start follow-on update november 30, 2009 steven pifer center on the united states and europe foreign...
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![Page 1: START Follow-on Update November 30, 2009 Steven Pifer Center on the United States and Europe Foreign Policy Studies The Brookings Institution spifer@brookings.edu](https://reader036.vdocuments.mx/reader036/viewer/2022062421/56649ce55503460f949b3394/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
START Follow-on UpdateSTART Follow-on Update
November 30, 2009
Steven PiferCenter on the United States and Europe
Foreign Policy StudiesThe Brookings Institution
November 30, 2009
Steven PiferCenter on the United States and Europe
Foreign Policy StudiesThe Brookings Institution
![Page 2: START Follow-on Update November 30, 2009 Steven Pifer Center on the United States and Europe Foreign Policy Studies The Brookings Institution spifer@brookings.edu](https://reader036.vdocuments.mx/reader036/viewer/2022062421/56649ce55503460f949b3394/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Background: 1991 START TreatyBackground: 1991 START Treaty
• No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers)• No more than 154 heavy ICBMs
• No more than 6000 warheads• No more than 4900 on ICBMs/SLBMs• No more than 1540 on heavy ICBMs• No more than 1100 on mobile ICBMs
• Detailed verification measures• Expires December 5, 2009
• No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers)• No more than 154 heavy ICBMs
• No more than 6000 warheads• No more than 4900 on ICBMs/SLBMs• No more than 1540 on heavy ICBMs• No more than 1100 on mobile ICBMs
• Detailed verification measures• Expires December 5, 2009
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Background: 2002 SORT TreatyBackground: 2002 SORT Treaty
• No more than 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads
• No limits on SNDVs• No verification measures• Expires December 31, 2012
• No more than 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads
• No limits on SNDVs• No verification measures• Expires December 31, 2012
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Background: US START- Accountable Forces, July 2009
Background: US START- Accountable Forces, July 2009
• SORT count at/near 2200 warheads• Per START data exchange, 1188 SNDVs
capable of carrying 5916 warheads:550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs 160096 Trident I SLBMs 576336 Trident II SLBMs 268847 B-1 bombers 4718 B-2 bombers 18141 B-52 bombers 987
• SORT count at/near 2200 warheads• Per START data exchange, 1188 SNDVs
capable of carrying 5916 warheads:550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs 160096 Trident I SLBMs 576336 Trident II SLBMs 268847 B-1 bombers 4718 B-2 bombers 18141 B-52 bombers 987
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Background: Russian START-Accountable Forces, July 2009Background: Russian START-Accountable Forces, July 2009
• SORT count unknown• Per START data exchange, 809 SNDVs
capable of carrying 3897 warheads:465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs 2001
268 SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs 1288
76 Bear/Blackjack bombers 608
• SORT count unknown• Per START data exchange, 809 SNDVs
capable of carrying 3897 warheads:465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs 2001
268 SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs 1288
76 Bear/Blackjack bombers 608
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July Joint UnderstandingJuly Joint Understanding
• Strategic warhead limit of 1500-1675 and SNDV limit of 500-1100• Exact numbers to be specified in the treaty
• New treaty to contain provisions on:• Counting rules• Elimination and verification (based on START,
simplified and less costly as appropriate)• Interrelationship between offense and defense• Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs
• Strategic warhead limit of 1500-1675 and SNDV limit of 500-1100• Exact numbers to be specified in the treaty
• New treaty to contain provisions on:• Counting rules• Elimination and verification (based on START,
simplified and less costly as appropriate)• Interrelationship between offense and defense• Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs
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START Follow-on TreatySTART Follow-on Treaty
• Will combine predictability of START with flexibility of SORT
• Key remaining issues at beginning of current round of negotiations• Missile defense• SNDV limit• Conventional warheads on SLBMs or ICBMs• Verification
• Will combine predictability of START with flexibility of SORT
• Key remaining issues at beginning of current round of negotiations• Missile defense• SNDV limit• Conventional warheads on SLBMs or ICBMs• Verification
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Missile DefenseMissile Defense
• Joint Understanding says treaty to include “a provision on the interrelationship between
strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms”
• Russians sought to restrict missile defense• US position: missile defense not a subject
for START follow-on negotiation
• Joint Understanding says treaty to include “a provision on the interrelationship between
strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms”
• Russians sought to restrict missile defense• US position: missile defense not a subject
for START follow-on negotiation
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SNDV LimitSNDV Limit• Large gap between July Russian proposal
(500) and US proposal (1100)• Reasons for higher US proposal:
• SNDVs converted to conventional roles• “Phantom” systems• Russia plans to eliminate missiles while US
plans to download missiles
• Large gap between July Russian proposal (500) and US proposal (1100)
• Reasons for higher US proposal: • SNDVs converted to conventional roles• “Phantom” systems• Russia plans to eliminate missiles while US
plans to download missiles
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Conventional SystemsConventional Systems
• US strategic systems converted to conven-tional roles• B-1 bombers• Four Trident SSGNs
• How to assure no nuclear role?
• US strategic systems converted to conven-tional roles• B-1 bombers• Four Trident SSGNs
• How to assure no nuclear role?
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“Phantom” Systems“Phantom” Systems
• SNDVs no longer in service or useable but not yet eliminated per START rules
• US “phantoms” include:• B-52s at Davis Monthan AFB• MX ICBM silos• Some Minuteman III silos
• SNDVs no longer in service or useable but not yet eliminated per START rules
• US “phantoms” include:• B-52s at Davis Monthan AFB• MX ICBM silos• Some Minuteman III silos
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“Phantom” and Eliminated B-52s“Phantom” and Eliminated B-52s
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“Phantom” Systems -- MX Silo“Phantom” Systems -- MX Silo
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Eliminated Minuteman SiloEliminated Minuteman Silo
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Closing SNDV LimitClosing SNDV Limit
• Possible ways to address:• Verification measures to confirm conventional
systems have only conventional role• Eliminate “phantoms” per START or agree on
less demanding elimination requirement
• Resolving these issues should reduce US SNDV requirement by ~300 systems
• Possible ways to address:• Verification measures to confirm conventional
systems have only conventional role• Eliminate “phantoms” per START or agree on
less demanding elimination requirement
• Resolving these issues should reduce US SNDV requirement by ~300 systems
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Upload PotentialUpload Potential
• Upload potential: downloaded warheads could be returned to missiles• Example: a Trident D-5 downloaded to three
warheads will have five empty warhead slots
• The dog that’s not barking?• May be issue for next round
• Upload potential: downloaded warheads could be returned to missiles• Example: a Trident D-5 downloaded to three
warheads will have five empty warhead slots
• The dog that’s not barking?• May be issue for next round
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Conventional WarheadsConventional Warheads
• US “prompt global strike” plan envisages Tridents or new ICBMs armed with conven-tional warheads
• Russia sought ban on conventional warheads on strategic systems
• US “prompt global strike” plan envisages Tridents or new ICBMs armed with conven-tional warheads
• Russia sought ban on conventional warheads on strategic systems
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Counting and VerificationCounting and Verification• Possible warhead counting regimes
• Type attribution rule (START)• Actual load counting -- US plans to vary
number of warheads on Trident SLBMs
• Simplifying verification measures• Russians wish to end telemetry provisions and
loosen monitoring of mobile ICBM systems
• Possible warhead counting regimes• Type attribution rule (START)• Actual load counting -- US plans to vary
number of warheads on Trident SLBMs
• Simplifying verification measures• Russians wish to end telemetry provisions and
loosen monitoring of mobile ICBM systems
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PrognosisPrognosis
• Treaty likely as both sides want it • Russian and US motivations differ but strong
on both sides• Both presidents strongly endorse treaty
• Question = when will treaty be completed?
• Treaty likely as both sides want it • Russian and US motivations differ but strong
on both sides• Both presidents strongly endorse treaty
• Question = when will treaty be completed?