standards actions highlights and mintues 2013/… · serc spring workshop (march 2020) supply chain...

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Standards Actions

Howard Gugel, Vice President of Engineering and StandardsBoard of Trustees MeetingAugust 20, 2020

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• Reliability Benefits Clarify role of Planning Coordinator (PC) in the Western Interconnection

• Action Adopt PRC-006-5 – Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding WECC

Regional Variance

WECC– Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding


• Background Review by NPCC resulted in revisions to Section 8 Processes to Change

Errata and minor conforming changes

• Action Approve NPCC Regional Standard Processes Manual

NPCC Regional Standard Processes Manual


Supply Chain Update


• Standard development Electronic Access Control and Monitoring Systems (EACMS) and Physical

Access Control Systems (PACS) Low impact BES Cyber Assets

• NERC Alerts 2019 – specific manufacturers of telecom and drones 2020 – Generation and transmission assets

• Industry partnerships NATF work on certifications Vendor work with DoE

Current Activity


• NERC Control Area (CA) Continues to assist Regional Entity Support/Outreach SERC Spring Workshop (March 2020) Supply Chain Working Group Guidelines Webinar (May 2020) RF Fall Workshop (August 2020) ERO Enterprise Internal Call on Audit Approaches

• Compliance and Certification Committee Supply Chain Task Forceo “..will execute the CCC role to address potential concerns with industry readiness

for the upcoming enforcement of the Supply Chain Risk Management.”

Supply Chain Outreach


Low Impact Study

• FERC Directive - “.. direct NERC to conduct a study to assess the implementation of Reliability Standard CIP-003-7.” Determine whether the electronic access controls provide adequate

security Due 18 months after CIP-003-7 effective date (July 2021)

• Regional Entities collecting data throughout 2020 COVID-19 Impact Already started receiving data Engagements throughout 2020 and 1Q 2021

• All data collected by end of Q1 2021• Draft report ~June 2021


• Webinars on Security Guidelines Risk Considerations for Open Source Software Cyber Security Risk Management Lifecycle Vendor Identified Incident Response Measures Secure Equipment Delivery Vendor Risk Management Lifecycle Procurement Language Provenance Risks Related to Cloud Service Providers

Supply Chain Working Group


Rules of Procedure RevisionsSteven Noess, Director, Regulatory ProgramsBoard of Trustees MeetingAugust 20, 2020


• Five-Year ERO Performance Assessment Filed on July 22, 2019. FERC accepted January 22, 2020 Order continues Electric Reliability Organization certification

• Directives: Certification Procedures; Infrastructure Security Program; and Sanction Guidelines.

Order on Five-Year Performance Assessment


• Certification Procedure Directives Update the scope section; Provide minimum criteria for certification; Add a mechanism to reject the request for certification; Provide potential for conditional approval for certification; Establish minimum requirements for the certification team; Include NERC review and approval of the proposed schedule for

completing the certification process; and Address the risk of an entity’s failure to be certified or certified when

needed.

FERC DirectivesCertification Procedures


• Infrastructure Security Program Directive

Correct any inconsistencies, particularly regarding the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council(ESCC); and

Reflect current operational practices and oversight of the E-ISAC.

FERC DirectivesInfrastructure Security Program


• Sanction Guidelines Directives Explain how NERC and the Regional Entities choose the base penalty

amount; Detail the potential ranges for aggravating and mitigating factors; Explain whether and how non-monetary sanctions will be considered; Considerations of multiple subsidiaries of a parent corporation; Calculating a single penalty for multiple violations by a single entity; and Ensuring no penalty is inconsequential to the violator.

FERC Directives Sanction Guidelines


• NERC also developed enhancements as part of broader ROP modernization efforts

• Registration enhancements proposed to Section 500 and Appendices 5A – 5C: Specify roles and responsibilities for parties to a Joint Registration

Organization or Coordinated Functional Registration; Clarify situations where a BES Exception Request should precede a NERC-

led Registration Review Panel; Clarify NERC-led Registration Review Panel language; Remove redundant and unnecessary language; and Timeline to review Exception Requests after additional material is

provided.

Registration and Certification Registration Revisions


• Certification enhancements proposed to Appendix 5A: Add a Certification Review section addressing changes to an entity’s

existing Certification; Establish the potential for conditional Certification; Specify NERC’s ability to reject a Certification application; and Specify NERC’s ability to revoke and/or de-certify for cause.

Registration and Certification Certification Revisions


• Key proposed revisions to section 1003 to correct inconsistencies and accurately reflect current operational practices

Clarify that NERC “operates the E-ISAC on behalf of the electricity sector”

Add a more accurate description of the E-ISAC

Revise language related to the ESCC

Revise the language regarding NERC’s use of a risk management approach to Critical Infrastructure protection

o NERC considers security alongside reliability and resilience

o Delete references to programs or activities NERC does not participate or engage in

Infrastructure Security Program Revisions


• Enhancements proposed to Appendix 4B: Clarify how NERC and the Regional Entities choose the base penalty

amount Clarify all adjustment factors to the base penalty amount Address FERC directives Clarify application of existing concepts Revise language to ensure consistent terminology and remove extraneous

language

Sanction Guidelines Revisions


RSTC Organizational Review Update and Recommendation

Greg Ford, Chair, Reliability and Security Technical CommitteeBoard of Trustees MeetingAugust 20, 2020


Goals of RSTC Transition

• Set up the RSTC to deliver on the goals outlined in its charter• Maintain continuity in all ongoing, high-value work across the

subgroups • Capture best practices and synergies through the integration of

processes across the “legacy” committees • Clearly document roles and responsibilities and processes for

RSTC to improve clarity going forward and speed transition• Developing a model to support subgroups that is more

collaborative while maintaining alignment to overall NERC strategy

https://www.nerc.com/comm/RSTC/RelatedFiles/RSTC_Charter_approved20191105.pdf


Proposed Operating Model Overview

• Organize existing RSTC subgroups by Program Areas: Performance Monitoring Reliability and Security Assessment Risk Mitigation

• The Program Areas are NOT subcommittees but rather a simple way to organize work in distinct groups

• Sponsors would be assigned based on subgroup topics and work loads

• The Program Areas are supported by RSTC sponsors and NERC staff and would be responsible for managing work flow/ deliverables

• Security is expected to be a consideration for each subgroup where appropriate


Proposed Operating Model

Reliability and Security Assessment

Focus: Emerging Issues

Real-Time Operations

Subcommittee

Performance MonitoringFocus: monitoring and

analysis

Security Integration and

Technology Enablement

Subcommittee (New)

Reliability and Security Assessment Sponsors

Performance Monitoring Sponsors

Reliability Assessment

Subcommittee

Event Analysis Subcommittee

Performance Analysis

Subcommittee

Resources Subcommittee

Risk Mitigation Sponsors

IRPW

G

SPID

ERW

G

SPC

WG

EMPT

F

GM

DTF

Risk MitigationFocus: Mitigate existing

and emerging risks

SWG

SCW

G

LMW

G

PPM

VTF

EGW

G

SRTWG


Subgroups

Committee Subgroups

Scope Duration Approvals Leadership

Subcommittee• Oversee broad processes• Manage cyclical

deliverablesLong-term

Consensus seeking; vote as specified by its scope

Nominated by subcommittee; Approved by RSTC Leadership

Working Group

• Oversee specific data systems

• Support specific initiatives with broader interaction with other subgroups/topics

• Support a cyclical process• Support parent

subcommittee

Long-term/ mid-term

Consensus seeking; non-voting

Nominated by working group, parent subcommittee, or direct appointment by the NERC Technical Committees; approved by RSTC Leadership

Task Force

• Support a specific initiative• Direct, often only one

deliverable• Support parent

subcommittee

Short-term Consensus seeking; non-voting

Nominated by task force, parent subcommittee, or direct appointment by the NERC Technical Committees; approved by RSTC Leadership


Proposed Operating ModelPerformance Monitoring

Reliability and Security Technical Committee

(RSTC)

Executive Committee

Performance Monitoring


Subcommittee (RTOS)


(RS)

Reserves Working Group

(RWG)

Frequency Working Group

(FWG)


(EAS)

Energy Management

Systems Working Group

(EMSWG)


Subcommittee (PAS)

Failure Modes and

Mechanisms Task Force

(FMMTF)

Synchronized Measurements Working Group

(SMWG)

Reliability Operations

Coordination

Operating Reliability

Subcommittee (ORS)

Balancing and Frequency Response


(RS)

Inadvertent Interchange

Working Group (IIWG)


(RWG)


(FWG)

Event Analysis


(EAS)

Energy Management


(EMSWG)

Failure Modes and

Mechanisms Task Force (FMMTF)

Performance Analysis and

Data Collection


Subcommittee (PAS)

GADS Working Group

(GADSWG)

TADS Working Group

(TADSWG)

DADS Working Group

(DADSWG)

MIDAS Working Group

(MIDASWG)

Planning and Modeling

Synchronized Measurements Subcommittee

(SMS)

Move to NERC User Groups Retire GADS Working

Group (GADSWG)

TADS Working Group

(TADSWG)

DADS Working Group

(DADSWG)

MIDAS Working Group

(MIDASWG)

Inadvertent Interchange

Working Group (IIWG)


Proposed Operating ModelReliability and Security Assessment


(RSTC)

Executive Committee



Subcommittee (RAS)

Probabilistic Assessment

Working Group (PAWG)



Subcommittee (SITES) - New

Adequacy Assessments


Subcommittee (RAS)

Probabilistic Assessment Working

Group (PAWG)


To be retired in Early 2021E-ISAC

Proposed Operating ModelRisk Mitigation


(RSTC)

Executive Committee

Risk Mitigation


(SCWG)

Security Working Group (SWG) – former

CIWG

Security and Reliability Training

Working Group (SRTWG) -

merged

System Planning Impacts from DER Working

Group (SPIDERWG)

Inverter-Based Resource

Performance Working Group

(IRPWG)

Electric-Gas Working Group

(EGWG)

EMP Task Force (EMPTF)

Load Modeling Working Group

(LMWG)

Power Plant Modeling and Verification Task Force (PPMVTF)

Issue-FocusedPhysical and Cyber Security


(SCWG)

Grid Exercise Working Group

(GEWG)*

Physical Security Advisory Working Group (PSAWG)*

Compliance Input Working Group

(CIWG)

Security Training Working Group

(STWG)

Planning and Modeling

Load Modeling Task Force

(LMTF)

Power Plant Modeling & Verification Task Force (PPMVTF)

System Protection and

Control Subcommittee

(SPCS)

System Planning Impacts from

DER Working Group

(SPIDERWG)

GMD Task Force (GMDTF)


Performance Task Force

(IRPTF)


(EGWG)

EMP Task Force (EMPTF)

Training and Outreach

Reliability Training

Working Group (RTWG)

Moved to E-ISAC E-ISAC Physical Security

Advisory Working Group (PSAWG)*

Grid Exercise Working Group

(GEWG)*

GMD Task Force (GMDTF)


Control Working Group (SPCWG)

Systems Analysis and

Modelling Subcommittee

(SAMS)

Retire Systems Analysis and

Modelling Subcommittee (SAMS)


Proposed Operating Model – 23 subgroups


(RSTC)

Executive Committee

Performance Monitoring Risk Mitigation


(SCWG)

Security Working Group (SWG)*

Security and Reliability

Training Working Group (SRTWG)



Subcommittee (RAS)*




Group (SPIDERWG)*



(IRPWG)*


(EGWG)*

EMP Task Force (EMPTF)*



Subcommittee (SITES)*


(LMWG)

Power Plant Modeling and Verification Task Force

(PPMVTF) – to be retired early

2021

4 sponsors* 2 sponsors*6 sponsors*


Control Working Group (SPCWG)*


Subcommittee (RTOS)*


(RS)*


(RWG)


(FWG)


(EAS)*

Energy Management


(EMSWG)


Subcommittee (PAS)*

Failure Modes and

Mechanisms Task Force

(FMMTF)


(SMWG)

GMD Task Force (GMDTF) – to be

retired early 2021

Outlined groups report directly to RSTC.


• Reliability and Security Assessment Program Area• Vetting technology landscape• Identify barriers to adoption of technology• Providing a forum for advancing and integrating new technology• Considering cyber and physical threats more directly in

planning, operations, design, and restoration activities Identify solutions that eliminate or mitigate potential reliability, security,

and resilience risks to the BPS that could result from an increased cyber-attack surface or improperly implemented technologies

• Identifying and considering potential security threats and emerging risks E.g., DERMS, inverters, supply chain, PMUs

Security Integration and Technology Enablement Subcommittee (SITES)


• Risk Mitigation Program Area• Tactical scope focused on short term security and compliance

issues e.g., SARs, recently disclosed vulnerabilities, RISC report items

• Review and develop Security Guidelines and Compliance Implementation Guidance as needed

• Provides expert resources for RSTC groups that need input regarding the security aspects of their respective group’s activities

• Coordinate with SITES when security issue impacts operations or planning

Security Working Group (SWG)


What Would It Look Like for Sponsors?

Sponsors’ Assignments• Following organizational review, RSTC Sponsors

will be assigned by the RSTC Executive Committee to each subgroup* with regards to diversity of expertise.

• Sponsors’ assignments will be refreshed annually by the RSTC Executive Committee following review of the subgroups

Sponsors’ Responsibilities• Sponsors are members of the RSTC but not

members of any subgroup • Attend at least 2 subgroup meetings per year • Schedule quarterly calls with program area’s

subgroup leadership and NERC Coordinators to review status reports and prepare for RSTC meetings

• Notify the RSTC Executive Committee if any topics arise which should be on a RSTC agenda

• Advocate and support discussion for subgroup-related topics that arise during RSTC meetings



Subcommittee (RAS)*





Subcommittee (SITES)

Risk Mitigation


(SCWG)

Security Working Group (SWG)*

Security and Reliability

Training Working Group (SRTWG)


Group (SPIDERGW)*



(WG)*Electric-Gas

Working Group (EGWG)*

EMP Task Force (EMPTF)*


(LMWG)

Power Plant Modeling and

Verification Task Force (PPMVTF) – to be retired in

early 2021)


Control Working Group (SPCWG)*

GMD Task Force (GMDTF) – to be retired in early

2021)

Performance Monitoring


Subcommittee (RTOS)*


(RS)*


(RWG)


(FWG)

Event Analysis

Subcommittee (EAS)*Energy

Management Systems

Working Group (EMSWG)


Subcommittee (PAS)*

Failure Modes and

Mechanisms Task Force (FMMTF)


(SMWG)

Subgroups identified above by “*”


RSTC/RISC Coordination


Transition Timeline Update

Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Processes: Develop consolidated and summary workplanProcesses: Assign subgroup sponsors and communicate assignments

Strategy: EC Defines Draft Strategic Objectives

Strategy: Development of RSTC Operational PlanProcesses: Refine recommendations based on RSTC feedback

ActivityDevelop Transition Task Force and High-Level Approach

RSTC Meeting to Review / DiscussDraft RecommendationsOrganization: Review of Subgroups –identify future-state structure

RSTC Meeting to Review / Approve Recommendations

Processes: Develop detailed roles and responsibilities for RSTC / subgroupleadership

RSTC Meeting to Review / Approve Recommendations

Metrics: EC Identifies success metrics for RSTC and sub-groups based on strategic plan

Processes: Develop sponsor expectations

July 28 Closed RSTC meeting


Reference Information


Sponsor Selection

• RSTC members will initially self-nominate to subgroups based on their preferences

• Sponsors will be assigned to subgroups by the RSTC Executive Committee

• Annual training will be provided for Sponsors• Sponsors initially have term limits of 2 or 3 years based on their

election but may serve as a sponsor for the same subgroup after 4 years

• Sponsors may serve consecutive terms as long it involves a different subgroup

• Sponsor terms will be staggered to ensure continuity • If a sponsor is not able to fulfill their duty, the RSTC Executive

Committee will select a new sponsor to complete the term


2020 ERO Enterprise Reliability IndicatorsThird Quarter Status

Thomas Coleman, Director of Risk Issue ManagementBoard of Trustees MeetingAugust 20, 2020


Data (Annual Measurement) Threshold: No Category 3 or above events: Zero is green, else is red

2020 Status

Data (Compared to a 5-year rolling average) Slope of eSRI line is flat to decreasing and does not show an

increase above zero that is statistically significant (95% Confidence Interval).

“2020 Status” relates to the slope of the 5 year rolling average (Positive, Flat or Negative), not just the 2020 performance.

Positive Negativeslope Flat slope

Increasing Decreasing

Reliability Indicator 1: Fewer, Less Severe Events

• Why is it important? Provides a quantitative measure and trend of actual impacts on the BPSPS

• How is it measured? Count: Number of Category 3 or above events Trend: Statistical test is performed on the five-year cumulative daily event

Severity Risk Index (eSRI) for Category (1-3) events


• Why is it important? Reduce risk to BPS reliability from Standard violations by registered entities

• How is it measured? Moderate and serious risk noncompliance with a relevant history of similar past conduct* The number of violations discovered through self-reports, audits, etc. Risk to the BPS based on the severity of Standard violations

Reliability Indicator 2: Compliance Violations

Data (Compared to a 3-year rolling average) The number of serious risk violations resolved compared to the

total noncompliance resolved--- Current number is 1.4%

Data (Annual Measurement) Percent of noncompliance self-reported (Self-certified

noncompliance is not included)----Current number is 81%

Data (Annual Measurement) Percent moderate and serious risk violations with relevant

compliance history of similar past conduct compared with total noncompliance filed with FERC--- 1%

5% 4%

80%75%

2020 Status30% 20%

* To measure the effectiveness of the risk-based CMEP in reducing noncompliance, NERC review s moderate and serious risk violations and includes them in one of three categories: 1) noncompliance w ith no prior compliance history; 2) noncompliance w ith prior compliance history that does not involve similar conduct; and 3) noncompliance w ith compliance history that includes similar conduct.


Data (Year-Over-Year Comparison) Q3-Q2 comparison misoperations rate based on collection interval

(95% Confidence Interval) (Based on 2018 Metric) Includes five years: Q3 2015 through Q2 2020*. Five-year average:

8.374%

2020 Status

Data (Year-Over-Year Comparison) Q3-Q2 comparison for qualified events with misoperations and

loss of load (load loss/number of events) during the collection interval (95% Confidence Interval)

• Why is it important? Protection system misoperations exacerbate the impacts

• How is it measured? Annual Misoperations rate and the annual loss of load for events with

misoperations

Reliability Indicator 3: Protection System Misoperations Rate

+MW/event -MW/event

No Change

7.5%7.5% 7.0%

* Data for Q2 2020 not available until Q3. Includes reports through Q1 2020.


Data (Annual Measurement) No firm load loss due to gas-fired unit outages during cold weather: Zero is green,

else is red (Cold weather months: January – March and December of the same calendar year) As of 6/30/2020, Metric status is Green.

2020 Status

Data (Annual Measurement) (Match with 4.4, year defined as Q3-Q2) No firm load loss due to gas unavailability: Zero is green, else is red

As of 6/30/2020, Metric status is Green.Data (Compared to a 5-year rolling average) Percentage of winter period net MWh of potential production lost due to gas-

fired unit outages during cold weather (Cold weather months: January – March and December of the same calendar year) Five-year average: 0.0058%

Data (Compared to a 5-year rolling average) Percentage of annual net MWh of potential production lost due gas unavailability

compared to a 5-year rolling average (Due to data availability, year defined as Q3-Q2) Five-year average: 0.1513%

• Why is it important? Reduce risk to BPS reliability due to gas-fired unit outages during cold weather or

gas unavailability

• How is it measured? Firm load loss due to cold weather or gas unavailability MWh of potential production lost initiated by cold weather and gas unavailability

RI 4: Events Caused by Gas-Fired Unit Forced Outages Due to Cold Weather or Gas Unavailability

0.192% 0.0898%

0.00149% 0.00053%


• Why is it important? Measures risks to BPS reliability from three priority causes:

1. Operator or other human performance issues2. Substation equipment failures or failed circuit equipment3. Vegetation encroachment

Reliability Indicator 5: Reduce AC Transmission Line Forced Outages


• How is it measured? Number of transmission line

outages caused by Human Error divided by the total inventory of circuits

Reliability Indicator 5a: Operator or Other Human Performance Issues

2019 StatusData (Compared to a 5-year rolling average) Annual outage rate flat compared to a 5-year rolling

average (95% Confidence Interval) Increasing Decreasing

Flat


• How is it measured? Number of transmission line

outages caused by AC substation equipment outage failures and failed AC circuit equipment (such as transformers), divided by the total inventory of circuits

Reliability Indicator 5b: Substation Equipment Failures or Failed Circuit Equipment

2019 StatusData (Compared to a 5-year rolling average) Annual outage rate decreasing compared to a 5-year rolling

average (95% Confidence Interval) FlatDecreasingIncreasing


• How is it measured? Number of vegetation

encroachments and Sustained Outages

Reliability Indicator 5c: Vegetation Encroachment

Q1 2020 StatusData* (Compared to a 5-year rolling average) Number of vegetation encroachments, excluding fall-ins,

decreasing (within one standard deviation, based on small sample size) (Based on 2018 metric) -- 5-year average is 1.8 Increasing Decreasing

Flat5 2

Data** (Compared to a 5-year rolling average) Fall-ins: Number of vegetation encroachments decreasing (within

one standard deviation, based on 6-year sample) -- 5-year average is 21.2 Increasing Decreasing

24 15


• How is it measured? Number of applicable DOE OE-

417 Electric Emergency Incident and Disturbance Reports and NERC EOP-004 Event Reports

Security Indicator 6 : Impactful Cyber and Physical Security Incidents

2020 StatusData (Compared to 2016-2018 Quarterly Baseline) No disruption* of BES operations due to cyber security incidents

Zero disruptions of BES operations due to cyber attacks in 2020 Q2 Number of disruptions* of BES operations due to physical security

incidents: Below baseline Upper Control Limit is green, else is redTwo disruptions of BES operations (one with load outage) due to physical

attacks in 2020 Q2

*A disruption means that a BES element was removed from service as a result of the cyber or physical incident

Cyber Security

Physical Security


• Why is it important? Measures risk to the BPS by monitoring the number of Disturbance Control

Standard (DCS) events that are greater than the Most Severe Single Contingency (MSSC)

• How is it measured? Information received by NERC based on the BAL-002 Reliability Standard Due to the timing in Balancing Authority data submittals the metric is updated one

quarter in arrears Measures a rolling 7 year quarterly time trend testing for statistical significance

RI 7: Disturbance control events greater than the most severe single contingency

1Q2020 StatusData (Quarterly Measurement), New Green: a time trend line of the most recent 7 years of

quarterly DCS events > MSSC has a statistically significant negative slope

Middle: no statistically significant trend for the slope Red: a time trend line of the most recent 7 years of quarterly

DCS events > MSSC has a statistically significant positive slope Metric Results through 1Q20: Green - DCS data for the most

recent 28 quarters shows a statistically significant decreasing trend

No Statistical

Trend DecreasingTrend

IncreasingTrend


• Why is it important? Measures risk and impact to the BPS by measuring the interconnection frequency

response performance measure (IFRM) for each BAL-003-1 event as compared to the Interconnection Frequency Response Obligation (IFRO)

• How is it measured? IFROs are calculated and recommended in the Frequency Response Annual Analysis

Report for Reliability Standard BAL-003-1.1 implementation IFRM performance is measured for each event by comparing the resource (or load)

MW loss to the frequency deviation Due to the timing in selection of events the metric is updated one quarter in arrears.

Reliability Indicator 8: InterconnectionFrequency Response

2020 StatusData (Quarterly & Annual Measurement), New IFRM for each BAL-003-1 event is compared to the IFRO for each

quarter of the 2019 operating year Success is no Interconnection experiencing a BAL-003-1 frequency

event where IFRM performance is below their respective IFRO: Zero is green, else is red

Metric Results through 1Q20: No Interconnection experienced a BAL-003-1 event where their IFRM was below their IFRO

12RELIA

standards actions highlights and mintues 2013/… · serc spring workshop (march 2020) supply chain...

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