special third division people of the philippines,...

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

QUEZON CITY

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386For: Violation of Section 3 (e), of

Republic Act No. 3019

EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, et al.,Accused.

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, B., J. andFERNANDEZ, S.J., J.l

For resolution are the following:

1. ((Motion for Reconsideration (of the Resolutionpromulgated on March 12, 2018)" dated April 10,2018, filed byaccusedExequielB. Javie/7

, Assoc;a'e Justice Sarah Jane T. Fernande' was a~ ~aHed ,"solu'lon. Slft;n. as a spec;a'member of the Third Division as per Administrative Order No. 262-2018 dated April 30, 2018.2 pp. 177-187, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et ai.

2. "Manifestation with Motion to Keep Confidential theAccused Minor's Identity" dated April 6, 2018, filed by accusedErika Orcasitas;3 and,

3. "Motion to Quash Information" dated April 27, 2018, filedby accused Erika Orcasitas.4

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY ACCUSED-MOVANT JAVIER

Accused-movant Javier insists that the prosecution failedto provide a sufficient explanation on the delay of six (6) yearsin the preliminary investigation of this case.5 He submits thatdue to the said delay, he was unduly prejudiced and put at adisadvantage because the passage of time has "practicallyobliterated" the documents which are necessary to prove hisand his co-accused's innocence.6

Relying on the cases of People v. Sandiganbayan7 andTatad v. Sandiganbayan,8 the accused-movant argues that itis incumbent upon the State to prove that the delay wasreasonable or that the delay was not attributable to it.9

He avers that it took Graft Investigation and ProsecutionOfficer I (GIPO-I)Ma. Sonnette S. Daquita three (3) years andfour (4) months to resolve the complaint filed against him. 10Thesame accused-movant explains that the record of this case isbereft of any showing that GIPO-I Daquita conducted anyfurther investigation after the Letter-Complaint was in hercustody.l1 Allegedly, due to the inaction of GIPO-I Daquita, the

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3 pp. 193-197, Id4 pp. 214-225, Id5 p. 178, Id6 p. 178, Id7712 SCRA412 (2013)8159 SCRA 70 (1988)9 pp. 179-180, Id10 p. 181, Id11 p. 182, Id

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et al.

preliminary investigation of the present case was delayed formore than six (6)years. 12

Accused-movant Javier also reiterates that the filing of theLetter-Complaint by Salvacion Perez, et al., on February 9,2010,was the starting point of the preliminary investigation of thiscase.13 He avers that GIPO-I Daquita should have resolved thesaid complaint within the time frame provided for under theRevised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 14

Furthermore, the same accused-movant contends that thedelay in this case may be considered vexatious and damagingbecause [1] the "unfounded" accusations against him became a"noontime favorite" of the residents of Antique during the timeGIPO-I Daquita failed to resolve the complaint in this case formore than three (3) years and, [2] the records relevant to hisdefense have become unavailable, particularly the documents ofGrand Coop which can allegedly establish that the ownership ofthe subject rice mill was never transferred to Grand Coop.IS

MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION FILED BY ACCUSED-MOVANT ORCASITAS

In her motion, accused-movant Orcasitas prays that [1] hername in the succeeding proceedings of this case be notidentified; [2] the court adopt a system of coding which includesthe use of pseudonyms insofar as she is concerned; and, [3] thefull text of the orders and resolutions issued by the court whichbears her name be withdrawn from the court's web page. 16

In support of her afore-mentioned prayers, accused-movantOrcasitas submits that she was a minor at the time of thealleged commission of the crime which classifies her as a childin conflict of the law as defined under Republic Act (R.A.)No.

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12 p. 182, Id13 p. 181, Id14 p. 181, Id15 p. 183, Id16 p. 196, Id


9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.17 Sheinvokes Section 43 of the said law vis-a.-vis Section 36 of A.M.No. 02-1-18-SC which provides, to wit:

Section 43. Confidentiality of Records andProceedings. - All records and proceedings involvingchildren in conflict with the law from initial contactuntil final disposition of the case shall be consideredprivileged and confidential. The public shall be excludedduring the proceedings and the records shall not bedisclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any of theparties or the participants in the proceedings for anypurpose whatsoever, except to determine if the child inconflict with the law may have his/her sentencesuspended or if he / she may be granted probation underthe probation law, or to enforce the civil liabilityimposed in the criminal action.

The component authorities shall undertake allmeasures to protect this confidentiality of proceedings,including non-disclosure of records to the media,maintaining a separate police blotter for casesinvolving children in conflict with the law andadopting a system of coding to conceal materialinformation which will lead to the child's identity.Records of a child in conflict with the law shall not beused in subsequent proceedings for cases involving thesame offender as an adult, except when beneficial forthe offender and upon his/her written consent.

A person who has been in conflict with the law asa child shall not be held under any provision of law, tobe guilty of perjury or of concealment ormisrepresentation by reason of his/her failure toacknowledge the case or recite any fact related theretoin response to any inquiry made to him/her for anypurpose.l8 /7

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17 P. 193, Id rI18 Emphasis supplied by the accused-movant ••••••0


This Rule shall not apply to an accused who at thetime of initial contact as defined in Section 4(p}of thisRule, or at any time thereafter, shall have reached theage of eighteen (18), in which case the regular rules oncriminal procedure shall apply without prejudice tothe rights granted under Sections 36, 37, 38 and 39of this Rule.19

Section 36. Confidentiality of Proceedings andRecords. - All proceedings and records involvingjuveniles in conflict with the law from initial contactuntil final disposition of the case by the Family Courtshall be considered privileged and confidential. Thepublic may be excluded from the proceedings and,pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 of the Rule onExamination of a Child Witness, the records shall not bedisclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any of theparties or the participants in the proceedings for anypurpose whatsoever, except to determine if the juvenilemay have his sentence suspended under Section 25 ofthis Rule or if he may be granted probation under theProbation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed inthe criminal action.

The Family Court shall take other measures toprotect this confidentiality of proceedings includingnon-disclosure of records to the media, themaintenance of a separate police blotter for casesinvolving juveniles in conflict with the law and theadoption of a system of coding to conceal materialinformation, which will lead to the juvenile'sidentity. Records of juveniles in conflict with the lawshall not be used in subsequent proceedings or casesinvolving the same offender as an adult.20

Accused-movant Orcasitas further claims that her right toprivacy and confidentiality of records had been violated becausethe Information in this case together with the details concerning

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19 Emphasis supplied by the accused-movant20 Emphasis supplied by the accused-movant


the case against her released to the media bear her completename and address.21 She emphasizes that this runs counter tothe principle of R.A.No. 9344 wherein the offender is entitled tothe right of restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in orderfor her to be given the chance to live a normal life and become aproductive member of the community.22

MOTION TO QUASH FILED BY ACCUSED-MOVANTORCASITAS

Accused-movant Orcasitas reiterates that theSandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present caseagainst her. She argues that it is the Family Courts which havejurisdiction over the case against her pursuant to Section 1 ofA.M. No. 02-1-18.23

The same accused-movant also avers that even if the initialcontact of the child in conjZict of the law was during his/her ageof majority, jurisdiction over the said minor is still lodged withthe Family Courts because certain rights of the accused minorare still protected;24 the word "court" found in the saidadministrative matter refers only to a Family Court pursuant toSection 4 (h) of the said rule;25it is the Family Courts which aremost competent in the determination of the presence or absenceof discernment on the part of the child in conflict of the law; and,judges of these courts are specially trained and better equippedwith proper tools in appreciating the psychological, behavioraland medical issues of a child in conjZictof the law.26

In support of her afore-mentioned arguments,accused-movant invokes anew the case of DeGuerrero,27 wherein the Supreme Court heldSandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over

the sameLima v.that the

the cases

21 p. 195,Id22 p. 195,Id23 pp. 215-216, Id24 p. 216, Id25 p. 217, Id26 pp. 218-219, Id27 G.R. No. 229781, October 10,2017


against former Justice Secretary Leila De Lima, despite the factthe she occupied a position above Salary Grade 27 and that theoffense charged against her was allegedly committed in relationto her officialduties.28 She emphasizes a portion of the ruling ofthe Supreme Court in her present motion, to wit:

not one of the Sandiganbayan iustices wereprovided with knowledge and technical expertiseon matters relating to prohibited substance.29

Accused-movant Orcasitas stresses that jurisdiction overthe case against her naturally vests with the Family Courtsbecause much like drug cases (where Drug Courts are equippedwith expertise and training to handle drug cases), Family Courtslikewise have the same degree of competence and training incases where a child in conflict of the law is involved.3o

In the same vein, accused-movant Orcasitas claims thatthe Office of the Ombudsman has neither authority norcompetence to handle cases involving children in conflict of thelaw.31 She alleges that the Office of the Ombudsman is notspecially trained and/or equipped in conducting preliminaryinvestigations involving cases against minors.32 She invokesSections 32 and 33, Chapter 3 of R.A.No. 9344, which require a"specially trained prosecutor" to conduct the inquest,preliminary investigation and prosecution of cases involving achild in conflict of the law.33 The same accused-movant alsosubmits that the use of the word "shall" in R.A. No. 9344underscores the mandatory character of the above-mentionedsections and it is evident that the said law provides

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28 p. 219, Id29 Emphasis supplied by the accused-movant30 p. 219, Id31 p. 222, Id32 p. 222, Id33 p. 223, Id


mechanisms to protect a child in conflict of the law in criminalprosecutions.34

Finally, accused-movant Orcasitas submits that theamendment of the Information against her violated her right to anew preliminary investigation and due process.35 She assertsthat she is entitled to a new preliminary investigation becausethe Information against her was substantially amended36 andthe allegation in the amended Information that she was a "minoracting with discernment" was not passed upon by the Office ofthe Ombudsman in its resolution finding probable cause toindict herein accused of the crime charged. Invoking the case ofGo v. Court of Appeals,37 accused-movant Orcasitas explainsthat she was denied her right to due process due to the fact thatshe was not given the opportunity to rebut the above-mentionedallegation in the amended Information.38

CONSOLIDATED OPPOSITION

In its "Consolidated Comment/ Opposition to the followingmotions: 1. Motionfor Reconsideration assailing the Resolution ofthis Honorable Court dated March 12, 2018, filed by accused-movant Javier; 2. Motion to Quash Amended Information filed byaccused Orcasitas; and, 3. Motion to Keep Confidential theaccused Minor's Identity filed by accused Orcasitas" dated May28, 2018, the prosecution contends that the issues raised byaccused-movant Javier in his motion for reconsideration weresquarely passed upon by the Court in its assailed Resolution.39

Nevertheless, the prosecution contends that the issues raisedby accused-movant Javier are evidentiary in nature and arebetterventilatedduringtrial/;

34 p. 223, Id35 pp. 219-220, Id36 p. 220, Id37 206 seRA 138 (1992)38 p. 221-222, Id39 p. 243, Id40 p. 243, Id

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et aI.

On accused-movant Orcasitas' motion to quash, theprosecution avers that the issue of jurisdiction over the caseagainst her was likewise passed upon by the Court in itsResolutions promulgated on November 3, 2017, and January26, 2018.41 It maintains that the regular rules of criminalprocedure must be applied to accused-movant Orcasitaspursuant to Section 4 (k) of R.A.No. 9344 and Section 1 of A.M.No.02-01-18-SC.42

The prosecution further explains that Section 2 of R.A. No.10660 provides that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive original

jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 3019, where one or moreof the accused are those officials enumerated therein, whetheracting in a permanent or interim capacity, at the time of thecommission of the offense.43It elucidates that a plain reading ofthe amended Information in this case shows that accused-movant Orcasitas is charged to have acted in conspiracy withcertain government officials falling under the exclusive originaljurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in committing a violation ofSection 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.44 Thus, these allegations areenough to vest jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan and notwith the Family Courts. 45

Furthermore, the prosecution submits that the inclusion ofthe phrase "a minor, above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18)years of age, and having acted with discernment" is a mereformal amendment which need not be subjected to anotherpreliminary investigation.46 It adds that accused-movantOrcasitas' allegation that a child in conflict of the law ispresumed not to have acted with discernment is evidentiary innature and should be proven during tria1.47

Lastly, the prosecution opposes accused-movant Orcasitas'"Motion to Keep Confidential Accused Minor's Identity." Itreiterates that at the time of the initial contact with accused-

~41 p. 243, Id42 p. 244, Id43 p. 244, Id44 p. 245, Id45 p. 245, Id46 p. 245, Id47 p. 245, Id


movant Orcasitas, she has already attained the age of majority.Thus, the regular rules of criminal procedure must be appliedto her and not R.A.No. 9344.48

THE RULING OF THE COURT

After an assiduous assessment of the arguments raised bythe parties, the Court finds the subject motions bereft of merit.

To begin with,· as aptly pointed out by the prosecution, thearguments raised by accused-movant Javier in his presentmotion were the same arguments he raised in his ((Motion toQuash Information and to Defer Arraignment" dated September22,2017. To be sure, the Court squarely passed upon the issueof inordinate delay in its assailed Resolution promulgated onMarch 12, 2018, as well as in its Resolution promulgated onNovember 2,2017, to wit:

IV. There was noinordinate delay inconduct of thepreliminaryinvestigation of thepresent case thatwould warrant itsdismissal.

In Ombudsman v. Jurado,49the Supreme Courtclarified that although the· Constitution guarantees theright to speedy disposition of cases, such speedydisposition is a flexible concept. To properly define thatconcept, the facts and circumstances surrounding eachcase must be evaluated and taken into account. 50 Thereoccurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of

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48 p. 245, Id49 561 seRA 135 (2008)50 Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 2017

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et aI.

a case only when the proceedings are attended byvexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or whenunjustified postponements of the trial are sought andsecured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, along period of time is allowed to elapse without the partyhaving his case tried.51 Consequently, a meremathematical reckoning of the time involved would notbe sufficient.52

In Tatad, the Supreme Court applied the "radicalrelief' of dismissing the cases against the petitionersince the factual antecedents in the said case revealedthat as early as October 1974, a report was alreadylodged with the Legal Panel of the Presidential SecurityCommand against the petitioner. 53 However, this reportwas "made to sleep" until it became apparent thatSecretary Tatad had a "falling-out" with PresidentFerdinand Marcos.54 It was only on July 5, 1985, thatthe Tanodbayan issued a resolution recommending thefiling of the criminal Informations against thepetitioner. 55

In the said case, the Supreme Court found theexistence of inordinate delay and ruled that "politicalmotivations played a vital role in activating andpropelling the prosecutorial process. "56

Here, the present cases involve no imputation ofany political motivation in the filing of the presentInformations against the accused-movant and his co-accused.

In Angchangco, Jr., the Supreme Court orderedthe dismissal of the cases against the petitioner with theOffice of the Ombudsman and held that the delay ofmore than six (6) years in resolving the complaintsagainst therein petitioner amounted to a violation 0/7

51 Dacudao v. Gonzales, 688 SCRA109 (2013) ~52 Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008); See also Dacudao v. Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (201~)~ ,Enriquezv. Office o/the Ombudsman, 545 SCRA618 (2008)53 p. 80, Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)54 p. 80, Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)55 p. 81, Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)56 p. 81, Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)


acc-qsed's constitutional right to due process andspeedy disposition of cases. Therein, the Supreme Courtfound that: [1] the administrative aspect of the case hadalready been dismissed; and [2] petitioner's severalomnibus motions for early resolution· and motion todismiss remained un-acted even at the time of filing ofthe petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court.57

However, the factual circumstances of theaforementioned case do not obtain in th~s case. Here,the record shows the Office of the Ombudsmanpromptly disposed of the issue of inordinate delay in itsOrder dated June 27,2016.58

In Duterte, the Supreme Court found that thepetitioners could not have urged their right to speedydisposition of cases because they were completelyunaware that the investigation against them was on-going.59 The High Tribunal further pointed out thatpeculiar to the case of Duterte was the fact that thepetitioners were merely asked to comment and not tofile counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure tofollow in a preliminary investigation.60 Thus, aftersubmitting their explanation, and after four (4) years,the petitioners had reason to assume that the chargesagainst them had already been dismissed.61 This is notso in this case.

In the very recent case of Remulla v.Sandiganbayan,62 the Supreme Court emphasized theneed for the courts to weigh the different facts andcircumstances surrounding each case in order todetermine whether an accused's right to speedydisposition of cases had been violated. According to theHigh Tribunal, as early as 1983, in the case of Martinv. Ver,63 the Supreme Court had already adopted the"balancing test" laid down by the United States Supreme

/757 pp. 303-304, Angchangco, Jr., v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA301 (1997); Italics supplied58 pp. 42-43, Record59 p. 744, Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 (1998)60 p. 744, Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 (1998)61 p. 744, Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 (1998)62 G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 201763208 Phil. 658 (1983)


Court in the case of Barker v. Wingo,64as this testcompels the courts to approach such cases on an adhoc basis.65

Indeed, the cases invoked by accused-movantBacongallo cannot be blindly applied to the present casebecause of their differences in factual milieus. Toreiterate, particular regard must be taken of the factsand circumstances peculiar to each case in order todetermine whether or not there has been a violation ofthe accused's right to speedy disposition of cases.66

Accused-movant Bacongallo argues that thedetermination of the existence of inordinate delay in thepresent case should be reckoned from the date of thetext message of Rosenda Estaris.

The record shows that the text message ofRosenda Estaris dated October 2, 2008, seekingassistance from the Office of the Ombudsman wasevaluated by Maria Luvilla Gaurana and was docketedas CPL- V-08-0706 for further fact-finding;67 hence, thedetermination of the existence of inordinate delayshould not be reckoned from the date of the said textmessage because prior to the fact-finding report, theaccused-movant was never subjected to any formalcomplaint or investigation regarding thetransactions in issue. 68

Moreover, in the consolidated cases of People v.Sandiganbayan, First and Third Division andPeople v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division,69 theSupreme Court ruled that the fact-finding investigationshould not be qeemed separate from the preliminaryinvestigation conducted by the Office of theOmbudsman jf the aggregate time spent for both

/764 407 US 514 (1972)65 p. 6, Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 201766 Dela Peiia v. Sandiganbayan, 360 SCRA478 (2001)67 p. 10, Record68 See Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA135 (2008); Emphasis supplied69712 SCRA359 (2013)

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17 -CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et ai.

constitutes inordinate and oppressive delay in thedisposition of any caseJo However, it must beunderscored that the Supreme Court included theduration of the fact-finding investigation in thedetermination of the existence of inordinate delay in thesaid cases since the State miserably failed to prove thatthe delay in the fact-finding investigation and thepreliminary investigation was reasonable.

Plainly, the factual backdrop of the present case ismaterially different from those of the above-mentionedcases.

The record offactual antecedentsinvestigation:

this case reveals the followingsurrounding the preliminary

The "Evaluation Report" dated October 2,2008, containing the afore-mentioned textmessage, was docketed as CPL-V-08-0706for purposes of conducting a fact-findinginvestigation;71

On October 9, 2008, the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Antique passed andapproved Resolution No. 266-2008, whichcreated a tripartite committee to conductan inquiry in aid of legislation, on thesubject matter of the present case;72

The said committee indorsed its Findingsdated July 2, 2009, to the Office of theOmbudsman and the same wasconsolidated with Case No. CPL-V-08-0706;73

On February 9, 2010, Salvacion Z. Perez,et al., filed another sworn complaintagainst the accused regarding the samedisputed transaction;

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70 Emphasis supplied71 p. 432, Record72 p. 78, id73 p. 15, id

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17 -CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et ai.

Finding enough bases to conduct apreliminary investigation against therespondents, GIPO-IMa. Sonnette Daquitasubmitted a Final Evaluation Report withthe attached complaint, which wasapproved by the Ombudsman on June 21,2013;74

Thereafter, the complaint for preliminaryinvestigation was filed on August 12,2013;75

On August 28, 2013, the case wasdocketed as CPL-V-08-0706 for theconduct of a preliminary investigation;76

The orders for the submission of thecounter-affidavits of the respondents weresent to the accused on December 6, 2013,and March 31,2014;77

In its Resolution dated January 8, 2015,the Office of the Ombudsman foundprobable cause to indict the accused forthe herein crime;78

The same resolution was approved byOmbudsman Conchita Carpio Morales onFebruary 4, 2016;79

Accused Javier, Mondejar, Bacongallo,Cepeda, Bacaoco, Crespo, Barrientos,Cayetano, Estaris, Jr., Orcasitas andEsc1avilla filed their respective motions forreconsideration to the adverse resolution ofthe Office of the Ombudsman. The samewere denied by the OMB-Visayas in itsOrder dated June 27, 2016 and wasapproved by Ombudsman Morales on

________ N_o_ve_m_ber16, 2016; and,~

74 p. 434, id75 p. 44, id76 p. 434, id77 p. 431, id78 p. 29, id79 p. 30, id80 pp. 48-49, id


12. The Information in the present case wasfiledwith the Court on June 27, 2017.81

Plainly, the Office of the Ombudsman took promptaction after the case was docketed for preliminaryinvestigation on August 28,2013. While there may havebeen delay in the disposition of the case before theOffice of the Ombudsman, the Court does not find suchdelay as vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive.

Indeed, jurisprudence teaches that the conceptof "speedy disposition of cases" is consistent withreasonable delays; what the Constitution prohibitsare unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delayswhich render rights nugatory.82 Only when theproceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,and oppressive delays; or when unjustifiedpostponements of the trial are asked for andsecured, or when without cause or justifiablemotive a long period of time is allowed to elapsewithout the party having his case tried would therebe a violation of the right to speedy disposition ofcases. 83

Notably, the period during which the records ofthis case were examined and reviewed, the time pouredinto the research of pertinent laws and jurisprudence,the levels of review that the case had to go through andthe exercise of legal judgment and discretion shouldalso be taken into consideration in determining theexistence of inordinate delay. To stress, jurisprudenceinstructs that the essential ingredient in theadministration of justice is that it must be orderly andexpeditious and not mere speed~

~!l:81 pp. 5-7, id82 Braza v. Sandiganbayan, 691 SCRA 471 (2013); See also Ombudsman v. JUf', 0, 561 SCRA 135 (2008),Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 440 SCRA 423 (2004), Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr., 327 SCRA 145 (2000),Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987)83 Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008); Emphasis supplied84 Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA294 (2004); pp. 18-24, Resolution; pp. 797-803, Vol. I, Record

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et a1.

To be clear, the Court rejected a simple mathematicalreckoning of the time spent in the fact-finding investigation andpreliminary investigation of this case in ascertaining theexistence or non-existence of inordinate delay. Instead, itadopted the balancing test to determine whether or not theaccused's right to speedy disposition of cases had been violated.To stress, jurisprudence requires that courts approach "speedydisposition cases" on an ad hoc basis.85 Thus, the Courtcarefully weighed the factual circumstance peculiar to the thiscase vis-a-vis the four-fold factors and found that the time spentin the fact-finding investigation as well as the preliminaryinvestigation of this case does not constitute inordinate delay.

Moreover, the Court finds accused-movant Orcasitas'prayer that her identity be kept confidential and that the Courtuse a system of coding insofar as she is concernedunmeritorious.

In its Resolution promulgated on January 26, 2018, theCourt held that the provisions A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC do notapply to accused-movant Orcasitas because she was already oflegal age at the time of the initial contact in this case, viz:

Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-1-18, promulgated by theSupreme Court on November 24,2009, provides:

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - ThisRule shall apply to all criminal cases involvingchildren in conflict with law.

A child in conflict with the law is a personwho at the time of the commission of theoffense is below eighteen (18) years old but notless than fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old.

This Rule shall not apply to a personwho at the time of the. initial contact asdefined in Sec. 4 (q)of this Rule shall havereached the age of eighteen (18) in whichcase, the regular rules on criminalprocedure shall apply without prejudice to

~ See Remullo v. Sondigonbo.on, G.R. No. 218040, April 17. 2017 ~ A"64


the rights granted under Sees. 53, 54, 55and 56 o/this Rule.86

The term "initial contact" is defined under Section4 (q) of the same rule, to wit:

(q) Initial contact refers to apprehension ortaking into custody of a child in conflict with thelaw by law enforcement officers or privatecitizens. It includes the time the child allegedto be in conflict with the law receives asubpoena under Section 3 (b)of Rule 112 ofthe Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure orsummons under Section 6 (a) or Section 9(b) ofthe same Rule in cases that do not requirepreliminary investigation, or where there is nonecessity to place the child alleged to be inconflict with the law under immediate custody.87

A review of the factual antecedents of thiscase reveals that accused-movant Orcasitasreceived a copy of the order of the Office of theOmbudsman requiring her to file her counter-affidavit on December 23, 2013.88 Thereafter, sheexecuted her counter-affidavit on January 13,2014.89 Applying the afore-cited rules, the Courtholds that the "initial contact" with accused-movant Orcasitas occurred on December 23, 2013,or upon her receipt of the copy of the order of theOffice of the Ombudsman; hence, the provisions ofthe Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 areinapplicable to her because at that time, she wasalready twenty-one (21) years old. Therefore, theregular rules of criminal procedure should beapplied. 90

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87 Emphasis supplied88 p. 466, Record89 pp. 184-189, Record90 pp. 5-6, Resolution; pp. 18-19, Vol. II, Record; mphasis supplied


In this case, the accused-movant's sole basis forinsisting that the Family Courts have jurisdiction to trythe criminal charge against her is the fact that she wasa minor at the time the alleged criminal act imputed toher was committed. She completely overlooks the onematerial fact that she was already twenty-one (21) .years old when the "initial contact" with herrespecting the case took place. In fact, she is nowtwenty-five (25) years old for which reason, theregular rules of criminal procedure should beapplied to her.91

Likewise, accused-movant Orcasitas' continued reliance onthe case of De Lima v. Guerrero,92 is misplaced.

In its Resolution promulgated on January 26, 2018, theCourt ruled that the ruling in the said case does not benefit thecause of accused-movant Orcasitas, thus:

Neither does the case of De Lima v. Guerrer093

support the claim of the accused-movant. In De Lima,the Supreme Court ratiocinated that due to thetechnical aspect of drug-related cases; i.e. the uniquecharacteristics of narcotic substances, judges presidingover designated drugs courts are equipped with "theproper tools to appreciate pharmacological evidence andgive an analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. "94

It must be remembered that accused-movant Orcasitasstands charged of a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.Plainly, Section 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606,Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 and Section 2 of R.A. No. 10660,indubitably vest exclusive original jurisdiction with theSandiganbayan to hear and try a violation of the said

/7~

if91 p. 7, Resolution; p. 20, Vol. II, Record; Emphasis suppled92 G.R. No. 229781, October 10,201793 G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 201794 De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017; p. 7, Resolution; p. 20, Vol. II, Record


law.95 Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in De Lima,jurisdiction over violations of R.A.No. 3019 must be heard andtried by the Sandiganbayan due to the fact that it is a specialcourt which has jurisdiction over criminal and civil casesinvolving graft and corrupt practices and such other offensescommitted by public officers and employees.96

In her further bid to dismiss the case against her,accused-movant Orcasitas bewails that the Office of theOmbudsman is neither authorized nor is it competent to handlecases involving minors. To bolster her argument, she invokesSections 32 and 33 of R.A.No. 9344.

Accused-movant Orcasitas' argument fails to persuade.

As above shown, accused-movant Orcasitas was already oflegal age at the time "initial contact" with her was made. In fact,she was also of legal age when the preliminary investigation ofthis case was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.Therefore, the Court maintains its view that the regular rules oncriminal procedure apply to her pursuant to Section 1,paragraph 2 of A.M.No. 02-1-18-SC.

It must be stressed that Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770provides that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power,function and/ or duty to investigate and prosecute on its own orcomplaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officeror employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appearsto be illegal, unjust or inefficient. Notably, the same law alsoprovides that it is the Office of the Ombudsman and not theFamily Courts, which has primary jurisdiction over casescognizable by the Sandiganbayan and in the exercise of thisprimary jurisdiction, the Office of the Ombudsman may take over,at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government,the investigation of such cases. 97

Finally, the Court finds accused-movant Orcasitas'assertion of a violation of her right to due process untenab~

95 Emphasis supplied96 See Section 5, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution; Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution ~97 Section 15 (1), Republic Act No. 6770 otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989 r '"

-'Y


Jurisprudence teaches that an amendment in anInformation which [1] does not charge another offense differentor distinct from that charged in the original Information; [2]doesnot alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to causesurprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he/ shehas or will assume; and, [3] does not adversely affect anysubstantial right of the accused are mere formal amendments.98

Plainly, there is no need for another preliminary investigation incases where an amendment to an Information is only as toform.99

In this case, the amendment to the present Informationdoes not charge an offense that is distinct from that of theoriginal Information. Also, the change and/or addition made inthe present Information does not conceivably come as a surpriseto accused-movant Orcasitas. In fact, accused-movantOrcasitas relied on the same defense (that she was a minor whoacted without discernment) during the preliminary investigationof this case with the Office of the Ombudsman. In its Orderdated June 27, 2016, the Office of the Ombudsman passedupon the said defense of accused-movant Orcasitas, viz:

Respondent Orcasitas rehashed her defense ofminority, stressing that she was only 16 years old at thetime of the signing of SB Resolution No. 007-2008.Without any concrete evidence to show that she did notact with discernment, there is no legal basis to exempther from criminal prosecution and liability. As to thequestion of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayanover her person, such matter must be left to the sounddetermination of the Sandiganbayan.lOo

Notably, accused-movant Orcasitas continues to rely on thesame defense even after the Information in this case wasamended. A review of the record of this case reveals that the saiddefense was raised by her in her "Motion to Quash Information ~

98 See Leviste v. Alameda, 626 SCRA575 (2010); Matalam v. Second Division o/the Sandiganbayan, 4£ /SCRA736 (2006); Mendez v. People, 726 SCRA203 (2014) ~99 See Teehannkee, Jr., v. Madayag, 207 SCRA134 (1992)100 p. 15, Order dated June 27, 2016; p. 48, Vol. I, Record

~


the Accused Minor" dated July 26, 2017,101 and ((Motion forReconsideration" dated November 29, 2017102 or when she wasstill charged under the original Information.

Evidently, the claim of accused-movant Orcasitas that shewas denied her right to due process because she was not giventhe opportunity to rebut the allegation that she acted withdiscernment is baseless. It is jurisprudentially settled that theessence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.103

What is proscribed is the absolute lack of opportunity to beheard.104 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to presentone's own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.10S

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES [1] accused Exequiel B.Javier's "Motion for Reconsideration (of the Resolutionpromulgated on March 12, 2018)" dated April 10, 2018, [2]accused Erika Orcasitas' ((Manifestation with Motion to KeepConfidential the Accused Minor's Identity" dated April 6, 2018; 106and, [3] accused Erika Orcasitas' ((Motionto Quash Information"dated April 27, 2018,107 for lack of merit and/or being pro-forma.

Quezon City, Metro Manila

~o M..~-TANGPresiding JusticeChairperson

101 pp. 445-456, Vol. I, Record M.102 pp. 858-871, Vol. I, Record I" U103 Shu v. Dee, 723 SCRA 512 (2014); See also Vivo v. PAGCOR, 707 SCRA 276 (2013), Republic v. Caguioa,691 SCRA306 (2013), Demaala v. Sandiganbayan, 771 SCRA 1 (2014), and Ynot v. lAC, 148 SCRA659 (1987)103 715 SCRA673 (2014)

104/d ~105 pp. 695-696, Ocampo v. Abando,715 SCRA673 (2014)106 pp. 193-197, /d107 pp. 214-225, /d


ANET. FEAssociate Jus ice

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