state dissatisfaction: predicting the occurrence of interstate war

State Dissatisfaction: Predicting theOccurrence of Interstate War

Hsiao-chuan Liao*

Dissatisfaction is the trigger for states to initiate war according to power transition theory.The more a state is dissatisfied, the more likely it will initiate war. Traditionally, scholarsuse military buildups and alliance portfolios to measure states’ dissatisfaction. Thosemeasures do not express state dissatisfaction directly but provide, at best, circumstantialevidence. This paper introduces a direct measure of state dissatisfaction by countingrequests and threats made by one state to another state. Four types of cases are selectedfrom combinations of state dissatisfaction and initiation of war. The analyses are based ona selected-focus-dyad unit and quantified data sets. Using Boolean algebra, this articledemonstrates that military parity and dissatisfaction expressed by territorial threats aremore likely to trigger war. The results also show what elements of power parity and statedissatisfaction contribute to noninitiation of war. Last, the case studies highlight thenuances in the decision to initiate war among various states.

Key words: Boolean algebra, power parity, power transition theory, state dissatisfaction, war

Introduction

How can we predict the occurrence of interstate conflicts? Scholars havedifferent approaches to answering this question (Cashman & Robinson,

2007; Efird, Kugler, & Genna, 2003; Levy, 1982; Russett & Oneal, 2001; Senese &Vasquez, 2008; Vasquez & Henehan, 2001; Wallace, 1973). Among them, theargument of power transition theory (PTT) is powerful and plausible (Organski,1958; Oganski & Kugler, 1980). According to PTT, it is highly likely to result inwar when a discontented challenger has power that approximates that of ahegemon. Although the original PTT only applied to the global level, Lemke(2002) and Liao (2012) have extended its application to the regional and dyadiclevels, respectively. In other words, the two factors that account for global wars—state dissatisfaction and power parity—also contribute to regional wars anddyadic wars. State dissatisfaction triggers the occurrence of conflicts while powerparity provides the opportunity for states.

*Hsiao-chuan Liao is a postdoctoral researcher at National Taiwan University, Taipei,Taiwan. She received her PhD from the University of South Carolina Carolina, USA. Herresearch interests are international conflict, power transition theory, reputation and statepower, and Northeast Asia studies.

bs_bs_banner

Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 6, Number 2—Pages 217–236© 2014 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

However, the debate on how to measure state dissatisfaction has not beensettled. Two most often used measurements are the similarity of alliance portfo-lios (Kim, 1992) and military buildups (Lemke, 2002). Those two measurementsmay be appropriate when we examine the global powers. But they can onlyprovide, at best, circumstantial evidence. In previous work (Liao, 2012), I measurestate dissatisfaction by directly counting the incidence of states’ requests andthreats, before the occurrence of final conflict. This article adopts these measure-ments and further compares and contrasts whether requests (or demands asinterchangeably used here), and threats represent state dissatisfaction better interms of predicting war initiation.

Furthermore, a preliminary analysis of statistical tests substantiated the corre-lations among power parity, state dissatisfaction, and war initiation, but not theircausal relations. This article presents case studies on both the examples and the“anomalies” from the statistical tests. Through the cases, this article is able toanswer whether and how power parity and dissatisfaction cause war initiationamong different state dyads. Accordingly, the results of this study demonstratewhether Liao’s (2012) measurements of state dissatisfaction work. More impor-tantly, research on the selected focus dyads reveals the respective states’ behaviorwith respect to war initiation. Thus, this article can conclude which elements ofpower parity and which kinds of demands or threats lead states to war, andwhich among them do not lead to war.

A. F. K. Organski (1958) argues that wars become more likely as challengers’capabilities approach those of the hegemon. He demonstrates empirically that nowar occurs without power transition. Power transition is a necessary condition ofGreat Power war (Organski & Kugler, 1980, pp. 50–52). The timing of the onset ofwar is “after power transition,”1 which contradicts the arguments of balance-of-power theory (Kugler & Organski, 1989, p. 172). However, it seems that 13 casesout of the 126 tested in Organski and Kugler’s study (1980) experienced unequalpower distribution yet went through war, which diminishes support for powertransition as a necessary condition.2 Whether power transition causally links withwar initiation therefore needs further discussion.

Instead of discussing systemic wars, Lemke (2002) applies PTT propositions toregional wars. He argues that PTT not only can predict the onset of war at a globallevel but also can predict the onset of war in regional systems. According to hisarguments, the combination of power parity and dissatisfaction is the most influ-ential factor for the onset of regional wars. In the four regional systems—Africa,Far East, Middle East, and South America—states fight most times when theyare in a period of power parity and dissatisfaction. Liao (2012) further revisesPTT into a more generally applicable theory of war. According to Liao’s (2012)argument, in any politically relevant dyad, a state is highly likely to go to warwhen it is in a period of power parity with another state and when it is dissatis-fied. The discussion in this article is based on Lemke’s (2002) and Liao’s (2012)revision of PTT and the focus on power parity.

As for state dissatisfaction, there is no satisfactory measurement yet of thisvariable. Kim (1991, 1992) uses the similarity of alliance portfolio to measurestates’ dissatisfaction with hegemons. If a state has a different composition ofalliance portfolios from that of hegemons, this state is dissatisfied with thehegemons. Lemke (2002) uses “extraordinary military buildups” as the measure

218 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 6, Issue 2—2014

of a challenger’s dissatisfaction. If a challenger has an extraordinary militarybuildup prior to the year of the conflict event, this challenger is coded as adiscontented state (Kadera, 1996; Kugler & Lemke, 2000; Lemke & Werner, 1996;Werner & Kugler, 1996). However, the two measurements tend to confuse whatexactly is the focus of a challenger’s dissatisfaction. A dissimilar alliance portfolioor a rapidly increasing military buildup of a challenger does not necessarilyrepresent this challenger’s dissatisfaction toward any specific state, but with thestatus quo. Dissimilarity of alliance portfolio may not be effective in measuringthe dissatisfaction between states in any politically relevant dyad as states nowa-days mostly have similar alliance portfolios. Other factors such as domesticthreats or insurgencies can also lead states to increase their military buildups.Furthermore, when there are more than two contenders in a system, it is ratherdifficult to argue whether a particular challenger with extraordinary militarybuildup is aiming at a particular contender. Thus, this article utilizes Liao’s (2012)alternative measurement of state dissatisfaction, explained next, and applies it toselected cases to examine both the relationships between variables and the cred-ibility of the measurement.

War Initiation by States in Politically Relevant DyadsThis study applies PTT to any politically relevant dyad, and examines how

power and state dissatisfaction lead to war initiation. According to the revisedPTT (Liao, 2012), the hypothesis of war initiation is:

In a politically relevant dyad, as the dyadic states’ power equalizes and the dissat-isfaction of State A against State B increases, the more likely it is that State A willinitiate war with State B in order to change the status quo between them. (p. 147)

The applied population is that of politically relevant dyads, adopted from theEUGene database from 1816 to 2001 (Bennett & Stam, 2000; Benson, 2005). “Politi-cally relevant dyads” are defined as follows: One of the dyadic states is a majorpower (hence, the state is vital to the other state and/or has the capability tointeract with the nonmajor state in some way—militarily and/or economically),3

or the geographical distance of the two states’ borders is no more than 12 miles(including territorial waters). These dyads are more likely to influence eachother’s survival or interests, and to pay particular attention to the growth of eachother’s state power.

This article selects eight state dyads representing four types, based on therelationship between state dissatisfaction and war initiation4 (Table 1). Discon-tented states which initiate war are Type 1 while discontented states which do notinitiate war belong to Type 2. Type 3 are states that are not dissatisfied but initiatewar, and which are therefore considered anomalies of PTT. In Type 4, states are notdissatisfied and do not initiate war. These four aspects of the relationship betweenstate dissatisfaction and war initiation are considered. The next step is to system-atically select the cases. The eight state dyads are selected because they are eitherstatistically extreme or medium cases of the four types, respectively, accordingto the preliminary analysis of a statistical model (Table A1 in the Appendix). Onedisadvantage of small-N studies is that the cases lack representativeness. Throughthis systematic selection of cases, the results of this article are more representative.

State Dissatisfaction: Predicting the Occurrence of Interstate War 219

Furthermore, this article focuses on the first states in the selected dyads (thosemarked in boldface in Table 1) and examines all the military interstate disputes(MIDs hereafter) for each of the eight states in the specific year.5 The eightcountries are selected because one of their MIDs in that specific year has been amedium or extreme case in the case pool. Thus, this article focuses on the eightstates’ behavior against any other state in that year, to dissect how power parityand dissatisfaction influence the eight countries’ behavior in that year. ThoseMIDs may include war initiation or may not. In other words, those eight coun-tries, not the original dyads, are the focus in the analyses to follow. By taking thisapproach, I am able to make a number of comparisons of selected states’ warbehavior and demonstrate whether power parity and state dissatisfaction causestates’ war initiation case by case.

Methods: Boolean AlgebraIn order to enhance the credibility of his research, Charles Ragin (1987) synthe-

sized case-oriented strategies and variable-oriented strategies into Booleanalgebra. He argued that the case-oriented strategy, such as a comparative casestudy, is incapable of explaining a large number of cases at a time while the

Table 1. Case Selection

If State A initiates a war

YES NO

If State A isdissatisfiedwith State B

YES Type 1-1Iraq 1990(Iraq—Saudi Arabia)

Type 2-1Germany 1938(Germany—the United Kingdom)

Type 1–2Japan 1939(Japan—Mongolia)

Type 2-2China 1923(China—The Soviet Union)

NO Type 3-1Tanzania 1978(Tanzania—Uganda)

Type 4-1China 1950(China—Thailand)

Type 3-2The United States 1942(The United States—Finland)

Type 4-2France 1923(France—Albania)

Notes: Cases of the four types are selected according to the results of a regression model on therelationships among power parity, state dissatisfaction, and war initiation. The regression model is inthe Appendix (Table A1). Types 1-1, 2-1, 3-1, and 4-1 are the medium cases of the respective categories.Type 1-2, 2-2, 3-2, and 4-2 are the extreme cases of the respective categories. A medium case means itsdeviance is near the mean of the deviance in the category in the regression model. Whether a case isextreme is judged by the case’s influence. If the influential power of cases is the same, the representativecase is decided according to Pearson residual, leverage, and standard error of the prediction. Theselected dyads are in the parentheses. Then, this article targets on the first state in the dyads. Thecountries followed by a specific year marked in boldface are the observations of this article.


variable-oriented strategy cannot provide arguments for complex causal mecha-nisms and samples with many nested layers (Ragin, 1987, p. 69). Case studies lackthe ability to generalize patterns and test hypotheses with a large number of cases.On the other hand, a large-N study fails to describe more complex relations amongvariables and cannot explain exceptions. Thus, Ragin (1987) introduces Booleanalgebra to bridge the gap between the case-oriented strategy and the variable-oriented strategy.

In Boolean algebra, values of variables and outcomes are coded either 1 (trueor present) or 0 (false or absent) in a Truth Table. A Truth Table is a matrix thatdemonstrates how different combinations of variables trigger a final outcome.The frequency of events is not relevant to formulations. Following rules of com-bination and elimination, a “sums-of-products” of outcomes is produced.6 Thesums-of-products model demonstrates straightforwardly how phenomenaoccur. The next step is to simplify the “sum-of-products” by reducing “primitiveexpressions” to “prime implicants.” The principles of simplification are logicalalgorithm without intervention from events. Boolean equations after simpli-fication demonstrate the conditions necessary, sufficient, or irrelevant to theoutcome.7 In addition, instead of conducting in-depth case studies, this studyexecutes Boolean algebra based on existing quantitative data sets. In such a case,the author is able to compare phenomena and obtain patterns by a pure languageof logic without subjective judgments.

This study utilizes Boolean algebra to construct the logical relationshipbetween elements of the variables. This article balances sampling by selectingboth the most representative (Types 1-1, 2-1, 3-1, and 4-1) and the most extremecases (Types 1-2, 2-2, 3-2, and 4-2) in respective types from the case pool. Choos-ing both extreme and medium cases helps control for the effects of overestima-tion or underestimation on the relationships between variables.

DataThe only dependent variable is whether State A initiates a war. The definition

and date of war come from the the MID data set (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004).This article discusses both equations for states’ war initiation and for states’noninitiation of war.

Power and dissatisfaction are the independent variables of this article. Thisarticle uses the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) from the NationalMaterial Capabilities Data under the Correlates of War data set (Singer, Bremer, &Stuckey, 1972) as the measurement of state power.8 This article also discussestwo elements of power separately: military and economic. Both military parityand economic parity are considered in the Truth Table. The measure of militarycapability is military expenditure per year. Data come from the National MaterialCapabilities Data (Singer et al., 1972). The representation of economic capability isstates’ gross domestic product, drawn from the World Bank Database. Because theWorld Bank only has data after 1960, this study adopts Angus Maddison’s (1995)data as the main source for cases before 1960. In addition, this study codesnational trade of states as another source of economic power (Barbieri & Keshk,2012). The reason to use national trade as an indicator is that it is easily perceivedby other states. Also, states tend to consider other states with high flow of tradeto be economically significant.


The other independent variable is “State A’s dissatisfaction with State B.” Boththe definition and the measurement of state dissatisfaction are controversial. Whatwill a state do if it is dissatisfied with another state? How can we tell thata state is not satisfied with another state? According to Liao (2012), states makerequests or threats to other states to express their dissatisfaction. Some requests (ordemands as interchangeably used here) may be benign, but the message behind arequest is still clear: I am not satisfied with your behavior and the status quobetween us. Walt (1985) also argues that threat, rather than power, is a de factotrigger to states’ behaviors. States may not initiate war because of power distribu-tion, but states will initiate war if they are not satisfied with the statusquo among them. When they are not satisfied, they will issue demands or threatsto change the status quo. Thus, the demands or threats can represent state dissat-isfaction.9 This study adopts Liao’s (2012) measurements of state dissatisfaction.The first measurement is “revisionist attitude.” Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996)argue that states are revisionists if their dissatisfaction is high. In their MID data set,a state is coded as a revisionist state if it “attempts to challenge the pre-disputecondition” between dyadic states (Jones et al., 1996, p. 178). Three kinds of issuesare coded: “making claims to territory, attempting to overthrow a regime, ordeclaring the intention not to abide by another state’s policy” (Jones et al., 1996, p.178). If State A has demanded any change about State B’s territory, policy, regimeand government, or other issues, then State A will be coded as a revisionist state inthat specific year. States become revisionist states because they are not satisfiedwith the status quo and want to change it (Carr, 1939; Rynning & Ringsmose, 2008).

The second measurement is “gravity of dissatisfaction.” The definition of StateA’s dissatisfaction with State B is the idea that State A wants State B to do or notto do certain things, according to State A’s will. Intensity of threats demonstratesthe level of seriousness of State A’s dissatisfaction. This measure is adopted fromLiao (2012), in which she transformed the variable of “Gravity of Value Threat” inthe International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2000). Thismeasure identifies the object of the gravest threat as perceived by target statesand reflects the gravity of dissatisfaction of actor states. There are seven kinds ofthreats: economic threat, limited military threat, political threat, territorial threat,threat to influence in the international system or regional subsystem, threat ofgrave damage, and threat to existence. If two or more threats are perceived in thesame year, it is coded as most severe. For example, in the case of Japanesemilitary operations in China in 1931–1932, the ICB coded that China felt a terri-torial threat; thus, this study codes it as the gravity of Japan’s dissatisfaction at thelevel of territorial threat. Another advantage of this measure is that the codedthreats are substantial as target states have felt threatened.10

Truth TablesThis article chooses eight “State A” countries as the observations of this study:

Iraq in 1990, Japan in 1939, Germany in 1938, China in 1923, Tanzania in 1978, theUnited States in 1942, China in 1950, and France in 1923. Data collection is basedon a selected focus dyad-year unit. Take Iraq in 1990, for example; Iraq engagedwith 11 countries in 1990 in the MID data set. Thus, this study collects data foreach of these 11 MIDs and calculates whether the 11 state dyads (Iraq as the firststate in every dyad) achieve parity or dissatisfaction with each other. The other


seven states are as follows: Japan in 1939 had MIDs with 64 different countries;Germany in 1938 had 65 MIDs; China in 1923 had 8 MIDs; Tanzania in 1978 had12 MIDs; the United States in 1942 had 52 MIDs; China in 1950 had 74 MIDs;finally, France in 1923 had 60 MIDs.

Accordingly, this article sets up a Truth Table to demonstrate the presenceor absence of different combinations of variables in every MID for each of theeight states in a specific year.11 Both the dependent and independent variables arecoded dichotomously on a case-by-case basis. Thus, this article has eight TruthTables for each state in order to derive necessary or sufficient conditions for theeight states’ actions, respectively. There are three kinds of power parity: totalpower parity,12 military parity, and economic parity. The definition of powerparity is the gap of states’ power in between a negative and a positive 20%difference. The same threshold applies also to military and economic power. Asfor state dissatisfaction, having a “revisionist attitude” contains three elements:claim on territory, claim on policy, and claim on regime or government. “Gravityof dissatisfaction” originally has eight ranks, but only five levels of gravity ofdissatisfaction are discussed here: political threat, territorial threat, threat to influ-ence in the international system or regional subsystems, threat of grave damage,and threat to existence. Among the total 346 MIDs, only these five kinds of threatsare in variance and other kinds of threats are irrelevant.13

Power and DissatisfactionThis article discusses the eight states according to their types in Table 1. In

order to examine the causality between power, state dissatisfaction, and warinitiation in every type, we examine their relations from three aspects: the generalconditions of power and dissatisfaction, the elements of power, and the elementsof state dissatisfaction.

Type 1: Iraq in 1990 and Japan in 1939In Type 1, dissatisfied State A countries initiated war (Table 1), which should be

the standard cases of the Hypothesis. The selected dyads are Iraq with SaudiArabia in 1990 and Japan with Mongolia in 1939. In 1990, Iraq was involved in 11MIDs, and there were 64 MIDs of Japan in 1939.

If the Hypothesis cannot be failed, power parity and state dissatisfaction shouldbe proven necessary or related to State A’s war initiation. According to the resultsof Boolean algebra (Table A2),14 Iraq in 1990 met only the partial expectation of theHypothesis. Both revisionist attitude and gravity of dissatisfaction were necessaryand sufficient conditions for Iraq to initiate war in 1990; however, power paritywas irrelevant to the outcome. Iraq waged war against states that disputed itsclaimed territory regardless of its power ratio with the opponent states. In otherwords, as long as it demonstrated its dissatisfaction, it would initiate war eventhough it had inferior power compared with that of the opponent.

When this article considers elements of power and state dissatisfaction together,different elements of power and state dissatisfaction have different effects on warinitiation. The results of Japan and Iraq are similar in the elements of power(Table 2). Even though the total power parity seems irrelevant, military disparityand economic disparity were necessary for Iraq’s and Japan’s war initiation.


As for the elements of state dissatisfaction, Iraq initiated war if it made terri-torial demands, but not other requests or threats. Territorial claims and threatswere also necessary for Japan to initiate war, while the lack of either policy claimsor threats to influence in the system were necessary for Japan’s war initiation. Thesignificance of territorial requests or threats confirms Senese and Vasquez’s(2008) argument that territorial claims cause war much more often than otherkinds of claims.

This study could not find any direct causality between power parity and warinitiation in both cases of Japan and Iraq, but there were causal links betweenmilitary disparity and economic disparity with war initiation in Japan and Iraq.The reasonable explanations are as follows. Japan is a major power with whichfew states can be in parity, and Iraq is a regional major power with ambitions toexpand its territory. When this study examined their targeted countries, manycountries against which Japan and Iraq began war were allies of their enemies.In other words, Japan and Iraq initiated war with states that are more or lesspowerful because those states are allies of their main targeted states.15 Thus, thecondition of power parity becomes less relevant with war initiation.

The reason for selecting Japan is because its MID with Mongolia in 1939 is anextreme example of Type 1. When the study expands research to all of Japan’sMIDs in 1939, Japan began two wars in 1939 against the Soviet Union andMongolia. Japan’s dissatisfaction concerned territory and was expressed by claimsand threats. Japan had inferior power to the Soviet Union but superior power toMongolia. Japan was not in power parity with either of them. As Boolean algebrainfers, the lack of power parity and the presence of territorial claim and threat ledJapan to initiate war.

On the other hand, the absence of power parity16 and state dissatisfaction werenecessary, but not sufficient, for both Iraq and Japan not to initiate war (Table 3).In particular, if Iraq or Japan is in military disparity and if either of them makesterritorial requests, it will not initiate war. For example, states, such as Iran andJordan, had less power than Iraq, but Iraq did not begin war against these states

Table 2. Necessary Conditions for War Initiation in Type 1

Country Type 1-1 Type 1-2Iraq, 1990 Japan, 1939

Power anddissatisfaction

Revisionist attitudeGravity of dissatisfaction

No power parity

Elements ofpower

No military parity No military parityNo economic parity No economic parity

Elements ofdissatisfaction

Territorial claim No policy claimTerritorial claimTerritorial threatNo threat to influence in the systems

Notes: This table is derived from Boolean equations in Table A2 for the purpose of better and clearpresentation of the results. Repeated or ambiguous conditions are dismissed. The bold terms are bothsufficient and necessary for war initiation.


in 1990. In a word, if Iraq or Japan lacks territorial motivations, it will not beginwar. Moreover, because power parity is negatively necessary for noninitiation ofwar, the inference can be evident for the support of Hypothesis, which arguesthat power parity is necessary for a positive outcome. In other words, eventhough we cannot conclude that the presence of power parity is necessary for warinitiation, the absence of power parity is necessary for noninitiation of war.

Type 2: Germany in 1938 and China 1923Type 2 represents states with dissatisfaction that do not initiate war. This type

does not fail the Hypothesis as state dissatisfaction is not a sufficient conditionof war, according to the Hypothesis. The selected dyads are Germany versus theUnited Kingdom in 1938 and China versus the Soviet Union in 1923; thus, the focusof this article are Germany in 1938 and China in 1923. Germany was involved in 65MIDs in 1938, but there were no MIDs in which Germany initiated war. China wasinvolved in eight MIDs in 1923, but it did not initiate war against any state, either.Thus, there is no Boolean equation of war initiation for Germany and China.

In terms of noninitiation of war, Germany did not initiate war in 1938 only ifit was in power disparity or if it was satisfied. That is, either power disparityor lack of dissatisfaction was sufficient for Germany not to initiate war (Table 4).The factor of power parity was much more influential to China than to Germany.The absence of power parity was both necessary and sufficient for China notto initiate war in 1923. The low gravity of dissatisfaction was also necessary forChina not to initiate war in 1923. Because the negative presence of both conditionsled to a negative outcome, the Hypothesis is indirectly supported.

Further analyses of the elements of power parity and state dissatisfactiondemonstrate similar results as the above inference. Although no elements ofpower parity were necessary or sufficient for Germany not to initiate war, lack oftotal power parity and military parity were common conditions for Germany notto initiate war (see Germany’s Boolean equations in Table A2). The two condi-tions were more important for China as they were necessary conditions for Chinanot to initiate war. If China is not in power parity or military parity with another

Table 3. Necessary Conditions for Noninitiation of War in Type 1

Country Type 1-1 Type 1-2Iraq, 1990 Japan, 1939


No power parity No power parityNo revisionist attitude No revisionist attitudeNo gravity of dissatisfaction No gravity of dissatisfaction

Elements ofpower

No military parityNo economic parity

No military parity


No territorial claimNo threat to influence in the systemsNo threat of grave damageNo threat to existence

No regime claimNo territorial claimNo territorial threat


state, it will not initiate war regardless of its dissatisfaction (Table 4). For example,China was not in a period of power parity with the Soviet Union in 1923, althoughChina was dissatisfied with the Soviet Union. However, it did not initiate waragainst the Soviet Union.17 This is evidence that unbalanced state power betweenstates does not necessarily lead to war. Instead, it is necessary and sufficient forstates not to initiate war.

As for the elements of state dissatisfaction, the absence of political threat,territorial threat, threat to influence in the international system or regional sub-systems, and threat of grave damage were all necessary for both Germany andChina not to initiate war in 1938 and in 1923, respectively. No claims on regime orgovernment changes, no claims on territorial changes, and no threat to existencewere also necessary conditions for China not to initiate war in 1923. Furthermore,China did not initiate war even if China made policy claims. In other words, ifChina expressed dissatisfaction only at the level of claiming policy change, ratherthan other requests or threats, it did not initiate war in 1923 as the case of Chinawith the Soviet Union.

It is noteworthy that Germany reached power parity with France and theSoviet Union, and made territorial claims toward them in 1939. However, therewas no war initiated by Germany that year. Although the two conditions weremet, they were not sufficient to trigger war. To trigger an occurrence of war, otherfactors needed to be present as well. Thus, Germany in 1938 does not deviatefrom the expectation of the Hypothesis.

Type 3: Tanzania in 1978 and the United States in 1942Type 3 is more likely to be a deviance from the Hypothesis. State A is not

dissatisfied with State B, but State A begins war against State B. The selected statedyads are Tanzania fighting with Uganda in 1978 and the United States fighting


Country Type 2-1 Type 2-2Germany, 1938 China, 1923


No power parityNo gravity of dissatisfaction


Elements ofpower

No military parity


No policy claimNo political threatNo territorial threatNo threat to influence in the

systemsNo threat of grave damage

Policy claimNo regime claimNo territorial claimNo political threatNo territorial threatNo threat to influence in the systemsNo threat of grave damageNo threat to existence

Notes: The boldfaced term is a necessary and sufficient condition for noninitiation of war. Theitalicized ones are sufficient conditions for noninitiation of war.


with Finland in 1942. Thus, Tanzania in 1978 and the United States in 1942 are thetargets of the research. Tanzania and the United States were both not revisionistin their dyads but they began war, which seems to contradict the expectations ofthe Hypothesis. State dissatisfaction did not account for war initiation.

However, when this study switched the measure of state dissatisfaction fromrevisionist attitude to gravity of dissatisfaction, it told a different story. Althoughthe measure of revisionist attitude did not reflect Tanzania’s dissatisfaction, Tan-zania made a political threat to express its dissatisfaction in the MID with Ugandain 1978. The usefulness of gravity of dissatisfaction instead of revisionist attitudeas a measure of state dissatisfaction is also distinct in the case of the United Statesin 1942. The United States began war in 8 of 52 MIDs that year. Among the eightMIDs, the United States expressed its dissatisfaction through a threat to influencethe status of Germany, Italy, and so forth in the international system. However,using our measures for revisionist attitude does not detect this kind of dissatis-faction; thus, those cases become anomalies of the Hypothesis. Table 5 demon-strates the difference between revisionist attitudes and gravity of dissatisfactionas the necessary conditions for Tanzania in 1978 and the United States in 1942 toinitiate war.

On the contrary, the absence of power parity was necessary for Tanzania andthe United States to initiate war, which is against the expectation of the Hypoth-esis. The United States was superior to any other state in 1942. Only the UK andItaly had similar numbers of military personnel with the United States. Hence, itis not surprising to find that no country was in a situation of power parity withthe United States. This explains why lack of power parity is also a necessarycondition for the United States not to begin war. Moreover, the absence of powerparity was both necessary for Tanzania and the United States to initiate war andnot to initiate war, which seems conflictual in terms of substantiating the Hypoth-esis (Table 6). However, power disparity can mean that State A has power pre-ponderance or State B has power preponderance. Because this article does notdistinguish between them in the analyses, the impact of power disparity is notclear until further research can be done.


Country Type 3-1 Type 3-2Tanzania, 1978 The United States, 1942

Power and dissatisfaction No power parity No power parityNo revisionist attitude No revisionist attitudeGravity of dissatisfaction Gravity of dissatisfaction

Elements of power No military parityNo economic parity

No economic parity

Elements of dissatisfaction Political threat No policy claimNo regime claimNo territorial claimNo political ThreatNo territorial threatNo threat to existence


When this study further explored the elements of power, economic disparitywas necessary for both Tanzania in 1978 and the United States in 1942 to initiatewar. Both states initiated war if they were in economic disparity with other states.In addition, military disparity was necessary for Tanzania’s war initiation. Incontrast, Tanzania will not breach peace whether it is in economic parity or itis not in military parity. In the case of the United States, it will not initiate war ifit is not in economic parity with opponent states. Also, the United States will notstart war if it is in military parity with opponent states.

That gravity of dissatisfaction is a better measure of state dissatisfaction interms of war initiation is well supported in Type 3 cases. The presence of dissat-isfaction is necessary for states to initiate war while the absence of dissatisfactionis necessary for states not to begin war. In all 12 MIDs, Tanzania did not initiatewar because it was not dissatisfied with any state, even though it is in a power-parity period with Zambia. After the United States had become a de factohegemon, the level of its dissatisfaction, rather than power, became more influ-ential to its behavior of war initiation. Among the elements of state dissatisfaction,political threat was necessary for Tanzania to initiate war. As for the UnitedStates, this study finds negative conditions for war initiation of the United States.If the United States expresses its dissatisfaction, but does not claim changeson policy, territory, regime, or government and not by political threat, territorialthreat, or threat to existence, it will initiate war.

Type 4: China in 1950 and France in 1923In the last type, states are not dissatisfied, so no war occurs. China versus

Thailand in 1950 and France versus Albania in 1923 represent this category.China, the first state of the selected dyads, had 74 MIDs in 1950. It began war in8 out of 74 MIDs. France, the other first state of the selected dyads, engaged inMIDs with 60 countries in 1923, but did not initiate any war.

Although the absence of power parity is necessary for China to initiate war,the presence of military parity was necessary for China to initiate war (Table 7).China began war if it was in military parity with another state, even if it did notreach total power parity with another state. Also, gravity of dissatisfaction and


Country Type 3-1 Type 3-2Tanzania, 1978 The United States, 1942


No power parityNo revisionist attitudeNo gravity of dissatisfaction


Elements ofpower

No military parity Military parityEconomic parity No economic parity


No policy claimNo regime claimNo territorial claimNo political threat

No threat to influence inthe systems

No threat of grave damage


economic disparity were necessary for China to initiate war in 1950. A discon-tented China was in military parity with the UK, with which it began war in 1950.In other words, military parity and dissatisfaction made China initiate war in1950, which meets the expectation of the Hypothesis.

Furthermore, if we examine 74 MIDs, it seems that the effects of total powerparity did not contribute to China’s decision as much as state dissatisfaction does.When China had greater state power than that of opponent states, China did notfight. If China was dissatisfied, it began war even when it was inferior to anotherstate. Among elements of state dissatisfaction, threat to influence in the interna-tional system or the regional systems and threat to existence were both necessaryconditions for China to initiate war in 1950. Taking one of the MIDs in whichChina was involved as an example, China expressed its dissatisfaction against theUnited States in 1950 through a threat to influence in the international systemor regional subsystems, rather than by making claims. China later began waragainst the United States. Note that not all the MIDs in which China expressed itsdissatisfaction resulted in China’s war initiation. China threatened to influenceThailand’s position in the regional systems, but it did not begin war againstThailand. However, this does not affect the role of dissatisfaction as a necessarycondition for China to initiate war.

On the contrary, the absence of power parity was necessary but not sufficientfor China not to initiate war, while it was both necessary and sufficient for Francenot to initiate war. Without approximate power with another state, China andFrance would not begin war. As there were no countries in a period of powerparity with France in 1923, France began no war. If this study considers thespecific elements of power parity, the absence of military parity is necessary forboth China and France not to initiate war as Table 8 shows. A discontented Chinahas not been in military parity, though it had been in economic parity withseveral countries such as France and India; thus, it did not begin war.

As for state dissatisfaction, the absence of most kinds of demands and threatswas necessary for France not to initiate war; so was it in China’s situation. In fact,France only expressed policy claims and political threat toward Germany, amongthe 60 MIDs in which France was involved. Because France and Germany were


Country Type 4-1China, 1950

Power and dissatisfaction No power parityGravity of dissatisfaction

Elements of power Military parityNo economic parity

Elements of dissatisfaction No territorial claimThreat to influence in the systemsThreat to existence

Note: Because France did not initiate war in 1923, this article cannot infer the conditions for France’swar initiation.


not in a parity period and the levels of dissatisfaction were not severe, it is notsurprising that France did not initiate war.

The necessary conditions for China not to initiate war in 1923 (Type 2-2 inTable 4) and in 1950 (Type 4-1 in Table 8) are slightly different. The absence ofterritorial claims was necessary for China not to initiate war in 1923, while thepresence of territorial claims became necessary for China not to initiate war in1950. That is, even when China made a territorial claim on another state in 1950,it did not initiate war. It could have, however, begun war in 1923. It seems thatChina in 1950 was very cautious about war initiation. China must be in militaryparity with another state, before it would consider beginning a war.

In addition, two countries in 1923 are selected: China (Type 2-2) and France(Type 4-2). It is noteworthy that both Boolean equations are similar. The absenceof power parity is a necessary and sufficient condition for both countries not toinitiate war. The absence of military parity is also necessary. As for the elementsof state dissatisfaction, no territorial claim as well as lack of the five kinds ofgravity of dissatisfaction is necessary for noninitiation of war. Those commonconditions may imply that states in 1923 will not initiate war when they do notmake territorial requests or threats or when they are not in military parity, inparticular when they are not in a period of total power parity.

Type 1 does not provide direct evidence to support power parity as the neces-sary condition for State A to initiate war, but it provides evidence that supportsstate dissatisfaction. The presence of state dissatisfaction, in particular territorialclaim or threat, is necessary for State A to initiate war. Power parity is less relevantto war initiation, as we saw when Japan and Iraq fought with both its targetedstates and their allies. However, the absence of power parity—in particular thepresence of military disparity—is necessary for State A not to initiate war. Thissupports the Hypothesis from the other side of the coin. Types 2 and 4 also supportthe Hypotheses from this approach. Both types show that the absence of militaryparity and dissatisfaction are necessary for noninitiation of war. Type 4 further


Country Type 4-1 Type 4-2China, 1950 France, 1923


No power parityRevisionist attitudeNo gravity of dissatisfaction

No power parity

Elements ofpower

No military parity No military parity


No policy claimNo regime claimTerritorial claimNo threat to influence in

the systemsNo threat to existence

No regime claimNo territorial claimNo territorial threatNo threat to influence in the systemsNo threat of grave damageNo threat to existence

Note: The boldfaced term is a necessary and sufficient condition for noninitiation of war.


demonstrates that the presence of both one element of power parity and eitherthreat to influence in the systems or threat to existence are necessary conditions forState A to initiate war. The possible anomalies of the Hypothesis are cases in Type3. However, when this study changes the measure of state dissatisfaction fromrevisionist attitude to gravity of dissatisfaction, the presence of gravity of dissat-isfaction is necessary for State A to initiate war. That is, cases in Type 3 are treatedas anomalies of PTT, because their dissatisfaction is not properly measured.

ConclusionLemke’s (2002) and Liao’s (2012) large-N studies show that power parity and

state dissatisfaction are statistically significant to states’ war initiation. However,statistical evidence is not sufficient to conclude causality between variables.To discover what conditions are necessary for states to begin war, this studyexamined cases from a micro-foundation. Testing the Hypothesis at the selectedfocus dyadic level provides a different perspective on what elements contributeto war initiation. From the eight countries’ Boolean equations, we can see thatdifferent countries have partially different necessary conditions, particularly fornoninitiation of war. As for the same country in different years, it also has partiallydifferent necessary conditions in terms of war initiation.

Iraq in 1990 is a case in which state dissatisfaction is a necessary and sufficientcondition for State A to initiate war. The levels of dissatisfaction which triggeredboth Iraq in 1990 and Japan in 1939 to go to war were mainly based on territorialclaims and threats. If states lack territorial motivations, they will not begin war.The presence of power parity is intriguing in those eight countries. Germanyreached power parity with France and the Soviet Union in 1938, but it did notbegin war against them. Although the condition of power parity was met, this didnot mean that it was sufficient to trigger a war.

Tanzania in 1978 and the United States in 1942 also considered dissatisfac-tion more than the power factor before beginning war. The presence of gravity ofdissatisfaction is necessary to initiate war. Both countries will begin war evenwhen their dissatisfaction is expressed by low-level gravity of dissatisfaction, thatis, political threat. The U.S. behavior was especially not affected by the conditionof power parity, because one exception was that the United States would notinitiate war in 1942 if it was in military parity with opponent states.

However, China in 1923 paid more attention to the factor of power parity thanstate dissatisfaction. The absence of power parity was necessary and sufficient forChina not to initiate war. France in 1923 also did not initiate war if it was not ina period of power parity. While the absence of power parity seemed to be thecommon condition for states not to initiate war in 1923, claiming or threateningterritorial changes triggered war initiation during that year. However, it seemsthat China had become more cautious about war initiation in 1950. Even whenChina made territorial claims in 1950, it would not initiate war until it hadmilitary parity, rather than total power parity, with the opponents.

In conclusion, if State A is not dissatisfied or if it is not in military parity withState B, then State A will not initiate war. The fact that the absence of the twoconditions causes a negative outcome supports the Hypothesis. Military dispar-ity is especially important for the eight countries in terms of noninitiation of war.


If states are in military disparity, it is less likely that they will begin war. Inaddition, lack of territorial requests and all five kinds of threats are also necessaryconditions for State A not to initiate war. States during a period of power transi-tion may not fight, but they will fight in particular when states express theirdissatisfaction by claiming territorial changes or making territorial threats.

Furthermore, through the selected focus dyadic analyses, we were able todiscover how an inappropriate measure of state dissatisfaction produces anoma-lies of the Hypothesis. In terms of being an indicator of war initiation, gravity ofdissatisfaction does better as a measure of state dissatisfaction than revisionistattitude. The presence of gravity of dissatisfaction is necessary for war initiationamong half of the cases, while lack of it is necessary for noninitiation of warin most cases. We also find out how alliances influence the explanatory power ofthe Hypothesis. Some states begin war against other states, but not in a period ofpower parity, to keep their promises of alliance commitment. The years of thoseaffected cases tend to center around World War II, and many countries areinvolved in war due to alliance linkages with major powers, not of their ownvolition. It is no wonder that those selected states begin war against otherswithout the presence of power parity and dissatisfaction.

Last, the different effects of varied requests and threats on states’ war initiationimply a division between low-level dissatisfaction and high-level dissatisfactionin regard to war initiation. According to the analysis, the lowest level of statedissatisfaction is policy claim, followed by political threat, and claim on regime orgovernment changes. The higher level of state dissatisfaction is territorial claim,then territorial threat, threat to influence in the international system or regionalsubsystems, threat of grave damage, and last, threat to existence. States whichexpress lower-level dissatisfaction may not take war as a means. However, stateswith higher-level dissatisfaction are more serious about their dissatisfaction andmay use a war to achieve their goals, in particular when states are in a power parityperiod. In a word, states may not initiate war whenever they are dissatisfied. Whichkind of dissatisfaction they do express and under what power conditions they findthemselves in, can decisively influence their decisions on war or peace.

AppendixTable A1. State A as an Initiator of War

Variables Initiation of War

Power ratio −0.012 (0.003)***State dissatisfaction 3.137 (0.115)***Economic interdependency 1.69e–08 (3.07e–06)Regime type −0.465 (0.070)***Constant −5.386 (0.090)***Chi2(4) 646.59***AIC 0.1284No. of obs. 115674

Notes: This model is a replicate of Liao’s (2012) model. Estimations were performed in Stata (Logistic).Main entries are parameter estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. All tests are two tailed.***p < 0.001, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Economic interdependency and regime type are controlled in themodel. For details of the model, please refer to Liao (2012).


Tab

leA

2.B

oole

anE

qu

atio

ns

ofE

igh

tC

oun

trie

s

Cou

ntr

y

Pow

erP

arit

y,S

tate

Dis

sati

sfac

tion

,an

dIn

itia

tion

ofW

arE

lem

ents

ofP

ower

Init

iati

onof

War

(F)

Non

init

iati

onof

War

(f)

Ff

Ff

Ff

Ff

Type

1-1

Iraq

,199

0B

abB

abB

cab

cbc

Dab

cdbc

Dab

cdTy

pe1-

2Ja

pan,

1939

Non

eab

Non

eab

Non

eac

Non

eab

(d+

c)N

one

abd

Type

2-1

Ger

man

y,19

38N

one

1N

one

b+

aN

one

c(b

+A

)+

aBC

Non

ebc

D+

aCd

+bC

d+

abN

one

aCd

+ab

+bd

Type

2-2

Chi

na,1

923

Non

ea

Non

eab

Non

eac

Non

eab

(d+

c)N

one

abd

Type

3-1

Tanz

ania

,197

8N

one

Non

eaB

abab

Cab

cN

one

abC

dab

cDab

dTy

pe3-

2Th

eU

nite

dSt

ates

,194

2N

one

Non

eaB

Non

eab

CN

one

Non

eN

one

acD

aBcd

Type

4-1

Chi

na,1

950

Non

eaB

Non

eab

Non

ea(

c+

B)

Non

eab

DaB

cDad

(b+

c)Ty

pe4-

2Fr

ance

,192

3N

one

aN

one

aN

one

a(bc

+B

C)

Non

eab

(d+

C)

Non

eab

(d+

C)

Des

crip

tion

A=

pow

erpa

rity

,B

=re

visi

onis

tat

titu

de

A=

pow

erpa

rity

,B

=gr

avit

yof

dis

sati

sfac

tion

A=

pow

erpa

rity

,B

=re

visi

onis

tat

titu

de,

C=

grav

ity

ofd

issa

tisf

acti

on

A=

tota

lpow

er-p

arit

y,B

=m

ilita

rypa

rity

,C=

econ

omic

pari

ty,

D=

revi

sion

ist

atti

tud

e

A=

tota

lpow

er-p

arit

y,B

=m

ilita

rypa

rity

,C=

econ

omic

pari

ty,

D=

grav

ity

ofd

issa

tisf

acti

on

Cou

ntr

y

Ele

men

tsof

Sta

teD

issa

tisf

acti

onE

lem

ents

ofP

ower

and

Dis

sati

sfac

tion

Ff

Ff

Ff

Ff

Ff

Type

1-1

Iraq

,199

0B

cdab

cdbc

(Deg

+ad

Eg

+ad

eG)

abcd

egab

Cd

eab

cde

abcd

(Egh

+eG

h+

egH

)ab

cdeg

hA

bcd

e(G

hi+

gHi+

ghI)

abcd

eghi

Type

1-2

Japa

n,19

39N

one

abd

abC

deg

abce

gab

Cd

eae

(c+

Bd

)ab

cDeg

hac

dgh

(b+

e)A

bcd

Egh

icd

ehi(

ag+

bg+

aB)

Type

2-1

Ger

man

y,19

38N

one

c(d

+ab

)N

one

abe(

cg+

dg

+cd

)N

one

d(a

e+

abc

+B

ce)

Non

ecd

e(ab

g+

ah+

Bgh

)N

one

bdeg

(chi

+A

ci+

Ach

+aC

Hi)

Type

2-2

Chi

na,1

923

Non

eab

Cd

Non

eab

cdeg

Non

eac

e(d

+b)

Non

eac

deg

hN

one

acd

eghi

Type

3-1

Tanz

ania

,197

8N

one

Non

eaB

cdeg

abcd

egN

one

aBcd

eab

Cd

egh

acd

egh

abcD

eghi

abcd

eghi

Type

3-2

The

Uni

ted

Stat

es,1

942

Non

eN

one

abcg

(De

+d

E)

Non

eN

one

Non

ebc

dh(

aeG

+E

g)A

bcd

egh

abcd

ei(G

h+

gH)

Non

e

Type

4-1

Chi

na,1

950

Non

eaB

cdab

cdeG

abcd

egN

one

aCd

eA

bcd

Egh

cdeg

(bh

+ah

+ab

)ab

cdeg

hIbc

deg

h(i+

A)

Type

4-2

Fran

ce,1

923

Non

eab

dN

one

acd

egN

one

ace(

d+

B)

Non

ead

egh(

c+

B)

Non

eac

eghi

(bd

+B

D)

Des

crip

tion

A=

tota

lpow

er-p

arit

y,B

=te

rrit

oria

lcla

im,

C=

clai

mon

polic

ych

ange

,D=

clai

mch

ange

son

regi

me

orgo

vern

men

t

A=

tota

lpow

er-p

arit

y,B

=po

litic

alth

reat

,C=

terr

itor

ialt

hrea

t,D

=th

reat

toin

flue

nce

inth

ein

tern

atio

nal

syst

emor

regi

onal

subs

yste

ms,

E=

thre

atof

grav

eda

mag

e,G

=th

reat

toex

iste

nce

A=

mili

tary

pari

ty,B

=ec

onom

icpa

rity

,C=

terr

itor

ial

clai

m,D

=cl

aim

onpo

licy

chan

ge,E

=cl

aim

chan

ges

onre

gim

eor

gove

rnm

ent

A=

mili

tary

pari

ty,B

=ec

onom

icpa

rity

,C=

polit

ical

thre

at,D

=te

rrit

oria

lth

reat

,E=

thre

atto

infl

uenc

ein

the

inte

rnat

iona

lsys

tem

orre

gion

alsu

bsys

tem

s,G

=th

reat

ofgr

ave

dam

age,

H=

thre

atto

exis

tenc

e

A=

terr

itor

ialc

laim

,B=

clai

mon

polic

ych

ange

,C=

clai

mch

ange

son

regi

me

orgo

vern

men

t,D

=po

litic

alth

reat

,E=

terr

itor

ialt

hrea

t,G

=th

reat

toin

flue

nce

inth

ein

tern

atio

nals

yste

mor

regi

onal

subs

yste

ms,

H=

thre

atof

grav

eda

mag

e,I

=th

reat

toex

iste

nce


AcknowledgmentsThe author thanks Harvey Starr, Lee Walker, John Hsieh, Barbieri Kathrine, Michelle Benson, and

the two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions, which helped improve thisarticle. However, the author is solely responsible for the arguments forwarded in this article.

Notes1In the 1958 version, Organski argued that war happened before the capability of a challenger

overtook that of a hegemon. Thompson (1983) and Levy (1987) had similar arguments. But, in the 1980and 1989 versions, Organski and Kugler revised the argument and indicated that war started after thecapability of a challenger overtook that of a hegemon. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) utilizedtheir expected utility theory to test the power transition argument and found that the timing of waris after transition. Lemke and Kugler (1996) claimed that this debate demonstrates the strong corre-lation between power transition and war initiation. They further clarified that what leads to war is thefact of power “parity” during the process of power transition; PTT should be called power paritytheory (Lemke & Kugler, 1996, p. 12). This article takes this point and tests the relationship between“power parity,” not the process of power transition, and war initiation. The author is grateful for thereviewer’s reminder to clarify this point.

2In their table 1.6, it shows that 13 cases (out of 126 cases) went to war when the dyad states’ powerswere not equal (Organski & Kugler, 1980, p. 50). Instead of conducting traditional case studies, thisarticle uses logical tests to re-examine the relationship between the power arrangement in state dyadsand the occurrence of war. Both the cases that supported and the ones that did not support the powertransition argument are in the case pool of this article.

3The operational definition of “major power” is that states have a 10% or higher share of thecapability pool for all states.

4The author chose cases based on the condition of state dissatisfaction, rather than power parity,because this research would like to see whether the measures of dissatisfaction can account for warinitiation. Based on the criteria of satisfaction/dissatisfaction, this article can review both the caseswhich can be explained by state dissatisfaction and those that cannot, to discuss the effects of the twomeasures of state dissatisfaction in this article.

5This article studies whether power parity and state dissatisfaction lead to war in a specific yearbecause this article focuses on the logically causal relationship among variables in static structures.Although the two conditions may linger with time to reach maturity, this article takes them intoconsideration only when they have matured. Thus, dynamic processes of power growth or origins ofstate dissatisfaction are not the concern of this article.

6For example, F (A, B, C) = AbC + ABC (F is the outcome; A, B, and C are three variables).Uppercase letters mean that variables are present while lowercase letters indicate absence. Addition(+) indicates “or” while multiplication (×) is “and.” Items—AbC and ABC—are called “primitiveexpressions.” The “sums-of-products” shown above indicates that there are two situations forF’s occurrence. In the first situation, the necessary conditions for F’s occurrence are A’s presence, B’sabsence, and C’s presence. The conjunction of A’s, B’s, and C’s presence also accounts for F’soccurrence. For details of the rules and calculations, please refer to Ragin (1987, Chapters 6–8).

7Take F (A, B, C) = AbC + ABC for example. After reduction, F (A, B, C) = AC. Both A and C arenecessary conditions for F’s occurrence. B is irrelevant to the occurrence.

8These data are from 1816 to 2001, and includes six indexes of material capabilities of states. The sixindexes are total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption,military personnel, and military expenditure for each state (Singer et al., 1972).

9The requests/demands and threats here are those kinds of dissatisfaction which are seriousenough to trigger militarized interstate disputes. If a request or threat does not have the potential tolead to an MID or is not taken as an interstate crisis, it will not be considered as an expression ofdissatisfaction in this article. Moreover, one reviewer of a draft of this article commented thatdemands may not be a functional reflection of dissatisfaction because those most dissatisfied statesmay not expect that they can get what they want if they ask. I concur that states may initiate warwithout dissatisfaction. However, this article defines state dissatisfaction as those serious enough tobe able to trigger an MID; as a result, they should be able to be perceived by another state. In otherwords, if a state’s dissatisfaction cannot be perceived by another state, it is not the kind of dissatis-faction as defined in this article.

10Walt (1985) argues that offensive intentions are one of the components of threats. A valid threatshould let target states feel threatened.

11Due to limitations in publishing, the Truth Tables for the eight states are not attached.12The Total indicator represents total state power, CINC.13It does not mean that other kinds of threats are not important but those threats do not appear in

these cases. This is one disadvantage of small-N cases. Some elements/variables are omitted because


they happen to be absent in those selected cases. This is not a major limitation of the present study asthis study focuses on whether certain requests or threats are necessary for war initiation.

14Due to space constraints, all Boolean equations are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix.15Note that this study strictly follows the coding policy of the MID data set regarding the definition

of war initiation. In the MID data set, some states are coded as the initiators of war while they may onlyprovide armies or deploy troops for their allies (de facto initiators) against target states. Although itis debatable to consider those helper states as initiators of war, both time and resources are constraintsfor this study to attempt to re-examine and redefine more than 100,000 MIDs.

16The absence of power parity here can mean that State A is superior to State B in power or that StateA is inferior. Because I only concern power parity, I do not further distinguish the difference of powerdisparity. Thus, it is not conflictual if power disparity is necessary for both war initiation andnoninitiation of war, considering that it may refer to State A’s or State B’s power preponderance,respectively.

17On December 28, 1922, the Soviet Union was created. China requested the Soviet Union towithdraw the pro-communism policy. At last, China did not begin a war with the Soviet Union eventhough the Soviet Union did not change its policy.

ReferencesBarbieri, Katherine, & Keshk, Omar. (2012). Correlates of War Project trade data set codebook, Version 3.0.

Retrieved from http://correlatesofwar.org.Bennett, D. Scott, & Stam, Allan C. (2000). EUGene: A conceptual manual. International Interactions,

26(2), 179–204.Benson, Michael A. (2005). The relevance of political relevant dyads in the study of interdependence

and dyadic disputes. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22, 113–133.Brecher, Michael, & Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. (2000). A study of crisis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of

Michigan Press.Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, & Lalman, David. (1992). War and reason: Domestic and international

imperatives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Carr, Edward H. (1939). The twenty years’ crisis, 1919–1939. New York: Perennial.Cashman, Greg, & Robinson, Leonard C. (2007). An introduction to the causes of war: Patterns of

interstate conflict from World War I to Iraq. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.Efird, Brian, Kugler, Jacek, & Genna, Gaspare M. (2003). From war to integration: Generalizing power

transition theory. International Interactions, 29, 293–313.Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, Glenn, & Bremer, Stuart. (2004). The MIDs data set, 1993–2001: Procedures,

coding rules, and description. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 21, 133–154.Jones, Daniel, Bremer, Stuart, & Singer, J. David. (1996). Militarized interstate disputes, 1816–1992:

Rationale, coding rules, and empirical patterns. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 15(2),163–212.

Kadera, Kelly. (1996). The conditions and consequences of dyadic power transitions: deductions froma dynamic model. In Jacek Kugler & Douglas Lemke (Eds.), Parity and war (pp. 287–312). AnnArbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Kim, Woosang. (1991). Alliance transitions and great war. American Journal of Political Science, 35,833–850.

Kim, Woosang. (1992). Alliance transition and great power war from Westphalia to Waterloo. WorldPolitics, 45, 153–172.

Kugler, Jacek, & Lemke, Douglas. (2000). The power transition research program: Assessing theoreti-cal and empirical advances. In Manus I. Midlarsky (Ed.), Handbook of war studies II (pp. 129–163).Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Kugler, Jacek, & Organski, Abramo Fimo Kenneth. 1989). The power transition: A retrospective andprospective evaluation. In Manus I. Midlarsky (Ed.), Handbook of war studies I (pp. 171–194). AnnArbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Lemke, Douglas. (2002). Regions of war and peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Lemke, Douglas, & Kugler, Jacek. (1996). The evolution of the power transition perspective. In

Jacek Kugler & Douglas Lemke (Eds.), Parity and war (pp. 3–33). Ann Arbor, MI: University ofMichigan Press.

Lemke, Douglas, & Werner, Suzanne. (1996). Power parity, commitment to change, and war. Interna-tional Studies Quarterly, 40, 235–260.

Levy, Jack S. (1982). Historical trends in great power war, 1495–1975. International Studies Quarterly,26(2), 278–300.

Levy, Jack S. (1987). Declining power and the preventive motivation for war. World Politics, 40, 82–107.Liao, Hsiao-chuan. (2012). The relationship between state dissatisfaction and the level of conflict in state dyad:

The revised power transition theory. Doctoral Dissertation. University of South Carolina.


http://correlatesofwar.org

Maddison, Angus. (1995). Monitoring the world economy, 1820–1992. Paris: OECD.Organski, Abramo Fimo Kenneth. (1958). World politics. New York: Knopf.Organski, Abramo Fimo Kenneth, & Kugler, Jacek. (1980). The war ledger. Chicago, IL: University of

Chicago Press.Ragin, Charles. (1987). The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies.

Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Russett, Bruce, & Oneal, John. (2001). Triangulating peace. New York: Norton.Rynning, Sten, & Ringsmose, Jens. (2008). Why are revisionist states revisionist? Reviving classical

realism as an approach to understanding international change. International Politics, 45, 19–39.Senese, Paul D., & Vasquez, John A. (2008). The steps to war: An empirical study. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press.Singer, J. David, Bremer, Stuart, & Stuckey, John. (1972). Capability distribution, uncertainty, and

major power war, 1820–1965. In Bruce Russett (Ed.), Peace, war, and numbers (pp. 19–48). BeverlyHills, CA: Sage.

Thompson, William R. (1983). Succession crises in the global political system: A test of the transitionmodel. In Albert Bergesen (Ed.), Crises in the world-system (pp. 93–116). Beverly Hills, CA: SagePublications.

Vasquez, John, & Henehan, Marier T. (2001). Territorial disputes and the probability of war, 1816–1992. Journal of Peace Research, 38(2), 123–138.

Wallace, Michael D. (1973). War and rank among nations. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.Walt, Stephen M. (1985). Alliance formation and the balance of world power. International Security,

9(4), 3–43.Werner, Suzanne, & Kugler, Jacek. (1996). Power transitions and military buildups. In Jacek Kugler &

Douglas Lemke (Eds.), Parity and war (pp. 187–207). Ann Arbor, MI: University of MichiganPress.


state dissatisfaction: predicting the occurrence of interstate war

Documents