still ‘pivotal’? still the ‘first ally’? the ... · still ‘pivotal’? still the ‘first...

Still‘pivotal’?Stillthe‘firstally’? JamesStrong

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Still‘pivotal’?Stillthe‘firstally’?

ThesignificanceofSyriaforBritain’sglobalrole

DrJamesStrongLondonSchoolofEconomics

[email protected]

ThispaperexplorestheimpactonBritain’sroleininternationalpoliticsofParliament’srefusal tosanctionparticipation inmilitaryactionagainst theAssadregime inAugust2013. It looks at suggestions that the ‘shadow of Iraq’ continues to hang overparliamentary, press and public opinion, colouring debates about the use of forceoverseas.ItaskswhetherSyriaprovesBritainnolongerhasthestomachforafight,andconsiders how foreign policy leaders and the active, elite public see Britain engagingwith international affairs in future. In particular, it considers whether the ‘specialrelationship’cansurviveifBritainceasestobethe ‘firstally’oftheUnitedStates.Theprospect ofmilitary action in Syria proved contentious on both sides of the Atlantic.David Cameron’s parliamentary defeat arrested President Obama’s momentum andprovoked calls for similar votes in Congress and in the French parliament thatultimately scuppered the interventionplan.Yet there is little sign thatBritish leadersconsider their international role constrained, nor of blowback from disappointed USallies. This paper asks, finally, towhat extent the Syria experience undermines TonyBlair’s belief, before Iraq, that failure to support the US would mean the ‘specialrelationship’cametoanend.

Introduction

When parliament vetoedmilitary action in Syria at the end of August 2013 it

triggered a convulsion of national soul‐searching about Britain’s global role. Long‐

establishedforeignpolicycommitmentsseemedunderthreat.Observersonbothsides

of the Atlantic wondered how the ‘special relationship’ with the United States could

survive if Britain ceased to be an ever‐reliable ‘first ally’ in times of conflict. They

scoffedatthenotionthataformerlygreatpowercouldmaintaina‘pivotal’rolewithits

political elite so evidently reluctant to take on further foreign burdens. This sort of

scepticism has a long history in the British foreign policy discourse, which has been

dominatedinthepost‐imperialerabyrivalnarrativesofcontinuedexceptionalismand

inevitabledecline(Harvey2011).WhileexceptionalistsseeclosenesstoWashingtonas

aroutetoglobalsignificance,decliniststhinkitasymptomofweakness,andnotethat

Britain is quite clearly a junior and dependent partner of the United States. While

exceptionalists believe Britain’s UN Security Council seat and power‐projection

capabilitiesmagnifyitsinfluenceacrosstheworldstage,declinistslamentthecountry’s

repeatedembroilmentinfar‐flungcommitmentsitcannolongerrealisticallyafford.For


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abriefperiodaftertheSyriavotethedeclinistsenjoyedtheirascendance.Perhaps,they

wondered, Britain would finally break free of dependence on the United States, and

retreat with dignity from a global role to a more modest middle power stance. Yet

exceptionalismsurvived.PolicymakerscontinuetospeakasifBritainoccupiesapivotal

positionat theheartofworldevents, bridging the transatlanticdivideandhelping to

leadtheworlddespiteitsreducedcircumstances.

Against this backdrop, I ask in this paperwhether anything has changed as a

resultoftheSyriavote.Iconsiderwhetherdeclinismhasfinallytriumphed,orwhether

parliament’s refusal toendorse theuseof forceon thisoccasionhadmore todowith

specificcircumstancesthangeneraltrends.Therewascertainlyaspecificelementtothe

outcome of the vote, parliament’s first veto of military action since 1782. The new

parliamentaryprerogativethusestablishedwilllikelyhavemorelastingconsequences

nevertheless(Strong2014).Nexttimepolicymakersseektolaunchanoverseasmilitary

deployment, theywillknownottoassumeMPs’approval.Nofutureprimeminister is

likely tobe surprisedby aHouseofCommonsvote, asDavidCameronwas, although

theymaystillbeconstrainedbyparliamentaryopinion. If theHouseofCommonshas

becomeafundamentallydeclinistbody,thedeclinistargumentthatBritain’sglobalrole

shouldbereducedwillbecomeself‐fulfilling.IfgovernmentsbelieveMPswillnolonger

allow them to support the US or seek a pivotal global role, then theymaywithdraw

voluntarily,savingpoliticalcapitalfordomesticfights.Sofarthepresentgovernmentis

holdingtheexceptionalistlinedespiteitshumblingoverSyria.Manyofthosewhovoted

downthatinterventionmadecleartheywereexorcisingtheghostsofIraqasmuchas

addressingthepresentconflict.Mostdidnotreferdirectlytobroaderquestionsabout

Britain’sglobalrole.Someinsisttheydidnotmeantoalterthegeneralposition,onlyto

reject the specific proposal. Their decisions have consequences for Britain’s broader

roleconception,nonetheless.InthispaperIseektoexplorethoseconsequences.

Britain’ssenseofitsglobalrolegovernsitsidentityasaforeignpolicyactor,and

sotheinterestsitadvancesandthetoolsitdeploysintheirpursuit(Edmunds,Gaskarth

andPorter2014).Instudyingit,Iemployconceptsderivedfrombothroletheoryand

the interpretive schoolof InternationalRelations. Ibeginby introducinga conceptual

framework derived initially from Kalevi Holsti’s (1970) application of role theory to

ForeignPolicyAnalysis,andmodifiedusinginsightsfromworkfocusedspecificallyon

BritainbyDavidMcCourt(2011a)andJamieGaskarth(2014).Ithencontextualizethe


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Syriadebatebytracingtheevolutionofexceptionalistanddeclinistnarrativesandtheir

interactionwiththeconceptsof‘pivotalpower’andthe‘specialrelationship’.Thissets

thesceneforadetailedanalysisoftheSyriadebateitself,ananalysiswhichrevealsthe

crucialroleplayedbythehoveringghostsof Iraq.Finally Iaskhowfar theSyriavote

hasaffectedBritain’sroleintheworld.Iconcludethatitdidnotfundamentallyalterthe

specialrelationship.Britainhasbeenandremainsthejuniormemberofa“solidbutnot

slavish”transatlanticpartnership(Cameron2006).ThefacttheSyriavotecastdoubton

Britain’sabilitytomakecrediblethreatswasproblematic.ButwhileitmaycausetheUS

to seek additional allies elsewhere as it performs its own role as guarantor of the

westernworld’speaceandstability,Britain’sfailuretoendorsemilitarystrikesinSyria

didnotonitsowneraseAmericanmemoriesofdecadesofloyalsupport.Itdidhowever

raise more fundamental questions about Britain’s ability to punch above its weight.

HeretheissuewasnotwhatSyriachangedaboutthecountry’sglobalrole,butwhatit

revealed. Britain iswarweary. It has lost confidence in its ability to influenceworld

events.Itspublicandparliamentariansdistrustmilitaryproposalsinstinctively.

My main conclusion derives from these observations, and from the

unquestionable importance of Iraq to any explanation of what went wrong on 29

August.Manyof thosewhospokeandvoted in theHouseofCommons thatdaywere

stillfightingthepoliticalbattlesoftenyearsbefore.Declinismgavethemavocabulary,

andhelpedthemframespecificconcernsaboutSyriainmoregeneralterms.Syriawas

inmanyrespectsaperfecttarget.MostMPsbelievedthattheUSwascallingtheshots,

withBritainbeingdragged along in a supporting role.Most thought theUNweapons

inspectors then operating inDamascus should be given time to complete theirwork.

Intelligencecouldofferonly judgementsabouttheAssadregime’s likelyresponsibility

for chemical weapons attacks on civilians, not cast‐iron certainties, and few with

memoriesofIraqputgreatstockinintelligenceanymore.Thelegalcaseseemedshaky,

andthegovernmenteverybitaseagerasTonyBlairbeforeittolaunchamilitarystrike

withoutUNSecurityCouncilapproval.YetwhilethedeclinistnarrativedrovetheSyria

vote, the vote represented declinism’s highest point, for exceptionalism survived and

soonbegantofightback.DeclinismhadnothingtogainfromtheSyriavote.Refusingto

take that particular military action was the least Britain should have done, in the

declinist account. While declinism helped the anti‐intervention camp to frame its


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argumentsinlinewithoneofthekeytraditionsofthenationalforeignpolicydiscourse,

itwasleftnomoreadvancedandnomoreinfluentialafterthevotethanbefore.

Roletheoryandforeignpolicy

KaleviHolstifirstintroducedthenotionthatstatesplayparticularinternational

‘roles’ to Foreign Policy Analysis. Adapting a framework used by social psychologists

studyingindividuals,Holstidevelopedafourpartmodeldemonstratinghownotionsof

role‐appropriatebehaviouraffectforeignpolicy(figure1).

Figure1:Holsti’smodelofrole‐playinginforeignpolicy(Holsti1970).ForHolsti,everystatesitswithin“asystemofroleprescriptions”,originatingbothfrom

itselfandfromothers,whichsetexpectationsthatshapeits“nationalroleconception”

and so determine the “attitudes, decisions, and actions” together comprising its “role

performance” (Holsti 1970, 240). Subsequent studies failed to build the systematic

classification schema Holsti hoped for. Nevertheless, this first wave of role theory

scholarship proved fruitful both empirically and in terms of synthesizing FPA with

socialtheory(Biddle1986,67).NaomiWishsimplifiedHolsti’soverly‐complicatedset

ofeighteenpossiblestaterolesbyfocusingonbehaviouralongtwoaxes,rangingfrom

co‐operative to competitive behaviour and from high to low levels of status‐seeking

(Wish1980).StephenWalker interactedrole theorywithexchange theory tobring in

externalcuesalongsideself‐conceivedroles(Walker1981).MarijkeBreuningbrought

out one of Holsti’s original key points, the fact that “policymakersmight conceive of


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their nation playing different roles, or serving different functions, in separate issue

areas,geographicalregions,orsetsofrelationships”(Holsti1970,253,Breuning1995,

237). States holdmultiple roles simultaneously. Their behaviour cannot be predicted

fromanysingleroleconception.That,inturn,waswhyHolsti’sclassificatoryambition

wasnotfulfilled.

Despiteitsfailuretodeliverauniversalmodelofforeignpolicy,ValerieHudson

concluded that “national role conception research…is still a very useful approach to

questions of national identity formation” within FPA (Hudson 2005, 18). This is

especiallythecasegivencontemporarylevelsofinterestinexplanationsrootedinideas.

Foreign policy studies that focus on role enactment, expectations, and audiences not

only better explain foreign policy itself, but also promise closer integrationwith the

broaderdisciplineofInternationalRelations(Thies2010,2012,25,ThiesandBreuning

2012,1).AsecondgenerationofFPAscholarsinterestedinroleconceptionshavebuilt

uponthisobservation.CantirandKaarbo,forexample,demonstratedthesignificanceof

domestic political divisions for role identification and enactment (Cantir and Kaarbo

2012,5).Harnischemphasizedtheinteractionbetween“roletaking”and“rolemaking”

(Harnisch2012,47),whileJamieGaskarthdiscussedthewayroletheorytakesaccount

ofbothstructureandagencyin foreignpolicymaking,andtheflexibilitythisoffersto

support empirical accounts (Gaskarth 2014, 562). Clearly there is a place for role

conceptionswithinthecontemporaryFPAtoolkit.

DavidMcCourt’sworkonBritain’s ‘role in theworld’offers themostpertinent

application of role theory for the purposes of this study. McCourt argued that any

attempt to define Britain’s “role in theworld” (italics in original) inevitably reflects

political as well as analytical considerations (McCourt 2011a, 151). McCourt further

argued that any role conception identified through public debatewas simultaneously

constituted by it, and that the role performances that supposedly flow from the

identification process also feed back in to it (McCourt 2011b, McCourt 2011c).

Collectively, McCourt concluded, these dynamics explain the British political elite’s

obsessionwithconstantlyreconsideringthetraditionsunderpinningtheideaofaglobal

role.Discussionisbothinevitable,giventhepoliticalnatureofthetopic,andnecessary,

because it is only through public debate that any notion of Britain’s global role is

constitutedatall.WhateverroleBritainmightadopthaslittletodowithhardpoweror

objectively observable phenomena, and everything to do with the subjective images


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held in policymakers’ heads. We can access those images only by interpreting how

different individualshavedescribed thedilemmas theynow face, andhow theydraw

uponthetraditionsofexceptionalismanddeclinealongtheway.This inturnexplains

why any study based on the idea of Britain’s ‘global role’must necessarily adopt an

interpretiveapproach(Bevir,DaddowandHall2013,163,Gaskarth2014,561).

Traditionsofexceptionalismanddecline

DeanAcheson’soft‐repeatedcomplaint,thatBritain“haslostanempireandhas

not yet found a role” (Acheson 1962), still resonates for students of contemporary

British foreign policy. Gaskarth has identified no fewer than six distinct (and often

contradictory) role orientations emerging from recent discussions over the country’s

interactionwithinternationalaffairs(Gaskarth2014,566).Thisvarietyfurtherexplains

thepoliticalcontestsMcCourttalksabout. Itprovidesrivalswithopposingviewpoints

toargueover. It ensures thatnosingleover‐archingnarrativeemerges in the foreign

policydiscoursetodefineBritain’sproperplaceintheworld.Forallthecertaintyand

stabilitythatdefinednationalroleconceptionsduringtheageofempire,Britishforeign

policy discourse has been dominated more recently by “defensive anxiety and

existential angst” (Hadfield‐Amkhan2010, 6).Winston Churchill hasmuch to answer

for.HiseffortsafterWorldWarTwotoensureBritishrepresentationatthetoptableof

international affairs cast a lasting pall over his successors (Broad andDaddow2010,

207,DaddowandGaskarth2011,13,16,Gaskarth2013,67).HearguedBritainalone

could unite the three great “circles” of the freeworld; Europe, the “English‐speaking

peoples” and the Commonwealth (Churchill 1948). That exceptionalist account of

Britain’splaceintheworldhas,intheensuingdecades,interactedandcompetedwitha

declinismgroundedinpessimisticassessmentsofhowinfluentialastatecanhopetobe

in suchdramatically reduced circumstances (Harvey2011).Both traditions recognize

that Britain is no longer an imperial power. They disagree fundamentally on how it

shouldnowrespond.

DouglasHurd’sclaimthat“Britainhaspunchedaboveherweightintheworld”

(Hurd 1992) remains themost succinct encapsulation of the exceptionalist narrative.

TedHeath’ssuggestionthathiscountrywas“amediumpowerofthefirstrank”(Emery

1970)ismorecomplicatedbecauseitiscontradictory,sinceamediumpowercannotby

definition stand in the first rankof international affairs.Yet it too conjoins a realistic


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assessmentofBritain’smeansandanambitiousaccountofitsinfluence.Nootherleader

has railed as vehemently against the declinist narrative as Margaret Thatcher, who

celebrated victory in the Britain’s last imperial conflict, the 1982 FalklandsWar, by

declaring “wehave ceased to be a nation in retreat” (Thatcher 1982). Butmost have

maintained,atleastrhetorically,acommitmenttotheideathat“Britainstillcarriesfar

morecloutintheworldthanitscurrentshareoftheworldpopulationwouldsuggest”

(Hague 2009). TheMajor andBlair eras even saw an expansion ofBritain’s overseas

involvement, driven by the new realities of an increasingly globalized post‐ColdWar

world(Bevir,DaddowandHall2013,164).The2010NationalSecurityStrategyfocused

ondeficitreductionbutremainedbullishabouttheprospectsforBritishleadershipwell

intothetwenty‐firstcentury.AsoberassessmentofBritain’srelativematerialstrength

meanwhile,offersexceptionalistsgroundsforoptimism.Thecountry’smilitarybudget

is still relatively large, in both absolute terms and as a share of its (also large) GDP

(SIPRI 2013). Britain is small compared to the US, but it holds its own quite well

comparedtootherpowersofthenextrank,stateswhichcouldcollectivelybedescribed

as‘greatpowers’(Morris2011,326,Gaskarth2013,94).

Declinists, by contrast, emphasize thatBritain is a (very) juniorpartner to the

United States (Lehmkuhl 2012, 15). They lament that structural dependence on US

supportlimitsBritishpolicymakers’options(Hollis2010,34).EvenDavidCameronhas

admitted “partofgetting the relationship right isunderstandinghowbest toplay the

roleofthejuniorpartner”(Cameron2010a).Britain’sdependentstatusisbadenough.

It isexacerbated,however,bythefactthatBritain’scontributionisneithercritical for

the US, nor unique (Beech 2011, 351‐352). David Cameron usually sounds like an

exceptionalist,yetheobservedinhisfirstmajorforeignpolicyspeechasprimeminister

that“Britainjustcannotachievethethingswewanttoachieveintheworldunlesswe

workwiththeworld’ssuperpower”(Cameron2006).Othershavebeenmorescathing.

As early as 1986, Christopher Coker warned of a “depressing” failure of successive

governments to meet the country’s defence commitments in the face of economic

decline(Coker1986,1).AlexDanchevexaggeratedwhenheclaimed“BritainisBelgium,

thoughtheBritishdonotknowityet”(Danchev1998,164),butitisimportanttonote

thatBritain’sbeliefinitsownleadershiprolehasnotalwaysbeensupportedbyothers

(Barder 2001, 371). Both internal and external pressures shape national role

conceptions. If thosepressuresdonotalign,roleconfusionresults.This inturnopens


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theway for thesortofprolongedpublicdebate thatdefines theBritish foreignpolicy

discourse.Nationalleaderspreferamoreexceptionalistaccountofthecountry’sglobal

role than their overseas counterparts. This ensures no single agreed definition

develops,andinturnthatbothrivaltraditionssurvive.

Onesetofforeignvoicesmattertoexceptionalistanddeclinistaccountsinequal

measure,thoseemanatingfromtheUnitedStates.Britain,thetwotraditionsagree,has

historically played the role of “faithful ally” (Holsti 1970, 267) in the transatlantic

alliance.Theydivergeoverwhetherthispositionremainssustainable.Sofrequentlyhas

the ‘special relationship’ beendeclared “dead” (Wallace2005,64) and thenpromptly

resurrected that Marsh and Baylis termed it “the Lazarus of international relations”

(MarshandBaylis2006).PresidentKennedy’slimitedofferofPolarismissilesforusein

Britishsubmarinesin1962ledTheTimes toproclaimthe“probableendofthespecial

relationship” (The Times 1962), but in practice the ColdWar ensured continued co‐

operation.TheSovietcollapsedeniedtheUSandUKacommonenemyforthefirsttime

in fifty years (Baylis 1997, 223). Danchev, for example, argued that the special

relationship had passed through evangelical and functional phases and entered,with

theendoftheColdWar,oneofterminaldecline(Danchev1998,158).Duringthewar

on terrorism, however, the US and UK embarked together on thirteen years of

expeditionary war across multiple theatres, and developed their military inter‐

operabilitytoanunprecedenteddegree.PresidentObamaisnonaturalanglophile,yet

heperiodicallyreassertsthecontinuedspecialnessoftheUS‐UKalliance(Obama2010,

2013a,2014),evenblamingthecommontransatlanticpolitical factorof“anespecially

activepresscorps”forthefactthe“relationshipisoftenanalysedandover‐analysedfor

theslightesthintofstressorstrain”(Obama2011).Obamarecentlyheapedpraiseon

the “renewed” Franco‐US alliance (Obama and Hollande 2014). But, despite similar

efforts on the part of the US to diversify its critical defence relationships, few states

(includingFrance)disputeBritain’sclaimtobe‘firstally’(Sperling2010,17).

Britain’sgoalof ‘punchingabove itsweight’ in theworld ismorevulnerable to

declinistcritique,fromtwoperspectives.Firstly,TonyBlair’sargument,thatBritainwas

a ‘pivotal’ power linking the US and Europe (Blair 1999, 2002, 21, 2004), suffered

serious damage during thewars that dominated his later years in office. Building on

Churchill’s framework, James Callaghan first suggested the British could be “bridge

builders” between the old and newworlds (Callaghan 1975). Blair adopted the idea


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enthusiastically,announcinginhisfirstmajorforeignpolicyspeechingovernmentthat

“we are the bridge between the US and Europe” (Blair 1997). He was not the only

contemporary advocate such an approach to British foreign policy, though he was

perhaps the most prominent (Riddell 2003, 303‐304). Yet even his allies have

subsequentlyconcludedthatBlairunder‐estimatedthedepthofthetransatlanticdivide,

anddamagedhischancesbytreatingtheEUasanexternalcounterpartratherthanas

an integral element of Britain’s foreign policy establishment (D. Miliband 2008a,

2008b). More significantly, he failed to sustain his bridge over the issue of Iraq.

Reflecting on Blair’s decision to support President Bush while burning bridges with

President Chirac,WilliamWallace concluded that the transatlantic bridge “has again

collapsed, and...cannot now be rebuilt” (Wallace 2005, 55). Michael Cox, meanwhile,

praisedthesincerityandextentofBlair’seffortstobringtheUSandEuropetogether,

but also acknowledged their lack of success (Cox 2005, 218). Iraq proved Britain’s

pivotalpowercouldnotbridgethemostserioustransatlanticdivisions.

Secondly,while Britain retains links to far‐flung places through the remaining

overseas territories and the Commonwealth, its geographical reach is visibly much

reduced.HaroldWilsoninsistedthattheBritish“cannotaffordtorelinquishourworld

role”ashewithdrewBritishforcesfrom‘EastofSuez’(Wilson1964,423‐424).Thefact

ofwithdrawal,however,castdoubtoverthecontinuedexistenceofsucharole.McCourt

hasarguedthatitwasonlybyconsolidatingthecountry’sfocusthatWilsonwasableto

retain any sort of viable global ambitions (McCourt 2009, 454). From a declinist

perspective,however,theresidualinfluenceleftoveraftertheabandonmentofformal

empire is not the same thing as an actual role on the world stage. Nor is Britain’s

continuedwillingnesstogetinvolvedinforeignconflicts.Bellpointsoutthatdeclining

powersoftenseektoshoreuptheircollapsing internationalprestigewithsmall‐scale,

relatively low‐cost shows of military force (Bell 2013). The fact Britain is beating a

fightingretreatfromtheheightsofitsglobalpowerdoesnotmeanitremainsaglobal

player.Fromadeclinistperspectiveitmeansquitetheopposite.

Rhetorically,atleast,thepresentgovernmentfavoursabroadglobalrole.David

Cameronmaintains that “whenever Imeet foreign leaders, they do not see a Britain

shuffling apologetically off the world stage” (Cameron 2010b). Cameron implied his

foreigncounterpartswereexceptionalistswhetherornottheBritishthemselvesagreed.

William Hague has consistently rejected claims that Britain should accept a reduced


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international status (Hague 2012, 2014, 20). David Cameron and Nick Clegg’s

introductiontothe2010NationalSecurityStrategysaid“ournationalinterestrequires

ourcontinued fullandactiveengagement inworldaffairs” (CameronandClegg2010,

4). The reality of this commitment appears more complex, and the potential for

confusion between rhetoric and reality renders the definition of Britain’s global role

ambiguous,muchas itdidunderTonyBlair (Gilmore2014,542).While theStrategic

DefenceandSecurityReviewcommittedtomaintainingBritain’sexpeditionarywarfare

capability, it cut the size of the deployable force to brigade level (HM Government

2010b). Unlike divisions, brigades are not self‐sufficient in terms of support and

logistics.Theycannotbedeployedindependentlyforextendedperiodsoftime.Forall

thegovernment’spositiverhetoric,then,GaskarthconcludedthattheSDSRrepresented

in reality “a final recognition that the UK can no longer play a Great Power role”

(Gaskarth 2014, 579). We might qualify that statement, to note that the UK can no

longer play an independent Great Power role, but the underlying brute facts remain.

BritainsentadivisiontoIraqin2003.Itcannotdeploysuchaforcetoday.

While Britain’s leaders continue to assert their intention to play a global role,

their commitment to fiscal austerity throws their capacity to deliver into doubt. A

decade ago academics questioned the ability of US allies to afford themilitary inter‐

operabilitythatliesattheheartofBritain’sglobaldefencestrategy(Aldrich2004,745).

Thosedoubts havenot gone away (Bradford2011, 15), althoughAldrich’s prediction

thattheUSwouldbeforcedbyotherstates’relativebackwardnesstoactalonewithina

decade has not (yet) come true. Some observers have argued that felicities of its

bureaucratic organization (Egnell 2006, 1041) or global anti‐Americanism (McGwire

2006,640)willenableBritaintosustainitsglobal influencedespite itsdeclininghard

power capabilities. It is difficult, however, to reconcile a large‐scale reduction in

Britain’sabilitytodeploymilitaryforcewithitsdesiretoretainagloballeadershiprole

(Morris2011,341,Oppermann2012,4).Defencescholarsworryat thedamagebeing

donebyspendingreductionsdrivenby fiscal rather thanmilitaryneeds (Cornishand

Dorman2009,734,2010,395,2011,337,2012),adistinctionfinessedbytheNational

Security Strategy’s identification of fiscal profligacy itself as the country’s greatest

threat (HMGovernment2010a).Othershavearguedoverwhether financial shortfalls

(Dorman2010,376)or failure inthewars inAfghanistanandIraq(Oliver2012,157‐

158)representthegreatestthreattoBritain’sfuturemilitarycapability.


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Figure 2:Exceptionalist and declinist accounts of the special relationship andBritain’sabilityto‘punchaboveourweight’.

Iftheexceptionalistnarrativeenjoyedtheupperhandindebatesoverthespecial

relationshippriortoAugust2013,thedeclinistthesisseemedstrongeronthequestion

of Britain’s broader global role. The two positions are not incompatible. Declinists

generally do not believe the special relationship is dead,while exceptionalists accept

Britain’shardpowercapacityisnotwhatitoncewas.Theydifferontheimplicationsof

theseobservations (figure2).Theseare traditionsdividedby theirexpectationsmore

than their analyses, in other words. While the exceptionalist narrative portrays the

special relationship as a source of influence, for example, in the declinist account it

causesundesirableentanglementsthatstretchBritain’scapabilitiestoofar.

The29Augustdebate

Whilebothexceptionalistanddeclinistnarrativesfeatured,indifferentdegrees,

aboveallmemoriesofIraqcostDavidCamerontheSyriavote.Iraqshapedthedebate’s

other key arguments, around national interest, the special relationship, international

law, and British values (figure3). Troubling echoes of military misadventures under

Blair dwarfed Cameron’s efforts to focus on the task at hand. There were too many

similarities between the Iraq and Syria debates, and too many differences between

Syria and the far less controversial intervention in Libya two years before. Itwas in

many respects a perfect rhetorical storm. Long‐established traditions of declinism


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providedMPswithabroaderconceptualcontextinwhichtoarticulatespecificconcerns

abouthowthewarinIraqwaswaged,andintheprocesstode‐legitimizeintervention

in Syria by association. Exceptionalism proved unable to defeat declinist arguments

better‐supportedbyempiricalevidencederivedfromIraq.

Figure3:thekeythemesofthe29Augustdebate.

Cameron admitted that “deep public scepticism and war‐weariness” made

Britain wary of military action, but insisted regardless that its national interests

depended on stabilizing theMiddle East and punishing the use of chemicalweapons

(Hansard 2013, 1435, 1437). A handful of MPs agreed with Richard Ottaway that

Britain’s leading role in international organizations required it accept certain

responsibilities, including on occasion the responsibility to employ deadly force

(Hansard 2013, 1459).Most took amore declinist stance. Cameron’s former defence

secretary Liam Fox led a number of Conservatives who saw no national interest in

joiningaforeigncivilwar(Hansard2013,1452,1521‐1522). JamesArbuthnotsaid“if

theworldwantsustoactastheinternationalpoliceman,lettheworldsayso,because

whenwe have done so in the past, theworld has not tended to thank us” (Hansard

2013,1464).JohnRedwoodcomplained“inmyadultlifetimeinpoliticsIthinkthatwe,

as a country, have intervened too often” (Hansard 2013, 1476). Labour’s Paul Flynn,

meanwhile,spokeformanyofhisparliamentarycolleagueswhenhearguedthatBritain

hadnospecific interest inupholdingPresidentObama’s“foolishthreat” torespondto

theuseofWMDwithforce(Hansard2013,1537).Parliamentsimplydidnotacceptthat

Britain’s national interestwas at stake in Syria. Inmaking that judgement, it echoed


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quiteconsciouslythedeclinistviewthatBritain’sstatusnolongerwarrantedthesortof

global commitments being asked of it, commitments which went far beyond its

capabilities.

Few MPs worried about damaging the special relationship by voting against

interventioninSyria.CameroninsistedBritishinvolvement“willnotbedeterminedby

mygoodfriendandallytheAmericanPresident;[it]willbedecidedbythisGovernment

and votes in this House of Commons” (Hansard 2013, 1433). Unfortunately for

Cameron, many MPs did not believe him. Everyone present knew the government

recalledparliamentearly somilitaryactioncould startbefore theendof thesummer

recess the followingweek. Few could explain themove unless the US had asked the

governmenttogetreadytoactquickly.KennethClarkelaterconfirmedexactlythishad

happened(Clarke2013).DespiteCameronamendingthemotionunderdebatetorule

outexplicitlytheuseofforcewithoutafurthervote,toomanyMPsbelievedBritainwas

being pushed into a premature strike. Ed Miliband warned against being “rushed to

judgmentonthisquestiononapoliticaltimetablesetelsewhere”(Hansard2013,1447).

Several Labour backbenchers complained about Britain following a plan devised in

Washington, and recalled a similar sense surrounding the build‐up to war in Iraq

(Hansard 2013, 1461, 1502, 1535). Plaid Cymru leader Elfyn Llwyd went further,

claimingthat,regardlessofthewordingofthemotion,ayesvotewouldmeanmilitary

action within days with no further parliamentary recourse. Crucially, this sense that

BritainwasbeingdraggedintoaconflictaccordingtoUSratherthanBritishtimelines

openedthedoorforthemostexplicitreferencestoIraq.Againthedeclinistviewofthe

special relationship as a source of undesirable entanglement providedMPs with the

vocabularytocritiquethespecificsoftheSyriaproposal.Thereisnonecessaryreason

for Britain to object to the US taking the lead on military planning, given its vast

superiority in termsof firepowerandso likely leadingroleonmilitaryexecution.But

declinistinterpretationsofthespecialrelationshipstressnotUSresponsibilitiesbutthe

UK’slossofautonomy,anditwasonthatlossofautonomythatMPschosetofocusin

August2013.

Iraqhauntedparliament’sdeliberationsoverSyria.AndrewMitchellprefacedhis

remarks by acknowledging “the spectre of the debate in 2003” hovering overhead,

while David Anderson thought he saw “the ghost of Tony Blair” similarly immanent

(Hansard 2013, 1473, 1535). David Cameron tried initially to deflect attention from


14

earlier controversies, insisting “this situation is not like Iraq” (Hansard 2013, 1427).

OverLibya,in2011,theargumentworked,inlargepartbecauseitwasbackedbyaUN

Security Council Resolution. Over Syria,with no Resolution, it did not. Blair’s former

foreign secretary Jack Strawargued the Syrian situationmirrored Iraq farmore than

Libya (Hansard 2013, 1450). This observation struck home with many MPs, nine of

whomfromacrossthepoliticalspectrumstatedexplicitlythattheyhadlearntfromIraq

not to trust any government proposing to takemilitary action (Hansard 2013, 1457,

1461,1476,1488,1510,1513,1517,1521,1530).Ahandfulurgedtheircolleaguesnot

totartheentireBritishdecision‐makingapparatuswithabrushblackenedbyBlair,but

theywereverymuchintheminority(Hansard2013,1470,1503‐1504,1520,1543).Ed

MilibandnotedthatUNweapons inspectorswereworking inDamascusandneededa

fewweekstocompletetheirreport.Whilethegovernment’srevisedmotionpledgedto

give them that time, the very fact it had originally proposed to short‐circuit the

inspection process again raised unfortunate comparisons to Iraq, as some speakers

observed(Hansard2013,1443,1490,1535).Cameronover‐reachedwhenhepressed

for a robust response, and then failed to ensure he could win a parliamentary vote

beforeorganizingone,a fundamentalmistake.Toningdownhisproposal, even to the

extentthatMPswerenolongeractuallybeingaskedtoapprovemilitaryactionwithout

a further debate and vote, proved insufficient to reclaim the ground lost. Here the

broaderquestionssurroundingBritain’sroleintheworldplayedlittledirectpart.What

matteredwas Iraq, theparticularconcernsmemoriesof that conflict raised,andMPs’

immediatedesirenottorepeatthemistakesoftherecentpast.Manyoftheconclusions

theyreachedfurthersupportedthedeclinistnarrative.Butthisaspectofthedebatewas

lessinfluencedthanothersbygeneralissues,andmorebyveryspecificcomplaints.Iraq

did not worry MPs because they were declinists, theywere declinists because they

worriedaboutrepeatingthemistakesofIraq.

Questions about the legality of a strike on Syria followed naturally from

comparisons to Iraq.MenziesCampbell, a lawyer, long‐timeLiberalDemocrat foreign

affairsspokesman,andprominentcriticoftheearlierwar,praisedDavidCameronfor

releasing a summary of the Attorney‐General’s judgement on the legality of action in

Syria, and compared his stance positively to Blair’s ten years earlier (Hansard 2013,

1456).UnfortunatelyforCameron,releasingasummaryratherthanthefulltextofthe

advicewasactuallyexactlywhatBlairhaddone. In theearlier case,LordGoldsmith’s


15

finelybalanceddiscussionof thecase forwar inIraqremainedprivateuntil leaked in

2005.Itsappearancemadethemorecategoricalsummarynotereleasedin2003appear

unrepresentativeof the real legalposition, fuellingalready‐widespreadaccusationsof

officialperfidy.Sothecomparisonprovedmoredamagingthanhelpful.Labourshadow

foreignsecretaryDouglasAlexanderinsistedonlyaUNresolutioncouldlegitimizewar,

as did Green Party MP Caroline Lucas and several Labour back‐benchers (Hansard

2013, 1540, 1480, 1484). Gerald Kaufman complicated the picture further by

complaining about theway UNSCR 1973 had been used as cover for “illegal” regime

change in Libya (Hansard2013, 1468). Thiswas of course the exact complaint being

made inMoscowandBeijing. Even in theunlikely event the governmentmanaged to

secure a Security Council Resolution, Kaufman refused to support military action,

fearing further ‘mission creep’. Generally speaking, thosewhomade legal arguments

opposedtheuseofforceunderanycircumstances.Byinsistingonanapproachmorein

keepingwithinternationallawtheyknowinglypressedfornoactiontobetakenatall.

They also explicitly rejected the exceptionalist argument put forward by successive

British governments, that certain states have special rights to judge when military

interventioncanlegitimatelybeundertakenwithoutreferencetotheUN.

Hemmedinbyattacksonhislegalposition,DavidCameronagainechoedBlairby

appealing instead to fundamentalBritishvalues,drawingheavilyonanexceptionalist

vocabulary. Britain was, he insisted, the “sort of country” that upheld international

conventionssuchasthebanonchemicalweapons,andprotectedciviliansregardlessof

thenicetiesofUNapproval (Hansard2013,1430).Thisargumentwonsomesupport.

Andrew Mitchell invoked the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, and warned that failing to

interveneinSyriawouldoffer“aclearlessontohumanrightsabusersanddictatorswho

murder and terrorise innocent civilian populations” (Hansard 2013, 1474). Brooks

Newmark similarly accused the UN of failing “to live up to its mandate to protect”,

thoughhis conclusion that “we thereforeneed to findacoalitionof thewilling”again

raised unfortunate comparisons with Iraq (Hansard 2013, 1504). Clearly

exceptionalismhadnot yet vanished from theHouse of Commonsbenches. From the

LaboursidebothPatMcFaddenandMikeGapesresurrectedthe‘hardliberal’argument

fromtenyearsbefore,maintainingthatthehumanitariansituationinSyrianecessitated

outside intervention (Hansard 2013, 1523, 1528). Even as Nick Clegg admitted “Iraq

castsalongshadow”heinsisted“itwouldbeadoubletragedyifthememoryofthatwar


16

now caused us to retreat from the laws and conventions that govern our world”

(Hansard2013,1546).Althoughreceivedmoresympatheticallythanotherpartsofthe

government’scase,Clegg’sargumentsstillfailedtostrikeachordformanyMPs.David

Daviscondemnedtheabsenceofa“clearmoralimperative”foraction.GeorgeGalloway

criticized the claim that Britain and the US could act legitimately in the name of the

international community despite Russian and Chinese opposition. Douglas Carswell

compared the pressure to attack Syria to the silence that greeted the overthrow of

MohamedMorsiinEgypt.DavidLammywarnedthat“liberalinterventioncanfail–and

it can fail badly” (Hansard 2013, 1469, 1472, 1493, 1497). Again these arguments

representedvariationsaroundacommontheme.NoBritishnational interestswereat

stake,andBritain lacked the capacity inanyevent tomountaneffective intervention

otherthanasaveryminorpartneroftheUS.Fromthatperspective,heavilycolouredby

declinistnarratives, it seemed littlegoodcouldcome fromparliamentauthorizing the

useofforceinSyria.

Figure4:distributionofspeakersandvotes intheHouseofCommonsonthequestionofmilitaryinterventioninSyria.

MPs rejected both the Labour amendment and the underlying government

motion, the latter by just thirteen votes. The distribution of speakers in the debate

pointedtoamorefundamentalpersuasivefailurethanthisnarrowmarginimplies(see

figure4).SixtybackbenchMPsspokeduringeighthoursofdiscussion.Fourteenpledged

to support either the government or military action. Thirteen remained undecided.

Thirty‐threewereoutright opposed.Although a significantproportionof LabourMPs

For 14

Neutral 13

Against 33

Debate

For272

Abstain 93

Against 285

Vote


17

endorsedtheprincipleofhumanitarianintervention,fewwerewillingtosupportDavid

Cameron.MegMunn,forexample,spokewithgreatconvictionduringthedebateonthe

needtointervenetostopthekillingofciviliansinSyria.Sheexpressedlittlesympathy

with the arguments against intervention, including those based on the lack of UN

approvaloroncomparisonstoIraq.Shecouldhavebeenparrotingtheprimeminister

precisely. Yet she did not vote with him, abstaining on both divisions. Conservative

scepticsJohnRedwood,JohnBaronandEdwardLeightoedthepartylinetovotedown

the Labour Party amendment, but then absented themselves from the final division,

while four others refused either to support or to endorse Labour, then returned to

reject their own government’s position. For government backbenchers, the first vote

wasapoliticalone,thesecondoneofconscience.ForLabour,bothwerepolitical.Inthe

end the combination of Labour’s political discipline and the government’s failure to

marshalitsback‐benchtroopseffectivelyensuredthemotionfailed.Notfornothingdid

earlyblameforthedefeatfalluponthegovernmentwhips.

Afterthevote,thesearchforperspective

Parliament embraced a declinist account of Britain’s global role during its 29

August debate, largely thanks to the legacy of the war in Iraq. For many MPs, the

invasion of Iraq represented both the apogee of exceptionalism, and its moment of

ultimatehubris.WhenTonyBlair(2001)pledgedtostand“shouldertoshoulder”with

the United States after the 11 September attacks, he surrendered Britain’s

independenceinthehopeofgaininginfluenceinreturn.BlairbelievedBritain’sability

toplayitspreferredroleof‘firstally’inthe‘waronterrorism’dependedonhisoffering

absolutepublicsupporttoPresidentBush,raisinganyconcernsonlyinprivate(Hollis

2006,38).Hemadeastrongcommitment,includingthedeploymentofBritishtroops,to

underscore not only the importance of the transatlantic relationship from Britain’s

perspective but also the country’s willingness to pay a blood price in its defence

(Kennedy‐Pipe and Vickers 2007, 208). To an extent the strategy proved successful.

Even erstwhile Blair critic and then‐ambassador to Washington Christopher Meyer

concededthatBlair’s loyalty toBushgrantedBritain“thestatusof indispensableally”

(Meyer 2005, 250). From an exceptionalist standpoint, this was a desirable

development, one that guaranteed Britain its long‐sought ‘pivotal’ role. For the

declinists,Blair’sblindloyaltywasbothunnecessaryanddangerous.Itwasunnecessary


18

becausetheUS,asaraucouslydemocraticstate,cancopewithoccasionaldisagreement

amongitsallies,asJasonRalphhasarguedrepeatedly(Ralph2011,124,Ralph2013a,

335). It isdangerousbecauseof the foreign entanglements it implies. In thedeclinist

accountoftheIraqwar,BritainabandonedpotentialalliesinUSdomesticpoliticswho

wouldhaveralliedbehindamoreconcertedpushforpeace,andintheprocessaccepted

thecostsofaconflictitcouldillafford.WhenMPsspokeofIraqduringtheSyriadebate,

itwastothisdeclinistaccountthattheyreferred.

Declinist thoughtbothencouragedparliamenttovetomilitaryaction inAugust

2013andgainedasignificantempiricalboostfromtheoutcome.Politicalleaderstried

todismissthevoteasaminorhiccupinthegranderdiscourseofBritain’splaceinthe

world (E. Miliband 2013a). Commentators wondered openly whether the country’s

switch from indispensable to unreliable ally marked the end of its long decline into

irrelevance(Shapiro2013).Severalthoughtthespecialrelationshipwasatrisk.TheSun

published a front page “death notice” declaring it had “died at home after a sudden

illness…aged 67” (The Sun 2013). TheEveningStandard warned “in future, itwill be

only fair for anyUSpresident toaskwhether theBritish really candeliver” (Evening

Standard2013).BBCNorthAmericacorrespondentMarkMardellechoedthisconcern

(Mardell2013).Thiswasnomereknee‐jerkreaction.JustinWebb,alsoprimarilyofthe

BBC,wrote inTheTimes sixmonths after the Syria vote that Americans thought the

“Britshavelosttheirmoralspine”,withallbutBlair“placedsomewhereonacontinuum

of uselessness” (Webb 2014). Even PhillipHammond, the Defence Secretary,warned

parliament’s decision was “certainly going to place some strain on the special

relationship” (Hammond 2013). All this was music to declinist ears. Some took the

opportunity to dismiss the idea of a distinctive US‐UK partnership as unrealistic and

outdatednonsense(Hastings2013,Hitchens2013).Othersre‐emphasizedthecasefor

greater British independence from its more powerful ally (Alexander 2013, Milne

2014),oropenlycelebratedtheprospectofapermanentbreak(Alibhai‐Brown2013).

Declinistsamongthepublicandpoliticalelitepointedtoparliamentasbothasymptom

ofandacureforthedifficultiestheyidentifiedinBritain’sglobalstance.MPshadgrown

restive in the face of national overstretch. Their power and willingness to constrain

foreignpolicyadventurismofferedamuch‐neededcorrective.

US leaders took a more circumspect view of parliament’s behaviour. British

publicopinion, too, seemedunconcernedabout the longer‐termconsequences for the


19

special relationship (Ralph 2013b). Downing Street was more worried, quickly

publishing a note of Cameron’s discussion with Obama immediately after the vote,

emphasizingtheir jointdeterminationtoensurethespecialrelationshipstayedstrong

(HM Government 2013). US ambassador to London Matthew Barzun wrote in The

Observer how “odd” appeared the “rush by some to declare this relationship

dead…because it issocontradictorytowhat I’veseen”.Hewasparticularlyperturbed

by the fact that “the very thing that is needed to prevent these hasty last rites is

something for which we Americans often depend on Britain: perspective” (Barzun

2013a).JohnKerry,visitingLondonintheweeksafterthevote,toldjournaliststhatthe

USalliancewiththeUKwasindeedspecial,noting“ourbond…isbiggerthanonevote;

it’sbiggerthanonemomentinhistory”(Kerry2013).Barzunfolloweduponthispoint,

insisting “the idea that13votesonaThursdaynightat theendof the summercould

disrupt seven decades of cooperation,WorldWar Two and the ColdWar and all the

stuffweareengagedonnow, just is incredible” (Barzun2013b). If London couldnot

supplyitsownperspective,Washingtonseemeddeterminedtostepin.

TheObama administration’s behaviourwas perhaps evenmore reassuring for

theBritishthanitsrhetoric.Respondingpubliclytoparliament’sdecision,thepresident

praisedthevirtuesofademocratic foreignpolicyandpromisedtoseekcongressional

approval himself before proceeding further (Obama 2013b). Once it became clear he

couldnotwinthatlevelofdomesticsupport,Obamawithdrewthethreattouseforcein

Syria.Britain’sparliament,atleastindirectly,hadvetoednotjustBritishbutUSmilitary

action as well. Obama would not have risked submitting himself to congressional

approval had Britain not already set an example, and had its parliament not already

ruledout theuseof force.AstheEveningStandard’sSarahSandsobserved,“for those

who believe in the arrogance of the US, it must have been a surprise to see that it

needed British support after all” (Sands 2013). Christopher Meyer thought Obama’s

decisiontomimicCameronshowed“thatthespecialrelationshipwasnever indoubt”

(Meyer2013).BorisJohnson,influentialMayorofLondon,mootedfutureConservative

leaderandUScitizen,agreed(Johnson2013).TheHouseofCommonsForeignAffairs

Committee thought the US decision not to act without the UK in Syria showed the

superpower’scontinuedrelianceonitsjuniorpartner(ForeignAffairsCommittee2014,

29). Exceptionalist commentators launched a counter‐strike against their declinist

rivals, labeling them “melodramatic” (Daily Mail 2013, Evans‐Pritchard 2013) and


20

calling their concerns about the special relationship’s end “wildly exaggerated” (The

Independent 2013) and “surely overdone” (Cornwell 2013). Thedeclinist bump from

the initial vote proved short‐lived, at least as far as the special relationship was

concerned.

Thenational ‘soul searching’overBritain’sbroaderrole in theworld (Osborne

2013),andinparticularitsabilityto‘punchaboveitsweight’,provedhardertodismiss.

SpectatoreditorFraserNelsonconcluded“ParliamenthasrejectedthePrimeMinister's

vision of this country's place in the world” (Nelson 2013). EveningStandard deputy

political editor Nicholas Cecil observed that MPs preferred for Britain to “punch its

weight rather than trying to punch above it” (Cecil 2013). Others made invidious

comparisons betweenBritain’s behaviour and the unwillingness of smaller European

states (and Germany) to engage with even major issues beyond Europe’s borders

(Evening Standard 2013, Cohen 2013). Former US State Department official Richard

HaasswarnedonhisFinancialTimesblogthat“theUKisindangerofseparatingitself

from both the EU and the US, an undesirable status for a medium size country that

wantstoplayaworldrolebuthasfewindependentoptions”(Haass2013).Muchofthis

was in linewithearlierdeclinistarguments,assomeobserverspointedout (Hawkins

2013).ButtheSyriavotegavethestandardcritiquesofBritain’soutsizedglobalrolean

additional cuttingedge.ObserverswonderedhowBritaincould retain itsUNSecurity

Council presence (Foster 2013), or its “once‐cherished role as one of the world’s

foremostmoral policemen” (Roberts 2013) if it refused to intervene in the affairs of

other states.Thosemost scepticalof the idea thatBritain represents, inRobinCook’s

much‐criticizedphrase,‘aforceforgoodintheworld’(Cook1997),celebratedaretreat

from “great power status” (Dejevsky 2014). Even the House of Commons Defence

Committee, not typically regarded as a bastion of declinist thought, offered guarded

praise for the Syria vote’s unintended development of a “realistic vision of the UK’s

place in the world” (Defence Committee 2014). The committee left unspoken the

declinistimplicationthatreducingitsglobalrolewouldbeinBritain’sbestinterests.

Ed Miliband maintained “last week’s vote was not about Britain shirking its

globalresponsibilities,itwasaboutpreventingarushtowar”(E.Miliband2013b,308).

William Hague, meanwhile, noted that Britain was still closely engaged in Syria,

promoting a negotiated settlement and sending non‐lethal assistance to rebel groups

(Hague2013,159).Bothclaimsranghollow.Regardlessofhisexactintention,Miliband


21

didnotjustdelaythedecisionaboutoutsideinterventioninSyria.Heensureditdidnot

take place at all. Hague would not have emphasized so emphatically his non‐lethal

policy options if more robustmeasures were still available to him. Syria shows that

Britishforeignpolicyisnowalegitimatetargetforpartisanpoliticking,whichmeansin

turn that parliamentary arithmetic will determine future large‐scale engagements in

world affairs. This prospect clearly casts doubt on the country’s ability to fulfill its

commitments(Burt2014,33).Coalitionwhipsmisjudgedtheparliamentarymoodover

Syria,andDavidCameronmisjudgedEdMiliband.Fromthatperspective,the29August

votecouldbetermedan“accident”.Yet,astheFinancialTimes’GideonRachmannoted,

although “Miliband was not intending to send a signal that Britain’s global role has

fundamentallychanged…accidentscanalsobeturningpoints,particularlyiftheyreveal

and harden underlying shifts in the politicalmood” (Rachman 2013). The Syria vote

revealedhowrawmemoriesofIraqstillareamongstMPs.Ithardenedtheirconviction

that parliament has not just a right but a duty to veto government proposals to

intervene in world affairs. It raised serious questions about Britain’s willingness to

punchabove itsweight in future,andabout its leaders’ability tomaintain thespecial

relationshipwith theUnitedStates.Declinism,onbalance,didnotgaina significantly

stronger hold over the foreign policy discourse as a result of Syria. Instead, Syria

revealedhowpowerfulaninfluenceitalreadyexertedoverthosenowinapositionto

makedecisionsabouttheoverseasuseofforce.HaguewarnsthatBritain’s“capacityfor

self‐criticismmustnot become corrosiveof our ownvalues andour ability todefend

them”(Hague2014).Hehassomewaytogotomakethatwarningstick.

Conclusion

Although parliament’s veto of military strikes against the Assad regime owed

much to the British foreign policy tradition of declinism, exceptionalism survived its

defeat.TheSyriavotewasunusual. Itrepresentedaperfectdecliniststorm.Itseemed

so similar to Iraq, so nuanced as a decision, and so sudden after eighteenmonths of

conflict,thatMPsfeltinstinctivelyuneasyaboutallowingactiontogoahead.EvenDavid

Cameronadmittedtheyfacedafinely‐balancedjudgement.Gropingforconceptstohelp

articulatetheirconcerns,manyMPsalighteduponwarningsaboutthedangersofblind

loyaltytotheUSorcostlyoverstretchinfar‐offforeignlandsderivedfromthedeclinist

narrative.Severalbelievedabsolutelyinthecentraltenetsofdeclinism.Butmanyvoted


22

asmuchagainstthememoryofthewarinIraqasagainsttheprospectofinterventionin

Syria. Their complaints, though framed in general terms, almost inevitably referred

backinsomewaytotheearlierconflict.Whilethebroadertraditionsofexceptionalism

and decline undoubtedly influenced the Syria debate and vote, in the end bothwere

governedprimarilybyhostilitytotheinvasionofIraq,justframedrhetoricallyinmore

general terms. Neither tradition stood to gain or lose much from the outcome, as a

result. Neither was fundamentally tied up with the outcome of this one vote. While

declinist scepticism of Britain’s punching above her weight struck a parliamentary

nerve on this occasion, exceptionalism still holds sway in broader accounts of the

specialrelationship.Andtheexceptionalistreactionspurredbydeclinisttriumphalism

intheaftermathofthevoteseemslargelytohaveshoredupthestatusquo.

For all its drama, then, Syria held little substantive significance for Britain’s

futureglobal role.Britain isno less likely to seek topunch above itsweightafter the

August 2013 vote than it was before. No viable alternative has emerged to the

continuedtensionbetweenpost‐imperialtraditionsofexceptionalismanddecline,nor

to the central place of the special relationship and pivotal power as pillars of the

country’s foreign policy approach. As Jamie Gaskarth notes, there are no alternative

“scripts”forBritain’snationalroleconceptiontothosedefinedagainstthebackdropof

empire(Gaskarth2014,567).Syriadidnotchangethis. Itdidnot fundamentallyalter

the discourse surrounding the notion of Britain’s role. The broader system of role

prescriptionswithinwhichBritishleadersoperateremainsintact.USandotherforeign

leadersagreewiththeheadsofallthreemajorpoliticalpartiesthatSyriadidnotaffect

Britain’splaceas‘firstally’oftheUnitedStates.Whileitsclaimto‘pivotal’powerseems

morevulnerable, itis inturnbasedprimarilyonthespecialrelationship,andsolikely

alsotosurvive.SyriadidrevealtheextenttowhichBritain’snationalroleconceptionis

deeplydivided,largelyovertheechoesofIraq.Infact,itarguablydoesnotexistatall,

such is the disconnect between rival narratives within the country and different

outsiders’ perceptions beyond. Instead of a national role conception Britain often

displays littlemorethannationalroleconfusion.Thatagain isamajorreasonwhy its

responsetoSyriahasbeensohaphazard,andwhymemoriesofLibyaplayedlittlerole

inadebatedominatedbyIraq.Britaincanintervenemilitarilyoverseas.Itiswillingto

do so under the right circumstances. But it is a chastened and war‐weary power

nonetheless, hauntedby earliermistakes andwillingnot to act, not to prove itself at


23

every opportunity, in order to keep its commitments from escalating. Its role

performance is inconsistent, and so its attitudes, decisions and actions are

unpredictable, with one exception. The key trends dominating the contemporary

discoursehaveconstitutedanewcommitmenttoupholdingthecollectivewilloftheUN

SecurityCouncil.MPsshowedoverSyriathattheytrustedtheSecurityCouncilaheadof

theUSandUKgovernments.WhentheCouncilrefusedtosupportintervention,sodid

parliament.TosomeextentthisreflectedalossoftrustdrivenbymissingWMDandthe

publication of legal advice with critical nuances removed. To some extent, too, it

reflected declinism amongst the political elite, their confidence knocked by austerity

andtoomanyyearsofwar.

Neither feeling is necessarily permanent. A future parliament may regain

confidenceinBritain’sglobalroleandproveitselfmorewillingtosupportforeignpolicy

adventuresthatlacktheUNimprimatur.ItwillfirsthavetoexorcisethedemonsofIraq

andrenewitsfaithinBritishpowerasasignificantforceintheworld,andaforcefor

good to boot. Perhaps the significance of Syria, then, is not that it has changed

fundamentally the trajectory of British foreign policy discourse. For themost part it

clearly has not. What it has done, however, is highlight the intensity of its most

fundamental dilemmas, not quite constituting but perhaps accelerating an eventual

reckoningbetweenrivaltraditionsofexceptionalismanddecline.


24

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