STATE AGENCY FOR NATIONAL STATE AGENCY FOR NATIONAL SECURITYSECURITY

„„Eastern Mediterranean Regional Eastern Mediterranean Regional Counterterrorism ConferenceCounterterrorism Conference””

BucharestBucharest15.09.2015-17.09.201515.09.2015-17.09.2015

FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS:departure and return via Bulgaria

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1. General information2. Foreign fighters’ motivations3. Travel routes4. Returning fighters5. Security risks from foreign fighters6. Outlook7. Countermeasures

CONTENT

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2012 – 2014: a significant number of persons arrived in Syria from Europe and the West

Purposes of the travel to Syria: Participation in armed conflict Training in terrorist camps Logistic activities (humanitarian aid convoys) Commercial activities/smuggling (e.g. used cars

sellers)

General Information 1

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General Information 2

Main departure points: UK, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Western Balkans as well as Northern Caucasus

Fighters’ descent: Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria,

Morocco, Turkey Northern Caucasus (Khataib al-Muhajiroun) BiH, Albania, Kosovo, FYROM, Serbia (Sandžak region), Montenegro Western countries (converts)

Profile – lack of overall features, but mainly: Mostly male, but there are already a number of cases where

they were accompanied by female travellers Age – 20-25/25-45 Radicalized prior to travel

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Foreign fighters’ motivations

A nuanced assessment of the motivations of the foreign

fighters and facilitators reveals a variety of motivations:

Nationalism Pan-national Muslim activism Islamist (Salafists) ideologies Jihadist ideologies (aspiration to

support ‘Global Jihad’)

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Travel routes’ choice

Key factors: Affiliation of the recruiters to certain organization

and respective facilitation networks

Travelers’ nationality, descent, available identity documents and financial means

Existence of criminal and/or extremist background

Cover story

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Western Europe – Turkey by flight

not necessarily from the country of residence, but often also from a neighbouring countryflight to a Turkish city with an international airport (Istanbul, but Ankara and Antalya) legitimate identity documents issued in EU/Western countries, dual citizenship

by land transportWestern Europe - Romania/Serbia – Bulgaria - Turkeyillegal/legal crossing the Bulgarian-Turkish Border

Turkey – Syria land transport transit hubs at several locations/points

in Turkey clandestine transfer to Syria

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Western Balkans – Syria air transport to Turkey land transport via Bulgaria legal identity documents and

Shengen visas

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Rebel forces Free Syrian Army Islamist groups - Fajr al Islam, Suqur al Sham,

Jund al Sham, Jaish al Tawhid, Ansar al Islam, Hamzah bin Abd al Mutalib, Kataib al-Muhajireen, etc.

Jihadist groups - Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISLAMIC STATE), Jabhat al-Nusra,, Ahrar al Sham, Fatah al-Islam, Abdullah Azzam Brigades, etc.

Forces supporting the Syrian government -

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Hizballah, Jaish al Mahdi, etc.

Militant groups in Syria and Iraq

and foreign fighters

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Returning fighters 1

Unclear concept about the return routes towards Europe

Returnees’ motivation: adaptation problems (obstacles, unsatisfied expectations) terrorist attacks in Europe “vacation” between fighting facilitation networks’ activities recruitment

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Will they return as members of terrorist sleeper cells wanting to pursue the struggle?

Will they be disillusioned and hence disengaged from violent actions?

Even if they do not maintain links to other jihadists, will

they try to commit a terrorist act alone?

Returning fighters 2

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Irrespective of nuanced ideological motivations foreign fighters pose a security risk

Short term risk from returnees at the extreme end of the ideological spectrum, particularly in light of jihadist groups’ aspirations to carry out attacks in the West

Launching attacks in Bulgaria Well-trained jihadists have at their disposal all the requisite

knowledge for attack planning, preparation and execution Even without direct instructions, guidance or support they

possess strong attack motivation against “the enemies of Islam” – Bulgaria can be added to the enemy range

Jihadist volunteers are capable of implementing their “war against the West” locally in case that existing jihadist networks and channels are disrupted

Security risks from foreign fighters 1

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Medium to long term risks

setting up operative and logistic terrorist cells and networks Due to their citizenship “European” jihadists can sojourn

and travel freely in the country Their participation in Jihad abroad gives them power to

inspire, recruit or train others and to build trans-national networks

destabilisation of Muslim communities; creating tension towards anti-Islam

Security risk from foreign fighters 2

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IRREGULAR MIGRANTROUTES FROM CONFLICT ZONES

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Ankara

İstanbul

Hatay

Hakkari

Ağrı

Artvin

Ardahan

İzmir

Muğla

Mersin

Edirne

BLACK SEA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

SYRİA

IRAQ

IRAN

AFGHANISTAN

GREECE

BULGARIA

Shırnak

KayseriVan

IRREGULAR MIGRANTROUTES FROM CONFLICT ZONES TO BULGARIA

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SVILENGRAD

ELHOVO

BULGARIA BCU

SREDETS

BOLYAROVO

BCU M.TARNOVO

TURKEY

IRREGULAR MIGRATION PRESSUREMODUS OPERANDI

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GOALS: Reducing the number of illegal immigrants in the country

Limit the number of illegal immigrants entering the Republic of Bulgaria

Speeding up the extradition of the illegal immigrants conducting criminal activities

Mitigation and management of risks arising from presence of illegal immigrants in the country : Terrorism and extremism Pandemics and epidemics Ethnic, religious, political conflicts Criminality

Ensuring order, security and humanitarian conditions in the accommodation of persons who sought and received protection in Bulgaria.

Fast and effective integration of persons granted refugee or humanitarian status

The effective communication with the public

CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN with regard to the rising migration pressure on the

territory of Bulgaria

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Continuous and systematic monitoring of international, regional, and national risks and threats assessment with particular regard to migration pressure

Collection and analysis of information related to the crisis

ACTIVITIES AND MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BY SANS

Continuous exchange of information with partner agencies regarding threats of persons involved in terrorist or extremist activity entering the country.

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Application of enhanced measures for identification of illegal migrants belonging to terrorist organizations or international organized crime groups

Creation of joint teams to conduct initial interviews with foreign nationals who have crossed the border illegally

Imposing compulsory administrative measures on persons connected to terrorist and extremists groups

ACTIVITIES AND MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BY SANS (cont.)

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Outlook

The travel of European/Western fighters to and from Syria and Iraq is most likely to continue

Europe can be outlined as a possible alternative for direct attacks against “the enemies of Islam”

Bulgaria, Greece and Romania will continue to constitute transit countries for traveling jihadists from Syria

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Countermeasures

Interception and disruption of the built networks, channels, individual travels and possible attack planning (through open and operative measures) Detecting pre-departure signals

Monitoring of the respective diasporas and specific vulnerable groups and individuals – still accomplishable, but needs significant efforts and resources

Travel information analysis (i.e. irregular flows via Turkey to Syria) - difficult, in particular with regard to the Western citizens

Identification and surveillance of the facilitation networks for recruitment and travel movements

Monitoring of the returnees’ activities Active cooperation with the competent structures on national

level Close international cooperation with partner services and

implementing joint projects and operations

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION