spoiling for a (real) fight
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Fortnight Publications Ltd.
Spoiling for a (Real) FightAuthor(s): Martin CrawfordSource: Fortnight, No. 306 (May, 1992), p. 16Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25553425 .
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rights. Yet, apart from greater autonomy for
Scotland, these were the two that mattered.
Labour's reforms became an issue in the
last week of the campaign. They were radical
enough to be frightening to institutional con
servatives, yet not radical enough to inspire
people to vote Labour or change people' s minds
about the party. Labour's fearful conservatism
left it prepared to interfere with the British constitution but not to rewrite it. It paid the
price for its timorous attempt to appease its
own anti-PR lobby, led by the former deputy leader, Roy Hattersley.
Mr Hattersley has now resigned?along with Neil Kinnock. One can only hope that
Labour will now embrace PR and accept the
need for a strategy of co-operation with the
Liberal Democrats in bringing it about. If La
bour still fails to do this, then it is finished as a
radical and reforming party. Pro-Labour intellectuals are still numb with
shock, wringing their hands about an historic
defeat and the end of socialism as we know it.
They did this in 1987 too?some even con
vinced themselves that Margaret Thatcher had
staged an economic miracle. It is curious that a
government that has plunged into two major recessions in a decade, with a record of inepti tude in economic management unique in the
advanced industrial world, should be returned
to office. What does this say about Labour?
The truth is that Labour's economic strat
egy was- completely wrong?despite John
Smith, the shadow chancellor and likely next
party leader, being very popular with the vot
ers. Firstly, its monetary policy was slavishly conservative. Mr Smith was committed to main
taining the European exchange rate mecha
nism parity of 2.95DM to the pound, although this rate is crippling for British industry, con
demns the economy to permanent recession
and is unsustainable. Secondly, Labour pro
posed substantial tax increases for middle
income earners (over ?21,000), and the Tories
concentrated on this throughout the campaign.
Key groups would have faced high tax
increases in the middle of a recession, to fi
nance limited and ineffectual changes in social
spending and a small increase in child benefit, a modest rise in pensions, small extra amounts
for the National Health Service and education.
As the Tories pointed out, with a chutzpah
unique to the pin-striped breed, the middle
classes were being asked to make sacrifices for
small changes in spending that couldn't possi
bly sort out the underfunding of the public sector that they had created in the last 13 years!
Yet the claim is quite true: Labour did not offer
Anything else is just designer agonising by people
who are upset not to be on the
winning side
a real alternative in economic and social policy. So key sections ofthe electorate looked at their
wallets and decided to keep the change. Labour's mistake was not the proposal to
raise taxes, but what it proposed to spend the
revenue on. Had it concentrated on manufac
turing investment, industrial training and trans
port infrastructure?explaining the extent of
the Tories' neglect of manufacturing and the
need to reverse industrial decline?it might have had some hope. Factories before pen
sions, trained workers before the NHS, roads
before child benefit is a hard set of priorities for a traditionally welfare-state party to offer. But
Labour tried to have it all, whilst being fiscally
'responsible' and practising 'sound money'. It was at once too conservative and too
committed to a diverse range of underfunded
spending initiatives. If it had put industrial
renewal first, and concentrated all its efforts on
the Tories' economic failures, it might have
had some chance of denting traditional opin ion. As it was, it appeared to be a high-tax, soft
on-spending party that wasn't going to do any
thing dramatic?better the devil you know.
Labour will have to decide what kind of
party it wants to be. It will have to face the fact
that Britain cannot afford a major increase in
social spending, given middle-income earners'
attitudes, unless it is able to achieve a much
better rate of sustainable economic growth. It
will have to work out how to achieve such
growth, and move away from the current mix
ture of macro-economic caution and half
hearted advocacy of an industrial policy. It will
have to decide that a key component of eco
nomic modernisation is constitutional reform, to create a more equitable balance between the
parties and a more collaborative political cul
ture?one that allows long-run co-operation to
manage the economy. If it does these two
things it may have a future as a party of govern ment. If it does not, it can remain a party of the
poor, of the public sector and of opposition. Intellectuals' angst about the future is easy
to understand. The Conservatives don't like
them. Britain is economically and culturally
stagnant, and will remain so while mainstream
Toryism rules. But ignore the idle chatter of the
'death of socialism'. Labour on 35 per cent of
the vote is one of the few remaining strong
parties ofthe left in Europe. The reason Labour
is out of government is that it has been too
stupid to see the need to change the electoral
system while in government (in 1974-79) and
too conservative to make this a major plank of
its policy platform while in opposition. John Major's victory is far from good news,
but it means that the opposition in Britain has to
get up, dust itself off and get back to fighting the Tories. Anything else is just designer ago
nising by people who are upset not to be on the
winning side and who, because the Tories were
forced to fight in a recession, thought things were going to be easy this time around.
i SPOILING FOR A
(REAL) FIGHT
o_
A TOTAL of 4.738 people (0.6 per cent) spoilt their votes in Northern Ireland constituencies. Fermanagh/
South Tyrone had the highest rate. East Belfast the lowest Many more, of course, did not vote?325,233, or
28 per cent of the electorate. An
unknown number didn't bother to
register, Martin Crawford writes.
One of these was Kevin, whose
family have strong unionist roots?
his aunt has a statue of a 'B' Special
holding South African ami British Union flags adorning her TV set He couldn't see the point
"As far as I can see all politi cians here don't really care about
any kind of political progress. To he completely cynical about it they seem more interested in preserving
thelrposhlons in this place at the expense of doing any good tor the paople who voted for them That's
why I did not vote or even bother to register?^iere seems to be no
point" he said.
Liam, a pdrtical analyst had
registered feeling it important that at least Ms vote was claimed hut in the end he didn't use it
Belfast Nit none of the candidates were up to scratch. The area has a
history of Unionist domination, it is a
geographic thing and reflects back to the old gerrymandering. To my
mind many of the parties were totally
exploitative of the Ormeau Road
massacre, which was really
deplorable. The sitting MP, [Rev Martin] Smyth, i can't even
remember him saying anything about
it They are all the same in the end.".
Various voting people, all
describing themselves as anarchists, echoed this disenchantment
"Whoever you vote for, government wins" was the most popular reply.
Many had not registered because of having so fixed address, though smm also confessed to ^athy. A
few said there was no party to which they would feel comfortable giving their vote?none being sufficiently
prepared to embrace green or
radical issues.
Alasdak Roddick, of Belfast Youth and Community 6ro__p, had _______________ n_-# ____ ___iWt _u_tm -iii fepsiafeo, wr no otm i vote eraer
-Po?fticiaftsbereexistinavw?M, in a totally narrow tufa of thought. I SImWW ? # WfwWWp w^^w 9' ?v^b> IPS
difference if we hed a greater
degree of serf-government on e local
level, but I see the problems that
would be associated with that here." Michael McWilliams' whole
family didn't vote?even though,
again, they were registered: "We all
thought that there was no point as
no matter who you vote for here it
will make little difference to the way we are governed, in Northern Ireland we are basically ruled by the Tories from Westminster, so a vote for any candidate here is not going to make
any difference. I would have spoilt my vote hut I couldn't afford the bus fare to the constituency where I was
registered." Disenchairunent levels may not
be so high as te cause the govern meat am/ great concern?it hardly seems likely that there will ever he an erection where no one will vote.
Nevermeless, many people teel that the electoral system, or indeed the eanoldates, have Irtttete offer them. R nHMMRI Up HNP WWW WrtMHf if
anything, the diioiit hauled and, for whatever reason itiianfranrhiierirtn ww^umfawpw^en emvaMempue>e aawne^peayif veenaprsve^paFVP w
te resVeee the balance Is their
16 MAY FORTNIGHT
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