Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother.Held:  No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

Oropesa vs. Oropesa (G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012)Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, JPetitioner: Nilo OropesaRespondent: Cirilo OropesaFacts:Petitioner claimed that the respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over 10 years and was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment. Due to respondent’scondition, he cannot manage his property wisely without the help of others and has become an easyprey for deceit from his girlfriend, Luisa Agamata.On January 23, 2004, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for him and hiscompanion to be appointed as guardians over the respondent’s property. RTC dismissed the petitiondue to lack of evidence, and later on the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue:WON respondent is considered an incompetent person and should be placed under guardianship

Held:NO. respondent is not incompetent and should not be placed under guardianship and therefore the petition was denied.

Ratio :According to the respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence. The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs.On the contrary, Respondent pointed out in the petitioner’s evidence which includes aNeuropsychological Screening Report stating that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able .It is also long settled that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record." We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.

CASE TITLE :G.R. No. 169482             January 29, 2008IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner, 

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vs.LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.FACTS: This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the C.A.where the petition for habeas corpus was denied.The nephew of Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities filed for habeas corpus after demanding the return of Eufemia from her adopted daughters. The C.A. ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated February 2, 2005, the C.A. denied his petition.Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.7 Hence, this petition.Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty and that there is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs.Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner EDGARDO E. VELUZ was appointed as administrator of the properties of Eufemia and her deceased spouse. By this appointment, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. His failure to heed gave rise to a complaint of estafa. Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005. She willingly went with them. Petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents’ action.ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted.RULING: Petition Denied. – ApplicationL: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissedIn this case, the C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not.Petition was DENIED.

RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Development Corp. and Luz R. Bakunawa, G.R. No. 192413, June 13, 2012

Facts: Millan paid the spouses Bakunawa P1,019,514.29 as down payment for the purchase of six (6) lots with the Spouses Bakunawa giving Millan the Owner’s Copies of TCTs of said lots. Due to some obstacles, the sale did not push through; so Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and offered to return to Millan her down. However, Millan refused to accept back the down payment. Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, Hi-Tri took out on October 28, 1991, a Manager’s Check from RCBC-Ermita in the amount of P 1,019,514.29, payable to Millan’s company Rosmil and used this as one of their basis for a complaint against Millan. The Spouses Bakunawa retained custody of RCBC Manager’s Check and refrained from cancelling or negotiating it. Millan was also informed that the Manager’s Check was available for her withdrawal, she being the payee. On January 31, 2003, without the knowledge of Spouses Bakunawa, RCBC reported the "P 1,019,514.29-credit existing in favor of Rosmil to the Bureau of Treasury as among its "unclaimed balances" as of January 31, 2003. On December 14, 2006, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the RTC the action for Escheat. On April 30, 2008, Spouses Bakunawa settled amicably their dispute with Millan. Spouses Bakunawa tried to recover the P1,019,514.29 under Manager’s Check but they were informed that the amount was already subject of the escheat proceedings before the RTC. The trial court ordered the deposit of the escheated balances with the Treasurer and credited in favor of the Republic. Respondents claim that they were not able to participate in the trial, as they were not informed of the ongoing escheat proceedings. Later motion for reconsideration was denied. CA reversed the RTC ruling. CA pronounced that RTC Clerk of Court failed to issue individual notices directed to all persons claiming interest in the unclaimed balances. CA held that the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for want of jurisdiction.

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Issue: Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic

Held: There are sufficient grounds to affirm the CA on the exclusion of the funds allocated for the payment of the Manager’s Check in the escheat proceedings. An ordinary check refers to a bill of exchange drawn by a depositor (drawer) on a bank (drawee), requesting the latter to pay a person named therein (payee) or to the order of the payee or to the bearer, a named sum of money. The issuance of the check does not of itself operate as an assignment of any part of the funds in the bank to the credit of the drawer. Here, the bank becomes liable only after it accepts or certifies the check. After the check is accepted for payment, the bank would then debit the amount to be paid to the holder of the check from the account of the depositor-drawer. There are checks of a special type called manager’s or cashier’s checks. These are bills of exchange drawn by the bank’s manager or cashier, in the name of the bank, against the bank itself. Typically, a manager’s or a cashier’s check is procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of funds to be debited from the depositor’s account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank the value of the check to be drawn. Since the bank issues the check in its name, with itself as the drawee, the check is deemed accepted in advance. Ordinarily, the check becomes the primary obligation of the issuing bank and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand. Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a manager’s check does not ipso facto work as an automatic transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case the procurer of the manager’s or cashier’s check retains custody of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make an effective delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Law applicable: Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. – Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved. Petitioner acknowledges that the Manager’s Check was procured by respondents, and that the amount to be paid for the check would be sourced from the deposit account of Hi-Tri. When Rosmil did not accept the Manager’s Check offered by respondents, the latter retained custody of the instrument instead of cancelling it. As the Manager’s Check neither went to the hands of Rosmil nor was it further negotiated to other persons, the instrument remained undelivered. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that respondents retained custody of the instrument. Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur. An order to debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the Manager’s Check was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that the allocated fund is still held by the bank. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured the Manager’s Check. The doctrine that the deposit represented by a manager’s check automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because the instrument – although accepted in advance – remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit had been left inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.

SOLEDAD CAÑEZO vs. CONCEPCION ROJASG.R. No. 148788, November 23, 2007 NACHURA, J. FACTS: The subject property is an unregistered land with an area of 4,169 square meters situated at Naval, Biliran. In a complaint on 1997, petitioner Soledad Cañezo alleged that she bought such parcel of land in 1939 from Crisogono Limpiado, although the sale was not reduced into wri t ing. Thereafter , she immediately took possession of the property. In 1948, she and her  husband left for Mindanao and entrusted the said land to her father, Crispulo Rojas, who took   p o s s e s s i o n   o f ,   a n d   c u l t i v a t e d   t h e   p r o p e r t y .   I n   1 9 8 0 ,   s h e   f o u n d   o u t   t h a t   t h e  r e s p o n d e n t , Concepcion Rojas, her stepmother, was in possession of the property and was cultivating thesame. She also discovered that the tax declaration over the property was already in the name of  his father. Respondent asserted that it was her husband who bought the property from Limpiado, which accounts for the tax declaration being in Crispulo’s name. After the hearing, MTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, making her the real and lawful owner of the land. Respondent appealed to the RTC of Naval, Biliran, which reversedt h e   M T C   d e c i s i o n   o n   t h e   g r o u n d   t h a t   t h e   a c t i o n   h a d   a l r e a d y   p r e s c r i b e d   a n d  a c q u i s i t i v e  prescription had set in. However, acting on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC amended its original decision and held that the action had not yet prescribed considering that the petitioner merely entrusted the property to her father.  The ten-year prescriptive period for the recovery of a property held in trust would commence to run only from the t ime the trustee repudiates the trust. The RTC found no evidence on record showing that Crispulo Rojas ever  ousted the petitioner from the property. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA, which reversed the amended decision of the RTC. The CA held that, assuming that there was a trust between the petitioner and her  f a t h e r o v e r t h e p r o p e r t y , h e r r i g h t o f a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r t h e s a m e w o u l d s t i l l b e b a r r e d b y  prescription since 49 years had already lapsed since Crispulo adversely possessed the contested property in 1948.Hence, this petition for review.ISSUE:Whether or not there is an existence of t rust over the property – express or implied –    between the petitioner and her father

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 HELD:  N O N E .   A   t r u s t   i s   t h e   l e g a l   r e l a t i o n s h i p   b e t w e e n   o n e   p e r s o n   h a v i n g   a n  e q u i t a b l e ownership of property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of  certain powers by the latter. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or bywords evincing an  intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently, of the particular intention of the parties, as being superinduced on the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity.

AGUSTIN v CAFACTS:Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin‘s alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999The baby‘s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arne l shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe‘s repeated requests for Martin‘s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the childArnel is actually married and has a family of his own at the time he impregnated Fe Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martin‘s birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of CourtISSUE:WON DNA testing is self-incriminatory and violates privacy of personHELD:NO Being the first case where DNA testing was the focal issue the court examines the history of DNA testing The court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victim‘s DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that―the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed)between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected(were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. No evidence to show this If criminal can be subject to it at expense of death, what more in a civil case for paternity?

VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA,Petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, Respondent.[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]Facts:Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John NaborArriola (respondent) ,his son with his first wife , and Vilma G.Arriola, his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola(petitioners).On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering thepartition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191)left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs JohnNabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola inequal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to therights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the abovementioned property and so the respondent proposed to sell itthough public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refusedto include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed anUrgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, therespondent elevated the case to the CA with a petition forcertiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with theauction of the subject land including the house built on it. The CAgranted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of thesubject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed amotion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion.Hence this petition for review on Certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgement of partition

Ruling: The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered bythe judgment of partition but in view of the suspendedproscription imposed under Article 159 of the family code, thesubject house immediately partitioned to the heirs.Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husbandand the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwellinghouse where they and their family reside, and the land on which itis situated.Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on ahouse and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence

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. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family homecontinues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale orattachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as thespecific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemedconstituted as a family home by the deceased and petitionerVilma from the moment they began occupying the same as afamily residence 20 years back.Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minorbeneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unlessthe court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.(Emphasis supplied.)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG)

G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011

FACTS: Born   in  Makat i  on  September  9 ,  1972,   Ju l ian  Edward  Emerson CosetengMagpayo ( respondent ) i s the son o f Fu lv io M. Magpayo J r . and Anna Domin ique M a r q u e z -L i m   C o s e t e n g   w h o ,   a s   r e s p o n d e n t ’ s   c e r t i f i c a t e   o f   l i v e   b i r t h  s h o w s , contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was ent i t led " IN RE PET IT ION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF   JUL IAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO  JUL IAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."

In  suppor t  o f  h is  pet i t ion ,   respondent  submit ted  a  cer t i f i cat ion   f rom the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in   i t s  Nat iona l   Ind ices  o f  Marr iage .”  Respondent  a lso  submit ted  h is  academic r e c o r d s   f r o m   e l e m e n t a r y   u p   t o   c o l l e g e   s h o w i n g   t h a t   h e   c a r r i e d   t h e  s u r n a m e "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname.

In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG." On order o f Branch 77 o f the Quezon C i ty RTC, respondent amended h is petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. T h e   n o t i c e   s e t t i n g   t h e   p e t i t i o n   f o r   h e a r i n g   o n   N o v e m b e r   2 0 ,   2 0 0 8   w a s pub l i shed   in   the  newspaper  Broads ide   in   i t s   i ssues  o f  October  31-November  6 , 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008.

And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGEOF PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth]; 2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG"; 3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and 4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]…The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.

ISSUE: 1 . W h e t h e r o r   n o t   t h e   p e t i t i o n   f o r   c h a n g e   o f n a m e i n v o l v i n g   c h a n g e   o f c i v i l status should be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings.2 . Whether or not   the t r ia l cour t exceeded i t s   ju r i sd ic t ion when i t d i rected the deletion of the name of respondent’s father from his birth certificate.

HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. (in favor of the Republic) 1.A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) u s i n g   v a l i d   a n d   m e r i t o r i o u s   g r o u n d s   i n c l u d i n g   ( a )   w h e n   t h e   n a m e   i s

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ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c)when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of a l ien parentage; (e ) a s incere des i re to adopt a F i l ip ino name to erase s i g n s   o f   f o r m e r   a l i e n a g e ,   a l l   i n   g o o d   f a i t h   a n d   w i t h o u t   p r e j u d i c i n g anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.* * *  

In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to a f fect h is lega l s tatus in re la t ion to h is parents . I t seeks to change h is legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which m a y   a f f e c t   t h e   c i v i l   s t a t u s   f r o m   l e g i t i m a t e   t o   i l l e g i t i m a t e are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."

Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads: SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the c iv i l reg is ter , may f i le a ver i f ied pet i t ion for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.SEC.3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the c iv i l   reg is ter   i s   sought ,   the  c iv i l   reg is t rar  and  a l l  persons  who have  orclaim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.SEC. 4.Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the cour t sha l l , by an order , f ix the t ime and p lace for the hear ing o f the same, and cause reasonab le not ice thereof to be g iven to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.2 .Ru le  108 c lear ly  d i rects   that  a  pet i t ion wh ich concerns one’s  c iv i l s ta tus shou ld be f i led in the c iv i l reg is t ry in wh ich the ent ry i s sought to be c a n c e l l e d   o r   c o r r e c t e d   – t h a t   o f   M a k a t i   i n   t h e   p r e s e n t   c a s e ,   a n d   " a l l persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby "should be made parties to the proceeding. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And  as   the  above-ment ioned   t i t le  o f   the  pet i t ion   f i led  by   respondentbefore the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.

"A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby."

Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors.

That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the  subsequent  Sect ion  5 ,  a l so  above-quoted,  wh ich  prov ides   for   two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole wor ld   to   the  subsequent   judgment  on   the  pet i t ion .  The  sweep o f   the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out.

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES vs NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA,G.R. No. 186053November 15, 2010Facts: Nisaida was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino motherZenaida and Japanese father Koichi Nishina. Her father later died and so her mother marriedanother

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Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, respondent’s mother caused the l ate registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname of her mother’s second husband, “Hakamada.” Later on, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name “NisaidaSumeraNishina”. Hence, she filed  before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos,Bulacan, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 106-M-2007. After hearing the petition, RTC granted respondent’s petition and directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos “to cancel the second birth record of NisaidaSumeraHakamada issued in 1993 and to change particularly thesurname of respondent from Nishina to Watanabe.A copy of the Order was received on by theOSG which filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal. Before the Court of Appeals,respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode ofappeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue:WON filing of a record on appeal is necessary in this case.Held: No. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal. It contemplatesmultiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal  –   in addition tothe notice of appeal  –  is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should remainwith the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate anddistinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.In the present case, the filing of arecord on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and determined  by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondent’s petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.

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EN BANC, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012, EDGARDO NAVIA,[1] RUBEN DIO,[2] AND ANDREW BUISING, PETITIONERS, VS. VIRGINIA PARDICO, FOR AND IN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF BENHUR V. PARDICO RESPONDENT.

Virginia filed a petition for issuance of a writ of amparo against Edgardo, Ruben, and Andrew, security officers and security guards assigned to a subdivision, where Lolita, her son Bong, and Benhur also live. According to her, her husband and Lolong were fetched by the respondents from Lolita’s house upon complaint of a homeowner that they they stole electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Lolita accompanied them to the security department of the subdivision. Thereat, they were informed that the complainant is not interested in participating in the investigation, so the three respondents informed them that they will just release Bong (the son) and Ben. Bong signed a statement to the effect that he was released unharmed. Lolita also signed an entry where it was stated that she will never again entertain or harbour Ben in her house. Ben was left behind because Edgardo the supervisor was still talking to him. Later, Ruben and Andrew went back to the house to make Lolita sign another entry to attest that Ben was released unharmed, which she signed. Ben was not seen thereafter. Virginia, his wife then filed the petition for writ of amparo, alleging that the security personnel were responsible for the enforced disappearance of Ben. The Regional Trial Court granted the writ of amparo hence Edgardo, Ruben and Andrew filed the petition before the Supreme Court to question the propriety of the issuance of the writ of amparo.

“XXX, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9851[48] on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:

(g) “Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”

x x x

“From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:

(a)  that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b)  that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;

(c)  that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d)  that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.”

x x x

“But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.

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