spotify vs lowery

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SPOTIFY’S CORRECTED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONCASE NO. 2:15-CV-09929-BRO-RAO

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MAYER BROWN LLPJOHN NADOLENCO (SBN 181128)

[email protected] VOLOKH (SBN 194464)[email protected] South Grand Avenue, 25th Floor

Los Angeles, California 90071-1503Telephone: (213) 229-9500Facsimile: (213) 625-0248

A. JOHN P. MANCINI (admitted pro hac vice) [email protected] LEVINE STILLMAN (admitted prohac vice)[email protected] Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10020-1001Telephone: (212) 506-2295Facsimile: (212) 849-5895

ARCHIS A. PARASHARAMI (admitted prohac vice)[email protected] E. JONES (admitted pro hac vice)[email protected] K Street, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006-1101Telephone: (202) 263-3328Facsimile: (202) 263-5328

Attorneys for Defendant SPOTIFY USA INC.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID LOWERY, VICTOR KRUMMENACHER, GREGLISHER, and DAVIDFARAGHER, individually and on

behalf of himself and all otherssimilarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

SPOTIFY USA INC., a Delawarecorporation,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:15-cv-09929-BRO-RAO

DEFENDANT SPOTIFY USA INC.’SCORRECTED MEMORANDUM OFPOINTS AND AUTHORITIES INOPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR CORRECTIVEACTION TO PREVENTMISREPRESENTATIONS TOPUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS

Date: May 16, 2016Time: 1:30 pmJudge: Hon. Beverly Reid O’Connell

Case 2:15-cv-09929-BRO-RAO Document 55 Filed 04/26/16 Page 1 of 23 Page ID #:1484


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................................................................ii

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................... 3ARGUMENT............................................................................................................6

I. Plaintiffs Filed This Motion Despite Spotify’s Willingness ToProvide Them With Most Of The Communications In Spotify’sPossession That They Have Requested ............................................... 6

II. Plaintiffs Improperly Seek Relief Directed At, And Based OnThe Alleged Conduct Of, The NMPA, Which Is Not A Party ToThis Litigation......................................................................................7

III. Plaintiffs’ Demand To Review And Approve FutureCommunications By Spotify Violates The First Amendment...........10

A. Plaintiffs Allege No Improper Communications BySpotify...................................................................................... 12

B. Spotify’s Communications With Publishers RegardingThe NMPA Agreement Have Been Extremely Limited And Are Not Coercive.............................................................14

CONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 17



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Cases Alcatel-Lucent USA v. Dugdale Commc’ns,

2009 WL 3346784 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2009) .................................................. 6, 7

Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff ,42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930) ...................................................................................7

Applegate v. Kokor ,2015 WL 7007997 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2015) ..................................................... 7

Babbitt v. Albertson’s Inc.,1993 WL 128089 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 1993) ......................................................11

Bryant v. Gallagher ,

2014 WL 1276475 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014) ...................................................10 Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc.,

176 F.R.D. 239 (E.D. Tex. 1997).......................................................................15

Camp v. Alexander ,300 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ....................................................................... 16

Castaneda v. Burger King,2009 WL 2382688 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2009)....................................................11

Chase Nat’l Bank v. City of Norwalk ,

291 U.S. 431 (1934) ............................................................................................. 9

Deutsche Int’l 1 v. E1 Trade Int’l,2006 WL 6106246 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2006)......................................................... 7

Gerlach v. Wells Fargo & Co.,2006 WL 824652 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2006).....................................................11

Gonzales v. Valenzuela,2002 WL 34700599 (C.D. Cal Oct. 7, 2002) ....................................................... 7

Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard ,452 U.S. 89 (1981) ...................................................................................2, 11, 17

Hansberry v. Lee,311 U.S. 32 (1940) ............................................................................................... 8

Hernandez v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.,2015 WL 7176352 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) ...................................................11


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Jenifer v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth.,1999 WL 117762 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 1999) ......................................................... 15

Keystone Tobacco Co., Inc. v. U.S. Tobacco Co.,238 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2002) ...................................................................15

Kleiner v. First National Bank ,751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985)....................................................................16, 17

In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Securities Litigation,126 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ............................................................... 9

Microsystems Software, Inc. v. Scandinavia Online AB,226 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2000) ..................................................................................9

New York v. Operation Rescue Nat’l,80 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1996) ..................................................................................... 7

Parks v. Eastwood Ins. Servs., Inc.,235 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2002)....................................................2, 11, 13

Quezada v. Schneider Logistics Transloading & Distribution,2013 WL 1296761 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2013) ................................................... 16

Singer v. Live Nation Worldwide,2012 WL 123146 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012).........................................................7

Talamantes v. PPG Indus., Inc.,2014 WL 4145405 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014)...................................................11

Talavera v. Leprino Foods Co.,2016 WL 880550 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016) .......................................................16

Valdovinos v. County of Los Angeles,2008 WL 2872648 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 23, 2008) ....................................................... 7

Weight Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc.,455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972) ...............................................................................12

Wright v. Adventures Rolling Cross Country, Inc.,

2012 WL 2239797 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2012) ...................................................16

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,395 U.S. 100 (1969) ............................................................................................. 8

Zepeda v. I.N.S.,753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1983) ................................................................................7


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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs’ motion is long on speculation but falls short on the merits. As an

initial matter, Plaintiffs fail to mention that Spotify has agreed to disclose to them

both the agreement it has reached with the National Music Publishers’ Association

(“NMPA”) as well as communications with NMPA members1

regarding the

NMPA Agreement that are in Spotify’s possession—subject only to the basic

protections and processes of a protective order. But rather than see that common-

sense proposal through, Plaintiffs rushed to filed this motion.

Although it is hard to understand why Plaintiffs chose to circumvent a

meaningful negotiation process, their motion for appointment as lead counsel—

filed just hours after this motion—offers some clues. The lead counsel motion

describes this motion at length, specifically asserting that it bolsters their claim to

lead counsel status. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 47, at 11-13.

Any such motivation would be unfortunate, especially given that Spotify had

already agreed to provide much of the information Plaintiffs sought, rendering the

motion unnecessary. Perhaps recognizing this fact, Plaintiffs’ motion sweeps

beyond Spotify to target the NMPA. Indeed, Plaintiffs focus largely on alleged

communications made by the NMPA, not Spotify. E.g., Mot. 7-12. But their

attempt to obtain discovery from and injunctive relief against the NMPA via this

motion is improper for the simple reason that the NMPA is not a party to this

lawsuit. Plaintiffs attempt to bridge that gap by treating Spotify and the NMPA

interchangeably, but these assertions are contrary to common sense as well as the

facts. Spotify and the NMPA are independent and separately-represented entities

who are, after all, counterparties to the NMPA Agreement. What is more, the

adversarial negotiations culminating in the NMPA Agreement began in June 2015

months before this lawsuit was filed. See Decl. of Natalie Margulies ¶¶ 4-6. The

1It is undisputed that only the NMPA’s publisher members are eligible to

participate in the NMPA Agreement. See Mot. 8.



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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure foreclose Plaintiffs’ bait and switch: Rule 65

does not authorize the Court to enjoin communications by nonparty NMPA, and if

Plaintiffs wish to acquire any documents that are in NMPA’s possession, their

proper course is to obtain a subpoena under Rule 45.

Finally, although Plaintiffs do not point to a single allegedly improper

communication by Spotify—and Spotify’s communications with the NMPA’s

members about the NMPA Agreement have been exceedingly limited—they urge

the Court to impose a broad prior restraint on any future speech by Spotify

concerning the NMPA Agreement or any settlement. The Court should reject that

request. It is well settled that a defendant’s communications with putative class

members prior to class certification—including communications about potentia

settlements—are not only permitted, but protected by the First Amendment. See

Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard , 452 U.S. 89 (1981). As the Supreme Court made clear in

Gulf Oil, to withstand First Amendment scrutiny “an order limiting

communications between parties and potential class members” must be “based on a

clear record and specific findings” reflecting “a likelihood of serious abuses”—and

any such order must be narrowly drawn to “limit[] speech as little as possible.” Id

at 101-02, 104. Thus, as Judge Taylor put it in denying an application by plaintiffs

to prevent communications by a defendant, “the Supreme Court has held parties or

their counsel should not be required to obtain prior judicial approval before

communicating in a pre-certification class action, except as needed to prevent

serious misconduct.” Parks v. Eastwood Ins. Servs., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1082

1084 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (emphasis added) (citing Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 94-95, 101-

02). There has been no misconduct at all by Spotify here—much less “serious

misconduct”—and Plaintiffs’ mere speculation and erroneous accusations are no

substitute for the “clear record and specific findings” required for judicia

intervention.


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BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ description of the events leading up to this motion (see Mot. 4-6)

is misleading and incomplete. According to them, this motion is necessary

because Spotify has not “agreed to provide a copy of the agreement [with the

NMPA] or to disclose the terms or representations being made by” Spotify

regarding the NMPA Agreement. Mot. 1. That is false: As Plaintiffs’ own

submissions show, Spotify has agreed to disclose these documents to Plaintiffs on

the unremarkable condition that the parties first enter into a protective order to

provide basic processes and protections for the disclosure of confidentia

information. Rather than take Spotify up on that offer, Plaintiffs moved the goal-

posts, demanding for the first time shortly before the filing of this motion that

Spotify produce documents in the NMPA’s possession rather than just those in

Spotify’s possession. When Spotify pointed out that it could not produce

documents in a third-party’s possession or control, Plaintiffs then rushed to file,

now claiming that “Spotify . . . refused to cooperate with Plaintiffs in resolving this

issue.” Mot. 3.

The actual timeline of events surrounding the NMPA Agreement and the

parties’ correspondence thus tells a far different story than the one Plaintiffs tell in

their motion. Those events begin well before this lawsuit or the related Ferrick

action were filed: Spotify and the NMPA began arms-length negotiations and

conversations over an agreement regarding potential royalty payments for

unmatched works in June 2015; the parties exchanged proposed terms for an

agreement in November 2015—before Lowery indicated that he was considering

filing a lawsuit. Margulies Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. After several months of negotiation

Spotify and the NMPA reached a final, bilateral agreement in March 2016. Id. ¶ 4

Although the specific terms of the NMPA Agreement are confidential, an overview

of the Agreement was announced to the public in a press release on March 17

2016, jointly issued by the NMPA and Spotify. Id. ¶ 4 & Ex. 1.



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On Thursday, March 24, 2016, a week after that press release, Plaintiffs’

counsel sent Spotify (through its counsel) a letter seeking “a copy of the settlement

agreement between NMPA and Spotify, as well as any notifications that have been

sent to NMPA members (to the extent Spotify possesses them) regarding their

ability to ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ of the settlement.” Hanna Decl. Ex. F. The letter

(inaccurately) described the NMPA settlement as an “admission of Spotify’s

liability for its infringement of numerous works.” Id. On the same day

presumably recognizing that the NMPA is a separately represented and

independent entity, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent the NMPA a similar letter requesting

the NMPA Agreement and any notifications that have been sent to NMPA

members. Hanna Decl. Ex. G.

The NMPA, through separate outside counsel, sent Plaintiffs a letter the next

day denying their request for documents, pointing out the indisputable facts that

the NMPA is not a party to this case and that Plaintiffs’ counsel does not currently

represent any publishers or songwriters besides the named Plaintiffs. Hanna Decl

Ex. H.

Spotify’s counsel responded to Plaintiffs’ letter on Monday, March 28, 2016

correcting Plaintiffs’ mischaracterization of the NMPA Agreement as an admission

of liability and seeking more information about Plaintiffs’ request. Hanna Decl

Ex. I. Spotify’s counsel offered to “make ourselves available for a meet and

confer” and to “follow up” regarding the “confidentiality obligations to third

parties implicated by your request.” Id.

There was no response on this issue for eleven days. Then, on April 8, 2016

Plaintiffs’ counsel sent an email expressing the “inten[t] to bring the issue to the

Court’s attention via a motion,” on the apparent belief that Spotify had “declined

[their] request to review” the NMPA Agreement and communications referenced

in their March 24 letter. Hanna Decl. Ex. J, at 128. Spotify’s counsel responded to

that email on the same day, pointing out that Spotify had not declined the request



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but rather wanted more information from Plaintiffs. Id. at 127-28.

After further email exchanges, the parties agreed to a telephonic meet and

confer on April 14 and that the meet and confer would be considered timely for

purposes of filing a motion based on Plaintiffs’ March 24 request for documents

See id. at 122-25. During that meet and confer, as memorialized by an email from

Plaintiffs’ counsel, Plaintiffs’ counsel changed its request from seeking

notifications to NMPA members “to the extent Spotify possesses them” to seeking

“all documents made by either Spotify and/or NMPA to the NMPA members

regarding the agreement reached.” Id. (emphasis added).

Spotify sent back a detailed response the next day (Friday, April 15, 2016)

pointing out that Spotify “has agreed to produce the[] documents” initially

requested by Plaintiffs in their March 24 letter—namely, “the NMPA Agreement

and any notifications that have been sent to NMPA members regarding their ability

to ‘opt in’ or ‘opt out’ of the Agreement ‘to the extent Spotify possesses them’”—

“provided that they are governed by an operative protective order that contains the

protections required under the Agreement.” Id. at 121. As for Plaintiffs’ new

request that Spotify produce documents in NMPA’s possession, Spotify responded

that “it is not appropriate or even practicable for Spotify to agree to produce a third

party’s documents that are not in its own possession, custody or control,” and that

Plaintiffs were free to “seek any documents from the NMPA through the subpoena

procedure.” Id. Spotify agreed “not to object to such a subpoena based on Rule

26(f) requirements,” noting that “that is the most Spotify can commit to do vis-a-

vis third party documents that Spotify does not control.” Id. Spotify made clear

however, that it had not “waived any meet and confer requirements under the local

rules” with respect to Plaintiffs’ new request for third-party documents. Id.

Plaintiffs spurned Spotify’s offer to provide them with the documents that

they had originally requested. It appears that their counsel was determined to get

something on file in this Court in order to buttress their motion for appointment of



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lead interim class counsel, which was filed later the same day. See Dkt. No. 47

Indeed, their motion for appointment of interim class counsel touted the instant

motion as evidence of counsel’s supposed “commitment to protect the putative

class.” Id. at 11-13; see also Hanna Decl., Dkt. No. 47-1, ¶¶ 3-7 & Exs. A-D.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs Filed This Motion Despite Spotify’s Willingness To ProvideThem With Most Of The Communications In Spotify’s Possession ThatThey Have Requested.

This motion is the result of Plaintiffs’ rush to file in a transparent attempt to

further their bid for lead interim counsel status. As detailed above, Spotify has in

fact agreed to produce to Plaintiffs everything that they were asking for (subject to

a commonplace protective order), with the exception of their new request for

documents in the possession of third-party NMPA. And that new request is legally

improper. See pp. 7-10, infra. Thus, the present motion boils down to a pointless

waste of the Court’s time on an issue that Spotify was prepared to agree upon

Indeed, Spotify is filing the NMPA Agreement under seal along with this

opposition (Decl. of A John P. Mancini Ex. 1), providing the same access to the

Agreement, subject to the protections of confidentiality (if the Court agrees), that

Spotify was willing to provide without any motion practice.

Avoiding burdening the Court and the parties with this kind of unnecessary

motion practice is precisely what this district’s Local Rules are designed to

prevent. As Judge Gutierrez has put it, “[t]he meet and confer requirements of

Local Rule 7-3 are in place for a reason”; if the parties had meaningfully met and

conferred, then a “motion could have been avoided” and “the Court’s valuable time

could have been spared.” Alcatel-Lucent USA v. Dugdale Commc’ns, 2009 WL

3346784, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2009).

Indeed, Plaintiffs have failed to comply not only with the spirit of Local

Rule 7-3’s meet and confer requirement, but also its letter. In particular, Plaintiffs

made their request that Spotify produce documents in NMPA’s possession for the


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first time on April 14, 2016—four days before this motion was filed. As to that

new request—never before made—Spotify’s counsel had not waived Local Rule 7-

3’s mandate that the parties’ conference “shall take place at least ten (10) days

prior to the filing of the motion.” And courts in this district routinely deny motions

when the filing party has not properly met and conferred under Local Rule 7-3.2

This motion should be no exception.

II. Plaintiffs Improperly Seek Relief Directed At, And Based On TheAlleged Conduct Of, The NMPA, Which Is Not A Party To ThisLitigation.

Having no genuine basis for a motion against Spotify, Plaintiffs’ strategy

instead is to treat Spotify and the NMPA interchangeably, and to seek an order

nominally directed at Spotify for injunctive relief and discovery that they could not

obtain with respect to the NMPA.

Plaintiffs’ gambit is contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

common sense. The NMPA, as a nonparty to this litigation, is not subject to any

injunction issued by this Court. Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

codifies the “well-established principle that, in exercising its equitable powers, a

court ‘cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large.’” New York v. Operation Rescue

Nat’l, 80 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff , 42 F.2d

832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.)). It is well established that “[a] federal court

may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject

matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of

persons not before the court.” Zepeda v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983)

(emphasis added); see also, e.g., Applegate v. Kokor , 2015 WL 7007997, at *2

2See, e.g., Singer v. Live Nation Worldwide, 2012 WL 123146, at *2 (C.D

Cal. Jan. 13, 2012); Alcatel-Lucent , 2009 WL 3346784, at *3-4; Valdovinos vCounty of Los Angeles, 2008 WL 2872648, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 23, 2008)Gonzales v. Valenzuela, 2002 WL 34700599, at *1 (C.D. Cal Oct. 7, 2002)

Deutsche Int’l 1 v. E1 Trade Int’l, 2006 WL 6106246, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 42006).


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(E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2015) (“[A]bsent a substantial relationship, not present here, a

court may not enter an injunction against persons who are not parties to the case

before it.”). That limit makes sense; it is a basic rule of due process that “one is

not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated

as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). Accordingly, Rule 65 mandates that an

injunction can bind only a limited universe of entities: (1) the parties; (2) their

“officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys”; or (3) those in “active

concert or participation” with them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2); see also Zenith

Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 112 (1969) (“[A] nonparty

with notice cannot be held in contempt until shown to be in concert or

participation.”).

Plaintiffs presumably recognize these principles, because their Proposed

Order parrots the “in concert” language of Rule 65(d)(2). See Dkt. No. 46-2, ¶¶ 1

3. But they have no basis for their repeated assertions that the NMPA “is acting in

concert with Spotify.” Mot. 1, 3, 7; see also, e.g., id. at 2 (asserting that the

NMPA is Spotify’s “partner”); id. at 15 (asserting that the NMPA has made

communications “on behalf of Spotify”). Rather, they simply speculate in a

footnote, without further explanation, that because the NMPA used to own the

Harry Fox Agency, and because the Harry Fox Agency is currently Spotify’s music

licensing agent, the NMPA agreement “could not be the result of a truly

independent, arm’s-length negotiation.” Id. at 2 n.1. They in fact do not even

make that flimsy assertion themselves, but rather attribute it to unspecified and

unsubstantiated “vocal public criticism” about the NMPA Agreement. Id. And

they further suggest that the NMPA Agreement could not be the result of an arms’-

length transaction because it was finalized after this lawsuit was filed. Id. at 1.

Plaintiffs are wrong on all counts. As explained above, the NMPA

Agreement was not a response to this litigation, but rather the product of months of


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conversations and negotiations which had begun by June 2015, several months

before this lawsuit was filed. Margulies Decl. ¶ 5. Indeed, the negotiations were

substantially underway well before December 10, 2015, which was the date on

which Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to Spotify regarding the potential filing of

this suit. Id. For example, Spotify’s records show that by November 2015, Spotify

and the NMPA had exchanged detailed sets of proposed terms for the Agreement

Id. Moreover, these negotiations were conducted at arms’ length. Id. ¶ 6. Each

party was represented separately by counsel throughout the negotiations, during

which many issues were contested, and a number of aspects of the negotiation

were hard-fought and at times contentious. Id.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ showing falls far short of the narrow “active concert

or participation” standard codified by Rule 65(d). As the Supreme Court has long

held, the relationship between the party and the nonparty must be “that of associate

or confederate.” Chase Nat’l Bank v. City of Norwalk , 291 U.S. 431, 436-37

(1934); see also Microsystems Software, Inc. v. Scandinavia Online AB, 226 F.3d

35, 43 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[A]ctive concert” requires a “close alliance with the

enjoined defendant”).3 Spotify and the NMPA are counterparties to the NMPA

Agreement, not confederates.

3Plaintiffs cite only In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Securities Litigation, 126 F

Supp. 2d 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2000) for the proposition that the Court can issue anorder directed at a nonparty like NMPA limiting its communications. Mot. 12-13But in McKesson, a massive consolidated securities class action, the law firms thatthe court enjoined from soliciting putative class members were “firms whose leadcounsel bids had been rejected by the court.” 126 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. In responseto that rejection, the firms then “initiated a solicitation campaign to recruitindividual McKesson shareholders to assert non-class claims,” attempting to poach

plaintiffs from the putative class that they had just lost their bid to represent. IdThus, the law firms already were substantially involved with the litigation, unlikenonparty NMPA here. Moreover, the court in McKesson pointed to specialconcerns under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, such as itsaim of “discourag[ing] attorney-driven litigation.” Id. at 1243. Finally, the courtindicated that it was “particularly disturb[ed]” by “alleged deceptions” made bylawyers, including that “[a]ttorneys have a special obligation not to disguise theiradvertisements as official-sounding notices” (id. at 1244-45 (citing CaliforniaRules of Professional Conduct and related standards)). None of these concernsrelating to lawyers are present here.


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Finally, because the NMPA is an independent third party, Plaintiffs’ novel

and impractical demand that Spotify produce documents in NMPA’s possession

(see p. 5, supra) necessarily fails as well. The way to obtain discovery from a third

party is through a subpoena under Rule 45. Indeed, courts have made clear that

“[a] Rule 45 subpoena is the only discovery method by which information may be

obtained from a third party.” Bryant v. Gallagher , 2014 WL 1276475, at *2 (E.D

Cal. Mar. 27, 2014) (emphasis added) (collecting cases); see also Fed. R. Civ. P

34(c) (“ As provided in Rule 45, a nonparty may be compelled to produce

documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection.”) (emphasis added)

Plaintiffs have not even attempted to serve and enforce a subpoena here, instead

choosing to make an impossible demand of Spotify and then using Spotify’s

(understandable) inability to agree to that demand as a basis for filing this motion.4

III. Plaintiffs’ Demand To Review And Approve Future CommunicationsBy Spotify Violates The First Amendment.

The final relief that Plaintiffs request in their motion is an order limiting any

future communications by Spotify with putative class members concerning any

alleged settlement with Spotify. Specifically, they demand that “all written

communications concerning a settlement with Spotify must inform putative class

members of: (1) the pendency of this litigation; (2) the nature of the litigation and

the claims; and (3) their right to contact class counsel or any attorney of their

choosing before making a decision as to whether to opt in to any settlement with

Spotify.” Proposed Order ¶ 3. In addition, they demand that any such

communication “be submitted to Plaintiffs’ counsel for their review and approvalat least fourteen (14) days” in advance. Id.4

Plaintiffs complained that they could not serve a subpoena because there hasnot yet been a Rule 26(f) conference. But Spotify agreed to waive any objectionsto a subpoena on that basis. See p. 5, supra; Hanna Decl. Ex. J, at 121Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ excuse is baseless: Rule 26 provides that “[a] party maynot seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required

by Rule 26(f), except . . . when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or bycourt order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) (emphases added).


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Plaintiffs’ request violates Spotify’s First Amendment free-speech rights to

engage in pre-certification communications with putative class members, which

include the right to discuss the possibility of settlement. While Rule 23(d)

authorizes district courts to “enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of

counsel any parties,” the Supreme Court has mandated that any restrictions

imposed on communications with unnamed class members must avoid undue

infringement of the parties’ right to free speech. Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 100

Specifically, to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, an order limiting parties

communications with putative class members must “be based on a clear record and

specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the

potential interference with the rights of the parties.” Id. at 101; see also id. at 104

(recognizing that “the mere possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption

of a communication ban”). Put another way, “[t]o the extent that the district court

is empowered . . . to restrict certain communications in order to prevent frustration

of the policies of Rule 23, it may not exercise the power without a specific record

showing by the moving party of the particular abuses by which it is threatened .”

Id. at 102 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, federal courts in California have repeatedly held that parties

may communicate with putative class members pre-certification in the absence of a

specific showing of actual or threatened serious abuses, such as deceptive conduct

or coercion. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2015 WL 7176352, at

*15 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015); Talamantes v. PPG Indus., Inc., 2014 WL

4145405, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014); Castaneda v. Burger King, 2009 WL

2382688, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2009); Gerlach v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2006

WL 824652, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2006); Parks, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1085

Babbitt v. Albertson’s Inc., 1993 WL 128089, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 1993). As

Judge Friendly put it over four decades ago, “we are unable to perceive any legal

theory that would endow a plaintiff who has brought what would have been a


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spotify vs lowery

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