: Palestine Liberation Organization Chair

Yasir Arafat, the late King Hussein of

Jordan, and the visionary Anwar al-Sadat

of Egypt. The ailing Assad wants his legacy to

be steadfastness against concessions in

the name of Arab honor. Although aware

of Assad's rigidity, Barak hoped to be more successful in peacemaking than his

predecessors by creating the widest possible coalition government. That, along with

his strong electoral mandate, would make

possible the concessions required for peace with Syria?but not without reciprocity.

Siegman attributes the recent stall in

negotiations to the leaking of American

peace proposals that embarrassed Assad

and to Barak's decision not to publicize Israel's agreement to withdraw to the 1967 border until he could show skeptical Israelis what they would get from Assad

in return. To make peace with Syria, Barak

needs his coalition to stay intact. Therefore,

he is in no position to conduct secret diplo

macy or depend on "creative U.S.

diplomacy." Leaking the American draft

let Israelis, who are correctly suspicious of Assad, know Assad's real intentions.

Most Israelis doubt that Assad wants

peace and suspect he is angling for U.S.

support to modernize his ailing army. Barak has committed himself to a

referendum on a peace agreement with

Syria. Already, Likud leader Ariel Sharon is organizing opposition to the referen

dum, which will probably be based on a majority of the entire population, not a

majority of those who vote that day. Barak

understands that only a broad coalition

government could persuade the nation to

vote to withdraw from the Golan Heights and return to the 1967 border with Syria.

AMOS PERLMUTTER

Professor of Political Science, American

University

STOPPING SHORT

To the Editor:

One need not be an unreserved

defender of the present U.N. system to

be mystified by Max Boot's review essay of William Shawcross' new book, Deliver

Us From Evil ("Paving the Road to

Hell," March/April 2000). He appears to believe that American "benevolent

global hegemony" and "liberal imperialism"

[l66] FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Volume 79 N0.4

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:25:58 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Letters to the Editor

based on U.S. power are "alternatives to

the United Nations." Boot claims that

U.N. peacekeeping has failed because

"the U.N.'s culture breeds conciliators," and that its efforts to use force are

"pathetic." But he sees no good reason

(perhaps not knowing the U.N. Charter)

why "great powers [should] limit their freedom of action ... over their military interventions" by committing more

muscle to the U.N. At the same time, he

concedes that narrow realpolitik is not

enough; that in the modern world, ethnic

cleansing must be curtailed; and that

humanitarian intervention is sometimes

unavoidable. But "wherever possible, the

United States should encourage its allies

to act without American involvement"

because "no nation, no matter how rich, can afford to wage war without end."

On these premises, one would expect

greater support for America's newly democratic friends (whom Boot welcomes) in Asia, Latin America, and Europe when

they volunteer for collective military action

to help keep the peace under the rules of

the U.N. Charter?which was written

largely by the United States. Where "the United States may have to make the

heartbreaking choice to stay out" (e.g., in Rwanda, although not in Haiti), what

about at least giving more consistent

political support for the U.N. peacekeeping

budget (still hugely in arrears) to help pay for the "Bangladeshis, Bulgarians,

Brazilians, and the like" who put their lives

on the line and whom Boot so insultingly dismisses? Where a U.N. force as such is

not the choice, Security Council authority for regional or coalition action at least

underwrites legitimacy. So even with

Boot's minimalist definition of the

U.N. as "an occasionally useful adjunct

to great-power diplomacy," a modicum

of respect for multilateral endeavors by others is plain

common sense. Nato, even under the new strategy, cannot and

should not do everything. That is why all the nato allies and Japan,

as well

as major regional players, do their bit

for the U.N.

JOHN WESTON

U.K. Ambassador to NATO, 1992?95, and

U.K. Permanent Representative to the UN,

1995-98

BURMESE DAZE

To the Editor:

As Brannon P. Denning and Jack H.

McCall note, when states formed the

Union, they ceded to the new federal

government the power to develop and

implement foreign policy ("States' Rights and Foreign Policy," January/February

2000). The United States must speak with one voice on foreign policy.

The states' role, however, is neither as

narrow nor as minimal as Denning and

McCall make out. For example, states

play a fundamental role in America's

defense, as seen in the increasing reliance

on National Guard troops to project American foreign policy. State militias also

played fundamental roles in safeguard

ing the country and, at one point, saving

the Union.

Furthermore, international trade has

a phenomenal impact on the states. The

trade relationships between particular states and friendly nations are crucial to

maintaining America's economic vitality. The states have a significant stake, there

fore, in how the nation projects itself.

How do states participate in a global

economy without disrupting foreign

policy? Vermont passed a law last year

FOREIGN AFFAIRS July/August2000 [167]

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.78 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:25:58 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions